

THE (IR)RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ARE SMALL-ARMS SUPPLIERS COMPLICIT IN AFRICA'S GENOCIDES?

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Accounting for 40 percent of current global conflicts, the African continent has one of the highest rates of conflicts and conflict-related deaths and accounts for half of the sixteen on-going United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. These statistics mask that Africa produces minimal small arms and light weapons (SALW). The weapons have been used in genocides, politicides, and numerous conflicts, even as the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) takes hold and is supported by many of the arms-supplying nations. Still, statistics show that the major world democracies and economies, as well as the five permanent members (P-5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), are the largest arms exporters. Within the framework of R2P, how do these countries reconcile their arms transfer activities with weapons supply to countries in conflict? Is there an inverse relationship between arms transfers and support for international mechanisms to resolve international conflict? Are most of the arms used in conflict supplied through government-to-government transfers or through non-state actors—businesses, private military companies, and illicit market? Using multiple regression statistics, the research employs arms-transfer data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and correlates it with indicators of state fragility, democratization, and political violence. It investigates (1) the correlation between arms supplies and state fragility; and (2) the impact of membership in Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) on arms transfers and imports. The research finds that neither state fragility nor IGO memberships correlate with significant levels of arms transfers. Some expected correlations hold; military expenditure correlates with higher state fragility, arms transfer, US military aid, lower levels of economic development, and less globalization. Surprisingly, arms-exporting developed nations belong to more IGOs. Countries in

conflict do not import more arms than countries that are not. It appears that the claim that arms exporters adhere less to international norms than other countries is not supported.

In 1991, the first post-Cold War failed state manifested in Africa: Somalia. While an ethnically unified country, Somalia's failure marked the beginning of a nearly thirty-year period of inter-clan conflicts led by warlords. Soon, state failures became a familiar phenomenon in Africa, characterized by armed, frequently ethnic, conflict. Between 1955 and 2009, Africa accounted for 40 percent of global state failures, which includes ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, revolutionary wars, genocides, and politicides.¹ The estimated costs of Africa's armed conflicts and wars range from US\$100 billion² to US\$14 trillion as of 2015.³ As one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world, Africa unfortunately "has the uncanny reputation of being the world's leading theatre of conflict, war, poverty, disease, and instability."⁴ The complexity of the conflicts arises from the breadth of their nature: some are ethnic, some national, and some interstate.

However, conflict in African countries is not inevitable. Donald Rothchild explains, "There is nothing inevitable about destructive conflict between African states and their culturally distinct identity groups."⁵ He notes that while conflict has been widely chronicled, there is a basic framework for accommodation, reciprocity, and negotiation.⁶ Before delving into the nature and trajectory of conflicts in Africa, it is important to contextualize the idea of conflict. According to James Schellenberg, conflict, defined in the social (as opposed to the individual) realm, is "the opposition between individuals and groups on the basis of competing interests, different identities, and/or differing attitudes."⁷ Roderic Alley argues the root cause of conflict is "poverty,

1 Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), 5.

2 Chris McGreal, "The Devastating Cost of Africa's Wars: £150bn and Millions of Lives," *The Guardian*, October 10, 2007, accessed April 16, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/11/congo.international>.

3 James Somper, "Global Cost of War Reaches \$14 Trillion, Says Report," *The Telegraph*, June 18, 2015, accessed April 16, 2017, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11682594/Global-cost-of-war-reaches-14-trillion-says-report.html>.

4 Eghosa Osaghae and Gillian Robinson, "Introduction," in *Researching Conflict in Africa: Insights and Experiences*, eds. Elisabeth Porter et. al (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2005), 1.

5 Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 1.

6 Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa*, 1.

7 James A. Schellenberg, *Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 7–8.

political oppression, marginalization, prolonged failure of state functions, and unequal distribution of resource benefits.”⁸ This leads to insufficiencies in inclusiveness by government institutions, rights of subordinate groups, and allocation of society’s resources.⁹

Important questions arise surrounding the nexus of conflict, identities within the state, and transfer of arms. Are Africa’s conflicts more resource-based, or do they arise as a result and manifestation of disparate ethnic identities? Are they religious or, in more recent years, more ideological in nature? Is conflict a manifestation of the African state?¹⁰ Do the perennial ethnic conflicts threaten the viability of the state? Although addressing these questions are relevant in understanding the complexity of these conflicts, the potential complicity of developed countries and arms transfers is the scope of this study. This paper reviews emerging norms in international relations, specifically the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and states adherence to these international norms. At the same time, major democracies in addition to the members of the UNSC, the very interlocutors of maintaining global peace, account for majority of arms transfers to Africa. The major research question tackles whether countries’ positions on (and support for) the emerging global norm of R2P align with their practices of arms transfers, especially to non-democratic, conflict-prone countries.

