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LETTER

FROM THE EDITOR

Although it may be true that the United States has "never left" Asia, there certainly has been a renewed focus on the region since President Barack Obama took office in January of 2009. The administration officially calls it a "rebalancing" policy, but most students, academics and policymakers have come to know it by its more common reference: the "Asia Pivot." Two documents stand out as particularly reflective of the new US strategy in the region: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's 2011 article in Foreign Policy entitled "America's Pacific Century," and the 2012 US Department of Defense strategy guidelines document entitled "Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense." Both indicate that the US is deploying a new strategy

focused on re-engaging Asia. They differ, however, in emphasis.

Secretary Clinton's piece reads more like a speech, with an intentional focus on the broader ideational issues that underpin American grand strategy. From the perspective of an American looking westward toward the vast Pacific and into Asia, Clinton proclaims, in a very Americanesque way, that the source of US power is found in "more than our military might or the size of our economy." She goes on to note that the "most potent asset as a nation is the power of our values — in particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights […] which speaks to our deepest national character and is at the heart of our foreign policy, including our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region."

The defense paper, on the other hand, is much more explicit about America's hard power interests in the region, noting that the US "will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region" in order to advance "US economic and security interests inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia." Together with Secretary Clinton's speech, a new economic and security approach underlined by classic American values — at least in rhetoric — is clearly discernible.

As these two documents indicate, we have entered into a new age. How will Asia look in the coming years as a refocused America looks to engage a region that is becoming increasingly dependent on China for economic growth, leading to what some have labeled a new "bi-furcated" regional order, where countries in the region look to China for trade and investment but to America for security? This is the new Asia, or, stated alternatively, "Asia in the Age of the Pivot," the theme of this issue of *Papers, Essays and Reviews*. Between the covers of this issue, readers will find a multitude of perspectives on pertinent topics spanning a host of issues concerning Asia in a new and exciting age. There are five papers contributed by graduate students from all across the world, two essays submitted by professors with extensive knowledge and expertise in Asia, one interview with a renowned Yonsei professor and six reviews written by members of the PEAR staff.

In the first paper, "A Conspicuous Absence: Balance of Power Politics in East Asia and Their Challenge to International Relations Theory," Benjamin Knight critically reexamines balance of power theory in East Asia. Through his examination of security trends in East Asia, he finds that balancing is "conspicuously absent." By using theories grounded in the distribution of geopo-

litical power, Knight attempts to find an explanation for the lack of balancing against a rising China. He finds that neither US military presence nor structural inhibitions based on national power discrepancies are the reason for an absence of balancing and suggests an alternative explanation and additional empirical work is needed to understand the balance of power in the region. The second paper, "Institutionalizing East Asia: South Korea's Regional Leadership as a Middle Power," José Guerra Vio looks at the role South Korea plays as a middle power in the ongoing process of regional institutionalization in Northeast Asia. By looking at Korea's foreign policy choices and the approaches taken by recent administrations, he finds that Korea's impact as a hub between larger powers in the region is a very positive one. The third paper, although not specifically related to Asia, provides readers with a unique and alternative way to understanding Wallerstein's world-systems theory. Author Brendan McQuade, in his piece entitled, "A Critical View of Counterinsurgency: World Relational State (De)Formation," argues that counterinsurgency can be understood as a world-relational process because "it connects the varied outcomes of state formation across the wide gulfs of power and wealth that characterize capitalism." For our readers who are familiar with the history of rule in the Philippines and other Asian nations, like Indonesia and Vietnam, McQuade's piece will provide a new way of seeing how strong states and colonial rulers used counterinsurgency to expand and consolidate their power.

In the fourth piece, "Capability Approach to Street Vendors in Vietnam," Ly Nguyen uses the well-known "capabilities approach," advocated by Amartya Sen and other developmental economists, to argue for better policies for street vendors in Vietnam. She also looks to the experiences of other countries as a guide to suggesting better street vendor policies for Vietnam. The last paper makes an interesting connection between film and subversive political activity during the reign of authoritarian regimes in South Korea. Author Susan Menadue-Chun, in "The Subversive Strain in Modern Korean Film," finds that Korean film, which reflects certain political, economic and social factors of society, has served as a conduit through which Koreans have exercised a collective voice in opposition to oppressive policies of authoritarian regimes.

Both essays in this issue cover topics relevant to Asia, one specific and the other generally. In the first essay, Professor Adam Cathcart explores "the transformative power of music in diplomatic relations" during President Richard Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China in early 1972. By focus-

ing on the "encounter and struggle" of two fundamentally different musical schemes, Cathcart reveals the way music transcends the realm of harp and chord and enters the realm of diplomacy. The second essay, written by Professor Joel Campbell, provides readers with a critical review of two dominant 20th century theories: dependency theory and world-systems theory. Contrary to mainstream academic opinion, Campbell finds that by pointing out problems of uneven development and economic domination, these two theories can provide building blocks for constructing a more robust economic development theory in the 21st century. Given the rapid economic development currently underway in many countries in Southeast Asia, notably Vietnam and Indonesia, there are plenty of lessons that can be drawn from dependency theory and world-systems theory.

In the interview section, Professor Chung-in Moon provides readers with an insightful take on a breadth of issues facing countries throughout Asia. Professor Moon's comments provide readers with a perspective from someone who has been active in many realms of Asian affairs, spanning many years and several different administrations. In addition to his myriad of posts, government and academic, Moon has traveled twice with the South Korean delegation to Pyongyang. His opinion on the "Asia pivot," Korea's role in a new regional order, power transition in North Korea and the politicization of the North Korean refugee issue leaves no topic untouched.

The reviews section contains contributions by the PEAR staff on a multitude of timely issues. A review of Michael Beckley's article about the unipolar era and China's rise, a critique of Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi's monograph on Sino-US "strategic distrust" and an overview of Eamon Fingleton's alternative interpretation of Japan's so-called "lost decade" are ideal reads for anyone interested in contemporary issues in Asia. Other reviews include a critique of undercover reporting in North Korean analysis and two book reviews: one on *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics* by authors Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith and the other on *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000* by Iain Johnston. All the reviews, even the few that are not related specifically to Asia, carry great significance for the region and provide many lessons and analogies that will help readers better understand "Asia in the Age of the Pivot."

This is my second semester as Editor in Chief of PEAR. The time spent on this semester's issue has been as good, if not better, than last semester's. I want to thank the entire PEAR staff for their hard work and dedication to mak-

ing this issue a great success. I also want to thank Professors Jennifer Oh and Matthias Maass for their continued support as faculty advisors. Lastly, I want to express my gratitude to all the contributors for providing the excellent material that will surely give PEAR readers plenty to think about!

Steven C. Denney
Editor in Chief





MEET

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Benjamin Knight
University or California, Berkeley
knightb@berkeley.edu

Benjamin Knight received his BA in East Asian Studies and International Relations from Connecticut College in 2004, subsequently teaching in South Korea with the support of the Fulbright Foundation. After working as a research assistant at The Heritage Foundation, Benjamin joined the US Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer. After four years of service, Benjamin is now pursuing his MA in Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. His research interests include Japanese politics, foreign policy and international relations in East Asia.

José Guerra Vio
National Chengchi (Politics) University, Taiwan (NCCU)
joseguerravio@gmail.com

José Guerra Vio was born in Spain but raised overseas, mainly in Chile and partially in the USA. Since completing his MA, his studies have focused primarily on East Asia. He has spent the last six years living, working and studying in the region — mainly in Taiwan and China, but most recently in Korea. His college background is in communication, journalism, PR and IR. He holds a master's degree in Contemporary China Studies. As a PhD candidate in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi (Political) University in Taiwan, his research interests are regionalism and the international political economy of East Asia, particularly its governance and institutions. He is currently working on his dissertation research in Seoul.

Brendan I. McQuade
Binghamton University (SUNY)
bmcquad1@binghamton.edu

Brendan McQuade is a fourth year PhD candidate in the Sociology Department at the Binghamton University (SUNY). His fields of interest include political sociology, the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of surveillance. Empirically, he focuses on the history of the United States and, in particular, its political and diplomatic history. His research interests include counterrevolution on a world scale, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, US defense intellectuals and Homeland Security. He is currently beginning his dissertation research on Homeland Security Intelligence Fusion Centers and the rise of intelligence-led policing. He has interned at the National Security Archive at George Washington University, where he conducted Freedom of Information Act-driven research for the archive's Iraq Project. He earned his MA in Sociology from Binghamton University in 2010 and his BA in liberal arts from Hampshire College in 2007.

Ly Nguyen
University of Maryland, College Park
ly@iamly.com

Ly P. Nguyen is a Vietnamese student completing her master's degree in Public Policy with specialization in international development at the University of Maryland, College Park. She is the Assistant Director of Girls Excelling in Math and Sciences (GEMS), a local nonprofit organization providing afterschool math and sciences education to minority girls in middle school. Prior to GEMS, she interned at the Population and Community Development Association in Thailand and worked as a research assistant at the School of Public Policy. She has conducted research on policy issues regarding street vendors and children with HIV/AIDS in Vietnam. In 2010, she presented at the National Conference for Undergraduate Research in Montana and the New York Conference on Asian Studies in New York. Her primary research interest is in policy issues regarding marginalized populations.

Susan Menadue-Chun
University of Sydney, Australia
menaduechun@gmail.com

Susan is originally from Sydney, Australia but graduated from Sophia University in Tokyo, Japan in 1981. As an undergraduate she studied in the Department of Comparative Culture majoring in Japanese language and culture. In 2011, she finished the requirements for an MA in Asian Studies at University of Sydney and is due to graduate in June 2012. She has worked has an interpreter and director of a hospitality-related company in Japan and is interested in using her personal experiences with Koreans living in Japan to draw international attention to government discrimination towards *zainichi* Koreans. Susan's other academic interests include the study of Pan Asian Popular culture and how it empowers people to overcome prejudices. She is currently preparing to being her PhD at a university in Japan, where she will focus on the lives of teachers at *chongryun* (North Korean) schools. Susan is married to a second-generation *zainichi* Korean and is a mother of four children.

Joel Campbell
Troy University
joeljapan3@hotmail.com

Joel Campbell is an Associate Professor for the Masters of Science in International Relations program of Troy University (Pacific Region). He specializes in East Asian politics and political economy. He has previously taught international economy and business at Kansai Gaidai University, international politics at Miyazaki International College and international political economy at Tohoku Universuty, all in Japan. His PhD is from Miami University (Ohio).

Adam Cathcart
Pacific Lutheran University
cathcaaj@plu.edu

Adam Cathcart is an Assistant Professor of History at Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma, Washington, with research interests in Sino-North Korean relations, Sino-Japanese relations and European/US cultural exchanges with East Asia during the Cold War and beyond. He holds a bachelor's degree in cello performance from the Cleveland Institute of Music and has extensive experience as a performer of contemporary Chinese music around the world. His lectures on musical diplomacy have been presented at the US Department of State, the Ricci Institute at the University of San Francisco and the US Consulate in Chengdu, PRC. In 2010, his work in Sino-Japanese history was honored by China Quarterly with the awarding of the Gordon White Prize. A frequent traveler in the North Korean-Chinese border region, Dr. Cathcart writes about China and North Korea for *The Atlantic*, and is the Editor in Chief of the website SinoNK.com.

PAPERS

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Benjamin S. Knight
University of California, Berkeley

In this paper I examine two possible structural explanations as to why East Asia is not balancing China as neo-realist theory predicts. I begin by examining security trends in East Asia to confirm that balancing behavior is in fact, conspicuously absent. Having substantiated the paper's underlying assumption, I then explore two possible explanations that are grounded in the distribution of geopolitical power in East Asia: (A) The U.S. military presence ameliorates balancing behavior that would normally occur, and (B) East Asia is structurally unable to balance China because the difference in national power between China and East Asia is insurmountable. In order to empirically assess the validity of these two explanations, I examine both defense spending, as well as national power as measured by the Geometric Indicators of National Capabilities (GINC) metric proposed by Kadera and Sorokin. Neither of these two explanations fit the geopolitical realities of East Asia today. The evidence suggests the lack of any relationship between U.S. security commitments and defense spending among East Asian states. Likewise, even in a scenario of suboptimal balancing (oppositional dyads of states existing within the balancing coalition), East Asia is fully capable of balancing China so long as an external balancer (U.S. or India) participates. Having cast doubt on the validity of the two most common structural explanations for the absence of balancing behavior in East Asia, I suggest alternate explanations and argue the need for additional empirical work if we are to conclusively ascertain the applicability of balance of power theory in East Asia.

Introduction

Relative to the Cold War era, the rise of China has provoked little in the way of classic balancing behavior among East Asian states. Some international relations (IR) scholars interpret this conspicuous absence as presenting a challenge to the claimed universality of balance of power politics.[1] Others have employed terms such as "soft balancing" to argue that the realist tradition remains applicable, albeit in a more subtle form.[2] Whether balancing is nonexistent or simply "soft," the relative peacefulness of China's rise demands an explanation from the custodians of realist IR theory.[3]

Neo-realists typically invoke two structural-level explanations to account for the lack of balancing in East Asia today. One explanation is that US military influence within the region obviates the need to balance. The alternate justification is that China's national strength within the regional system is too great for the rest of East Asia to resist.

This paper empirically assesses these two accounts. First, by surveying the defense spending of US allies versus unallied states, this paper discredits the notion that US military presence constitutes a distortive influence within the regional balance of power politics. Second, tabulating the Geometric Index of National Capability (GINC) scores of regional actors reveals that the second theory, which states that China is too large to balance against, is unfounded. To conclude, the diminishment or elimination of these two theories leaves the conundrum of non-balancing East Asia intact, opening the door for possible normative explanations[4] or the application of balance of threat theory.[5]

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1 David Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

2 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China," *Security Studies* 2, (2008): 363-395.

3 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979)..

4 Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

5 Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 4, (1985): 3-43.

Is East Asia Balancing China Today?

While much has been said of the US's "pivot toward the Asia-Pacific,"[6] an assessment based on tangible capabilities reveals the answer to the above question as being "no." China has quintupled its military spending since the mid-1990s, while two of China's potential adversaries, Taiwan and Japan, have decreased their military spending relative to a decade ago. Of the fifteen East Asian state actors surveyed below, the only countries to show a marked increase in defense appropriations are South Korea and Australia. However, these increases are likely due to North Korea, the 2002 Bali bombings and Australia's subsequent participation in the US-led "War on Terror." All told, East Asia has yet to see a concerted attempt to balance China's increasing military advantage.

Before examining the theories of why this might be, it is necessary to establish the alignment of East Asian states, not just in terms of their relationship towards China, but also in terms of their dealing with each another. The ensuing state-by-state examination provides multiple reasons why, at the unit level, states may opt not to balance against China. Some actors, such as North Korea or (until recently) Burma, are internationally isolated, and are largely dependent upon China's support. Other actors have sizable populations of ethnic Chinese, and so may be less likely to view China as a threat. Yet other states, while ambivalent towards China,

6 Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense" (Washington D.C., 2012)



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

have more immediate security concerns and thus are precluded from balancing. In many cases, a state may simply lack the prerequisite resources. The next section explores these constraints in greater detail, specifically with an eye to exploring antagonistic bilateral relationships (oppositional dyads) that might prevent a state's participation in any anti-China coalition.

Northeast Asia

Within the Western Pacific, balancing behavior is most likely to occur in Northeast Asia. Taiwan remains to be committed to preventing forceful reunification, and balancing against Mainland China with the US represents its sole feasible option. However, with the exception of Taiwan, efforts at balancing in Northeast Asia are primarily in response to North Korea, not China. As previously discussed, this past decade has seen South Korea significantly increasing its defense appropriations. Given the magnitude of the potential threat North Korea

poses, it is Pyongyang, not Beijing, that is the focus of Seoul's defense planning.

In addition to bolstering its defense budget, South Korea has annually conducted strategic dialogue with Japan in regards to the DPRK, since Kim Jong-Il launched a Taepodong-1 across Japanese airspace in 1998.[7] Antagonistic historic precedent has not prevented The Global Times from interpreting former Prime Minister Naoto Kan's outreach to Seoul as the beginning of a Japan-ROK alliance.[8] Those who argue the existence of such alliance may point to the current negotiations between Tokyo and Seoul over the possible signing of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA):

> […] this agreement sets forth a framework for the reciprocal provision of supplies and services for such activities as: exercises and training, UN peace keeping operations, humanitarian relief operations, operations to cope with large scale disasters, transportation of nationals and others in overseas exigencies, or other routine activities.[9]

Such agreement would deepen the South Korea-Japan defense relationship to an unprecedented level. However, a close examination of the ACSA that Japan already signed with Australia reveals that in any China-related contingency, the utility of any agreement as such would be limited. Transferring armaments and ammunition between ACSA signatories is explicitly forbidden, as doing so would constitute a violation of Article nine of the Japanese constitution. Thus, any hypothetical ACSA between Japan and South Korea is only likely to come into play for the purposes of humanitarian intervention.

The pacifist nature of the proposed ACSA with Japan provides a strong evidence that South Korea harbors no intentions to balance China, while the

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7 As one ROK Foreign Ministry official put it, "It is inappropriate for us to shun security talks with Japan, when Tokyo is talking with Washington on security cooperation on the Korean peninsula." Hahnkyu Park,. "Between Caution and Cooperation: The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 1, (1998): 102.

8 "Be Careful of Japan - S. Korea Alliance," *Global Times*, August 24, 2010, http://www. globaltimes.cn/opinion/ editorial/2010-08/566474.html (accessed October 9, 2011).

9 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force of May 19, 2010," http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/pdfs/ agree1005.pdf (accessed December 27, 2011).

perennial threat from the north of the Thirty-eighth Parallel will likely ensure that such inclinations remain a distant priority. In fact, South Korea has been rather forthcoming in its discussions with US officials in delimiting the scope of the US–ROK Alliance to the Korean Peninsula.[10] Taken together, the lack of balancing behavior on the part of South Korea, Pyongyang's own amity with Beijing and the declining defense budgets of Japan and Taiwan,[11] show that any sort of anti-China balancing behavior has yet to appear within Northeast Asia.

Mainland Southeast Asia

Like Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia lacks any semblance of anti-China balancing. Simple resource constraints are a primary factor, and both Laos and Cambodia lack the prerequisite capabilities to contribute meaningfully to any balancing initiative. Moreover, Cambodia is enmeshed in its ongoing territorial dispute over the Preah Vihear Temple, meaning that its primary concern is Thailand, not China. Thailand itself is more militarily capable, but is likewise preoccupied with territorial disputes with both Cambodia and Burma. Furthermore, while Thailand remains an American ally, it has shown greater interest in using China to curtail US influence rather than vice versa.[12] While Burma has increased its defense spending in recent years, the country's military enjoys a close relationship with Beijing.[13] Like Cambodia, Burma maintains an uneasy relationship with Thailand – one that is frequently marred by border disputes and antagonism over Burmese human rights violations.[14]

Within Indochina, the actor with the greatest incentive to balance China is Vietnam. Contemporary maritime disputes over the South China Sea repre-

10 Interview with Republic of Korea Lieutenant Commander (Navy), August 11, 2011; Interview with United States Lieutenant Commander (Navy Reserve) & Defense Contractor living in South Korea, October 28, 2011.

11 Taiwan's military spending comprises some 2.2 percent of its GDP, but this amount has been declining since 2009. When adjusted for inflation, Japan's defense spending has been downward trending since 2003. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2011" (Signalistgatan, Sweden, 2011). http://milexdata.sipri.org.

12 Bruce Vaughn, "U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region" (a special report prepared at the request of the Congress,Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RL33821.pdf. (accessed November 11, 2011).

13 "Myanmar Allocates 1/4 of New Budget to Military," *Business Week*, March 1, 2011, http://www.businessweek. com/ap/financialnews/D9LMDOSO1.htm. (accessed October 15, 2011).

14 Rosalie Smith and Francis Wade, "Thai-Burma Relations Under 'Unprecedented Strain'," *Democratic Voice of Burma*, June 12, 2009, http://burmanewscasts.blogspot.com/2009/06/thai-burma-relations-under.html (accessed October 15, 2011).

sent only the most recent manifestation of a historic antagonism – one that cost over 50,000 lives during the brief 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, and an additional 40 fatalities during the Johnson South Reef Skirmish of 1988. Anti-Chinese nationalist sentiment remains pervasive in Vietnam today.[15] Meanwhile, the Chinese media has clamored loudly over Vietnam's most recent overtures to India concerning the possible development of the energy resources in the South China Sea, opining, "China may consider taking actions to show its stance and prevent more reckless attempts in confronting China." [16]

The relatively mundane topic of oil exploration belies the significant implications of Vietnamese-Indian cooperation that has the Chinese media so incensed. Southeast Asia represents a unipolar regional system with China as hegemon. Indian influence thus has the potential to alter the balance of power in the region in a manner detrimental to China's interests. As noted by The Economist, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang's visit to India in October 2011, his talk of the two countries' "strategic partnership" and his desire for a "security dialogue" have all stoked speculation in China that India is considering selling BrahMos, supersonic cruise missiles, to Vietnam.[17]

Despite such conjecture, evidence of Vietnam's intent to balance against China with India remains scant. "Security dialogue" between the armed forces of India and Vietnam might raise eyebrows in Beijing, but the two militaries have yet to see any substantive cooperation. Most significantly, China is both countries' main trade partner. Given the degree to which Vietnam's economy is dependent upon China, Hanoi has strong incentive to refrain from provoking China unnecessarily. Rather, Vietnam may as well keep the threat of cooperation with India as a potential recourse against Chinese unilateralism. All told, evidence suggests that the talk of Vietnam balancing with India against China will remain purely hypothetical for the foreseeable future.

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15 Parameswaran Ponnudurai, "Protests Raise Freedom Prospects," *Radio Free Asia*, August 27, 2011, http://www.rfa.org/english/east-asia-beat/protests-08272011024916.html (accessed October 15, 2011).

16 "India-Vietnam joint work must be halted," *Global Times*, October 14, 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/679263/India-Vietnam-joint-work-must-be-halted.aspx (accessed November 20, 2011).

17 "Banyan: Not as Close as Lips and Teeth - China Should Not Fear India's Growing Friendship with Vietnam," *The Economist*, October 22, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21533397 (accessed December 1, 2011).

Maritime Southeast Asia & Oceania

The final sub-region to be examined consists of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, and the Philippines. Malaysia's strong trade ties with China, as well as the country's significant ethnic Chinese population (approximately 23 percent) help ensure that Malaysia sees scant reason to engage in balancing behavior against China.[18] The consistency of Malaysia's military expenditures in the past decade – approximately two percent of GDP versus 4.3 percent for China — further supports the premise that Malaysia has little to no interest in balancing.

One of Malaysia's most salient security partners is Singapore, both countries being members of the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA). In recent years, Singapore has signed a host of defense agreements with regional partners. Such agreements include Taiwan's hosting of Singaporean troops since the 1970s,[19] India's leasing of Kalaikunda airbase in West Bengal to train Singaporean F-16s,[20] and Australia's multiple five-year contracts to permit Singapore's Armed Forces at Shoalwater Bay Training Area.[21] However, these agreements are a consequence of Singapore's inability to furnish its armed forces with sufficient space to train, and are benign in nature. Given that Singapore makes no claim in the South China Sea dispute, Singapore has no obvious incentive to balance China. Even the hosting of US warships at Changi Naval Base represents a quid-pro-quo arrangement by which the Singapore Air Force is allowed to train at Luke Air Force Base. With defense spending relative to GDP falling from 5.4 percent in 1999 to 4.3 percent a decade later, Singapore has yet to display any indication of seeking to balance China's rise.

Singapore also enjoys good relations with Indonesia. In 2007, Singa-

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18 Zarinah, Mahari, "Demographic Transition in Malaysia: The Changing Roles of Women" (a special report by the Demographic Statistics Division, Department of Statistics, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 2011), http://www.cwsc2011.gov.in/ papers/demographic_transitions/Paper_1.pdf (accessed November 10, 2011).

