

Conclusion

Quotas are a fairly new and controversial phenomenon that should be subject to future research. I recommend that researchers compare the effects of quotas in developing nations to the effects of quotas in developed nations in order to determine which factors lead to the success of women empowerment and if such success is replicable. It should also be considered whether certain kinds of societies are more likely to implement and subsequently benefit from quotas than others. For example, could quotas create change in non-democratic nations? What role does a society's religion play in these questions of empowerment of women? I attempted to address some of these questions with my case study approach, but I realize that I have scarcely scratched the surface of the great body of information that is available. Finally, as the database on quotas grows with the passage of time, researchers should incorporate a much larger time span into their studies than I was able to do with the data that is currently available.

Along with statistical research, the philosophical debate over quotas will continue. In my opinion, the strongest argument against quotas is that they may lead to choosing female political leaders who are less qualified than the men that they replace. Quotas bypass the "merit principle" that is central to functioning democracies which is paradoxical as it seems that democracies are necessary for effective quotas.⁴³ The argument about less-qualified politicians is a valid concern, and if it is true (despite Esther Duflo's findings in "Why Reservations?" that even less-educated women provide the same amount and quality of public goods as their male counterparts), then quotas may lead to ineffective policies in the long-run.

Policy makers and academics must come up with an effective counter-argument to address this criticism. Sen's arguments about capabilities and agency provide a solid base for the ethical foundations of gender equality-promoting policies. Women should participate in governance because there is something intrinsically good about running one's own life. Thus, if Duflo's findings are true, then not only should women participate because it is ethically right for them to do so, but also because they will achieve results that are as good as those achieved by males. Drawing on feminist philosopher Anne Phillips, Mari Teigen offers an interesting theoretical argument. Rather than males asking, "Why women?" perhaps society should ask itself, "Why not women?"⁴⁴ Rather than an antidiscrimination debate, the controversy over quotas should be put

43 Carol Bacchi, "Arguing for and against Quotas: Theoretical Issues," in *Women, Quotas, and Politics*, ed. Drude Dahlerup. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 33.

44 Mari Teigen, "The Affirmative Action Controversy," in *Women, Quotas and Politics*, ed. Drude Dahlerup, (London: Routledge, 2006), 33.

SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: HANS J. MORGENTHAU AND THE 21ST CENTURY

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*"Speaking truth to power" succinctly summarises the realist philosophy of Hans J. Morgenthau. The ability to speak is the ability to convey a message; truth implies that message has some basis in fact; and power implies a capacity for action. It hints at the position of an observer having appraised the actions of the powerful and concluded a path for the powerful to follow that best employs the lessons of the past. Whether power listens to truth is another matter. Writing throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s, including his seminal 1948 text, *Politics Among Nations*, which explained his brand of political realism, Hans J. Morgenthau was a leading exponent of the realist school of thought. Through his insistence on portraying political reality and historical truth, and their proscriptive properties for guiding foreign policy, Morgenthau's thinking was echoed in the works of foreign policy makers from George F. Kennan to Henry Kissinger. Yet, it is puzzling that Morgenthau's name and realistic appraisal of international political conduct is seemingly absent from contemporary foreign policy criticism. Identifying this puzzle, it is therefore timely to consider how the method of realism was realised by Morgenthau during his own time, and why that method of realism is relevant and necessary in the contemporary world. Therefore, this paper will re-examine Morgenthau's realism, critique its detractors and contrast it with its contemporary realisation in an effort to promote the relevance of Morgenthau in the twenty-first century.*

Introduction

A blister burned on a child's finger is more persuasive than parental warnings. Perhaps we have not yet suffered enough for the lessons of Vietnam to sink in. Thus men must die, women must weep, what nature has provided and man

has wrought must be destroyed, because governments, blinded by prejudice and paralysed by pride, learn too slowly for the good of the governed.

- Hans J. Morgenthau¹

In 1951, diplomat, foreign policy maker and scholar George F. Kennan delivered a series of lectures regarding the conduct of American diplomacy from 1900 to 1950. He concluded that the first half of the twentieth century was filled with so much pain and suffering because of varying extents of clouded political judgement. The next 50 years would require more careful, prudent diplomacy if the world were to avoid repeating the same mistakes with potentially more disastrous results. Kennan goes on to say:

It will mean the emergence of a new attitude among us toward many things outside our borders that are irritating and unpleasant today [...] an attitude of detachment and soberness and readiness to reserve judgement. It will mean that we will have the modesty to admit that our own national interest is all that we are really capable of knowing and understanding [...] This concept is less ambitious and less inviting in its immediate prospects than those to which we have so often inclined, and less pleasing to ourselves. To many it may seem to smack of cynicism and reaction. I cannot share these doubts. Whatever is realistic in concept, and founded in an endeavour to see both ourselves and others as we really are, cannot be illiberal.²

Kennan calls for the realistic appraisal of, in particular, the American presence in the world. This is to be achieved by sacrificing narcissistic idealism in favour of prudent thinking that allowed for the element of irrationality in the process of foreign policy-making. What Kennan illustrates is that the penetration of realism in framing the conduct of foreign policy is not just a method for historians or political scientists; rather Kennan insists that realism made practical sense in the policy-making process.

