

REFORMING JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY: HISTORICAL CHALLENGES, MODERN NECESSITIES

Giacomo Bagarella

London School of Economics

In light of challenges such as international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and a rising China, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has sought to reform Japan's security policy to give the country greater flexibility in how it addresses these issues. However, low trust between Japan and its neighbors, China and South Korea, which derives from an unresolved post-Second World War legacy, as well as modern disputes, hinders Japan's ability to adopt a modern security posture. The experiences of Germany and Italy in addressing post-war reconciliation and establishing normalized security policies offer insight into how a holistic approach can assuage neighbors' fears, although important differences exist between each case. At the same time, Japan's ability to construct positive ties with former Southeast Asian colonies exemplifies that past atrocities are no barrier to reconciliation when governments can focus on common, present interests rather than on historical recriminations. Japan can learn from these cases and improve the way it communicates about its security reforms, adopt an unequivocal stance on its Second World War legacy, and focus on shared interests in order to be able to pursue a normalized security policy and overcome historical issues with China and South Korea.

Can Japan update its security policy without upsetting its neighbors and destabilizing the surrounding region? Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks to expand Japan's military capabilities, shift to a policy of "collective self-defense," and revise the strategic posture of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Collective self-defense would require that Japan intervene to defend an ally—such as the United States—if the latter were attacked. Previously, this commitment only held true in the opposite direction. Such a change requires rethinking Article 9 of Japan's constitution, which prohibits Japan from engaging in war. Mr. Abe's ambitions to reinterpret this Article have met with both domestic and international opposition.

The logic behind the Japanese government's intentions is to establish Japan as a "proactive contributor to peace" in a twenty-first century environment, which requires a different security paradigm than the more passive one Japan has maintained since the end of the Second World War.¹ Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, speaking in 2014, justified Japan assuming greater responsibility in promoting "peace and safety" in its neighborhood and the world by citing changes in the Asian balance of power and the emergence of threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation.² Abe reiterated the same point at the thirteenth Asian Security Summit later that year, emphasizing his efforts to bring about a generation of "new Japanese'... who are determined ultimately to take on the peace, order, and stability of this region as their own responsibility." Abe described his vision as "Japan for the rule of law. Asia for the rule of law. And the rule of law for all of us. Peace and prosperity in Asia, forevermore."³ The Japanese Diet secured Abe's reforms by passing relevant legislation on September 19, 2015.⁴

However, such statements and policies do not sit comfortably with the Japanese public and its closest neighbors, China and South Korea. Domestic opinion polls show low support for Abe's proposed security reforms. While 37 percent of those sampled by an *Asahi Shimbun* survey in July 2015 said they supported Abe's cabinet, just 29 percent agreed with the government's proposed bill on allowing collective self-defense and expanding JSDF activities internationally. Furthermore, only one-fifth of Japanese find that the security bill should be a priority for the current legislature.⁵ The present opposition to Abe's security reforms, which have spurred significant protests, is consistent with the Japanese public's aversion towards its military, dating back to 1945.⁶

If Abe's moves are seen to lack public support within Japan, they encounter even stiffer resistance from China and South Korea. In China,

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- 1 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, *Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect Its People*. July 1, 2014.
 - 2 Fumio Kishida, "Comment by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Munich Security Conference" (speech, Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 1, 2014).
 - 3 Shinzo Abe, "Peace and Prosperity in Asia, Forevermore: Japan for the Rule of Law, Asia for the Rule of Law, and the Rule of Law for All of Us" (speech, The 13th IISS Asian Security Summit - The Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 30, 2014).
 - 4 Cabinet Secretariat, *Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation*.
 - 5 "Asahi Shimbun Public Opinion Poll (07/19/2015)," The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, July 19, 2015.
 - 6 Franz-Stefan Gady, "Japan at Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, September 16, 2015.