19 Barry Wain,. "A David-and-Goliath Tussle China and Singapore Are Embroiled in an Unexpected Row over Taiwan. The Confrontation Could Affect the Way other Asian Countries See China," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 5, 2004. http://www.singapore-window.org/sw04/040805fe.htm (accessed October 28, 2011).

20 "After Kalaikunda, Singapore to Train at Indian Army Firing Ranges," *The Indian Express*, August 13, 2008. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/After-Kalaikunda,-Singapore-to-train-at-Indian-Army-firing-ranges/348181/ (accessed October 15, 2011).

21 United Nations, "Australia and Singapore Agreement Concerning the Use of Shoalwater Bay Training Area and the Associated Use of Storage Facilities in Australia" 1889, no. 32145 (1995): 1-32145. http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/17/6/00014055.pdf (accessed November 2, 2011).

pore committed itself to an extradition treaty with Indonesia in exchange for Indonesia's offering to permit Singaporean Armed forces to train on Sumatra.[22] However, Singapore's amicable relations with China may be a potential hindrance to its warming relations with Indonesia. Indonesia has had challenging relations with China since the mid-1960s, and with 74.2 percent of Singapore's population being comprised of ethnic Chinese, Indonesia views the city-state as a vehicle of Chinese influence. It is likely for this reason that Singapore has so far refrained from accepting China's offer to allow Singaporean Armed Forces to train on Hainen Island instead of Taiwan, lest Singapore confirm Indonesia's misgivings.

Indonesia's wariness towards China largely centers on China's presumed involvement in the Indonesian Communist Party's failed coup of September 30, 1965. As evident during the anti-Chinese riots of 1998, an element of racism may also be at work. However, more pressing for Indonesia than concerns regarding China is the more immediate issue of Indonesia's own territorial integrity. The creation of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste epitomizes the difficulties faced by the Indonesian government (and armed forces) in maintaining effective control over 8 million people spread over 13,000 islands. [23] On the international front, relations with Malaysia, while much improved since the days of the Konfrontasi, still suffer from unresolved territorial disputes. Foremost of these is Ambalat territory within the Celebes Sea — a patch of maritime territory that by some estimates may contain up to 764 million barrels of oil.[23] Of the Indonesian Navy Eastern Fleet Command's thirty capital combat ships, seven are kept on active notice in the vicinity of Ambalat.[24] Given proximity, history, and the ongoing antagonism just described, it is little wonder that Indonesian security strategy is primarily focused on Malaysia, not China.

Aside from Vietnam, the country most likely to seek to balance China is the Philippines. The two countries have experienced territorial disputes over Johnson South Reef in 1988, Mischief Reef in 1999, and most recently Scar-

22 Donald Greenlees, "Indonesia and Singapore Sign Two Landmark Treaties," *The New York Times*, April 27, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/world/asia/27iht-indo.3.5474698.html (accessed October 15, 2011).

23 Ali Nur Yasin and Sorta Tobing, "Ambalat's Huge Oil and Gas Reserves," *Tempo Interaktif*, June 2, 2009. http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2009/06/02/brk,20090602-179380,uk.html (accessed November 15, 2011).

24 Amir Tejo, "Navy Was Set To Fire on Warship," *Jakarta Globe*, June 4, 2009. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/navy-was-set-to-fire-on-warship/277953 (accessed October 18, 2011).

borough Shoal in 2012.[25] Like India's relationship with Vietnam, US defense cooperation with the Philippines against China represents more the potential for balancing behavior, than the cultivation of actual hard capabilities. This is primarily because (A) the Philippines' Navy lacks capabilities that are modern and credible enough to threaten China, and (B) the US has so far refrained from providing these capabilities. A case in point is the fact that the Philippines' most capable warship, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PF-15), is 47 years old. Given these constraints, it is difficult to argue that the Philippines is prepared to actively balance China. Thus, while China may criticize the Philippines' annual naval exercises with the US, for the time being, such exercises can at best be described as a symbolic gesture.[26]

Lastly, Australia's security linkages with Japan, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as its deep trade ties to the region, necessitate its inclusion in any discussion of East Asian security dynamics. The over $80 billion in trade between Australia and China is indicative of an amicable and mutually beneficial relationship. Although the Bush-Koizumi-Howard consensus during the years 2001-2008 certainly accelerated military cooperation between Japan and Australia, such efforts have not been directed at China. To recall, the Japanese-Australian Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement is pacifist in nature. Thus, with the possible exception of Australia's hosting of a Japanese satellite monitoring facility, defense cooperation between these two states have yet to enhance the tangible capabilities that would come into play in any China-related contingency.[27]

Conclusion

The defense agreements and growing budget allocations described above are products of East Asian states' expanding security cooperation, as well as general economic growth within the region. However, these trends fail to constitute

25 Teresa Cerojano, "3 of 8 Chinese Fishing Boats Leave Disputed Shoal," *The Associated Press*, April 13, 2012.

26 "US Has No Stomach for South China Sea Military Clash," *Global Times*, October 30, 2011, http://www. globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/681576/US-has-no-stomach-for-South-China-Sea-military-clash.aspx (accessed October 13, 2011).

27 Richard Tanter, "The New Security Architecture: Binding Japan and Australia, Containing China," *Nautilus Institute at Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Austral Peace and Security Network*, March 15, 2007. http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/policy-forum/2007/0707atanter.html. (accessed October 21, 2011).

as formal balancing. In order for balancing to be effective, the joint capabilities must be at the approximate level of the state to be balanced. The developments that most closely resemble balancing within the region — the ACSA signed between Japan and Australia and the proposed ACSA between Japan and South Korea — achieve little in fulfilling this basic requirement. As to why balancing is not taking place, we have encountered multiple rationales at work at the unit level. Some actors, North Korea and Burma for instance, are beneficiaries of Chinese patronage. For other states such as the Philippines, the relatively small size of their economies and their limited resources may preclude effective balancing behavior. Some states possess populations that consist of ethnic Chinese and/or extensive trade ties with China. Finally, there are those states that would likely attempt balancing behavior if not for the existence of perceived threats closer to home. If one's goal is to understand the policies of an individual state, then each of the rationales just described must be taken into account. However, the subject of inquiry is East Asia and the regional system as a whole. Thus, the next section shifts away from discussing unit-level justifications for the absence of balancing in East Asia and explores possible explanations at the level of structure.

PART II: WHY THE CONSPICUOUS ABSENCE?

This section examines two structural-level explanations commonly invoked by neo-realists as to why East Asia has thus far refrained from any genuine attempt to balance China.

EXPLANATION 1:
The US Presence Makes it Unnecessary to Balance China

EXPLANATION 2:
East Asia is Structurally Unable to Balance China

After empirically examining each of these two explanations, I conclude that neither theory fits the available evidence. Accordingly, neo-realists must take greater pains to substantiate their assumptions regarding the applicability of balance of power theory in East Asia.

Does the US Presence Obviate the Need to Balance China?

Many scholars and actors (including US Pacific Command) typically assume that the US maintains a stabilizing effect on East Asia. Another way of phrasing this is to argue that the presence of an external balancer lessens or prevents balancing behavior that would have otherwise emerged in response to the rise of a local hegemon. One way of assessing the validity of this assertion is to compare states that benefit from the US military presence to those that do not.

> HYPOTHESIS: States that are not allied to an external balancer perceive themselves to be less secure than allied states that enjoy such protection. Because of this, non-allied states will tend to spend greater resources on defense than allied states.

In this instance, the key variable of interest is the US alliance system. In China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia, David Kang identifies seven states that exemplify the allied/non-allied gradient that governs security policy in East Asia. From most closely affiliated with the US to least, these seven states are Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and North Korea.[28] If the hypothesis is correct, then we should anticipate that those states outside the US alliance system (North Korea, Vietnam and Malaysia) should have higher defense spending than those with a security guarantee from the US (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines).

> PREDICTION: Vietnam, Malaysia and North Korea will display higher levels of defense spending relative to those states allied with the US.

The data used here is primarily from the CIA World Factbook,[29] the World Bank and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).[30] Defense spending is based on fiscal year 2009. The results are shown below in terms of the percentage of GDP dedicated to military spending (US allies are designated

28 Kang, *China Rising*, 55.
29 Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook* (Washington, DC, 2000-2010).
30 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2011" (Signalistgatan, Sweden, 2011). http://milexdata.sipri.org (accessed November 18 2011).

in black).



(SOURCE: CIA World Factbook)

Of the seven countries surveyed, only two allied countries, Japan and the Philippines, rank in the order predicted by the hypothesis. These results indicate that South Korea feels less secure than Vietnam or Malaysia, despite the presence of 28,000 US troops in its territory. Meanwhile, the presence of 35,000 US troops based out of Japan has contributed to Tokyo's willingness to make incremental cuts (in real terms) to its defense budget throughout the past decade. All told, there appears to be no relationship between the extent to which US defense capabilities are forward deployed and the defense appropriations of the host country. The number of US forces devoted to the Philippines constitutes a tiny fraction of those deployed to South Korea, but the Philippines seems to feel perfectly comfortable dedicating only 0.9 percent of its economic activity to defense — roughly a third of what South Korea spends relative to the size of its economy.

Many academics, military planners and politicians take for granted as

a fact that US withdrawal would lead to a regional arms buildup.[31] A specific example of this claim is the notion that the US military presence acts as a "cork in the bottle" of Japanese remilitarization.[32] However, there is no clear relationship between the rates of military spending and the membership in the US alliance system. Anecdotal evidence of Japan politely ignoring US exhortations to expand its defense responsibilities and capabilities reinforces this assessment.

The above examination only discusses seven states. In order to further substantiate whether any relationship exists between the membership in the US alliance system and defense spending, it is necessary to expand the analysis to include the remaining regional actors of Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Burma. In addition to doubling the number of states being examined, we can attain a broader picture by looking at the changes in defense spending over time rather than just the year 2009. To this end, this paper employs linear regression of each country's defense spending during the period of 1988-2010. The more detailed data represented in the various regression lines reveal longer-term trends than what was discernable in the earlier snapshot of 2009 alone. If the hypothesis is correct, non-allied countries (solid lines) should tend to group near the top of the pile since the lack of support from an external balancer should drive them to achieve higher levels of defense. Likewise, allied states (dotted lines) should tend to congregate towards the bottom.

The results show that during the period 1988-2010, South Korea tended to increase its defense spending most rapidly while defense spending by Taiwan was most likely to decrease. Of the fourteen countries surveyed, Australia and Japan placed second and fourth respectively as being most likely to increase their defense spending during the 22-year period. The other two US allies, Thailand and the Philippines, averaged an extremely low figure but yet maintained a positive slope. Glancing at the chart below, one faint pattern emerges among the regression lines. Three of the top four states that increased their defense spending most consistently are all allies with the United States.

31 Seth Cropsey, "Keeping the Pacific Pacific: The Looming U.S.-China Naval Rivalry," *Foreign Affairs*, September 27, 2010.

32 This expression is generally attributed to Lieutenant-General Henry Stackpole. See Christopher Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).



(SOURCE: SIPRI)

This is the opposite of what we would expect if our hypothesis were correct. Rather, the ordering of states bears a much closer resemblance to what we would expect if there were no influence by outside actors. In other words, the regression lines shown above are more closely to model assumptions of zero US influence than they do to our hypothesis.

In conclusion, there is no evidence that a state's military spending is determined by the depth of its strategic relationship with the United States. One specific consequence of this observation is that "cork in the bottle" type assumptions — that the US presence constrains arms racing and a possible return to Japanese militarism — should no longer be assumed. More broadly, the evidence presented here discredits the theory that a strong US presence has somehow suppressed the anti-China balancing behavior predicted by neo-realist

theory.

Is East Asia Structurally Able To Balance Against China?

This section examines the second of the two explanations discussed earlier as to the absence of anti-China balancing: East Asia is structurally unable to do so. Earlier we discussed the resource constraints states face, and how such constraints inevitably limit the states' options in their dealing with rising China. Along these lines, neo-realists may argue that East Asia is structurally unable to balance China and that states are aware of this and are avoiding policies that they perceive to be unfeasible. While Kang agrees that such an argument might offer an explanation, he excoriates neo-realists for using an insufficiently rigorous empirical basis (italics mine):

> *At a minimum, the onus is on those who argue that East Asia states are too small to balance, to show empirically that these states actually fear China, that these states searched all available internal and external balancing options, and ultimately decided that capitulation was the best policy to follow. Anything less is not a serious analytic argument, but rather an admission by realists that their theories about balance of power to not apply.*[33]

This section can be construed as an attempt to meet this standard, and does so by examining a hypothetical scenario in which East Asia balances against China with 100 percent participation and zero transaction costs – a "best case scenario" from the standpoint of the balancers. If within this scenario, East Asia fails to yield an aggregated level of national power comparable to that of China's, then we can say that East Asia as a system is structurally unable to balance China.

Measuring the strength of a hypothetical balancing coalition requires the measurement of individual state's national power; however, "national power" is a far more complicated attribute than military spending and calls for sophisticated measures. This paper employs the metric, pioneered by Kadera and Sorokin, known as the Geometric Index of National Capability (GINC). GINC emphasizes six primary components of national power: Military expenditure (ME), military personnel (MP), iron and steel production (IS), energy consump-

33 Kang, *China Rising*, 10.

tion (NRG), urban population (UPOP) and total population (TPOP). The formula below states how we can use GINC to derive the share of national power that STATEX possesses within the regional system.

GINC$_X$ =

$$\sqrt[6]{\frac{ME_X}{ME_{TOTAL}} \cdot \frac{MP_X}{MP_{TOTAL}} \cdot \frac{IS_X}{IS_{TOTAL}} \cdot \frac{NRG_X}{NRG_{TOTAL}} \cdot \frac{UP_X}{UP_{TOTAL}} \cdot \frac{TPOP_X}{TPOP_{TOTAL}}}$$

This metric has two main advantages. Most importantly, it is designed to fully utilize the datasets available within the Correlates of War Project. [34] Secondly, its geometric nature means that relative to its predecessor, the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC), "GINC is immune to entry and exit effects on dyadic power relationships."[35] Given the unresolved conflicts across the Thirty-eighth Parallel and the Taiwan Strait, this becomes an important characteristic.

The GINC dataset employed here encompasses sixteen political actors: China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia and the United States. The dataset uses economic and demographic data from the World Bank and military data from the Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST) database.[36] Where gaps exist, the missing data is taken from countries' own statistics collection bodies, such as ministries of the interior or census bureaus.[37] Data from the CIA World Fact Book is also incorpo-

34 Paul F Diehl, "The Correlates of War Project Bibliographic Essay," *Correlates of War Project*, http://correlatesofwar.org/ (accessed October 28, 2011).

35 Kadera & Sorokin 2004, 226.

36 A project with no fewer than nineteen partners, the majority of data I employ was provided by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). See "Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST)," *Armed Forces, Weapons Holdings and Employment in Arms Production*, 2010, http://first.sipri.org/ (accessed October 28, 2011).

37 Hung Yao Chao, "ESCO Business in Taiwan," *CTCI Foundation: Energy Conservation Technology Development Center*, 2001 www.ecct.org.tw/esco/teach/14.ppt (accessed October 28, 2011); International Iron and Steel Institute (Committee On Statistics), A Handbook of World Steel Statistics (Brussels, Belgium, 2007); Brian R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750-2005* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Republic of China Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics Population by Sex, Rate of Population Increase, Average Persons Per Household, Density and Natural Increase Rate (Taipei, Taiwan, 2011), http://eng.stat. gov.tw/public/data/dgbas03/bs2/yearbook_eng/y008.pdf (accessed October 28, 2011); Taiwan Ministry of the Interior, *Population and Density in Urban Planning Districts* (Taipei, Taiwan: Construction and Planning Agency, 2011), sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/y08-02.

rated as a last resort. To ensure reliability, the results of the GINC equation were compared to those of the more traditional CINC equation. In addition, these calculations were performed on an alternate dataset[38] — the National Material Capabilities (v4.0) dataset maintained by the Correlates of War Project.[39] The results for these sixteen countries show a strong match between the GINC and CINC calculations (showing an average correlation coefficient of 0.92).[40] The fact that the results are similar regardless of the method of calculation used or dataset employed strengthens the reliability of the findings.

The resultant GINC scores succinctly express China's rise as a regional power. Not only is China's national power larger than that of the US (42.7 percent versus 29 percent), but China has held a larger share of regional power than the US since 2000. Moreover, with an aggregate GINC score of 28.1 percent, East Asia as a whole has largely failed to keep pace with China. Summarizing the graph below, a hypothetical US/East Asia anti-China alliance would today achieve a ratio of geopolitical strength vis-à-vis China of 57 to 43 — a disparity of approximately 25 percent. To place this disparity and its implications in context, this difference is comparable to the difference in military spending which existed between NATO and the USSR in 1982.[41] If one argues

xls (accessed October 28, 2011); Houmpheng Theuambounm, *Status of Renewable Energy Development in the Lao People's Democratic Republic* (Bangkok, Thailand: United Nations Renewable Energy Technology Center, Technology Research Institute, 2007), http://www.greengrowth.org/download/green-businesspub/Greening_of_the_Business/Governments/Houmpheng_Theuambounmy_Status_of_Renewable_Energy.pdf (accessed October 29, 2011); United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision* (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Popular Division), 2004); World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) (Washington, DC, 2011), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed October 29, 2011); World Resources Institute, Total Energy Consumption Per Capita Units: (Kilograms of Oil Equivalent (KOGE) Per Person): Taiwan, 2005, http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/ index.php?step=countries&cID%5B%5D=176&theme=6&variable_ID=351&action=select_years (accessed October 29, 2011).

38 Note: The National Material Capabilities (v4.0) dataset ends at 2007, versus my own dataset that ends in 2010.

39 Correlates of War Project, National Material Capabilities (v4.0), 2007. http://correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc4.htm (accessed October 29, 2011).

40 The correlation coefficients of the GINC calculations relative to Correlates of War Project's CINC estimates were .90 for China, .94 for an aggregated East Asia, and .92 for the US

41 I include the comparison here to give readers a frame of reference, but acknowledge that the relationship between China and East Asia's GINC scores today, and NATO and USSR's relative military spending twenty years ago, involve unlike terms. Suffice to say that approximating GINC for NATO and the USSR is beyond the scope of this paper (Department of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report: Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington D.C., 1980); Department of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report: Fiscal Year 1990 (Washington D.C, 1989); NATO Press Service, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO's Defense (NATO HQ: DMS 1356680, 1976); NATO Press Service, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO's Defense (NATO HQ: DMS 1356658, 1985)).

that the USSR and NATO effectively balanced one another at that time, then one is forced to conclude that under ideal conditions, East Asia, *with the assistance of an external balancer,* is perfectly able to balance China.

CHANGES IN NATIONAL POWER BETWEEN THE U.S., EAST ASIA, INDIA, AND CHINA (1960-2010)



"Region" is defined as encompassing the following: China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, and the United States.

However, given the improbable assumptions underlying these figures, it is only fair to question if this condition would hold under less ideal conditions. In the overview from Part I, we observed that East Asia is home to several antagonistic bilateral relationships (North and South Korea, Cambodia and Thailand, and so forth). Moreover, we cannot assume that an anti-China balancing coalition would secure participation from every East Asian state. For instance, North Korea is hardly likely to balance China. As a result, not only North Korea, but a certain portion of South Korea and Japan's national power, must be removed from the 28.1 percent GINC score. Put simply, East Asia is not aggregated, and a more realistic model that takes that into account may show that East Asia is structurally unable to balance China given the antagonistic relationships prevalent within it.

China Versus a Divided East Asia

To improve accuracy, the previous calculations of national power should be recalculated to take into account the antagonistic relationships, or "oppositional dyads" within East Asia. Based on the regional overview from Part I, we can discern at least five oppositional dyads: North and South Korea, North Korea and Japan, Thailand and Burma, Thailand and Cambodia, and lastly, Indonesia and Malaysia. We can approximate the extent to which a state's national power is tied up within these dyads by zeroing out the GINC score of the smaller state, and then subtracting the smaller GINC score from that of the larger state. For example, on Korean peninsula, North Korea's GINC score with respect to China would be zero, while South Korea's effective GINC score would be its normal value, minus the GINC score for North Korea. The system of modifiers applied to oppositional dyads in East Asia is laid out as follows:

Applying Oppositional Dyad Modifiers to GINC
(With Respect to China)

~~North Korea~~
+ South Korea – (North Korea)
+ Japan – (North Korea)
+ Taiwan
+ Vietnam
+ Laos
+ ~~Burma~~

China (No Modifier) Vs. + The Philippines + Thailand – (Cambodia + Burma) + ~~Cambodia~~ + ~~Malaysia~~ + Singapore + Indonesia – (Malaysia) + Australia

Vs. **U.S.A (No Modifier)**

Once the GINC modifiers are implemented and the regional figures are re-tabulated, the results are striking in that the resultant changes are so slight. The GINC scores for the US and China increase from 29 percent to 31 percent, and

from 42.2 percent to 45.7 percent respectively. Reflecting the fact that East Asia is far from being unified, East Asia's GINC score falls from 28.1 percent to 23.1 percent. Based on this, we can infer that depending on whether or not East Asia is able to create a unified balancing coalition, the region's aggregated strength will vary from approximately 66 percent to 50 percent.

These differentials succinctly describe how China may increasingly dominate East Asia as local hegemon, but does not take into account the influence of an external balancer. Taken together, the US and East Asia remain to be able to form an effective balancing coalition, with the hypothetical coalition's GINC score of 54 percent exceeding China's 46 percent. Moreover, it is quite possible that at some point in the future, the US may not be alone as an external balancer. As we saw earlier, India's influence in the region is increasing, and thus a scenario in which India seeks to balance China is entirely possible. What happens if we expand the analysis to include India and Pakistan?[42] As expected, the ratio of geopolitical strength disfavors China even more, with the US, India, East Asia and China attaining GINC scores of 26.5 percent, 19.8 percent, 14.5 percent, and 39 percent respectively.

42 To this end, I employ the same system of GINC modifiers discussed earlier, subtracting Pakistan's GINC from India, and then multiplying Pakistan's GINC times zero.

CHANGES IN NATIONAL POWER BETWEEN THE U.S., EAST ASIA, INDIA, AND CHINA (1960-2010)



"East Asia" is defined as encompassing the following: North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia. India is also shown as the third stratum from the top. GINC modifiers for oppositional dyads are employed. Likewise, a negative modifier is applied to India to take into account India's ongoing dispute with Pakistan. Data represents the period 1960-2010.

CONCLUSION

This paper examined two possible structural explanations as to why there exists a conspicuous absence of anti-China balancing in East Asia today – a condition that neo-realist theories of balance-of power politics fail to predict. A brief survey of the capabilities, alignments, and security policies of various East Asian states confirms that for a variety of unit-level reasons, the bulk of East Asia is indeed, opting to forgo outright balancing. The paper's central premise thus confirmed, we empirically assessed two structural-level explanations typically invoked by neo-realists to account for the lack of balancing in East Asia today: (A) the US military presence obviates the need to engage in balancing behavior, and (B) China's national strength within the regional system is too great for the rest of East Asia to feasibly balance it.

The evidence presented casts significant doubt on the validity of the first of these two theories, and renders the second null. Contrary to what we would expect of countries situated comfortably and securely within the system of US alliances, American allies in East Asia were slightly more likely to have increased their defense spending in the past half century than those states without an explicit security guarantee. To be certain, the lack of a relationship between alliance membership and defense spending does not disprove the notion that the US has suppressed balancing behavior in East Asia. However, it does mean that notions of the US as a "cork in the bottle" of East Asian arms racing should be reexamined, and that more work remains to be done to determine the precise nature of US influence on security dynamics within the region.