Hans J. Morgenthau is one such scholar and foreign policy critic who

bridges the gap between political theory and reality. Morgenthau understands that a realist perspective is required to conceptualize the irrationality that has been present in international relations for a very long time. Morgenthau, seeing the political process unfurled across history, goes one step further and seeks to capture and explain a nation's international political conduct within the thinking of political realism. The result is a method of historical interrogation that will construct political reality as it is experienced, rather than how it is thought to exist. In other words, Morgenthau has developed a framework that describes the actualities of how foreign policy-makers such as Kennan felt.

The main contention of Morgenthau's realism is to avoid deliberately dressing historical truth in predictive absolutes, labelling those who insisted on doing so as pursuing a method of single cause. This criticism is levelled at two methods of thought. First is the surgical approach of scientific theory and its attempt to replicate the hypothetical and predictive scientific process in the social world. Predictive theorizing, to Morgenthau, dehumanizes the social process. Second are the historical revisionists who smooth over the constraints of historical time and circumstance in favor of continuity and predictability. To Morgenthau, both these types of intellectual schools inadequately interrogate the process of international politics just as they misinterpret the reality in which they live. The method of single cause is evident anywhere personal prejudice limits the analytical rendering of politics and comes into conflict with Morgenthau's six principles of political realism.

According to Morgenthau, there exists no absolute key to understanding international relations. But, through an objective rendering of historical truth, one might get close to describing a political reality of international politics. From this vantage point, one could then identify what a state is doing, may possibly do, or has truly done in the past, by focusing on the decision and consequence of political action as enacted by those with political responsibility and interest.

Having re-examined Morgenthau's conceptualization of political realism, and its proscriptive method for the formulation of foreign policy, this paper will consider two elements in opposition to Morgenthau's vision captured in his framing of the method of single cause. First is how revisionist history has affected the critical understanding of international politics. Second is the structural and scientific evolution of realism in a contemporary context. As will be evident by the final example of a contemporary realist-revisionist history of American conduct in Iraq during two of the largest conflicts of the past twenty years, Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the necessity for a return of

¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade 1960-1970* (Praeger: New York, 1970) 407.

² George Kennan, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 and the Challenge of Soviet Power*, (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1951) 102-3.

Morgenthau's method of interrogating historical truth will become clear. Without a fundamental appraisal of historical truth, the foreign policy-making process is doomed to perpetuate the same mistakes within an international political system.

International politics and political realism according to Morgenthau

Politics exist where decisions, actions and consequences govern people. There are, however, differing political contexts for how politics are accomplished. Although fundamentally similar, how one conducts politics in the work place has naturally different factors and constraints to that of, say, a local council meeting. The same can be said of domestic and international politics. Domestic political action has, in comparison to the ethereal nature of international politics, a level of check-and-balancing that international politics simply lacks. Factors that can influence decision making, such as enforcement of laws and political accountability, simply do not exist to the same extent in an international context. Therefore how a nation might conduct itself in a treaty negotiation is distinctly different to how careful a politician must be when consulting a lobby group. The key to the successful conduct of politics in these differing contexts lies in identifying and accepting these differences.

Morgenthau does not set out to redefine politics. In fact, he is in direct opposition to doing just that. The age is forever searching for the philosopher's stone, writes Morgenthau, "the magic formula, which, mechanically applied, will produce the desired result and thus substitute for the uncertainties and risks of political action the certitude of rational calculation."³ The trend of social theory is to point towards a desire to unequivocally understand politics at the expense of experienced reality. Instead, Morgenthau seeks to capture that experienced reality by accepting politics for what it already is.

Morgenthau refers to the theoretical simplification of history and politics as the method of single cause.⁴ Evident in the social-thinker's pursuit to quantify the social world and gain the legitimacy of science and influencing scores of revisionist historians, the problem in accepting a single-cause was the ensuing schism that inevitably developed between theory and reality. Consider the single-cause origin of Marx's theory of communism, in particular the continual re-writing of its inevitable history at each step of systematic failure.