Arms Transfers

Few studies have examined the relationship between the role of arms transfers, especially from major powers, and perennial conflict in Africa within the context of the emerging international norm of R2P. Given that Africa is a net importer of the small arms and light weapons (SALW), it is useful to review the dissociation of arms sales from the causation of conflict. In considering the role of arms transfers and their effect on fostering conflict in the context of R2P, this research builds upon Cassidy Craft and Joseph Smaldone’s correlation between arms trade and political violence in the three decades between 1967 and 1997.¹¹

8 Roderic Martin Alley, *Internal Conflict and the International Community: Wars Without End?* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 17.

9 Alley, *Internal Conflict and the International Community*, 17.

10 Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 2.

11 Cassidy Craft and Joseph P. Smaldone, “The Arms Trade and the Incidence of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1967–97,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 6 (2002): 693–94.

Although some African countries have obtained licenses to produce their own weapons, most weapons are imported. While Africa is perceived as receiving an influx of thousands of weapons each year, it has one of the smallest global markets in terms of dollar value, with an estimated value around US\$15 million to US\$25 million.¹² However, most of the arms transfers within this estimate may include only the legally imported arms. Conflicts in the Middle East, in addition to rogue governments, have made it possible for significant quantities of weapons to be brought into Africa by international arms dealers, corrupt officials, African middlemen, and cooperating governments.¹³

Onyinka Onwuka identifies seven major factors that influence the proliferation of SALW in Africa, which include the surplus of colonial and Cold War stockpiles, redistribution of stocks from older post-colonial conflicts, and supplies by governments to private armies, paramilitary forces, armed factions, and certain tribes. Other sources include leakages from government inventories, smugglers, and black market syndicates due to porous borders, diversions from inadequate controls, and supplies from local manufacturers and blacksmiths, such as the weapons used in the Hutu-Tutsi massacre in 1994.¹⁴ These factors pose challenges to the state and cause instability even after peace is achieved.¹⁵

African countries are cognizant of the problems posed by SALW proliferation and their role in exacerbating the numerous, violent conflicts. In 1999, the problem prompted a continent-wide declaration during the thirty-fifth Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting, which supported a “commitment to combating the illicit proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of small arms, light weapons, and landmines at both sub-regional and continental levels.”¹⁶ This led to the First Continental Meeting of Experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Addis Ababa in May 2000.¹⁷

Governments generally regulate arms transfers. Edmund Byrne

12 Mathurin Hounnikpo, “Small Arms and Big Trouble,” in *African Security and the African Command: Viewpoints on the US Role in Africa*, eds. Terry F. Buss et. al (Sterling, VA: Kumarin Press, 2011), 170.

13 Hounnikpo, “Small Arms and Big Trouble,” 171.

14 Onyinka Onwuka, “Territoriality, Arms Trade and Sub-Regional Security,” in *Governance and Border Security in Africa*, eds. Celestine Oyom Bassey and Oshita O. Oshita (Lagos, Nigeria: Malthouse Press Limited, 2012), 182–83.

15 Nicholas Marsh, “Taming the Tools of Violence,” *Journal of Public Health Policy* 28, no. 4 (2007): 401–09.

16 Marsh, “Taming the Tools of Violence,” 401.

17 Ibid.

attributes this primacy of arms transfer by governments to the “centuries-old assumptions about political sovereignty, including the nation-state’s absolute authority and responsibility regarding war and weapons.”¹⁸ Unlike other commercial enterprises, governments often use strict criteria to allow for the transfer of arms, closely regulating the arms suppliers. Because governments are often susceptible to domestic audience pressures and international sanctions, they often regulate the provision of such arms. While weapons restrictions are not easy to put in place, the UN does regulate arms transfers to conflict areas through sanctions and arms embargoes.

Who Transfers Arms?

Between 1945 and 1990, the Cold War superpowers dominated the global arms trade, almost “evenly split about three fourths” of it.¹⁹ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States’ share remained at under 50 percent, while Russia’s share fell to about 15 percent.²⁰ On average, military arms transfers can be directed to governments or to sub-government groups. Arms transfers to governments fall into the broader category of geopolitical power and capabilities contest; whereas to sub-national groups, the arms sellers often attempt to influence present or subsequent governments.²¹

Some of the largest, coordinated, and regulated arms transfers occurred during the Cold War, sanctioned by the US and the USSR. As David Kinsella notes, the rivalry—and therefore arms—ended up benefitting local military rivalries. Reflecting the small arms and light weapons transfer, Kinsella argues client states were not recipients but were still able to acquire weapons, becoming an extension of the superpowers’ competition.²²

Because of this rivalry, the enforcement of arms transfer standards was lax. Arms transfer control mechanisms and prohibitions, or lack thereof, could be violated or disregarded without significant sanction due to UNSC veto power. Post-Cold War, other potential violations occurred through sale and transfer through a second country and through alliances, such as Russia’s actions in the Syrian civil war. The war in Iraq demonstrated, for example,

18 Edmund F. Byrne, “Assessing Arms Makers’ Corporate Social Responsibility,” *Journal of Business Ethics* 74, no. 3 (2007): 202.

19 David Kinsella, “Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series Analysis of Global Arms Transfers,” *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (2002): 209.

20 Kinsella, “Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation,” 209.

21 *Ibid.*, 210.