93 percent of respondents in a 2014 Genron NPO-*China Daily* poll have unfavorable or relatively unfavorable impressions of Japan, up from 72 percent in 2009. The highest-ranked reasons were the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (64 percent) and Japan's lack of a "proper apology" over its invasion of China (60 percent).⁷ Japan's image fares little better in South Korea, where a 2015 Genron NPO-East Asia Institute poll identified that 73 percent of South Koreans sampled had unfavorable impressions of their neighbor. Here, too, historical and territorial disputes taint Koreans' views of Japan: 74 percent attribute their unfavorable view to Japan's "lack of remorse" for invading Korea and 69 percent to confrontations over ownership of Takeshima/Dokdo Island.⁸

To be fair, much of the external animosity preceded Abe's proposed reforms. However, as a renowned nationalist and perceived hawk, his security policies make for an easy target for politicians across the East China Sea and Sea of Japan. Domestically, for a public whose primary concerns are economic and whose worldview is generally neutralist, a revolution in security policy is unpalatable despite possible worries about an ascendant China and a nuclear-armed, recalcitrant North Korea.

Yet the Japanese government's current position is by no means unique: the two other defeated powers from the Second World War—Germany and Italy—have faced similar challenges in developing autonomous security policies while burdened by their historic legacies. All three countries possess what might be termed as "pacifist" constitutions, but their paths to becoming active players in international security have been very different. Their domestic publics' responses to this evolution also exhibit variations. It is worthwhile to study these cases, contrasting them to shed light on Japan's situation and on potential remedies.

From Pacifist Constitutions to Normalized Foreign Policies

Among the similarities that Japan, Germany, and Italy share are constitutional safeguards against militaristic excesses. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution echoes Italy's Article 11 in forswearing war as a means of resolving international disputes, while Article 26 (1) of Germany's Basic

7 The Genron NPO and China Daily, *The 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll: Analysis Report on the Comparative Data*, publication, September 9, 2014.

8 The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, *The 3rd Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2015): Analysis Report on Comparative Data*, publication, May 2015.

Law criminalizes preparing a war of aggression and disturbing international peace.⁹ Japan's is the sole case where the constitution appears to ban military forces altogether, even though Article 9 was interpreted to permit the use of force as a matter of self-defense. Consequently, though military forces "will never be maintained" to "[settle] international disputes," the ban did not apply to the aptly named Self-Defense Forces.¹⁰

In Europe, Germany and Italy took different paths, with the former experiencing a slower remilitarization and shift to an active role on the international stage. Only in 1955 did Cold War logic lead Britain, France, and the US to permit the establishment of a West German military and, successively, to its accession into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which they had established six years earlier.¹¹ By contrast, Italy retained a military following 1945 and was a NATO member from the organization's inception. (The Japan Self-Defense Forces were founded in 1954.) Furthermore, while West Germany's defense paradigm focused on "territorial defense" and remained reluctant to intervene abroad until the early twenty-first century, Italy had begun to define itself as a "global peacekeeper" as early as the 1980s.¹² Italy, having played a relatively secondary role in the Axis, was thus able to transition into a foreign policy paradigm unencumbered by its Second World War legacy. Only with Libya did it continue to experience occasional tensions on this topic into the twentieth century.

These policy differences are evident in each country's deployments to international missions in 2014, as can be seen in Table 1. A starker difference emerges in the roles of deployed units: Italy devoted over 1,000 soldiers to both Afghanistan and Lebanon, many of which were in combat or front-line roles. Germany committed a similar amount to Afghanistan and nearly 700 to the Balkans, with similar duties. Japan's main contribution was an engineering company with an employee count numbering 271 to the

9 "The Constitution of Japan," Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet; Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany*; and Italy, Senato della Repubblica, *Constitution of the Italian Republic*.

10 Alice Lyman Miller and Richard Wich, *Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations since World War II* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 54.

11 Laura Chappell, *Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy: Converging Security and Defence Policy in an Enlarged EU* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 50-59.