Littered throughout the conduct of international politics are examples that complicate the totality of the single cause: "The belief in the limitless power of the scientific method has become particularly prolific and particularly ineffective [in international politics:] for it is here that the devices engendered by this belief have no connection whatsoever with the forces which determine the actual course of events."⁵ Those forces stretched from individual agents acting in their own interests, to a nationalistic utopian vision that compelled people to war, to natural disasters that might destroy an entire means of production.

More importantly, the method of single cause glosses over the single most unpredictable aspect of politics - people. Instead, it reflects the intellectual's own partisanship and analytical constraints, neglecting the partisanship and actions of the individuals concerned. It is also to the detriment of the historical narrative that the dimensions of human reasoning are denied in favour of the author's own prejudicial beliefs. Politics, in reality, is conducted by a plethora of individuals who have to reconcile their own personal interests with those they must represent. Those personal interests always remain a factor to the conduct of politics as the individuals continuously consult or suppress those interests in the drafting of policy. The extent that the individual would understand and respond to the interests of others is what defines the convolutions of political action.

Where the method of single cause naturally moves towards is an ideal; the construction and pursuit of a desirable end-result. As the intellectuals project their own partisanship and prejudice through their dismissal of individual interest, so does the intellectuals' idealism cloud experience reality. "The purer the intention", notes Morgenthau, "and the more comprehensive the plan, the wider the gap between expected and actual results."⁶ The issue that lies in the projection of an ideal is the means by which that ideal must be achieved.

Consider a contemporary example of this ideal-reality gulf in the conduct of international politics. Operation Iraqi Freedom is predicated on the expectation that a democratic and capitalist oasis in the Middle East can be created. The American foreign-policy process, and by extension international political conduct, has as its single cause the ouster of a dictator and rebirth of Iraq. In light of having successfully rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein, but failing to build the capitalist oasis, one is able to capture the gap between the expected and actual result of intent. Arguably, it is much easier to destroy than it is to

³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Vs Power Politics* (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1946), 95.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 148.

rebuild. Morgenthau has previously made this point when criticising foreign-policy choices regarding Vietnam, accusing policy makers of “[trying] to gain a national objective without taking the risks and bringing sacrifices necessary to achieve it, to will an end without willing the means.”⁷

In the theoretical space, one can consider Francis Fukuyama’s liberal and capitalistic world at the “end of history” in 1991.⁸ The international community still awaits the peaceful embrace that was supposed to evolve. A gap always inevitably develops whenever one talks of high ideals in international relations distinct from grounded reality.

Committing to an ideal-denied individual’s reason: “If several incompatible irrational impulses compete for dominance over action,” explains Morgenthau, “reason will support the one most favorable to the survival, the growth, and the socially approved interests of the individual.”⁹ The ideal, in conflict with experience, is the least likely goal to be favored with the absoluteness required by the belief in a single cause whenever in competition with any other factors that ensure a continued, successful, individual existence.

Politics embody the competition of individual interests, just as international politics consist of nations competing for the fulfilment of their own self-interest. What ensures the continued pursuit and fulfilment of this interest is prudent consideration of what political action must be taken. It is therefore prudence that prevents politics from becoming only about the individual. The individual “acting on his own behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his inexpedient action concern only himself. What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action.”¹⁰ Political action requires prudent human reasoning, exercised internationally through a nation’s foreign policy. A lack of prudence would see the rise of narcissistic self-fulfilment, since seeing the lack of reasoned constraint in the political process, the individual seeks to take advantage of it. The fact “is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity, men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold.”¹¹

Still, it is difficult to accept that the political process consists of factors beyond one’s control. It is natural to want to control what ends the political process should produce. But, in order to avoid stagnating in a theoretical pothole as

reality fails to replicate what the single cause method predicts, the intellectuals must accept that “no formula will give the statesman certainty, no calculation eliminate the risk, no accumulation of facts open the future. While his mind yearns for the apparent certainty of science, his actual condition is more akin to the gambler’s than to the scientist’s.”¹² That is not to say, however, that one cannot stack their own deck.