22 *Ibid.*, 213–14.

how the US military, private military contractors (PMCs), businesses, and individuals facilitated arms transfers. In countries with rampant corruption, companies will promote the illegal arms trade and benefit from increased conflict; whereas in countries with low corruption, companies will rely on legal arms trade and are hindered by threats of conflict.²³

Small arms and light weapons often find their way to African conflicts by circuitous routes. In some instances, weapons belonging to the government become available to militias and civilians; while in others, they are procured for the express purpose of use in wars that often have regional implications. Goose and Smyth, for example, illustrate the complexity of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, tracing its occurrence to historic grievances and independence-era massacres. After Yoweri Museveni's 1986 rise to power in Uganda and following a seven-year civil war, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda. A sizable portion of RPF forces were from the Ugandan army, who also provided a trove of small arms and other weapons systems.²⁴

The Rwandan government turned to its former colonizer, Belgium, which declined to provide arms since Rwanda was technically "at war." On the other hand, France, who wanted to keep Rwanda within the bloc of twenty-one Francophone African nations, provided weapons, advisors, and combat troops.²⁵ In addition to fueling the conflict that would become one of the worst genocides in Africa, the weapons purchases by the Rwandan government effectively bankrupted Rwanda.


The largest arms exporters are the US, the USSR (until 1991), the UK, France, Russia, Germany, China, the former Czechoslovakia, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Israel, and Canada (see Figure 1). In the SIPRI list of the top 75 arms exporters worldwide, there are four African countries: South Africa, Libya, Egypt, and Ethiopia. One can confidently assert then that most of the SALW that make their way into the conflicts in Africa originate from developed countries. Majority of the top weapons suppliers are also democracies.

23 Vigna and Ferrara, "Detecting Illegal Arms Trade," 28.

24 Stephen D. Goose and Frank Smyth, "Arming Genocide in Rwanda," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 5 (1994): 88.

25 Goose and Smyth, "Arming Genocide in Rwanda," 89.


FIGURE 1 Top Arms Suppliers (1950–2012)



Source: “Top Arms Suppliers,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2013.

Conversely, in Figure 2 below, only nine African countries are in the top seventy-five arms importers, accounting for 12 percent of total imports. Additionally, four of these, Egypt, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Libya, are also arms exporters. It would appear, therefore, that for the number of conflicts that rage in Africa and given the arms exported/imported into the continent, there is a disconnect in how arms contribute (or do not) to the exacerbation of armed conflicts.

FIGURE 2 Top Arms Importers (1950–2012)



Source: “Top Arms Importers,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2013.

A Different Approach to Arms Transfers

The end of the Cold War was paralleled by rapid globalization, which facilitated access to information. With the collapse of the old order, client states began to fail. Some of the states' failures were characterized by intense local, regional, and interstate conflicts. US hegemonic reign concurrently occurred as the number of states increased, with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the subsequent breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. More states meant more sources of weapons (and conflict); at the same time, issues that had not been as salient, such as regulating arms transfers, took on greater importance. For example, Goose and Smyth show the different reactions to the Rwandan government's affiliated militia's massacre of Tutsis: Belgium withdrew its ambassador while France apologized for the massacres.²⁶ Arms sales and transfers to countries in conflict often bears consequences, from embarrassment to electoral defeat. For example, when the proof of arms sales between Belgium and Nepal—a country in conflict and with a poor human rights records—surfaced in 2002, the Finance Minister Magda Alvoet was pressured to resign.²⁷

Perhaps among the worst offenders, the US quickly shifted its rhetoric: from containing Soviet expansion and unequivocally supporting allies including non-democratic regimes to paying more attention to human rights and democratic reforms.²⁸ Towards this end, the US changed its approach towards recipients of arms transfers, especially governments that were considered human rights violators or non-democratic. It was a significant shift for the US, who had been previously subsumed by the threat of communism. The US now premised foreign aid, alliances, and arms transfers on human rights and democracy records.²⁹ For example, after the overthrow of the democratically elected government in Nigeria in 1999, the US blocked government arms transfers to the military regime.³⁰

These new developments and increased scrutiny in arms transfers paralleled other global political developments. These included, but were not limited to, the fall of the Soviet Union, the increased democratization

26 Goose and Smyth, "Arming Genocide in Rwanda," 91.

27 Lerna K. Yanik, "Guns and Human Rights: Major Powers, Global Arms Transfers, and Human Rights Violations," *Human Rights Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2006): 357–88.

28 Shannon Lindsey Blanton, "Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (2005): 648.

29 Blanton, "Foreign Policy in Transition," 648.

30 *Ibid.*, 649.

(for example, close to forty African countries became democratic between 1989 and 1991), and greater scrutiny on use of foreign and military aid. This was also the period when IGOs and NGOs were agitating for increased state responsibility towards their people, re-conceptualizing the relationship between citizens and the polity. This would later evolve into the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P.