12 Fabrizio Coticchia and Giampiero Giacomello, "All Together Now!: Military Operations Abroad as 'Bipartisan Instrument of Italian Foreign Policy,'" ed. Giampiero Giacomello and Bertjan Verbeek, in *Italy's Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 136.


United Nations’ mission in South Sudan, with an explicit ban from engaging in military operations. Additionally, Figure 1 below indicates that Japan’s military expenditures, measured both as percentage of gross domestic product and per capita, rank among the lowest within a diverse comparison group. Figure 2 presents the evolution of military spending among Japan, China, and South Korea in the last quarter century. Though Germany and Italy also trail both partners and adversaries, it is remarkable to see the world’s third largest economy devote so few resources to the military.

TABLE 1 Deployments to International Multilateral Operations as of 2014

Country	Troops and Observers	Destination Countries	Maritime Operations
Germany	2,700	17	3
Italy	3,500	15	2
Japan	<500	2	1


Source: See the “Deployment” section for each country in Chapter 4 (Europe) and Chapter 6 (Asia) of *The Military Balance* 115, no. 1 (2015).

FIGURE 1 Comparison of Defense Spending Across Select Countries



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Military Expenditure Database* (2015).

FIGURE 2 Military Expenditure, Billions of Constant 2011 US Dollars



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Military Expenditure Database* (2015).

Germany's allies have welcomed greater German responsibilities in international security. Its partners have long demanded that Germany play a continental and security role commensurate to its economic stature, a feeling best epitomized by a statement in 2011 by the then-foreign minister of Poland Radek Sikorski when he stated, "I fear Germany's power less than her inactivity."¹³ This declaration has particular weight given how Poland's twentieth-century relationship with Germany—a land to be conquered, subdued, and exploited—resembles that of Korea with Japan.

However, the view that Germany and Italy have fully atoned for their Second World War crimes—thereby reconciling increasingly assertive security postures with their neighbors—while Japan has not, is convenient, but partial at best. For, if China and South Korea still resent Japan's post-war legacy, other countries in Asia—many of them former Japanese colonies—view Japan favorably, as suggested in a 2014 Pew Research Center poll (see Table 2).

13 Radek Sikorski, "I Fear Germany's Power Less than Her Inactivity," *Financial Times*, November 28, 2011.

TABLE 2 How Asians Rate Each Other's Countries

Country	% With favorable views of:			Confidence in Abe to do the right thing in world affairs*
	Japan	China	US	
Thailand	81	72	73	53
Philippines	80	38	92	55
Indonesia	77	66	59	46
Vietnam	77	16	76	65
Malaysia	75	74	51	57
South Korea	22	56	82	5
China	8	-	50	15

*Note: 58 percent of Japanese respondents had confidence in Abe to do the right thing in world affairs.
Source: "Chapter 4: How Asians View Each Other (in 'Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America's Image')," Pew Research Center, July 14, 2014, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-4-how-asians-view-each-other>.

Moving Forward, Looking Backwards

We may thus ask two separate questions in order to attempt to answer our initial policy puzzle. First, how did (West) Germany and Italy develop an international role without worrying their neighbors? Second, what has worked in Japan's relations with Southeast Asia that might help improve how China and South Korea perceive it? The European context suggests that multilateral organizations like the European Union (and its predecessors) and NATO were critical in rebuilding trust among former foes. Institutions such as the European Coal and Steel Community bound the markets for these strategic resources among continental ex-enemies, defusing what had been one source of tensions prior to 1945. From a multilateral perspective, it was also helpful that a common enemy—the Soviet Union—existed to rally Western European countries, helping shift the focus from the past threat, Germany, to the new one across the Iron Curtain. After the destruction and human loss of two world wars, Western European leaders recognized the need to prevent another such conflict from happening and to bind their liberal democracies together in the future.

