
FREEDOM FOR ALL, OR FREEDOM FOR SOME? GENDER QUOTAS IN ASIA, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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Gender quotas for female legislators are a relatively new phenomenon. As this new policy is becoming prevalent, it is important to determine whether it is achieving its objectives of increasing female representation and promoting female empowerment. I show that quotas do not have a statistically significant effect upon the female labor force participation rate in Asia, Africa or the Middle East. This may be because quota percentages are not high enough, not enough time has passed since they were implemented or female legislators are heavily influenced by males. Case studies on India and Pakistan demonstrate that quotas cannot effectively promote empowering policies unless democratic principles are strong within the nation and women are able to hold leadership positions. However, quotas do change male attitudes towards female leaders, and many female leaders provide public goods better-suited to women. Thus, I support gender quotas.

Introduction

Despite great progress in gender equality manifested in pro-women legislation over the last century, such as a decrease in the wage gap between men and women and changes in popular societal attitudes, women still face great obstacles when entering the world of politics. Even in Western European nations that can boast long-standing traditions of freedom and equality for all of their citizens, there are much lower percentages of women in political roles than men.¹ Not only does this seem to suggest systemic discrimination against women, but it can also lead to skewed policy decisions; studies have shown that female

¹ Mercedes Mateo Diaz and Susan Millns, "Parity, Power, and Representative Politics: The Elusive Pursuit of Gender Equality in Europe." *Feminist Legal Studies* vol. 12 (2004): 279-302.

lawmakers tend to prioritize subjects on the political agenda that men are either uncomfortable with or unknowledgeable about.² If women consistently participate less in the political process than men, nations may be more likely to see policies and practices that not only put women at a disadvantage but also fail to adequately address all of a society's ills.

Within the last ten years, more than half of the world's nations have implemented some type of quota system for women at the national level in an attempt to decrease the gender gap — both within political participation itself and within the policies that national legislatures promote.³ Quotas may be constitutional or legislative; they may be mandatory or voluntary; they may consist of reserved seats or be attached to geographic areas; they may be implemented at the first primary or at the final stages of elections. Because of this wide variance, different types of quotas are not distinguished from one another throughout this study. Quota policies are implemented with two assumptions: first, that female legislators tend to promote policies that help women; and second, that quotas are an effective method of enabling greater numbers of female legislators to promote empowering policies. The first assumption has gained great credence in the political-science community, so I will not duplicate previous research in an attempt to prove it.

The second assumption, that gender quotas enable female politicians to implement women-friendly policies, is much more controversial, and it will serve as the focus of this paper. If quotas are achieving their objectives, then quota-implementing nations ought to see a rise in various female empowerment indicators following the quota policy. If quotas are not effective, then the international development community ought to devise another policy to empower its women and girls and to mitigate the persistent gender gaps displayed in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

To help determine whether gender quotas at the national level are effectively empowering women in developing countries, I combine differences quantitative analysis with a case study approach to pursue the following research question: Do quotas for females in national-level legislatures lead to female empowerment, measured as a higher percentage of women participating in the labor force in Asia, Africa and the Middle East?

I chose to use the percentage of women participating in the labor force as my outcome variable because women working outside of the household

serves as a good indication of empowerment or agency, to use the phrase put forward by economist Amartya Sen.⁴ Income might serve as a potential indicator for empowerment, but needs within various countries differ so much that it is very difficult to tell whether change in income levels are adequate, much less empowering, for women in developing nations. Education is also often used as a sign of empowerment, and nothing better supports agency, or the running of one's own life, than education. However, female education would probably respond relatively slowly to the kinds of gender-friendly policies that are implemented by legislatures with higher percentages of women.

Amartya Sen underlines the importance of women as empowered agents in *Development as Freedom* when he writes, "No longer the passive recipients of welfare-enhancing help, women are increasingly seen, by men as well as women, as active agents of change: the dynamic promoters of social transformations that can alter the lives of both women and men."⁵ Quotas for women in national-level political positions promote Sen's ideal of agency on two levels. The women who serve in political positions have the opportunity to design policies that promote their own needs, and the policies may also make it easier for women to gain access to educational and economic opportunities.

The statistical analysis in this paper is inconclusive, but through the qualitative case studies on India and Pakistan, certain types of gender quotas appear to support empowerment. Therefore, despite the lack of statistical evidence, I recommend that nations implement gender quotas to mitigate the pressures from patriarchal society and tradition. If development is freedom, as Sen suggests, then development should include gender quota policies.