The Responsibility to Protect

The R2P doctrine is a major modification to the largely uncontested idea of state sovereignty. Traditionally, sovereignty outlined the rights but was not conceived to encompass the states' responsibility to protect its citizens.³¹ This has gradually changed, although history is littered with mass atrocities and massacres. More recent cases have included the Rwandan genocide, the Janjaweed militia killings in western Sudan, and the ongoing conflict in the Great Lakes region, which has often been characterized as having elements of a genocide.³²

The role of the state in protecting its citizens—and more broadly its responsibility to its citizens—is not entirely new. Recorded history of the obligations of the state towards its citizens includes Justinian (sixth century), the moral codes of most major religions, and the written works of sixteenth to nineteenth century philosophers such as Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke. For example, Locke argued:

Part of God's natural law was that no one may harm anybody else in their health, life, liberty, or possessions. No one could be subjected to another's rule unless they consented, and a government's responsibility was to protect natural rights.³³

Over time, various documents, treaties, and covenants, including the Geneva Conventions of 1899 and 1949, the Treaty of Versailles, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), paved the way for greater

31 Gareth J. Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 15.

32 Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 18.

33 John Janzekovic and Daniel Silander, *Responsibility to Protect and Prevent: Principles, Promises, and Practicalities* (New York: Anthem Press, 2013), 12.

recognition of the role of states in assuring human rights. During the World Summit in 2005, leaders of 192 countries affirmed the Guiding Principles for the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the extension of these guidelines to the intractable issues of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In a further nod to the importance of the concept of R2P, its principles and definitions were widely accepted and then adopted by both the UN General Assembly and the UNSC in 2009.³⁴

R2P holds that states have the primary responsibility for the protection of their citizens from the four categories of crimes against humanity. It further tasks the international community with the duty to assist states (especially those unable to) fulfill this responsibility using appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means to protect populations from potential harm.³⁵ States that failed to carry out their responsibilities faced intervention from the international community. For individual states, R2P entails prevention (warnings to address root causes of potential atrocities), responsibility to react (military, economic, political and diplomatic sanctions), evidence collection, and military intervention as a last resort, and the responsibility to rebuild (full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation).³⁶ As a result of R2P, a formal, collective agreement between the states over the treatment of citizens has been established, precipitating an international response to domestic violations.³⁷

Weapons sales and arms transfers have implications for R2P and how countries assure that their actions are consistent with halting, or at minimum, not facilitating genocide. International arms transfer entails perils even to friendly nations. For example, during the First Gulf War, France could not use their Mirage fighter jets because Coalition forces “could not distinguish the French Mirages from ‘enemy’ Iraqi Mirages sold to Iraq by France.”³⁸ Additionally, the Iraqi radar jamming systems purchased from the British posed a great danger to Coalition forces.³⁹

Even though the Iraqi government had a record of gross human

34 Sarah E. Davies and Luke Glanville, “Introduction,” in *Protecting the Displaced: Deepening the Responsibility to Protect*, eds. Sarah E. Davies and Luke Glanville (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 4–5.

35 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, “Summary of the Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),” World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy, accessed August 20, 2013, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/learn-about-rtop>.

36 Ibid.

37 Janzekovic and Silander, *Responsibility to Protect and Prevent*, 46.

38 Yanik, *Guns and Human Rights*, 358

39 Ibid.

rights violations, they still managed to acquire these sophisticated weapons. A nation's capacity to acquire modern weapons and maintain them, even when its ideology and support by the arms supplier shift (e.g. the US-supplied Iranian F-14s during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi), demonstrates the problems of arms supplied by friendly governments. The arms can then be used later for purposes for which they were not intended. The supply of weapons to Rwanda by South Africa, Israel, Albania, France, and Bulgaria illustrates legal weapons sales later used for nefarious purposes.

Governments need to be cognizant of unintended consequences of arms trade. Trade produces "security externalities" by increasing the recipient's military capacity; therefore, exporters may limit sales to even allies and stop sales to enemies.⁴⁰ For Iran and Rwanda, the arms were delivered to friendly governments, so it is not always evident that governments will later turn on its citizens in violation of R2P.

Lingering Issues

Reviewing relevant literature on the increasing recognition of the role of countries in limiting the occurrence of conflicts and genocide and the states' responsibility to intervene when the countries in question cannot halt atrocities, some inconsistencies are found in countries' positions. For example, there is a disconnect between the foreign policy positions of a number of OECD countries regarding their commitment to the reduction in conflicts, and the total amount of weapons shipped to foreign countries—especially those experiencing conflict—by these committed OECD countries.

Research Questions

This research addresses the following main question: Do countries' positions on the emerging global norm of R2P align with their practices of arms transfers, especially to non-democratic, conflict-prone countries? The research develops several hypotheses to test the relationships between weapons transfers, countries' democratization, state fragility, economic development, and other factors, such as how much countries spend on their

40 Shannon L. Blanton, "Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in the Developing World: U.S. Rhetoric versus U.S. Arms Exports," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 123–31.

militaries as a percentage of their GDP. Additional questions that this paper explores include: Do countries experiencing internal conflict import more arms to sustain and further their conflicts? Where do they acquire their weapons? Are politically fragile countries concentrated in certain regions or equally distributed across the globe? What other relationships exist between fragile states and other variables such as military expenditure, democratization, and levels of economic development?