Within Germany, there was a will to cut all ties to the Nazi era, and successive governments consistently pursued policies that sought to dismantle the legacy of Adolf Hitler's regime. German leaders committed

themselves to making amends for the country's actions. They issued apologies, condemnations of Nazi German atrocities, investigated and tried war criminals, and paid reparations to numerous (but not all) affected parties. Despite differences between the center-right Christian Democrats and center-left Social Democrats in the intensity and scope of these policies, Germany's stance was unambiguous. Britain, France, and others lauded this process and welcomed Germany as a new and reformed economic power and ally.¹⁴ However, these conditions could not be replicated for Japan as the post-war security architecture in the Pacific Ocean, crafted by the US to contain the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, relied on bilateral relations between the US and its partners rather than on a concert of states.¹⁵

Domestically, Japan's approach was more conflicted than Germany's, notwithstanding multiple efforts at reconciliation. Since the 1960s, multiple Japanese prime ministers have issued apologies for Imperial Japan's crimes, especially to China and South Korea. (Notably, China relinquished its demand for reparations in its 1972 agreement to normalize diplomatic ties with Japan.)¹⁶ Yet it was the 1990s that brought a wave of strong statements of remorse and acknowledgment of former atrocities.¹⁷ However, nationalist voices condemning apologies and promoting their warped view of the past tainted these efforts, despite being in the minority.¹⁸ Other events, such as Japanese prime ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, further eroded Japan's sincerity in the eyes of its neighbors. Only in December 2015 has Japan been able to break the impasse with South Korea on the "comfort women" issue by offering compensation to victims and a new apology from Abe. Despite the promise this shift holds for Korean-Japanese relations, domestic publics have reacted critically (in the case of South Korea) and ambivalently (in the case of Japan), and much remains to be done at the intergovernmental level.¹⁹ Thus, historical wounds have remained open.

14 Jennifer Lind, "The Perils of Apology," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2009.

15 Miller and Wich, *Becoming Asia*, ch. 7.

16 "Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China," news release, September 29, 1972, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed April 23, 2016.

17 Lind, "The Perils of Apology."

18 Katsuyuki Yakushiji, "Japanese National Security Policy" (lecture, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, Hiroshima, February 21, 2016).

19 J. Berkshire Miller, "No Grand Bargain," *Foreign Affairs*, January 12, 2016; Trevor Kennedy and Misato Nagakawa, "Public Divided Over 'Comfort Women' Agreement," East Asia Forum, January 22, 2016.

Germany and Italy therefore benefited from the creation of economic and military ties with former enemies in postwar years, whereas the US hub-and-spoke approach in the Pacific separated Japan and other countries. At the same time, Germany underwent a far-reaching process of coming to terms with its past, which remains unique in extensiveness and duration. Japan's attempts to achieve similar results were snagged on thorny issues, such as contradictory official behavior and domestic critiques of efforts at reconciliation. Tokyo's policy, never meant to be as encompassing as Berlin's, was ambiguous in its limited nature and domestic inconsistency. Italy was spared the scrutiny of its wartime allies, although it did reach a reparations agreement with Libya in 2008, which then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi called "a complete and moral acknowledgment on Italy's part of the damage it inflicted on Libya during the colonial period."²⁰

The Pragmatist's Approach

Further from Japan, but in regions no less affected by the brutality of its wartime behavior, a different experience provides an interesting case study. Singapore, which the Japanese empire seized from the British in early 1942, displays how pragmatism can climb above bitter memories to foster positive relations. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's founding and long-time prime minister, describes the "unbelievably cruel" and "callous" actions of Japanese occupying forces in Southeast Asia.²¹ Yet Lee settled the historical matter rapidly after Singapore became independent in 1965. After first raising the issue of "blood debt" in a meeting with the Japanese prime minister in 1962, Lee then accepted a reparations plan in 1966. His objective was to secure Japanese investments in Singapore to develop the country's economy. Although Lee laments that Japan "neither repented nor apologized" for its past deeds, he was keen to befriend Japan. The latter's leaders reciprocated, appreciative that Lee no longer raised historical issues.²²

Lee prioritized securing economic benefits to acknowledgments of guilt. Naturally, Singapore's relationship to Japan was more asymmetric than that of China or South Korea, limiting how assertive a stance he could

20 "Berlusconi Da Gheddafi, Siglato L'accordo: «Uniti Sull'immigrazione»,” (Berlusconi Meets Gheddafi, Agreement Signed: «Unified on Immigration») *Corriere Della Sera*, August 30, 2008.