Literature Review

The expansive literature on quotas presents a mixed picture of the policy's effectiveness. However, many of the studies cited here are completed at the local, rather than the national, level and they use different methods to measure different effects.

Quotas are ineffective.

A study by Petra Meier, entitled "A Gender Gap not Closed by Quotas", finds quotas to be ineffective. Meier indicates that quotas remain controversial even

2 "Women Rising," *The Economist*, September 20, 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/12260891?story_id=12260891 (accessed January 28, 2011).

3 The Quota Project, www.quotaproject.org (accessed January 30, 2011).

4 Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Random House, 1999).

5 *Ibid.*, 189.

in nations where they have been implemented. Although quotas may reform the public sphere at the macro level, Meier indicates that they have not been able to change minds or practices at the micro level.⁶ She seems to place much of her analysis on the fact that men tend to be against quotas, whereas women tend to be in favor of them. But her subsequent dismissal of the quota policy, due to this fact, denies the persuasive voice which quotas seek to give them. Empowerment policies should not be dropped merely because those who stand to lose power oppose those policies.

Quotas' effects are inconclusive.

Three studies produce inconclusive results. In "Parity, Power, and Representative Politics", Mercedes Diaz and Susan Millns show that quotas may be an effective tool to achieve parity between males and females in government, but they cannot be "one size fits all". Nations must streamline gender quotas so that they "suit the particularities of individual national electoral regimes".⁷ Without such streamlining, quotas are likely to be ineffective. This, combined with the analyses of India and Pakistan presented later in this study, should not discourage policy makers from implementing quotas. It should merely serve as a cautionary tale that she who ignores context does so at the risk of political stability and legitimacy.

In "Arguing For and Against Quotas: Theoretical Issues", Carol Bacchi argues that policies such as quotas might bypass the merit principle in favor of less qualified candidates.⁸ She also notes that quotas are not discriminatory, but rather an attempt to do justice. Bacchi's latter argument supports Sen's agency theory supporting empowerment for women: Quotas ought to be implemented because they are more just. There is something inherently good about actively pursuing one's own objectives.⁹ Thus, according to Bacchi and Sen, even if quotas do not instrumentally promote higher female participation rates in the labor force, they are worthwhile if they create societies that are more inclusive and hence more just.

In "Gender Quotas: Controversial but Trendy" Drude Dahlerup rec-

ognizes that quotas are a relatively new and very controversial phenomenon, and they have already sparked multiple studies with inconclusive results.¹⁰ She advocates for a specific research agenda on the political conditions and compromises surrounding the implementation of quota systems, backing Diaz and Millns' assertion that quotas' effects will be very different in different countries. In analyzing my case studies on India and Pakistan, I am following her recommendations by attempting to determine whether this controversial policy genuinely meets its goals in two different settings. My findings indicate that context is crucial to the effectiveness of gender quotas.

Quotas are effective.

In an article called "Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?" Lori Beaman and her colleagues show that exposure to female leaders through the Indian system of reserved seats for women in local government positions alters male perceptions of female leadership ability.¹¹ They conclude that although quotas may be unpopular, they may precipitate a reversal in male bias against female leaders. If this is true, then quotas for their own sake may be worthwhile, even if they do not directly lead to a higher percentage of females entering the labor force. Likewise, Esther Duflo shows in "Why Political Reservations?" that female leaders tend to provide the same amount and quality of public goods yet take fewer bribes than male leaders.¹² This study provides a defense of women as leaders, but it does not necessarily show that women promote policies which specifically empower women. This highlights the lack of statistical evidence in my own study, which fails to find a correlation between quotas and labor force participation rates. But it also supports my conclusions that as a tool of empowerment, quotas are inherently good and just policies.

Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo present another study entitled "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from an India-Wide Randomized Policy Experiment."¹³ The authors find that local government leaders tend to

6 Petra Meier, "A Gender Gap Not Closed by Quotas," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* vol.10 no. 3 (September 2008): 329-347.

7 Mercedes Mateo Diaz and Susan Millns, "Parity, Power, and Representative Politics: The Elusive Pursuit of Gender Equality in Europe," *Feminist Legal Studies* vol. 12 (2004): 279-302.

8 Carol Bacchi, "Arguing for and against Quotas: Theoretical Issues," *Women, Quotas, and Politics*, ed. Drude Dahlerup. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 32-51.

9 Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*. (New York: Random House, 1999), 74.

10 Drude Dahlerup, "Gender Quotas: Controversial but Trendy," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* vol. 10 no. 3 (2008), 322-328.

