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FROM THE EDITOR

This past semester since the previous edition of the Yonsei Journal has seen an incredibly historic and turbulent time in the recent history of the Korean Peninsula. For many of the authors and editors based in Seoul, the unfolding events have provided new insights and encouraged new questions that I am sure we will see reflected in upcoming submissions.

For us at this point, however, we have worked to keep the Journal focused on issues that are still particularly key in our world today. Some are headline grabbing and address hot topics such as policies for climate change mitigation or the role of foreigners in IS. Others, however, approach ongoing issues that would benefit from more discussion and a wider awareness in international relations and geopolitical fora. Some also take deep dives into issues that are enjoyable reading in the midst of what can often be an overwhelming media barrage. These include analysis of international audiences that enjoy Korean dramas, and a historical overview of the international dimensions of the ancient Nastaliq script.

The Papers section begins with "The General Situation and Trend of the Foreigners in IS Under the Background of the Syria Crisis" by Song Niu, a Professor with the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University. He explores how foreigners become a part of IS, their reasons for leaving their home country, and where the research indicates the trends might turn to next. The role of religiosity in institutions, and of national and personal religious identity in the face of geopolitical questions, is also explored.

The second paper considers the ongoing questions around China's rise and the implications it has for geopolitics. This has been explored by several authors over the editions of the Yonsei Journal, with each approaching the

topic from a different angle. Safiqul Islam from the University of Chittagong uses the recent work of China in the Bay of Bengal region as the case study in this instance. As the author writes, both China and India have economic and strategic interests in and claims to the region, making it a microcosm of the ongoing relationship between rising powers.

The final paper in our first section is "The Clock is Ticking for Bangladesh: Policy Recommendations and Strategies for Mitigating Effects of Climate Change" by So Youn Kim. She explores the impending crisis that Bangladesh will face due to the inevitable effects of climate change, some of which are being felt now. In response to this, she proposes practical solutions, based both in policy that has been used before as well as new ideas that could help mitigate the effects. Proactive information campaigns and innovative relationships with non-governmental organizations are all considered.

Our Essays begin with another topic that the Yonsei Journal has also previously engaged with; the international aspects of popular culture, and what greater lessons can be drawn from it. Brittany Tinaliga addresses the rise of Korean dramas in the United States, and provides an extensive overview of the current makeup of western audiences. Her detailed analysis and original polling on why international fans support a cultural product that seems so alien provides new insight into this phenomenon.

Continuing with an essay that features an in-depth discussion of a topic is the paper "Nastaliq: A New Form of Art in India" by Ghulam Abbas. Here he chronicles the long and complex history, including its regional and international ties, of Nastaliq script. This is a new and creative step for the Journal – to push how we think of "international relations" often to be beyond the straightforwardly political realm. It adds an important and fascinating historical component.

Next we have an interview. This year the journals Diana Piscarac sat down with with Sokeel Park, the Ciybtrt Director and Director of Research and Strategy with Liberty in North Korea. This interview explores the ongoing work their organization does with North Korean refugees. In light of the June 12th summit in Singapore between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump, there is much to talk about.

And finally the journal conlcudes with a book review by Jonathan Lim, a former Yonsei student currently with the Australian National University. He reviews Richard Stiennon's recent publication *There Will Be Cyberwar: How The Move To Network-Centric War Fighting Has Set The Stage For Cyberwar.* In doing so, he considers Stiennon's thesis both in the context of the relevant theory on cyber war, as well as current geopolitical situations in which it can be applied.

As this edition goes to print, new developments in the regional geopolitical situation may change dramatically before the next one. I look forward to reading the fall publication and seeing how the talented authors, and skillful Yonsei editing team, handles the opportunities for great material the unfolding geopolitical situation brings. For now, these authors and their work goes in a different direction.

One of the best aspects of putting together the Journal this semester was the chance to work with such bright and engaged student editors who were personally invested in making sure all the articles were peer reviewed with commitment. It reflects exceptionally well on their academic character that they have produced such a thoroughly edited work and stands them in good stead for the rest of their academic journeys. With that, it is my privilege and pleasure to present the Yonsei Journal to you.

Sincerely,

Alexandra Stephenson

MEET THE
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PAPERS

THE GENERAL SITUATION AND TREND OF THE FOREIGNERS IN IS UNDER THE BACKGROUND OF THE SYRIA CRISIS

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Abstract: "Islamic State" (IS) is a major obstacle to the Syrian peace process and a major threat to both regional and world peace. With the growing global impact of IS terrorist activities, more and more foreigners have responded to IS propaganda by joining, working for, and engaging in terrorist activities in the service of IS abroad. Foreigners in IS are citizens of countries outside of Syria and Iraq who leave their home countries to work for IS. This paper argues that foreigners in IS have provided strong support for the consolidation and expansion of IS terrorist activities through human resource intensive contributions. Reasons for defection from a home country to participate actively in IS have been identified as: an "identity crisis" in the home countries of highly educated and unemployed males, loosening policies for international exit and entry, and the deceptive propaganda of IS. Through an analysis of the foreigners in IS, this paper finds that extremism and terrorism can be reduced by innovation within current international institutions, optimization of existing national social systems, and by strengthening the legitimacy of religious involvement in the international system.

At the start of the Syrian peace process in 2016, the United States and Russia compromised on the issue of Syria, which led to the cooperation of the two sides in the fight against the IS terrorist forces in Iraq and Syria. Since the emergence of IS in 2014, the organization has been in a state of gradual decline. Military strikes from the great powers the US and Russia, resulted in an increased concern from the international community and ultimately a greater coalition of force united against IS. Like other organizations, each step in the development of IS has been determined by the personal factors of its members, and the foreign personnel in IS play a vital role too. Foreign personnel have the ability to carry out terrorist activities in their own countries, or other countries, through the use of radical religious ideas specific to IS ideology and by utilizing the professional skills learned through the organization.[1] The ability

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1   Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency," Working Draft, Washington, D.C: Center for Stra-

to mobilize foreign personnel creates a more powerful IS. IS needs to recruit foreign personnel, who continue to join the so-called Jihad, to provide a steady stream of human resource support for IS and their global terrorist activities.

I. Definition of Foreigners in IS and Their Recruitment

(a) Defining Foreigners in IS

According to the definition formulated by David Malet, foreign fighters are "non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts."[2] This definition has three important implications: first, the foreigners have no citizenship in the unstable countries in question; second, those foreigners are not subordinate to the official military organization within the unstable country; third, those foreigners are not mercenaries.

As a terrorist organization that aspires to attain the status of a "state," its name has always reflected this goal: initially termed the "Islamic State of Iraq," the name was changed to the "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham," and finally to "Islamic State". The aspirational "territory" of IS extends from Iraq to the al-Sharm region of the East coast of the Mediterranean region (also referred to as the Levant), and the organization seeks to establish "provinces" in many other countries and regions across Africa and Asia too. The final goal of IS is to establish control over a global territory. The fact that IS claims eventual sovereignty of the entire world makes the so-called "Foreigners of IS" a relatively dynamic concept. IS acquisition of "territory" has already expanded beyond the current national boundaries of sovereign states recognized by international society as well as overrun the established concept of nation-state recognized by international community. Many people with multiple citizenships recognized by the international community work for the IS and IS has granted them with an "Islamic State Passport" too. This makes the definition of 'foreigners' in IS unclear as the Islamic State itself, nor its passport is legally recognized by the international community.[3]

If we investigate the origins of IS, the organization was established in Jordan and the organization's founder Abu Musab Zarqawi is Jordanian. This would technically make the IS "regime" established in cross-border areas of Syria and Iraq an "alien regime". The IS base camps are mainly located in the

tegic and International Studies, December 9, 2005, p.129.

2   David Samuel Malet, "Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts," Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, August 2009, p.9.

3   John Hall, "Anything to Declare? ISIS Launches Passport Holders for International Terrorist as Part of Its Campaign of 'Psychological Warfare'," *Daily Mail,* August 12, 2014.

border areas of Syria and Iraq, therefore citizens of countries or regions other than Syria and Iraq who work for IS can be considered as foreigners of IS.

(b) The Reasons for the Recruitment of Foreigners by IS

The preliminary goals of IS are to work towards "state-establishment", expand the sphere of influence, and consolidate terrorist base camps. The terrorist activities of IS are different from that of other terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda's chief, Osama Bin Laden, lived under the protection of the Taliban regime or Pakistan tribal elders, and carried out global terrorist activity by emphasizing covert tactics. IS has made use of high-profile methods that are designed to attract instant global attention. IS is trying to transform itself from an organization to an entity that resembles a state. Currently, no state or international organization recognizes IS as such. In addition to the terrorist activities that have made IS famous, IS has established administrative agencies in its control areas in Iraq and Syria, and has assumed the social service functions of a "state." IS has tried to recruit people from all over the world who may potentially provide services that will help it to strengthen its international terrorist headquarters, compete with Al-Qaeda and other traditional terrorist organizations, and form a force of terrorism. The realization of IS goals is limited by its ideology: all hires must be Islamic extremists. IS requires a vast pool of talented professionals in order to maintain regime operation and social service functions. There is a shortage of IS professionals working in administrative, financial, medical, health, urban construction, and other related fields necessary for the consolidation and construction of terrorist base camps. Multilingual personnel proficient in networking technology are also required for external communication operations and global propaganda efforts. Specifically, IS needs more foreigners to be involved in the major areas of organization and propaganda. The early members of IS are mainly Jihad warriors armed only with extremist ideology, and they are ill-equipped to establish a state.

The second goal of IS is to support terrorist activities abroad. Foreigners provide strong support to IS and pose a major threat to the international community. After joining IS they have the option to either fight with local members in Syria and Iraq or use their foreign passports to return to their homelands to engage in terrorist activities. After acquiring skills to commit terrorist acts,[4] these foreign fighters establish new contacts with other extremists in their home countries and often build new networks to carry out

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4   "'Islamic State' Reportedly Training Terrorists to Enter Europe as Asylum Seekers," *Deutsche Welle*, April 19, 2018.

terrorist activities.[5] Abdel Hamid Abaaoud, the designer of the Paris terrorist attack in December 2015, went to Syria for training, and was further radicalized after returning home. He then recruited assistants, established a terror network and conducted a major terrorist attack in Paris.[6] Foreigners of IS have shown a strong capacity for IS to conduct terrorist activities abroad. As former director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation James Comey said, "Foreign fighters traveling to Syria or Iraq could, for example, gain battlefield experience and increased exposure to violent extremist elements that may lead to further radicalization to violence; they may use these skills and exposure to radical ideology to return to their countries of origin, including the United States, to conduct attacks on the Homeland."[7]

II. The Reasons Foreigners Join IS and Their Origins

(a) Impetus to Join IS

We will discuss the three major contributing factors which lead foreigners to join IS, starting with the "identity crisis" experienced by the foreigners in their own countries. This situation is most apparent in first and second generation immigrants to the United States and Europe. These immigrants are often subject to alienation and marginalization in society and in joining IS they hope to obtain a sense of mission and belonging. One appeal to this desire for identification has been crystallized through the mission of helping the "Muslim Brothers" in the territory of Syria against the Assad regime.

Second, the copycat effect as a result of the rapid growth in the number of foreigners entering Syria. In 2011, the number of foreigners in Syria was equal to the total number of Muslim Jihad groups in other areas, namely Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. In the first half of 2012, about 700-1,400 foreign fighters entered Syria[8], subsequently the number of foreigners in Syria continued to grow faster than in other regions. By the end of 2013, the migration numbers had grown to include more than 11,000 people.[9] At present, entering Syria through Turkey is the best choice for foreigners entering the IS controlled

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5   Thomas Hegghammer, "Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting," *American Political Science Review,* Vol.107, No.1, 2013, pp.1-15.

6   Josh Halliday, Jonathan Bucks, "Abdelhamid Abaaoud: What We Know about the Paris Attacks 'Mastermind'," *Guardian*, 18 November, 2015.

7   House Homeland Security Committee Hearing, September 2014, https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearing-worldwide-threats-homeland/.

8   Aron Zelin, "Foreign Fighters Trickle into the Syrian Rebellion," June 11, 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/foreign-fighters-trickle-into-the-syrian-rebellion.

9   Alex Spillius, "Number of Foreign Fighters in Syria Nearly Doubles," *The Telegraph.* December 17, 2013.

region.[10] Syria can be described as an incubator for recruiting large numbers of foreigners who have little or no combat experience. On May 31, 2013, Yusuf al-Qaradawi[11] called for the Jihad in Syria. Western media speculated that this would lead more foreigners to participate in Jihad in Syria.[12]

Third, the wide use of internet-based communication technology has played a crucial role in recruitment of foreign nationals to IS. The wide use of communication technology and the convenience of air travel not only reduce the costs associated with transit and communication, but also facilitate the arrival of foreigners to Syria. The enhancement of the level of communication technology increases the power of IS social media activities, which IS actively makes use of to propagate its ideas and publish recruitment information. This provides more opportunities and possibilities for foreigners to join IS. The decreasing transportation costs for foreigners joining IS is appealing to those who have been made vulnerable by an "identity crisis" in their home country. Ultimately, foreigners choose to join IS, and then use the same means to recruit more foreigners to the extremist ideology.[13]

(b) The Origins of the Foreigners of IS

The areas controlled by IS are at war with Syrian government troops, Iraqi government troops, Kurdish armed forces, the United States, Russia, and other regional powers and ethnic forces. The complexity of the regional situation has created different approaches to the basic situation of foreigners in IS. Many institutions studying the phenomenon have gathered different data through separate investigations. According to data from the US civil information organization the Soufan Group,[14] about 30,000 people from 85 countries joined IS in December 2015. Most of the foreigners of IS are from Arab countries, but many of them are from western countries, such as EU member states, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In addition, there are thousands of foreigners from Russia, and hundreds from Indonesia and Tajikistan.[15] The recruitment of foreigners by IS has quickly become a global phenomenon.

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10   "Destination Jihad: Why Syria and not Mali," April 10, 2013, https://icct.nl/publication/destination-jihad-why-syria-and-not-mali/.

11   He is the chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, and he is very famous in the Islamic World.

12   Thomas Hegghammer, Aaron Y. Zelin, "How Syria's Civil War Became a Holy Crusade," *Foreign Affairs*, July 3, 2013.

13   Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters," *International Security,* Vol.35, No.3, Winter 2010-11, pp.53-94.

14   It is very important, "provides strategic security intelligence services to governments and multinational organizations".

15   Efraim Benmelech, Esteban F. Klor, "What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?" The Hebrew

The Soufan Group authored two reports on this subject, one of them, titled "Foreign Fighters in Syria: A Threat at Home and Abroad" by Richard Barrett, was published in June 2014. This report analyzes the country of origin for foreigners of IS (Figure 1). The data was collected mainly from social media and community resources. However, since IS is likely to hide its actual membership figures, official data may be smaller than the actual number of recruits. As Barrett wrote, "It is often only when someone dies that his family learns that he went to Syria, either through a telephone call from a friend designated by the dead fighter for that purpose, or through a death notice published on a group's website, Facebook page or Twitter feed." Foreign nationals who join IS mainly come from five countries: Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan and Turkey. Figure 1 shows that among these countries, the majority IS foreigners are from Tunisia and Saudi Arabia.

Figure 1[16]
FIVE SOURCES OF IS EXPATRIATES

Another report entitled "Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq" was published in December 2015. Table 1 is a rank of the national classification of IS foreign personnel, according to the official data; Table 2 is a rank of the national classification of IS foreign personnel, according to the unofficial data. The report lists the official and unofficial number of citizens of 65 countries who joined the IS and went to Syria and Iraq to participate in Jihad, of which the official statistics have recorded 50 countries, and unofficial data have covered 15 countries.

University in Jerusalem and CEPR, April 2016.

16   Richard Barrett, "Foreign Fighters in Syria: A Threat at Home and Abroad," April 10, 2014, http://sou-fangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf.

Table 1: Foreigners of IS by country (official figures)[17]

No.	Country	Official Count	Non-official Count	No.	Country	Official Count	Non-official Count
1	Tunisia	6000	7000	26	Spain	133	250
2	Saudi Arabia	2500	-	27	Canada	130	-
3	Russia	2400	-	28	Denmark	125	125
4	Turkey	2100	-	29	Australia	120	255
5	Jordan	2000	2500	30	Azerbaijan	104	216
6	France	1700	2500	31	Malaysia	100	-
7	Morocco	1200	1500	32	Philippines	100	-
8	Lebanon	900	-	33	Albania	90	150
9	Germany	760	-	34	Italy	87	-
10	U.K.	760	-	35	Norway	81	60
11	Indonesia	700	500	36	Finland	70	85
12	Egypt	600	1000	37	Pakistan	70	330
13	Belgium	470	470	38	Sudan	70	100
14	Tajikistan	386	-	39	Switzerland	57	-
15	Bosnia	330	217	40	Israel	50	-
16	Austria	300	233	41	Ireland	30	30
17	China	300	-	42	India	23	45
18	Kazakhstan	300	-	43	New Zealand	7	6
19	Sweden	300	300	44	Brazil	3	-
20	Kosovo	232	-	45	Madagascar	3	-
21	Dutch	220	210	46	Singapore	2	-
22	Maldives	200	60	47	Cambodia	1	-
23	Algeria	170	225	48	Moldova	1	-
24	US	150	250	49	Romania	1	-
25	Macedonia	146	100	50	South Africa	1	

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17 The Soufan Group, "Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq," December 2015, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate_FINAL 3.pdf.

Table 2: Foreigners of IS by country (Non-official figures)[18]

No.	Country	Non-official Data
1	Libya	600
2	Kyrgyzstan	500
3	Turkmenistan	360
4	Kuwait	70
5	Somalia	70
6	Serbia	60
7	Afghanistan	50
8	Georgia	50
9	Trinidad and Tobago	50
10	Montenegro	30
11	Argentina	23
12	UAE	15
13	Portugal	12
14	Qatar	10
15	Japan	9

III. The Recruitment and Task Assignment of Foreigners of IS

(a) The Classification and Recruitment Methods of Foreigners of IS

Foreigners of IS can be divided into two types: fighters and non-fighters. According to Reuters data, ninety percent of IS fighters in Iraq are Iraqis, and seventy percent of IS fighters in Syria are Syrian. Throughout the IS network, thirty percent of the senior officials are military officers and police officers that were purged after the collapse of the Sadam regime. The number of foreign fighters is estimated to stand at approximately 40,000. A variety of media outlets, including The New York Times, report that the number of IS is in the tens of thousands but less than 200,000; and half of these are foreigners.[19] A report issued by the United Nations in September 2014, states that there were more than 15,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries serving IS. The US intelligence community estimates that as of February 2015, 20,000 foreign fighters were fighting for IS, 3,400 of which were from western countries.[20] In

18   Based on data from Richard Barrett (2014) and The Soufan Group (2015).
19   Mary Anne Weaver, "Her Majesty's Jihadists," *New York Times*, April 19, 2015.
20   Robert Windrem, "ISIS by the Numbers: Foreign Fighter Total Keeps Growing," February 28, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-numbers-foreign-fighter-total-keeps-growing-

September 2015, the FBI estimated that there were 30,000 foreign fighters serving IS. According to a report issued by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the number of IS foreign fighters from the main contributing countries stands at: Tunisia (5,000), Saudi Arabia (2,500), Russia (2,400), France (2,000), Morocco (1,500), Jordan (2,000), Turkey (1,400) Lebanon, (900), Germany (700), Libya (600), the UK (600), Indonesia (500), Uzbekistan (500), Pakistan (500), (figures for countries with numbers below 500 are excluded).[21] A report by the World Bank found that approximately 3,803 foreign fighters joined IS during 2013-2014. Of those foreign fighters at least 69% hold a high school degree, and a large portion of them went to college; only 15% of foreign fighters did not attend a high school, and less than 2% of the foreign fighters are illiterate. The average age of these foreign fighters is 20-35. Foreign fighters from Europe and Central Asia typically have the same level of education as citizens in their home country, while foreign fighters from West Asia, North Africa, South Asia and East Asia possess levels of education significantly higher than that of people in their home countries. The report concludes that poverty and low levels of education does not lead to terrorism. On the contrary, highly educated but unemployed males are more likely to seek enrollment in terrorist goups.[22]

Foreign non-fighters are difficult to identify within IS. Before armed training commences, newly arrived foreigners of IS are assigned to engage in water fetching, cleaning toilets, and other menial physical activities. These tasks often lead to dissatisfaction, and during the armed training stage, the lack of entertainment and prohibition of mobile phones leads many foreigners to quit. Due to these factors, it is difficult to estimate the number and identity of people within this group.

Another source of foreign non-fighters is women. IS ideology prohibits women from using weapons, instead, insisting that the role of women is to be a good wife for Jihad fighters. The all-female Al Khansa Brigade published a document entitled "Women of the IS: Study on Declaration and Cases,". This document advises women to live a "sedentary" life at home and to fulfill their "sacred duty as mothers." Only a few women are allowed to work as teachers, doctors, nurses, cooks, first aid medics, and tailors. According to data from the British Institute of Strategy and Dialogue, 550 women from western countries

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21   Institute for Economics and Peace, "Global Terrorism Index 2015," November 2015, http://economic-sandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf.

22   Aamna Mohdin, "ISIL's Foreign Fighters Are Surprisingly Well-educated, According to the World Bank," October 6, 2016, http://qz.com/802276/the-foreign-fighters-of-isisislamic-state-are-surprisingly-well-educated- according-to-the-world-bank/.

are serving IS in Syria and Iraq.[23] In total, foreign non-fighters account for a smaller proportion of IS foreigners and are not part of the main contingent of IS members.

According to the British scholar Peter Neumann, the number of IS foreigners in Syria engaged in Jihad has exceeded the total number of foreigners in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Somalia and Mali since 2003.[24] So, how did the foreigners of IS become a "global threat"? First, they have been trained[25] and undergo testing in order to become qualified terrorists; secondly, they construct terrorist networks[26] with a global scope, recruiting more like-minded people to plan terrorist activities together; third, they are schooled in extremist ideology,[27] and taught not only to hate foreign occupiers, but also to believe that there is a desperate war between the Muslim world and the West. Fourth, they return to their own countries, plan and implement terrorist activities, and spread extremist ideas, in the process widening the range and scope of recruitment activities.

International media exposure given to the terrorist acts and the extremist ideology of IS enhances its reputation. This exposure allows for IS to engage in passive recruitment. Those Muslims that already hold extremist ideology are the first to be passively recruited. Historically, these religious extremists participated in the occupation of Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca in 1979, the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan and the subsequent civil war in Afghanistan, as well as the civil war in Iraq in the post-Sadam era, and the civil war in Syria that began with the "Arab Spring."

The second stage of recruitment of foreign fighters to IS is active recruitment, during which IS experienced a "free ride" stage and an "internal development" stage. In the first stage, IS developed a base by joining Al Qaeda. Under the banner of Al Qaeda, IS vigorously established its power in Iraq. In the second period, IS promoted itself as an "established state", a self-styled "Caliph" and as the incorporation of many branches of Al Qaeda.

IS used the internet—such as western social networking sites including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—for recruitment. It published Dabiq and other electronic magazines, developed a Jihad game for the internet, as well as a

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23 Carolyn Hoyle, Alexander Bradford, Ross Frenett, "Being Mulan? From Western Migrants to ISIS," 2015, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Western-Women-in-ISIS-Territory.pdf.

24 Daniel Byman, "What Do the Paris Attacks Tell Us about Foreign Fighters?" *Washington Post,* November 16, 2015.

25 Howard Koplowitz, "ISIS Training Camps: Islamic State Group Opens Military Grounds in Deir Ez-Zor after Suffering Heavy Losses in Syria, Iraq," *International Business Times,* August 4, 2015.

26 Rukmini Callimachi, "How A Secret Branch of ISIS Built A Global Network of Killers," *New York Times*, August 4, 2016.

27 Cole Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State," March 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-ideology-of-the-Islamic-State.pdf.

mobile phone application to attract young people from the western countries to join IS jihad. Through its propaganda magazine Dabiq, IS called for foreign fighters to jump on the "Caravan," incited them to serve the Caliph and urged them to return to their home countries and engage in more terrorist attacks. The magazine also often publishes graphic language on carrying out attacks in the West.

Recruited foreigners have played a role in the expansion of IS. A large number of IS websites and videos are produced by foreigners, especially those from western countries. Their production value, proficient use of network, technology and multi-lingual approach have influenced many foreigners decision to join IS. T-shirts with the IS logo, souvenirs, and the warmth and battlefield friendship across countries depicted in propaganda films, have allowed many foreigners to greatly underestimate the tragic life and hardship that comes with the fight for IS in Syria and Iraq. Based on the IS interpretation of Islam, IS released a brochure detailing the sale of women and girls, which also has a great appeal to many foreigners with ulterior motives.

(b) Task Assignment of Foreigners of IS

With the exception of senior positions, such as non-combat municipal services, professional technology and network publicity, and logistics-related jobs, the vast majority of IS foreigners' tasks can be divided into two groups: the first is to serve as "cannon fodder" by participating in armed confrontation against the enemies around IS base camps. The foreigners of IS are numerous and they often encounter bullying by Syrian and Iraqi local fighters and powerful Saudi fighters. As IS is relentless in the execution of foreign deserters who might jeopardize morale, occasionally foreign fighters are subject to mass execution by IS while trying to flee.