21 Kuan Yew Lee, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), 501-502.

22 *Ibid.*, 502-504.

have taken. However, Singapore was able to achieve both material and moral goals. It took advantage of the growing affluence and importance of Japanese business in Asia. However, it also maintains vivid reminders of the Japanese occupation as evidenced by several memorials and museums. These sites bolster a narrative of a hardy Singaporean spirit that stands proud even without having received formal apologies.

Building off this experience, Singapore has even stepped forward to show China and South Korea the way to reconciliation with Japan. Speaking in May 2015, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, son of Lee Kuan Yew, urged Japan to offer wholehearted apologies for its wartime behavior. At the same time, he called on China and South Korea to accept Japan's apologies and move on from their positions, as Southeast Asian states had done.²³ On a similar note, other analysts have argued that, "[if] Japan is to act more like Germany, South Korea needs to act more like France by accepting reconciliation efforts."²⁴ Shogo Suzuki, a scholar at the University of Manchester, critiqued Japan's neighbors for ignoring past apologies, setting unreasonably high standards, and "moving the goalpost." He holds that Japan's guilt is true and should not be overshadowed by politicians' statements. Ultimately, China and South Korea should also be willing to make their own efforts to overcome the historical disputes rather than continuing to instrumentalize them.²⁵

As evidenced in Table 2 above, Singapore's positive disposition towards Japan is not an exception among its neighbors. Another case in which Japan developed friendly post-war relations with a former colony is that of the Philippines. Despite a harsh occupation regime and the destruction Japanese troops wreaked as they retreated from the Philippines, the latter have maintained strong ties to Japan ever since their independence from the US in 1946. Here too, Japan's extensive trade with, and foreign aid and direct investment to, the Philippines secured a mutually beneficial economic relationship. More recently, the partnership has evolved into security ties as the Philippines have sought Japanese support against Chinese moves in the South China Sea.²⁶ It may also have helped that Emperor Hirohito of

23 "Lee Urges Japan to Come Clean on WWII Atrocities," *The Japan Times*, May 30, 2015.

24 Jeffrey W. Hornung, "Japan's Discomfort Women," *Foreign Affairs*, January 13, 2015.

25 Shogo Suzuki, "Will Japan's War Apologies Ever Satisfy China?," East Asia Forum, November 5, 2015.

26 Mong Palatino, "Has Manila Forgotten Japan's War Atrocities?," *The Diplomat*, January 29, 2014; Richard Javad Heydarian, "Japan-Philippine Alliance: Transcending Historical Memories," CSIS CogitASIA, August 19, 2015.

Japan reportedly apologized to Filipino president Corazon Aquino when the two met in 1986.²⁷ Across the region, Japan's role in economic development assistance has tended to overshadow recriminations about Second World War legacies. With the caveat that the experiences of China and South Korea differ from those of Southeast Asian states—Japan colonized the latter for years rather than decades, and in most cases ousted other foreign colonists rather than domestic authorities—it still appears that alternative paths to post-war reconciliation exist amongst possible Chinese and South Korean approaches.

Arrested Development

As far removed as they are from security policy in the twenty-first century, these debates continue to hamper Japan's ability to reform its posture in alignment with current needs. The lack of domestic appetite for these changes does not negate that Japan's post-war stance may no longer be suitable when considering current risks like nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and power-accruing neighbors. However, alarm calls of an unapologetic, threatening Japan from China and South Korea—falling upon sympathetic ears even from Europe and the US—stunt these modest efforts time and again.