Morgenthau believes that by adhering to six particular principles defining the conduct of politics, any analysis of political action would reflect adequately objective historical truth. The first principle is to acknowledge that the conduct of politics have underlying objective laws; laws which have always existed. Governance, whether it is in a democratic, dictatorial, monarchic or communist state, has always sought to ensure survival, identity and amenity of those who made up the governed. How those laws are interpreted may have not been egalitarian and could be discriminatory in application, but are shared among political contexts. This is but a reflection of the individual interest and agency that engendered any political process.¹³

In international politics, according to the second principle, those objective laws are manifest through the pursuit of a nation’s self-interest and the ability to realize that self-interest through the accumulation and application of power. In order to understand why a sovereign nation chooses to craft foreign policy in a certain way, it is necessary to identify the interests being pursued and through what means power is exercised.¹⁴

Power, therefore, becomes a factor in the application of political action. How one is to define power is left open to context and circumstance. Explaining in the third principle that power cannot have a fixed category, what Morgenthau seeks to avoid is trapping the historical truth within the method of single cause. Power can be made up of many things — military, finance, population, industry — just as politics manifests itself in many different ways. It can take any combination of those sources of power to fulfil an interest; any single source not necessarily more important than another.¹⁵

Owing to the individuals within politics, there was inevitably a moral significance attached to political action. Although morality exists in the consideration of an issue, Morgenthau is quick to emphasize in the fourth principle

7 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Vietnam, Truth and Power*, p 424.

8 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Penguin Books, 1992).

9 *Ibid.*, 158.

10 *Ibid.*, 186.

11 *Ibid.*, 193.

12 *Ibid.*, 221.

13 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Alfred A Knopf: New York, 5th Edition, 1973), 4.

14 *Ibid.*, 5.

15 *Ibid.*, 8.

that morality cannot be applied in a universal sense to the political conduct of nations. Time, context and circumstance are all filters that are necessary to ensure that a political action is always measured within the reality in which it is made. It also avoids projecting the intellectual's morality onto the history being contemplated.¹⁶

Furthermore, Morgenthau goes on to point out as the fifth principle that one can not claim the moral pursuit of a nation as universal morality. A nation will always claim that what they pursue is "right," but at no stage does that conceptualization of right become universal and encompassing of all nations. In short, no nation or action has a rightful claim to be the embodiment of God's will.¹⁷

The final principle explains that the political sphere, which encompasses the decision, action and consequence of political action, is separate from the sphere of the economist, or the moralist, or the lawyer. Each sphere has a distinct understanding and definition of the conduct of an individual and state. However, it was the political sphere in which people found themselves being arranged and administered through governance. The role of each sphere is in adding to the overall understanding of political action through differing interpretations and motivations of individual intent, but it is at the risk of misrepresenting the historical truth of political reality to allow any single sphere other than that of the political to wholly define political action.¹⁸

The method of single cause and historical truth

Morgenthau is extremely mindful of the role historical truth has to play in the implementation of policy. Correctly portraying and understanding the past is imperative to the realist understanding of politics in general. One has the ability to engage with political reality by interrogating the historical record and constructing an argument based upon experienced historical fact. The professionalism of the historian "flows from the competence with which he handles the factual material and the conclusiveness with which he marshals it in support of his position. His aim, by which his efforts must be judged, is the coherent reconstruction of the past, which illuminates the past, the present, and the human condition regardless of time and place."¹⁹

In juxtaposition to Morgenthau's deft consideration of the historical records is the intellectual William Appleman Williams. Williams offers a scathing rebuke of realism by constructing a history of American foreign policy that had as its single purpose the economic expansion of an American empire. What Williams aims to illustrate historically is America tearing a hole into the international economy at the turn of the twentieth century, seeking to create a space whereby America has the option to offload surplus goods and bolster the domestic economy without the mess of territorial expansion. Williams notes that the purpose of opening a foreign country's economy to American interest "was conceived and designed to win victories without the wars."²⁰

Intrinsically connected with his explanation of foreign policy are economic goals. Dismissing those individuals who make up those goals and policies, Williams notes that American leaders are not evil men, they are just misguided in their foreign policy directions as the economic goals of the nation become the sole obligation of foreign affairs.²¹ Why these leaders are misguided appears to be due to the progression of peaceful economic expansion into hostile economic takeover:

Men, who began by thinking about the world in economic terms, and explaining its operation by the principles of capitalism and a frontier thesis of historical development, came finally to define the United States in military terms as an embattled outpost in a hostile world. When a majority of leaders of America's corporate society reached that conclusion, the nation went to war — first covertly, then overtly.²²

The frontier thesis legitimizes the American belief that they are occupying empty economic space when expanding into the world. That this empty space might be occupied only means that any disagreement about an American presence can be interpreted as anti-American tendencies, which in turn meant conflict of interest.

The result is that "the American outlook defined as a danger to any nation (or group) that challenged or limited such expansion."²³ Progressively,

16 Ibid., 10.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., 11.

19 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade 1960-1970* (Praeger: New York, 1970),

73.

20 William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Dell Publishing: New York, 2nd revised edition, 1982), 57.