11 Lori Beaman, Raghavendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova, "Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* vol. 124 no. 4 (2009): 1497-1540.

12 Esther Duflo, "Why Political Reservations?" *Journal of the European Economic Association* vol. 3 no. 2/3 (May 2005): 668-78.

13 Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from an India-Wide Randomized Policy Experiment." *Econometrica* vol. 72 no. 5 (September, 2004): 1409-1443.

allocate resources according to the needs of their own genders.¹⁴ Thus, a quota system promoting female leadership roles leads to government services that women really want. Once again, quotas are characterized as justice-enhancing policy tools that contribute to the empowerment of women.

Overall, the literature is supportive of the inherent value of quotas, though Meier stands out as a quota skeptic. Many previous studies align with my own conclusions that quota policies must be context-specific in order to succeed. Despite the literature's relative support for quota policies, given that most studies have been conducted only at the local and national level, it is important for more work to be done at the international level. This study attempts to fill that gap in the literature.

Data

Quota information used in my statistical analysis comes from the Quota Project Database, sponsored by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and Stockholm University.¹⁵ Data for the outcome variable, the percentage of women participating in the labor force, comes from the World Bank's Development Indicators database.¹⁶ The data spans ten years, from 1999 to 2008. Data for the control variables also comes from the World Bank Development Indicators and covers the same time period. The control variables include the fertility rate, GDP per capita (transformed into the log of GDP per capita), and adult female literacy rate.

I expect that the female labor force participation rate (LFPR) will be negatively correlated with the fertility rate. One assumes that females who are having higher numbers of babies will be less likely to enter the labor force. I expect to find a positive correlation between the log of GDP per capita and the female LFPR. A more robust economy, evidenced by a higher GDP per capita, should be more likely if females participate in the labor force, creating products and earning income to purchase products. I also expect to find a positive relationship between the adult female literacy rate and the female LFPR. Females who are uneducated will probably lack the skills and perhaps even the courage to enter the labor force.

My sample contains 87 countries from Asia, Africa, and the Middle

East. Thirty-two of the nations have national-level gender quotas, and 55 nations do not. Summary statistics are presented below:

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Female LFPR	870	53.3	20.09	10.4	91
Quota	870	0.206	0.404	0	1
Fertility Rate	868	4.197	1.53	1.08	7.85
GDP Per capita	841	2457.171	5096.389	85.542	38267.91
Female adult literacy rate	169	62.596	24.123	9.399	99.083

Quantitative Methodology

I employ a difference in differences quantitative technique, though I do not have a clean before and after time period that is typical of difference in differences tests because of the staggered implementation of gender quotas at different times throughout this study.¹⁷ To account for the staggered entry of quotas, I use data from 1999 to 2008 to try to capture the change over time in nations where quotas were present and in nations where quotas were not present. This method is known as a difference in differences test because rather than simply subtracting the average level of female participation of one group of nations from another group at one, static moment, it considers the difference between the differences over time. I use the following OLS regression equation to conduct my statistical analysis using the difference in differences method:

$$LFPR_{ct} = \alpha c + \beta t + \text{Quota}_{ct} + \text{Fertility}_{ct} + \text{LogGDPpercapita}_{ct} + \text{Literacy}_{ct} + \epsilon_{ct}$$

To attempt to control for two of the biggest potential problems that may skew this study, differences between countries and over time, I use country and time fixed effects (represented by αc and βt above) in one portion of my analysis.

In order for a difference in differences test to be valid, the parallel trends assumption must hold. One expects that the nations with and without quotas would have the same trends in the female LFPR even if the quotas had not been implemented. If this assumption is not true, then there is something inherently different about the two groups of nations which will bias the statistical results. I conducted a simple difference in difference test on the means of female LFPRs

¹⁴ Ibid., 1431.

¹⁵ Quota Project, <http://www.quotaproject.org/> (accessed January 30, 2011).

¹⁶ World Bank Development Indicators, <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4> (accessed March 28, 2011).

¹⁷ Esther Dufo, "Empirical Methods," 13.

of the countries with and without quotas in my sample to determine whether the parallel trends assumption holds.

	Mean LFPR, Quota Countries	Mean LFPR, Non-Quota Countries	Difference in Differences
1996	51.284	52.268	0.984
1995	51.029	52.141	1.112
Difference	0.255	0.127	0.128

I chose to test the parallel trends assumption between the years 1995 and 1996 because the first year that a quota was implemented in my sample was in 1997. Thus, I am looking at the difference between the trends of female LFPRs in two years in which no nation in my sample had implemented a quota, regardless of whether or not the nations eventually did so.