The second explanation offered by neo-realists, that East Asia is structurally unable to balance China, is technically true. Under optimal conditions of full participation and zero transaction costs, East Asia is only able to produce two-thirds of China's geopolitical strength. However, any examination of East Asia that assumes isolation from US or Indian influence is hardly realistic. Whether the external balancer is America or India, the hypothetical differences of national power predicted here are less than what prevailed during the last decade of the Cold War. This implies the feasibility of balancing as a strategic option. Last, the aforementioned analysis is based on the current distributions of power. Already there is talk about India's economic growth rate soon overtaking China's.[43] Should such outcome occur, the feasibility of balancing China will improve substantially. In short, notions that East Asia is somehow unable to balance China are indefensible.

David Kang rightly accuses neo-realists of failing to undertake the onus of empirically substantiating why East Asia is not balancing China. This paper represents an attempt to address this abnegation. However, having discredited two structure-based explanations for the absence of balancing behavior in East Asia today, it is only natural to seek to engage this theoretical puzzle that stands ever more intransigent. What explains this conspicuous absence?

Kang writes that the "East Asian region has its own internal dynamics, shared history, culture, and interactions" and argues in favor of a regional view of China's rise while implying the need for a rigorous study of East Asia's nor-

43 "China and India: Contest of the Century," *The Economist*, April 19, 2010. http://www.economist.com /node/16846256 (accessed October 15, 2011).

mative framework.[44] Such an avenue of research may very well yield dividends. As previously discussed, minus an external balancer, East Asia is not capable of balancing China. Moreover, the existence of an external balancer is, historically speaking, a relatively recent phenomenon. Given that the vast majority of East Asian history has taken place within a unipolar system, it is possible that regional norms have developed in such as way so as to be tolerant of a powerful China.

While Kang implies that a more constructivist approach to understanding regional dynamics might be called for, another option may be to utilize balance-of-threat theory as articulated by Stephen M. Walt. However, Walt's framework represents more a starting point than a definitive answer. Of his four determinants of threat (aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions), only one — the lack of perceived offensive intentions — argues in favor of the absence of balancing that we see today. Bearing this in mind, appraising the relative salience of these four threat indicators and the breadth of their applicability may constitute one particularly constructive avenue of inquiry for those seeking to understand what the future holds in this "Pacific Century." **PEAR**

44 Kang, *China Rising*, 203.

INSTITUTIONALIZING EAST ASIA: SOUTH KOREA'S REGIONAL LEADERSHIP AS A MIDDLE POWER

José Guerra Vio
National Chengchi (Politics) University, Taiwan (NCCU)

Most of the analysis trying to understand East Asian integration in recent years has focused primarily on the study of bilateral FTAs or the ASEAN process as the center of gravity for regionalism. However, after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, the ASEAN Plus Three process involving Japan, South Korea and China was consolidated. This is just one example of how the focus of regionalism for the first time became East Asian wide, and the potential new center of gravity for regional institutionalization shifted to the northeast region. Institutionalization is a novel practice for policymakers in this region, particularly in the most advanced and developed economies of Northeast Asia. The focus of this paper is on South Korea, which is taking a very proactive role in regional affairs, especially when it comes to the building of regional institutions and the creation of regional governance. Foreign policymakers in Seoul have been busy in recent years with positioning the ROK as the hub for Northeast Asian regional integration, trying to estblish South Korea as a bridge between the two traditional competitors for leadership and influence in Asia: Japan and China. As a major power in the region, South Korea appears to have the capacity to take up a leadership role, particularly in regards to the institutionalization of Northeast Asia. The main purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of South Korea's on the processes of institutionalization in Northeast Asia. By looking at the foreign policy choices and the approach to regionalism of current and previous administrations, the impact appears to be positive.

Introduction: East Asian North-South Institutional Gap

The construction of an East Asian Community, as a long term goal, cannot be realized in the absence of strong political will and leadership, which must stem from the institutionalization of cooperation among the regional power and big-

gest economies of NEA, namely China and Japan. However, due to historical differences, rivalry, competition and even some territorial disputes among the two, South Korea — as the other most advanced country in the region — appears to have the capacity to affect these processes and take up the leadership vacancy; hence forming a bridge between the two Northeast Asian powers and also helping to reduce the institutional gap between Northeast and Southeast Asia. The first question that arises is why China or Japan would want South Korea to assume leadership responsibilities in terms of regional institutionalization. China, Japan and South Korea's economic interdependence due to increasing intraregional trade — plus a series of transnational common problems that require their collective action — makes the need for institutionalization of regional cooperation an objective reality. Nevertheless, in light of the differences and mistrust that prevails between all the parties, Beijing and Tokyo appear to feel more comfortable dealing with Seoul. From a Chinese point of view, they also share with the Koreans a conflictive relationship with Japan due to Japan's imperial history. On a citizen level the perception of Japan and the way it has dealt with the history remains mostly negative in both countries.[1] From a Japanese perspective, the ROK is considered part of the same side, since both countries are US allies, democracies and they both prefer a more open and pro-Western approach to the region.

In this sense, this paper argues that the Republic of Korea — understood as a middle power — should be considered a leading actor in the processes of regional institutionalization in East Asia. What are the particular characteristics of its leadership role and its approach to regional institutionalization? In which ways have these been manifested in the past and in recent years? These issues will be addressed by looking at the relationship between the particular kind of regional leadership exerted by South Korea and the institutionalization processes of East Asia from an inter-governmentalist perspective. This approach derives from both neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism. It shares with the former the emphasis on economic interests as the principal driving

1 Berger argues that in the relationship with its neighbors Japan's soft power constitutes that of a hard case, as its image suffers from severe liabilities. Berger exposes a 2006 study in which 71 percent of Chinese have a negative view of Japan. Also Kim shows how the same year over 72 percent of the people in South Korea perceived Japan with distrust. See Thomas Berger, "Japan in Asia: A Hard Case for Soft Power," *Orbis* 54, issue 4 (Fall 2010): 565-582; and Byung-kook Kim, "Between China, America, and North Korea: South Korea's Hedging," in *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, eds. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (New York: Cornell University, 2008), 191-217.

force of regional integration, which coincides with the latter on stressing the importance of regional institutions as the means to achieve and secure integration. However, it differs from earlier approaches as it gives a central role to national governments.[2] Therefore, it is relevant to distinguish between the different types of regional processes. Regionalism refers to the conscious and deliberate attempts by national states and governments to create formal mechanisms for dealing with common transnational issues through inter-governmental dialogue and treaty, and the creation of regional governance as an outcome of this. By contrast, regionalization is conceived as an undirected process of growing interdependence that originates in the actions of individuals, groups and corporations rather than through the deliberate actions of national governments.[3] These two types of processes are not mutually exclusive, and many see regionalism as a response to regionalization.

Regional institutionalization is at the core of that transition and particularly in East Asia it is better understood from an inter-governmentalist perspective since the issue of sovereignty remains a contentious point in the region. This happens because most models of regional institutionalization, particularly those followed by European nations, imply a considerable amount of sovereignty delegation onto supranational entities. In East Asia that "intellectual leap over more bounded notions of sovereignty"[4] has not occurred despite the high degree of economic interdependence, and indeed it is unlikely that East Asia will follow the European model of "sovereignty pooling." Instead a kind of "regulatory regionalism" based upon inter-governmental efforts is appearing in this part of the world. This carries fewer negative connotations for sovereignty and regime autonomy because "institution building" in the most traditional sense implied some sovereignty pooling aspects that alarmed East Asian regional leaders. In contrast, they have opted for delegating to the state whatever policy coordination necessary, and this is how institutionalization from an intergovernmentalist point of view can act as a sovereignty enhancing mechanism.[5]

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2 Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

3 Shaun Breslin, "Greater China and the Political Economy of Regionalization," *East Asia* 21, no.1 (2004): 9.

4 Richard A. Higgott and Martina Timmermann, "Institutionalizing East Asia: Learning Lessons from Europe on Regionalism, Regionalization, Identity and Leadership," in *Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional steps towards Global Governance*, eds. Martina Timmermann and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008), 52.

5 Ibid., 56.

The creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative after the AFC is a recent example in this sense, as the first steps towards East Asian-wide institutionalization implying a form of institution — the APT framework — and governance in the form of financial assistance.[6] However, Rozman argues that the future challenge for East Asia lies in the establishment of an institutionalized community that takes China, Japan and South Korea as the core.[7] Figure 1 depicts this problematization. The ascending arrows illustrate the processes this article pays attention to, while the big feedback arrows are included to show both how they reinforce and consolidate institutionalization in the region, as well as the roles of the different actors involved.

6 Signed in May, 2000 in the city of Chiang Mai, Thailand, this initiative created a network of bilateral arrangements among the APT members, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea with the ASEAN countries. This pact provided financing for members, which may encounter liquidity problems. In 2009 an agreement was reached to replace the complicated bilateral swap agreements for a comprehensive multilateral arrangement that created a single fund to help with managing regional financial crises, which represents the first successful regionalist project of the APT grouping.

7 Gilbert Rozman, "Northeast Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads: Is an East Asian Community in sight?" in *Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional steps towards Global Governance*, eds. Martina Timmermann and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008), 83-97.

Figure 1: Main Proposal

South Korea's Leadership as a Middle Power

Much has been written and theorized in regard to the issue of regional leadership when it comes to East Asia, as many scholars expected the PRC and/or Japan to play a similar role Germany and France played in the evolution of the EU. However, the two regional powers have not been able to agree and lead together the institutionalization process, which is often regarded as very hard to achieve in East Asia. Clearly, in any process of regional institutionalization, leadership is a key element, especially if the aim is to pursue a regional community — as it is assumed in this case. Higgott and Timmermann argue that for

East Asia to narrow the asymmetry with the West (and the US in particular), the region needs to enhance its collective institutional decision-making capabilities: "For this to occur, endogenous regional leadership needs to strengthen."[8] South Korea appears to be the most suitable candidate to take up this role, as a democratic and economically developed state. Rozman explains: "South Korea is the natural center of Northeast Asia and is best positioned to draw others together. President Kim Dae-jung became the leading advocate of APT and also the EAS; and President Roh Moo-hyun took office making a strong appeal for regionalism in NEA."[9] Moreover, the future of regional arrangements like these depends more on the industrialized Northeast Asian countries than in the ASEAN 10 members since the Southeast Asia "bridge" for regionalism that worked for a time seems today unlikely to carry it much further.[10] An East Asian regional framework indeed requires the institutionalization of NEA with endogenous leadership driving the process.

The use of the concept of "middle power" is more or less recent and it materialized as a valid analytical tool only in a post-Cold War world. The emergence of new actors and the increasing relevance of the so-called "low politics" — economic, cultural, social or even environmental issues — in international relations, have given smaller or medium-sized countries more room and opportunities to pursue a more active participation in the international community. Jordaan defines middle powers as: "states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system."[11] Usually several characteristics are taken into consideration when trying to identify middle powers, most commonly the state capabilities that position them in the world order but also the role and influence of their foreign policy. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue that the common approach to middle powers through position in the international hierarchy has its problems as it relies too heavily on quantifiable measures of power.[12]

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8 Higgott and Timmermann, "Institutionalizing East Asia," 54.

9 Rozman, "Northeast Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads," 85.

10 Ibid., 90.

11 Eduard Jordaan, "The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relation: distinguishing between emerging and traditional Middle Powers," *Politikon* 30, no. 2 (2003): 165.

12 Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 17.

Thus, a comprehensive understanding of middle powers is the favored option here to understand South Korea's regional leadership. A geographic approach to this issue is first considered, which suggests that a middle power state is a state physically located "in the middle" between other great powers.[13] This obviously has a strong regional component and fits well the case of South Korea. A second approach is the so-called normative view of middle powers, which sees them as somewhat "wiser or more virtuous" countries as compared to the rest, and thus they are considered to be more "trustworthy because they can exert diplomatic influence without the likelihood of recourse to force."[14] This idea is more closely related to the reputation that a certain country — usually a democratic one — has, and it definitely serves the argument of positive public image that Seoul has been trying to pursue internationally by hosting various events and by supporting certain international causes.

More important though, is the behavioral approach, which focuses on the particular style of behavior that the so-called middle powers often display in the international arena. This is characterized by their preference for multilateralism, their ability to embrace compromise in certain disputes and the implicit notion of "good international citizenship" in their diplomacy. This emphasis on behavior implies that "middlepowership," is not a static feature but instead it is modified over time according to the changes in the international system, as "there is the possibility that followers may adopt leadership roles."[15] Indeed, although today it is possible to see how South Korea can be considered as a middle power, this remains a recent development in its international status. Jordaan's differentiation of middle powers into 'traditional' and 'emerging' middle powers is helpful:

> Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviorally they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions. […] Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratized states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviorally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favoring regional integration but seek also to construct

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 18.
15 Ibid., 21.

identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.[16]

South Korea in particular, represents this dichotomy well, Robertson argues. Due to its physical, economic and military capabilities, the ROK is often placed in a higher position within the global hierarchy according to most traditional measurements of power.[17] Indeed, South Korea's population in 2007 was 48 million people, ranking the ROK 23rd in the world; additionally, the OECD in the same year ranked South Korea as the thirteenth largest economy in the world with a GDP of $957 billion. Moreover, according to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2005 Factbook, the South Korean military expenditure of $21 billion per year ranked it eighth in the world. All these are of course indicators that relate to the more material aspects of power. Nevertheless, foreign policy behavior tell us more when trying to identify a middle power, since these types of states usually opt for one or many possible roles as a regional leader; acting as a bridge or mediator and/or as a manager for institution building.

Although Robertson points out that "South Korea's foreign policy behavior has not reflected the internationalist tendencies we associate with middle powers such as Sweden, Norway, Canada, and Australia,"[18] this has been changing since the 1990s. Accordingly, Robertson proposes that the ROK's case may well constitute that of an evolution, from emerging middle power to a more traditional middle power. This evolution manifests particularly in Seoul's foreign policy behavior and the role that it has assumed both at regional and global levels. The active participation of South Korea in the G20 process is the clearest example of the latter and what the government of Lee Myung-bak has called the "Global Korea" strategy. As I will demonstrate, particularly at the regional level, Seoul has displayed early signs of leadership in the wake of the 21st century.

However, some are critical of South Korea's real capacity to act as a regional leader for several reasons, citing among them primarily the antagonistic sentiment towards Japan amongst the Korean public and their skepticism of China.[19] Indeed, these are relevant and objective trends within the citizenry.

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16 Jordaan, "The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations," 165.

17 Jeffrey Robertson, "South Korea as a Middle Power: Capacity, Behavior, and Now Opportunity," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 16, no. 1 (2007): 153.

18 Ibid.

19 Kim exposes quantifiable data of surveys conducted among the Korean public to argue that the negative perceptions they have of the neighboring countries impedes South Korea to develop a constructive regional cooperation strategy. See Kim, "Between China, America, and North Korea," 191-217.

Still, the perceptions of the general public do not mean that official foreign policy options must follow the same approach. Decision-making at such high levels is usually carried out by elites that understand better the implications and necessity of regional cooperation. In addition, South Korea's inability to deal with the North and the constraints brought about by its dependency on the US for security are other reasons put forward by those who are skeptical of Seoul as a regional leader or bridge. For instance, Kim Byung-kook chooses to focus only on ROK's security dilemma from a realist point of view to argue that it can hardly be considered a regional leader because it has failed in acting as a mediator between North Korea and America. This approach has its limitations, and if the focus is instead put on foreign policy behavior towards regional cooperation and not in the stalemate that dealing with Pyongyang usually entails for Seoul, then the picture looks more positive. From an inter-governmentalist point of view where the emphasis is put on the interactions of states at a governmental level, there is no reason to argue that Seoul's regional policies cannot display middle power behavior. Moreover, Kim not only focuses his critique on one single administration — the Roh Moo-hyun administration from 2003 to 2008 — he also argues that President Roh's main mistake was to have miscalculated South Korea's capabilities, opting for a great power strategy instead of that of a middle power.[20] Thus, Kim's argument does not entirely contradict that of this paper, and it actually helps to validate the importance of understanding the ROK's position as a middle power in East Asia.

In order to do so, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal's proposal is central as it helps to identify these "middlepowership behavioral patterns" in three phases: first as catalyst; where middle powers take the lead by providing the intellectual and political energy to promote certain initiatives. Second as facilitator; where middle powers focus on coalition building in order to support issue-specific agenda-setting efforts. This type of work is relevant as it entails aspects like the planning and hosting of formative meetings and the setting of priorities for future collective action. Finally, another way in which a middle power can exert leadership is as a manager. In this context, a heavy emphasis is put on institution building and confidence building, the development of norms and the use of formal and informal fora.[21] This allows us to understand the many ways regional leadership can be exerted, where leadership is distinguished from hegemony; as

20 Kim, "Between China, America, and North Korea: South Korea's Hedging," 194.
21 Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, *Relocating middle powers*, 24-25.

Higgott and Timmermann put it, "leadership is not just economic and military preponderance. Leadership can be intellectual and inspirational."[22]

Seoul's Early Signs of Leadership

Most of the analysis set the end of the Cold War as the backdrop for East Asia to start thinking about ways to promote cooperation and security on a multilateral basis for a region that nevertheless is until today highly determined by strong bilateral relationships. It would not be entirely inaccurate to say that South Korea is not different and it only began to engage East Asian regionalism in a systematic manner in the 1990s. However, some trace Seoul's interest in regionalism to as early as the 1940s. Park Young-june, an expert in Korean foreign policy, military and security affairs, emphasizes that "from an early stage the ROK has been interested in the building of regional institutions primarily due to the necessity of safeguarding its own security at first, but later also because of the need to propel its economic development."[23] To illustrate, Park points to the First Republic's President, Syngman Rhee and his 1949 speech in which he proposed a Pacific Alliance with the US, the Philippines and Chiang Kai Shek's Taiwan, in the context of a North-South divide in the Korean Peninsula and the idea of communist containment in the wake of World War II. This was indeed a proposed version of NATO for the Asia-Pacific. Evidently, this idea did not materialize, mainly because the Americans opted for a kind of approach based on bilateral alliances to secure stability and their presence in the region throughout the Cold War. This did not stop Seoul from trying to promote a regional agenda, especially in 1960s under the authoritarian government. As security became granted by the US hub-and-spoke system of military alliances, the focus turned to economic development and access to overseas markets. South Korea's leader, Major General Park Chung-hee, suggested an Asian Economic Cooperation Group; however, this could not materialize in the absence of official diplomatic ties between Seoul and Tokyo.[24]

The prospects of a normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan — which was finally achieved in 1965 — provided a good context

22 Higgott and Timmermann, "Institutionalizing East Asia," 52-53.
23 Author's interview with Young-june Park, Ph.D., Head of Center for Military Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security, Korea National Defense University. March 14, 2012.
24 Ibid.

for the creation of the Asian-Pacific Council (ASPAC), which emerged in late 1964 as a diplomatic initiative put forward by Seoul. Park argues: "The materialization of this organization and its secretariat established in the ROK was very important and meaningful for the Koreans until the mid 1970s."[25] The founding members of this group were all non-communist American or Western allies in the Asia-Pacific, such as Australia, the Republic of China, Japan, the ROK, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam. Although from its inception ASPAC had to accommodate competing interests, in practice it became an informal consultative forum similar to the ones in place nowadays in the region. ASPAC's demise came a decade after its foundation in the wake of China's emergence from the Cultural Revolution and the Fall of Saigon in 1975. Today, ASPAC is largely ignored by scholars, but its value should not be underestimated. For over ten years during some of the most critical moments of the Cold War, ASPAC — a South Korean-led initiative based in Seoul — provided the only East Asian regional framework for dialogue and consultation. What remains debatable about this regional institution is whether it left any legacy that could be traced in the post-Cold War regional frameworks existing today. The informal and consultation-oriented way supports the argument that ASPAC provided the conditions for an embryonic development of what is well known today as the 'ASEAN Way' or 'Asia-Pacific Way' that characterizes the functioning of most regional organizations, as ASEAN itself — although founded in 1967 — did not become consolidated and regularly held until the 1980s. The intrinsic nature of the functioning of East Asian regional institutions could have been forged in Seoul instead of Singapore.

Nevertheless, today, most scholars identify two events as the preconditions for East Asia to start thinking about a "modern" form of regional institutionalization. The first one is the end of the Cold War and the environment it provided for the prospects of a new regional and global order. In this context it was the Korean president Roh Tae-woo who initially proposed the idea of a multilateral dialogue to tackle security issues in Northeast Asia.[26] This was possible thanks to South Korea's normalization of relations with both China and the USSR in the late 1980s. Seoul's proposal was presented to the UN General

25 Ibid.

26 Sook-jong Lee, "Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism," in *East Asian Multilateralism Prospects for Regional Stability*, eds. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 198- 213.

Assembly in 1988 and it was dubbed as the "Consultative Conference for Peace in Northeast Asia," which expected to bring together the same six members that would eventually constitute the Six-Party Talks. Despite what has been described above, many see this Korean initiative as the commencement of a regional policy in Seoul under the new Sixth Republic, with a primary focus on the integration processes of Northeast Asia.[27] This focus prevailed throughout the next decade. In 1994, the ROK tried again to start a similar initiative at the Asia Regional Forum Senior Officials' Meeting in Bangkok.[28] Although without much success initially, these examples are evidence of Seoul's primary interest in promoting multilateral frameworks among its neighbors, which could be understood from a balance of power prospective to the issue, as Lee suggests, since the ROK is indeed a smaller nation surrounded by regional and global powers.[29]

The second and most emphasized event that triggered regional institutionalization in East Asia is the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. The regional horizon of policymakers in Seoul was broadened by the critical juncture brought about by the AFC, which had made evident the necessity of closer ties between the advanced Northeast Asian countries and the developing countries in Southeast Asia.[30] This contingency was very influential, although the ROK was already actively involved in regional institutionalization processes before the financial crisis broke out. For instance, it is widely acknowledged in the region that within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Seoul's mediation was central and it played an instrumental role for the simultaneous inclusion of the "three Chinas" — namely the PRC, the ROC and Hong Kong — as three distinct members of this regional dialogue in 1991.[31] Moreover, during the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-98) under the so-called "New Diplomacy" and the growing interdependence with surrounding countries, South Korea became highly proactive in a variety of regional dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue

27 Jae-woo Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges," in *Governance and Regionalism in Asia*, ed. N. Thomas (London: Routledge, 2009), 93-115.

28 Lee, "Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism," 199.

29 Ibid.

30 Most scholars agree on this point, among them some of the Korean experts revised: Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges," and also Lee, "Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism."

31 Sung-hoon Park and Jeong-yeon Lee, "APEC at a Crossroads: Challenges and Opportunities," *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 2 (2009): 97-124.

(NEACD), the Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASD), the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).[32] All these multilateral frameworks involved Track 2 or the so-called Track 1.5 security related talks which served well Korean interests at the time since they implied a parallel track to the government-driven process.