21 Ibid., 2.

22 Ibid., 61.

23 Ibid., 173.

American aggression and the resulting anti-Americanism are because of America's economic foreign policy. Imperial greed has obscured everything America believes it stands for. The tragedy that becomes embodied by American diplomacy is that "it denies and subverts American ideas and ideals."²⁴

Williams concludes based upon his historical evidence that American foreign policy and, in turn, diplomacy, has devolved into tragedy in four different ways. First, political elitism means a tiny group of individuals define the image of the nation and play with decisions of life and death; second, there lacks significant engagement by elected representatives towards those they supposedly represented; third, the inability of decision makers to critically engage with the issues; and finally, the application of traditional analytical techniques when radical approaches are needed.²⁵

Williams has done all he can to present a version of history that juxtaposes as much as possible with the proposed ideal of the American democratic society that is proclaimed. What Williams believes is that representative democracy should be reflected through foreign policy on the international political stage; that domestic audiences are the deciding factor in determining whether or not a foreign policy should be imposed. He assumes that the people, in their moral and democratic judgement, are unclouded by mass emotions and not influenced by the reactionary ignorance that habitually plagues popular causes. He also assumes that on the international stage, the checks and balances of a domestic democratic society will ensure that democracy prevails.²⁶

The tragedy of American diplomatic conduct to Williams is almost verbatim as to how Morgenthau described the continued reality of practiced politics. The difference between the two intellectuals is in the conceptualization

24 Ibid., 291.

25 Ibid., 303.

26 Revisionist critique, however, is not always as well drawn out as Williams. Consider Gar Alperovitz's introduction to his history of the atomic bombs detonated over Japan in the closing stages of the Second World War: "The challenge for both the historian and the reader is to abandon the safe posture of disinterested observer: Judgements must be made at each step of the way concerning what is known (and still not known) about the decisions that were made during the summer of 1945." Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of the American Myth* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), xiv. Alperovitz wants to revise the conclusion that the atomic bomb was necessary to end hostilities with Japan by critiquing, in hindsight, the morality of those who had the responsibility to use it. It is telling that, according to Alperovitz, accepting the legitimate use of the atomic bomb labelled one a "disinterested observer." It frames succinctly his perception of realist history. If one were to consider the Japanese historian Sadao Asada, the revisionist trend really means that "American Historians have neglected the Japanese side of the picture. Concentrating on the motives behind the use of the bombs, they have slighted the effects of the bomb." Sadao Asada, *Cultural Shock and Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays* (University of Missouri Press: Columbia, 2007), 177.

and use of international history to prescribe foreign policy answers. Williams insists economics make up the "tragedy" of American foreign policy; whereas Morgenthau argues that the "tragedy" is just part of a political reality that has always existed and will continue to do so until the international order significantly changes.

What Williams, as a revisionist, seeks in the historical record is evidence of a single cause that guides and shapes the direction and intention of whatever action he chooses to critique. Williams is searching for the single explanation of political action that will render the political process as replicable and predictable. What Morgenthau, as a realist, construes from the same historical record is a series of political decisions, actions and consequences that are shaped by individuals who have to interpret a particular circumstance in a particular context. It is not a predictable trigger that causes political action, but instead a complicated understanding of balanced and competing interests and power that define what political reality is to look like.

The method of single cause and realism

The face of realism today is not quite realism as how Morgenthau explains it. Where once stood a prudent framework for appraising the conduct of foreign affairs now stands a segment of political theory that aims to predict and replicate the social and political processes of the world. In short, the practice of contemporary realism has succumbed to the very thing Morgenthau opposes. Consider, as an example, the structuralism of John Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

What defines Mearsheimer's realist perception of the world is the same as classical realism – the pursuit of self-interest and the centrality of power. Mearsheimer departs from Morgenthau's realism by endowing power with a definition. Power, according to what he labels "offensive realism," is inherently conflict-oriented and violent. "I define power largely in military terms because offensive realism emphasises that force is the ultimate ratio of international politics"²⁷ explains Mearsheimer, who further explains that this is because "[great powers] have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival."²⁸ Mearsheimer talks in the language of violence: "states should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best

27 Ibid., 56.

28 Ibid., 21.

way to survive in a dangerous world.”²⁹ Mearsheimer disregards Morgenthau’s six principles by endowing the concept of power with such a heavy definition that he insists any international conduct must adhere to it verbatim in order for the world to make sense.

The result is that the core of Mearsheimer’s model of realism is a reliance on quantifiable theory, explaining that “it is difficult to assess how much relative power one state must have over its rivals before it is secure. Is twice as much power an appropriate threshold? Or is three times as much power the magic number.”³⁰ Mearsheimer goes on to lament, “determining how much power is enough becomes even more complicated when great powers contemplate how power will be distributed among them ten or twenty years down the road.”³¹ Mearsheimer interprets realism to mean a quantifiable, scientific understanding of the conduct of nations. Never let reality get in the way of a good theory.