As is shown in the chart above, the difference in differences between the two groups of nations is only 0.128. The line graph likewise shows trends that are very nearly parallel. 0.128 is a very small difference that is close to zero, indicating along with the graph that the parallel trends assumption holds. However, to be sure that this was true, I conducted a regression analysis in order to obtain standard errors to find statistical significance. I included dummy variables for quotas and years, and added an interaction term for quota*year. Again, I used data from 1995 and 1996 to obtain the following equation:

$$LFPR = -1.11Quota + 0.127Year + 0.128Quota*Year + C$$

The coefficient on quota*year, 0.128, provides the same difference in differences that I presented above, which was found by simply subtracting the difference in means of the two groups. The standard error for quota*year was 6.7, indicating that the variable is not statistically significant. Thus, I cannot say that the mean of one group is statistically different from the mean of the other group. The parallel trends assumption holds.

Quantitative results

I tested six OLS regression models, and the results are presented in the table below.

Coefficients on Female LFPR	Regression, no controls	Regression with controls, no literacy rate	Regression with all controls	Regression with fixed effects, no controls	Regression with fixed effects, no literacy rate	Regression with fixed effects, all controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Quota	1.670 (1.685)	1.607 (1.549)	-1.604 (3.259)	-0.176 (0.205)	-0.304 (0.199)	-0.074 (0.720)
Fertility rate	...	-0.448 (.583)	1.833 (1.412)	...	-3.655*** (0.373)	-2.716** (1.055)
Log GDP per capita	...	-7.853*** (0.711)	-10.782*** (1.645)	...	-0.489** (0.278)	-1.797** (0.814)
Female liter- acy rate	0.219*** (0.083)	0.041 (0.069)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	870	839	164	870	839	164
Prob > F	0.3219	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.0011	0.210	0.307	0.996	0.997	0.998

Quotas are not statistically significant in any of the models. I will interpret regression model (5):

$$LFPR = \alpha ct + \beta ct + -0.304Quota ct + -3.655Fertility ct + -0.489logGDP ct + C ct$$

Model (5) includes the time and country fixed effects, which capture the difference in differences but does not include the control variable of the female literacy rate. Although I tried to compile data on female literacy from several different sources, much of the education data is available from only the most recent years. As shown in the table above, the number of observations dropped from 870 to 164 when I included the female literacy rate, so although I do believe that one would see a positive correlation between the female literacy

rate and the female LFPR, I simply do not have enough data available to test that relationship at this time. This exclusion may cause omitted variable bias. However, since I am unable to test whether or not that is true, and since I have included time and country fixed effects in my study, I will assume that the fixed effects capture any changes in education that might have influenced the female LFPR.

In regression model (5), including fixed effects but omitting the adult female literacy rate, quotas are not statistically significant. This was unexpected and contrary to the findings of Chattopadhyay and Duflo presented in the literature review and I will offer several theories to explain why this may have occurred.

The fertility rate in model (5) was statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level, and its coefficient displays the negative correlation that I expected to find. On average and holding all else constant, I can be 99 percent confident that a unit rise in the fertility rate is associated with a -3.655 unit decrease in the female LFPR. As women have more children, their participation rates drop.

The log of GDP per capita was also statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, though the negative relationship is opposite from what I expected to find. On average and holding all else constant, I can be 95 percent confident that one percent rise in GDP per capita is associated with a -0.489 unit decrease in the female LFPR. This result is unexpected, because higher participation in the labor force ought to correspond with a better performing economy. However, the coefficient on log GDP per capita is very small, indicating that the effect is fairly small.

The lack of statistical significance for quotas was unexpected. However, my study does face the problem that the quotas have been implemented in many nations for just a few years. It is highly likely that they are not statistically significant because the policy has not had enough time to make a difference in the female LFPR.

Laying aside potential problems with the statistical analysis, quotas may have failed in four possible ways. Female politicians may act independently, but they may not be implementing policies to foster the empowerment of women. Perhaps they feel that it is unfair for them to try to implement policies that benefit women above men. It is also possible that female politicians do not act independently; they may wish to do something that promotes female empowerment, but they are still led and influenced by males. Additionally, the percentage of women allotted by the quota may not be large enough to allow

their voices to truly be heard; even though these women may act independently to empower women, they may be outnumbered by males who do not support the policies. The most optimistic possibility is that male politicians who had been in place before the quotas were implemented had already been doing a good job of promoting female empowerment.