In sum, Park Young-june explains that despite some setbacks and several political changes brought about by the democratic transition in South Korea, there has been a certain level of coherence in trying to build regional institutions among policymakers in Seoul. Park argues that the reason for this has always been geostrategic; as Seoul saw itself isolated from the rest of Asia in its immediate neighborhood — because of North Korea on one side and having historical conflicts with Japan on the other — it sought to develop regional frameworks to ensure its security, promote cooperation and develop new markets as the country underwent rapid industrialization. This tendency towards regional institutionalism eventually became embedded in South Korea's foreign policy.[33]

South Korea's Shift to Modern Regionalism

The 1997-98 crisis was indeed the turning point for the ROK to embrace "modern" regionalism in East Asia following a more inter-govermentalist approach to institution building and governance: "The crisis made Korea realize the vulnerability of its economy to exogenous shock and the depth of its integration with the region. Hence, the negative lesson from the crisis was a positive catalyst for Korea's commitment to East Asian regionalism."[34] Before this event, South Korea viewed its national interests as strongly grounded in trans-Pacific cooperation; thus, when Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir famously suggested the idea of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG), it was the ROK and Japan that reacted in a more skeptical way, considering their close political and economic ties with the US.[35] The AFC changed this mentality in Seoul. While the previous emphasis on Northeast Asia and security issues was justified by South Korea's circumstances as a divided nation under constant threat from

32 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges."
33 Author's interview with Young-june Park, Ph.D., Head of Center for Military Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security, Korea National Defense University. March 14, 2012.
34 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges," 98.
35 Lee, "Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism," 201.

the North, the political and economic landscape shifted due to the Asian crisis. Some even argue that the problems the Asian financial crisis underscored within South Korea — which was badly hit by the financial turmoil and the effects of crony capitalism — helped the opposition leader Kim Dae-jung win the presidential election in 1997.[36]

In the wake of the AFC, Kim's administration (1998-2002) was the first ROK government to embrace and push for the idea of an East Asian regional community. Park Young-june argues that President Kim Dae-jung was undoubtedly the most active Korean leader in forming regional institutions and a cooperation network: "Even Japanese and Chinese still highlight President Kim's contributions."[37] This shift was clear, as Seoul opted for a new definition of its geographical borders in East Asia, based upon the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework that emerged in this context — which excluded the United States as well as other Pacific countries such as Australia and New Zealand.[38] This meant that South Koreans had to review their position of "open regionalism" as it was pursued within the APEC framework, which became largely dominated by the Americans. Lee argues this also meant a change in identity expressed in Korea's diplomacy particularly towards Japan but also in pursuing economic agreements instead of concentrating so much on traditional security aspects. The so-called "forward-looking policy" proposed under President Kim serves as a good example of how Korea attempted to downgrade the sometimes conflictive nationalist sentiments, showing regional leadership in resolving sensitive historical issues as this policy "was based on the idea that common East Asian identity and Japan's cooperation would be needed to foster prosperity and peace in the region."[39] This sense of collective destiny was reinforced by the negative experiences with the IMF and the World Bank that most troubled East Asian countries encountered as a result of the AFC.[40] In this context the APT became the axis of East Asian regionalism as it included the three advanced economies of Northeast Asia, which account for about 90 percent of the

36 Ibid., 202.

37 Author's interview with Young-june Park, Ph.D., Head of Center for Military Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security, Korea National Defense University. March 14, 2012.

38 Sung-han Kim, "Northeast Asian Regionalism in Korea," in *New Regional Security Architecture for Asia*, CFR project, directed by Sheila A. Smith, Council on Foreign Relations (2009), www.cfr.org/content/ publications/.../NEAsia SecurityKim.pdf (accessed January 20, 2012).

39 Lee, "Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism," 203.

40 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges."

region's GDP as a whole.[41]

South Korea immediately became enthusiastic about this new framework, and during Kim's presidency it actively developed region-oriented policies. East Asian regionalism became in this period one of the major pillars for the ROK's foreign policy, as it was seen as a viable means to promote peace and prosperity in the region.[42] President Kim Dae-jung saw the Korean Peninsula issue and its possible solution as part of a broad regional network including neighboring countries in NEA, thus the emphasis on regional institutionalization during his government, in addition to the well-known "Sunshine Policy" of engagement with North Korea. Hence, the foundations of the Six-Party Talks were laid during this period: "For President Kim, the issue of regional cooperation and institutionalization was intertwined with the chances of improving inter-Korean relations."[43]

Yet, the most significant of many initiatives trying to build an East Asian Community was the formation of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) that president Kim Dae-jung announced at the 1998 APT summit meeting in Hanoi, in addition to the creation of the East Asia Study Group (EASG), to allow the academic and private sector become involved in finding out ways to further cooperation within the APT countries. As Choo explains, in the launching and support of these initiatives South Korea was very vocal in advocating for regulatory frameworks for regional governance. Seoul "proactively assumed a leadership role in harmonizing different policy opinions that surfaced naturally during political debates and negotiations at the meetings of these two groups."[44] Under this kind of constructive leadership the ROK was able to coordinate the final 26 policy recommendations that stem from the EASG. Those measures not only included economic and financial cooperation, but also political, security, environmental, energy, cultural, educational, social and institutional types of measures. In accordance with its mandate, the EASG submitted its final report to the APT Summit in Cambodia in 2002 in which it also assessed recommendations for the EAVG and the implications of an East Asia Summit, which became a reality a few years later. Among those seventeen short-term and nine long-

41 Lee, "Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism," 204.
42 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges," 99.
43 Author's interview with Young-june Park, Ph.D., Head of Center for Military Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security, Korea National Defense University. March 14, 2012.
44 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges," 99.

term concrete measures proposed in the EASG final report, some that stand out are highlighted below, as they are considered here to contribute specifically to regional institutionalization:

- Form an East Asia Business Council;
- Establish an East Asia Investment Information Network;
- Build a network of East Asian think-tanks;
- Establish an East Asia Forum;
- Establish poverty alleviation programs;
- Strengthen mechanisms for cooperation on non-traditional security issues;
- Work together with cultural and educational institutions to promote a strong sense of identity and an East Asian consciousness;
- Promote East Asian studies in the region;
- Form an East Asia Free Trade Area;
- Pursue the evolution of the ASEAN+3 Summit into an East Asian Summit;
- Promote closer regional marine environmental cooperation for the entire region;
- Build a framework for energy policies and strategies, and action plans.[45]

Consequently, Seoul strove as the organizer and host of most of these related meetings that culminated in the hosting of the inaugural summit of the East Asia Forum in December 2003.[46] The change of administrations, however, meant a halt in the support of some of these regional initiatives started by Kim Dae-jung. With President Roh Moo-hyun, the emphasis on regional institutionalization shifted back to Seoul's immediate neighborhood of Northeast Asia. This new approach did not contradict previous efforts, as many Korean authors point out, but it responded mainly to strategic concerns and to the necessity of institutionalization of the relations between the big regional players in Northeast Asia,

45 Final Report of the East Asia Study Group. Presented at the ASEAN + 3 Summit, on 4th of November, 2002. Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Official document available online through Japan's MOFA website, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/report.pdf (accessed December 4th, 2011).

46 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges;" and Lee, "Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism."

particularly in the economic aspects, but not exclusively.[47] This shift serves to illustrate this paper's assumption of Northeast Asian institutionalization as a necessary step to advance East Asian-wide regionalism. In his inaugural speech, Roh proclaimed the idea of a "Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative for Peace and Prosperity" and also emphasized the role of Korea in this framework as a "hub" in NEA, creating a special Presidential Committee for this purpose under the initial name of "Northeast Asian Business Hub" in 2003 and changing its name in 2004 to "Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative" to work on the creation of policy and governance promotion.[48] From the early days of his new administration, Roh "highlighted a strategic message that Korea should be a "bridge" linking continental and maritime powers, a hub of ideas and interregional networks, and cooperation catalyzing a regional community of peace and prosperity."[49] This important shift was the ROK's response to the stalemate in regional power structures arising mainly from competing agendas and the Sino-Japanese rivalry that implied two different views in regards to the way in which East Asian integration should be carried out. Indeed many see Seoul as the only regional actor with the potential to assume an intermediate role between Japan and China:[50]

> China and Japan's unwillingness to cooperate on regional affairs, coupled with an easily upset bilateral relationship, has pulled them in different directions with respect to the building of the East Asian Community (EAC). The fundamental level of their disagreements was revealed at the inaugural meeting of the EAS, when Japan insisted on – and China opposed – the membership of Australia and New Zealand. Under these circumstances, it seems that the balancing role of middle powers such as Korea is more important than ever if the region is sincere about building the EAC.[51]

Nevertheless, Choo remains skeptical, since in practice the ROK as a middle power has not fully succeeded in asserting itself as leader in regional affairs because the region is highly dominated by a number of great powers. This means Seoul still has difficulty in trying to influence the development of the region's

47 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges;" Lee, "Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism;" and Kim, "Northeast Asian Regionalism in Korea."
48 Lee, "Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism."
49 Kim, "Northeast Asian Regionalism in Korea," 2.
50 Rozman, "Northeast Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads: Is an East Asian Community in sight?"
51 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges," 106.

normative structure.[52]

Current Approach to the Region

Since he took power in 2008, Lee Myung-bak seems likely to continue the ROK's commitment to the region and its institutionalization process with a certain emphasis on Northeast Asia while keeping the APT as the main vehicle to advance East Asian integration. In the meantime, the EAS has invited other extra-regional actors to balance the influential presence of China and its rivalry with Japan. Continuing with his predecessors' tradition of branding the ROK's foreign policy with fancy names, Lee's "New Asia Diplomacy" implies the broadening of Seoul's diplomatic horizons in order to make greater contributions to regional and global causes, which reflects middle power behavior. This is clearly seen in the ROK's active and enthusiastic participation in several international frameworks, such as hosting the G20 summit in 2010. As part of the vision of a "Global Korea" — the name given to the current administration's National Security Strategy — Seoul seeks to develop worldwide recognition as a constructive and developed member of the international community, while strengthening cooperative partnerships with Southeast Asia, Central Asia, India, Australia and New Zealand as a way to initiate a new "Asian Era."[53]

Indeed, President Lee's diplomatic priorities are pragmatic and realist, where bilateral and key partnerships weigh heavily against multilateralism. The current leadership in Seoul has been undertaking a "creative pragmatic" approach in its diplomatic efforts to develop the ROK into a global nation in order to realize a vision of an "advanced and prestigious country."[54] This pragmatism, however, is not seen as mutually exclusive with the ROK's ongoing good-neighbor policy and the construction of a "Cooperative Network for Northeast Asia" where multilateralism becomes institutionalized. This remains a major priority and top challenge within Lee's major agendas.[55] (Figure 2: Global Korea Strategy) In this context, the enhancement of the Trilateral Cooperation

52 Ibid.

53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, *Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea*, 2009, http://www.mofat.go.kr (accessed February 20, 2012).

54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, *Diplomatic White Paper 2009*, http://www.mofat.go.kr (accessed February 20, 2012).

55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, *Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea.*

Meetings of the CKJ group is the most recent example of the importance Seoul is giving to the issue of institutionalization of Northeast Asia. This tripartite summit that took form in the context of the AFC and the creation of the APT framework has been in recent years consolidated as the main channel for dialogue among the three major NEA actors, putting South Korea at the center of shaping the institutionalization of cooperation between China and Japan. It is clear for Seoul's policymakers that "there is greater need to strengthen trilateral cooperation among Korea, China, and Japan as a way to enhance East Asia's standing and role in the international community, and collectively address key challenges confronting Northeast Asia."[56]

2008 was a year of great progress for trilateral cooperation between South Korea, China and Japan. For the first time, the Trilateral Summit was held in the territory of one of the three countries — in Fukuoka, Japan — independently from the APT meetings. On the occasion, the three leaders adopted a joint statement agreeing to hold the high-level exchanges more regularly, which for Seoul was especially meaningful since the Koreans have been suggesting for years that the summit should be held on a regular basis. The adoption of the ROK-Japan and ROK-China agreements on currency swap deals, each of $30 billion to cope with the global financial crisis, reflected the commitment of the three countries to put their collaborative efforts into action and the importance given to the role of South Korea in these schemes.[57] Additionally, in 2010 the three countries adopted the so-called "Vision 2020," a blueprint for trilateral cooperation which outlines the future prospects of this multilateral framework by establishing a series of concrete tasks to accomplish in five fields, including: Institutionalization and Enhancement of the Trilateral Partnership, Sustainable Economic Cooperation for Common Prosperity, Cooperation in Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection, Promotion of Friendly Relations through the Expansion of Human and Cultural Exchanges and Joint Efforts for Regional and International Peace and Stability.[58]

With the fourth high-level meeting concluded successfully in 2011, the now regularized dialogue also includes ministerial talks on similar issues — namely culture, foreign affairs, trade and environment — while the decision

56 Ibid.
57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, *Diplomatic White Paper 2009*.
58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, *Diplomatic White Paper 2011*, http://www.mofat.go.kr (accessed February 20th, 2012).

to create a permanent secretariat in the ROK was a remarkable step in putting Seoul at the heart of the process, something that has indeed become embedded in South Korea's approach to regional institutionalization of NEA. Although the three countries came together initially to respond to economic interdependence: "this exchange has led to an expansion of trilateral cooperation to address new security challenges."[59] It is true that the Seoul-based secretariat has been envisioned to serve as a coordinating body, and even though the three parties weigh equally in the agenda setting at least in theory, the functional contributions of the ROK's role as coordinator shows once again the country's display of middle power behavior, bridging between the two regional giants, showing a similar kind of leadership it showed ten years ago when promoting the EAGV. These examples illustrate well how middle powers can function as catalysts, facilitators and managers to promote cooperation.

It is true that in terms of leadership affiliation, as most Korean scholars point out, Seoul's espousal of open regionalism places it much closer to Tokyo's set of norms than to the East Asian-exclusive mindset prevalent in Beijing.[60] Nevertheless, if we take a look at the meetings and summits that the ROK has attended with China, these actually outnumber the ones held with Japan on a bilateral basis in recent years. Seoul is indeed paying more attention to its relations with China than with Japan. For instance, in 2010 the ROK held 24 high-level meetings with China, which is an average of two exchanges per month; and only sixteen meetings of the same kind with Japan, many of which took place under other multilateral contexts.[61] This can be seen as a way to balance the fact that Japan, as well as the ROK, is a US ally, while China — which has become South Korea's major trade partner — is not and it remains the one country in the region with some leverage over North Korea. Seoul may also be paying more attention to Beijing in order to gain its support for its regional leadership aspirations in pragmatic and functional issues. China's response to Korean initiatives in regional institutionalization can determine their degree of success and legitimacy.

Finally — and despite the emphasis of this article on more exclusively East Asian regional frameworks — it is important to highlight that due to the

59 See-woon Byun, "The China-South Korea-Japan Triangle: The Shape of Things to Come?" *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, no. 115 (Washington: East-West Center, June 6, 2011).

60 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges," 108.

61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, *Diplomatic White Paper 2011*.

reality of the North Korean threat and the strategic relevance of the ROK-US security alliance, keeping the Americans involved in the region remains one of Seoul's top priorities in their current approach to the region. This has been reflected in the strengthening of the alliance in recent years and the support for US membership in institutions like the ARF and the EAS, which are based on open regionalism. In essence, the Lee Myung-bak administration believes in the synergies between multilateralism and East Asian regionalism on the one hand, and the strategic bilateral alliances and partnership on the other, which is clearly depicted in President Lee's strategic vision for a Global Korea (see image on next page).

Figure 2: Current "Global Korea" Foreign Policy Strategy



Conclusion

This paper explores a regional level of analysis to examine the contributions and the possible effects of South Korea's regional leadership — conceptualized as a middle power in the region — in the processes of the institutionalization of East Asia. Certainly, it is very difficult to accurately measure a country's leadership role in these types of processes. According to some authors[62] South Korea as a middle power has yet to fully consolidate itself as a regional leader. This might be especially true when it comes to the recognition as such by other players in the region. The prospects are still not clear as on how much Seoul can really achieve as a leader of East Asian regionalism without the legitimate support and consensus of the other two regional powers, regardless of whether this is ultimately manifested as a purely coordinating or also as an agenda setting role.

Indeed, the examples given illustrate the behavioral approach to understanding middle powers as catalysts, facilitators and managers to promote cooperation. Seoul's role of coordinator is extremely relevant in this case as it takes the responsibility away from Beijing or Tokyo, who would feel more uncomfortable when having to deal with each other directly. For instance, a mutual agreement was made among the leaders of the three NEA countries after the Koreans insisted on the need to establish a permanent secretariat for the Trilateral Cooperation Meeting. As its 2011 Diplomatic White Paper suggests, through the establishment of this administrative body, it is expected that South Korea will continue its contributions to the consolidation and institutionalization of the trilateral cooperation as well as playing a facilitating role in its development.[63] Accordingly, it is plausible to argue that regarding the institutionalization of Northeast Asia, Seoul's leadership appears to be a more accommodating and preferable option to build consensus and trust among the other two regional powers in the region,[64] similar to the role ASEAN has taken in the East Asian-

62 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges."

63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, *Diplomatic White Paper 2011*.

64 At the opening ceremony of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul last year the Chinese ambassador Zhang Xinsen said the establishment of the new body in Korea was an important step to realize the consensus among the three countries. Although less explicit, the Japanese Ambassador Muto Masatoshi stressed the shared responsibilities among the parties based on the principles of openness, transparency and mutual trust. The ROK assumed the first leadership of the new institution, with Shin Bong-kil, South Korea's former ambassador for international economic cooperation, acting as Secretary-General. In the occasion he argued that the secretariat holds significant potential in the context of Korea's regional diplomacy. (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7606468.html; and http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.

wide community building process. In turn, this elevates the ROK's regional status by allowing it to exert leadership and a certain leverage over the process.

In sum, South Korea's leadership as a middle power should be judged on whether or not it has successfully advanced the common interests of a group of states.[65] This unfortunately remains a task extremely hard to fulfill in the presence of strong rivalry and mistrust between the main regional actors. Those common interests, however, are increasingly being successfully pursued in several functional areas in which Seoul has constructively contributed to the building of regional frameworks at an inter-governmental level. Its efforts should not be underestimated, since South Korea has increased its commitment to serve as a bridge for Northeast Asian cooperation and East Asian community building. By actively supporting and promoting regional initiatives through its foreign policy Seoul has more than once acted as a catalyst, facilitator and manager of processes related to the institutionalization of cooperation among its neighbors. The ROK as a regional middle power can thus be considered an important driving force when institutionalizing East Asia. **PEAR**

jsp?newsMLId=20110927000898, accessed April 16th, 2012).

65 Choo, "South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges," 107.

A CRITICAL VIEW OF COUNTERINSURGENCY: WORLD RELATIONAL STATE (DE)FORMATION

Brendan I. McQuade
Binghamton University (SUNY)

The relations of wealth and power that define capitalism as a global system were created, in part, by long term, large scale processes subsumed by policy discourse and practice associated with the term "counterinsurgency." Institutionally and practically, counterinsurgency coordinates coercive state institutions (military, police and intelligence) in a multipronged attack, including "civic action" and economic development, against an internal, armed rival. At the structural level, counterinsurgency is one of the political processes that creates and constitutes the spatial and developmental unevenness that characterizes the interstate system and world economy, asymmetrically driving militarization across the uneven zones of world systems. Historically, this military doctrine emerged to consolidate the colonial rule of the expanding empires of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. It rose to prominence in order to manage decolonization in the mid-twentieth century and has returned in the last decade to deal with the increasingly acute social problems of the neoliberal period. It is a world-relational process because, across all these periods, it connects the varied outcomes of state formation across the wide gulfs of power and wealth that characterize capitalism. In contemporary cases like Afghanistan, Chechnya, Columbia, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia and Yemen, and reflecting its emergence out of the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, counterinsurgency has involved the lead effort by a strong state or the subsidization of a weaker one.

From Vietnam to Homeland Security

My interest in counterinsurgency began with efforts to understand the significance of my former Congressman, Robert Simmons. In his first campaign in

2000, allegations surfaced that he was a war criminal.[1] While Simmons deflected the charges, his service in Vietnam was more complicated and morally ambiguous than straightforward soldiering. From 1970 to 1972, Simmons was a CIA advisor to the Police Special Branch in Phu Yen province. In this capacity, he helped his Vietnamese counterparts identify the civilian support networks of the National Liberation Front. He ran "penetration agents" to infiltrate the National Liberation Front, Communist Party and its related associations. He advised the Phu Yen Province Interrogation Center, participated in interrogations and denied medical treatment for injured prisoners. He trained paramilitary units and sent them out on missions to "neutralize" communist political cadres.[2] He was knee-deep in the political intrigues and ethical quandaries entailed in a clandestine war against a guerilla movement for national liberation. He was a counterinsurgent.

As a congressman, Simmons supported the broad application of policies normally associated with counterinsurgency. One of the main goals of counterinsurgency is to separate the guerillas from the population; to this end, military trials and indefinite detention provide the juridical means to isolate guerillas, political cadres and their sympathizers from the general population for the duration of the conflict. For example, in South Vietnam, where Simmons served, 100,000 to 150,000 "national security detainees" languished in detention centers by 1972.[3] The War on Terror saw similar systems: a complex of "theater internment facilities" in occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, a global network of CIA "blacksites" and the infamous island prison at Guantanamo Bay.[4] While Simmons did not have a direct hand in these policies, as a congressman, he traveled to Guantanamo Bay and defended the practice of indefinite detention at the prison.[5]

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1 "Candidates Make Differences Clear," *The New London Day*, March 4, 2000. http://www.theday.com/article/20001104/DAYARC/311049998 (accessed February 8, 2012).

2 Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and The Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 82-88, 105, 124, 150, 190, 213, 222-223, 295-296; Douglas Valentine, "The Spook Who Would be Congressman," *Counterpunch*, November 4-6, 2000. http://www.counterpunch.org/2000/11/04/the-spook-who-would-be-a-congressman (accessed February 8, 2012); Douglas Valentine, *The Phoenix Program* (New York: William & Morrow, 1990), 383, 399, 407.

3 Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, 400-402.

4 Jennifer Van Bergan and Douglas Valentine,"The Dangerous World of Indefinite Detentions: Vietnam to Abu Ghraib," *Case Western Reserve Journal of Law* 37 (2006): 449-508; Rachel Meeropol, ed., *America's Disappeared: Secret Imprisonment, Detainees and the "War on Terror"* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005).

5 "Simmons Tours Guantanamo," *The Associated Press*, July 13, 2005.

More significantly, Simmons, as Chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, oversaw the creation of an elaborate domestic intelligence system: the now seventy-two Homeland Security fusion centers and the Homeland Security Information Network that link them together.[6] Similar to the intelligence sharing systems created for counterinsurgency in Vietnam, the fusion centers bring together multiple agencies to share intelligence, both laterally across jurisdictional levels and vertically among local, state and federal governments. While common to the intractable dirty wars of counterinsurgency, this domestic intelligence network is unprecedented in US history and raises a series of troubling questions about the power of the executive.[7]

Simmons, moreover, was not the only veteran of Vietnam-era counterinsurgency to reemerge in Homeland Security. Thomas Ridge, the first Secretary of Homeland Security, was, as an Army sergeant, a platoon leader and a participant in counterinsurgency operations.[8] Bruce Lawlor, CIA Police Special Branch Advisor in Quang Nam Province, became the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) first Chief of Staff.[9] Roger Mackin, who, as an army major, directed counterinsurgency operations in Da Nang City and ran its Intelligence and Operations Coordination center, first served as the DHS counternarcotics officer and later acted as the deputy undersecretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.[10]

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6 House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, A Progress Report on Information Sharing for Homeland Security, 109 Cong., first sess., July 20, 2005; House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, The Progress of the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, 109 Cong., second sess., May 24, 2006; House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Department of Homeland Security Intelligence and Border Security: Delivering Operational Intelligence, 109 Cong., second sess., June 28, 2006; House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, State and Local Fusion Centers and the Role of DHS, 109 Cong., second sess., September 7, 2006; House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, The Homeland Security Information Sharing Network: An Update on DHS Information-Sharing Efforts, 109 Cong., second sess., September 13, 2006.

7 Mike German and Jay Stanley, What's Wrong with Fusion Centers. The American Civil Liberties Union, December 5, 2007. http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf (accessed February 8, 2012).

8 Jeffrey St. Clair and Alexander Cockburn, "Tom Ridge in Vietnam: Tarnished Star," *Counterpunch*, October 1, 2001, http://www.counterpunch.org/2001/10/01/tarnished-star (accessed February 8, 2012).

9 Douglas Valentine, "An Open Letter to Major General Bruce Lawlor: The Flight of the Phoenix from Vietnam to Homeland Security," *Counterpunch*, August 25, 2002, http://www.counterpunch.org/2002/08/25/flight-of-the-phoenix-from-vietnam-to-homeland-security (accessed February 8, 2012).