The second task assignment for foreigners is to act as a returning Jihadist. IS intentionally distorts interpretations of history, claiming that the prophet Mohamed migrated from Mecca to Medina where he eventually developed Islam. IS uses this narrative to encourage foreigners to go to Syria and Iraq to carry out the so-called "Hijrah Jihad".[28] After IS terrorist training and brainwashing, foreigners from countries with a larger Muslim population are sent back to their home countries, with the aim of developing terrorist forces and achieve the re-flux of the "Jihad" in that country. There are two special kinds of violent terrorist acts that foreign fighters partake in. The first is committed by foreigners who did not personally go to the IS controlled areas of Syria and Iraq, but joined IS by other means. They carry out lone-wolf terrorist

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28   "Hijrah" means migration or emigration.

attacks, especially in European countries. The second task assignment regards those foreigners headed to Syria and Iraq through third countries in the way of "Hijrah Jihad,". These fighters often meet some trouble during their trips or are arrested by the police in the transit countries, and carry out violent terrorist attacks through the "local Jihad." Many Southeast Asian countries have experienced this type of case issued by China's Uighur "Hijrah Jihadist."

IV. The Future of Foreigners of IS

IS controlled areas in Syria and Iraq are under continuous attack by the US, Russia, Syrian and Iraqi government troops. As a result, the IS controlled areas in Syria and Iraq have shrunk dramatically, and many strategic and oil producing areas have been recaptured by Syrian and Iraqi government forces or local armed forces. In terms of its effective strength in Syria and Iraq, IS has lost the advantages of high oil revenues and the number of fighters. Many foreign fighters of IS were killed by the US or Russia, as well as various armed factions within Syria and Iraq, and the fate of other foreigners is not promising either. At present, there are several options for them: the first is to stay in Syria and Iraq to fight, where it is difficult to escape the fate of being killed or captured. The second option is to pretend to be a Syrian refugee and sneak into Europe, where it is possible to carry out violent terrorist attacks with local extremists. IS purportedly has the ability to forge Syrian passports. Therefore, it might be possible for foreign fighters to legally enter Europe under the guise of Syrian citizenship.

The third option is to escape Syria through other illegal means. Since, the international community regards IS membership as illegal, many countries have banned IS members from entry, or even cancelled their citizenship. As a result, those foreigners of IS who do not want to continue fighting in Iraq and Syria, and whom are unable to enter Europe as Syrian refugees, can only flee to their home country or hide in other countries. The potential danger of "immediate local Jihad" should not be underestimated. Thomas Hegghammer estimates that about 1/9 of foreigners in Syria and Iraq are linked to terrorist organizations. This figure is mainly based on the experience of foreigners in Afghanistan, and the ratio in Syria may be higher than that.[29]

However, not all foreigners will eventually become terrorists. The factors for potentially dangerous foreigners to become a terrorist threat are often limited by the elements of IS foreigners of relevant countries, such as national security service capacities and the relative power decline of IS.

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29   Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters," *International Security,* Vol. 35, No. 3, Winter 2010/11, pp.53-94.

In Afghanistan in the 1980s, about 5% of foreign fighters died; Chechnya had a death rate of more than 90%, compared with nearly 20% in Syria.[30] Many foreigners stay and continue to engage in Jihad because they are not able to return to their own countries. Inability to return also means an inability to plan terrorist attacks in their own countries. For those foreign fighters who are able to return to their country, taking up arms to fight in places where Muslims are oppressed is 'more glorious' than planning terrorist activities in western countries. Some foreigners will not engage in terrorist attacks in their countries due to personal concerns. For example, Abdisalan Hussein Ali, a Somali American from Minnesota who died after he carried out a suicide terrorist attack against the African Union troops in Mogadishu in October 2011, told a friend that he could not attack the United States. "Why would I do that?" his friends recalled. It was because "my mom could be walking down the street."[31]

Efforts to safeguard national security in many countries have reduced the likelihood of the foreigners of IS engaging in terrorist activities. Before 9/11, both in the United States and abroad, "Jihad" as the banner of terrorism received little attention, but after the 9/11 incident the situation rapidly reversed. In fact, Snowden's reveal of the Guantanamo detention event and the US-Iran UAV event have together raised questions and debates about whether the US government is itself too radical on the security issue. But the US government indeed has put forth a lot of effort in the maintenance of national security so that the IS terrorist attacks now mainly focus on Europe and the Middle East.[32]

Finally, IS is surrounded by enemies, which will eventually lead to the scattering of its forces. In 2004, when IS called itself an al Qaeda branch in Iraq, this organization focused on its fighting against the Iraqi government, then further captured territory in Syria. Although IS has planned and organized terrorist attacks in Lebanon, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, their targets are still concentrated in Syria and Iraq. Since 2016, IS has suffered major setbacks in Iraq and Syria, and has begun to target the United States, Russia and the European powers. It is hitting out in all directions. In recent years, international terrorist attacks, especially attacks in Sinai and Paris, all point to IS, which also signals that the focus of IS is changing.

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30   Daniel Byman, "What Do the Paris Attacks Tell us about Foreign Fighters?" *Washington Post,* November 16, 2015.

31   Daniel Byman, "What Do the Paris Attacks Tel us about Foreign Fighters?" *Washington Post*, November 16, 2015.

32   Robin Simcox, "European Islamist Plots and Attacks since 2014—and How the US Can Help Prevent Them," August 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/european-islamist-plots-and-attacks-2014-and-how-the-us-can-help-prevent-them.

In fact, the diversity and understandable propaganda means IS are just one half of a coin; whether foreigners are willing to accept the idea is the other half. Many foreigners in IS are not Muslims, especially those foreigners from the West. In addition to religious fundamentalism, bloodlust, and camaraderie many foreigners in IS seek out anti-establishment positions as a way to rebel against the institutional injustices in their home countries. The establishment of a state by terrorist organizations like IS, the UK leaving the EU, the election of President Trump in the United States, and various other global events are all parts of an antiestablishment movement sweeping the globe. The fate of these IS foreigners is closely related to the improvement of current international institutions, optimization of social systems, and enhancements in international legitimacy of religion in the international system. Only after a revolutionary change in the above fields, will we reduce the growth of extremism and terrorism so as to provide an opportunity to eliminate international terrorism. Thus, the phenomenon of internationalization and the network of terrorism represented by foreigners of IS can be reduced. Regarding IS, we cannot be too optimistic. As a powerful and often invisible force, extremism and terrorism will continue to provide great power as a spiritual driver for IS and the many foreigners that support it.

THE STRATEGIES OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE BAY OF BENGAL REGION: REVISITING STRATEGIC COMPETITION

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Abstract: The geographical location and the bright economic prospects of the coastal countries of the Bay of Bengal have made the region an important center of geopolitics and economic growth. The two rising global powers—China and India—are an integral part of the forming dynamic of the region. Consequently, they have security and economic interests in the Bay of Bengal and are thus vying to maximize their respective interests. They are also suspicious of the strategies of each other in the region due to historically unresolved issues over border disputes, like Tibet and the Dalai Lama, and Pakistan. China has developed an economic and strategic partnership, and initiated overland and maritime connectivity projects in order to promote sub-regional cooperation with the coastal countries of the Bay while India is making trade agreements, military cooperation, and strategic relations of its own. The Indian government has adopted overland and shipping route policies, and formed a sub-regional cooperation forum within the region. This paper investigates the nature of the two countries' strategies and their strategic competition in three littoral countries - Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. The focus is on why India and China are competing with each other and argues that the end result will be a balanced security environment in the region's near future.

Keywords: *Bay of Bengal, strategies of China and India, strategic competition, connectivity initiatives, subregional cooperation, economic cooperation and strategic partnership with coastal countries*

Introduction

The Bay of Bengal is an integral part of the economy and security of China and India; as a result, they are both vying for influence in the same strategic space. India has 2,000 miles of coastline on the Bay of Bengal. China, while proximate to the Bay, does not have a coastline.[1] The Bay of Bengal generally

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1   David Scott, "India's Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions," *Asia Pacific Review* 3,

includes associated waters of the Andaman Sea, and the Straits of Malacca in the eastern Indian Ocean. It is a compact body of water enclosed from three sides: India and Sri Lanka on the west; Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar in the north and Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore on the eastern side. The Straits of Malacca of the Bay are one of the main doors of the Indian Ocean, leading to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Around one third of global trade is transacted through the straits.[2] Thus, the Bay of Bengal is an important hub of economic activities connecting South, Southeast, and East Asia. Growing economic importance has made the region an increasingly important center of global focus. Robert Kaplan noted: "The Bay is returning to become the center of the history and no one interested in geopolitics can afford to ignore the Bay of Bengal any longer."[3] China and India, the two rising powers, have, thus, tried to promote their interests and secure themselves from outside threats. Their mutual threat perception is especially acute in the region; both countries are suspicious about the strategies initiated by each other. Beijing is building infrastructure, initiating connectivity projects, promoting sub-regional cooperation, and making economic and strategic partnership with the coastal countries of the Bay in order to achieve economic and security interests, and to overcome strategic vulnerability. On the other hand, New Delhi is developing its own military infrastructure, projecting connectivity initiatives, and forming its own sub-regional cooperation in an effort to make economic, defense, and strategic relations with these countries. The roles of China and India in the Bay of Bengal region, thus, came into the fore, and have been discussed and debated. Some papers explore the strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal but do not investigate the nature of their strategies and competition in the region. David Brewster (2014) has focused on the Bay of Bengal as a strategic space made division of South and Southeast Asia, and multilateral maritime security grouping has emerged based on it.[4] In his other article (2015), Brewster explores increasing strategic significance of the Bay of Bengal.[5] Sidra Tariq (2016) investigates why China and India perceive a security dilemma in the Indian Ocean.[6] Further, Pushpita Das (2011) focuses on the necessity of development of military infrastructures in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands

no.2 (2006):97-129.

2   David Brewster, "Dividing Lines: Evolving Mental Maps of the Bay of Bengal," *Asian Security* 10, no.2 (2014):151-67.

3   Robert Kaplan cited in David Brewster, "The Rise of the Bengal Tigers: The Growing Strategic Importance of the Bay of Bengal," *Journal of Defence Studies* 9, no. 2 (April-June 2015): 89.

4   Brewster, "Dividing Lines."

5   David Brewster, The Rise of the Bengal Tigers: The Growing Strategic Importance of the Bay of Bengal," *Journal of Defence Studies* 9, no. 2 (April-June 2015): 81-104.

6   Sidra Tariq, "Sino-Indian security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean: Revisiting the String of Pearls Strategy," *Regional Studies* XXXIV, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 3-28.

and how these can give India a secure position in the Bay of Bengal.[7] The paper will, thus, explore the nature of the strategic competition of the two countries in the Bay of Bengal region and will determine the reasons for regional cooperation. This will facilitate understanding of the nature of these two power's strategies and illuminate their strategies in the Bay of Bengal region, in particular on the causes of their regional competition.

Strategic Thinking and the Security Dilemma

In exploring strategic development and competition in the Bay of Bengal region, it is important to see this subregion as a discrete entity with its own particular dynamics and interplay of relationships. The longstanding conceptions of South and Southeast Asia as regions with their own specific strategic dynamics is traditionally divided by a line running through the middle of the Bay of Bengal. It is located at the end of South Asia and the beginning of Southeast Asia and makes a connection between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The unique pivotal position of the Bay of Bengal between South and Southeast Asia has drawn the interest of the regions' great powers: China and India. Although conceptions of where regions begin and end are relatively arbitrary, the way in which these regions are conceptualized can have a profound effect on strategic actors.[8] Political power and aspects of geography such as the size, location, militarily important terrain, maritime choke points, and areas containing critical resources informs both objectives and the strategy used to achieve them.[9] Geographical location may impose constraints while it may also provide opportunities that would have far-reaching implications on policy and strategy.

The classic definition of the security dilemma, as described first by John H. Herz in 1951, is a structural notion in which "the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening."[10] Major International events like WWI and WWII, and the dynamics of the Cold War have been analyzed through the lens of this notion. Further, the notion of security dilemma is linked with other theories and doctrines of international security as well; for example, constructivists and defensive realists approach the concept of

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7   Pushpita Das, "Securing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands," *Strategic Analysis* 35, no. 1 (May 2011): 465-78.

8   Brewster, "The Rise of the Bengal Tigers: The Growing Strategic Importance of the Bay of Bengal," 82.

9   Robert, Harkavy, "Strategic Geography and the Greater Middle East," *Naval War College Review* 54, no.4 (Autumn 2001): 37-53.

10   Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in *the Post Cold War Era, Second Edition (UK: ECPR Press, 2009), 27.*

security dilemma in different contexts. Defensive realist Kenneth Waltz argued that the anarchic nature of the state system is at the heart of the security dilemma. In the absence of a "common government", each state is in charge of its own security and survival. He opined that states are suspicious of other states' intentions and as a result, always try to maximize their own security which leads to a security dilemma. Constructivist Alexander Wendt focuses on the subjective element, contending that security dilemmas occur due to "intersubjective understandings where states assume the worst about each other's intentions."[11] Security dilemmas occur due to states' mutual suspicion of each other. One exists between India and China since they are suspicious about each other's intentions. Their mutual suspicion is a product of historical experiences, border disputes, China's close ties with Pakistan, and India's ties with the US; this security dilemma manifests itself in the Bay of Bengal sub-region.[12] The strategic behaviors of India and China in the region are akin to "if one is taking actions that may give a strategic advantage over the rival one so as to create a threat, the rival one would seek to mitigate an existing strategic disadvantage since the end of 1990s."[13] While the concept of a "security dilemma" may not be a perfect framework for understanding the dynamics of strategic competition between India and China in the Bay of Bengal region, it is evident that India seeks to maintain its considerable geostrategic advantage, and China tries to mitigate its disadvantage. They have currently played out in a jostle for influence throughout the region.

The Strategies of China and India in the Bay of Bengal Region

This section will explore the strategies of China and India in the Bay of Bengal region: their economic cooperation and strategic partnership, promotion of subregional cooperation, and connectivity initiatives. In particular, the section will investigate their economic cooperation and strategic partnership of China and India with the three potential coastal countries - Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka - of the Bay of Bengal since they are located geographically close and are significant in strategic and security consideration to the two powers.

Economic Cooperation and Strategic Partnership

India's long coast line with the Bay of Bengal and its Andaman and Nicobar archipelago provide it with natural advantages that have historically made the country the dominant power in the region. As a result, China is strategically

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11 Alexander Wendt cited in Sidra Tariq,"Sino-Indian security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean," 4.

12   Surjit Mansingh, "India and China Today and Tomorrow," The International Spectator 46, no. 2(2011): 47-48.

13   Brewster, "The Rise of the Bengal Tigers," 54.

vulnerable since unresolved tensions from as far back as the 1950s have continued to strain Indo-Chinese relations. Of particular importance are border disputes, issues regarding Tibet and the Dalai Lama, relations with Pakistan, the Indian fear of being boxed in as a result of the Chinese "String of Pearls" Strategy, and China's fear of encirclement or containment by deepening Indo-US ties. More than eighty percent of China's energy and goods are transported through the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) of the Straits of Malacca[14] and the 244 Islands of India's Andaman and Nicobar archipelagos constitute a "metal chain" that could lock tight the western exit of the Straits of Malacca.[15] In addition to the Straits of Malacca, these islands are close to the Six Degree Channels through which the sea lanes of communication in the eastern Indian Ocean run.[16] The archipelago has become a major amphibious warfare hub as India has set up full-fledged training facilities and based an integrated land-air-sea fighting unit there. India has also developed port facilities for operations in the Bay of Bengal and its coastal regions reportedly with the support of the United States.[17] A naval blockade to the western exit of the Straits of Malacca would place China's energy supply from the Middle East and Africa, and transportation of other goods, in a very vulnerable position. China, thus, perceives the presence of Indian threats in the SLOCs of the Bay as an urgent issue. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao considered the chokepoint of the Straits of Malacca as China's "Malacca Dilemma."[18] Shyam Sarah pointed out that Indian control over these islands, strategically in such position as they are, help it manage China's rise and protect its regional interests.[19] In order to overcome its strategic vulnerability and the Malacca Dilemma, China is developing economic, strategic, and military cooperation and strategic partnerships with the coastal countries of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Chinese leaders in Beijing are moving to develop an interconnected system of ports that starts with China's Hainan Islands and transverses the deep seaports of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in southern Sri Lanka (which is already partially opened), the Marao port in the Maldives which is under construction), and Gwadar port in Pakistan, before reaching the Middle East. India claims that China is trying to develop a

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14   The Straits of Malacca are only 1.5 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, the Phillips Channel in the Singapore Straits and the main connecting link between Indian and Pacific Ocean. It forms some of the world's significant traffic bottlenecks, and between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world's sea trade is done through the Straits.

15   Das, "Securing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands," 466.

16   Ibid.

17   David Scott, "India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Securing the Waves," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013):484-511.

18   Storey I, "China's Malacca dilemma. Jamestown foundation," *China Brief* 6, no.8 (2006).

19   Scott, "India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean," 498.

network New Delhi refers to as a "String of Pearls" that would surround India by sea.[20] This has caused great consternation in India as Raja Mohan argues that Delhi's dithering in developing economic ties and connectivity means that India is in danger of "losing" the Bay of Bengal to China.[21] Thus, in order to secure its economic and strategic interests and to reduce Chinese influence in the region, India is developing bilateral defense, economic, and strategic partnerships of its own in the Bay of Bengal.

Economic Cooperation and Strategic Partnership with Myanmar

Myanmar is important for China as a land bridge because it is part of its attempt to revive its southwest "Silk Road" both westward towards Bangladesh and India, and southeastward from Yunnan Province. Myanmar can provide southwestern China access to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. The two countries have, consequently, maintained close bilateral relations for centuries. In particular, their relations improved substantially when the military junta known as Tatmadaw in Myanmar took over the power in the name of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) by staging an organized military coup on September 18 1988. The SLORC put down mass democracy protests that aimed to institute regime change and developed "a political agenda to retain complete authority for itself and to close off the options for political leadership."[22] However, under mounting international pressure the military regime of Myanmar developed close relations with China to survive. [23] Even as the pressure from the rest of the international community grew, Beijing supported the military regime with a full spectrum of political, strategic, and economic ties. China has offered interest free loans, provided arms and military assistance, and granted credit to the military regime, as well as other economic aid and investments for the construction of Myanmar's basic infrastructure and industrial projects.[24] Significantly, during the Wu-Wen era of Myanmar government (2002–2011), the China-Myanmar relationship deepened further. China became involved in the construction of airfields, roads, railways, pipelines, and seaports in Myanmar in an effort aimed at better connecting China with the Bay of Bengal, both by sea and directly overland. In July 2005, the National Development and Reform Commission

20   Takenori Horimoto, "Ambivalent Relations of India and China: Cooperation and Caution," *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies* 3, no. 2 (2014): 61-92.

21   Brewster, "The Rise of the Bengal Tigers," 93.

22   Xiaobo Su, "Repositioning Yunnan: Security and China's Geo-economic Engagement with Myanmar," *Area Development and Policy* 1, no. 2, (2016): 178-94.

23   Geng Lixin, "Sino-Myanmar Relations: Analysis and Prospects," T*he Culture Mandala* 7, no.2 (January 2007): 1-15.

24   Ibid, 6.

of China and Myanmar's Ministry of Energy formally signed a memorandum of understanding to promote the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines.[25] The pipelines start at Kyaukryu port on Myanmar's west coast with the Bay of Bengal and enter China at Yunnan's border city of Ruili.[26] The 2380 km long oil pipeline is supposed to carry 22 million tons of crude oil per year from the Middle East and Africa to China.[27] China has also assisted Myanmar in developing naval facilities on the offshore islands of Myanmar, including St. Mathews near the mouth of the Straits of Malacca, and the Coco Islands which lie barely 18 km north of India's Andaman Islands.[28] Additionally, Beijing is constructing a river route from Kunming to Yangon, and highways and railways to connect the sea port of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar to Kunming. The new route will ease China's dependence on energy coming through the Straits of Malacca and offer an alternative way to overcome its Malacca Dilemma. Moreover, it will reduce time and cost of transportation of energy and other goods supply to southwestern China.

The former military regime adopted an extreme nationalization policy that has proved to be a great failure and led to the dire poverty of the people of Myanmar.[29] The retardation of economic development in Myanmar is partly attributed to sanctions imposed by western countries. As a result, in order to overcome the overall domestic and international situation, the military government arranged the presidential election in 2010. However, after assuming power in the 2010 election, it has been said that the change of regime might have led to the redirection of its foreign policy - especially its relations with China. The challenges of the armed minority forces and the opposition parties, plus the unfriendly international environment, had driven Myanmar's government to make political security the imperative for their foreign policy. Thus, the current trend in Myanmar's foreign relations has also led to the rapid restoration of its relations with India, Japan, and the western world. Myanmar and India would expand cooperation in oil and gas exploration and trade, joint military exercises, and developing infrastructure. In particular, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit in late 2011, and then-US President Barack Obama's official visit in November 2012, marked the beginnings of the US pivot to the Pacific.[30] The Chinese government officially expressed its

25   Xiaobo, "Repositioning Yunnan," 188.

26   Yue Ricky Wai-Kay, "Sino-Myanmar Relations: Is Pauk-Phaw Pragmatic or Rhetoric?," Journal of Comparative Asian Development 13, no. 2 (2014): 264-89.

27   Ibid.

28   Cdr. Gurpreet Khurana, "China and India Maritime Rivalry," Indian Defence Review 23, no. 4 (2009): 1-8.

29   Holliday Ian, "National unity struggles in Myanmar: a degenerate case of governance for harmony in Asia," Asian Survey 47, no. 3 (2007): 374-92.

30   Chiung Chiu Huang, "Balance of Relationship: the Essence of Myanmar's China Policy," The Pacific

positive attitude toward the strengthening relationship between Myanmar and the US, though Chinese media, and attacked Clinton's visit as inciting antipathy between China and its allies.[31] However, there are signs that Myanmar is making an effort to build a military alliance with the western countries to target China. China is the largest trading partner and investor in Myanmar. 47 percent of foreign direct investment utilized in the country is provided by China.[32] In 2013, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and the President of Myanmar, Thein Sein, indicated in their talks held in Nanning that the acceleration of the development of the southwest region of China and the progress of economic reforms in Myanmar both provided space for cooperation on major projects between the two nations.[33] China-Myanmar bilateral relations will, therefore, continue to secure their mutual benefit and serve China's strategic interest in the Bay of Bengal.

The Indian fear of being boxed in is intensified by strong China-Myanmar strategic partnership. Indian think tanks understand that robust China-Myanmar relations have made Indian access to the Greater Mekong Region and Southeast Asia more of a challenge. In the early 1990s, India began to engage with Myanmar. They had spent many years vocally condemning military rulers of Myanmar but were willing to change strategies in order to reduce China's leverage in the country and make the Indian "Look East" policy successful.[34] The Indian Look East policy was adopted in the early 1990s for rebuilding Indian economic links and strategic partnerships with the rising economies of Southeast Asian countries along the bay, and Myanmar is seen as a land bridge toward the region. The country's natural resources, and particularly its gas and oil reserves, make it an important prospective trading partner of India.[35] Myanmar's strategic position in the Bay of Bengal is also of key importance, as India aims for regional leadership and to protect its dominance in the bay, and the former generally reducing Chinese influence in the region is specifically important to that aim. In March 1993, India's Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit visited Myanmar, and discussed Indian concerns with Myanmar's military cooperation with China. In January 1994, Myanmar's Deputy Foreign Minister visited India, and the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding

Review 28, no. 2 (2015): 189-210.

31   Ibid

32   Liu Wu, "Sino-Myanmar Bilateral Relations in 2013: Develop Steadily and Challenges Existed," in *Annual Report on the Development of International Relations in the Indian Ocean Region,* 2014, eds. Wang R. and Zhu, C., (Verlag Berlin Heidelberg: Social Sciences Academic Press and Springer, 2015), 175.

33   Ibid, 176.

34   Engh Sunniva, "India's Myanmar Policy and the 'Sino-Indian Great Game," *Asian Affairs* 47, no.1 (2016): 32-58.

35   Ibid, 40.

aimed at expanding border trade by increasing co-operation and preventing "illegal and insurgent activities."[36] India began to boost economic ties with Myanmar pushing back against Chinese influence and stepping up links with an important Bay of Bengal country that could serve to project Indian interests in Southeast Asia.

Bilateral trade between India and Myanmar gradually increased from $87 million in 1990–1991 to $577 million in 2004–2005, and reached $2.2 billion in 2016-2017.[37] In 2001, India's Foreign Minister Singh opened the 160 km "India-Myanmar Friendship Road" connecting Tamu with Kalewa and Kalemyo (all in the Sagaing region of Myanmar) which further connects to Mandalay by road.[38] In May 2012 efforts were made to improve the road as India agreed to repave it, build and reconstruct 71 bridges along the route, and extend the road to Yargyi. Myanmar would then extend the road up to Monywa, close to Mandalay.[39] Additionally, India has become involved in oil and gas exploration in Myanmar. Indian public and private companies have bought stakes in block A-1 of the Shwe gas field, two on and offshore blocks of the Rakhine state, and another two-A-3 and A-7- offshore blocks of Myanmar.[40] Further to the strategic and economic interests previously mentioned, India has also sought to acquire intelligence on alleged Chinese bases on Myanmar's islands, gain access to its seaports, and cooperate closely with Myanmar's naval forces.[41] In the case of Indian concern of Chinese influence, Myanmar has balanced its relationship with both countries by adopting their requests for cooperation. Myanmar responded to India's invitation of military cooperation and allowed the Indian Navy flotilla to berth in the Burmese port Thilawa from 2002 onwards. Moreover, whereas China's military has not yet done any joint operations with Myanmar, India has successfully conducted Indo-Burmese joint naval exercises in 2003, 2005, and 2006.[42] More importantly, during Thein Sein's government, the close co-operation between the two countries intensified and Myanmar's naval vessels in 2013 made their first port calls to mainland India.[43] After taking office in 2011, President Thein Sein visited India and China in succession to balance the relationship with the two countries. After assuming power, Narendra Modi's government expanded engagement with Myanmar as part of its efforts to transform the Look East policy into a more vigorous Act East policy. In particular, his visit to Myanmar on September 6-7, 2017,

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36   Ibid, 38
37   *Policy Brief,* 2014; *New Age,* September, 07, 2017.
38   *Forbes Magazine,* March 26, 2013.
39   *The Times of India,* March 26, 2013.
40   Sunniva, "India's Myanmar Policy and the '*Sino-Indian Great Game,*" 44.
41   Ibid, 45.
42   Huang, "Balance of Relationship: the Essence of Myanmar's China Policy," 202.
43   Raja Mohan, "India-Myanmar Naval Diplomacy," *The Indian Express,* March 11, 2013.

expanded commercial and strategic ties between the two countries. During the visit, both countries agreed that they would look at strengthening cooperation security and counterterrorism, trade and investment, infrastructure, energy, and culture.[44] It may be said that the objectives of Indian and Chinese relations with Myanmar are not only to secure their economic and strategic interests, but also a strategic competition to expand their respective spheres of influence through connectivity, economic and military engagement rather than direct confrontation.