Furthermore, my outcome variable, participation of females in the labor force, may be an imperfect proxy for female empowerment. Education is probably a better indication of true agency in a woman's life, but the available data is simply not complete enough to test at this time. Policy makers should attempt to study the effects of quota policies across countries when more time has passed and more and different data is available. Though context is important for the success of quotas, it is important to compare and contrast the experiences of nations across entire regions so that policy makers can learn from each other's mistakes and successes. Data limitations hamper this particular statistical study, but they present an important and varied research agenda for the future.

Qualitative methodology

To augment my statistical analysis and dig into the multiple factors affecting female empowerment, I use a case-oriented comparative approach to describe context-specific quota policies and the status of women in India and Pakistan. India has quotas only at the local level, and Pakistan implemented both a local and a national-level gender quota in 2002. By looking closely at India and Pakistan, I attempt to determine whether the implementation of quotas fosters the effective participation of female legislators, such that their voices are heard and they are able to enact policies that are women-friendly.

Qualitative case studies: India and Pakistan

India has no national-level quotas for women, but the Seventy-Third Amendment to its constitution reserves 33 percent of local seats for women. The reservations also include one-third of the Pradhan leadership positions.¹⁸ Pakistan implemented a 33 percent reservation at the local-level and a 17 percent reservation at the national-level in 2002. I will compare the effectiveness of female legislators at both levels of government in both countries.

18 Lori Beaman, Raghendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova, "Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* vol. 124 no. 4 (2009): 1500.

	India	Pakistan
Local quota	33% local seats 33% Pradhan positions	33% local seats
National quota	N/A	17%, both houses
Percentage of women in local government	1.2 million female members; percentage ranges state by state but is approx. 33%	33%
Percentage of women in national government	10.7% in Rajya Sabha ¹⁹ 11% in Lok Sabha ²⁰	21.6% in National Assembly ²¹ 17% in Senate ²²

In “Why Political Reservations?” mentioned briefly in the literature review, Esther Duflo describes the Indian Panchayat as a “system of village-level [...] councils, whose members are elected by the people, that are responsible for the administration of local public goods.”¹⁹ Therefore, the local reservation policy provides an ideal natural experiment for researchers to look at the effects of local female legislators and leaders upon the allocation of local public goods.

Duflo’s study, “Why Political Reservations?” shows that female leaders within the reservation system tend to provide the same amount and quality of public goods yet take fewer bribes than male leaders. Local female leaders are as effective as, and even more efficient than, their male counterparts.²⁰ This finding refutes the arguments of opponents of reserved seats, who worry that female politicians will not be as effective at their jobs as males because of less education and training. But even if women were less effective because of lower levels of education, NGOs in India are already stepping up to fill in the gaps in female local leaders’ educations. Because of the legitimate fear that inexperienced female politicians may be proxies for their husbands and fathers, NGOs such as the Confederation of Voluntary Associations (COVA) work to build the capacity of female leaders.²¹

Local-level quotas have not only led to more effective leaders for villages and more education programs for women, but have also made advances

against male prejudice. In a study entitled, “Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?” Lori Beaman and her colleagues use the natural experiment to show that exposure to female leaders through the Indian system of reserved seats for women in local government positions altered male perceptions of female leadership ability. They conclude that although quotas remain relatively unpopular, they may precipitate a reversal in male bias against female leaders.²² If this is true, then quotas may be intrinsically worthwhile, even if they do not directly lead to policies that empower women by improving literacy or health.

Thus, local government gender quotas and programs that spring up around them have been shown to reduce prejudice and corruption within Indian society and build capacity of local women. Chattopadhyay and Duflo add that the quota system also induces rural women (non-leaders) to speak up in local meetings in their article, “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from an India-Wide Randomized Policy Experiment.” The authors show that more women participate if their leaders are women, signaling empowerment for not only the women who become leaders, but also for women who previously did not participate at all in political meetings.²³ Furthermore, the authors indicate that female leaders are more likely to promote public goods that align with the needs of women than male leaders.²⁴ Thus, a government that uses quotas at the local level may better represent the true desires of the entire community, rather than the desires of vocal males who have needs that differ from women who are shut out of the policy-making process.

The literature on Indian policies and governance emphasizes again and again that women’s issues must be addressed at all levels of governance. The effects of a local government quota will be limited if it is implemented in isolation. Jo Beall writes that decentralization may be very limiting, as she argues that “distributive policies may be better exercised at the national level.”²⁵ Beall adds that some state governments have been very slow to change their systems in such a way that allows gram panchayats to govern effectively.²⁶ Thus, even if women in leadership roles in panchayats implement policies that help other

19 Esther Duflo, “Why Political Reservations?” *Journal of the European Economic Association* vol. 3 no. 2/3 (May 2005): 668.