10 Howard Ball, *U.S. Homeland Security* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 99; Audrey Hudson,

These biographical links between Vietnam-era counterinsurgency and contemporary Homeland Security speak to broader changes. In the last 30 years, three police innovations in the US have transformed the institution and practice in ways that resemble elements of counterinsurgency: (1) the creation of the first SWAT team in 1966 and the subsequent proliferation of paramilitary police units provide police with a militarized strike arm;[11] (2) the rise of community policing embeds "peace officers" in neighborhoods and intends, counterinsurgency-style, to penetrate civil society organizations and redirect them toward security;[12] and (3) the increasing computerization of crime statistics and mapping provides for the actuarial management of insecurities and centrally directed control.[13] These three innovations are, today, coming together under the policy discourse of intelligence-led policing and institution of fusion centers.[14] This militarization of policing is changing the practices and institutions not only of policing but also the wider federal system. It speaks to longer term, larger scale processes than those we associate with the history of individual nation-states.

World-Relation State (De)formation

The career trajectories and institutional and practical homologies and linking Vietnam-era counterinsurgency and contemporary homeland security expose counterinsurgency as a process of world-relation state (de)formation. The relations of wealth and power that define capitalism as a global system were created

"Homeland Security replacing intel official," *The Washington Times*, April 24, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/24/homeland-security-replaces-veterans-report-agency- (accessed April 25, 2012).

11 Radley Balko, *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America* (Washington DC: The CATO Institute, 2006); Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units," in The Police and Society: Touchstone Readings, ed. Victor Kappeler (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1999).

12 Kristian Williams, *Our Enemies in Blue: Police and Power in America* (Cambridge: South End Press, 2007), 218-221; Kristian Williams, "The Other Side of the COIN: Counterinsurgency and Community Policing," *Interface* 3 (2011): 81-117.

13 Peter Manning, *The Technology of Policing: Crime Mapping, Information Technology and the Rationality of Crime Control* (New York: New York University Press, 2008).

14 In Massachusetts, for example, the State Police, the state agency that operates the Commonwealth Fusion Center, pioneered Counter Criminal Continuum Policing. C3 Policing is promoted as "the adaptation and application of the military counterinsurgency mode." See: Bradley Hibbard, John Barbieri and Michael Cutone, "Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing in Springfield, Massachusetts: A Collaborative Effort between City and State Police to Reduce Gang Violence," *Police Chief Magazine*, September 9, 2011, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=2475&issue_id=92011 (accessed April 4, 2012).

by long term, large scale processes which were subsumed, in part, by policy discourse and practice associated with the term "counterinsurgency." Institutionally and practically, counterinsurgency coordinates coercive state institutions (military, police and intelligence) in a multipronged attack, including "civic action" and economic development, against an internal armed rival. On the structural level, counterinsurgency is one of the political processes that creates and constitutes the spatial and developmental unevenness that characterizes the interstate system and world economy, asymmetrically driving militarization across the uneven zones of world systems.

Historically, this military doctrine of counterinsurgency emerged to consolidate the colonial rule of the expanding empires of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It rose to prominence to manage decolonization in the mid-twentieth century and returned in the last decade to deal with the increasingly acute social problems in the neoliberal period. It is a world-relational process because, across all these periods, it connects the varied outcomes of state formation across the wide gulfs of power and wealth that characterize capitalism. Contemporary cases in countries like Afghanistan, Chechnya, Columbia, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen reflect its emergence out of the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century; counterinsurgency involves strong states leading or subsidizing such effort in weaker states.

While its proponents present counterinsurgency as a more liberal and culturally sensitive mode of rule that penetrates civil societies and their partners' security forces run by civic leaders cultivating good governance, the critical theory developed here historicizes counterinsurgency in order to capture the neglected political processes that link the formation of strong states and deformation of weak states. Specifically, I argue that counterinsurgency is a pseudoscientific policy discourse that pacifies populations agitated by "constant revolutionizing" of capitalist social relations and fabricates social order around the logic of accumulation. Institutionally, counterinsurgency bloats the secretive, non-parliamentary organs of state and institutes extra-legal space that has variously been called "the wild zone of power" or a "state of exception." Practically, it politicizes security professionals in ways that undermine the rule of law and democratic process. It is policy discourse and practice of rule that offers insight into the long term, large scale processes of state (de)formation.

Problem Solving Theory and Critical Theory

As my point of departure, I take Robert Cox's distinction between problem solving theory and critical theory. Counterinsurgency, like all policy discourses, is a "problem-solving theory," which, by refusing to "reflect upon and transcend […] its own perspective," accepts "the world as it finds, with prevailing social and power relations and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action." In contrast, this essay develops an alternative, critical perspective that "stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about." This paper "is directed toward the very framework of action, or problematic, which [counterinsurgency] accepts as its parameters."[15] Looking beyond the policy discourse and to historicize "counterinsurgency" as a symptom of longer term, larger scale processes of social change is not in theory the positivist sense of causal hypothesis to be tested and proven; instead, it is a process of historical theorization that traces the lineage of discreet discourse and practice as it is differentially deployed and (re)formed within an evolving relational structure of global social relations, animated by multiple determinations across intertwined temporal rhythms.

The natural starting point for such a critical theory is the existing policy discourse. General David Petraeus' acclaimed Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines "insurgency" as "an organized protracted politico-military struggle to weaken the control of and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power or other political authority while increasing insurgent control," and "counterinsurgency" as the "military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."[16] Epistemologically, counterinsurgency is premised on positivist faith in calculability. Practically, this epistemic orientation manifests itself in the disaggregation of complicated social problems into measurable units. It animates a managerial approach to politics, where "insurgency" is rendered a technical problem of infiltration and subversion, not a political problem of social exclusion, economic underdevelopment and undemocratic political authority.

In this way, the "problem solving" theories that characterize coun-

15 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10 (1981): 128-129.

16 John Nagl, David Petraeus and James Amos, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago :University of Chicago Press, 2007), 2.

terinsurgency as a policy discourse simplify messy and indeterminate political processes into legible and neat processes that can be managed. The assumptions of problem solving theory evaporate in the heat of messy and indeterminate historical processes. The so-called "intelligence failures," then, reveal more than ineffective operations or analysis. Problem solving naturalizes current political arrangements and, by reducing political problems to technical problems of management, tries to out-administer deeply rooted conflicts that demand more fundamental solutions. Such linear and obsessively casual thinking fails to capture "non-rational" social formations — peasant and tribal societies, religious and ideological movements — raising the risk of an escalating series of miscalculations that spiral out of control and lead into a quagmire.

The Limits of Problem Solving Theory

In Vietnam, for example, problem solving orientation of policymakers and their faith in the efficacy of their systems of legibility created false impression of government success. Here, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and the failure to predict the Tet Offensive are the obvious examples. A scheme to measure trends in pacification, HES "required district advisers to complete monthly report cards, grading their areas on a number of social, economic, political and security standards." These reports were aggregated and results overlaid on a map of South Vietnam to give visualization of relative security. In late 1967, just before the Tet Offensive demonstrated the communist's political control of South Vietnam, counterinsurgency had "secured" 75 percent of South Vietnam's population, according to HES.[17] While HES appeared as an accurate and clear representation of the war in Vietnam, it was, in practice, a statistical farce. The raw data fed into HES was highly subjective, reflecting the opinions of the US personnel who compiled them. Moreover, much of the HES data was falsified: Twenty percent of the villages were never evaluated and, yet, were still included in the HES reports.[18]

Instead of addressing the shortcomings of HES that caused the system to project an obviously false perception of success on the eve of Tet, HES was reformed in such way to define the problem out of existence. After Tet,

17 James William Gibson, *Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did* (New York: Random House, 1986), 305-315.

18 John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2009), 324-325.

many HES criteria — land reform, development of agriculture, eradication of disease, eradication of illiteracy, improvement of transportation — and pacification tasks — investigating government corruption, organizing political rallies, creating village organization, reconciling local differences — were dropped from the reporting requirements.[19] A self-fulfilling prophecy, the population-rated "security" grew, reaching to 84 percent. William Colby, the CIA's counter-insurgency chief in Vietnam, warned that such inaccurate reporting might lead Saigon "to delude itself about its standing with its own people." When South Vietnam quickly collapsed only three years after US withdrawal, Colby's fears were confirmed.[20]

Color-coded maps, statistics and data tables fail to apprehend the social, ideological or cultural forces behind the government's failure and the "insurgency's" success. Systems like HES and other "problem solving theories" that do not interrogate the social determinants and implicit assumptions of the line of inquiry, privilege the quantifiable indices of "government progress" over illegible factors of culture and ideology. Here, one is reminded of the postwar exchange between Colonel Harry Summers, a military historian and a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) colonel. As Summers recalled it, he said, "You never defeated us in the field." To which the NVA officer replied, "That may be true. It is also irrelevant."[21] Despite overwhelming military superiority, the United States could not prevail in Vietnam. The answer does not lie in technical improvements to multiple doctrines but in critical theorizing that considers the wider political context of, for example, "counterinsurgency in Vietnam" and uses it to historicize "counterinsurgency" as a minor process that structures and is structured by deeper and longer historical relations.

Toward a Critical Theory of Counterinsurgency

Since counterinsurgency usually involves a stronger state intervening in a formerly colonized region (Vietnam, Central America, Afghanistan) or central government targeting a rebellious and marginalized ethno-racial group (North-

19 Ibid., 323-324.

20 Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam Hearts and Minds* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 185-186, 194-195, 197-199, 260-261.

21 Harry Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982), 1.

ern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya) it necessarily raises questions of colonial domination and uneven development. Instead of assuming a "world of interrelated and massively unequal sovereign jurisdictions" as natural condition of world order, I draw on world-systems analysis to explore how counterinsurgency operates as a world relational process creating and constituting the spatial and developmental unevenness that characterizes interstate system and world economy.[22] Counterinsurgency is a process that animates the interactive and cross-pollinating political systems created by colonial relations, providing insight into the properly political aspects of the "development of underdevelopment," a process normally conceived in more economistic terms.[23]

World-systems analysis is an appropriate literature to frame a critical study of counterinsurgency because one of the school's greatest strengths is the shifting of the unit of analysis from mainstream social science's blinding focus on individual states to larger world historic systems. While Immanuel Wallerstein defined the state in orthodox Weberian terms,[24] he did argue for a wider view of state formation. To Wallerstein, the character and nature of any given state reflects its position and role in the modern capitalist world system. States with mostly core processes of capital accumulation are stronger and, thus, more able to influence the global division of labor to their benefit. Peripheral states, in contrast, "are usually unable to do very much to affect the axial division of labor, and in effect, are forced to accept the lot that has been given them." The world system, then, requires "the existence of a multiplicity of states within the overall division of labor," so that capitalists "can gain the advantages of working with states but also circumvent states hostile to their interests."[25]

If the processes of core-periphery differentiation and hierarchization led to an uneven distribution of strategies of accumulation across world-regions, then, there is a similarly varied development of political arrangements

22 Terrence Hopkins, "The Study of The Capitalist World Economy: Some Introductory Considerations," in *World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology*, eds. Terrence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), 25.

23 Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Manning Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America* (Cambridge: South End Press, 1983); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington: Howard University Press, 1982).

24 "[…] A bounded territory claiming sovereignty and domain over its subjects […] A state claims the legal monopoly over the use of weapons within its territory, subject to the laws of the state." See: Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems-Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 97.

25 Ibid., 29, 50-52.

to maintain these conditions. Tracing the development of "pacification" back to sixteenth century Spanish military texts on the operations against indigenous Americans, Mark Neocelous identifies "the permanent pacification of the internal territory" as a necessary mission of capitalist states. "[S]ecurity [is] not […] some kind of universal or transcendent value but […] a mode of governing or political technology of liberal order building." He writes:

> […] the gathering of information about the population, the teaching of trades, education, welfare provision, ideological indoctrination and, most importantly the construction of a market. These activities concern the practices of everyday life constitutive of human subjectivity and social order. They are the practices we associated with political power: the dispersal of the mythical entity called 'security' through civil society and the fabrication of order around the logic of peace and security. This is pacification through policing of the everyday insecurities of life organized around accumulation and money, which would, form this point on, remain central to the colonial enterprise.

The constant "revolutionizing of the instrument of production" endemic to capitalist development — technological development, the rise, crest and collapse of business cycles and capital movement — creates a permanent politics of insecurity. Insecurities, both the quotidian problems of daily existence and global structural problems, need to be "secured" to provide the necessary modicum of stability to allow for capital accumulation.[26] Capitalism requires constant pacification.

Processes of pacification, however, are not only the purview of peripheralized states. It is a long term, large scale process that links seemingly disparate world regions. "The creation of strong states becomes impossible to understand, much less explain," William Martin and Mark Beittel argue:

> without tracing a relation to the simultaneous formation of weak states. In this formulation, states no longer arise from and demarcate national units or societies as in the comparative framework but instead become part of the ongoing creation of a globally relational structure.

26 Mark Neocelous, "'A Brighter and Nicer New Life': Security as Pacification," *Social & Legal Studies* 20 (2011): 192-193, 198, 200.

In this regard, "planter-dominated political systems in the Americas" and "bourgeois, industrial states in Europe," were formed by different facets of larger world-historic processes. Accordingly, the "consolidation of states in core areas is matched to the collapse of states in peripheral areas."[27] Just as the colonial plunder of the world drove the industrialization of the West, the political experience in conquering and governing the world's peripheries conditioned the development of "strong states" in the West. While the solidly democratic societies of the core of the world system can incorporate more of their populations on consensual grounds than the weak states of peripheralized societies, the histories of pacifying unruly populations and securing the insecurities of capitalist development join states across such wide gulfs of wealth and power in collective political projects to secure the insecurities of capitalist development.

More concretely, methods of rule first pioneered in peripheralized regions often become seemingly natural features of governance in the core of the world system. After all, one of the first modern police forces, the Metropolitan Police of London, founded in 1829, is based upon the earlier example of the Royal Irish Constabulary in 1818.[28] Indeed, what is now called intelligence-led policing in "the core" is prefigured by the experience of colonial policing: the Special Branches and Criminal Investigative Divisions of British colonial police, the gendarmerie and police spéciale of French colonies and the Garde d'Haiti and Philippine Constabulary from the United States' more limited experience in formal colonialism.[29] From this historical perspective, counterinsurgency, as an integrated operation of all elements of state power that joins states across wide gulfs of wealth and power, becomes policy discourse and state practice that link the formation of strong states and the deformation of weak states.

27 William Martin and Mark Beittel, "Toward a Global Sociology: Evaluating Conceptions, Methods and Practices," *The Sociological Quarterly* 39 (Jan. 1998): 154.

28 Mike Brogden, "The Emergence of the Police the Colonial Dimension," *The British Journal of Criminology* 27 (1987).

29 David Arnold, *Police Power and Colonial Rule: Madras 1859-1947* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); David Killingray and David Anderson, eds., *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1991); Alfred McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: the United States, the Philippines and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1914-1934* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995); Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

The Formation of Strong States and the Deformation of Weak States

As one of the political processes creating and maintaining the uneven distributions of wealth and power that are the material determinants of differential outcomes of state-formation, counterinsurgency structurally joins the formation of strong states and the deformation of weak states. Institutionally, involvement counterinsurgency bloats the secretive, non-parliamentary organs of state and institutes extra-legal space that has variously been called "the wild zone of power" or a "space of exception." Building on Carl Schmidt's observation that identification of the enemy is the act that creates a collective entity that undergirds sovereign state power, Susan Buck-Morss argues that "[m]odern sovereignties harbor a blind spot, a zone in which power is above the law and thus, at least potentially, a terrain of terror."[30] Similarly, Georgio Agamben has advanced the notion of "space of exception," the area excluded from sovereign protection and populated by bearers of what he calls "bare life," politically excluded and subject to unrestrained violence.[31] In these terms, counterinsurgency both creates broad "spaces of exception" in peripheralized regions and institutes the "wild zone of power" even within the solidly democratic capitalist core.

The differential institution of "spaces of exception" is evident in the societies touched by the late nineteenth century rise of the United States as world power. During the Great Depression of the nineteenth century, the United States resolved the generalized crisis in overproduction through overseas imperialism. This was the period of Open Door Policy in the Pacific and the Banana Wars in the Caribbean. In addition to opening China to trade, this self-consciously imperialist foreign policy asserted US power over its Latin American periphery, positioning the rest of the Western Hemisphere as an investment opportunity of US capital and a market for US goods.[32] Through a series of conflicts formative to the nascent policy discourse of counterinsurgency — Boxer Rebellion in China (1898), the Philippine Insurrection and Moro Rebellion (1898-1913), occupations of Cuba (1898-1912), Dominican Republic (1903-1924), Honduras (1903-25) and Haiti (1915-34) — the contours of the US national security

30 Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in the East and West* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), 3

31 Georgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 35.

32 William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2009); Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

began to take shape in the same process that created comprador regimes on the periphery of the US imperium.

Haiti, the Philippines and the United States

The Philippine Insurrection, Moro Rebellion and US occupation of Haiti, for example, conditioned the dynamics of state formation in the US, Haiti and the Philippines. While the scope of fighting was comparatively small in comparison to conventional wars, the fighting was nonetheless brutal. United States occupation authorities mobilized gangs of corvée laborers to develop economic infrastructure necessary to better integrate Haiti into the world market -- roads, telegraph lines, hospitals. The occupation and particularly, the re-imposition of slavery through corvée labor sparked a peasant insurrection, the Cacos Rebellion, which climaxed with an insurrection provisional government and at least 2,000 men under arms in Northern Haiti. By the time the rebellion was crushed in 1919, approximately 11,500 Haitians had died with 6,000 killed in fighting and another 5,500 perished from forced labor. [33]

In addition to disciplining the Haitian population and reaffirming the region's position as one of the most peripheralized zones of the world system, another enduring consequence of the occupation was the militarization of the Haitian state. Occupation authorities formed the Haitian gendarmerie or Garde D'Haiti, a military force with the dual mission of law enforcement and territorial defense that initially was under the command of a US Marine or Navy officer. During the occupation, the gendarmerie fought the cacos, and oversaw forced labor crews.[34] As the only armed force and one that blended police and military functions, the Garde D'Haiti was uniquely politicized in a way that reflected its formation in the crucible of counterinsurgency. Reflecting this undemocratic legacy, Robert Fatton Jr. — in his analysis of Haiti's predatory state as a malformed state rooted in the legacies of colonialism, US occupation and contradictions of dependent development — calls the Haitian army "the Trojan horse of the old predatory coalition." After years of meddling in politics, including several military coups, the Aristide administration, the first democratically

33 Ralph Michel-Trouillot, *Haiti: State Against Nation* (New York: Monthly Review Press 2000), 106.

34 Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1914-1934* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 77, 102

elected leadership in Haitian history, disbanded the army in 1994.[35] The legacy of counterinsurgency in Haiti was a militarized and deformed state with the capacities to open up broad spaces of exception and dole out tremendous violence against its own people.

Similar dynamics are evident in the example of the Philippines. In contrast to the much smaller Cacos Rebellion, the combined human cost of the Philippine Insurrection and Moro Rebellion reached that of conventional wars: between 100,000 and 600,000 Filipinos died.[36]

The occupation had three discernible stages:

> [...] first, a short bloody war against the Philippine Army; next, a harsh counterinsurgency to crush its guerilla forces; and finally, a protracted secret-police operation to demoralize the radical leaders and discredit the nationalist ideals that had been their inspiration.

Institutionally, the result of the pacification of the Philippines was, like Haiti, a deformed, militarized state. By 1903, the occupation already created 10,400 police positions to complement the 18,000 American soldiers and 22,000 Filipino troops. The police did the intimate work of governing. By the time of nominal independence in 1935, the Manila Metropolitan police had amassed files on 200,000 Filipinos or 70 percent of the city, and the Philippine Constabulary, now a 6,000-man-strong paramilitary force, had pacified the country and built a nationwide intelligence network that included Manuel Quezon, the future Philippine president, as an informant and collaborator.[37]

All told, the occupation developed robust intelligence-gathering, covert action and police capacities that "redirected the country's political trajectory from confrontation to collaboration, from revolutionary mobilization to electoral participation, from nationalist idealism to material realism."[38] In the Philippines, then, US occupation first created a broad space of exception and used tremendous amounts of violence in order to suppress nationalist revolt. While counterinsurgency quelled the nationalist insurgency by 1902 and the revolt of

35 Robert Fatton, Jr. *Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 205-206.
36 John Gates, "War Related Deaths in the Philippines 1989-1902," *Pacific Historical Review* 53 (1984).
37 McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 26, 28, 62-63, 234-235.
38 Ibid., 124.

Southern Moro people by 1918, the persistent police operations that followed fabricated a social order of polyarchic democracy.[39] The overdeveloped police capacities of the Philippine state, like that of Haiti, became an enduring force in the country's political history. An instrument of political warfare deployed against communist guerillas in late 1950, the police became the institutionalization of states' wild zone of power. Under the Marcos regime, where security forces killed 3,257, tortured an estimated 35,000 and "salvaged" or dismembered and displayed 2,520, "the police grew increasingly brutal, making torture and salvaging standard procedures against both political dissidents and petty criminals." [40]

Involvement in counterinsurgency also transformed the institutional composition of the United States. Here, Alfred McCoy's comment on the political effects of colonial interventions on metropolitan countries is apt: "Just as war transforms technology and industry, so colonialism plays a comparable role for government, producing innovations, particularly in the use of coercive controls, with a profound impact on its bureaucracies both home and abroad." In his work, for example, McCoy demonstrates how the Philippines became an important colonial laboratory, unrestrained by democratic process, to systemize a permanent counterinsurgency state, which "succeeded in containing and then crippling the radical left, advancing collaborating elites and shifting the center of political gravity from militant nationalism to patronage politics."[41]

These tactics were repatriated back to the Progressive-era United States, where they enabled a dramatic leap in the state's capacity for internal pacification. Here, Ralph Van Deman, "the father of military intelligence," is the personification of the world-relational linkages among state (de)formation processes in the US and the Philippines. During the occupation of the Philippines, Van Deman commanded the Division of Military Information, running information networks and synthesizing intelligence from across the archipelago. Upon his return to the US, Secretary of War Newton Baker placed Van Deman in the Army's Military Intelligence Division (MID) in 1915. In the coming years, Van Deman, the MID, its informant networks and its meticulous files were at the base of some of the worst episodes of domestic policing in the United States: the

39 William Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 118-119.
40 McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 403.
41 Ibid., 21-27, 37, 129

Palmer Raids, Hollywood Blacklisting anti-Japanese hysteria and, when Van Deman's files were transferred to the FBI upon his death in 1952, the COINTELPRO program.[42] Although less explicit and more shrouded by the more strongly institutionalized democratic institutions of core states, US involvement within the wild zones of power, in specific moments, opened spaces of exception where even US citizens became legitimate targets of violence.