Ultimately, Japan's evolution towards becoming a "normal" state in global security policy is not a matter of political liberalism or conservatism, but of pragmatism in light of changing times. Speaking in Singapore, Tokyo University Professor Katsuyuki Yakushiji argued that Japan can accrue greater international responsibilities without developing aggressive capabilities or nationalistic chauvinism, and these—along with Japan's past apologies for its wartime behavior—are facts that its neighbors should recognize. Instead, China and South Korea exploit Abe's defense reforms and historical issues for domestic political gains by painting Japan as a threat, a stance that benefits no party.²⁸ Likewise, in recent surveys of European attitudes towards Japan, the European Council on Foreign Relations reported that "[the] German public is very skeptical about [the reinterpretation of Article 9] with the media heavily influenced by the image of Abe as a right-wing nationalist. On

27 "Hirohito's Reported Apology to Aquino over War Atrocities Enters Debate," *Union of Catholic Asian News*, January 11, 1989.

28 Katsuyuki Yakushiji, "Japanese Foreign Policy and Current Relations with Neighbour Countries" (lecture, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore, October 2, 2015).

the contrary, German decision makers understand the changes in security laws under Abe administration as a normalization process, similar to the one that Germany went through.”²⁹

Japan’s government struggles to present elements that show that its intentions are not bellicose. The Japan Self-Defense Forces lack significant power projection capabilities.³⁰ Furthermore, in the words of a Japanese military official, the requirements for intervening in collective self-defense are so drastic that the reform does not change much in practice.³¹ Japanese foreign policy itself remains focused on economic power as opposed to military power, and Japanese voters overwhelmingly prioritize economic to security issues.³² Altogether, these factors suggest that knee-jerk responses to changes in Japanese security policy, especially from its neighbors, depend more on the political affiliation of the Japanese prime minister, domestic instrumentalization of Japanese actions, and nationalism.

Domestic constraints are under Japan’s own control to address, whereas foreign responses require cooperation with other states. The German and Italian experiences benefited from a specific geopolitical context that was different for Japan. The German model of “coming to terms with the past” is also highly unique in its extensiveness and vast public support, undermining its applicability to Japan. Moreover, even when Japan has moved in this direction, its efforts have failed to resonate with neighbors. On the other hand, the experience of Southeast Asian states—Singapore, above all—underscores that resolving historical disputes benefits both participants and does not have to come at the expense of erasing a past of victimhood at Japan’s hands. Pragmatism, albeit incentivized by a power imbalance favoring Japan, allows states to work together to address the challenges of the future rather than remaining mired in the disputes of the past.

This indicates some potential courses for Japan to improve relations with China and South Korea, thereby allowing it to pursue a modern security policy. First, it should strive to eliminate contradictory expressions of both guilt and support for wartime behavior. Other countries may yet fail to accept apologies, but at least these will be unquestionable. Second, it should highlight to its neighbors that resolving these disputes does not

29 “Japan And... Germany,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2, 2015.

30 Dennis C. Blair, “Military Power Projection in Asia,” in *Strategic Asia 2008-09: Challenges and Choices*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Andrew Marble, and Mercy Kuo (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008).

31 Yakushiji, “Japanese National Security Policy.”

32 Ibid.

mean forgetting the past or burying parts of their national identity. Rather, resolution opens up mutually beneficial scenarios and new opportunities for cooperation. Third, Japan should work where the balance is in its favor and where it has more in common with its partner. Specifically, it should prioritize overcoming historical issues with South Korea, and the comfort women agreement is a step in the right direction. This would also isolate China as the final holdover and help Japan gain recognition, particularly in the Western world, that it has truly overcome its awful legacy. Lastly, Japan should send clearer signals with regard to its security posture, and better convey that these reforms do not enable what is a limited military apparatus to suddenly become a regional threat or even simply engage in military action at will. There is no silver bullet for Tokyo to employ and resolving historical issues remains an objective that will take many years to accomplish. However, studying the cases of post-war reconciliation and atonement in Europe and Japan's rebuilding of relations with former colonies creates a potential path forward to grant Japan more room to construct a security policy coherent within the twenty-first century. **Y**