20 *Ibid.*, 674.

21 Khawar Mumtaz, “Women’s Representation, Effectiveness and Leadership in South Asia,” February 2005, for the 5th South Asia Regional Ministerial Conference, Celebrating Beijing Plus Ten, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1-43, http://www.unifem.org.in/PDF/Women_representation.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011).

22 Lori Beaman, Raghendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova, “Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* vol. 124 no. 4 (2009): 1502.

23 Raghendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from an India-Wide Randomized Policy Experiment.” *Econometrica* vol. 72 no. 5 (September, 2004): 1428.

24 *Ibid.*, 1429-30.

25 Jo Beall, “Decentralisation, Women’s Rights, and Development,” *Democracy, Development and Decentralisation in India*, (London: Routledge, 2010): 172.

26 *Ibid.*, 174.

women, they are likely to face obstacles at the state and national levels.

Despite the success of local-level quotas, Indian women may oppose reserved seats at the national level because they perceive them as depriving quota-elected women of their power. Mumtaz notes that in Pakistan, women who gain reserved seats are elected indirectly, which “in effect isolates them from their constituencies and potential source of power.”²⁷ If that is the case, then women who understand the political process may not even be interested in running for reserved, at-large seats because they recognize that they are largely symbolic. Furthermore, the existence of reserved female seats may discourage Indian voters from electing women from the constituencies in the non-reserved seats. If the government labels certain seats as female seats, that implicitly labels the rest of the seats as male seats. In order to be true tools of empowerment, quotas must be tied to geographic constituencies.

Pakistan employs a female representative at-large reservation system in its National Assembly.²⁸ Because they serve as members at-large, female Pakistani elected officials are deprived of their own geographical constituencies to whom they are accountable. Thus, these women tend to feel beholden to the political party that indirectly elected them, and they toe the party line even when it is detrimental to women’s interests.²⁹

The Pakistani national-level gender quota of seventeen percent does not even approach the majority that is needed to pass legislation in the National Assembly.³⁰ This highlights the need for female representation to reach a critical mass, usually defined at a minimum of 30 percent of a given governmental body, in order to begin to make a difference.³¹

This type of corruption is illustrative of some of the larger differences between India and Pakistan, which may help to explain the difference in the effectiveness of gender quotas in their governments. Historically, Pakistan suffers from a very large deficit of democracy.³² At the time of independence from

Britain, the areas of India that became Pakistan had much less experience with electoral procedures than the areas that became independent India.³³ Subsequent Pakistani elections have tended to be rigged, postponed or have occurred solely at the local level, which is a stark contrast to India’s strong record of free and fair elections at the local, state, and national levels.³⁴ Thus, Pakistanis tend to have very little faith in the effectiveness of elections and in the honesty of their elected leaders. According to Andrew Wilder, “the primary purpose of [nearly all of Pakistan’s elections] was to legitimize the retention of power by the unelected institutions of the state rather than to transfer power to elected institutions.”³⁵ This statement indicates that even though Pakistan has reserved seats for women in its national legislature, their elected power may not be very legitimate, and they may not have much power to speak of. To illustrate this important point, a Pakistani Member of the National Assembly by the name of Ayaz Amir wrote in his weekly newspaper column in 2009, “Politicians in Pakistan live under a great illusion. They think they run the country when actually they do nothing of the kind. More than ever...it is the captains of industry, commerce, banking and real estate who run things from behind the scenes and wield real power.”³⁶

Clearly, elected officials in Pakistan have less power than their counterparts in India, and the citizens of Pakistan have not bought into the effectiveness of democracy to as great an extent. Female elected leaders in Pakistan suffer disrespect and exclusion even more than male elected leaders. Unfortunately, these female legislators are often patronized by their male counterparts and asked for input only on women’s issues. They tend to be excluded entirely from budget discussions.³⁷ In the Senate sessions of 2003-2004, although females constituted seventeen percent of the Senate, they raised only seven percent of the questions on the floor.³⁸ A report by the International Crisis Group from 2007 quotes some female local councilors as saying, “We don’t get anything. We have no vote, we have no voice.” Another female local leader referred to herself as a “mere

27 Khawar Mumtaz, “Women’s Representation, Effectiveness and Leadership in South Asia,” February 2005, for the 5th South Asia Regional Ministerial Conference, Celebrating Beijing Plus Ten, Islamabad, Pakistan, 9, http://www.unifem.org.in/PDF/Women_representation.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011).