Another difference between Mearsheimer and Morgenthau lies in the fundamental assumption of uncertainty: “In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics” suggests Mearsheimer.³² What this contemporary realization of realism lacks is the vision to see the world as it is in all its unpredictable glory. Mearsheimer is not attempting to describe reality so much as to categorize it in order that it acts according to how he sees it. Therefore realism, to Mearsheimer, is merely to be predictive. Realism, explains Barkin, “that claims to predict effectively [...] undermines any claims it may make for prudence in the making of foreign policy.”³³ In modelling his methodology on the predictive sciences, Mearsheimer has “become in part precisely the thing that the classical realists were arguing against, an exercise in emphasising the predictability of international politics, rather than a cautionary note about its unpredictability.”³⁴

It is unfortunate that when it came time to put offensive realism into action, Mearsheimer’s signature appeared on a paid advert in the *New York Times* denouncing American power politics in relation to invading Iraq in 2003.³⁵ This

means a number of things; that Morgenthau is right when he suggested that theory inevitably fails when confronted with the reality of international politics; and that individual agency overpowers theoretical idealism when confronted with political reality. One might argue that Mearsheimer is overcome by the morality of invading Iraq; morality that does not figure in his own theory. Mearsheimer, for all the theorizing about great powers accumulating more power by force, cannot commit to that ideal when faced with its reality.

A Conflagration: Revisionist Realism and Historical Truth

The purpose of revisiting Morgenthau to such an extent is twofold. Firstly, as seen above, the term “realist” has history drastically different to its contemporary counterpart. Second is the method of Morgenthau’s writing. Morgenthau was deft in his consideration and respect of historical records. As a result, his writing is in part a historical narrative. This makes up the second lesson of Morgenthau that in the historical recollection of events, one finds the evidence of political action and how that historical recollection is presented determines the validity of the analysis.

In recent history, the application of Morgenthau’s thinking is most needed in the historical interrogation of two American conflicts: Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The encompassing twenty-year period is only now having its first draft-versions of history written, yet already focus has begun to be drawn on particular aspects and elements of American conduct that do not fit into a realist understanding of interest, people and power.³⁶ The history of America in Iraq most lacks is the sustained focus on the political action surrounding the presidential administrations during both confrontations.³⁷

Further criticism of the historical narrative regarding America and Iraq over the last twenty years can also be seen in recent comments made by Dr. Philip Zelickow at a discussion concerning his contribution to the edited collection of essays “In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the fall of

29 Ibid., 11.

30 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (W. W. Norton & Company: New York, 2001), 34..

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 8.

33 Samuel Barkin, “Realism, Prediction and Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* no. 5 (2009), 239.

34 Ibid., 245.

35 New York Times paid advert, “No Iraq war”, 2003.

36 For an example of contemporary analysis surrounding the second Gulf War, see P. W. Singer “Outsourcing War,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2, (2005) for the focus on the private military complex and its future potential in foreign policy; Paul R. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2, (2006) for the implication of imperfect intelligence as a deficiency in American foreign policy; Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq” *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 5, (2004) suggests that by sticking to Iraq America can repent for past mistakes; and Robert W. Tucker; David C. Hendrickson “The Sources of American Legitimacy” *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 6, (2004) which comes closest to the realist critique of power relations by discussing America’s lost international legitimacy and its attempts to find it once again.

37 My own dissertation focuses on the origins and causes influencing the decision making process leading up the Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

the Berlin Wall and 9/11”³⁸. Zelikow remarks that the fundamental questions of “what happened” and “why” are simply disregarded when talking about contemporary American foreign policy.³⁹ In light of the recent release of the Oral History Project of the George H.W. Bush administration at the Miller Center, the continuing digitization of documentary evidence from the George W. Bush administration, and the release of personal recollections of those who were part of the decision-making process, it is an auspicious time to be reconsidering fundamental approaches to understanding historical recollections and their lessons for contemporary policy contexts.