Economic Cooperation and Strategic Partnership with Bangladesh

Bangladesh is a nation of strategic importance not only to the South Asian sub-region but to the larger geo-political dynamics of Asia as a whole.[45] In particular, Bangladesh, like Myanmar, is in a position which can provide China access to the Bay of Bengal, and subsequently to the Indian Ocean. The proposed deep seaport at Sonadia in Chittagong has the potential to develop as a regional hub and serve the interests of Bangladesh and China. A road link is supposed to be constructed from the seaport of Chittagong in Bangladesh to Kunming, via Myanmar that will be suitable strategically to China, and a shorter land route than that from Sittwe seaport to Kunming.[46] Further, Bangladesh has a border with India in the west, north, and the larger part of its eastern side. It offers an important position for Chinese moves and motivations in shaping South Asian politics.[47] In November 2011, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared "America's Pacific Century" and its "pivot to Asia", conveying the message that the US would maintain a "strategy to contain China" and considered the interest of the US in Asia greatly threatened by China.[48] In particular, in South Asia, the US strengthened its strategic alliance with India and encouraged it to play a more active role in the region. The main objective of China was to prevent the domination of any ambitious power from gaining regional hegemony by strengthening ties with small South Asian countries. The rising influence of a global superpower in the region posed a new strategic threat to China as it well remembers the lessons learned from British influence in the region. During the British colonial rule of India, the British East India

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44   *The Hindu*, September 07, 2017.

45   Vaughn Bruce, "Bangladesh: Political and Strategic Developments and US Interests," *CRS Report for Congress* 13, Congressional Research Service (2010) see at Online: www.crs.gov.

46   Md. Safiqul Islam, *"Sino-Bangladesh Relations: Geo-strategic and Geo-political Implications,"* in Sino-South Asian Relations: Continuity and Change, ed., Md. Monoar Kabir (Chittagong, Bangladesh: Department of Political Science, University of Chittagong, 2013), 204.

47   Zaglul Haider, *The Changing Pattern of Bangladesh Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Mujib and Zia Regimes* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2006), 166.

48   Rumi Aoyama, "One Belt, One Road: China's New Global Strategy," *Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies* 5, no. 2 (2016): 3-22.

Company supplied opium from Bengal (Bangladesh) to China, providing huge profits to British merchants and simultaneously causing a health crisis and social upheaval in China. This resulted in two opium wars and China's humiliation.

Bangladesh has its own interest in countering Indian hegemony, and seeks to enhance its strategic value and gain economic benefits. In pursuit of this, Bangladesh has developed friendly relations with China.[49] Significantly, Bangladesh seeks to not excessively depend on India in order to ensure a degree of autonomy in its foreign policy, that has prompted the country to inch closer to China.[50] Likewise, China has gradually become the development partner of Bangladesh and one of the main sources of its military hardware. They have been instrumental in providing aid in the fields of communications, power and energy, technology, and infrastructure. As a result, China overtook India as Bangladesh's largest trading partner in 2005.[51] In addition to trade, China is developing the Chittagong port and establishing a Special Economic Zone on 774 acres of land at Anawara in Chittagong.[52] The two countries have agreed to construct rail connections between Kunming in Yunnan Province and the strategically important port of Chittagong in Bangladesh via Myanmar, and build container port facilities there. These will be used for commercial access.[53] Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina requested greater developmental assistance from China for a deep seaport at Sonadia Island of Cox's Bazar district in south eastern Bangladesh, which could be used by all the neighboring countries. The Chinese government responded very positively to her proposal with an interest of developing a deep seaport at Sonadia Island; and within a short time, then-vice president of China Xi Jinping came to Bangladesh to forward the discussions. The two countries agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding during the visit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to China in 2014. However, India put diplomatic pressure on Bangladesh to call-off the memorandum signing, causing it to be shelved at the last minute.[54]

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49 Gurudas Das, "Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Issues in Trade, Transit and Security," *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies* 13, no. 4 (October-December 2009): 4-34.

50 Shelly Barbhuiya, "India-Bangladesh Relations: Issues and Challenges," Himalayan and Central Asian Studies 13, no.4 (October-December 2009): 35-61.Maini Tribivesh Singh, "India-Bangladesh Relations: The Bigger Picture," *The Diplomat,* June 05, 2015.

51 Sreeradha Datta, "Bangladesh's Relations with China and India: A Comparative Study," *Strategic Analysis* 32, no. 5 (2008): 755-72.

52 The Inqilab, 1 October 2015 in Md. Safiqul Islam and Tange Qingye, "China's "Belt and Road" Initiative: Implications for Bangladesh," *Regional Studies* xxxiv, no. 3 (2016): 54-74.

53 Gurudas Das; Ujjwal K. Paul; and Tanuj Mathur, "Sub-regional Cooperation for the Development of Land-locked Peripheral Areas: The Case of BCIM," *South Asian Survey* 20, no. 1 (2013): 74-93.

54 Muinul Islam, "Regional Connectivity: Current Challenges for Bangladesh," Paper prepared for presentation in the regional seminar of the *Bangladesh Economic Association* - Chittagong Chapter (19 March 2016):25.

India's geopolitical rivalry with China regarding the latter's access to the Bay of Bengal sabotaged the deep sea port of Sonadia. However, through Xi Jinping's visit to Bangladesh on October 14th 2016, this time as the leader of China, strategic partnerships between the two countries in international relations went beyond simply strengthening cooperation. During that visit, China inked 27 deals worth $24 billion in soft loans for various key development projects.[55] Thirteen Bangladeshi and thirteen Chinese companies signed joint venture agreements involving $13 billion to increase bilateral trade between the two.[56] They also signed important agreements on sharing intelligence information to combat terrorism and on the procurement of six military vessels and military hardware from China. According to the agreement, China has already provided Bangladesh with four submarines for its navy. Bangladesh and China have agreed to go forward with constructing the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) and China's Maritime Road.

India is apprehensive of China's pursuit of friendly ties with India's eastern and western neighbors—Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively—as an attempt to frame the country and subvert its leadership in South Asia.[57] Further, New Delhi considers South Asia as its backyard, exerting influence over it, and so a growing relationship between China and Bangladesh could disrupt Indian interests in this region.[58] Many international relations experts in Bangladesh believe that it was under serious pressure because of the Indo-US effort to contain China. The Khaleda Zia government (2001-2006) was more engaged in various aspects with China than the previous government. As a result, the Indo-US alliance has made the Khaleda led Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) expendable.[59] Indo-US alliance supported Awami League (the present ruling party of Bangladesh) to win in the 2008 election by pushing the military backed government of Bangladesh that was in power. However, Indians were concerned that "Chinese leaders have encouraged Bangladesh to pursue an independent foreign policy and move away from India's sphere of influence".[60] Nonetheless, due to geography, the two countries have remained important for each other in terms of security and economic dependence.[61] During that time

55 *The Daily Star*, October 15, 2016
56 *New Age*, October 15, 2016
57 Horimoto, "Ambivalent Relations of India and China," 75.
58 Piyali Dutta, "India-Bangladesh Relations: Issues, Problems and Recent Development," *Special Report 97*, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, (September 2010).
59 Anwara Begum, *Sino-South Asian Relations: Missed Opportunities?* (Dhaka: A H Development Publishing House, 2015), 360.
60 M. Jashim Uddin and Mahbubur Rashid Bhuiyan, "Sino-Bangladesh Relations: An Appraisal," B*IISS Journal* 32, no.1 (2011):1-24.
61 Smruti S Pattanaik, *Four Decades of India and Bangladesh Relations: Historical Imperative and Future Direction* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2012), 20.

Sheikh Hasina led the Awami League government, and their relations reached a new height. In the last five yearsduring this regime, the trade between the two countries has grown by more than seventeen percent with bilateral trade at $6.8 billion in 2015-16.[62] In facilitating bilateral economic and security relations, the two countries have signed a good number of agreements and memoranda that include trade, uses of seaports in Bangladesh, and power plants.[63] Similar to China, India and Bangladesh also have signed an agreement on sharing intelligence to prevent terrorism and religious extremism.[64] Bangladesh has also provided India with naval and land corridors for transporting their goods from the mainland to its northeastern region. India has already started to transport their goods to the region through the land and river routes of Bangladesh.[65] Moreover, during Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina's visit to India on April 7-10 2017, Bangladesh and India signed six agreements and 16 memoranda of understanding which include cooperation on nuclear power, border trade, cooperation in the field of information technology and electronics, cooperation in outer space research and strategic studies, cyber security, etc.[66] Significantly, a major aspect of the visit has been defense cooperation which includes a memorandum of understanding on a defense framework, and a $500 million line of credit for defense procurement for the Bangladeshi military forces. Despite the pressure from India and Indian criticism of Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Bangladesh in October 2016, the agreements were nonetheless signed between China and Bangladesh. Bangladeshi newspapers reported that the government was under tremendous diplomatic pressure from India, especially after they received four submarines for the Bangladeshi Navy from China. Consequently, Bangladesh has signed a MoU on defense frameworks in order to balance its relations with China and India. It can therefore be noted that India has tried to influence domestic politics and international affairs of Bangladesh in order to exclude Chinese influence on the country.

Economic Cooperation and Strategic Partnership with Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is India's immediate neighbor, just 30 nautical miles away from its southern coastline. Indians have long interpreted the Chinese engagement with Sri Lanka as a part of China's "String of Pearls" strategy. In order to reduce Chinese influence in Sri Lanka and to secure strategic and economic

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62 *The Times of India*, April 4, 2017.
63 Md. Abul Kashem and Md. Shariful Islam, "Narendra Modi's Bangladesh Policy and India–Bangladesh Relations: Challenges and Possible Policy Responses," *India Quarterly* 72, no.3 (2016):250–267.
64 The New Age, April 10, 2017.
65 Kashem and Islam, "Narendra Modi's Bangladesh Policy and India–Bangladesh Relations," 257.
66 *The Daily Star*, April 09, 2017.

interests, New Delhi has made a strong engagement with the country in the field of growing trade and investment, development, education, infrastructure, and defense. India is the largest trading partner of Sri Lanka.[67] In particular, trade between the two countries has grown rapidly after the enforcement of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000.[68] New Delhi has also developed close relations with the Sri Lankan Navy and made a trilateral maritime security agreement with Sri Lanka and Maldives.[69] In the coming years, India wants to make multilateral maritime security groupings with other coastal countries of the Bay modeled on its existing agreement .[70] Sri Lanka and the Maldives signed a memorandum of understanding for Indian assistance in reconstructing the Palely airstrip on the Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka.[71]

Under the Rajapaksa regime, there were indications that Beijing may have sought to develop a small-scale military presence in Sri Lanka. A Chinese submarine visit to the Chinese-built port in Colombo was taken by Indians as a sign of China's intent to develop a regular submarine presence in the area.[72] To pull Sri Lanka back into the Indian orbit, India put rings of engagement around its elites. The Modi government influenced the elections held in January 2015 to change existing Rajapaksa government by deploying its foreign intelligence agency, The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).[73] International media reported how RAW orchestrated the defeat of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa who is credited for the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) guerrilla organization, that sought to establish an independent Tamil state ending the decades of bloody civil war in 2009.[74] China contends however that it pokes its nose into domestic politics of Sri Lanka, unlike India. The change of regime in Sri Lanka has, therefore, taken Indian-Sri Lankan bilateral relations to a new height. The two neighbors are moving steadily toward a comprehensive economic partnership agreement. Under the agreement, Indian investment will flow into Sri Lanka and make the island's production facilities part of the international value chain that runs through India. Additionally, the Sri Lankan government provides India resources to build roads and highways from Jaffna

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67   Balachandran P. K, "New dawn for India-Sri Lanka relations," *The New Indian Express,* October 11, 2016.

68   Ibid.

69   Brewster, "The Rise of the Bengal Tigers," 92.

70   Ibid, 92

71   Amit Kumar, "Sri Lanka's Lion in Dragon's Arms," South Asia Monitor, March 2012. See at http://www. southasia monitor. Org/Mar/17wsa3.shtml (Accessed on June 15, 2016).

72   Ibid.

73   The Holiday, December 23, 2016.

74   Ibid.

to Mannar, Mannar to Colombo, and Mannar to Trincomalee, that will facilitate the trade between the two countries.[75]

Sri Lanka is an island state located in the western exit of the Bay and close to the busiest sea lanes of communications in the southern Indian Ocean. China is transporting about 80 percent of its energy and other goods in the sea lanes of communications near the coastline of Sri Lanka.[76] Thus, China also has strategic and economic interests in Sri Lanka and has provided military and technical assistance to create an enduring, deep-rooted relationship. Chinese assistance has grown fivefold in 2014 to nearly $1 billion, overtaking Sri Lanka's, and its long time largest donor at that time, Japan.[77] The most striking cooperation between China and Sri Lanka has been the construction of the strategically significant deep seaport at Hambantota and the Colombo International Container Terminal with Chinese assistance and funding. The total cost of the Hambantota project is expected to be 1.5 billion and China has agreed to provide 85 percent of the cost.[78] China also financed a second international airport near Hambantota, a $248 million expressway connecting the capital of Colombo with the airport at Katunayake, and an $855 million coal power plant.[79] Under the present Maithripala Sirisena led-government, the two countries have signed a deal recently to hand over the Hambantota deep seaport to China along with the nearby Mattala International Airport and 12,500 acres of land to develop into a Special Economic Zone. This is in part due to the balance of Sri Lanka's relationships with India and China and in part due to significant debt.[80]

Indian experts have argued that many of the development projects in Hambantota, which originally began during the Rajapaksa-led government as Sri Lankan national projects financed by Chinese companies, have gradually turned into de facto Chinese enclaves. If this continues Hambantota will undoubtedly become a hub of China's Maritime Silk Road in the Indian Ocean. The location of the port on the southern tip of Sri Lanka, about six hundred nautical miles north from the international sea lines of communications in the Indian Ocean, makes it a strategic prize.[81] It is 1300 km away from each of India's two strategic naval bases at Visakhapatanam and Andaman and

75   Balachandran, New dawn for India-Sri Lanka relations.
76   Eryan Ramadhani," China in the Indian ocean Region: The Confined Far-Seas Operations," *India Quarterly* 71, no. 2 (2015): 146-159.
77   Begum, *Sino-South Asian Relations,* 103.
78   *Iftifak*, June 24, 2013
79   Copper, J. F., "China's Foreign aid and Investment Diplomacy in South Asia" *China's Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy* II, ed. Copper, J. F (2016), 49-91.
80   *The Holiday,* December 23, 2016.
81   Kumar, "Sri Lanka's Lion in Dragon's Arms."

Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal.[82] Hambantota is also just 500 km to the south of Sri Lanka, India's spaceport, from where it conducts sensitive launches of military satellites and missile tests.[83] In a nutshell, China's presence in the Hambantota deep seaport will reduce the influence of India in the Bay of Bengal and presents a potential strategic threat to India in its own backyard.

Connectivity Initiatives

China seeks to cement its influence in the Bay of Bengal, and thereby reduce its strategic vulnerability through connectivity initiatives. Its strategic vulnerability is, in particular, reinforced by the scarcity of overland transport connections between China and the Bay of Bengal. The ancient Silk Road linked the southwestern region of China to the bay through Bengal (Bangladesh) and Burma (Myanmar) but until the twentieth century, there were no major transport routes (roads, railways, and rivers) connecting the region with the Bay. A lack of consensus on connectivity projects between India and China has made the construction of a land route difficult. Its geographical position, therefore, puts limits and narrows China's options.[84] Formidable geographical barriers caused by the mountain ranges, deserts and jungles along the southwestern region of China have made the development of such links difficult. In contrast, India's geographical location has given it a natural advantage in the bay. New Delhi can control the Bay of Bengal as well as look southward into the deep Indian Ocean and its sea lanes of communications from its bases and resources within Indian territory.[85] Its eastern naval command is able to oversee and conduct operations into the Bay at any time from its naval bases at Paradip in Orissa and Tulicorin in Tamil Nadu. Its naval air station—INS Parundu—further to the south at Uchipuli was upgraded in 2009 to accommodate larger aircraft that can operate in the Bay.[86] If China could develop a series of overland pathways to the Bay, using Yunnan Province as a base facing South Asia and Southeast Asia, it could effectively counter India's strategic advantage. Significantly, the BCIM-EC will run from Kunming of Yunnan Province in China to Kolkata of West Bengal in India through Bangladesh, Northeast India, and Myanmar that will link the Bay of Bengal and subsequently the Indian Ocean. The corridor that was the road map of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum was included as one of the six economic belts of China's "Belt and Road" initiative

82   Copper, "China's Foreign aid and Investment Diplomacy in South Asia," 55.
83   Kumar, "Sri Lanka's Lion in Dragon's Arms".
84   David Brewster, "An Indian Ocean Dilemma: Sino-Indian Rivalry and China's Strategic Vulnerability in the Indian Ocean," *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 11, no.1, (2015):48-59.
85   Scott, "India's Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean," 100.
86   Scott, "India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean," 493.

presented by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2013.[87] However, two routes of the BCIM-EC will link seaports at Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar located to the Bay of Bengal. Moreover, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor will follow the same route up to Myanmar and then will go to the countries of Southeast Asia along the Bay. They would involve the creation of a transport and manufacturing corridor.

Figure1. China's Proposed BCIM and Indo-China Peninsula Economic Corridors

Source: www.asiabriefing.com.

China's twenty-first century maritime Silk Road will touch major sea ports of coastal countries in the Bay as it enters the region from the South China Sea. The Maritime Road will comprise 29 coastal counties from the South China Sea to Indian Ocean.[88] Among them, there are eight coastal countries of the Bay - Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. China is going to develop seaports, other infrastructure, and establish

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87   Zaara Zain Hussain, "The BCIM Regional Cooperation: An Emerging Multilateral Framework in Asia," *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 7, no. 2 (2015): 173–189.

88   Md. Safiqul Islam and Tange Qingye, "China's "Belt and Road" Initiative: Implications for Bangladesh," *Regional Studies, Institute of Regional Studies* xxxiv, no. 3, (2016): 54-74.

Special Economic Zones (SEZ).[89] China envisages that it will link together all the countries in the northeastern Indian Ocean. Most importantly, in the Bay region there are already Chinese industrial parks in Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. The overland and maritime connectivity projects and engagement with the littoral countries of the Bay will work as a response to the changing geopolitical situation marked by the US as a rebalance to Asia, and erase China's historic vulnerability to India in the Bay of Bengal region. This will allow Beijing to ensure its security there.

Figure 2. China's Maritime Silk Road


Source: http://www.spsnavalforces.com

As for mutual cooperation and mutual development, the economic corridors and the maritime Silk Road' may enable the creation of a growth triangle of these countries and will facilitate China's Western Development Strategy.[90] For

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89   Ibid, 60.

90   In order to mitigate the long-standing domestic imbalance of regional development, a drive was launched by Beijing in 1999 to promote social and economic progress in the central and western parts of the country by injecting financial aid and offering favorable policies. Yunnan Province formulated the "Western Development" scheme and formally adopted the program in constructing an international passage connecting China to Southeast and South Asia at the Ninth Plenary Session of the Sixth Yun-

a long time, the communication system and infrastructure of the region have been weak, and the economy developed slowly since the region is landlocked and far from the center of growth in China.[91] China will be able to transport energy and goods to and from its southwestern region easily, on time, and at a minimum transport cost. These would bind the Bay of Bengal much closer to the Chinese economy. Moreover, Beijing has been successful in developing connections through Myanmar, including the recently completed oil and gas pipelines between the new deep seaport of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar and its Yunnan province. The natural gas pipeline project started to transport gas to China on July 28 2013.[92] The 2,806 km long gas pipeline runs from Ruili to Kunming and reaches southwestern provinces such as Guizhou and Guangxi.[93] The Kyaukpyu project was also included in the 1200 km railway and highway at the cost of $20 billion.[94] The new Sino-Myanmar pipelines, railway and highway Kyaukpyu projects can reduce China's reliance on the Straits of Malacca and diversify China's oil and gas supply. It will lessen risks and strengthen China's ability to cope with the complex and volatile international situation.

Figure 3. China's Trans-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines

Source: www.oilseedcrop.org

nan Provincial committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December, 1999.

91 Hongwei Fan, "China's 'Look South': China-Myanmar Transport Corridor," *Ritsumeikan International Affairs* 10, (2011): 43-66.

92 Liu, "Sino-Myanmar Bilateral Relations in 2013," 176.

93 Ibid.

94 Kostecka, D.J., "The Chinese Navy's Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean," *China Brief* 10 , no. 15 (2010) :3-5.

New Delhi fears that Beijing's connectivity initiatives will challenge India's interests in the region and that the proposed BCIM Economic Corridor could even threaten India's national cohesion by integrating India's estranged northeastern states into the Chinese economy.[95] India, by contrast, promotes the Trilateral Highway Project that would build road connections from Delhi to Thailand via Bangladesh, India's north-eastern states, and Myanmar.[96] At the meeting among representatives of India, Myanmar, and Thailand in Naypyidawin in April 2012, the three countries formally agreed on the construction of an India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway.[97] The project aims to connect the three countries through the construction of a highway from Moreh in Manipur state via Mandalay and Yangon in Myanmar to Mae Sot in Thailand. While the project was announced nearly ready in late 2013, recent projections estimate its completion by 2016.[98] But in summer 2014, several newspapers reported that 2017 may be a more realistic timeframe for completion.[99] However, it was unclear about the progress towards constructing the trilateral highway project between the three countries. New Delhi's overland connection project with Southeast Asia through the Bay of Bengal region is challenging to build due to the impoverished condition of its eastern neighbors, ethnic insurgencies and political problems over transit rights. It will, however, enhance India's focus on balancing its interests to protect its strategic position in the region.

Figure 4. India's Proposed Trilateral Highway Project

Source: http://swarajyamag.com/world/india-myanmar-thailand-highway-strategic-dimensions

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95   Patricia Uberoi, "Problems and Prospects of BCIM Economic Corridor," *China Report* 52, no.1 (2016):19-44.
96   Brewster, "The Rise of the Bengal Tigers," 92.
97   *The Economic Times*, October 22, 2013.
98   *The Hindu*, May 30, 2013.
99   *The Hindustan Times,* June 24, 2014.

India is also sponsoring the renewal of shipping connections across the Bay of Bengal. Until the 1940s, Calcutta was the hub for a dense intra-regional shipping network connecting India and the territories around the Bay, and linking rivers such as the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Irrawaddy to provide direct connections with more remote areas.[100] These connections withered away in the decades following the independence of India, Pakistan, and Myanmar from the colonial rule. Following the demarcation of borders of these sovereign states, and a lack of agreement among them on the shipping route made barriers continue. However, India is reviving the old oceanic and river shipping routes as they are much more simple and cost-effective for intra-regional connection. In October 2014, the Indian state-owned shipping line restarted direct connections between Chennai, Colombo and Rangoon, initiating connections between ports in India and Bangladesh on a trial basis. India has long been transporting goods and energy to its northeastern region through the river routes of Bangladesh. It has also developed the Kaladan multimodal transport projects with Myanmar. The project will link the ports of Kolkata (India) and Sittwe (Myanmar) by shipping route, and link Sittwe with Lashio further up to the Kaladan River by boat.[101] A road will then link Lashio with the Mizoram province of India. An agreement was signed between the two countries in 2008 to implement the project.[102] The main rationale has been to improve connectivity between mainland India and the northeastern states by creating an alternative to the Siliguri corridor which is at present the only route[103].

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100 Brewster,"The Rise of the Bengal Tigers," 93.

101 *Indian Express,* June 17, 2006.

102 K. W. Htun, N. N. Lwin, T. H. Naing and K. Tun, "ASEAN-India Connectivity: A Myanmar Perspective" in AS*EAN-India Connectivity: The Comprehensive Asia Development Plan, Phase II,* ERIA Research Project Report 2010-7, eds., Kimura, F. and S. Umezaki (Jakarta: ERIA, 2011):151-203.

103 Ibid, 184.

Figure 5. India's Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project

Source: Myanmar Port Authority (2010)

India is also keen for its companies to participate in the proposed new port project near Chittagong in Bangladesh that would help to connect its northeastern Tripura state via road and allow it to transport goods to the region at minimum cost and time.[104] The Indian connectivity initiative will provide access to Southeast Asia and the greater Mekong region, while also reducing China's influence in the region.