28 Ibid., 16.

29 Saira Bano, “Women in Parliament in Pakistan: Potential Problems and Solutions,” *Women’s Studies Journal*, vol. 23 no. 1 (September 2009): 32.

30 Pakistani National Assembly Web site, http://www.na.gov.pk/intro_na.html, (accessed May 7, 2011).

31 Drude Dahlerup, “Introduction,” in *Women, Quotas, and Politics*, ed. Drude Dahlerup, (New York, Routledge: 2006): 12.

32 Philip Oldenburg, *India, Pakistan and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths*, (New York, Routledge: 2010): 74.

33 Ibid., 78.

34 Ibid., 78, 82.

35 Qtd. in Philip Oldenburg, *India, Pakistan and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths*, (New York, Routledge: 2010): 80.

36 Ibid., 102.

37 Shirin M. Rai, Nafisa Shah and Aazar Aya, “Achieving Gender Equality in Public Offices in Pakistan,” United Nations Development Programme, 2007, http://undp.org.pk/component?option=com_publications/Itemid,100/limitstart,60/, (accessed April 27, 2011).

38 Saira Bano, “Women in Parliament in Pakistan: Potential Problems and Solutions,” *Women’s Studies Journal*, vol. 23 no. 1 (September 2009): 31.

rubber stamp.”³⁹ Thus, the combination of the relative lack of power of elected officials in general and of women in particular makes it very difficult for quotas for women to have a direct effect upon gender-friendly policies that are or are not implemented within Pakistan. This is surprising, given the relative success of quotas in India. However, rather than providing an argument to oppose the implementation of quotas, the case of Pakistan should encourage policymakers to seek out ways to strengthen all facets of democratic inclusion in Pakistan. The problem in Pakistan is not the effectiveness of quotas — it is the effectiveness of democracy. The quota policy must not be held responsible for any failure to affect policy change. In isolation, quotas cannot provide the silver bullet to democratic participation. But in a nation where democracy is more effective, such as India, quotas can provide the impetus necessary to transition towards a more gender-just system of representation.

One bright spot in national politics in Pakistan is the formation of the Parliamentary Women’s Caucus. All elected women, 76 from the National Assembly and 17 from the Senate, are members of the caucus under the leadership of Dr. Fehmida Mirza, Honourable Speaker of the National Assembly and the first female Speaker in the history of the nation.⁴⁰ Benazir Bhutto first proposed the caucus, although it was not formed until after her assassination. She stated that its goals were to take up gender concerns in a way that they would be implemented through legislation; to coordinate with major women’s organizations in an effort to support gender sensitive programs; and to connect with female parliamentarians around the world.⁴¹

The caucus is relatively new, and according to its website it has endorsed only four resolutions in the National Assembly of Pakistan.⁴² Thus, it does not seem that the Caucus has been overly active in drafting and passing specific domestic policies that affect the women of Pakistan. However, its members are still vastly outnumbered by the males in the Pakistani parliament. The women face multiple obstacles, but at least they are trying to achieve some solidarity so that they may address women’s issues more effectively, both through legislation and through the potential partnerships with other women’s organizations that Benazir Bhutto first proposed. If these women were joined by others elected

through a quota system rooted in geographical constituencies, the women might be able to achieve the critical mass necessary to truly affect legislation. Following Sen’s theory of agency, they would be working together to achieve things that they have reason to value. If a quota system enables even one more woman to make her voice heard in Pakistan’s parliament, and if that in turn strengthens women’s faith in democracy even a little bit in Pakistan, then the policy will be worthwhile.

Policy Recommendations

Amartya Sen’s capability approach to development helps to illuminate the need for a deepening of democracy in order for quotas to be effective. When women deliberate and vote within their own societies, they exhibit agency and expand their capabilities. According to Sen and many other economists, this is the ideal way to pursue human development. Thus, if quotas help to foster such deliberation and acceptance of democracy, then quotas should be implemented. Although quotas are an arbitrarily imposed percentage, they are a tool used to provide more freedom and agency for women in the developing world. Despite some views that quotas are reverse discrimination against both men and women or that many quota-elected women are merely puppets of their husbands, much of the literature suggest that quotas give women the confidence they need to speak out about their wants and needs.