Data and Methods

Based on data from 1961 to 2010, this research uses quantitative, multivariate regression statistics to determine the correlation between the rhetoric of adherence to and support for international norms—such as peaceful settlement of disputes and memberships in international organizations—and arms transfers. The data covers the 192 member states of the United Nations, excluding South Sudan since it was not covered by the period under review. The starting point of 1961 was selected since it denotes the beginning of independence declarations in African countries.⁴¹

The research uses several data sources for different indicators that were later compiled into a database. From the World Bank, data on per capita GDP, net ODA received, and military expenditure (percent of GDP) were obtained. Data on the membership of IGOs were obtained from the Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke's Correlates of War, and IGO Data (v2.1) dataset.⁴² From COW IGO data, the variable, *igounit*, represents the total IGO membership of a country per year. The research includes *netmilaid*, the net US military aid provided to different countries. The variable is included based on the notion that the US is more likely to provide military aid to countries that are cooperative and democratic.

Data for the former Soviet Union republics, now members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), are available from the years 1990–2000. For Germany's IGO membership, the research uses West Germany's membership from 1961 to 1990, given that West Germany had

41 Data from "Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-present," United Nations, accessed September 26, 2013, <http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml#text>. In addition to the original 51 members who signed the UN Charter, most of the next group of 32 members came from Asia. The first group of African countries to join the United Nations totaled 17 and joined in 1960.

42 Jon C. Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke, "The COW-2 International Organizations Dataset Version 2.0," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21, no. 2 (2004): 101–19.

belonged to more than four times as many IGOs as East Germany. To measure the effect of conflict on a state and its stability, the research eliminated the use of the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset with the *ACTOTAL* variable (the sum of civil violence, civil wars, ethnic violence, ethnic wars, and interstate wars). Between 1961 and 2010, there were 9,408 observations available, but only 1,537 of them are valid data points (16.34 percent of the cases).⁴³

Results

State Fragility and Arms Transfers

From the first omnibus model, the adjusted R^2 of 0.491 indicates that the model accounts for about 50 percent of the variation in state fragility given different model variables, which is not a robust fit. Ten of fifteen variables in this model are statistically significant, seven of which are statistically significant at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence levels. They include year, per capita GDP, level of globalization, military spending as percentage of GDP, South America regional variable, arms transfer, and membership in IGOs. US military aid, North American regional variable, and Africa are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Per capita GDP, level of globalization, and South America variables are negatively signed. (See Appendix, Table 1).

As expected, state fragility correlates negatively with per capita GDP; richer countries are politically more stable than poorer countries. The same finding holds for globalization; state fragility correlates negatively with higher levels of development (which in turn potentially correlates with wealth). For comparison purposes, the South America variable is included since both Africa and South America experienced some conflict in the twentieth century. The variable correlates negatively with state fragility, indicating that South American nations are more stable than the African nations.

State fragility measures are time limited with the available data. For example, the Fund for Peace started tracking failed states in 2005, while the Polity IV data tracked state fragility beginning in the 1980s. US military aid correlates positively with state fragility. It may be concluded that countries receiving US military aid have higher state fragility rates than countries

43 Monty G. Marshall, "Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946–2012," Center for Systemic Peace, accessed September 26, 2013, <http://www.systemicpeace.org>.

that do not. It is not clear why this might be the case, although countries in conflict may be bigger arms importers. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP also correlates positively with state fragility. This is an expected and hypothesized finding. Countries experiencing internal or external conflict may be more prone to spending more on their military as they attempt to put down insurrections and challenges to the state. As expected, the African regional variable correlates positively with state fragility. According to the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy's Failed States Index, 70 percent of the top 10 failed states are in Africa.⁴⁴ Also, 63 percent of the top 30 failed states are in Africa.⁴⁵ These results help explain the positive correlation between state failure and the African region. The IGO membership coefficient correlates positively with the state fragility variable. Countries experiencing conflict have higher fragility scores and belong to fewer IGOs. States in civil wars, such as Somalia, often do not have relationships with or representation at multilateral bodies due to the contestation of government.

Arms Transfers around the World

Having arms transfers with the SIPRI Arms Transfer as the dependent variable produces an interesting finding. The omnibus model has an adjusted R^2 of 0.881; the model explains a robust 88 percent of the variation in arms transfers. The variables' correlations further add to our understanding of the relationship between arms-originating countries and recipients. In the omnibus model that has arms transfer (countries arms' sales) as the dependent variable, ten of the thirteen variables are statistically significant. Of these, four variables are positively signed (constant, state fragility, North American regional variable, and per capita GDP), indicating a positive correlation between these variables and global arms exports. Coefficients for year, level of globalization, military expenditure as percentage of GDP, South American and European regional variables, FDI outflows, and US net military aid are statistically significant but negatively signed, indicating a negative relationship between the variables and arms transfers across the world. (See Appendix, Table 2.)