Subregional Cooperation

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Thailand, and Sri Lanka is a viable option for India to forge an effective regional group to promote broader economic and strategic integration. Its objective is to create an environment that enables rapid economic development, accelerates social progress, and maintains close and beneficial cooperation with the existing international and regional organizations.[105] BIMSTEC can act as a bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia, and the signing of the framework agreement for this free trade area in 2004 was a major step forward in its creation. In signing the agreement, India acquired

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104 Ibid

105 Aparna Sharma and Chetna K Rathore, "BIMSTEC and BCIM Initiatives and their Importance for In-dia," This Discussion Paper was researched and written for *Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environment* (CUTS CITEE) D-217, (2015): 04, see at www.cuts-international.org

an opportunity to revive its past relations with its old colonial-era partners. The BIMSTEC framework agreement was initiated as part of the Indian "Look East" policy, and India is a leading member of the organization. Recently, New Delhi has renewed its focus on the BIMSTEC grouping due to the need to develop improved transport connectivity across the Bay of Bengal. Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh stated at the BIMSTEC summit held in Myanmar in March 2014 that: "Connectivity— physical and digital—is the key to (BIMSTEC's) vision and can be a driver of cooperation and integration in our region."[106] BIMSTEC may contribute to enhance India's focus on balancing its interests to protect its strategic position and reduce Chinese influence in the region. Moreover, India's subregional cooperation across the Bay of Bengal has been accompanied by an expansion of its primary area of strategic interest. India has long aspired to be recognized as the predominant power in the Bay of Bengal and it now also aspires to assume a greater strategic role in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The idea of the Indo-Pacific has emerged on the basis of strategic space of the Bay of Bengal. The idea is being promoted by strategic thinkers and political leaders in the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.[107] The US especially is encouraging an expansion of India's security role eastwards into Southeast Asia and the Pacific, largely driven by concerns about China.[108] India is now going to make Indo-Pacific cooperation a goal in order to form an anti-China coalition of maritime power which may include nations such as the US, Japan, India, and Australia, although at this point it does not have any organizational structure.

China has, in contrast, promoted subregional cooperation to make collective effort in the development of infrastructure, fostered economic development, and minimized its geographical vulnerability. Significantly, Beijing initiated the BCIM forum for subregional cooperation as the Kunming Initiative in August 1999, comprising Bangladesh, Southwestern China, Northeastern India, and Myanmar. The forum has become an important subregional cooperation mechanism in the region, aiming at greater infrastructural development, building connectivity and enhancing economic integration. It will link the Bay of Bengal with northeastern India and southwestern China, and promote contact among these four countries at both the public and private sector level.[109] Likewise, the Greater Mekong subregion, started in 1992, has incorporated the six littoral countries of the Bay of Bengal consisting of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yunnan and Guangxi provinces of China. The

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106 Brewster,"Dividing Lines, " 163.
107 Annpurna Nautiyal, "US Security Strategy of Asian Rebalance: India's Role and Concerns," *Strategic Analysis* 41, no. 1,(2017): 14-33.
108 Ibid.
109 Hussain, "The BCIM Regional Cooperation," 175.

countries of the Greater Mekong region emphasized interregional connectivity and 'regional integration' rather than competitiveness and community.[110] The transport links established within the region, for example, the North-South Corridor, and East-West Corridor, link different parts of Vietnam to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar, and Yunnan and Gaungxi province of China.[111] The subregional zones are therefore the meeting point of the three markets of China, Southeast, and South Asia. There are abundant natural resources, labor, and established international sea routes. Some Indian experts argue that the sub-regional cooperation zones will be a growing assertion of Chinese economic-cum-political power. It will facilitate China's ability to make explicit alignment by the countries with its "neighborhood", in particular, the coastal countries of the Bay of Bengal. Moreover, it will contribute to balancing China's strategic position with India and other rival powers to protect its interests in the region.

Conclusion

The strategic competition between China and India is evident in the Bay of Bengal region; they perceive a security dilemma due to their suspicion about the strategies of the other. The bilateral relations of the two countries continue to be marked by distrust and suspicion in part due to unresolved issues between them, some of which have existed since the 1950s and some of which are more recent developments. Significantly, India fears losing its dominant position in the Bay of Bengal to China. China wants to prevent the domination of any ambitious regional or global power over the coastal countries of the Bay, as a regional hegemonic power poses a strategic threat. China's main strategy is to strengthen ties with the coastal countries in the Bay. Given its geographical location and lack of physical connectivity with the Bay, China seeks to overcome its geostrategic and security vulnerability, while India wants to protect its dominant position in the Bay of Bengal region. Most importantly, China is developing links from its southwestern region to the Bay of Bengal in order to open up the region as part of its Western Development Strategy. Similarly, India is trying to implement its "Look East" policy through the Bay of Bengal region to Southeast Asia. Both China and India are seeking to maximize their economic and strategic interests.

China and India are developing economic, defense, and strategic partnerships with Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. China is constructing land routes, railway, gas and oil pipelines, seaports, and airfields in Myanmar in order to secure its connection to the Bay. It has also developed economic,

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110 Das, et al., "Sub-regional Cooperation for the Development of Land-locked Peripheral Areas," 76.
111 Htun et al., "ASEAN-India Connectivity," 170.

strategic, and defense relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and is constructing highways, railways, and bridges, establishing Special Economic Zones, providing military hardware to these countries, and developing seaports in Chittagong (Bangladesh) and Hambantota (Sri Lanka). India has also developed bilateral defense, economic, and strategic relationships with some of the littoral countries of the Bay of Bengal and is strengthening its already close relations with Myanmar in security and counterterrorism, trade and investment, infrastructure, and energy. It has built strong relationships with its immediate neighbors, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, by signing several economic and defense agreements. In addition, both China and India have initiated subregional cooperation and connectivity initiatives to protect economic and strategic interests and to minimize security vulnerability in the Bay region. China's proposed BCIM and Indo-China economic corridors could provide the land-locked western region of China access to the Bay and stimulate subregional economic development. Moreover, the Maritime Road will touch the major sea ports of littoral countries of the Bay. These projects will work as a response to the new geopolitical situation created by the US and India, and move to ease its vulnerability in the region. India too has promoted a sub-regional cooperation forum, BIMSTEC, comprising coastal countries of the Bay and proposed the Trilateral Highway Project that will build road connections from Delhi to Thailand through Bangladesh, Northeastern India, and Myanmar. Delhi is also reviving the old oceanic and river shipping routes which were operational until the 1940s. These initiatives will contribute to balancing the position of India in the region.

The nature of Indian strategies in the Bay of Bengal region is hegemonic and the country is always critical of the coastal countries' economic, strategic, and defense engagement with China. India has also, at times, put diplomatic pressure on these countries to call off their bilateral deals with the Chinese government. India's attempt to influence the foreign affairs of these countries is an effort to exclude Chinese influence from the region. Moreover, India interferes in internal political affairs of neighboring countries in order to ensure that a favorable government is in power. On the other hand, China is not critical of Indian deals with the coastal countries of the Bay of Bengal. There is no evidence that China interferes in internal politics of these countries. However, China has encouraged the littoral countries to follow an independent foreign policy and move away from India's sphere of influence. Moreover, China's economic engagement and strategic partnership with the coastal countries is stronger than Indian engagement and strategic relations. China's development and uses of seaports in Myanmar and Sri Lanka can advance China's strategic position, vulnerable due to China's geographic distance. Further, China's connectivity initiatives are more acceptable and the country is

successful in completing oil and gas pipelines to link its southwestern region to the Bay through Myanmar. Therefore, considering the success of connectivity initiatives and subregional cooperation, the depth of economic engagement, and the strategic partnership of China and India with the coastal countries of the Bay, for the time being the geostrategic situation of the Bay of Bengal is precariously balanced between the two powers.

THE CLOCK IS TICKING FOR BANGLADESH: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

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Abstract: Climate change is one of the most important issues in Bangladesh. Environmental and human security risks accompanied by climate change make the Bangladeshi population highly vulnerable to violent conflicts over resources.[1] Especially, in slums, where many climate refugees end up, the situation may be even worse. It is estimated that by 2050, there will be one billion global climate migrants, thirty million of whom will be Bangladeshi.[2] According to the Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, this situation will lead to "social disorder, political instability, cross-border conflict and upheavals."[3] Since the prospect of climate change seems an inevitable phenomenon, the Bangladeshi government should design policies to fit its current situation. This paper proposes three different policies for the Bangladeshi government. First, a pro-active policy needs to be established to address the occurrence of natural disasters stemming from climate change. This policy would include education and public awareness for the Bangladeshi people to minimize potential damage. Second, a resettlement policy needs to be arranged to help climate refugees/migrants recover. Finally, the third policy needs to focus on mobilizing both local people and NGOs to deal with the crisis.

Introduction: The Scope of the Problem

Bangladesh has a large population of 162 million inhabitants and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of USD 1,330.[4] Its small geographical

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1   Nicole Detraz, "Environmental Security and Gender: Necessary Shifts in an Evolving Debate," *Security Studies* 18, no. 2 (2009), 347.
2   *Climate Displacement in Bangladesh The Need for Urgent Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Rights Solutions* (Geneva: Displacement Solutions, 2012), 13.
3   Ben Saul, "The Security Risks of Climate Change Displacement in Bangladesh," *Journal of Human Security* 8, no. 2 (2012), 7.
4   The World Bank, "Bangladesh," The World Bank Group, 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/country/bangladesh.

size relative to its population makes Bangladesh one of the most densely populated countries in the world.[5] Agriculture is the most important industry in Bangladesh; approximately 87 percent of rural households—accounting for 70 percent of the Bangladesh population—depends on agriculture for their income, and 16.5 percent of its GDP derives from this industry.[6] In agricultural societies like Bangladesh, newly emerging environmental threats through climate change like periodic flooding and drought become more deadly. Moreover, the impact of these threats can be magnified by existing high poverty levels in Bangladesh. These factors make Bangladesh more vulnerable to climate change.[7] Various natural disasters are already occurring in Bangladesh. Flooding, cyclones, storm surges, water logging, salinity intrusion, riverbank erosion, coastal erosion, rising sea levels, and land loss will be exacerbated by the effects of climate change. In particular, sea level rise is the worst consequence of climate change as the experts expect the thirty percent of Bangladeshi land to be subsumed by 2080.[8] Consequently, people will lose their homes and be obliged to migrate. However, due to a lack of affordable housing, there is a danger that they will end up in slums, where particularly vulnerable groups are under the threat of violence because of the absence of police and protection measures. Addressing the issue through an awareness-raising campaign will make people more prepared in the event of disaster. In addition, a resettlement policy, which deals with both regional and domestic migration, will address the consequences of climate change migration such as violence and the existence of slums. A community-based approach is effective and sustainable, allowing both policymakers and the general public to see the issue through the eyes of the local population.

Critique of Policy Options

Currently, Bangladesh is having difficulty controlling its population growth along with the increase of climate refugees. Bangladesh, an agriculture dependent country, will find itself at higher risk if its current rate of population growth remains the same.[9] The government has proven itself incapable of domestic reform and has failed to manage farmland use. These are early warning signs

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5   The World Population Review, "Bangladesh Population 2018," *The World Population Review*, 2017, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/bangladesh-population/

6   The World Bank, "Bangladesh: Growing the Economy through Advances in Agriculture," T*he World Bank Group,* 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2016/10/07/bangladesh-growing-economy-through-advances-in-agriculture

7   Mostafa Mahmud. Naser, "Climate Change and Migration: Law and Policy Perspectives in Bangladesh," *Asian Journal of Law and Society* 2, no. 1 (2015), 44.

8   Saul, "The Security Risks of Climate Change Displacement in Bangladesh," 7.

9   Md A. F. Younus, *Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in Bangladesh: Processes, Assessment and Effects* (New York: Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg, 2014), 21.

that the government is incapable of tackling climate refugee issues effectively. That said, the government of Bangladesh has made some efforts to plan for the effects of climate change. The Ministry of Environment and Forests has published the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP). As a part of this plan, the National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) came into effect in 2005.[10] Furthermore, thirty-five years ago, the Bangladeshi government invested ten billion US dollars in various programs for the protection of the country from climate change vulnerabilities. Structural flood management schemes, such as building flood shelters, roads and highways beyond the reach of floods, were put in place.[11] However, the government overlooked the need for mobilizing the local population and neglected to raise awareness or devise local-friendly and sustainable plans to deal with the issue. Despite its attempts to adopt a local approach to carrying out climate change adaptation policies, and given physical conditions, the government neither provided nor implemented any detailed guidelines on how, and in what projects local people can be included.

Preparation Policy – Education

A policy to raise awareness of environmental threats among the Bangladeshi public will help them become involved in promoting security in their communities. By educating and including the public in all stages of project development, the Bangladeshi people will be better informed of and prepared for natural disasters as they learn how to handle and cope with the crisis. People will be able to manage consumption and economic needs, obtain emergency food supplies, cope with uncertainties, and respond to sudden changes.[12] Thus, the government should give its people access to information on how to handle emergency situations in relation to climate change as a way of enhancing the awareness on climate change and helping them prepare and adapt to these changes.

With the help of NGOs, the Bangladeshi government should commit its resources towards education since the knowledge about such issues can increase their own self-adaptation efficacy.[13] Climate awareness affects people's adaptation efficacy against climatic stresses. Such physical, cultural,

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10   Naser, "Climate Change and Migration: Law and Policy Perspectives in Bangladesh," 41.

11   Younus, *Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in Bangladesh: Processes, Assessment and Effects,* 19.

12   Mustafa Saroar and Jayant K. Routray, "Climate Awareness and Adaptation Efficacy for Livelihood Security against Sea Level Rise in Coastal Bangladesh," In *Climate change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability, eds. Jürgen Scheffran et al.,* (Berlin: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012), 576.

13   Ibid., 577.

and information resources that affect an adaptation capacity have a similar influence on their adaptation efficacies.[14] People will be better equipped socio-psychologically through awareness education, and their beliefs and strength of collective action can be enhanced.

A climate awareness raising program will provide people with some extrinsic and tangible benefits in protecting their livelihoods in both the short and long term. For example, the public will be made aware of the importance of conserving resources such as water, food, clothing, energy and electricity. Furthermore, training the public to follow guidelines in emergencies, such as what to bring and how to find the closest shelters, will help the public minimize the human risks of climate change. Teaching the public to regularly listen to the broadcasting of emergency messages via various media (including television and radio) will teach them how to receive information in an emergency. Besides other survival skills, people can be taught to construct temporary shelters above flood paths.[15] Training sessions on rescue, evacuation and first aid will teach them how to escape from areas of crisis as well as help others do the same.

In the case of natural disasters caused by climate change, people often depend on external assistance seeking material and non-material support from local governments and NGOs rather than devising their own solutions. Such a tendency toward dependence should be discouraged through awareness education, as it weakens people's own efficient adaptation.[16] The more people depend on external help, the less they will be able to survive flooding before rescue teams arrive on the scene. When natural disasters like flooding destroy homes, people need to make sure they have enough food and clothing to survive. Through education, people will learn how to be prepared for future crises, and this is especially true for people who are poorer, less resilient and unable to cope. This kind of education might include campaigns for large audiences, education for young students in schools, and young volunteers. The participation of volunteers in a crisis will also minimize the burden on the Bangladeshi government.

To prevent deforestation and to recreate the natural defences of the country against storms, the government can educate its civilians about the importance of the mangroves, which can provide resistance to incoming storms and monsoons. Education about what action to undertake to improve the current situation will enable civilians to plant and replenish the forest.

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14   Ibid., 589.
15   Sovacool, Benjamin K. et al., "Improving Climate Change Adaptation in Least Developed Asia," *Environmental Science & Policy* 21 (2012): 121.
16   Saroar, "Climate Awareness and Adaptation Efficacy for Livelihood Security against Sea Level Rise in Coastal Bangladesh," 590.

Before deforestation, mangrove forests provided at least 500m of natural defenses against storms; now, they only provide 12-50m of protection in most locations.[17] The government should make people aware of the consequences of illegal deforestation and logging. Educated citizens are more likely to make greater efforts to preserve their overall environment that includes afforesting mangroves.

The Bangladeshi government can also encourage farmers to adopt different "wetting and drying (AWD) methods of irrigation," different types of fertilizers, growing non-rice crops, and integrating straw stubbles into rice paddies as a substitute for producing rice paddies under irrigated settings, which have contributed to massive GHG emissions in Bangladesh.[18]

The natural disasters caused by changing climate patterns can trigger many diseases and illnesses such as diarrhea, skin diseases, malaria, mental disorders and dengue. The Bangladeshi government's raising awareness campaign about climate change related diseases will benefit civilians as they learn how to prevent and cope with such diseases. A case in point was a health awareness campaign on palliative care conducted in a small village of Villupuram in India. It entailed distribution of pamphlets, poster presentations, and door-to-door delivery of information.[19] By increasing people's understanding of the local health system and its services, the Bangladeshi government can encourage individuals' ability to better cope with health problems that are related to climate change.[20]

Resettlement Policy – Adaptation Plan

The second policy recommendation is a practical resettlement policy. The Bangladeshi government should mobilize NGOs and local governments to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants. This policy includes building institutional frameworks to protect and manage climate-induced migration. Local governments should monitor internal and external migration to help them resettle migrants more effectively. The government should aid the resettlement and rehabilitation of climate refugees in Bangladesh. All the stakeholders must take part; communities, local governments, civil society organizations, and the private sector (development partners) need to be involved to effectively apply

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17 Sovacool et al., "Improving Climate Change Adaptation in Least Developed Asia," 117.
18 World Bank, Climate-Smart Agriculture in Bangladesh (Washington D.C. : The World Bank, 2017), 1.
19 Ankit Chandra et al., "Impact of Health Awareness Campaign in Improving the Perception of the Community about Palliative Care: A Pre- and Post-intervention Study in Rural Tamil Nadu," *Indian J Palliat Care* 22, no. 4 (2016): 467.
20 Rashid, Sabina F., "Urban Poverty, Climate Change and Health Risks for Slum Dwellers in Bangladesh." (Tokyo: Springer, 2018), 59.

this resettlement plan, which will enable efficient use of every crucial human resource and contribute to the safeguarding of human security.

As migration may be necessary, it is important for Bangladesh to facilitate regional cooperation with other South Asian countries. Of particular importance is India, as India shares borders with Bangladesh. India is a democracy and has a growing economy capable of providing economic opportunities, and because of the shared cultural heritage between India and Bangladesh, they have similar languages. It is an especially good migration destination for the Bangladeshi people. However, India's view on Bangladeshi migration is an impediment. One of India's cities, Assam, is largely opposed to illegal migration from Bangladesh because its citizens believe that illegal migrants will change the local demographics, incite violence, dominate employment, exploit natural resources and take away land from tribal peoples. Still, India's current ability to stop migration is limited.[21] As a part of this resettlement policy, the Bangladeshi government should invite the Indian government to have official meetings together to discuss the size of the movement into India, the manner in which migrants are received by host communities, the political response from local Indian governments, and the ways to mitigate the anti-foreign sentiment rampant in these Indian host cities.[22]

Environmental degradation and natural disasters make people homeless and jobless, causing migration. Thus, environmental migration has structural roots in poverty and unemployment. Poor people have lower adaptive capacities to environmental pressures than wealthy people due to lack of resources, including money and knowledge, which might otherwise help them to endure environmental effects. The resettlement policy of Bangladesh should focus on poor people who live in high risk areas and who are not protected by the government. Climate refugees migrating to urban areas are a catalyst for poverty and hardship. They could trigger unrest and violence against those among them who are more marginalized such as children and women.[23] For better settlement, it is important to check slums where climate refugees frequently end up. Slum dwellers are socially marginalized, cut off from their traditional communities and face social and security problems because they are excluded from basic services, comfortable housing, clean water, health care and education. It is important for the Bangladeshi government to make coordinated planning and policy on urbanization and poverty, a priority.[24] The Bangladeshi government should work with insurance companies to provide

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21   Saul, "The Security Risks of Climate Change Displacement in Bangladesh," 8.
22   Ibid, 17.
23   Saroar, "Climate Awareness and Adaptation Efficacy for Livelihood Security against Sea Level Rise in Coastal Bangladesh," 602.
24   Saul, "The Security Risks of Climate Change Displacement in Bangladesh," 26.

affordable insurance products for coastal dwellers who are vulnerable to flooding, so that with insurance payments, they can offset the damages and resettle in new areas smoothly.[25] Job training for less skilled climate refugees is also effective to help them find new jobs where they resettle.

It is important to recognize that this kind of climate change fuels violence and conflicts over resources. Migration to neighboring countries, as well as domestic migration to mostly urban cities should be monitored by the Bangladeshi government. Once again, slums created by climate refugees are the targets of crime and conflict. The Agargaon slum is the biggest slum in Dhaka, the largest city in Banglades. Its residents are prone to crime, smuggling and drug trafficking. Security forces, such as the police, find its narrow and winding paths inaccessible. Groups of mastans (local goons) participate in gun fights in order to dominate and gain control of the slums.[26] All types of crime, such as drugs and alcohol dealing, land grabbing, gambling, illegal arms dealing, murder, kidnapping and domestic violence are very frequent in these slums.

To help climate refugees resettle in these new areas, it is important to improve current conditions. Climate change will act as a supplier and producer of stress and insecurity. It is vital for the Bangladeshi government to intervene with effective enforcement mechanisms and police forces to help climate refugees better adapt to living in new circumstances. The relocation of a population within its domain makes the government responsible for the management and distribution of land. As a part of this resettlement policy, it is important to re-establish control over the land to be distributed. Since large areas of land are at risk of submersion due to rising sea levels and the pre-existing population density of Bangladesh, the threat posed by climate change is particularly pronounced. By 2051, only 0.07 acres of agricultural land per person in Bangladesh will be left.[27] As such, it is vital to stimulate resettlement by providing settlement locations and a proper infrastructure. Land is needed for the relocation of communities to build houses, maintain livelihoods and engage in farming activities. Khas land is "deemed" to be owned by a state mentioned in register VIII, whose application is not limited to agricultural and non-agricultural lands, (such as forests and cities) and rivers. The land can be used for development of the state.[28] However, currently eighty-eight percent of khas (state owned land) are illegally owned by powerful elites and other

25 Salauddin and Ashikuzzaman, "Nature and extent of population displacement due to climate change triggered disasters in south-western coastal region of Bangladesh," *International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management* 4, no. 1 (2012): 64.

26 Saroar, "Climate awareness and adaptation efficacy for livelihood security against sea level rise in coastal Bangladesh" 603.

27 Naser, "Climate change and migration: Law and policy perspectives in Bangladesh," 48.

28 Chancery Research and Consultants Trust, s.v. "Khas Land," 2018.

interest groups.[29] The Bangladeshi government must implement an effective land management system to reclaim and distribute these lands fairly to climate migrants for their resettlement. For this, land laws should be revised and clarified for the dissemination of land near the sea and rivers. Section 54 of the Land Management Manual (1990) prioritizes dissemination of Khas lands, and section 56 prioritizes such distribution to families whose lands are utilized for farming or that have suffered water erosion. Families whose lands were flooded due to sea level rise could be given the highest rank in obtaining khas lands.[30] Rational plans and controls to "optimize land" are a vital part of this climate change adaptation plan.[31]

Proactive/Adaptation Policy – Local Level Approach

The Bangladeshi government should devise a community-oriented risk reduction policy and strategy that uses local knowledge, does not threaten environmental security, and ensures the security of the local people. Community-based activities need to be deeply rooted in societies so that people are able to express what they really need and what they prioritize; problems can be noticed and dealt with correctly as responsive measures are devised and applied. This policy will strengthen social cohesion and cooperation within the community and build confidence among individuals, families, and communities by allowing them to be prepared for disasters and their mitigation.