Politicization of Security Professionals

Practically, counterinsurgency politicizes security professionals in ways that undermine the rule of law and democratic process. In the crucible of counterinsurgency, they learn to place an "emphasis on the unity and interrelatedness of civilian and military tasks and authority" and eventually carry their "determination to equip the natives with the 'will to fight' […] to the metropolitan country when the 'will' of the people 'at home' appears to be sagging. The crusade abroad may find expressions at home when the society is viewed as needing moral or political regeneration."[43]

In the United States, aforementioned Ralph Van Deman is the perfect example. Ostensibly focusing on counterintelligence, the Military Intelligence Division's "'suspect list' for domestic subversives […] consisted of many hundreds of thousands [….] In Van Deman's view, Irish Americans, German Americans, 'Hindus' and 'Negros' were all dangerously susceptible to enemy propaganda and required constant surveillance." Van Deman's fears of political subversion animated MID's "wartime mission that suffered from a […] combination of class bias and ethnic anxiety" and opened a space of exception that enveloped both Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) activists and African Americans. Although never able to produce any evidence, the MID consistently concluded that "Negro subversion" instigated by German provocateurs was a grave threat to security. Colonial rule and counterinsurgency, then, "had a profound influence on metropolitan society, introducing an imperial mentality of coercive governance into US domestic politics."[44]

In France, the introduction of counterinsurgent mentality produced

42 Ibid., 77-79, 296-299, 313-316, 318-345.
43 Eqbal Ahmad, "Counterinsurgency," in *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad*, eds. Carollee Benglesdorf, Margaret Cerullo, and Yogesh Chandrani (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 64.
44 McCoy, Policing *America's Empire*, 308-316, 346.

even more dramatic and explosive results. As early as the 1920s, Field Marshall Lyautey "emphasiz[ed] that the army might be required to move beyond colonial administration to regenerate French society and politics [...] in the interests of maintaining the empire."[45] In the lead up to World War II, Lyautey's attitude became emblematic of far right politics in France. Late in his life, Lyautey joined the Croix-de-Feu, a fascist organization and after massive right wing demonstrations turned violent in February 1934, Lyautey threatened to lead Jeunesses Patriotes, a fascist paramilitary group, on a march on the Chamber of Deputies, a threat so ominous that it lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Édouard Daladier.[46] While Lyautey died soon thereafter, prominent counterinsurgents continued to be involved in far right politics. In the 1940s, Charles Lacheroy and Roger Trinquier, two notable counterinsurgents, joined La Cité Catholique, a far-right anti-communist Catholic organization whose members (including Lacheroy) overlapped with the Organisation de l'armée secrète, a right wing terrorist organization dedicated to preserving French rule over Algeria.[47] For France, counterinsurgency "produced, at first, deep extra-constitutional involvement by the military in the political affairs of the country and finally a rebellion."[48]

Like in the French case, counterinsurgency politicized security professionals in the Philippines. The permanent counterinsurgency state created by US occupation and intensified during the Marcos dictatorship produced a hardened cadre of mid-ranking military officers that were frustrated by the ceilings to their career advancement set by the internal politics of the Marcos-era military and emboldened to turn their experience in political warfare against the regime: "these young lieutenants learned […] to regard their own society as the enemy and used espionage, surveillance, arrest and torture against people who, in normal circumstances, they would have been defending from foreign attack." Calling themselves the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), these rebellious officers first attempted a coup against Marcos in 1986 and launched five more failed coups against Marcos' democratic suc-

45 Ian Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and Their Opponents Since 1750* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 41.

46 Jacques Szaluta, "Marshal Petain's Ambassadorship to Spain: Conspiratorial or Providential Rise toward Power?" *French Historical Studies* 74 (1974): 517.

47 Marina Lazreg, *Torture and The Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 19-28, 61, 206-207.

48 Eqbal Ahmad, "Counterinsurgency," 64

cessor Corazon Aquino. Following the collapse of their final coup attempt in 1989, RAM went underground and continued a bombing campaign.[49]

The politicization and revolt of the Filipino army officers directly was resolved in terms consistent with the historic deformation of the Filipino state. With conflicting pressures from RAM to restore a military dictatorship under new leadership and the Aquino government to recognize civilian rule, the Armed Forces of the Philippines eventually settled into post-Marcos accommodation with elite democracy:

> [...] the military recognized 'civilian supremacy' and accommodated itself to the existence of elite democracy on the condition that Aquino give it free rein in conducting the counterinsurgency and, effectively, agree to treat it like a state within a state with veto power over vital areas of national policy.[50]

Here, through the politicization of security professionals, counterinsurgency acts as a force that feeds the wild zone of power at the basis of modern sovereignty.

Counterinsurgency and Shifting Patterns of World Order

The institutional and practical processes captured by the policy discourse and practice of counterinsurgency — the differential institution of the wild zone of power in peripheral and core sovereignties and the subsequent politicization of security professionals — are visible within a few discreet moments in the world system and are some of the political processes that inform the constitution, decomposition and reconstitution of world order. Historically, counterinsurgency, a policy discourse that emerged out of the cumulative experiences of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century's imperial expansion, was a political practice and discourse that animated the incorporation of new areas of the globe into the world-system.

Emerging out of fin de siècle imperialism, counterinsurgency linked the consolidation of colonial rule and the formation of the increasingly autarkic states and national economies in the lead up to World War II. As the nineteenth-

49 Alfred McCoy, *The Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 77-86.

50 Walden Bello, "US-Philippines Relations in the Aquino Era," *World Policy Journal* 5 (1988): 684.

century order of "free trade imperialism" broke down during the long depression of 1873-96, the great powers scrambled for Africa, dismembered Qing China, and deepened control in preexisting colonial peripheries in order to support the increasingly interventionist states of the period "rival imperialisms." In contrast to the earlier liberal period, states were now defined in sharper opposition to other societies and fortified with limited concessions to once disenfranchised groups and classes.[51] During this time, moreover, nascent counterinsurgency enabled the consolidation of the colonial relations that provided the base for industrialization, urbanization and the massive growth in the institutional capacity of the state.

These global structures and social relations secured by nascent counterinsurgency conditioned massive social and cultural change. For the United States, the fin de siècle imperialism and nascent counterinsurgency provided the context in which an increasingly assertive national identity could be formed while simultaneously drawing the racial and gender boundaries of an unruly world in the want of paternal leadership. The US occupation of Haiti, Mary Renda asserts, "contributed to both the bolstering and the reshaping of prevailing conceptions of national identity […] propel[ling] the cultural logic of 'American greatness.'" However, the occupation "could never control the entire discursive terrain" and "other discourses crowded the field." Citing Eugene O'Niell's The Emperor Jones and Zora Neale Hurston's Tell my Horse, Renda sees Haiti as a site of "struggle over the politics of masculinity and other implications of interventionist paternalism's gender politics." Even these seemingly progressive engagements with Haiti, however, "were bound up with cultural fabric of paternalism and exoticism, whether they thought they were shredding that fabric or donning it with pride."[52] In less explicit fashion, the social relations secured by nascent counterinsurgency enabled the "housewifiziation" of middle and working class households. "Housewifization" is the process where the capital accumulated through and new household products derived from colonial expansion enabled the positioning of women in strong states as consumers, while simultaneously relegating them to the domestic sphere and the "cult

51 Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times* (New York: Verso, 1995), 55-58, 269-300; Robert Cox, *Power, Production and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 151-210.

52 Mary Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 301, 306-307.

of domesticity."[53]

After World War II, the disparate writings of an older generation of officers — like French Field Marshalls Joseph Gallieni and Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, who pioneered counterinsurgency in Indochina and Morocco, respectively, and Madagascar, collectively; British Major General Charles Callwell, who served in the Second Boer War, and Army Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawarence ("of Arabia"); and the various US officers who served the occupation of the Phillipines and the "Banana Wars" in Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic — were objectized in text and military doctrine and variously instituted in state structures throughout the world.[54] Counterinsurgency had become a common, if minor, element in the security apparatuses of the core of empowered states that constitute the center of the world system.

As the independence struggles escalated during the twentieth century, counterinsurgency became a way to maintain formal colonial relations in a period of crisis, war and eventually, decolonization. While imperial expansion depended on illiberal discourses like the British "white man's burden," the French mission civilisatrice and the American manifest destiny, counterinsurgency is actually consonant with progressive and liberal values. "The rhetoric which defines its goals is reformist and liberal," Eqbal Ahmad explains:

> Freedom, progress, development, democracy, reforms, participation, and self-determination are its favorite working words. Generally, their theorists, of whom a majority comes from France and the USA, have been men of impeccable liberal credentials […] [A]mong its most prominent exponents,

Ahmad counts "many of Kennedy's New Frontiersmen and well-known univer-

53 Maria Mies, *Patriarchy & Accumulation on a World Scale* (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 88-111.

54 Its formative texts were: from the UK, Charles Callwell's *Small Wars Journal* (1896) and T.E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1922) on the English backed "Arab Revolt" against the Ottoman Empire from 1916 to 1918; from France, Roger Trinquier's *Modern Warfare* (1964) and David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Wafare* (1964), both drawing on World War II, The First Indochina War and The Algerian War; and from the US, the Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* (1940), drawing on US occupations of the Philippines, Haiti, and Nicaragua. With the renewed interest in counterinsurgency these texts have been recently republished: Charles Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Seaside: Watchmaker Publishing, 2010); David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); T.E. Lawerence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (Blacksburg: Wilder Publications); Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2009).

sity professors" and "in France, […] such eminent politicians as Jacques Soustelle [an anthropologist and the French Minister of State in charge of Overseas Departments] and Robert Lacoste," a socialist MP and senator.[55]

In this way, counterinsurgency became extremely important to the consolidation of the US-led Cold War order. The Soviet Union and People's Republic of China's claim to the revolutionary mantel left the United States with an ideological gap to cover if it did not want to openly embrace the counterrevolution. Counterinsurgency, in redefining revolution as insurgency, constituted an a priori denial of legitimacy to revolutionary movements. Along with modernization theory and the discourse on totalitarianism, which conjoined interwar fascism and state socialism, counterinsurgency made the US-subsidized counterrevolution against state socialism — "the Cold War" — possible by displacing counterrevolution as an object of study and developing an ideological project to frame it in progressive, albeit non-revolutionary, terms.[56] Indeed, the late 1950s and 1960s were the golden era of counterinsurgency as the West broadly embraced the policy to manage political struggles like the Greek Civil War, Malayan Insurrection, Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, Indochina Wars and Algerian War of Independence. On this point, the highly touted East Asian development state must be seen as the consensual carrot of development offered to Taiwan and South Korea and politically powerful contrast to the coercive stick of counterinsurgency offered to Indochina.[57]

These struggles — particularly the Algerian War of Independence for France and the Second Indochina War for the United States — helped break US-centered postwar order: Socially, the conflicts occupied world attention and animated radical revolt across the world; economically, war spending drove stagflation; politically, Algerian and Vietnamese victory marked the declining utility of direct military force to manage the restive peripheries of the world. In this context, the profile of counterinsurgency was lowered and the strategy was rehabilitated as "low-intensity warfare." Instead of direct intervention of foreign troops, Western powers sent only advisors and relied on foreign surrogates. Here, the US support of South African intervention in Angola, the CIA

55 Eqbal Ahmad, "Counterinsurgency," 39.
56 Arno Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870-1956: An Analytic Framework* (New York: Harper & Row), 10, 30-33.
57 Walden Bello and Stephanie Rosenfeld, *Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies in Crisis* (Oakland: Food First Books, 1992).

and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence's funding and training of the Afghan Mujahedeen during the Soviet War in Afghanistan and US support for Central American death squads, the Nicaraguan Contras being the most prominent, are emblematic of reformed counterinsurgency.[58] In all these cases, counterinsurgency was used for decidedly counterrevolutionary purposes to support undemocratic movements or states loyal to the West that were fighting the expansion of state socialism or a mass based revolutionary movement.

In the last decade, the prominent return of counterinsurgency speaks to an era of heightened global conflict and the increasing militarization of the processes of state (de)formation. In a context of economic crisis, ecological disaster and resource competition, the application of counterinsurgency in the West's War on Terror must be seen as an attempt to maintain the colonial relations of power upon which modern capitalist world system rests. This resurgent counterinsurgency links the militarization of the state across the divides of wealth and power. In Iraq, the United States' occupation has succeeded in creating a militarized counterinsurgency state. While the rest of the Arab world exploded in democratic rebellion, Iraq quietly detained hundreds including prominent journalists, artists and intellectuals in response to protests in Baghdad's Tahrir Square calling for anti-corruption measures and improved state services.[59]

On the other end of this colonial relationship, in the United States, the tactics of counterinsurgency are being repatriated to militarize the law enforcement. Under the guise of counterterrorism, there has been a rapid proliferation of "intelligence-led policing" which strongly resembles the practice of counterinsurgency with its aggressive and preemptive surveillance of suspect individuals and communities. Here, the fusion centers overseen by my former Congressmen and CIA Vietnam veteran, Robert Simmons are the heart of the contemporary militarization of policing. Fusion centers are just one small component in rapid expansion of the security apparatus. Currently, "1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies work on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States."[60] Many of these new agencies and centers, moreover,

58 Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism, 1940-1990* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 301-448.

59 Stephanie McCrumman, "Iraq 'Day of Rage' Protest Followed by Detentions, Beatings," *The Washington Post*, February 26, 2011.

60 Dana Priest and Willliam Arkin, "A Hidden World Growing Beyond Control," *The Washington Post*, July 19, 2010.

are at the center of recent controversies involving the illegal repression and harassment of the constitutionally protected in political activity.[61]

Conclusion

Altogether, counterinsurgency, as a world-relational political process, presents many challenges to traditional social science with its focus on individual nations as the unit of analysis. As an organized and institutionalized form of practice, counterinsurgency emerged as a pseudo-scientific policy discourse variously practiced, codified and instituted by the great imperial powers. As a historical process, counterinsurgency transforms both the state in which it is applied and the state which is imposing or sponsoring, differentially instituting a wild zone of power within both the corrupt dictatorships and faltering polyarchic democracies of periphery and solidly democratic states of the capitalist core. Taking a wider view, counterinsurgency links states across the unevenly developed interstate system and world-economy together in an interactive system, which, simultaneously, creates and constitutes the colonial differences dividing global society. As it concerns the state, counterinsurgency becomes one of the processes linking the formation of strong states and the deformation of weak states. It secures the global inequalities necessary for the accumulation of capital and helps creating the institutional arrangements necessary to maintain unstable co-

61 American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, "ACLU of Maryland Lawsuit Uncovers Maryland State Police Spying Against Peace and Anti-Death Penalty Groups," *ACLU*, July 17, 2008. http://www.aclumd.org/aPress/Press2008/071708_PeaceGroups.html (accessed Aug. 18, 2011); American Civil Liberties Union of Washington State, "Art Professor Detained for Taking Photos on Public Property," *American Civil Liberties Union*, November 15, 2007, http://www.aclu-wa.org/detail.cfm?id=787 (accessed Aug. 18, 2011); Democracy Now, "Democracy Now! Broadcast Exclusive: Declassified Docs Reveal Military Operative Spied on WA Peace Groups, Activist Friends Stunned," *Democracy Now*, July, 28, 2009, http://www.democracynow.org/2009/7/28/broadcast_exclusive_declassified_docs_reveal_military (accessed Aug. 18, 2011); Democracy Now, "FBI Expands Probe into Antiwar Activists," *Democracy Now*, Dec, 23, 2010, http://www.democracynow.org/2010/12/23/fbi_expands_probe_into_antiwar_activists (accessed Aug. 18, 2011); Guy Lawson, "The Fear Factory," *Rolling Stone*, Feb. 7, 2008. http://guylawson.com/pdf/rollingstone/fearfactory.pdf (accessed Aug. 18, 2011); Erica Rosa, "Colorado 'Fusion Center' to step up Intelligence Gathering During DNC," *The Colorado Independent*, July, 30, 2008. http://coloradoindependent.com/4424/colorado-fusion-center-to-step-up-intelligence-gathering-during-dnc (accessed Aug. 18, 2011); Matthew Rothschild, "VA Police Delete Photographs Taken by Muslim-American Journalism Student," *The Progressive*, Sept. 17, 2007. http://www.progressive.org:80/mag_mc091707 (accessed Aug. 18, 2011); Andy Sher, "ACLU Bristles Over Terror List," *Chattanooga Free Press*, Dec. 22, 2010; Shuan Waterman, "Documents Show Md. Police Spied on Anti-War, Death Penalty Protestors," *United Press International*, Jul. 17, 2008. http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/07/17/Documents_show_Md_police_spied_on_anti-war_death-penalty_protesters/UPI-74771216337696/ (accessed Aug. 18, 2011).

ercive political systems in the world's peripheries. It is on this basis, that the current resurgence of counterinsurgency must be approached, understood and engaged. **PEAR**

CAPABILITY APPROACH TO STREET VENDORS IN VIETNAM

Ly Nguyen
University of Maryland, College Park

Street vending is not a new phenomenon, but one that is generally considered part of an underdeveloped and backward society primarily dominated by the informal sector, which will disappear once a country modernizes. In developing countries such as Vietnam, however, efforts to deter the activity have only been met with a street vending population growing faster than ever and contributing to urban livelihood. In this paper, I will use the Capabilities Approach advocated by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, David Crocker and others to justify policies to accommodate street vendors. I will also draw on the experience of other countries to propose a set of strategies to organize street vending in Vietnam.

Introduction

A phenomenon common in many developing countries, including Vietnam, are the parallel existences of the formal economy and its informal counterpart. Street vending makes up a large portion of the informal economy, and is defined as any activity that produces or distributes legal and socially acceptable goods from the street, informal market or other publicly accessible space, while avoiding regulatory control."[1] Street vending has long been an integral part of Vietnamese economy, society and culture, despite its drawbacks. However, it has traditionally been marginalized and vendors are constantly subject to police harassment.[2] Despite frequent attacks and persistent problems, street vending continues to exist and even thrive, possibly as a result of government policies, economic development and subsequent inequalities.[3] The irony of street ven-

1 John Cross and Alfonso Morales, *Street Entrepreneurs: People, Place and Politics in Local and Global Perspective* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).
2 Sharit K. Bhowmik, "Street Vendors in Asia: A Review," *Economic and Political Weekly*, (2005): 2256-2264.
3 Cross and Morales, *Street Entrepreneurs*.

dors is that more and more people are flocking to cities to become street vendors as a result of modernization and urbanization; but it is for these same reasons that the government wants to control their existence.

Because street vending provides viable employment for many people, particularly poor women, for whom the formal economy has not been able to generate enough jobs, efforts to promote the formal sector need to be coupled with policies to accommodate and protect the informal sector. The Capability Approach (CA), pioneered by development economist Amartya Sen, provides a sufficient framework to argue for the need of government policies to empower street vendors. Vendors' contribution to the livelihood of the society as a whole illustrates the instrumental values of an accommodating economic environment for street vendors. More importantly, such accommodating policies also coincide with the recognition of the exercise of individual and collective agency, self-reliance and socio-economic freedoms of street vendors. Violations of these freedoms and rights constitute violations of human rights, and will result in the persistence of poverty. Poverty, in this context, includes not only material deprivation, but also socio-economic and security deprivations. As Sen rightly argues, these freedoms are essential in countering various forms of deprivations.[4] Therefore, if the goal of the government is poverty alleviation, it needs to first work to promote economic and social freedoms for the group afflicted with poverty.

The first part of this paper is a literature review on the current conditions of street vendors in Vietnam, their contribution to the well-being of the overall population, problems associated with them and threats to their livelihood. The second part of the research will discuss how current policies and authorities affect the treatment of street vendors, which further marginalize them; and why changes in policies are desirable and ethically justified. The final section will provide some specific policy recommendations pertaining to the situation in Vietnam. Underlying the entire paper are the concepts proposed by the capability/capabilities approach advocated by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and David Crocker, among others.

4 Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1999).

Literature Review

A limitation of the research is that despite the rapid growth of this important segment of the urban informal sector, there is a lack of academic research on the topic; especially a lack of quantitative and systematic research. The most well developed research on street vendors is based on surveys covering a few hundred street vendors at most, which is hardly representative of the whole population. The mobility of street hawkers makes it difficult to provide an accurate estimate of their number, but they inarguably make up a significant portion of the urban workforce. Prior to the ban in 2008, there were about 12,000 street vendors selling produce in Hanoi, including 5,600 vegetable and 5,900 fruit vendors.[5] They usually earn about 35,000 Vietnamese dollars (two US dollars in 2009) a day. In 2003, Hanoi had about 600 informal markets, more than five times the number of formal markets.[6] It is also estimated that in 1998, more than ten percent of Hanoi's labor force was engaged in food processing, and countless traders, most of whom were women, were working as street vendors and were spread out all over the city. The bulk of street hawkers are women and migrants from rural areas who, through vending, are able to maintain an economic existence anywhere between basic survival to lower middle-class status.[7]

Street vendors contribute to the well-being of the urban population by providing inexpensive goods for the urban poor and generating employment for a large number of people, especially women.[8] A World Bank report in 2002, based on data from all countries available, showed that informal traders, "mainly street vendors," made up 73-99 percent of employment in trade and 50-90 percent of trade gross domestic product.[9] This shows a considerable contribution of street vending to the overall economy and labor market. They are also located in strategic locations that are convenient for customers. Besides, street vendors are an integral feature of Vietnamese culture and mores, from the per-

5 Alia Malik, *From Hanoi and Beyond: Vietnam on the Road to Change*, "Changing economic realities could mean revising streetside traditions," http://www.merrill.umd.edu/dateline/vietnam/vendor2.html (accessed April 21, 2011).

6 Cuong Huu Tran et al., "Vegetable Retail Marketing in Hanoi Province" (Project report, VEGSYS, EU 5th Framework INCO2 , 2001).

7 Masayoshi Maruyama and Trung Viet Le, "The Nature of Informal Food Bazaars: Empirical Results for Urban Hanoi, Vietnam," *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services* 17, no. 1 (January 2010): 1-9.

8 Bhowmik, "Street Vendors," 2256-2264.

9 Martha Alter Chen,"Women in the Informal Sector: A Global PIcture, the Global Movement," *Labor Market Policies Core Course* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002).

spective of urban denizens as well as foreign tourists. Hardly does any student go through their week without visiting a food vendor at least a couple times, if not daily, with their friends and classmates. Neither does a typical mother come home after a day of work without stopping by a street vendor to buy fresh vegetables and meat for dinner. Not only do street vendors exist to cater to the need of the urban poor, they also support their existence and that of their families. Most street vendors belong to the poorest quintile of society, and vending is their primary or only means of survival and economic livelihood. In other words, vending is a way for them to alleviate poverty when the government, private and others in the formal sector fail to do so.

Due to the lack of regulation, street vending is associated with intrusion upon public space, obstruction of traffic, inadequate or questionable hygiene and nutrition, improper waste disposal and tax evaders. Many of them are itinerant vendors whose mobility is greatly limited with multiple baskets to carry, and they normally block the sidewalk or street.[10] In addition, food safety has increasingly become a concern with regards to street vendors. As they are unregulated, no one can really verify the contents of their food, whether they insert any unauthorized chemicals, or the process by which they prepare the food. Also, as many vendors wander around the city the whole day and have nowhere to wash their dinnerware; sanitation is certainly an issue. The fact that they are so mobile also leads to concerns regarding waste disposal. Since they do not "own" the place or places where they sell, and the level of awareness about keeping public spaces clean is still low in Vietnam, street vendors and their customers often discard garbage and napkins on the sidewalk and street.

Street vendors have traditionally been a vulnerable population. They are neither protected nor empowered by the government or NGOs, nor do they belong to any union. Therefore, they are deprived of the benefits of labor and social protections and representation by labor union or an equivalent entity.[11] Most vendors have at least once faced harassment by local authorities. 43.6 percent of the respondents in Maruyama and Le's study indicate regular harassment by local authorities, over thirteen percent occasionally, and approximately 43 percent rarely. But absence of harassment is often the result of paying some

10 Darunee Tantiwiramanond, *Changing Gender Relations and Women in Micro Enterprises: The Street Vendors of Hano, Research Report* (Bangkok: Asian Scholarship Foundation 2004).