The negatively signed globalization index variable is curious, given that developed countries are the largest arms exporters. Yet, since

44 Fragile State Index, "The Failed States Index 2013," The Fund for Peace, accessed September 26, 2013, <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2013-sortable>.

45 Ibid.

only a few countries account for a high percentage of arms exports, the relationship between developed countries and arms export is not robust. Indeed, major arms exporters include the USA, USSR (now Russia), UK, France, and China. Although European countries export arms, their arms sales are far behind the US, Russia, and China. European countries do not transfer arms to countries experiencing conflict at significantly higher rates than other countries. One expects that countries' arms imports to positively correlate with military spending as percentage of GDP.

From the results of this model, state fragility positively correlates with military spending, possibly on arms. One can surmise that countries attempting to maintain control of legitimate violence and countries experiencing internal dissent are likely to increase their arms imports, thus spending more on the military to keep their military supportive of the government.

Membership in IGOs and Arms Sales

Next, the regression statistics attempt to explain the determinants of arms transfers especially to the least developed countries particularly in Africa. This model examines selective variables: US net military aid (expected to be low since the countries are experiencing conflict), SIPRI arms transfer (hypothesized that developed countries transfer more arms even as they belong to IGOs), year, levels of globalization, levels of democracy, per capita GDP, and membership in IGOs. Wealthier countries have the financial ability to maintain membership in many IGOs, are more likely to give aid (net ODA), and will invest more in other stable countries (FDI outflows). Likewise, African countries that are hypothesized to have higher levels of conflict should spend more on their military. The adjusted R^2 of 0.120 in the model is not robust enough to explain arms transfers.

From this model, the coefficients for year, Asia, IGO memberships, net ODA, and US military aid are statistically significant, despite the low explanatory power. The expectation for higher IGO membership to correlate negatively with arms exported does not hold; there is a positive correlation between IGO memberships and arms transfers. Despite their membership in IGOs, countries in regions experiencing conflict such as Asia continue to import arms even and participate in IGOs. For example, even as the conflict raged on against the Khmer Rouge during the 1980s in Cambodia, both factions were represented at the UN General Assembly in New York.

Military aid from the US correlates positively with the value of arms received. Perhaps, this reflects both the collinear relationship with military assistance and the possibility that it is in the form of arms. Also, the US is one of the primary sources of arms transfers around the world. Interestingly, the value of arms received correlates negatively with net overseas development aid (Net ODA), suggesting that countries that import more arms are less likely to receive foreign aid of the economic nature. It is therefore possible that as they become more conflictual, countries restrict aid even as they export more arms.

IGO Membership and Arms Transfers

The next model investigates arms transfers by countries that have multiple memberships in IGOs. One expects that a country with multiple IGO memberships is more likely to have fewer arms transfers especially to war-torn and conflict zones. Here, IGO memberships represents concurrence with IGOs and their norms, support for multilateral actions such as arms embargoes, adherence to UNSC resolutions banning transfer of weapons, limiting arms provision to foreign countries embroiled in conflict, and, more generally, engaging in and supporting diplomatic efforts.

Previously, the research found that the top arms exporters are members of UNSC, followed by many OECD countries. These countries are mainly liberal democracies that have often pushed for international norms such as the R2P. While these countries may limit their arms transfers to foreign countries, the leading net arms importers are not necessarily countries experiencing conflict. This leads to the question of how democratic countries with IGO membership end up transferring arms to foreign countries. Is there a disconnect between the countries' rhetoric and membership in international organizations?

With an adjusted R^2 of 0.319, the model explains a paltry 32 percent of the variation in arms transfers and is thus not a strong indicator of the factors explaining arms transfers. Although the model's explanatory power is quite low, several variables are statistically significant: year, per capita GDP, level of globalization, North America, and total arms received. (See Appendix, Table 3.) These variables are also positively signed, indicating a positive correlation between membership in IGOs and these variables. Apart from the total arms received, the other correlations are to be expected. Wealthier and highly developed countries, which are in Europe and North America,

join more IGOs over time. Membership in IGOs is correlated negatively with military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the regional variables of Europe and Asia. Given the low R^2 value, the model cannot be a reliable indicator for explaining membership in IGOs.

IGO Membership, Global Norms (R2P), and Arms Exports

In the final model, the coefficients for year, per capita GDP, globalization, military expenditure, regions (North America, Asia, and Europe), and arms imports are statistically significant. Most Western democratic countries, which tend to belong to more IGOs, are also the leading arms exporters. Bearing in mind the weak overall explanatory relationship (as evidenced by the low adjusted R^2 value), the data do not support the claim that countries participating in a greater number of IGOs (and therefore, more likely to support international norms such as R2P) transfer fewer arms to countries experiencing conflict, particularly in Africa, than to all other countries. (See Appendix, Table 4.)