People in the community are the ones who suffer most from the adverse effects of natural disasters, so communities should be the "frontier" to respond immediately to this destructive situation. Thus, communities can devise their own coping and survival strategies when they face the situation and respond to it before any government or NGO arrives. Such management by the community will effectively help people because communities are the main actors that develop and apply important measures when faced with disaster; in this way, they ensure human security. Community-based risk reduction will take into consideration the most important component—the particular context of the community.[32]

The main objective of risk reduction with community-based policies is to reduce vulnerabilities, ensuring ecological and environmental security as important tenets of a sustainable policy toward climate change.[33] Building secure, disaster-resilient and developed communities is the goal of this

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29   Naser, "Climate change and migration: Law and policy perspectives in Bangladesh," 48.
30   Ibid., 49.
31   Ibid., 48.
32   Umma Habiba et al., "Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction Approaches in Bangladesh." In Disaster Risk Reduction Approaches in Bangladesh," (Tokyo: Springer 2013), 261.
33   Detraz, "Environmental Security and Gender: Necessary Shifts in an Evolving Debate," 347.

approach. This policy approach is participatory in that it includes local people at every level who thereby become responsive in terms of considering the perceptions of the community. This multi-disciplinary approach combines local knowledge with science and new technology. It also empowers people by giving them more access to and control of resources and primary services. For example, in Tajikistan in 1999, a substantial number of local specialists, engineers and workers participated in the "Slope Stabilization Project". After the project was completed, the community carried out "its own follow-up" actions that included the reconstruction of other pathways, forestation and public education.[34] It is important to make the most of natural resources such as rainwater which can be used in harvesting. Stored rainwater can be used for drinking and cooking purposes, offering feasible options. Annually, rainfall in Bangladesh is 2,350 mm and this should be spread uniformly across the country.[35] Many types of rainwater harvesting models can be used in homes and at the community level. Rainwater harvesting, especially in rural areas, provides alternative water sources to salinity and drought-affected areas as long as this water's pH value and quality are maintained at normal conditions. In the case of drought, when water tanks are empty and people collect drinking water using filters, this harvesting is very useful. Rainwater used for agriculture will be more important in the future.[36] These sustainable measures will ensure ecological security for the environment.[37]

Basing the disaster reduction plan on the centrality of local communities rather than on a top-down government intervention will create a better understanding of community dynamics, perceptions, and needs. It is important to recognize that local knowledge and capabilities be considered and enhanced. NGOs provide important links between public authorities and communities before and after disaster crises. NGOs offer a variety of supports including services to vulnerable groups of people, capacity building, community outreach and mobilization, advocacy and awareness-raising related to the reduction of health risks, hygiene promotion and resilience. NGOs are driven by communities that have particular interests, and they become the "voices" of these communities.[38]

NGOs have local knowledge and understand the context of the situation to manage and adapt to natural disasters stemming from climate change. So

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34   *A Guide to Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction in Central Asia* (Geneva: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction), 14.
35   Habiba, "Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction Approaches in Bangladesh," 274.
36   Ibid.
37   Detraz, "Environmental Security and Gender: Necessary Shifts in an Evolving Debate," 347.
38   Gulsan Ara Parvin, et al., "Urban Risk Reduction Approaches in Bangladesh," in *Disaster Risk Reduction Approaches in Bangladesh*, edited by Rajib Shaw et al., (Tokyo: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013), 253.

being inclusive of vulnerable people in the planning of disaster risk-reduction, and implementing partnerships with local and national level organizations help to ensure sustainability and that the environment is successfully secured.[39] Furthermore, city corporations, municipalities, and city development authorities can direct building and construction rules and regulations, and land-use measures frequently. Communities can participate in the evaluation of risk and resilience of natural disasters stemming from climate change where municipal development authorities facilitate the process. NGOs should combine this local knowledge and scientific understanding with technologies to understand the bigger picture of the risks involved. This helps to build a common understanding of the risks.[40] These preparations and early warning processes require community members' knowledge, and they can guarantee that the public will be more informed through practices such as drills and simulation exercises. Communities and education institutions where local NGOs take part can minimize the impacts of natural disasters. For example, five hundred villages in Aceh, Sri Lanka conducted projects involving teams of volunteers after the destructive impact of a tsunami and an earthquake that hit Aceh. They helped in devising necessary skills for the emergency during a disaster and conducted a public awareness-raising campaign complete with evacuation simulation exercises. In fact, 400,000 people are benefitting from this "grass roots early warning system."[41]

Conclusion

All in all, three policy recommendations were introduced. As the economy of Bangladesh is based on agriculture, it is relatively powerless to significantly alter or reduce the CO2 emissions that drive climate change. Instead of preventing or stopping climate change, Bangladesh needs to devise policies that can prepare and adjust to changing conditions. As a proactive policy, education to raise public awareness for better preparation is recommended. This policy ensures the security of the population by making the Bangladeshi people better prepared. Second, as part of an adaptive strategy, a resettlement policy addressing possible consequences must be discussed and focused on resolving the problems of security as it relates to climate refugees. Finally, a community-oriented policy, in-between a reactive and adaptive policy, is encouraged. It aims to ensure security by involving local people, and protects ecological security by offering sustainable methods that do not threaten the environment. Hopefully, the Bangladeshi government will take into

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39   Ibid.
40   Ibid., 250.
41   Habiba, "Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction Approaches in Bangladesh," 261.

consideration these options as effective measures to combat natural disaster crises due to climate change. Climate change should be viewed from a long-term perspective. All the mechanisms recommended here have a long-term outlook that enables people to better prepare, better adjust and be better focused.

ESSAYS

HANBOKS, VAMPIRES, AND CROSS-DRESSING WOMEN: THE APPEAL OF KOREAN HISTORICAL DRAMAS AMONG AMERICAN VIEWERS

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Abstract: The goal of this study was to determine the appeal of historical Korean dramas among non-Korean Asians and non-Asians in the US and in turn what this implied for Korean production companies. This study incorporated a multi-methods approach, including CDA application, online corpus analysis, and quantitative data, to answer these research questions. The results revealed that both non-Korean Asian and non-Asian Americans found cast and acting ability and storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters to be the most appealing drama elements. Also, non-Korean membership did not hinder overall enjoyment mostly because viewers wanted to learn about Korean history and culture, enjoyed the storyline, and were able to relate to the characters and themes. After comparing and contrasting the results to past literature, the following ideas were reinforced: the viewer's ability to relate to story themes affects reception and dramas are not analyzed in a "we vs. Korean" perspective. Furthermore, US K-Drama fans consult a K-Drama "scorecard" where they examine shows according to factors such as cast acting ability, plot believability, and themes. Fans also partake in a K-Drama "expert" culture instead of taking a Korean culture expert/non-expert stance. Overall, these K-Drama "experts" are drawn to dramas with familiar/reliable actors and relatable storylines, characters, and themes—a promising prospect for Korean production companies.

Keywords: *Critical discourse analysis, Korean dramas, Korean pop culture, fandom, fan culture*

Introduction

The Hallyu wave (Korean cultural wave) and its globalization has continuously been a growing topic of interest in scholarly research.[1] In line with this research

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1   Searching the keywords "hallyu wave" or "Korean pop culture" in any academic journal search engine will reveal a myriad of academic pieces centered on the different media forms within the Korean

trend, this study will focus on a specific aspect of the Hallyu wave, namely Korean dramas (hereafter referred to as K-Dramas). As will be discussed later, K-Dramas have an audience not only in Korea or in its neighboring Asian countries but outside of Asia as well - even in the United States. A Korea Times article reports that according to a survey and visitor numbers to streaming sites analyzed by the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA), nearly 18 million Americans watch K-Dramas.[2] Crystal Anderson, in her research on America's impact on Hallyu, states that American viewers are attracted to K-Dramas due to the cultural elements and "lack of the sex and violence" that seems to largely permeate American television.[3] In fact, K-Dramas have been broadcasted in online streaming sites available in the United States, such as *DramaFever*, *Viki*, *Netflix*, and *Hulu*. Online communities within forums like *Dramabeans*, *Soompi*, and other K-Drama related sites enjoy participation from American and other international fans as seen when one browses through the user profiles.

As Korean dramas seem to have gained some footing with US audiences, so to can it be expected for the US K-Drama fandom to have been exposed to *saeguk* (Korean historical dramas). The purpose of this study is to gauge what elements in Korean historical dramas are especially appealing, relevant, or serve as the viewers' point of connection and relation. Since these dramas highlight a history that is not the viewers' own cultural background (assuming of course that the viewer is not Korean), is there a need for the viewer to identify Korean cultural membership with the cultural aspects and values, or do the other drama elements serve as the main appeal? This study will also examine the implications of this research for Korean production companies looking to make historical K-Dramas appealing to the US audience.

How are the international, non-Korean audience, drawn into this form of entertainment that concerns a complex history that is not their own? There are few, if any, rigorous studies on K-Dramas within the US market, specifically in regards to the non-Korean Asian v. non-Asian context.

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culture wave. This includes a range of pieces focused on Korean pop and Korean dramas and their reception, perception, performance, and the culture surrounding them domestically and internationally. Researchers outside of Korea have taken to this phenomenon and have even presented their findings at conferences.

2   "About 18 Million Americans Enjoy K-dramas: Korea Creative Content Agency," *The Korea Times,* November 24, 2014, accessed November 20, 2016, http://www.koreatimesus.com/about-18-million-americans-enjoy-k-dramas-korea-creative-content-agency/.

3   Crystal S. Anderson, "HallyU.S.A: America's Impact on the Korean Wave," in *The Global Impact of South Korean Popular Culture: Hallyu Unbound*, ed. Valentina Marinescu (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014), 127.

Korean Drama Analyses and Reception

Eunwoo Joo's study on the Korean historical drama *Chuno* suggests that the historical events in the drama are related to contemporary Korean society specifically in regards to the rise of socio-political and economic inequalities, forced competition, and a crisis of democracy. He argues that the social mobility, modernity, and capitalism elements are appealing to contemporary viewers. Lastly, Joo points out the similarities between *Chuno* slaves and neo-liberal Korean non-regular workers which viewers may find appealing since it provides a point of relation which Joo suggests was intended by producers.[4]

Moving on to the reception of cultural groups rather than individuals, Belinda Espiritu's research examines the reception of specific Korean television dramas among Filipino women in college. She argues that whether or not students had middle class backgrounds, attended Catholic, urban, or provincial schools in addition to the groups' overall Filipino culture and psychology influenced their discourse and showed what values/ideologies they subscribed to. Espiritu also argues that this study demonstrates how self-identity is reflexively created as the women were able to relate to the Korean characters and storylines but unable to relate to local melodramatic dramas. This study also touches upon the "theater of struggle" Filipino women participate in when engaging with Korean dramas where they simultaneously affirm cultural similarities with Koreans and/or other Eastern Asians and assert their Filipino identity.[5]

Swee Ho's study, on the other hand, focuses on Japanese women's reception of the Korean drama *Daejanggeum* in regards to themes and portrayals of women. The Korean historical and cultural context did not have as much relevance as their personal expectations, desired identities, and self-image. Overall, Ho states that these dramas allow the women to create shared meanings, become aware of contemporary problems, and find ways to change the realities of society.[6]

A study by Marion Schulze looks at how international drama fans examine Korean dramas and fans do not approach and discuss Korean dramas with a culturalist stance. Korean elements are not just labeled as "other," but viewers

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4   Eunwoo Joo, "A Historical Imagination of a Neo-liberal Society: Considerations on the Korean Historical Drama Chuno," *Review of Korean Studies* 14, no. 2 (2011): 35, accessed November 20, 2016, book. aks.ac.kr/lib/down2.asp?idx=2818.

5   Belinda Flores Espiritu, "Transnational Audience Reception as a Theater of Struggle: Young Filipino Women's Reception of Korean Television Dramas," *Asian Journal of Communication* 21, no. 4 (2011): 370, accessed November 20, 2016, http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=61fa7427-8a26-4ae1-851f-008b32c4511e%40sessionmgr102&vid=1&hid=125.

6   Swee Lin Ho, "Old Texts, New Desires: How the Korean Television Drama Daejanggeum Evokes Reflexivity, Renewal, and Resistance among Japanese Women," *Review of Korean Studies* 14, no. 2 (2011): 109-10, accessed November 20, 2016, http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/sochsl/Old%20Texts%20New%20Desires%20RKS2010.pdf.

actively position themselves culturally or as feminist. Finally, there are no set definitions of Korean culture in dramas because Korean culture is imagined, negotiated, and reconstructed within interactions between the international audience and proclaimed cultural experts.[7]

The Study and Research Questions

As demonstrated above, there is literature surrounding the popularity, analysis, and reception of K-Dramas. Specifically, researchers have sought to provide frameworks in regards to analyzing and reading them. Other studies have examined how certain groups make sense of dramas according to their unique backgrounds. This suggests that certain drama elements can be appealing to certain groups depending on their social situation, values, and backgrounds amongst other factors. These studies also indicate that these dramas can be used as tools of critique and discussion when examining contemporary events, values, and conditions. Lastly, imagined Korean culture, meanings, and analyses are constantly negotiated and reconstructed. While there has been research on the reception of Korean dramas across several non-Korean cultural groups, there is very little specifically on just the US viewer pool, especially in regards to their interaction with the historical genre. Furthermore, when examining this reception from US viewers, the non-Korean Asian v. non-Asian dichotomy is neglected. This brings us to the question of whether one's shared (or unshared) "Asian values" have an effect on the viewer's ability to reflect on and connect to certain Korean drama themes as this may also factor in to overall viewer enjoyment. Additionally, research on this dichotomy should consider how American values have any influence, if at all, on the appeal towards historical dramas.

This proposed research on the reception of Korean historical dramas among American viewers is significant because, as mentioned, the United States is no stranger to Korean dramas. It also touches upon outsiders' interactions with and perception of the projected history of a complex culture. This research will illustrate just how far this aspect of the "Korean media wave" has traveled within the United States and will demonstrate how a "non-modern" part of the Hallyu wave has gained traction in contemporary times. For Korean production companies looking to target the American market, this research would be helpful to determine what drama elements are successfully drawing in American viewership among non-Korean Asians and non-Asians, while still

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7   Marion Schulze, "Korea vs. K-dramaland: The Culturalization of K-dramas by International Fans," *Acta Koreana* 16, no. 2 (2013): 392-3, accessed November 20, 2016, http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com. ignacio.usfca.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=9662078b-8b72-4e9d-ae6c-232e757b370b%40s essionmgr101&vid=1&hid=125.

keeping the unique cultural and historical aspects in these dramas. Thus, the following research questions guide this study:

RQ1: What is the appeal of Korean historical dramas for non-Korean Asians and non-Asians in the United States?

RQ2: What then are the implications for Korean entertainment production companies?

Method

This study used a mixed methods approach combining primary Korean drama media, quantitative, and online discourse corpus to form a rigorous set of sources. Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework was used to engage with the drama material. This framework connects discourse and ideology. It can also be utilized to critique social injustices and power, which is ultimately connected to language. Fairclough explains that a textual analysis can involve (1) identifying the main themes or the presented "main parts of the world" and (2) pointing out the perspective or angle these themes are presented within.[8]

Participants

The comprehensive online discourse analysis focused on the following sources: *Dramafever*, *Dramabeans*, and *Soompi*. Participants who did not speak Korean posted the comments. Notably, there was no way of accounting for each commenters' country of origin, but these sites are open to worldwide participation so it is assumed that this is an international participant pool.[9] In the quantitative portion, 131 participants, strictly from the United States, participated in the online survey. Most participants identified as female at 90.8% (n= 119) while 8.4% (n= 11) identified as male.[10] Ages ranged between 13 to 56 years old with an average age of about 22. 52.7% (n= 69) of the participants claimed to be of non-Korean Asian descent while 26% (n= 34)

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8 Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (Routledge, 2003), 129, accessed November 20, 2016, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd =2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjrn-nhtczQAhXCzFQKHULJB1MQFggjMAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fd isciplinas.stoa.usp.br%2Fpluginfile.php%2F270695%2Fmod_folder%2Fcontent%2F0%2Fii.%2520Nor man_Fairclough_Analysing_discourse.pdf%3Fforcedownload%3D1&usg=AFQjCNFKHKfPlT9uYfSxgS3O M1MQPOG8FQ&bvm=bv.139782543,d.cGw.

9 Comments written in non-English languages were not accounted for as I could not adequately translate them. Notably, almost all of the comments written in non-English languages were in Spanish. This may be of relevance especially for the Latino viewership.

10 This is a notable finding as my past research on K-Pop yielded a similar result. In this participant pool, however, the ratio of males was slightly larger. This leads me to question whether K-Dramas are more acceptable for males to openly admit they like (rather than K-Pop) or if just not that many males had access to my surveys.

claimed non-Asian descent. Additionally, 20.6% (n= 27) identified as "other" and 0.8% (n=1) identified as Korean. Other background information revealed that most participants have been K-Drama fans between less than one year to five years at 45% (n= 59), followed by five to nine years at 41.2% (n=54), then ten years and above at 13.7% (n=18). A majority of the participants mentioned they were drawn into watching Korean dramas because of family or friends' recommendations, followed by K-Pop influences, or just by chance (e.g. coming across a Korean drama on *Netflix* and deciding to check it out). Next, they were asked about their favorite Korean drama genres to which the majority proclaimed their favorite was romance (n= 75), then historical (n= 65), and finally romantic-comedy and comedy (each n=42). 97.7% (n=128) of the participants stated they utilized English subtitles, while 2.3% (n=3) stated they did not use English subtitles.

Procedures

The textual analysis was performed on three Korean historical dramas: *Sungkyunkwan Scandal*, *Scholar Who Walks the Night,* and *Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo*. *Sungkyunkwan Scandal* was chosen because of its fair reception domestically, cult popularity, and number of awards received. It was also broadcasted internationally to seven other countries.[11] *Scholar Who Walks the Night* had international viewership through online streaming sites and a few notable awards.[12] *Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo* was chosen for its more positive international, rather than domestic, reception and its award accolades.[13] I examined specific scenes and dialogue and focused on how themes disparaging power were played out.

Next, I focused on three websites with a platform for international viewers to hold discourse surrounding Korean dramas—*Dramafever*, *Dramabeans*, and *Soompi*.[14] These sources were chosen for their popularity within the online Korean drama community. Also, these dramas aired during different times from 2010 to 2016, which provides us with a longitudinal view of how Korean dramas have been discussed over time. As previously mentioned, these dramas garnered decent viewership and therefore plentiful discussions from a diverse international audience. Overall, I examined comments under

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11 "Sungkyunkwan Scandal," Wikipedia, accessed November 27, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sungkyunkwan_Scandal.

12 "Scholar Who Walks the Night," Wikipedia, accessed November 27, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholar_Who_Walks_the_Night.

13 "Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo," Wikipedia, accessed November 27, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moon_Lovers:_Scarlet_Heart_Ryeo.

14 *DramaFever* is an online streaming site best known for streaming K-Dramas. *Dramabeans* is a site run by contributors who regularly post K-Drama recaps. *Soompi* is a site that provides media coverage of all things Korean pop culture and is known for their active forum.

nine online-streamed videos, comments following nine drama recaps, and comments within three forum threads. I analyzed roughly 500 comments from each drama for each source, which amounted to 3,915 comments in total. I sifted through the comments for frequency of positive audience reception. The purpose of coding was to pick out significant drama elements that indicated audience appeal, if at all. Lastly, for the online survey, I circulated my Google forms survey across multiple relevant sites such as Facebook drama fan pages, Hallyu forums, and my own social media platforms to gather participants.[15] A disclaimer in the beginning of the survey assured participants that their identities would be anonymous. I used findings from the coding analysis to tailor questions to address my research questions.

Results-CDA of Korean Historical Dramas

Sungkyunkwan Scandal

Overall, *Sungkyunkwan Scandal* occurs during the Joseon dynasty and is mainly about Yoon-hee Kim who is disguised as her brother in order to support her family through jobs at the bookstore. During a particularly dangerous job in which she substitutes as a test-taker for the Sungkyunkwan entrance exam, she is caught by the morally upright Sun-joon Lee who ends up not turning her in and actually advises her to pursue her education. In the rest of the series, she must deal with characters at the school, avoid trouble with the student body president, maintain her secret identity, and work through her feelings for Sun-joon. Two themes presented in this drama are the struggle for "gender" and "education" equality. One scene in which these themes are present is in episode 18. As a bit of context, Yoon-hee ends up asking her mother about her father's death. Her mother tells her that she doesn't wish for her to "rebel against the world" like her father, leading Yoon-hee to believe that his death was wrongful. Yoon-hee then speaks with her brother, Yoon-shik, about her dead father who she believes she did not have the closest relationship with. Yoon-hee asks him what kind of father he was as she could not recall his face since she would always be outside the door while their father read to Yoon-shik. Yoon-shik then replies that during that time, their father was actually reading to her by sitting near the door and as loud as possible. The scene then cuts to a portion of their late father's lecture notes where he talks about his daughter:

> To watch my daughter advance in her studies is a painful thing. If I were her teacher, I would have wanted to teach her. But is it right to teach her to have aspirations in a world where she cannot fulfill them? I am a foolish father who cannot provide any opportunities to his talented daughter. I listen with abated breath as my daughter reads aloud, and today, once more, I weep deep inside my heart. [16]

For this particular dialogue sequence, the themes are performed through the lens of those disadvantaged by the ideologies of the higher powers—specifically a female with aspirations in her education and a supportive father who is actually an esteemed scholar himself. Yoon-hee feels as if her father had set her aside when in reality, her father was aware of the education and gender inequalities that would have quashed her higher aspirations. In the show, females were not afforded the luxury of an education and the path to get into the Sungkyunkwan school was not an easily accessible one given the notoriously difficult entrance exam. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the overall plot stems from the female protagonist being pushed to dress as a male to get into the school to help her family out. It is clear just how few options females had in regards to job options as the cross-dressing elements arises from a basic need for survival.

Scholar Who Walks the Night

Scholar Who Walks the Night's takes place during an alternate Joseon dynasty and its basic premise surrounds Yang-sun Jo, who cross-dresses as a male bookseller to support her once-thriving family. She eventually comes across Sung-yeol Kim, a Hongmungwan scholar who is actually a vampire with a mission to kill the evil vampire Gwi, in order to avenge his dead lover Myung-hee. Evil Gwi lives underneath the royal palace and throughout the series holds the power to manipulate politics in order to stop the crowned Prince, Yoon, from taking his place at the throne. Some themes presented in this show are government's role, censorship, and the power of the people.

In a particular sequence of scenes within episode 15, Yoon is faced with no choice but to hold state meetings at night as per Gwi's orders. Thus, the statesmen find themselves clustered during their first night meeting where Yoon has to force himself to read a decree ordered by Gwi himself. The decree basically promises harsh punishment against any people who try and challenge the court. As Yoon reads this decree aloud, Gwi walks in and sits on

16 "Sungkyunkwan Scandal: Episode 18," Red Pill, Dramabeans, published on November 4, 2010, accessed November 25, 2016, http://www.dramabeans.com/2010/11/sungkyunkwan-scandal-episode-18/.

the table in front of Yoon, effectively blocking him and the throne before the now confused politicians. One politician points out that the decree might not sit so well with the public and Gwi casually responds that they can just capture all the dissidents, establish martial law, and round up citizens wearing black hanboks (traditional Korean dress).[17] These black hanboks essentially work as the citizens' "symbolic guerilla warfare."

This theme is seen through the people's and the puppet government's perspective. The crowned Prince, Yoon, who is now king because his grandfather recently died, finds himself at an impasse as he must obey evil Gwi's orders. An external power is controlling the government and not allowing the people to voice any concerns or critique against the government. From the court's perspective, Gwi is suppressing them from doing their job for the people. What they have is a sole ruler conducting a job meant for many, which is moving them away from a more democratic ruler. From the people's view, this decree means it is no longer "rule for the people" but just "rule" - and in this case, unbeknownst to them, rule by a single entity.

Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo

This drama takes place in the year 941. Ha-jin Go, a modern-day woman, somehow travels back to the Goryeo dynasty where she wakes up in the body of 16-year old Haesoo. The show depicts her romantic encounters with the different royal princes; she at first falls for the gentle-natured 8th prince, Wook, but then eventually the feared 4th prince, So. Besides these romantic elements, the drama also centers on the competition and politics among the princes as they fight for the throne. One larger theme played out in this drama is class and status.

In episode 11, Haesoo is accused of attempting to poison Crown Prince Mu. The crown prince asks the king to set him aside given his hidden illness but the king is unwilling to give up his first-born son. Later, Prince Wook, one of Haesoo's suitors finds out that his sister was actually behind the poisoning conspiracy, as she did not want him to throw away the chance to be king just because of his infatuation. He begrudgingly chooses to be silent about what his sister did because he realizes he cannot cast aside his family as traitors.[18] Later, Prince So pleads with King Taejo to save Haesoo and asks if he's okay with trading in Haesoo's life just to protect the crowned Prince. The king sees

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17 "Scholar Who Walks the Night: Episode 15," Javabeans, Dramabeans, published on August 26, 2015, accessed November 25, 2016, http://www.dramabeans.com/2015/08/scholar-who-walks-the-night-episode-15/.

18 This scene is particularly heartbreaking as he chooses to maintain his family's power to save face rather than save the one he loves. This could also be another example of the power disparage theme whether one's status takes precedence over emotional ties.

no qualms in sacrificing what he sees as a "lowly life" in exchange for the more important one. Prince So in his disgust questions if this is how a king thinks. King Taejo then chastises him and tells him that anyone who begs for her life will be killed.[19]

This "class/status" power disparage is seen in this scene between Wangso and his father, King Taejo, as the king is clearly unwilling to do the right thing as Haesoo takes no precedence over a crowned prince. Haesoo, a female of no immediate royal importance to the higher power, is left to suffer torturous treatment while being wrongfully imprisoned. Wangso's disgust may mirror the viewer's own feelings as status should not bear weight over questions of morals, however in this context the king sees fit to protect his royal lineage. This theme is seen through the lower status person's view as Haesoo's unfair subjection to torture shows lack of justice for those with considerably less power and therefore "less of a voice" in society.

As demonstrated by the analysis across the three dramas, Korean historical dramas are not just mindless entertainment and are worth studying as their themes can serve as points of connection and relation despite the cultural/historical barrier with the viewer.

Online Streaming Site and Forum Comments

Table 1. Positive Korean Historical Drama Reception among International Viewers

	SUNGKYUNKWAN SCANDAL	SCHOLAR WHO WALKS THE NIGHT	MOON LOVERS: SCARLET HEART RYEO
DRAMAFEVER	65 of 97 67 %	115 of 181 63.5 %	206 of 390 52.8 %
DRAMABEANS	64 of 145 44.1 %	63 of 142 44.4 %	103 of 403 25.6 %
SOOMPI	40 of 63 63.5 %	50 of 110 45.5 %	125 of 350 35.7 %

Sources: DramaFever 2010, 2015, 2016; Gems 2010; Javabeans 2010, 2015, 2016; Kaiskloset 2015; Yeohweping 2015.

Before narrowing the scope of the research onto strictly American viewers, it was important to gauge the reception of these dramas during their initial

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19 "Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo: Episode 11," HeadsNo2, Dramabeans, published on September 27, 2016, accessed November 25, 2016, http://www.dramabeans.com/2016/09/moon-lovers-scarlet-heart-ryeo-episode-11/.

release among the wider international audience. Table 1 provides a general look at the ratio of positive forum/website comments surrounding these different Korean historical dramas.[20][21] The overall reception of the pilot episodes indicated the historical dramas were appealing enough to encourage continued viewership among international commenters.[22] The following tables provide a breakdown of certain drama elements (that served as "points of appeal") and their frequency. The first viewer comments examined were for the historical drama *Sungkyunkwan Scandal* (n=1,241) and spanned from August to November 2010. After quantifying the drama elements found across all positive viewer comments, the most prevalent elements/themes were compiled into the tables below:

Table 2. Appealing *Sungkyunkwan Scandal* Drama Elements among International Viewer Comments

	Cast & acting ability	Storyline, plot, dialogue, & characters	Themes	Overall production value & soundtrack	Romance/ Comedy genre	Korean historical & cultural elements
DRAMAFEVER	93 of 199 46.7%	68 of 199 34.2%	14 of 199 7%	7 of 199 3.5%	12 of 199 6%	-
DRAMABEANS	82 of 229 35.8%	111 of 229 48.5%	13 of 229 5.7%		13 of 229 5.7%	6 of 229 2.6%
SOOMPI	57 of 222 25.7%	100 of 222 45%	16 of 222 7.2%	19 of 222 8.6%	22 of 222 9.9%	-

Sources: DramaFever 2010; Gems 2010; Javabeans 2010; Red Pill 2010.