Within the current discourse, historical narratives of America in Iraq swing from extremes and influence greatly the understood history of America in Iraq. On one side is the polemic from social commentators such as Tariq Ali or Christopher Hitchens, whose stinging rebukes and patriotic aggrandizements of American policy owe more to emotional outbursts than historical analysis.⁴⁰ The other side consists of more measured, academic analysis, although just as fraught with error in its presentation. In fact, this analysis presents the best example of a conflagration of all things Morgenthau was against, revisionist history in the guise of realist historical critique. Consider *The Threatening Storm: The Case for the Invasion of Iraq*.⁴¹

The Threatening Storm was published just prior to the 2003 invasion by Kenneth Pollack, a former CIA specialist for Iraq. Pollack is an informed insider who occupied a privileged position from which to interrogate American foreign policy regarding Iraq. In his own time and writing, Morgenthau is skeptical about the tenacity with which “insiders” could appraise policy they were there to help craft. Morgenthau noted that “on the one hand, he is a former member of the Administration, residually loyal to it, and he may well be a member of another administration to come. On the other hand, he is an intellectual with

a critical mind of his own. The combination of these two positions is bound to be psychologically revealing but politically calamitous.”⁴² It is worth noting the individual motivations of any piece of writing assumes a revisionist posture at the expense of attempting to objectively render history, for it reflects to a certain extent the piece may contain an observer bias.

The revisionist-realist nature of *The Threatening Storm* lies in its appraisal of the causes of American involvement in Iraq. These causes stem from former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Pollack suggests that it is Saddam who is the root cause of all problems within and emanating from Iraq.⁴³ While this is not totally without merit, it suggests that Saddam is the single greatest problem facing America and insinuates a moral judgement based upon his removal. America must stop Saddam, suggests Pollack, and what is required for his removal is nothing less than war.

Pollack ensures that in every confrontation Iraq has had with America, Saddam is at the forefront. The perceived intentions and utterances of Saddam equalled Iraqi capability. It is usually possible to figure out why Saddam did something after the fact, but it is hard to predict ahead of time what he might do, explains Pollack:

[...] would the United States be willing to intervene if Iraq possessed nuclear weapons and threatened one of its neighbours with a lesser degree of violence? And how would Saddam react? Again, we don't know. The answers are probably irrelevant. Given Saddam's propensity to violence, constant miscalculations, willingness to accept terrible damage in pursuit of a goal, unwillingness to back down unless he has actually suffered terrible damage, and belief in his own messianic destiny, we could not rule out any reaction from him.⁴⁴

38 Ed. Melvyn P. Leffler; Jeffrey W. Legro, In *Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy After the Fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11* (Cornell University Press, 2011).

39 Philip Zelikow, (Panel discussion about In *Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy After the Fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11* at the Wilson Center International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 13/10/2011).

40 See Tariq Ali, *Bush in Babylon: The Recolonisation of Iraq*, (Verso, 2003); Christopher Hitchens and his Critics, *Terror, Iraq and the Left*, Ed. Simon Cottee; Thomas Cushman, (New York University Press: New York, 2008).

41 Kenneth Pollack is not, by any means, the only intellectual to have written some sort of American history relating to Iraq and the Gulf Wars. For more depth and breadth in analysis, see Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, (Yale University Press: New Haven, London, 2007); Hans Blix *Disarming Iraq*, (Bloomsbury, 2005); or Lester H. Brune, *United States and Two Gulf Wars: Prelude and Aftermath*, (Regina Books: Claremont, California, 2007).

42 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade 1960-1970* (Praeger: New York, 1970), 413.

43 Pollack relies on Kanan Makiya's dissident history of Saddam Hussein's rise to power prior to the 1990s in *The Republic of Fear: the Politics of Modern Iraq*, (University of California Press, 1998). It is from this book that the history of Saddam as a successor to Stalin in the ranks of dictatorial cruelty has persisted. However, *The Republic of Fear* must be taken in two frames of mind. First, Makiya makes no illusion that his agenda consists of disposing Saddam regardless of the costs. Secondly, written as a dissident, *The Republic of Fear* is anecdotal and emotional. It is difficult to render an objective understanding of history if clouded by emotional judgement. It may inform, but for the sake of emotional bias, it cannot become the analysis.

44 Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* (Random House: New York, 2002), 276.

Constructing Saddam as an irrational madman is a deliberate part of Pollack's revisionist history. Pollack does not care to detail the actual reality of Iraqi capabilities, instead choosing to fan emotional hatred in order to elicit an emotional response. The fact is, for all the madness of Saddam, any manifestation of it has been largely contained to Iraq or at most the region since the first Gulf War. He lacked any capability to fulfil whatever dark rhetoric he decided to babble. But, it does not take long to point out the historical analogy Pollack is seeking. "Saddam is not Adolf Hitler", assures Pollack, "mostly because Iraq is not as powerful as Germany was [...] But the threat that Saddam presents to the United States and to the World is just as real, and the one we have today is no less pressing than those we faced in 1941."⁴⁵ That Saddam lacks any parallel with Nazi Germany in intent, motivation and military capability is beside the point. Saddam is an evil man in a way similar to Hitler. That Pollack claims Saddam posed the same threat as Hitler without drawing any historical comparison to substantiate that threat illustrates succinctly the shortcoming of the revisionist historical analysis. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. remarks, "such incidents illustrate the depressing persistence of the mentality which makes policy through stereotype, through historical generalisation wrenched illegitimately out of the past and imposed mechanically on the future."⁴⁶