Wealthier countries, which are also on average more democratic, belong to more IGOs. Military expenditure as percentage of GDP correlates negatively with membership in IGOs. Countries that spend more on the military may experience more conflict, and thus more fractured, and be less likely to adhere to international norms. This pattern is evident even in examination of raw data: the former East Germany belonged, on average, to about half as many IGOs as the former West Germany.

Even as these findings portend avenues for further research, alternative explanations hold. As shown previously, the US, Russia, China, and major European powers are the main producers and suppliers of weapons; as their own national defense budgets indicate, this leads to a surplus in arms sales. For instance, the US is the largest net arms exporter, and the US defense budget spending accounts for approximately 37 percent of the US\$1.6 trillion spent on defense around the world in 2015.⁴⁶

Additionally, due to the higher levels of technological development, these countries can export arms because they develop the most advanced weapons and weapons technologies. Membership in IGOs may be a point of prestige, particularly in institutions whose membership is either regional,

46 Anup Shah, "World Military Spending," *Global Issues*, June 30, 2013, accessed April 22, 2017, <http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending>.

geographical, or exclusive, rather than inclusive (such as the UN). Thus, countries, such as North Korea, may be less likely to adhere to international norms and will join IGOs as a way to avoid pariah status.

Analysis and Conclusions

This research sets out to understand whether countries' positions on the emerging global norm of R2P align with their practices of arms transfers, especially to non-democratic, conflict-prone countries. The data used in this research did not conclusively support this argument. The US ranked first in arms transfer, followed by several developed countries; at the same time, countries like India, Israel, and Turkey were major recipients of the arms transfers. The correlation between arms transfer and conflict particularly in Africa is very weak. Some of the explanations include the nature of the weapons used in many conflicts in Africa, ranging from domestically produced weapons (machetes, bows, and arrows) to non-domestic, commercially produced weapons (SALW like the AK-47), primarily originating from Russia and China.

Independently, the state fragility and IGO membership variables do not explain arms transfers. The regression statistics found several interesting results: the negative correlation between state fragility and per capita GDP, globalization, and the South American region. State fragility correlates positively with Africa, arms transfer, North America, military expenditure, and US military aid. Other important results include a negative correlation between arms transfers and the year, level of globalization, military expenditure as percentage of GDP, South America, and Europe, FDI outflows, and US net military aid.

These results reflect some expected correlations: a small number of the more developed countries, located in North America, Latin America, and Europe, export fewer SALWs. Therefore, it appears that weapons in African conflicts largely come from non-democratic countries. Military expenditure as percentage of GDP correlates negatively with arms transfers; again, this may be indicative of fewer major arms importers and countries in conflict do not import significant amounts of weapons. Even when countries import arms, their levels of wealth (measured by per capita GDP) make it difficult to import sizeable amounts of arms.

Major powers, some of them democracies and also UNSC members, are the leading arms suppliers to different countries. Developed countries

have a higher level of participation in IGOs and should, therefore, adhere more to international norms such as R2P. The major arms importers are also some of the emerging powers; contrary to initial hypotheses that countries in conflict will import more weapons, countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa import fewer arms than would be expected given the levels of conflict.

Accurate data on illegal arms exports is often difficult to find. Even if it is accessible, the trends in arms sales do not suggest that governments are involved in the illegal arms export business. Nonetheless, governments may also export arms without official sanction or for clandestine purposes, as evidenced in the Iran-Contra affair.⁴⁷ It is also plausible that conflicts often arise independently from arms exports. For example, France was one of Rwanda's major sources of arms up to and until the Rwanda genocide broke out in 1994. Prior to that, France may have exported arms to a legitimately elected Rwandan government, only cutting off the arms exports when conflict broke out.

The major finding of this research is that major powers are the most significant arms exporters. They are also active in IGOs, which often set conditions for both war and peace and arms sales, including embargoes. These countries are also active in promoting international rules and regimes, including those espoused in the R2P doctrine. However, there is no correlation between these major countries' arms sales and transfers to African countries and their support for global norms, as measured by their membership in IGOs. Failing states do not join IGOs at a significant rate but spend more on their military perhaps to quell rebellions. Thus, countries with membership in IGOs are neither more nor less likely to sell arms to countries that are not meeting their responsibilities to the R2P doctrine.

47 Mark Gasiorowski, "Islamic Republic of Iran," in *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, eds. David E. Long, Bernard Reich, and Mark Gasiorowski (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011), 62.