According to table 2, none of the drama elements occurred more than half of the time.[23] However, it is worth noting that across all three sources cast and

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20 "Sungkyunkwan Scandal," "Scholar Who Walks the Night," "Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo," Dramafever, televised in 2010, 2015, 2016. ; "Sungkyunkwan Scandal: Episode 1," "Scholar Who Walks the Night: Episode 1," "Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo: Episode 1," Dramabeans, published in 2010, 2015, 2016, accessed November 25, 2016; "[Drama 2010] SungKyunKwan Scandal," "[Drama 2015] Scholar Who Walks the Night," "[Drama 2016]Moon Lovers □ Scarlet Heart Ryeo ~ \^0^/ Thank You Eclipses !," Soompi, published in 2010, 2015, 2016, accessed November 25, 2016,

21 Comments where viewers explicitly stated they liked a certain drama element (even if they mentioned something they did not like) were counted as positive reception.

22 It is important to note that the unaccounted percentages do not wholly account for negative reception. Rather, most of those comments did not indicate the viewers' perception and instead contained questions, links, recaps, and analyses, to name a few types of content.

23 "Sungkyunkwan Scandal," DramaFever, episode 1, 10, 20; "Sungkyunkwan Scandal: Episode 1, 10, 20," Javabeans, Red Pill, Dramabeans, accessed November 25, 2016; "[Drama 2010] SungKyunKwan

acting ability; storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters; themes, and romance/comedy genre were consistently present in positive viewer comments. This suggests that there are indeed specific appealing Korean drama elements present in international viewers' online discourse.

The second examined Korean historical drama was *Scholar Who Walks the Night*. The coded comments (n=1,324) were published between July to September 2015. The following table lays out the most frequent appealing drama elements among commenters:

Table 3. Appealing *Scholar Who Walks the Night* Drama Elements among International Viewer Comments

	Cast & acting ability	Storyline, plot, dialogue, & characters	Romance Genre	Overall production value & soundtrack	Fantasy genre	Korean historical & cultural elements
DRAMAFEVER	110 of 216 50.9%	75 of 216 34.7%	13 of 216 6%	11 of 216 5.1%	-	4 of 216 1.9%
DRAMABEANS	101 of 185 54.6%	53 of 185 28.6%	7 of 185 3.8%	6 of 185 3.2%	-	15 of 185 8.1%
SOOMPI	44 of 137 32.1%	49 of 137 35.8%	30 of 137 21.9%	5 of 137 3.6%	6 of 137 4.4%	-

Sources: DramaFever 2015; Girlfriday 2015; Javabeans 2015; Yeohweping 2015.

Compared to the *Sungkyunkwan Scandal* findings, within the *Dramafever* and Dramabeans sources, commenters saw cast and acting ability as appealing elements more than half of the time.[24] Cast and acting ability; storyline, plot, dialogue and characters; romance genre; and overall production value and soundtrack all occurred consistently and frequently in positive viewer comments across all three sources. The next examined comments (n=1,350) pertained to the drama entitled *Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo* and were posted between August to November 2016. Coding of the positive reception comments yielded the following results:

Scandal," Gems, Soompi, accessed November 25, 2016.

24 "Scholar Who Walks the Night," DramaFever, episode 1, 10, 20; "Scholar Who Walks the Night: Episode 1, 10, 20," Javabeans, Girlfriday, Dramabeans, accessed November 25, 2016; "[Drama 2015] Scholar Who Walks the Night," Yeohweping, Soompi, accessed November 25, 2016.

Table 4. Appealing *Moon Lovers*: Scarlet Heart Ryeo Drama Elements among International Viewer Comments

	Cast & acting ability	Storyline, plot, dialogue, & characters	Romance Genre	Overall production value & soundtrack	Fantasy genre	Korean historical & cultural elements
DRAMAFEVER	110 of 216 50.9%	75 of 216 34.7%	13 of 216 6%	11 of 216 5.1%	-	4 of 216 1.9%
DRAMABEANS	101 of 185 54.6%	53 of 185 28.6%	7 of 185 3.8%	6 of 185 3.2%	-	15 of 185 8.1%
SOOMPI	44 of 137 32.1%	49 of 137 35.8%	30 of 137 21.9%	5 of 137 3.6%	6 of 137 4.4%	-

Sources: DramaFever 2016; HeadsNo2 2016; Javabeans 2016; Kaiskloset 2015.

As shown by the data in table 4, commenters mentioned the storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters element was appealing more than half of the time within the *Soompi* forum.[25] Across all three sources, the most common elements of appeal were storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters; cast and acting ability; romance genre; and overall production value and soundtrack. When analyzing the positive viewer comments as a whole, the statistics appear to indicate that there is indeed a significant amount of online discourse about specific appealing drama elements. Overall, certain drama elements were consistently and frequently mentioned which suggests, first, that viewers have a drama "scorecard" of sorts, and second, that international, non-Korean viewers are attracted to these Korean historical dramas despite the absence of a direct cultural/historical connection.

Survey data

First, it was important to glean a general idea of what participants found appealing about Korean dramas overall and whether they considered themselves fans of specifically Korean historical dramas. The most frequent

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25 "Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo," DramaFever, episode 1, 10, 20; "Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo: Episode 1, 10, 20," Javabeans, HeadsNo2, Dramabeans, accessed November 25, 2016; "[Drama 2016]Moon Lovers ♥ Scarlet Heart Ryeo ~ \^0^/ Thank You Eclipses !," Kaiskloset, Soompi, accessed November 25, 2016.

Korean drama appeal was the unique plots, storylines, and characters ("the interesting and unique plots"). The next most frequent answer was the cast and their acting ability ("if an actor or actress that I enjoy watching is in that drama, I will give the drama a chance no matter how I feel about it"). Next were the Korean cultural and historical aspects ("it's always so cool to be able to see the references to actual history..."). Another frequent appeal was the production value/cinematography ("the art direction"). Lastly mentioned was the romance genre ("...they also provide a cliché romantic story lines that are fun and fanciful...appeal to typical girly fantasies...girls can relate to").

When asked whether they considered themselves fans of specifically Korean historical dramas, 77.1% (n=101) participants claimed they were fans while 22.9% (n=30) stated they were not particularly fans of the genre. The following table illustrates the more frequent reasons for why US viewers considered themselves Korean historical drama fans:

Table 5. Reasons Why US K-Drama Viewers are Korean Historical Drama Fans

Historical drama appeal	Frequency	Percentage
Korean cultural/historical aspect	66	68%
Storyline, Plot	27	27.8%
Cast, Acting ability	2	2.1%
Themes	1	1%

Most participants identified the Korean cultural and historical aspects as their reason for watching these historical dramas ("I'm really interested in Korean history and the clothing from that time is beautiful") followed by the storyline/plot ("I find the plots interesting..."). The following section of the survey presented the participants with three different Korean historical dramas. They were asked whether they have watched it, what their overall enjoyment rating was and why, what the drama's appeal was, what their biggest takeaway was, and whether their lack of direct connection to Korean culture affected their enjoyment. As the focus of this paper is on the appeal of historical dramas, only the drama appeals and absence of connection to Korean culture in relation to enjoyment will be mentioned.

When asked about the drama *Sungkyunkwan Scandal*, the top overall appeals among participants were cast and acting ability (18.9%, n=76), storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (18.7%, n=75), and Korean historical and cultural elements (13.7%, n=55). Specifically, non-Korean Asians (n=69) stated that cast and acting ability (24.6%, n=47), storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (22%, n=42), and themes (12%, n=23) were the most appealing

elements for this drama. The top appeals for non-Asians were storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (23.4%, n=32), cast and acting ability (19.7%, n=27), and Korean historical and cultural elements (17.5%, n=24) Lastly, the others group indicated that their top appeal was cast and acting ability; storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters, followed by gender elements, then themes, and finally Korean historical and cultural elements (each at 16.7%, n=2).

Next, when asked whether the participants' lack of ability to connect directly with the Korean history aspect in this drama affected enjoyment, 62.3% (n=43) of the non-Korean Asian group answered no citing the opportunity to learn more about Korean culture and history, enjoyment of the drama itself, and ability to relate as a female. 37.7% (n=26) of the respondents answered "yes" and reasoned they were just not a fan of the historical aspects and a lack of knowledge about the culture made it difficult to follow. 80.5% (n=33) of non-Asians' answers indicated that inability to relate did not affect enjoyment with reasons being they enjoyed learning about history, the drama was enjoyable in and of itself, or they had prior exposure to other dramas. On the other hand, 19.5% (n=8) of the respondents answered "yes" due to disinterest with the genre to begin with and not being a fan of the politics. 75% (n=3) of the "others" group answered "no" because it was an opportunity to learn or they were able to relate as a female. 25% (n=1) of the "others" group stated "yes" due to their unfamiliarity with the traditions.

The next part of the survey presented the drama *Scholar Who Walks the Night*. The most frequent appeals across the three groups were cast and acting ability (21.5%, n=77), the fantasy genre (16.8%, n=60), and storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (16.2%, n=58). 27.1% (n=46) of the non-Korean Asian pool found cast and acting ability most appealing, followed by storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (21.8%, n=37), then the fantasy genre (15.3%, n=26). For non-Asians, the topmost appeal was cast and acting ability (23.6%, n=30), then the fantasy genre (22%, n=28), and lastly storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (15.7%, n=20). Within the "others" group, the most frequent appeal was the Korean historical and cultural elements (28.6%, n=2) with a few other drama elements at 14.3% each.

The next portion asked about viewer enjoyment in relation to one's inability to relate to Korean history. For non-Korean Asians, 75.8% (n=47) responded it did not affect enjoyment because they saw it more as a fantasy show, they enjoyed learning about Korean history, and they still enjoyed the overall storyline. In contrast, 24.2% (n=15) stated that membership in Korean culture did affect enjoyment due to lack of prior historical knowledge and they believed the fantasy genre detracted from their experience. 97.6% (n=40) of non-Asians claimed that non-membership did not detract from enjoyment due to their interest in the history, enjoyment of the storyline, and ability to find

connections with their own experiences. 2.4% (n=1) of the respondents felt that inability to directly relate to Korean history affected enjoyment. Among the "others" participants, 100% (n=3) felt inability to relate did not affect enjoyment because the storyline was entertaining enough.

For the drama *Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo*, the top overall appeals among US viewers were cast and acting ability (30.7%, n=103), storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (25%, n=84), and themes (12.2%, n=41). Among non-Korean Asians, the most frequently mentioned appeals were cast and acting ability (32.7%, n=67), followed by storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (26.8%, n=55), then romance genre (13.2%, n=27). Within the non-Asian group, the top appeals were cast and acting ability (28.1%, n=34), storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (21.5%, n=26), and finally Korean historical and cultural elements (15.7%, n=19). According to the "others" group responses, storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters (30%, n=3), cast and acting ability (20%, n=2), and Korean historical and cultural elements (20%, n=2) were most appealing.

Next, when asked about the participants' enjoyment due to inability to relate to the cultural aspect, most non-Korean Asians (79.4%, n=54) responded there was no effect because they enjoyed the storyline regardless, they related to the characters' plights, and they appreciated the opportunity to learn more about Korean culture and history. Those that stated there was an effect (20.6%, n=14) reasoned that they saw the show more for its romance aspect. Within the non-Asian group, the majority indicated there was no effect (97.6%, n=41) because they took this as an opportunity to learn about Korean culture/history, they enjoyed the overall storyline, and they were able to connect through parallels they perceived in modern society. In contrast, only 2.4% (n=1) of participants stated there was an effect. For the "others" group, all respondents said there was no effect on enjoyment (100%, n=3) because they found enjoyment in the storyline elements and enjoyed the presentation of Korean cultural/historical elements.

Discussion of Findings

The brief textual analyses conducted on the three Korean historical dramas revealed overall that the dramas all contained scenes that served as critical discourse of certain systems and ideologies. Namely, *Sungkyunkwan Scandal* offered a critique of gender and educational expectations, *Scholar Who Walks the Night* presented a critical look at government's role, censorship, and people's agency, and *Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo* examined class and status. These particular themes are not specific to Korean culture and would probably be widely understood and grasped by the general audience which

is in line with Schulze's insistence that viewer's do not analyze dramas in a we vs. Korean culture dichotomy. This is also similar to Joo's findings about the drama *Chuno* and how its historical events and themes were appealing among audiences as they could find similarities in contemporary struggles and injustices. This finding is also reflected in Espiritu and Ho's research about unique viewer backgrounds influencing how viewers relate to themes and values. This indicates that these dramas can be thought provoking and relatable among most viewers. Additionally, the established themes may serve as a point of relation for non-Koreans that do not have a direct connection to the history or culture.

Next, the extensive coding analysis of forum and streaming site comments indicated that there was a significant amount of positive buzz for the series' pilot episodes overall which means there is cause for investigating the appeal of these specific dramas. Furthermore, these historical dramas held a certain appeal among international viewers. Among the positive comments for *Sungkyunkwan Scandal*, the most consistent drama appeals were cast and acting ability; storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters; themes; and romance and comedy. Next, in *Scholar Who Walks the Night*, the most present appeals were cast and acting ability; storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters; romance genre; and overall production value and soundtrack. Last, the most frequent elements found in comments for *Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo* included storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters; cast and acting ability; romance genre; and overall production value and soundtrack.

Across comments for all three historical dramas, cast and acting ability; storyline, plot, dialogue,   and characters; romance genre; and overall production value and soundtrack were the drama elements found to be most appealing within positive international viewer comments. These results are similar to findings in the Joo, Espiritu, and Ho studies in terms of how relating to and reflecting through the storyline, portrayals, and plights of the characters affected overall audience enjoyment. This analysis also reflects Schulze's assertion that viewers do not take on a culturalist viewpoint as, similarly to the CDA findings, commenters largely indicated that it was their connection to the cast, storyline, romance, and overall production satisfaction that affected positive reception.

This apparent consistency in appealing drama elements also suggests that drama fans may have a "scorecard" of sorts that they mentally refer to when evaluating these series. The overwhelming consistency of the drama element casting and acting ability suggests that international viewers, on the surface, place great importance on who they see on the screen and how they perform well, if at all. This also adds another angle to Schulze's finding about expertise being a factor in how Korean culture is defined. Familiarity and reliability with

certain actors and actresses may signal that a viewer is a K-Drama "expert" with experience and knowledge in what makes a drama "good." As it seems that fans who feel inclined to comment on K-Drama sites may be seasoned viewers, it makes sense that cast and acting ability be a significant appeal as, rather than proclaim to be Korean culture experts, taking a K-Drama expert stance seems to be the less "risky" route as a non-Korean interacting with this cultural product. Also in terms of reliability, in order to connect with the storyline and themes that are being enacted, these K-Drama experts would likely feel some sort of bias towards cast members they're accustomed to, thereby affecting overall enjoyment.[26]

According to the survey distributed amongst Americans viewers only, across all three groups, the consistently frequent drama elements were cast and acting ability and storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters. Among non-Korean Asians and non-Asians, the most mentioned elements were the same as the results for Americans in general. However, for non-Asians, another more frequently mentioned appeal was Korean cultural and historical elements. Overall, the majority of non-Korean Asians and non-Asians did not view non-Korean membership as a barrier to enjoyment. Within both the non-Korean Asians and non-Asians groups, most respondents reasoned that they were able to learn about Korea, they enjoyed the storyline, and they found they could relate to characters and/or themes. As mentioned earlier, the cast and acting ability result can be attributed to the viewers' "K-Drama expert" repertoire. The storyline, plot, dialogue, and characters appeal is once again in line with the idea of viewer background influencing their ability to relate to and find parallels with their own lives. Respondents did not see their non-Korean membership as an influence on reception which reflects Schulze's finding pertaining to international viewers not analyzing dramas in a we vs. them lens.

In regards to the non-Korean Asian v. non-Asian dichotomy, there were no stark differences in what drama elements were appealing or why enjoyment was not affected. But in regards to drama element appeals, non-Asians also mostly answered that the unique Korean historical and cultural aspects influenced enjoyment. This might suggest that their *non-Asian-ness* played a role in encouraging them to view a historical drama for the educational aspects as well. Notably, lack of Asian representation in the US media being met in these dramas might have been one reason for non-Korean Asians overall enjoyment as was indicated in a few responses. Among the American pool as

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26 Future studies should examine whether or not a viewer's familiarity with the cast takes significant precedence over other drama elements. This "unavoidable bias" may be worth looking into for production companies.

a whole, the distaste of certain American television elements was also a cited reason for why non-Korean membership was not a barrier to enjoyment.

Conclusion

American viewers may not have a direct cultural connection but other drama elements such as cast, story, themes, and genres serve as main points of appeal and relation and help to promote Korean culture and history. Korean historical dramas can be relatable to non-Koreans overall as they contain themes that critique universally, if not mostly, known systems and ideologies. Viewers overall found the most appeal in cast and acting ability which shows the American market's reliance on reliability and familiarity when evaluating Korean dramas. Additionally, a K-Drama expert repertoire and scorecard, which contains factors such as cast and production, seem to come into play when viewers interact with historical Korean dramas. Overall, familiarity with actors, shared experiences with characters, and ability to relate with storylines can serve as points of connection and transcend any cultural or historical differences between viewers and actors. Further, although Korean historical and cultural elements did not come out to be the main appeal for why the majority of viewers decided to watch the shows, the apparent eagerness for viewers to learn about Korean history shows great promise for Korean production companies looking to expand their reach into the US market. As the survey consisted of largely female respondents, future studies should examine the phenomena behind the female saturated market for K-Dramas in the US.

NASTALIQ: A NEW FORM OF ART IN INDIA

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Abstract: The emerging discipline of the history of the book places particular emphasis on the relationship between text, script, and the image through a study of 'text-and-image' (text and its relationships with the illustration or image), the attendant components, miniatures and calligraphic scripts. In medieval India, the Mughal patronage nurtured the arts of calligraphy and miniature paintings in the process strengthening the relationship between the text and the image. Medieval India was the period when calligraphy was elevated as an art form on a par with miniature painting, without any artistic binary distinctions such as high/low, studio/karkhana, modern/traditional, and elite/popular. During the colonial era, Orientalist attitudes attached to the establishment of art schools in Lahore, Madras, Calcutta and Bombay denied the expression of local aesthetics and regional cultural identities by denigrating respected local artistic traditions. For instance, Euro-American academia attached the significance to calligraphic styles if they were related to Quranic scripture, thus often overlooking the profoundly dynamic field of calligraphic arts itself. However, with the advent of printing technology, the Nastaliq—a Perso-Arabic script—and the popular idiom of the art of calligraphy in the Indian subcontinent, such as case of Bazaar images, became "doubly peripheral to the spatiotemporal categories of the world according to art history." Thus, as the advent of the printer allowed their physical separation, the historic text-and-image bond between calligraphy and miniature was broken. Subsequently, miniature found Nawabs as new patrons, who gave the discipline a new outlook as an independent art form. The art of calligraphy found its way into popular culture, and calligraphers increasingly turned to Urdu newspapers and printing-presses, one of the mass-produced forms of colonial visual culture, to practice and display their artistry. This paper explores the historical development of Nastaliq, tracing how Nastaliq became popular among both the general public and elite and how Nastaliq developed its bonds with Punjabi and Urdu languages. It endeavors to ascertain the lost status of Nastaliq as an art form parallel to miniature painting in the text-and-image relationships in the medieval period in India.

Introduction

The Nastaliq is a Perso-Arabic script used as the preferred style for a variety of languages, Dari and Pashto in Afghanistan, and Persian in Iran. Nastaliq's

popularity extends to South Asia where the calligraphic hand is utilized by the Urdu and Kashmiri languages in India and Pakistan. In Pakistan, Punjabi and Saraiki are also written in this script. Through its usage in various languages over the centuries, the Nastaliq script has developed an exclusive relationship with the Punjabi and Urdu languages.

The association between the art of calligraphy and the Islamic/Quranic/sacred calligraphy is so strong that it often precludes discussion or consideration of its historical and secular development. Therefore, it is important to note that this study is not concerned with the calligraphy of the Quranic scripture, which was recognized as the principal "Islamic art" form within formal western appraisals of art. Instead, a concentration on the aesthetic development of the Nastaliq, which appeared during the medieval India, will constitute the focus of this study. The Nastaliq was invented in Iran and refined in India during the Sultanate period, a period characterized by renewed artistic engagement between cultures. The scope of this paper will be limited to the particular idiom of Nastaliq, which was developed in India, and is distinctive from the Turkish, Afghan or Iranian styles. Nonetheless, I do not intend to draw comparison between these idioms either. This paper endeavors to ascertain the lost status of the Nastaliq as an art form parallel to miniature painting during the medieval era in India. The paper focuses on the secular image of the Nastaliq through its usage in non-religious text and unusual popularity in the general public. This feature is contrary to the Sulus, the Naskh and the Kufic scripts, which have been admired by the elite and known for the calligraphy of the Islamic or the Quranic scripture.

There is an impressive body of works that focuses on the Islamic calligraphy in the Indian subcontinent. The majority of which discuss historical developments of the Nastaliq, but only partially and not completely, for two main reasons. First, this is due to the critical stance of Oriental philosophy towards the Islamic arts, which underscores the proscription of the painting of living beings as the only cause for the development of the tradition of calligraphy in the Muslim world according to Islamic Sharia.[1] Second, the same calligraphers have been practicing the Nastaliq and all other styles of calligraphy such as the Sulus, the Naskh and the Kufic etc. However, these two books *Nastaliq Nama* ("The Book of Nastaliq") and *Sarguzashat Khat-e Nastaliq* ("The Story of the Art of Nastaliq") are noteworthy. The former—authored by Sayyid Anees ul-Hasan, son of Nafees Raqam, one of the most popular calligraphers of Pakistan—is a short treatise that provides an introductory historical background of the Nastaliq. A second book, also composed by the family member of an esteemed

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1   Pares Islam Syed Mustafizur Rehman, *Islamic Calligraphy in Medieval India*, (Dacca: University Press Limited, 1979), 5.

artist within the field, was written by Muhammad Abdullah Chughtai. Chugati's brother, Abdul Rehman Chughtai, is regarded as one of the pioneer painters of Pakistan, and his book offers a comprehensive overview of the Nastaliq, investigating the historical developments of the idiom throughout both the pre-Mughal and the Mughal periods. Before exploring the historic bonds between the Nastaliq, Punjabi and Urdu languages and the text-and-image (text and its relationships with the illustration or image) relations between calligraphy and miniature, I will briefly address the question of the invention of Nastaliq in post-Sassanid Persia.

Invention of the Nastaliq in Iran

The historical developments of the Perso-Arabic script show that the Naskh replaced the Kufi, which was then phased out by the rise of Taliq until Nastaliq supplanted the Taliq by becoming popular in Ajam or the non-Arab world. The Taliq script was developed in Iran in the tenth century and is a precursor to the Nastaliq style. There is some controversy regarding the invention of this script, with some historians crediting Hasan Ibn Husain Ali of Fars in 322 AH/934 Ad as the author.[2] However, another faction of historians attributes the invention of the Taliq to Khwaja Taj-ud Din Salman of Isfahan (d. 897 AH), and/or his contemporary, Munshi Abdul Hai Astarabadi.[3] Issues of ownership over the script aside, no historians deny that the Taliq is a seventh style of writing, and that it is a combination of the Tawqi and the Riqa. Both, the Tawqi and the Riqa styles were invented by Abu Ali Muhammad Ibn Ali Ibn Muqlah al-Shirazi (885-6–940 AD).[4]

There are two generally accepted reasons supporting the creation of Taliq as a combined script: (1) popular aesthetic convention and (2) the reality imposed by time constraints. Office secretaries combined the last letter of the first word with the first letter of the second word, extending this practice to the haroof-e munfasila (alphabets written separately).[5] As the style developed, calligraphers began to join the kashish (flourish) and dwair (circles) of the preceding words with the flourishes and circles of the following words.[6] This

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2   Maulvi Ehtram Uddin Ahmed Shaghil Usmani, *Sahifa-e Khush Nawisan,* (Nai Dilli: Qaumi Council Barai Farogh-e Urdu Zaban, 1987), 61.

3   Dr. Muhammad Abdullah Chughtai, *Sar Guzasht-e Khat-e Nastaliq,* (Lahore: Kitab Khan-e Nauras, 1970), 10.; and Prof. Sayyid Muhammad Saleem, *Tarikh-e Khat Wa Khattatin,* (Karachi: Zawar Academy Publications, 2001), 134.

4   Ibn Muqlah is also traditionally credited with inventing sitta., i.e. six styles of writing, Sulus, Tawqi, Muhaqqaq, Naskh, Raihan and Riqa.

5   Prof. Sayyid Muhammad Saleem, *Tarikh-e Khat Wa Khattatin*, (Karachi: Zawar Academy Publications, 2001), 134.

6   Dr. Muhammad Abdullah Chughtai, *Sar Guzasht-e Khat-e Nastaliq*, (Lahore: Kitab Khan-e Nauras, 1970), 9.

practice resulted in the round forms and exaggerated horizontal strokes that characterize the Taliq. The letters were derived primarily from the Riqa script whereas the ornate and slopping quality of the written lines were rooted in the Tawqi script. Aesthetically, the invention of Taliq was the first new style of writing that pleased non-Arab eyes and was uninfluenced by the Naskh.