11 Bhowmik, "Street Vendors," 2256-2264

"negotiated" fees to the authorities, as indicated by one-third of the respondents.[12] Due to the vagaries of market prices, vendors' mobility, insecure and irregular employment as a result of vulnerability to inclement weather, police harassment and competition with other street vendors, their incomes are often minimal and their sales fluctuating. Besides, serious lack of economic opportunities and technical and managerial competence have not left much room for the expansion of business and productivity or improvements in skills for a more sustainable job.[13]

The Vietnamese government does not recognize the contributions of street hawkers to the economic and social well-being of urban Vietnam. Indeed, they have been largely "indifferent," "intolerant," and even hostile to the existence and needs of this sector, seeing them as a nuisance and obstacle to urban development.[14] Street vendors are often subject to police harassment and excluded in the planning process. Due to the hostility of officials towards vendors and fear of vendors towards officials, there have not been any serious efforts to negotiate between the two groups. Prior to 2008, policy towards street vendors had been at most ambiguous. However, in August 2008, the Hanoi municipal government formally enforced a ban on street vendors on 62 major streets and 42 market areas of Hanoi, places with the highest concentration of vendors. Officials of the Hanoi People's Committee, the city's governing body, announced that the ban was meant to restore order and "civilization" to the city's chaotic streets.[15] But instead of decreasing, the number of street vendors kept growing. The same case happened in other cities around the world. In Mexico City, for example, street vending was completely banned in the 1960s for almost a decade, but vendors emerged stronger than ever.[16]

The rationale behind the modern economic system is the creation of more efficient and productive individuals by "controlling and ordering" the relations among them. However, efficiency only takes place under optimal conditions that do not happen overnight and have to be gradually molded. These

12 Maruyama and Viet Le, "The Nature of Informal Food Bazaars," 1-9.

13 Philomena Muimuri, *Women Street Vendors in Nairobi, Kenya* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, 2010); Resurreccion, Bernadette P., Hor Sophea and Sothea Phan, *Report of Independent Final Evaluation of EEOW Cambodian Chapter* (Phnom Penh and Bangkok: International Labor Organization/Japan Multi-bilateral Program, 2007)..

14 Cross and Morales, *Street Entrepreneurs*.

15 Malik. *From Hanoi and Beyond.*

16 Cross and Morales, *Street Entrepreneurs.*

"optimal conditions" entail not only economic and political factors such as the market system, business organization, factory structure, enabling laws and regulations, but also the very social and cultural life of individuals, families and communities. In short, mass production requires mass market, and mass market does not come into being instantaneously.[17] And even if they did, the informal sector, with some changes, can contribute much and remedy its own problems.

Though Vietnam has transitioned into a market economy for over two decades and has created a relatively favorable environment for business and economic growth, it is by no means sufficient to provide jobs for an economically active population of nearly 50 million people (as of 2008, the most recent year with data available).[18] At the same time, not everyone has the resources required to start a business. More stringent requirements in the regulatory system lead to high start-up costs. In fact, over-regulation and constraints in the formal sector are the major reasons why people resort to the informal sector.[19] High operating and registration costs were cited as the main barrier to starting a business in the formal sector by 43 percent of respondents in the survey by Maruyama and Le.[20] The start-up costs are $25 and $750 for the informal and formal sectors, respectively. On the other hand, street vending particularly appeals to some of the poor, especially women, due to its flexibility and ease of entry.[21] In addition, not requiring rent and utilities such as electricity, street bazaars operate with minimal overhead costs and are ideal for low-skilled entrepreneurs. The view that street vending is backward, inefficient and unsustainable does not take into account the fact that it fills in the gaps where the formal sector has failed to provide.

The lack of access to financial services by the poor further compounds the problem of relatively high start-up costs. But even if micro-loans are available, most of the poor in Vietnam are still unaccustomed to borrowing loans from institutions. Part of the reason is that they see this as taking a risk that they may not be able to recover if their business fails. Therefore, micro-financing efforts should be coupled with social and economic policies to accommodate the

17 Ibid.
18 "Short Term Indicators of the Labour Market," last modified April 8, 2011, http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest (accessed April 21, 2012).
19 Hernando De Soto, *The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Basic Books, 1989).
20 Maruyama and Viet Le, "Informal Food Bazaars," 1-9.
21 Muimuri, *Women Street Vendors*.

majority of the poor who are not yet capable of handling low-interest loans, by providing them with an environment that allows them to be self-sufficient and able to accomplish basic needs with minimal resources.

Capability Approach to Street Vendors

Sen puts a great deal of emphasis on the importance of economic freedom, first and foremost for its intrinsic values, which encompass the freedom to enter markets and to exchange, something that people have reasons to value. Secondly, economic freedom is desirable because of its contribution to the expansion of social freedom, including, at the most basic level, health and education.[22] Having the means to generate income, street vendors will be in a better position to pursue health care and education. This is likely to give their children better opportunities in the future, to join the formal labor force and break the cycle of poverty. The implication of this is that in city planning, the government cannot just look myopically at city beautification and order, but has to look into policies that will benefit future generations, especially those of the currently marginalized groups of society. Economic freedom also leads to freedom from insecurity of not being able to feed the family or being looked down upon.

Opponents of street vending cite intrusion upon public space, a collective good, as one of the reasons why vendors should not be allowed to operate. However, as the Indian Supreme Court ruled,

> […] if properly regulated according to the exigency of the circumstances, the small traders on the sidewalks can considerably add to the comfort and convenience of the general public, by making available ordinary articles of everyday use for a comparatively lesser price. An ordinary person, not very affluent, while hurrying towards his home after a day's work can pick up these articles without going out of his way to find a regular market. The right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1)g of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for passing or re-passing and no other use.[23]

22 Sen, *Development as Freedom*.

23 Chitra Chopra, "National Policy for Urban Street Vendors," *Indian Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation*, http://mhupa.gov.in/policies/natpol.htm (accessed January 23, 2012).

For both reasons that are desirable to the society as a whole and for the individual, the government should not exclude anyone from the labor market. This not only means that the government should not directly force some people out of or prevent them from joining the labor market, but also that if some people are not yet able to join, it is the government's responsibility to create an enabling environment in order for them to later participate. For some people, education and vocational training might be enough to participate in the labor market; and the government has tended well to these services in Vietnam. For others, especially the poor, who do not have the opportunity to benefit from these services or are not able to afford to join the formal platform and have to resort to the informal economy, the government needs to adjust its policies accordingly to enhance the capabilities, choices of functioning and opportunities for these people. By outright prohibition of people from conducting vending activities, the government has essentially stripped them of their economic freedom. Only when a person has achieved the level of having a set of capabilities available to them, in this case whether to participate in the informal or formal market, and still chooses to resort to the former merely to avoid taxes, or trading illegal goods and services, will it be justified for the government to enforce punitive actions.

In his portrayal of the agency-centered capability approach, Crocker distinguishes three types of agency: (1) the agency of others, (2) my indirect agency and (3) my direct agency, and stresses the importance of strengthening and extending direct agency, making indirect agency less indirect, and linking direct and indirect agency.[24] Crocker's emphases on a person's "direct agency" and "reasoned agency" are particularly useful in analyzing the situation of street vendors in Vietnam. In Sen's and Crocker's capability approach, agency is understood as deliberated decisions and actions that realize a person's goals, objectives and values and make a difference in the world. Direct agency constitutes what is at stake when vendors are faced with harassment and illegalization. By carrying out the act of vending by themselves and out of their own intentions, street vendors are acting out of their direct agency. The authority, by prohibiting street vendors from conducting business on the street, is not only trampling on their economic freedom but also inhibiting their direct agency and self-reliance. Even if the government puts these people on welfare and is able

24 David Crocker, *Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

to provide them with three meals a day (which is realistically impossible in the case of Vietnam given the government's limited budget), it might improve their well-being, but it, by no means, strengthens their agency. Well-being, in the capability framework, is understood as a person's "wellness," "personal advantage," or "personal welfare."

The concept of "reasoned agency" demonstrates what street vendors are lacking and how it should be were they to achieve full agency, or reasoned agency. According to Crocker, a person is an agent with respect to action X if he/she (1) decides for him/herself to do X, (2) bases his/her decisions on reasons, (3) performs or has a role in performing X and (4) thereby brings about (or contributes to the bringing about of) change in the world. A person is exercising reasoned agency only when he/she is consciously and purposefully carrying out an act that results in some change in the world, whether intentionally or not. Even though the act of vending demonstrates vendors' direct agency, it cannot be considered full agency, since the vendors' operation is not well-informed, in the sense that they are not educated about nutrition and hygiene standards, about ethical and profitable conduct of business, and about their entitlements, all of which are integral to a sustainable business. Besides the negative attitude and perception of authority and some groups towards street vendors, one of the greatest obstacles for them to gain rights is their own lack of awareness about their entitlements. Instead of trying to proactively change the situation by fighting for their rights, vendors become reactive and even servile to authority (coming up with ways to circumvent the police) and are merely occupied with being able to get by day in day out. In this way, their active agency is severely limited. Without awareness, these vendors will not be able to exercise reasoned agency.

The examples above illustrate the essence of individual agency in the case of street vendors. What is equally important is their "collective agency," which is the ability of vendors to collectively deliberate among themselves and with planners or regulators on the specifics of policies concerning them. Collective, or popular, agency is valuable both intrinsically and instrumentally.[25] First of all, it is intrinsically good that groups run their own affairs (self-determination) rather than be dominated by others or subject to the whims of chance. Second, by allowing people, especially hitherto marginalized groups, to participate in the planning and decision-making of projects that affect them, policy makers

25 Sen, *Development as Freedom*; Crocker, *Ethics of Global Development*.

are recognizing the worthiness of their opinions and human dignity. Instrumentally, the right kind of participation of collective agency arguably can contribute to solidarity, self-reliance and poverty alleviation among street vendors, as seen in the case of the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in India. Membership with SEWA has resulted in greater confidence, respect for self and others, stronger social networks and other benefits for women vendors.[26] The Market Federation formed by the Cambodian government in 2001 with the support of the government of Japan is an example of a vendors' association's ability to employ collective agency to protect the interest of its members. The Federation helps its members seek health care benefits, provides assistance for members' families in case of illness or death, protects them from police harassment and negotiates with the Market Management Committees for better terms for selling locations. The project evaluation provides evidence in support of better opportunities for business and leadership training and credit facilities to enhance their livelihoods and social position in their communities.[27] These are extremely important given the inherent vulnerability of the occupation.

Based on the aforementioned normative analysis, I will propose a set of strategies to address the problems of accommodating street vendors, a valuable sector of the economy, while preserving the health of their clients and the cleanliness and order of the city.

Possibilities for Future Policies

As mentioned above, street vendors are perceived to be obstructions to traffic and urban "civilization." But underneath lies a more serious problem, which is the preconceived notion of the "appropriate" use of public space by officials. And the standard for what is appropriate is largely decided by that of the developed world – the thoroughly clean and clear sidewalks and streets, which does not necessarily fit into the context of developing countries like Vietnam. On the contrary, as Jane Jacobs asserts in her book, the life and perceived safety of a city is largely dependent upon the liveliness of its streets and sidewalks, and the people and activities occupying them.[28] The mere sight of people conducting er-

26 Elizabeth Hill, *Worker Identity, Agency and Economic Development: Women's Empowerment in the Indian Informal Economy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).

27 Resurreccion et al., *EEOW Cambodian Chapter*.

28 Jane Jacobs, "The Uses of Sidewalks: Safety," in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York, NY: Randome House, Inc., 1961), 29-54.

rands or getting food and drinks is itself an attraction to draw more people on to the street. So far, street vending is the major attraction for residents and tourists on the streets of Hanoi.

According to Cross and Karides,[29] part of the solution to the problem should be spatial reorganization, by looking at ways in which space can be redefined and localized. The government needs to recognize and let each area define its own notion of "appropriateness." This coincides with Sen's and Crocker's emphasis on "collective agency." Instead of having a one-size-fit-all solution to all vendors, the government should delegate decision-making to the district or subdistrict levels. Hanoi consists of ten districts, and each district is further divided into eight to 21 subdistricts. Infrastructure, geographic and economic conditions vary across districts and subdistricts; therefore, policies should pertain to the particular conditions of each district. The authority should create spatial zones of informal or semi-informal markets to allow small, low-capital vendors to operate under a self-regulating system suitable with their resources and taxes and regulations applied to them kept at the level of bare necessities. A great number of vendors would be willing to pay a small fee in exchange for greater security and stability. Urban planners should aim to locate markets at strategic locations that do not jeopardize vendors' ability to attract customers, or else the solution will be unpopular among them. By allowing these vendors to remain informal within broad guidelines, the government is not only encouraging micro-entrepreneurship but also saving resources for key issues such as public health concerns. This would help a number of vendors to transition into the formal sector if they see fit in order to protect their capital and resources.

Given the government's limited budget, it can seek creative solutions such as contracting to private real estate developers who are willing to invest in market areas and earn revenues from vendor fees. To ensure more reliable and sufficient streams of revenues, these markets can operate through a system of cross-subsidization, where in a market zone consists of vendors in the formal sector who pay relatively higher fees than those in the informal sector.

The decision-making process needs to incorporate vendors who are already in the area. There will always be new vendors coming to a certain area,

29 John Cross and Marina Karides, "Capitalism, Modernity, and the 'Appropriate' Use of Space," in *Street Entrepreneurs: People, Place, and Politics in Local and Global Perspective* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 31-65.

but the already existing ones would know and be able to articulate the problems they are facing, how the authority can create a safer environment for them, and what they themselves can do to create a healthier business environment. This is also an opportunity for the planners to express their concerns and intentions. Both sides can deliberate on the process of accommodation, education about hygiene and nutrition, proper waste-disposal process and other aspects of a street market zone. Both groups can, and should, have something to contribute.

The municipal government should allow vendors to organize within their market zones into an entity equivalent to "street vendor association." Such an association would serve two purposes: defending vendors' rights and promoting their interests.[30] The Market Federation formed by the Cambodian government in 2001 with the support of the government of Japan is an example of a vendors association's ability to employ collective agency to protect the interest of its members by helping them seek health care benefits, providing assistance for their families in case of illness or death, protect them from police harassment and negotiate with the Market Management Committees for better terms for selling locations. The project evaluation provides evidence in support of better opportunities for business and leadership training and credit facilities to enhance their livelihoods and social position in their communities.[31]

Nevertheless, as the case of India demonstrates, street vendor associations are necessary but by no means sufficient to protect vendors' rights. In India, even where the municipality permits street vending, the police still have the authority to remove them because section 34 of the Police Act authorizes the police to remove obstructions from the street. This leads to vendors paying bribes to the police to obtain advance warnings of confiscation instead of joining unions, which is part of the reason why the unionization rate is below twenty percent in India. Besides, between ten and twenty percent of vendors' earnings go into bribing.[32] This means that a truly supportive framework for street vendors needs to take into account revising the laws and regulatory systems accordingly. In the case of India, it could be adding reasonable exceptions

30 Hernando De Soto, "Informal Trade," in *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc, 1989), 59-92.

31 Resurreccion et al., *EEOW Cambodian Chapter*.

32 Sharit K. Bhomik, "Street Vending in Urban India: The Struggle for Recognition," in *Street Entrepreneurs: People, Place and Politics in Local and Global Perspective*, eds. John Cross and Alfonso Morales (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 92-107.

for street vendors, for instance.

Both India and Malaysia had in the past implemented a system of licensing to monitor street vendors. Licenses were accompanied by specific guidelines and requirements that the owners must comply with, covering citizenship status, age and health status of the vendors; the size of the stalls or vehicles, prohibited places, the hours and types of goods allowed to be traded. However, the government stopped issuing licenses in Kuala Lumpur in 1996, due to exceeding demand.[33] In India, the experience of licensing has also been largely negative, as it shifts harassment and extractions towards unlicensed vendors.[34] Instead of licensing, we suggest a simple registration process, whereby vendors are allocated according to the nature of the trade/services and planning standards. As part of the registration process, vendors will pay a small fee in order to support the functioning of the organization representing them. The registration process may still entail some of the requirements delineated in the licensing process, especially those affecting the health of customers and those regarding proper waste disposal, but overall should be broader guidelines.

A holistic approach also needs to take into account education on hygiene, nutrition standards and proper waste disposal for street vendors. Most of the current nuisance comes from their lack of awareness about the so-called public space and the importance of health standards. Therefore, tackling these issues is important. This can be delegated to the vendors associations to educate their members, but efforts to monitor and evaluate need to be designed in ways that would minimize the opportunity for rent-seeking.

Besides spatial planning, appropriate representation and regulations; policy makers should also look into long-term solutions, such as encouraging vendors to adopt the practice of borrowing from micro-finance institutions as they are looking into expanding their businesses or getting a home. Groups representing street vendors can take on this role by providing them with information to obtain credits individually or collectively. Street markets of Mexico City are good examples of how this approach can work very well. There, the more established vendor associations were able to accumulate enough wealth to provide loans and housing credits to vendors, and even build schools for children.[35]

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33 Norhaslina Hassan, "Accomodating the Street Hawkers into Modern Urban Management in Kuala Lumpur," *39th ISoCaRP Congress* (Cairo: ISoCaRP, 2003).

34 Bhomik, "Street Vending," 92-107.

35 Veronica Crossa, "Resisting the Entrepreneurial City: Street Vendors' Struggle in Mexico City's

In addition, if budget allows, the government should also consider social security to cover instances of loss of merchandise, because to street vendors whose assets are all that they carry with them on any workday, losing that merchandise would mean starting from scratch. In cases where the earnings from a day of work go into feeding the family for that day, this would also mean an inability to feed their children. Social security is also needed to protect vendors in cases of sickness, injury, or having sick children, to name a few. Most importantly, this is a step to preserving the dignity of street vendors in cases of uncertainty.

As mentioned above, past and current relationships between public officials and vendors have been characterized by hostility and lack of understanding. Public officials view street vending as a nuisance to urbanization and modernization, and something that should be gotten rid of. On the other hand, vendors fear the authority, especially harassment by the police, with whom they are often in direct contact. Overall, the relationship is largely asymmetric with much greater power and voice on the side of the government. Ideally, there should be mutual respect and willingness to cooperate between the two parties, arising from the understanding of and empathy with the other side.[36] The government should be more open and receptive to hearing concerns from migrants coming to urban areas to earn a living through street vending. On the other hand, street vendors should also be more sensitive to the concerns of the government and the public at large in regard to their business conduct.

Conclusion

In addition to complementing formal markets and supermarkets, street vending allows for entrepreneurship, economic and agency freedom; and it is what puts a face on Vietnamese cultural and social life. Policy makers should recognize the contributions of street vendors and acknowledge that they cannot be wiped out overnight, but that the process to incorporate vendors into the formal sector will take time and resources. As Cross and Morales rightly argue, policy makers should educate themselves about and engage in dialog with merchants,

Historic Center," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 33, no. 1 (March 2009): 43-63.

36 Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991).

recognize that the formal and informal sectors are two interwoven parts of a unified economy and not competing factions, and implement policies to foster the healthy co-existence of the two. One reason why street vending is so integral to the social and cultural life of Vietnam is the intimate interaction between vendors and their clients. It is ironic that developing countries are trying to eliminate street markets in order to formalize and give their cities a more Westernized look and ambience, while cities in the United States are advocating for the "going local" movements by encouraging local farmer markets. However, an imbedded culture of formality has rid the Western farmers' markets of the informality and intimate interaction that occur between the buyers and sellers in the street bazaars of the developing world. This is a valuable aspect of society and culture that is worth cherishing and preserving before it becomes too late. Policies to accommodate street vendors should seek to empower and enhance the individual as well as their collective agency. They should also seek to encourage dialogues and foster understanding and mutual respect between the vendors and the authority. Finally, policy makers should also keep in mind the need for the consideration of policies to enhance vendors' other capabilities and freedoms, besides economic freedom, including education, health and social security. **PEAR**





THE SUBVERSIVE STRAIN IN MODERN KOREAN FILM

Susan Menadue-Chun
University of Sydney, Australia

The role of Korean film has become more conspicuous within the realm of Asian popular culture with the rise of the Korean Wave (Hallyu), marked by transnationalism, when Asian countries moved away from American dominance and re-grouped across boundaries and time zones with mutual understandings linked by popular culture. Democracy in Korea and the Korean Wave have been associated with giving Koreans a collective voice of a subversive nature through films disseminated on a global stage. The film industry, since the 1960s, has provided a collective voice in varying degrees to convey social resentment irrespective of authoritarian government polices. However, there has been a general failure to recognize that the social history of Korea in the post-Korean War period has been closely associated with political, economic and social factors reflected in film. Furthermore, despite totalitarian governments exercising cultural hegemony, the Korean people have managed to resist a monolithic ideology through subversive tones in censored films. This paper focuses on the role Korean film has played as a component of Asian Popular Culture and as medium through which Korean people have exercised a collective voice under authoritarian regimes.

Introduction

In the repressive era of President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), Koreans were expected to make personal sacrifices in the name of economic recovery. Political unrest was regarded as a threat to the overall revival and stability of the nation. Film was considered a propaganda tool and censorship was the norm. In that state of affairs, however, it is puzzling to find how a film confronting issues of homosexuality, authority, class and sexuality could avoid strict codes of censorship. Nevertheless, in 1972 director Ha Kil-jong confronted those taboos in The Pollen of Flowers (Hwabun).[1] Indeed, in a highly symbolic manner the

1 Korean Film Archive (KOFA). "100 Korean Films,"

film challenged the totalitarian nature of the Park regime. The Pollen of Flowers concerns a young, handsome concert pianist named Dan-joo who becomes a protégé, and possibly lover, of his master Hyun-ma. Furthermore, Dan-joo's difficult relationship with the wife of Hyun-ma, Se-ran, epitomizes the class discrimination of the time as she regards him as polluted because he is from a lower class.

Twenty-five years later, Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) was the first political opposition leader to become a democratically-elected president. At that time, there was a loosening of film censorship and Koreans began questioning their national identity. In this new era, blockbuster films like 2000's The Joint Security Area (Gongdonggyeongbiguyeok)[2], by director Park Chan-wook, dared to confront the long held anti-communist paradigm. In the film, two guards on different sides of the DMZ become friends. The South Korean guard visits his North Korean counterparts' barracks at night, where the supposed enemies talk and play juvenile games. Despite the tragic ending with South Korean Sgt. Lee (Lee Byung-hyun) committing suicide upon learning his bullet killed his North Korean friend, this emotional and compelling story reminded South Koreans that though they distrusted their brothers north of the DMZ, North Koreans are human too.

The two Korean films presented above were released at different times in the development of the Korean nation; however, they both carry subversive tones. The experience of the Korean film industry shows how both totalitarian and democratic governments have tried in different ways to use film as a way of reinforcing economic power structures and polices. These governments have rarely been able to completely suppress the subversive elements within the film industry, however. This paper will illustrate this argument with two cases studies.

The first case study will comment on the potentially subversive role film has played in Korea under the censorship and authoritarian rules of President Park Chung-hee (1961-79) and President Chun Doo-hwan (1980-88). Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), when government control of film became far less restrictive and more of a cultural commodity. This allowed the Korean film industry to express subversive sentiments on much wider national and global stages.

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http://www.koreafilm.org/feature/100_59.asphttp://www.koreafilm.org/feature/100_59.asp (accessed April 10, 2011).

2 The Joint Security Area, directed by Park Chan-wook (2000; CJ Entertainment).

The most appropriate means of analyzing the methods by which the authoritarian regimes referred to above used cinema is via Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony. This theory presumes a domineering ruling class governing the masses with the pretense of the "good for all," when in fact a majority are disadvantaged. The method in which the governments of Roh-Tae-woo and Kim Dae-jung can sufficiently be analyzed is via Joseph Nye's theory of soft power.[3] Nye asserts, "[a] country's soft power rests on its resources of culture value and policies."[4] The films to be briefly discussed here have been carefully selected, not only for their box office success, but also for the subversive social issues they addressed.

Subversive Films under Park and Chung

This paper will analyze the subversive nature of films during the repressive regimes of President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) and President Chun Doo-hwan (1980-88). During these regimes, Korea experienced vicious political repression, economic growth, urbanization, a reassessment of conservative Confucian ideology and cultural hegemony through censorship and hard power.