Appendix

Table 1 State Fragility: Omnibus Model and Table of Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig	Correlations		
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Zero-order	Partial	Part
(Constant)	-1798.13	64.312		-27.959	.000			
Year	.906	.032	.852	28.108	.000	.528	.584	.511
GDP per capita	-.001	.000	-.579	-12.199	.000	-.296	-.298	-.222
Globalization	-.095	.013	-.188	-7.281	.000	-.117	-.183	-.132
NetODA	.067	.055	.024	1.224	.221	.166	.031	.022
FDI Outflows	6.85E-012	.000	.021	.800	.424	-.112	.021	.015
Democracy	.010	.024	.009	.424	.671	-.127	.011	.008
US Military Aid	.001	.001	.036	1.901	.057	.023	.049	.035
Exp. on Mil % GDP	.123	.047	.052	2.635	.009	-.003	.067	.048
N. America	2.232	1.156	.064	1.931	.054	-.215	.049	.035
S. America	-1.163	.417	-.066	-2.789	.005	-.163	-.071	-.051
Europe	-.924	.689	-.028	-1.341	.180	-.119	-.034	-.024
Africa	.729	.351	.050	2.074	.038	.251	.053	.038
SIPRI Arms Xfer	.002	.000	.480	12.422	.000	-.206	.303	.226
SIPRI Arms Rcd	.000	.000	-.024	-1.216	.224	-.009	-.031	-.022
IGO memberships	.048	.006	.206	7.873	.000	-.302	.198	.143
Predictors: State fragility								

Table 2 Arms Transfer: Table of Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	205233.586	19678.310		10.429	.000		
Year	-102.997	9.904	-.203	-10.399	.000	.346	2.891
Globalization	-6.733	2.763	-.039	-2.436	.015	.525	1.904
Exp. on Mil. % GDP	-37.691	8.656	-.055	-4.354	.000	.813	1.230
Region - N. America	1671.907	231.896	.158	7.210	.000	.275	3.638
Region - S. America	-220.452	84.645	-.038	-2.604	.009	.614	1.629
Region - Europe	-1267.425	151.704	-.111	-8.355	.000	.743	1.345
Region - Asia	48.554	75.130	.009	.646	.518	.716	1.397
Democracy	-4.737	5.332	-.013	-.888	.375	.633	1.580
Fragility Polity IV	45.489	5.104	.144	8.913	.000	.508	1.970
IGO memberships	-1.785	1.612	-.014	-1.107	.268	.785	1.273
GDP per capita	.335	.011	.790	29.806	.000	.188	5.326
NetODA	14.610	11.822	.015	1.236	.217	.887	1.128
FDI Outflows	-3.94E-009	.000	-.028	-1.766	.078	.526	1.903
US Net Military Aid	-.278	.112	-.030	-2.495	.013	.888	1.126
Dependent Variable: SIPRI Arms Xfer							

Table 3 IGO Members: Table of Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Correlations		
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Zero-order	Partial	Part
(Constant)	-1324.323	393.331		-3.367	.001			
Year	.688	.198	.176	3.477	.001	.057	.119	.098
GDP per capita	.001	.000	.166	1.805	.071	.281	.062	.051
Globalization	.220	.051	.166	4.272	.000	.288	.146	.121
NetODA	-.005	.226	-.001	-.020	.984	-.056	-.001	-.001
FDI Outflows	-1.564E-011	.000	-.015	-.376	.707	.198	-.013	-.011
Democracy	.044	.101	.015	.435	.664	.200	.015	.012
US Net Military Aid	.002	.002	.029	.920	.358	.082	.032	.026
Exp. on Mil % GDP	-.790	.161	-.153	-4.892	.000	-.213	-.167	-.138
N. America	13.809	4.416	.173	3.127	.002	.287	.107	.088
America	-1.519	1.635	-.033	-.929	.353	.097	-.032	-.026
Europe	-14.665	2.896	-.171	-5.064	.000	-.105	-.172	-.143
Asia	-12.389	1.440	-.292	-8.601	.000	-.204	-.285	-.243
Fragility Polity IV	.084	.101	.034	.825	.410	.056	.028	.023
SIPRI Arms Xfer	.000	.001	-.032	-.385	.700	.247	-.013	-.011
SIPRI Arms Rcd	.018	.002	.322	10.397	.000	.230	.338	.294
Dependent Variable: COW - IGO memberships								

Table 4 Arms Exports: Table of Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	-14808.117	5391.944		-2.746	.006		
Year	7.404	2.706	.134	2.736	.006	.239	4.192
Globalization	.254	.906	.010	.281	.779	.478	2.091
Exp. on Military % GDP	2.575	3.186	.021	.808	.419	.839	1.192
Region - N. America	-25.542	79.206	-.014	-.322	.747	.301	3.326
Region - S. America	-7.224	27.321	-.008	-.264	.792	.633	1.580
Region - Europe	6.454	46.668	.004	.138	.890	.768	1.302
Region - Asia	241.119	23.226	.291	10.381	.000	.727	1.375
Democracy	1.609	1.656	.028	.971	.331	.713	1.402
Fragility Polity IV	-2.127	1.749	-.041	-1.216	.224	.504	1.982
IGO memberships	1.998	.425	.164	4.698	.000	.472	2.118
GDP per capita	-.004	.004	-.061	-.933	.351	.134	7.463
NetODA	-8.861	3.749	-.060	-2.364	.018	.891	1.122
FDI Outflows	-1.504E-010	.000	-.009	-.257	.797	.478	2.093
US Net Military Aid	.296	.040	.182	7.342	.000	.935	1.069
SIPRI Arms Transfer	.009	.010	.047	.885	.376	.202	4.958
Dependent Variable: SIPRI Arms Received							