Another theory attributes the invention of the Taliq to headiness, or the need for expedition in official and administrative affairs. As the secretaries or scribes had an invariably short time to take the dictation, they developed a style which exaggerated horizontal flourishes and beautiful rounded shapes in the writings of official correspondence, both saving time and creating a distinct aesthetic. Interestingly, this new idiom of writing soon became popular amongst both the general public and the elite and was subsequently recognized as a khat[7] or an authentic style of calligraphy.

Nastaliq is the most influential script that was developed in Persia during the post-Sassanid era. Within the history of Islamic calligraphy, the invention of the script of Nastaliq stands not only as a revolutionary development, but also as a great riddle in the history of calligraphy. Historians traditionally hold two different viewpoints on this issue. Most historians unduly credit Khwajah Mir Ali Tabrizi (d. 850 AH/1446-7 AD) for the invention of Nastaliq,[8] yet, they have failed to adequately justify this presumption. On the other hand, a few historians posit that Mir Ali Tabrizi did not invent this style of writing (see Fig. 1), rather he was merely the first calligrapher to give this ordinary style a definite shape and grace, and thus, he paved the way for its subsequent developments.[9] The latter viewpoint supported by Abul Fazal, the court historian of the Mughal Emperor Akbar, contended:

> They say that Mir Ali of Tabriz, a contemporary of Timur, derived it from the Naskh and the Taliq; but this can scarcely be correct, because there exist books in the Nastaliq character, written before Timur's time.[10]

Etymologically, the term "Nastaliq" is a Persian derivation of Arabic words the "Naskh" literally meaning "abrogation" or "abolition" or "cancellation," and

7   Khat – Originally meant a line dug into ground or drawn in sand by a stick or finger. Then it was used for a line ruled on paper or parchment and a line of writing. Essentially khat means handwriting.

8   Dr. Muhammad Abdullah Chughtai, *Sar Guzasht-e Khat-e Nastaliq*, (Lahore: Kitab Khan-e Nauras, 1970), 9.

9   Hafiz Sayyid Anees Al-Hasan, Nastaliq Nama: *Asar-e Khamah-e Nafees Raqam,* (Lahore: Darul Nafais, 2004), 12.

10   Abul Fazal Allami, *Ain-i Akbari, Vol. I.*, Trans. H. Blochmann, (Calcutta: The Baptist Mission Press, 1873), 101.

the "Taliq" meaning "suspending" (art). It can be argued that the new style of writing called Nastaliq is a combination of the two different styles known as the Naskh and the Taliq. The qualities of both styles are reflected through the Nastaliq. However, the term Naskh-e Taliq, of which Nastaliq is an abbreviation, offers us a more credible, etymological explanation.

According to Abdullah Chughtai, the Iranians created a new script of Nastaliq in order to differentiate their Persian writings from the Arabic.[11] Similar to the innovation theories attendant to the Taliq, the invention of Nastaliq was explained as a similar effort made by the Persians to reconstruct Persian or Ajami identity, at the level of the writing style. It follows that Nastaliq was formulated as a response to the saturation of the Sulus, the Naskh, and the Kufic scripts which were popular writing styles of the Quranic text and subsequently held strong bonds with the Arabic language. According to Chughtai, the emergent new script of Nastaliq was widely adopted for daily use and secular writings.[12] Chughtai's description of Nastaliq development accords with the widely accepted view among historians that in the early fifteenth century, Mir Ali gave a definite shape and name to an existing style which had been in ordinary use for a long time but was not yet recognized by established calligraphers. Mir Ali's genius saw the immense possibilities inherent to this ordinary style and he then transformed it into an elegant flowing style. Mir Ali's success in further developing Nastaliq earned him universal recognition and acclaim.[13] Similar to the Taliq, the contributions of Mir Ali to the development of the Nastaliq were particularly pleasing to Persian or non-Arab eyes.

Evolution of the Nastaliq in Medieval India

The Muslim presence in India stretches back at least a thousand years, with the medieval period serving as a high point of exchange characterized mainly by Muslim contributions toward the development of Indian cultures and civilization, especially in the realms of painting, architecture, music, language and literature. Book art, in particular, was an area of intense cooperation, support, and exchange. The Muslim contribution to the book arts or artistic and technological developments for the transmission of knowledge provided a foundation for Ulrike Stark's "communication revolution" produced after the advent of print-technology in the colonial era.[14]

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11 Dr. Muhammad Abdullah Chughtai, *Sar Guzasht-e Khat-e Nastaliq*, (Lahore: Kitab Khan-e Nauras, 1970), 16.

12 Ibid.

13 Pares Islam Syed Mustafizur Rehman, *Islamic Calligraphy in Medieval India,* (Dacca: University Press Limited, 1979), 7-8.

14 Ulrike Stark, *An Empire of Books: The Naval Kishore Press and the Diffusion of the Printed Word in Colonial India 1858-1895,* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2007), 5.

The history of book arts in India reveals that the Nastaliq, in addition to its affinity with Punjabi and Urdu languages, was able to develop text-and-image relationships with the miniature paintings in idyllic environments in medieval India under the Mughal Court patronage. There are a number of inscriptions and manuscripts written in Nastaliq during the pre-Mughal period in India that refute the judgment of some scholars that the use of Nastaliq did not prevail in India until the advent of Mughal rule.[15] The majority Iranian and Turk Mughal aristocracy used Persian as the official language of India. At the start of the Mughal period, the new script of Nastaliq was already equally popular amongst the elite and with the public in Iran and India, therefore, it was an inevitability that the Mughal monarchs, princes, princesses, and the Indian elites would develop a fascination with this new form of calligraphy. Ultimately, we see, from Babur to Bahadur Shah Zafar, how keen Mughals and their elites were to patronize the Nastaliq specifically within the book arts and in general circumstance too.

The founder of the Mughal dynasty, Babur (1526-1530), was a practitioner of calligraphic arts, and he claimed to have devised a kind of script called Khat-e Baburi. The subsequent Mughal emperor, Hamayun (r. 1555-1556), had a well-documented affinity for painting and calligraphy, and he made a habit of inviting a number of ambitious artists and calligraphers to visit his place in India. The most renowned of his guests were Khwaja Abdul Samad Shirazi and Mir Sayyid Ali Tabrizi. Hamayun's successor, the great Mughal Emperor Akbar (r. 1556-1605) could not himself master the art of calligraphy, yet he too he was famous for his generous patronage of both miniature painters and calligraphers. During his reign, calligraphers came from Persia to join the service of Akbar and Indians with artistic talent also flocked to his court. Abul Fazal says:

> His Majesty shows much regard for the art and takes a great interest in the different systems [styles] of writing; hence the large number of skillful calligraphists. Nastaliq has especially received a new impetus.[16]

Emperor Jahangir, apart from his deep love for miniature painting, also had very good handwriting skills, and he offered all of his sons training in the art of calligraphy as well. Prince Khusraw, Sultan Perwaiz and Prince Khurram

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15   Pares Islam Syed Mustafizur Rehman, *Islamic Calligraphy in Medieval India,* (Dacca: University Press Limited, 1979), 30.
16   Abul Fazal Allami, *Ain-i Akbari, Vol. I.,* Trans. H. Blochmann, (Calcutta: The Baptist Mission Press, 1873), 102.

(Emperor Shahjahan) were all notably proficient in the art of calligraphy. The princesses were never behind their male counterparts. Gulbadan Begum, the youngest daughter of Emperor Babur, Jahan Ara Begum, the eldest daughter of Shahjahan, and Zebun Nisa, the daughter of Aurangzeb, also learned and practiced calligraphy in depth.

For about two centuries, Indian calligraphers exclusively practiced the Iranian form of Nastaliq under their Persian masters. But it was Abdur Rashid Daylami (d. 1670), a royal calligrapher of the Emperor Shahjahan (r. 1627-1658), who made early efforts to transform the Iranian form of Nastaliq to accord with the elements of popular visual taste for calligraphy in India (see Fig: 2). Much later, in the colonial period, Muhammad Amir Rizvi (b. 1857), alias Mir Punja Kash, practiced Nastaliq in the tradition set by Aqa Rashid so skillfully that he was able to develop the style further. He improved upon the form of circles and sharpened the edges of syllabaries which lead to create the new idioms of Nastaliq Dehlvi and Nastaliq Lahori (see Fig. 3).

Historical developments of the book arts in medieval India manifested strong nexuses between certain scripts and languages, i.e. Arab and Perso-Arabic scripts/Punjabi and Urdu and Devnagri/Hindi, etcetera. Likewise, the relationships of the Nastaliq script particularly to the Punjabi and Urdu languages are akin to the bonds between the text and the image. These relationships started after the advent of Islam in India, developed with the growth of the vernaculars, and were nurtured greatly during the medieval period. But the colonial characterization of communities and religions, and languages and scripts, such as Muslims/Urdu and Hindus/Hindi, and Urdu/Perso-Arabic and Hindi/Devnagri scripts respectively as well as the establishment of the critical discipline of art history in the West, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, cut across the Nastaliq in many ways.[17] This impact may be studied in different ways: as a text-and-image and as the exaltation of the Nastaliq as an art form. In fact, this study is not concerned with the historical developments of the Urdu language or literature either, as a corpus of literature is already available on the subject. However, it is important to comprehend the value of the historic relationship of a particular script to the language, which was based on the notions of *rawadari* (tolerance), adaptation and eclectic behavior on the part of their patronage – both the general public and the elite.

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17   Interestingly, this colonial characterization of religion, community, script and language is continuous even in India today.

Fig: 1. Nastaliq by Mir Ali Tabrizi
(d. 1446-47).

Fig: 2. Nastaliq by Abdur Rashid Daylami
(d. 1670).

Fig: 3. Nastaliq Lahori by Taj ul Din Zareen Raqam 1936.

According to some historians, especially those who have heavily relied on the syncretism in medieval India,[18] the appearance of Muslims, from diverse backgrounds in different historical periods, aided the establishment of new social, economic, political, religious and cultural milieus in India. The Muslims came to India as conquerors, "The culture of the Muslims," as Jamil Jalabi said, "was the culture of a conquering nation. [Yet] It had a full capacity and potential to assimilate great vastness of life."[19] During the early phases of Muslim settlement in India, the process of syncretism took place, which resulted in the emergence of the new composite culture called Al-Hind ways or Muslim-Hindu culture.[20] The distinguishing characteristic of the Al-Hind ways was that it did not eradicate the ancient Indian heritage, but embraced it within a new consciousness of good neighborliness, of sharing together, of joint ownership of the sacral spaces without compromising either of their own respective identities. In Tara Chand's words, following the notions of *rawadari*:

> After the first shock of the conquest was over, the Hindus and the Muslims prepared to find a via media whereby to live as neighbours ... [and as a result] a new linguistic synthesis takes place; the Muslim give up his Turkish, Persian and Arabic and adopt the speech of the Hindu. He modifies it like his architecture and painting to his needs and thus evolves a new literary medium – Urdu.[21]

It is evident that the ancient Urdu (Hindvi) started with the rise of modern Hind Aryan languages in 1000 AD as a part of Islamic influence on Indian cultures. It is worth nothing that the Muslims did not bring this language with them, nor did they give it to India, or impose it by force. Rather, Urdu was the organic outcome of daily intercourse between the Persian- and Turkish-speaking troops, its origin reflected through the term "Urdu" itself, a Turkish loan word meaning 'army' or 'camp'.[22] Urdu soon became so popular that all Sufis and the Bhakti poets, like Baba Farid, Amir Khusraw, Kabir, Guru Nanak and other notable figures of the Vaishnava cult used the Urdu vernacular

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18 Other than Susan Bayly, Derryl MecLean, Asim Roy, and M. Waseem, which Farina Mir has mentioned, Tara Chand, Jurgan Waseem, S. A. A. Rizvi, Imtiaz Ahmad, Irfan Habib, T. N. Madan, Lina M. Fruzzetti, A. R. Saiyid, Kerrin Graefin, V. Schwerin, Patrecia Jeffery, Beatrix Pfleiderer, and many others have heavily relied on syncretism in positive connotation in South Asia.

19 Jamil Jalabi, *Tarikh-e Adab-e Urdu*. (Lahore: Majlis-e Taraqi-e Adab, 2008), 2.

20 Tara Chand, *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, (Allahabad: The Indian Press (Pubs.) Private Ltd., 1976), 111.

21 Ibid., 112.

22 T. Grahame Bailey, *A History of Urdu Literature: Heritage of India Series,* (Calcutta: Association Press, 1932), 5-13.

as their medium to convey messages to the masses. Thus, a new common language developed and by the nineteenth century it became the lingua franca of India. Its basic structure and grammar were of Indian origin but the vocabulary borrowed liberally from Turkish, Arabic, Persian and other local dialects.

Interestingly during this time period the Nastaliq was the script adopted by the general public for writing purposes. The Nastaliq was not forcefully imposed by the Sultans of Delhi or the Mughal kings. Considering its immense popularity, the Sufis also used the same script to compose their poetry.[23] In other words, this selection was a result of purely eclectic behaviors on the part of both the elite and popular masses. Perhaps the nature of the visual and the oral/aural taste of the emergent new idiom of Nastaliq and the language of Urdu respectively matched each other. Another reason could, possibly, be the strong relationship of the Nastaliq and the Persian language. The era of the evolution of Urdu,[24] and the period in which the relationship between the Nastaliq script with Persian was established coincides, and it seems likely that there is a strong connection between these events. Considering the influence of the Persian language and Persian speakers who came to India at this time, as well as their pivotal role in the early developments of the Urdu language, the emergence of the Nastaliq as a script of Urdu is not surprising at all.

Pares noted: "the Nastaliq came to be used by the general public long before it obtained the official recognition, both in Persia and India".[25] In the case of Persia, we know that the Nastaliq was a product of certain political and aesthetic requirements of the Persians (or non-Arabs), but this script, from its very inception, gained traction with the general public. During the pre-Mughal era in India, similar uses of the Nastaliq in the popular culture are also apparent from period inscriptions, written on the shops, wells, gardens, entrance doors of mosques, graves of ordinary men and ladies, and ordinary buildings distinguishing them from those of the royal personalities and edifices.[26] It was later that the Safavid in Iran and the Mughals in India recognized the Nastaliq as an independent and authentic form of the art of calligraphy. At the same time, the Nastaliq maintained its secular image due to its usage in popular secular texts. Still, religious tests were not precluded,

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23   In the Punjab, Baba Farid, Bulhe Shah, Shah Hussain, Sultan Bahu, Mian Muhammad Bakhsh and many other Sufis also selected the Nastaliq script for the writing of their poetry.

24   The scholarship of the history of the Urdu reflects that the Urdu language started to develop just after the invasion of the Punjab by the Sultan of Ghazna. For further detail see, Ibid.; and Muhammad Su- hail, "Origin and Development of Urdu Language in the Subcontinent: Contribution of Early Sufia and Mushaikh," *South Asian Studies*, 27:1 (2012): 141-169.

25   Pares Islam Syed Mustafizur Rehman, *Islamic Calligraphy in Medieval India,* (Dacca: University Press Limited, 1979), 30.

26   Ibid., 62.

and a considerable number of Quranic scripture and manuscripts written in Nastaliq are available in libraries and museums worldwide. But the popular gaze never truly developed a visual taste for the sacred text written in Nastaliq and its associations remain strongest with the secular word.

The preference of the general public for the Nastaliq above other scripts, was matched by the Mughal emperors and their nobles, who also cherished and patronized the Nastaliq so generously that this particular idiom of calligraphy became associated with the art of illustration in text-and-image relationships. It was at this time that the calligraphy of Nastaliq was deemed as an art form parallel to the miniature paintings.

Later in the colonial period, indigenous art forms were juxtaposed with western arts in critical art theory, labeled as either exotic or critiqued, local artistic traditions received a pejorative treatment in the canon of modern art academia. For instance, they were generally compared as such: Western/ local or indigenous, high/low, studio/karkhana, art/craft, modern/traditional, and elite/popular etcetera. This binary opposition was reinforced through the Orientalist philosophy of Islam and the establishment of the discipline of art history. A literature review of the art of calligraphy in the Muslim world reflects the art of Nastaliq as a form of "Islamic art," irrespective of its indigenous, cultural, political and aesthetic values.

Presently, some interpretations of Islam focus on minority radical elements in such a manner that "Islam" has become synonymous with "terrorism" or "fundamentalism," through what Edward Said calls "cultural apparatus". This "new" image of "Islam" is the legacy of nineteenth-century French and British Orientalism, which propagated the view that "Islam" regulates the Islamic cultures and societies as a single coherent entity. This religious determination of "Islamic" societies continues to inform contemporary characterization of "Islamic" societies as monolithic. Edward Said quoted Walzer in this regard to further his point:

> If you speak of Islam you more or less automatically eliminate space and time, you eliminate political complications like democracy, socialism, you eliminate secularism, and you eliminate moral restraints.[27]

Again, Cornor Cruise O'Brien stated that "certain cultures and subcultures, homes of frustrated causes, are destined breeding grounds for terrorism," and "the Islamic culture is the most notable example."[28] This very concept does not merely deny historical, regional, and cultural identities to Islam; rather it

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27 Edward W. Said, *Covering Islam,* (London: Vintage Books, 1997), 41.
28 Ibid., 32.

distorts the political and cultural realities of Islamic societies and bears upon the way its culture is understood. Said refers to this phenomenon as a lazy historical judgment and points out that this incredible stereotyping impacts seriously the understanding of social, democratic, and secular values of indigenous arts, cultures and societies.

The establishment of art schools in Lahore, Madras, Calcutta and Mumbai (erstwhile Bombay) were also coopted by the Orientalists and local aesthetics and cultural tastes were denied by a down casting of the respected local or indigenous arts.

At the same time, the calligraphy of the Quranic scripture was recognized by Euro-American academia and generally referred to as 'Islamic Art'. Without a careful study of the techniques, origins, and significance of the work, 'Islamic Art' became a catch-all, monolithic term used to describe any art from the area. The importance of the printing press not only aided the development of the Nastaliq script, but also led to a rehabilitation of its image in the wake of pervasive Orientalist critiques of indigenous art forms, allowing in case images in the Bazaar, for those images to become "doubly peripheral to the spatiotemporal categories of the world according to art history."[29] The historic text-and-image nexuses between the Nastaliq and miniature were broken and the miniature found new patrons under the Nawabs, who viewed miniatures as an independent art form, and the traditional miniature was liberated from its historic text-and-image context. The Nastaliq, due to its relations with the Urdu also, found its way into the more popular arenas and calligraphers used Urdu newspapers and printing-presses to mass produce their visual culture.

According to Abul Fazal, the art of writing was, no less than and, even superior to painting. He noted:

> What we call *form* leads us to recognize a body; the body itself leads us to what we call *a notion, an idea.* Thus on seeing the form of a letter, we recognize the letter, or a word, and this again will lead us to some idea. Similarly, in the case of what people term *a picture*. But though it is true that painters, especially those of Europe, succeed in drawing figures expressive of the conceptions which the artist has of any of the mental status, so much so, that people may mistake a picture for reality; yet pictures are much inferior to the written letter, inasmuch as the letter may embody the wisdom of bygone ages, and become a means to intellectual progress..."[30]

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29   Kajri Jain, Gods in the Bazaar: *The Economies of Indian Calendar Art,* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007), 17.

30   Abul Fazal Allami, *Ain-i Akbari, Vol. I.,* Trans. H. Blochmann, (Calcutta: The Baptist Mission Press, 1873), 97-98.

Abul Fazal held these views on the art of calligraphy at the time in which Nastaliq was also deemed as an art form at par with the miniature painting, yet, as we have discussed earlier, Nastaliq and calligraphic arts lost status as an art form during the colonial period. Practically and theoretically, contemporary and historically, as Jyotindra Jain argues:

> Hasn't there been a history of the image [/text-as-image] before the era of art? Moreover founding moments for...discourses on both modernist art and mass culture were one and the same ... the theory of one was the theory of the other.[31]

As this study of the developments within the realm of Nastaliq art has shown, the interdisciplinary aspects of Nastaliq are inseparable from the historical and geographic borders of art history, thus we must understand that it is imperative to rediscover those art forms which have been marginalized in the formalized western history of art and recover their meaning and beauty. Contrary to the previous, marginalized status of this idiom of calligraphy, its new status as "text-as-image" will definitely allow for it to be seen as art history and not only as visual material for anthropological studies. Like the Urdu language, the Nastaliq can be used as a great visual metaphor and stands as an unrivaled testament to the panorama of the great Indian composite cultures.

Conclusion

The Persians developed the Nastaliq from the scripts of Naskh and Taliq for two reasons: (1) the lack of time and (2) the popular aesthetic requirements. Politically, it helped Iranians to reconstruct their Persian or Ajami (non-Arab) identity, at the level of writing style, and aesthetically, it was visually pleasing to Persian or non-Arab eyes. It is difficult to mention exactly when it was invented, yet most historians have agreed that during the early fifteenth century, Khwajah Mir Ali gave definite shape and name to an existing ordinary style of writing to become an elegant flowing style called the Nastaliq.

It came to India with the Muslims, and it is evident that the Nastaliq was in use long before the establishment of the Mughal rule. I find that the Nastaliq in India, like in Persia, had developed its dual relationships: (1) text-and-image relationships with the miniature painting, and (2) text-and-image relationships with the Urdu and Punjabi languages. The Nastaliq could soon become popular among both the general public and the elite due to the aesthetic quality of

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31   Jyotindra Jain ed*., India's Popular Culture: Iconic Spaces and Fluid Image*s, (Mumbai: Marg Publications, 2007), 8.

the emergent new idiom and the language of Urdu matched with the visual, oral/aural taste of the general public and elite in India. In the new artistic environment, it was cherished and nurtured greatly that after practicing Nastaliq under their Persian masters for about two hundred years the Indian artists were able to evolve new forms of Indian idiom popularly known as Nastaliq Dehlvi and Nastaliq Lahori. In both arenas of the public and the elite, calligraphy of the Nastaliq was deemed as an art form parallel to the art of illustration. It was later in the colonial period that due to the orientalist philosophy of the 'Muslims' of the world as a coherent 'monolithic' entity, and of course, the emergence of the art history discipline in the nineteenth century, calligraphy of the Quranic scripture was recognized as authentic and was categorized as "Islamic art," and the Nastaliq, a form of indigenous art was simply ignored. It is also evident that the Nastaliq could never develop relations with the sacred script as it has been able to maintain its secular image in the face of the Sulus, the Naskh and the Kufic.

INTERVIEW

REACHING OUT TO 25 MILLION NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE
Interview with Sokeel Park

REACHING OUT TO 25 MILLION NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE

Interview with Sokeel Park

Sokeel Park is Director of Research & Strategy and South Korea Country Director at Liberty in North Korea (LiNK), an international NGO that rescues and resettles North Korean refugees. After completing a Bachelor in Psychology at the University of Warwick and an M.A. in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, he has worked in the United Nations, the South Korean government and in diplomatic consultancy at Independent Diplomat. He regularly gives lectures about LiNK's operations and North Korean issues to an international audience.

The Journal's editor Diana Piscarac sat down with Sokeel Park to discuss LiNK's engagement with North Korean refugees, the current political developments, and changes affecting North Korean society.

Y: How did you become involved with Liberty in North Korea, and what does your current position as South Korea Country Director as well as Director of Research & Strategy entail?

SP: I first met staff of Liberty in North Korea and also North Koreans, who had become refugees and then resettled in South Korea and the United States, when I was in New York. I was there for my graduate internship at the United Nations headquarters, and I was also interested in North Korea and North Korean refugees, human rights and humanitarian issues. In terms of my role as South Korea country director, I oversee our South Korea operations. That includes some of the coordination and handling of the refugee rescue program, and also the resettlement and post-resettlement assistance for North Koreans after they come to South Korea, and also our efforts to engage with youth in South Korea, in order to inform, educate and help them develop not just understanding but empathy for North Korean people, to change the narrative. So that involves a lot of different efforts, online and offline. In terms of research and strategy, North Korea is a multi-faceted, complex and changing issue and we think we need not just secondary research, but also to develop our own

insights, information and analysis on what's happening on the issue, so that we can talk about it authoritatively and provide some new insights, especially from the North Koreans who are leaving the country. We try to learn from them, we see them as our teachers on the issue. We collate that, analyze it and then share it with the international community and with the media. Also develop our strategy as an organization, to be as effective as possible to support the North Korean people, and in the long term, working towards our vision, which is liberty in North Korea.

Y: Please tell us about your background and how it informs your current work.

SP: I include my studies in that. My undergraduate studies were in psychology and my master's is in international relations and international history. I think all of that informs my thinking and my analysis on these issues. It's relevant and useful in analyzing both what's happening inside North Korea and approaches and strategies to bring forward change and opening of the country.

Y: What are some of the challenges and rewards of doing human rights work?

SP: I don't necessarily consider myself to be a human rights activist. In human rights there is just one framework, of course it's important, but in terms of challenges and rewards, both come from the fact that this is a relatively small industry. There are not that many organizations and institutions focused on North Korea, which means there are not that many opportunities for people to get into it in the first place. However, and in there lie the rewards as well, it's kind of a niche market that brings a lot of opportunities. Another challenge is that it's a long term issue. Sometimes progress can be difficult to see and measure, on working towards the goal of liberty in North Korea, achieving and securing their freedom, and ultimately developing their country. But it's also rewarding to be able to see micro-level changes, from individual North Koreans, and in the long run, it's a massive privilege to be able to work on an issue that is of humanity scale importance. I think we're going to see a lot of change in North Korea and the Korean peninsula within our lifetime.