It seems likely that quotas cannot be as effective in a non-democratic atmosphere. If quotas are to be implemented in a society that also allows women to speak out and affect change according to their own needs, then they are unlikely to lead toward more gender-friendly policies. However, gender quotas should not be discarded entirely because of this apparent failure. Any and every tool for democratic change would have to be discarded if this were so. If Sen’s theory of development, focused on capability and agency, is correct, then policy makers ought to institutionalize tools of empowerment as much as possible. It is very difficult to foster improvements in the capability and agency of women without institutional change. Even if quotas’ effectiveness is limited to a slow change of male prejudice against female leaders, I believe that they are still worth implementing.

39 International Crisis Group Asia Report no.77 (2004): 14, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/077-devolution-in-pakistan-reform-or-regression.aspx>, (accessed March 28, 2011).

40 Pakistan Women’s Parliamentary Caucus, <http://www.wpcp.org.pk/wpcp/AboutUs.aspx>, (accessed April 25, 2011).

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

Conclusion

Quotas are a fairly new and controversial phenomenon that should be subject to future research. I recommend that researchers compare the effects of quotas in developing nations to the effects of quotas in developed nations in order to determine which factors lead to the success of women empowerment and if such success is replicable. It should also be considered whether certain kinds of societies are more likely to implement and subsequently benefit from quotas than others. For example, could quotas create change in non-democratic nations? What role does a society's religion play in these questions of empowerment of women? I attempted to address some of these questions with my case study approach, but I realize that I have scarcely scratched the surface of the great body of information that is available. Finally, as the database on quotas grows with the passage of time, researchers should incorporate a much larger time span into their studies than I was able to do with the data that is currently available.

Along with statistical research, the philosophical debate over quotas will continue. In my opinion, the strongest argument against quotas is that they may lead to choosing female political leaders who are less qualified than the men that they replace. Quotas bypass the "merit principle" that is central to functioning democracies which is paradoxical as it seems that democracies are necessary for effective quotas.⁴³ The argument about less-qualified politicians is a valid concern, and if it is true (despite Esther Duflo's findings in "Why Reservations?" that even less-educated women provide the same amount and quality of public goods as their male counterparts), then quotas may lead to ineffective policies in the long-run.

Policy makers and academics must come up with an effective counter-argument to address this criticism. Sen's arguments about capabilities and agency provide a solid base for the ethical foundations of gender equality-promoting policies. Women should participate in governance because there is something intrinsically good about running one's own life. Thus, if Duflo's findings are true, then not only should women participate because it is ethically right for them to do so, but also because they will achieve results that are as good as those achieved by males. Drawing on feminist philosopher Anne Phillips, Mari Teigen offers an interesting theoretical argument. Rather than males asking, "Why women?" perhaps society should ask itself, "Why not women?"⁴⁴ Rather than an antidiscrimination debate, the controversy over quotas should be put

43 Carol Bacchi, "Arguing for and against Quotas: Theoretical Issues," in *Women, Quotas, and Politics*, ed. Drude Dahlerup. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 33.

44 Mari Teigen, "The Affirmative Action Controversy," in *Women, Quotas and Politics*, ed. Drude Dahlerup, (London: Routledge, 2006), 33.

SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: HANS J. MORGENTHAU AND THE 21ST CENTURY

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*"Speaking truth to power" succinctly summarises the realist philosophy of Hans J. Morgenthau. The ability to speak is the ability to convey a message; truth implies that message has some basis in fact; and power implies a capacity for action. It hints at the position of an observer having appraised the actions of the powerful and concluded a path for the powerful to follow that best employs the lessons of the past. Whether power listens to truth is another matter. Writing throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s, including his seminal 1948 text, *Politics Among Nations*, which explained his brand of political realism, Hans J. Morgenthau was a leading exponent of the realist school of thought. Through his insistence on portraying political reality and historical truth, and their proscriptive properties for guiding foreign policy, Morgenthau's thinking was echoed in the works of foreign policy makers from George F. Kennan to Henry Kissinger. Yet, it is puzzling that Morgenthau's name and realistic appraisal of international political conduct is seemingly absent from contemporary foreign policy criticism. Identifying this puzzle, it is therefore timely to consider how the method of realism was realised by Morgenthau during his own time, and why that method of realism is relevant and necessary in the contemporary world. Therefore, this paper will re-examine Morgenthau's realism, critique its detractors and contrast it with its contemporary realisation in an effort to promote the relevance of Morgenthau in the twenty-first century.*

Introduction

A blister burned on a child's finger is more persuasive than parental warnings. Perhaps we have not yet suffered enough for the lessons of Vietnam to sink in. Thus men must die, women must weep, what nature has provided and man