Yet, the outcome of *The Threatening Storm* is exactly as Pollack desires. Evident in the congressional record is an endorsement by democrat Patrick Kennedy of Rhode Island of *The Threatening Storm* as evidence of the irrationality of Saddam Hussein, and hence called for support of the proposed invasion of Iraq.⁴⁷

It is foolish to think that, had a more prudent voice interrupted Pollack's train of thought, events may have been different, but for the sake of the historical narrative as it now appears work must be done to undo the skewed understanding of American engagement in Iraq. In the long run, explains Morgenthau, "no government can escape the consequences of its mistakes, and the longer it persists in them, the greater will be the loss both to the substance of the national interest and to national and personal prestige."⁴⁸ Of course, the same can be said of those who perpetuate the inaccuracy of the historical record.

45 Ibid., 423.

46 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *War and the American presidency* (W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 133.

47 United States of America, Congressional Record, V. 148, Pt. 15, October 10, 2002 to November 8, 2002, 20269.

48 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade 1960-1970* (Praeger: New York, 1970), 405.

Using Morgenthau to Speak Truth to Power

The irrationality present in international politics is what allows such an array of conflicting critiques. Morgenthau does not set out to redefine politics and political critique; he merely seeks an understanding of reality that best describes what is being experienced. Morgenthau does so through respecting historical truth and seeking proscriptive lessons, rather than neglecting them and attempting to predict answers.

In juxtaposition, and relative to Morgenthau's criticism of the method of single cause, opposing schools of thought ignores Morgenthau's realism as not explanatory enough. The revisionist historians look for single causes to explain the occurrence of events in the intractable flow of history, while the political scientists neglect historical truth in favour of theoretical possibilities.

Reaching a contemporary context, the trend of realism towards a structural and purely theoretical conceptualization of international politics and the whitewashing, single-minded pursuit of the revisionist historians, has resulted in foreign policy calamity such as *The Threatening Storm*. The purpose of drawing out a discussion of Morgenthau is to highlight to what extent the measured, objective presentation of historical reality is absent in the contemporary historical discourse and policy formulation process.

Morgenthau, through his writing, gives us all the necessary tools and techniques to reconstruct his own method for engaging and portraying political reality. Our intention now is to emulate the way Morgenthau approaches and constructs history in his own time for our own recent history. We should do this while remaining aware of and avoiding the revisionism and single cause dimensions of historical analysis.

Re-examining Morgenthau is but the start of a larger project. It is not enough to consider Morgenthau as just a theoretician at the expense of his practical lessons. Wading into the history of America in Iraq during the last twenty years and the two military confrontations in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom with Morgenthau as a guide, one hopes to produce a realist understanding of the political action of American engagement with Iraq. The question has not changed since Morgenthau himself observed American conduct during the Vietnam War:

Is our prestige better served by proving again and again what requires no proof – that we have power and resolution – or by correcting policies that so many disinterested observers regard as being politically unwise, mili-

tarily unprofitable and morally dubious?⁴⁹

It is idealistic to expect a lesson ignored in the past to be learned now. But, without accepting political reality as it is and has always been and without describing and engaging with actual political experience, one cannot hope to understand the contemporary convolutions of international politics and influence its progress through the implementation of effective foreign policy.

CHILDREN FOR DEMOCRACY: DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

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Demographic transition in the form of sub-replacement level fertility rates and increasing life expectancy has resulted in a rapidly-aging population in the Republic of Korea. A change of this nature is a challenge for any country but especially difficult for a nascent democracy still in the process of consolidation. This paper examines the social circumstances and factors surrounding Korea's demographic transition, the potential economic effects that transition entails and ways in which the stability of the nation's democracy may be affected. It concludes by recommending the most practical adjustments Korea can make to ensure increased quality of life, continued economic development and stabilizing consolidation of its hard-earned democracy.

Introduction: Calamity of Another Kind

The tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011 temporarily overshadowed a natural calamity of another kind looming in East Asia. Demographic transition in the form of lower total fertility rates combined with increased life spans has been the norm in the developed economies of Europe and North America throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Two East Asian nations have displayed this trend in recent decades, and to an even greater degree. The Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea) and Japan have joined Western countries in this societal transformation, producing fewer children as adults live longer. Their populations are aging as a result and the process is well into its third decade with no sign of stopping.

Korea and Japan have experienced this shift in the midst of rapid post-war economic development and democratization in a much more compressed manner than did any Western country, where democracy, economics, and

49 Ibid., 404.