Y: During one of your open talks you mentioned the "emergence of shared disobedience" among the high-tech empowered North Korean millennials, sharing new information about the outside world. To what extent does the influence of the Jangmadang Generation permeate North Korean society?

SP: The North Korean population that grew up during and after the famine of the 1990s, and from an early age have been socialized into this new changing, opening North Korean economy and information environment, is obviously growing year by year; this is a long-term generational change. I think it is key in our analysis of not just North Korea, but authoritarian governments in general, that authoritarian leaders can't just rely on fear, they actually have to get some kind of support and legitimacy from the people. And what the Jangmadang generation represent in the way that they influence and will continue to influence North Korean politics, is that North Korean policy will need to become more economy-oriented, in order to accommodate this new generation, their desires, their values, their increased understanding of North Korea's economic backwardness and to maintain support from them. I think we have seen that throughout the Kim Jong-un administration, maybe even more so this year, with an even more strongly signposted pivot towards economic development and lowering the emphasis on national security. In the long run, it seems pretty clear that Kim Jong-un recognizes that he can't maintain control and power without having economic development, and partly that is because of the way the economy is restructured internally and the development of a capitalist mindset and market economy, but also the growing awareness of China and South Korea, and how far behind North Korea is. Therefore that sense of relative deprivation and understanding of the causes of that deprivation, that it is not just because of the weather or factors outside the government's control, but that the North Korean government is actually part of the problem. That presents some accountability. It's very indirect, but the North Korean policy elite, and Kim Jong-un, is sensitive to these changes inside the country, including the changes in the youth generation. There are policies that are aimed at the new generation, to bring them back into the "socialist revolution", and to reclaim their authority. Regarding "shared disobedience", there are no public voices dissenting against the government, there's no organized disobedience, but there is disorganized shared disobedience, including when people are gathering and watching South Korean media together and collaborating in very subversive behavior, outside of government control. That can be a gateway to having more subversive conversations, to sharing opinions, desires and influencing behavior.

Y: In view of the regional context, specifically China's rise, could the Chinese economic model be a suitable path for North Korea's economic development?

SP: North Korea will find its own model. We have different examples of transition from China, Vietnam, even Cuba and other places. China is the closest and easiest-to-learn model in a lot of ways. More North Koreans, in terms of people who officially travel, have been to China than to any other country, for obvious reasons, so it will be a strong model. But North Korean policy makers are active agents in making decisions to maybe model off some things, but reject others. At this stage, what we can say is, under Kim Jong-un there has been policy and legal innovations in the direction of liberalization, decollectivization, more local autonomy, basically accommodation of what had already become the reality of capitalism. It's a matter of time and exact pathway. For Kim Jong-un, his base priority is maintaining control and power, but recognizing that in order to maintain control and power for the long-term, he has to play a long game. I think he has come to a rational conclusion that North Korea needs economic development in order to maintain support from the people. At the end of the day it's 2018, and in order to really develop your economy effectively you need to allow Internet access to businesses and to people, and you need to have that kind of communication-information infrastructure, but that would present a challenge to Kim Jong-un's control and power. It seems that he knows he has to incorporate, basically, the liberalization of the economy. It's a matter of how far and how quickly he is willing to go with that. North Korean people will start to demand other things, not just white rice and meat, but more opportunities and freedoms.

Y: What are some of the ways that LiNK monitors and assesses the situation of human rights in North Korea?

SP: It's talking with North Koreans who have left the country, and we take an open, unstructured approach throughout our conversations with them. We recognize all of the caveats in that kind of research, and we also recognize that a lot of people are doing very systematic kind of work. I think that a lot can be gained from more open, less structured, less planned, less constrained conversations, where you just get the other person to start talking and a lot of it is on them to teach you what they know, rather than just asking specific questions that we may have. One example is asking people to describe their house, so very objective, what kind of electronic goods they have in their house

and if they say that they have a TV, what do you watch on TV, if they say they have a DVD player or a laptop, that is interesting, where did you get a laptop from, how much did that cost, and so on. It's allowing their answers to lead the conversation and keep it more open. It's more of a journalistic approach, where you're asking people questions to get their experiences and their views, in their words, in an open way, to thereby derive information about phenomena rather than to necessarily develop statistical knowledge on what's happening.

Y: Your rescue program has so far helped over 800 North Korean refugees and through your media campaigns some of their stories have reached people all over the world. What impact does this have on the human rights situation in the DPRK and discussions about the issue?

SP: The objective there is to build more support for North Korean refugees and North Korean people, more broadly. If that means that North Korean refugees get more help, whether that's through our organization or another organization, or if any organization or even governments, whichever actors implement more people-focused strategies, that can help the North Korean people and bring forward change and opening of North Korea as a country. One of the problems that we've had with the international community, was that we've dealt with North Korea through such a strong security framework, as a security problem, instead of dealing with it more holistically, as a country. The summit is coming up, so if we deal with Kim Jong-un we need to make sure that that deal doesn't just benefit him and doesn't just deal with the narrow security problems that grab the most attention, but are not necessarily the most fundamental. Then we're dealing with the symptom. So we need to make sure that our deals benefit the 25 million North Korean people, not just one North Korean person, Kim Jong-un. So pushing North Korea in the direction of change and opening, to be more economy-oriented instead of security-oriented, and in the long term, normalized in the international community. I don't think we can have a sustainable solution on all of these problems, including security, without North Korea opening and normalizing as a country. And so our approach needs to take that into account and include the North Korean people. It needs to start with the understanding of the internal situation, how things are already changing, and strategies designed to accelerate those forces of change inside the country. I think that North Korean people and those who have become refugees have entered into the picture more over the last few years, so we still need to humanize the North Korean people, and build more understanding and empathy for them, internationally but also in South Korea, where there

is a huge problem of not perceiving 25 million North Korean people. That's a result of historical legacy of the mutual isolation and the securitized framework through which South Korean society has approached North Korea, but that needs to change, and it's one of the things that we're working on, especially with young South Koreans.

Y: Two inter-Korean summits and an upcoming US-NK summit, in less than half a year. The recent developments seem to bring historical change on the Korean Peninsula. What is the potential impact of these events on the issue of North Korean refugees?

SP: I don't think it will have a predictable big effect on the North Korean refugees in the short-term. This is obviously playing out at high-level politics, and when we talk of North Korean refugees, that's very much ground-level, in terms of the reality on the ground in North Hamyeong and Yanggang provinces in particular, and the border between North Korea and China, and the general situation in China. In the long run, in terms of the bigger picture, I think that the summit policy can be a good thing, but it won't lead to denuclearization. But it can lead to a process that allows both North Korea and the US to model through the least worst scenario, where North Korea maintains some elements of its nuclear program, but the US also feels they have become a more reasonable, less threatening actor, without ever finally getting into denuclearization. This diplomatic engagement can be win-win. Win for the international community, win for Kim Jong-un, at least in the short to medium term, and also a win for the North Korean people. And I'll add that the more North Korea changes and opens up, becomes more oriented towards economic development instead of security and in the long run normalizes as a country, the more the internal situation changes, the more Kim Jong-un will be on track to play nicely with the international community, and the more leverage the international community will have with Kim Jong-un. Without that, the engagement would be on a very precarious, very weak footing, it will be easy to backslide.

Y: We could suddenly see a friendlier side of Kim Jong-un, in addition to more contact between North Koreans and the rest of the world during the Pyeongchang Olympics earlier this year. Do you think these events have changed the way the world looks at North Korea? Are these engagements relevant to the situation of the people in North Korea?

SP: I don't think these kind of PR moves and soft power plays from the North Korean government make much of a difference in the way the international community and public views North Korea. The view of North Korea is fairly fixed in terms of a weird, terrible dictatorship, so we don't need to worry too much about North Korean soft power. But those kind of soft power exercises and trade-offs are something that South Korea will win every single time. If North Korean musicians come to South Korea, some people might be interested because it's kind of novel, but it won't make that much of a difference. But if a lot of South Korean musicians go to North Korea, especially if it's consistent, that can actually change North Korean culture, change the way that North Korean people see South Korea. So South Korea has a massive advantage over North Korea in soft power. One concert or sport event won't change the game completely, but it's all cumulative, the more you do it, whether it's sporting exchanges, music, academic work, any kind of cultural exchange, the North Korean people will learn about South Korea and the outside world, and how backwards they are, how backwards they've been kept. One of the best things that could come out of this diplomacy which is already starting a little bit, and I'm pleased that Moon Jae-In has supported that kind of cultural interaction, is that we can unlock the engagement at the level of high politics, so that we can open up 'low politics,' grassroots, "people to people, society to society" track of engagement. It remains to be seen how much Kim Jong-un and the North Korean government will allow that track to grow, how much cultural exchange will be possible, but we have to push it to the limit to see what that limit is, and we shouldn't set our own limits on it. If we isolate the North Korean people from the outside world, then we play into their government's strategy and ideologies. Most of the isolation comes from the North Korean government itself, but we sometimes inadvertently support that.

Y: There has been much renewed talk about the reunification of the two Koreas, within the prevailing paradigm of politics and denuclearization. In view of LiNK's stated mission to change the narrative of how we look at North Korea, what are the major challenges you are facing?

SP: Maybe we can zoom down into the issue here in South Korea. The framework and the ideology around reunification is problematic to changing the narrative and to encouraging especially young South Koreans to think about North Korea in a different way. One of the issues with reunification is that it can lead to a framing of the problem of North Korea as the division of the Korean peninsula. The division of the Korean peninsula is of course the origin, the historical starting point of both the North Korean and South Korean states, but

it's not the fundamental problem now, into 2018. The fundamental problem is the governance of North Korea, that makes it the most closed, repressive, and ideologically governed country in the world. The reunification framework, the very strong keyword of "reunification,, that in South Korea is such a strong keyword, like you say North Korea and reunification comes right after. It's such a strong association in culture, political culture, and in people's minds. It leads to a sub-optimal framing of the problem itself, which is dealing with North Korea as a country, and then also leading to sub-optimal strategies for solving the issue. Because if the problem is division, then the solution is reconciliation. The other problem with reunification is that increasingly young people aren't interested in it. That creates problems because there's not an open, honest conversation around reunification. It kind of reminds me of the political conversation around the European Union and European integration in the UK, before Brexit became an issue. European integration was a given, there wasn't an open honest conversation about benefits and costs, it was just an agenda that was pushed by political elites without having an open conversation, that then obviously led to a disaster. Even if you want reunification, I think we should have a more open and honest, and healthy conversation about the benefits and potential costs of reunification. Within the discourse of reunification that young South Koreans feel increasingly detached from, there's a danger that there is not really a place for them, a role for them, they are not agents in this picture, they just wait and see what happens between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un. It's almost like a TV news drama, the same thing with Trump and Kim Jong-un. It's something that we need to work on, talk with young South Koreans. I have actually had very positive responses, when we present that kind of vision and talk about those kind of solutions, actually a lot of people are on board with it. So I do see a lot of hope there.

REVIEW

BOOK REVIEW – THERE WILL BE CYBER WAR
Jonathan Lim

BOOK REVIEW – THERE WILL BE CYBER WAR

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Australian National University

Details:

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Introduction

Richard Stiennon's *There Will Be Cyberwar: How the Move to Network-Centric War Fighting Has Set the Stage for Cyberwar* provides an intricate perspective into the emergent threats faced by governments in the cyber realm, and emphasizes how the constant lethargy and reactive approach of governments toward cybersecurity heralds the inevitability of a "cyber Pearl Harbor".

Stiennon is an industry analyst, adviser, and security executive with 20 years' experience in subjects such as cybersecurity, governance, risk and compliance, and analytics within the technology research industry. He was previously the Director of Cyber Security for Kaiser Permanente, where he ran one of the industry's first security data science teams focused on advanced threat detection. He has also held leadership roles in several venture capital backed security organization and insurance firms, was a founder of RustNet, and worked as an ethical hacker for PricewaterhouseCoopers.[1] These experiences have provided him with a broad perspective on how the IT industry

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1   RSA Conference, 'Richard Stiennon', *RSA Conference*, 27 December 2015), https://www.rsaconference.com/speakers/richard-stiennon.

operates, and how bureaucracies have responded to emergent cyber threats. Stiennon has been writing and speaking about cyber security since 1995, and is the current General Manager of Cyber Security & Privacy for GE Healthcare, and Chief Research Analyst at IT-Harvest. It has been Steinnon's intention to contribute his perspectives to advancing cybersecurity throughout both the government and business sectors, through this book.

Steinnon reveals how the rapid and reckless adoption of technology by the United States military has been a double-edged sword, one which has multiplied the ability of the US to project power instantaneously across the globe to maintain its military industrial complex and superpower status, and which has simultaneously opened vulnerabilities within its military infrastructure, and threatens to overturn the balance of power on the battlefield. This proliferation of technology within the military to affect a competitive advantage is termed Network Centric Warfare (NCW). While the US remains the world's foremost cyber super power, its national critical infrastructure is prone to debilitating attacks within future conflicts unless immediate proactive measures are taken to affect the forward consideration of attack methodologies.

The book spans 174 pages and 18 chapters in total, including its bibliography. While there is a notable absence of any visual materials, there is an established scholarly apparatus through its table of contents, frequent use of referencing indicators, and inclusion of citations at the end. This provides sufficient background information for readers to conduct further research.

Context

This book represents a concise introductory text to the world of network centric warfighting and an updated view of cyber affairs within the military and IT industry. The book builds upon his previous works including *Surviving Cyberwar* (Rowman&Littlefield, 2010) and *UP and to the RIGHT: Strategy and Tactics of Analyst Influence* (IT-Harvest Press, 2012), seeking to amend the contentions on cyber espionage and cyber war within the former with geopolitical developments since 2010, and incorporating the technical expertise and industry knowledge demonstrated within the latter. *There Will by Cyberwar* provides a strong basis for further reading within Fred Kaplan's *The Secret History of Cyberwar* (Simon&Schuster, 2017), which provides a more comprehensive analysis of the wider historical basis of cyberwarfare and reveals how the US government remains unprepared against a resourceful cyberattack. Steinnon's book provides a competent foundation for further research into various fields of international affairs, including international security, outer space, and international humanitarian law.

There Will be Cyberwar represents Steinnon's most recent published work and it became a Washington Post Best Seller in April 2016. It reveals vulnerabilities within the military Internet of Things (IoT).. and illustrates the evolution of cyber weapons, emphasizing the fatal reactive pattern of governments and businesses towards cyberattacks, and highlights how organizations must maintain constant vigilance of developments in cyberspace.

Analysis

In its opening the book presents a hypothetical US military operation in the Taiwan Straits through the eyes of a post-event Congressional committee on the incident. This was premised on the desire to deter China's assertive moves and reaffirm US commitment to its allies in East Asia by moving its carrier fleets into the Taiwan Straits. The event was preceded by a series of calculated espionage operations, with communications encryption keys being stolen, GPS signals being spoofed, active bugs preventing the deployment of weapons systems, and communications channels exploited to facilitate deception. This was followed by a catastrophic cascade of events resulting in the decimation of US military forces in East Asia, the invasion and loss of Taiwan, and international concern over US capacity to maintain its security commitments.

This dramatic geopolitical scenario serves as a detailed demonstration into how the US military's persistent vulnerability to crippling cyberattacks could degrade or destroy its offensive and defensive capabilities within conflict zones, resulting in a lost battle, a change in military standing, and a shift in geopolitical balance. In its closing remarks, the comments by the fictional congressional committee provide a learned insight into what is required to avoid such an incident in the future; including a secure supply chain, continuous software and vulnerability reviews, and strong authentication measures. While prima facie the scenario appears implausible, if not highly unlikely, the underlying chain of events contributing to this eventuality have been validated by China's state-sponsored espionage operation "Titan Rain"[2] and its theft of weapons blueprints from the US Defense Industrial Base in 2013.[3]

Steinnon proposes his definition of cyberwar as "the use of computer and network attacks to further the goals of a war-fighting apparatus" and encompassing both computer network attacks (CNA) and exploitation (CNE). He deliberately chose this definition to constrain cyberwar to the military use of computers and network attacks while leaving open the possibility of non-

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2   Council on Foreign Relations, 'Titan Rain' *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/titan-rain.

3   Ellen Nakashima, "US weapon plans compromised by China: report" *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 28 May 2013, https://www.smh.com.au/technology/us-weapon-plans-compromised-by-china-report-20130528-2n8gn.html.

state actors such as terrorists and violent activists, thus leading readers on a structured explanation of how the move toward NCW has set the basis for cyberwar. Indeed, where a definition of "Cyberwar" in law and legal convention is absent, traditional law of war concepts have been applied to cyber operations.[4] Steinnon's analysis would have benefited from reference to the legal and geopolitical implications of a set definition of "Cyberwar", particularly concerning the relevant customary international principles contained within the Tallinn Manual 2.0, with acute reference to the emergent dichotomy between "cyberwarfare" and "cyber operations," as many cyberattacks commonly reside beneath the threshold at which international law would consider them a formal act of war.[5]

To reinforce his thesis on vulnerabilities within military technology, Steinnon argues that the military is prone to cyber vulnerabilities in its often-reckless rush to network its systems and maintain its technological advantage. This has in turn resulted in the lack of safety precautions in the pillars of NCW; weapons systems, battle management systems, command and control networks, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) communications. Steinnon crafts a coherent narrative outlining how this circumstance has transformed US military operations. He recounts the efforts of Admiral Archie Clemins to bring the US Navy into the information age, outfitting the US Navy's 7th Fleet with IT infrastructure in the form of Windows 95 PCs. The employment of NCW thus enabled the US to respond instantaneously to developments on the ground during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in March 1996, reassuring Taiwan and underlining US commitment to its allies against China. However, subsequent vulnerabilities within NCW were exposed followed by the 2001 Hainan Island Incident, where China's capture of a Navy EP-3E plane over the South China Sea provided them with the operating system and techniques employed by the NSA and resulted in the compromise of the US intelligence communications links in 2008.[6]

Steinnon illustrates how the US mismanagement of cyber and electronic security measures has been an persistent issue which lead to the loss of US military drones to Iran in 2011 and 2013,[7] ships using spoofed automatic

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4   Lisa Brownlee, "Why Cyberwar is so hard to define" *Forbes*, 16 July 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisabrownlee/2015/07/16/why-cyberwar-is-so-hard-to-define/#6edab9d431f1.

5   Klav Leetaru, "What Tallinn Manual 2.0 Teaches Us About The New Cyber Order" *Forbes* (9 February 2017) https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/02/09/what-tallinn-manual-2-0-teaches-us-about-the-new-cyber-order/#32d34fc4928b.

6   Kim Zetter, "Burn After Reading," *The Intercept*, 10 April 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/04/10/snowden-documents-reveal-scope-of-secrets-exposed-to-china-in-2001-spy-plane-incident/.

7   "Iran airs images allegedly extracted from U.S. drone," *USA Today*, 7 February 2013, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/07/iran-cia-spy-drone-footage/1898011.

identification systems,[8] insurgents intercepting live video feeds from US Predator drones,[9] and the infiltration of the Secret Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNet is a global communications network employed by defense contractors) by a number of viruses among others.[10] Steinnon's criticism of the US military's lax approach to cybersecurity remains relevant two years onward, with the Navy suffering a series of suspicious and fatal ship collisions– the USS John S. McCain colliding with a civilian ship in the Straits of Malacca and the USS Fitzgerald colliding with civilian ships off the coast of Japan.[11]

Steinnon's primary thesis is predicated on a cylcle repeated throughout history: technology is developed, then an attack is developed, followed by defense being developed. The results is a persistent shortcoming that security measures are rarely built into new technologies, thus jeopardizing critical national infrastructure systems such as industrial control systems, medical devices, transportation, and the pillars of NCW. Two years after publication, Steinnon's thematic predictions were validated by the May 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack, a worldwide cyberattack which spread through an exploit present in older Windows Systems and constituted one of the largest cyberattacks in history—with 200,000 computers across 150 countries affected and total damages amounting to billions of dollars.[12]

Steinnon suggests a few strategies which may be assumed by the US military to address its current cybersecurity weaknesses, including bolstering cyber supply-chain security, adopting more pervasive use of encryption with strong key management, operational and system hardening, and continuously monitoring all network traffic. This is accompanied by the doctrine of the Cyber Kill Chain developed by Lockheed Martin, a form of cyber triage which breaks down each stage of a malware attack into seven defined levels where victims can identify and stop a cyberattack.[13] Steinnon also suggests the wide

8   Tim Simonite, "Ship Tracking Hack Makes Tankers Vanish from View," *MIT Technology Review,* 18 October 2013, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520421/ship-tracking-hack-makes-tankers-vanish-from-view/

9   Siobhan Gorman and Yochi J. Dreazen, August Cole, "Insurgents Hack US Drones" *Wall Street Journal*, 17 December 2009, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB126102247889095011.

10   Noah Shachtman, "Under worm assault, military bans disks, USB drives," *Wired*, 19 November 2008, https://www.wired.com/2008/11/army-bans-usb-d/.

11   Sean Gallagher, "USS McCain collision ultimately caused by UI confusion," *ArsTechnica*, 3 November 2017, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/11/uss-mccain-collision-ultimately-caused-by-ui-confusion/; Luis Martinez, "USS Fitzgerald officer pleads guilty to role in deadly collision," *ABC News*, 8 May 2018, https://abcnews.go.com/US/uss-fitzgerald-officer-pleads-guilty-role-deadly-collision/story?id=55021772.

12   Zeeshan Aleem, "The WannaCry hack shows North Korea's emergence as a cyber powerhouse" *Vox* , 19 December 2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/12/19/16794970/wannacry-north-korea-bossert-cyberattacks.

13   Maria Korolov and Lysa Myers, "What is the cyber kill chain? Why it's not always the right approach to cyber attacks," *CSO*, 7 November 2017, https://www.csoonline.com/article/2134037/cyber-attacks-

adoption of threat management rather than risk management as more viable and effective to countering the evolving nature of cyber threats originating from advanced persistent threats (APT). APTs are a prolonged, aimed attack on a specific target with the intention to compromise their system and gain information from or about that target.[14]

Two issues notably absent within the book include the rise of cyber sovereignty in response to cyberattacks and the role of psy-ops within cyberwarfare. First, since 2011 there has been a perceptible shift within government policies towards the concept of cyber sovereignty—the notion that governments can exercise control over their digital environment.[15] This transition has accelerated since 2015 as illustrated by China's 2016 Cybersecurity Law [16] and Australia's mandatory data breach notification laws,[17] as governments sacrifice privacy rights in their attempts to track and manage cyber breaches suffered by private entities. Second, the events surrounding the 2016 US presidential election and the alarming rise of fake news indicates a perceptible shift in cyber operations employed by state and non-state actors from targeting the military and economic to the socio-political. Social media has been the main avenue of attack, with Russian bots being used to inject pernicious and false information amongst the general populace in a wider ploy to influence the political institutions and leadership of a target country,[18] and carefully crafted propaganda material supporting and inciting extremist violence being proliferated by groups such as ISIS.[19]

Summary

There Will Be Cyberwar provides a concise analysis of the implications of cybersecurity upon the US military's adoption of NCW, how its continuous difficulties in managing cyberattacks reflects upon the risks and vulnerabilities

espionage/strategic-planning-erm-the-practicality-of-the-cyber-kill-chain-approach-to-security.html

14   Pieter Amtz, "Explained: Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)," *MalwarebytesLabs*, 25 July 2016, https:// blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/malware/2016/07/explained-advanced-persistent-threat-apt/.

15   Sarah McKune, "An Analysis of the International Code of Conduct for Information Security" *The Citizen Lab*, 8 September 2015, https://citizenlab.ca/2015/09/international-code-of-conduct/>.

16   (中华人民共和国网络安全法) "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China" *People's Republic of China*, President of the People's Republic of China, Order No.53, 7 November 2016.

17   Paul Smith, 'New mandatory data breach notifications laws to drag Australia into cyber age' on *The Financial Review* (23 February 2018) <http://www.afr.com/technology/new-mandatory-data-breach-notifications-laws-to-drag-australia-into-cyber-age-20180222-h0whxa>.

18   Gabe O'Connor and Avie Schneider, 'How Russian Twitter Bots Pumped Out Fake News During The 2016 Election' on *NPR* (3 April 20170 <https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/03/522503844/how-russian-twitter-bots-pumped-out-fake-news-during-the-2016-election>.

19   Kimbra L. Fishel, 'ISIS and the Continuing Threat of Islamist Jihad: The Need for the Centrality of PSYOP' on *Moderndiplomacy* (19 April 2018) <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/04/19/isis-and-the-continuing-threat-of-islamist-jihad-the-need-for-the-centrality-of-psyop/>.

faced by governments and private entities, and that the unwillingness of governments and organizations to adapt risks the inevitable occurrence of a "cyber Pearl Harbour". The intended readership of this book includes those moderately familiar with technology and politics. The book succeeds in engaging scholars of international politics through its recounting of cyber operations conducted by both state and non-state actors and its projected influence upon how these actors can be expected to interact with each other within the 21st century. However, it is also expected to intrigue cybersecurity professionals interested in military technology, IoT, public policy, and the geopolitical landscape. Steinnon's book sits as a bridge between the fields of IT and International Affairs, given its broad geopolitical predictions, perceptive insight into military affairs, and vast knowledge in relation to the nature and operation of cyber operations on a technical level. Accordingly, the book is a valued contribution to the areas of IT and International Relations given its utility as a foundational text for scholars new to the topic of cyberwarfare.

GUIDELINES

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PEAR (Papers, Essays, and Reviews) welcomes submissions from all scholars, most notably graduate students, regarding the diverse field of International Studies, particularly those topics that challenge the conventional wisdom of any given issue. Each issue of the printed Journal will contain the following three sections:

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