During this era, the "group collective mentality" of Koreans was instrumental in pooling resources in support of Korea's post-war period when democracy and human rights were sacrificed in pursuit of economic recovery. Koreans accepted economic hardship and brutal clampdowns on so-called dissenters for the good of the country. In spite of Korea's economic success in the 1960s, "the cultural conditions for democratization were not favorable, and the political system was highly repressive, and the culture was strongly shaped by the hierarchical worldview of Confucianism ideology."[5]

In this context, the regimes of Presidents Park and Chun used the film industry as a propaganda tool and sought to suppress any subversive elements within that industry. As a proponent of subversive mechanisms, Lenin once said, "Of all the arts, cinema is the most important to us!"[6] Like Lenin, the Korean government regarded cinema as a significant propaganda medium and

3 Joseph Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Politician and Social Science* 616, no.1 (2008): 94.
4 Ibid.
5 Thomas Kern, "Cultural Performance and Political Regime Change," *Sociological Theory* 27, no. 3 (2009): 294.
6 Andrei Lankov, 2007. *The Dawn of Modern Korea* (Seoul: EunHaeng NaMu, 2007), 273.

took firm control, aware that the medium could be also used against the government. Park Chung-hee's regime implemented the Motion Picture Law of 1962, which strictly controlled Korea's film production.[7] One method was to decrease the number of movie companies from 71 to sixteen. Korean movie companies were legally entitled to import foreign movies, however they were obliged to produce three domestic movies for every foreign movie imported. It was also compulsory for cinemas to screen Korean movies for 90 days each year. In reality, however, foreign films were both more popular and lucrative than domestic offerings. Furthermore, Korean films were closely scrutinized and censored for politically subversive or pro-communist content, resulting in a flood of poor quality Korean films in the 1960s and 1970s.[8] The arrests of filmmakers accused of producing movies of a pro-communist nature were presented by the regime as justification for authoritarian rule.

The Motion Picture Law was the foundation for the regime's cultural hegemony. Further, as a consequence of the government's national industrialization policy, the film industry received large government handouts, which strengthened its position as a propaganda tool.

In the 1970s, the government considered opposition to the censorship of pro-Communist voices. Films that portrayed social problems were banned, and genres that provided escapist entertainment were approved. In order to ensure the success of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Chun Doo-hwan implemented the "3S Policy" (sex, screen, sports) with the objective of deflecting attention away from films that raised potentially destructive issues for the government. The 3S Policy attempted to promote non-subversive films that allowed for an easing of censorship on sexual connotations in film and promoted the establishment of professional baseball and soccer teams. Despite the government using film to reinforce the existing power structure, many Korean film directors creatively avoided government censorship to show their discontent with the social status quo. For example, the following four films question (sometimes in the guise of comedy) authority, sexuality, gender bigotry, youth culture and censorship itself.

Yeong-Ja's Heydays (Yeongja-ui Jeonseongsidae; 1975), directed by Kim Ho-Seon, remains the most important "hostess melodrama"[9] of the 1970s.

7 Ibid., 274.
8 Ibid.
9 The hostess melodrama was a genre regarding young women lured to Seoul in the promise of

The film dealt with young women from the countryside being forced into prostitution due to social breakdown in a society striving for economic success.[10] The March of Fools (Babodeul-ui Haengjin; 1975)[11] directed by Ha Kil-jong, applied a cynical twist as it depicted the unhappy lives of young people in the 1970s. This film gave a realistic perspective on the government's clampdown on youth culture by focusing on issues such as long hair, heavy drinking, modern romance, the closing of universities due to anti-regime demonstrations and the military draft.

Winter Woman (Gyeoul Yeoja; 1975),[12] directed by Kang Dae-jin, instigated a great social debate by exploring the new boundaries of sexual moralities for women against the backdrop of a Confucian patriarchal society. Winter Woman challenged its critics and the unpopular local film industry when it exceeded foreign film profits at the box office.

Good Windy Day (Balambul-eo Joh-eun Nal; 1980),[13] directed by Lee Jang-ho, was a black comedy that focused on Korea's alienated youth and social inconsistencies due to the country's economic and political policies in the 1980s. Good Windy Day stood apart from other 1980s films by defying Chun Doo-hwan's 3S Policy's emphasis on erotic and melodramatic movies.

In summary, despite the tremendous efforts of the totalitarian governments of Presidents Park and Chun to establish absolute cultural hegemony over film, writers, directors and actors managed to project the collective voice of the masses in resisting the dominant ideology through subversive tones in censored films. Next, a different government approach to films as cultural commodities for export and soft power will be discussed.

Reevaluation of National Identity

This second case study will be divided into two segments. In both, the subversive issue of Korea's reevaluation of national identity in a response to collective social experiences will be analyzed. The first section will briefly cover the

work. Instead, they found themselves cheated and ended up in prostitution.

10 Korean Film Archive (KOFA). "100 Korean Films," http://www.koreafilm.org/feature/100_59.asphttp://www.koreafilm.org/feature/100_59.asp (accessed April 10, 2011).

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

period of liberalization under President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993), which is considered the period when Korea made a procedural transition to democracy. This section will be followed by the second segment covering the period of President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), during which Korea made a full substantive transition to a democratic republic.

During the first period, the presence of the Minjung Movement and President Roh's shift away from an inflexible military dictatorship resulted in a relaxation of film censorship. The Minjung Movement began under authoritarian governments as a political movement of the middle class, with politics run by intellectuals and students who lobbied for political and economic change. There was also a reevaluation of national identity and collective political, economic and social experiences in which the Korean film industry played an active role. Korea's new film era of auteurist cinema and Korean blockbusters became the agent for conveying this new concept.

Two films directed by Minjung Movement member Park Kwang-su embody the ideology of the movement: To Black Republic (Geudeuldo Uricheoreom; 1990)[14] and A Single Spark (Areumdaun Cheongnyeon Jeon Tae-il; 1995).[15] Park was critical of the military's uncompromising policy of modernization and the social dislocation that resulted from state capitalism and the widening class divisions in Korean society.[16]

The film Sopyonje (1993),[17] directed by Im Kwon-taek, was produced at a time when Koreans were starting to reflect how much of their culture and tradition they had lost due to modernization. Andrew Salmon has pointed out the loss of tradition is a common side effect of "hardware-focused" economies.[18] In effect, Sopyonje provided an opportunity for Koreans to be reconciled with their past.[19] Although the film was not expected to draw large crowds, it surpassed all expectations and became the number one box office hit between 1990-1995. The film ran for six months throughout Korea and sold a total of 1,035,741 tickets.[20]

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14 To Black Republic, directed by Park Kwang-su (1990; Dong A Exports Co., Ltd.).

15 A Single Spark, directed by Park Kwang-su (1995; Age of Planning).

16 Eunjin Min, Jinsook Joo, and Ju Kwak Han, *Korean Film History, Resistance and Democratic Imagination* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 119.

17 Sopyyonje, directed by Im Kwon-taek (1993; Taehung Pictures).

18 Andrew Salmon, "Zero to Superhero and Anti-hero," *Korea Times*, October 10, 2010.

19 Eunjin Min, Jinsook Joo, and Ju Kwak Han, Korea Film History, Resistance and Democratic Imagination, 131.

20 Darcy, Paquet, "A Short History of Korean Film," Last updated March 1, 2007 http://koreanfilm.

Sopyonje tells a story of three pansori[21] performers, Yeo-bong and his two children, who travel through the country performing pansori and endeavoring to be true to the tradition of their art. The film's setting runs between the 1940s and 1970s and portrays the pressure that invading Japanese and American traditions placed on the art of pansori performers.

The second segment of this case study begins with the presidency of President Kim Dae-jung, who represented the first peaceful transfer of power to the leader of an opposition party. Unlike former governments, which had taken a strong anti-communist line, President Kim pursued a stance of national reconciliation with North Korea through his Sunshine Policy, while promoting Korean national culture. Joseph Nye states that Korea's democratic political system and the attractiveness of Korean arts, crafts and cuisine allowed Korea to use its culture as soft power.[22] In other words, culture became an export commodity and a foreign policy tool that allowed Korea to integrate more closely into a pan-Asian community. The use of culture as soft power may be interpreted as a tactic by the government to reinforce the existing power structures. The distinct difference in comparison to Korea's former authoritarian governments was the freedom to produce subversive material that challenged the government.

President Kim's new democratic government took a more pluralist approach to values and ideologies in a more consumer and pleasure-oriented environment. Thus, the younger generation's sense of values changed. Rejecting the self-denial of their parent's generation, they displayed a strong sense of personal freedom and interest in materialism. They placed a high importance on emotional display, reflecting an association of Confucian ideology with Western democratic values.

The Kim Dae-Jung government's involvement in the Korean film industry began in 1998 when the Basic Law for the Cultural Industry Promotion came into effect. In a new positive environment for film, and an initial budget of $148.5 million, the Busan International Film Festival was inaugurated.[23] The law also facilitated the participation of financial investment in the film industry.

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org/history.htmlhttp://koreanfilm.org/history.html (accessed April 19, 2011).

21 Pansori is a Korean vocal art performed by a solo singer with a dramatic story line.

22 Joseph Nye, "South Korea's Growing Soft Power," Project Syndicate, 2009 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye76/Englishhttp://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye76/English (accessed April 19, 2011).

23 Doobo Shim, "Hybridity and the Rise of Korean Popular Culture in Asia," *Media, Culture & Society* 28, no. 1 (2006): 34.

Under Kim Dae-jung the cultural sector's budget increased from 484.8 billion won in 1998, to 1,281.5 billion won, or 1.15 percent of the total government budget, in 2002.[24]

The above conditions gave rise to the "Korean Wave"[25] in cinema, which began to take shape around 1997.[26] Following colonization by Japan in the first half of the twentieth century and then successive authoritarian regimes up to the late 1980s, the Korean Wave was a catalyst for globalization on the world stage. The Korean Wave heralded a new era for Korean cinema that resisted Hollywood domination and in doing so developed a style that reflected Korea's culture and history.

An aspect of the Korean Wave was the rise of the Korean blockbuster and the Korean auteurist cinema (itself an offshoot of the New Korean Cinema).[27] While the Korean blockbusters pursued mass appeal and financial success, the less auterist films were also influential in conveying social issues. Important auterist films during this era were Silver Stallion (Eunmaneun oji anneunda; 1991),[28] which dealt with issues of post colonialism; White Badge (Hayan jeonjaeng; 1992),[29] which contemplated national division; Berlin Report (Baereurlin ripoteu; 1991),[30] which addressed modernization and democratization; and A Petal (Kkonnip; 1996),[31] which scrutinized globalization. Blockbuster films such as Taeguki, Silmido, The King and the Clown and The Host also reflected Korea's new national identity.

Taegukgi (Taegukgi hwinallimiyoeo; 2004),[32] directed by Kang Je-kyu, tells the story of two brothers separated during the Korean War. Their brotherly love is tested during the ordeal of battles. Questions are raised about the division of North and South on the Korean peninsula. Silmido (2003),[33] directed by Kang Woo-suk, is a true account set in 1968 of 31 death-row prisoners who were selected to assassinate Kim Il-sung. They endured intensive and

24 Ibid., 35.
25 The term that refers to the global dispersion of Korean popular culture.
26 Shim, "Korean Popular Culture," 28.
27 The New Korean Cinema was an activist film movement established in 1988 to resurrect the domestic film industry.
28 Silver Stallion, directed by Jang Kil-su (1991; Han Jin Enterprises Co., Ltd.).
29 White Badge, directed by Jeong Ji-yeong (1992; Vanguard Cinema).
30 Berlin Report, directed by Park Kwang-su (1991).
31 A Petal, directed by Jang Sun-woo (1996; Miracin Korea).
32 Taegukgi, directed by Kang Je-gyu (2004; Samuel Goldwyn Films,Destination Films).
33 Silmido, directed by Kang Woo-suk (2003; Cinema Service).

cruel training only to see the mission aborted at the last minute. The film shows the harshness and disloyalty of the authoritarian regime and those who serve it. The King and the Clown (Wang-ui namja; 2005),[34] directed by Lee Joon-ik, is a story of entertainers during the reign of King Yeonsan in the late fifteenth century, who had the courage to ridicule the king. It challenges conventional Korean views on hierarchy, ignorance regarding sexual issues and intolerance of homosexuals. The movie also scrutinizes corruption of authority and Korean prejudice against the arts and entertainment. The Host (Goemool; 2006),[35] directed by Bong Joon-ho, is a monster film with a blockbuster story and a political message that focuses on the reality of the American military presence in Korea. It was written as a response to an incident in 2000 when a US military mortician dumped formaldehyde down a drainpipe. In the film, the formaldehyde mutates and gives birth to a horrifying monster that terrorizes Seoulites. At the time of the incident in 2000, Green Korea United[36] released a strong statement:

> This case serves as an exemplar for how the US and US military is deceiving, purposefully or not, the Korea and its people. [T]he fact that the US military is disposing of toxic fluids such as formaldehyde in the Han River, where ten million people use it for household use, is in itself an outrage and mockery to the Korean people.

Furthermore, in American National Security Law Brief of 2011, Jimmy Koo refers to The Host.[37] In his brief, he mentions that the film generated anti-Americanism in Korea and reminded Koreans of the financial burden of bearing the American military's neglect of environmental concerns.

The Host was a domestic success, with the audience of approximately 13,010,000 viewers in 2006. As such, it continued to be Korea's top-selling film until 2010.[38] Nikki Lee points out that the portrayal of real historical events and social issues in blockbuster movies confirms the Korean film industry's nation-

34 The King and the Clown, directed by Lee Joon-ik (2005; Cinema Service).
35 The Host, directed by Bong Joon-ho (2006; Showbox, Magnolia Pictures).
36 Green Korea United, "The Eighth US Army Division Discharged Toxic Fluid (Formaldehyde) into the Han-River," Green Korea United, http://green-korea.tistory.com/74 (accessed April 16, 2012).
37 Jimmy H. Koo, "The Uncomfortable SOFA: Anti-American Sentiments In South Korea and The U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement," *National Security Law Brief* 1 (2011): 105.
38 Nikki J.Y Lee, "Localized Globalization and a Monster National: The Host and the South Korean Film Industry," *Cinema Journal* 50 (2011): 47.

alist stance.[39] In nationalist films, such as The Host, shared historical memories are identified by domestic audiences as "cultural texts" that symbolize the nation.

In summary, democratic changes facilitated a new style in Korean film. The government loosened censorship and became more involved in marketing Korean film, using it as an instrument of imposing soft power. National identity and radical issues of a subversive nature integrated with cinema were given a collective voice in Korean films.

Conclusion

In conclusion, as the two case studies above have endeavored to prove, the history of cinema in Korea has been equally depressing and inspirational. This paper concludes that the function of film in Korea has changed over time to adapt to unique social, political and economic conditions under totalitarian and democratic regimes, in order to produce "a cultural product [that] embodies the system of beliefs and values of people as well as external constraints given in the production process."[40]

Films have facilitated a collective voice and revealed Korea's social history. Under the totalitarian regimes of President Park and Chun, films were defined by domestic politics, government constraint, anti-communist ideology, escapism and strong efforts to boost national pride for economic development. Despite the amount of top-down influence, film genres questioning gender bigotry, sexuality, youth culture and censorship reflected social discontent. By comparison, global politics, economic recovery, government support, soft power, national reunification, changes in social values and reassessment of national identity have defined films under and after the presidency of Kim Dae-jung. Likewise, films advocating national identity and reflecting social changes were achieved through conveyed messages such as loyalty, duty, friendship, governmental responsibility, ignorance, intolerance and anti-Americanism.

Films as cultural hegemony under the hardware-driven economy, or films as a soft-power cultural commodity, have still been able to reflect significant social discontent and changes in popular opinion. Undoubtedly, regardless of govern-

39 Ibid., 50.

40 Eunjin Min, Jinsook Joo, and Ju Kwak Han, Korean Film History, Resistance and Democratic Imagination, 22.

ment's interference or support to build up the existing power structure, efforts at total suppression have failed. As a medium through which to express Korean people's thoughts and ideas, films have empowered their voices to be heard throughout the state and society. **PEAR**

ESSAYS

THE CONDITIONING OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ARE DEPENDENCY AND WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY STILL RELEVANT?
Joel Campbell

NIXON, KISSINGER AND MUSICAL DIPLOMACY IN THE OPENING OF CHINA, 1971-1973
Adam Cathcart





THE CONDITIONING OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ARE DEPENDENCY AND WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY STILL RELEVANT?

Joel Campbell
Troy University

The Emergence of Dependency

The world underwent significant political change in the early post-World War II era, as the old colonial empires broke up and many new nations were born. Political economists groping to understand the process of economic development in times of rapid transformation swiftly split along ideological lines. The position that dominated in the developed world, variously called the modernization, diffusionist or mainstream school, stressed nation-building and modernization using European and American economic development as models. Extensive left-wing criticisms of this school led to three radical approaches to development in the 1960s, many of them developed by Latin American scholars. The first emphasized the dual structure of developing economies. The second approach put forward the concept of dependency, the linking of lesser developed countries (LDCs) to the world capitalist economy. The third approach focused on imperialistic domination of one country by another. Advocates of each of these three approaches in turn split into Marxists and non-Marxists[1].

Understanding the process of development is crucial to current comparative politics. Both the developed and undeveloped worlds are consumed by issues of development — financial crises, debts, aid, trade, military alliances — and these issues determine relations between those worlds. Developmental scholars attempt to form both universal theories and explain individual national cases, which are the key tasks of comparative politics. Dependency and its successor, world-systems, may no longer be as popular as they once were, but are they still relevant? This essay argues that, despite clear methodological problems, the two approaches may be useful building blocks for the construction of

1 Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theoretical of Comparative Politics: the Search for a Paradigm* (Boulder: Westview Press*, 271-330), 1981.*

a twenty-first century theory of economic development.

Classic Dependency Literature

Much of the early dependency literature began in Latin America, based on earlier structuralist literature by Raul Prebisch[2] and others, who harshly criticized the mainstream approach. It presented fairly static core-periphery models of exploitation. Cardoso and Faletto provide a more nuanced approach and, in their later work, even suggest possibilities for "development with dependency."[3] Dependency ideas gradually found fertile ground in European and American academia. One of the most prominent North American works is Andre Gunder Frank's Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, a strident call to arms against the exploitation of the global South that often strays into ideological diatribe:

> These essays were written to contribute to the Revolution in Latin America and the world, and they are collected here in the hope that they may help others to contribute more to the Revolution than the author has been able to. The essays arise out of the author's attempt, like that of millions of others, to assimilate the Latin American Revolution and the inspiration it finds in the Cuban Revolution, whose tenth glorious anniversary we celebrate [...].[4]

Clearly, he throws academic objectivity to the wind. The book consists of three parts — a critique of American liberal economics as a conservative ideology, a presentation of the manifestations of neo-imperialism in Latin America and a discussion of how a dual economy operates there. His central thesis is that much of the developed world is characterized by underdevelopment (i.e., any development serves primarily core country interests). Strongly disagreeing with mainstream economist W.W. Rostow,[5] he says underdevelopment is in no way comparable to earlier economic stages of currently advanced countries. He also

2 Raul Prebisch, *Change and Development: Latin America's Great Task* (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1970).

3 Fernando Enrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979).

4 Andre Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), ix.

5 W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

pinpoints Latin American bourgeoisie as the tactical enemy and imperialism as the strategic foe.

Like Frank's jeremiad, Richard Harris's collection of essays on Africa, The Political Economy of Africa, is an angry protest. It is also, claims Harris, "an alternative to the conventional Western social science literature on Africa," because it looks at Africa in terms of the world economy, and at the effects of that world economy on individual African countries.[6] Colin Leys's Underdevelopment in Kenya[7], like the works of Frank and Harris, focuses on the problem of underdevelopment. He shows a country very much different from the image held in the West, a country warped by both the colonial experience and the subsequent penetration of Western capital.

Where mainstream works called for modernization, Denis Goulet focuses on inequality in peripheral nations. The Cruel Choice, his analysis of developing countries, insists that the developed countries generally manipulate impoverished countries for their own ends and, even when attempting to be helpful, do more harm than good because they impose a goal of affluence that debases the societies it is designed to assist.

Goulet closely links ethics and economic thought. He insists that international inequality encompasses two kinds of change: 1) production, "mastery over nature," organization, and technology, and 2) power and ideology. He declares:

> While professing a desire to share technology and abundance with less developed, advanced societies [...] struggle to maintain their supremacy in domains relating to the second set of processes.[8]

Power and economic progress are thus entwined from the beginning and in essence, the developed countries try to reduce the rest of the world to a social experiment undermining the will and culture of developing peoples. Poor nations cannot hope to promote that first kind of developmental change unless they can "redefine the parameters" of the second.

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6 Richard Harris, ed., *The Political Economy of Africa* (New York: Schenkman Publishing Co, Inc., 1975).

7 Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: the Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964-1971* (London: Heineman, 1975).

8 Denis Goulet, *The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development* (New York: University Press of America, 1985), 15.

Impoverished countries struggle with both global environmental and social changes. Ethics, he asserts, provide developing societies with both a critique of the process and prescription for action. Development presents many cruel choices — hence the title — "because choices are made within narrow confines," and whoever controls development imposes "harsh constraints and bitter consequences." To ameliorate cruel choices inherent in development, Goulet advocates provision of basic amenities before anything else, i.e., dealing with poverty before advancing to affluence; here, he agrees with basic policy statements of the World Bank. Goulet is for "world solidarity without domination," "cultural diversity and ecological health" and "human freedom." Anyone could probably endorse these bromides, but Goulet also has in mind development as a provider of both necessities and dignity. He thus advocates elimination of economic vulnerability (generally felt as "the shock of underdevelopment") through reciprocity in international trade and finance. Furthermore, by promoting a kind of non-sectarian Christian developmental ethic, he elevates the subject of development above its usual dry economic format. While hewing gently to the Marxian dialectic of change, he avoids a strictly doctrinaire stance.

Goulet is at once more realistic and more starry-eyed than other dependency thinkers. The realism comes by noting the difficult choices the developing world faces. Writers on either end of the political spectrum in effect are saying, "adopt my program and conditions will improve." Goulet instead seems to declare, "adopt my point of view, and we can begin to deal with the monstrously difficult problems before us." If the most fundamental human problems cannot be solved until attitudes change, he has taken a vital first step. He is right to point out the commonly dehumanized nature of development programs, and he lays out many of the ideological and policy concerns that must attend to either scholarly or practical development approaches.

Goulet's lack of realism derives from his overuse of idealistic language, his neglect of theory in favor of advocacy, and the gap between his normative assertions and practical applications. One wonders whether rich countries can be helpful in any way, or how the developing world can extricate itself from its mess, if the problems are as endemic as he suggests. Ronald Chilicote and Joel Edelstein's Latin America: the Struggle with Dependency and Beyond[9]

9 Ronald H. Chilicote and Joel C. Edelstein, *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974).

is a more focused approach to leftist concerns about development, especially dependence, and therefore one of the best introductions to dependency theory. They and their contributors contrast dependency with the diffusion approach, which they seem to define as whatever does not fit into dependency in terms of three issues: 1) feudalism and "dual" societies, 2) national bourgeoisie and 3) ruling classes. Their dependency theory affirms the existence of a dual economy, one part partially developed and dependently linked to a larger advanced economic metropole, the other primitive and dependent on a local economic satellite acting on behalf of the metropole. Six historical case studies illustrate the process of dependency in Latin America, from colonial times to the present.

As with most works on dependency, Chilicote and Edelstein's efforts never come to grips with conceptual drawbacks or methodological issues. These include dependency's overtly ideological nature, conceptual muddiness, loose definitions, skimpy empirical bases and poor operationalization.

A more balanced approach appears in Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism, edited by Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth.[10] Also useful for comparative purposes, these articles take a skeptical approach to both mainstream and dependency development concepts. For instance, Kurth asserts that it is impossible to validate common explanations of US interventions in the postwar era. Karl Deutsch states that most theories of imperialism and neo-imperialism do not address the "emancipatory potentials" of developing countries, i.e., their ability to shake off the remnants of the imperial system. In fact, noted by Andrew Mack, the concept imperialism is a highly ambiguous one with a variety of attendant methodological problems. James Caporaso thinks that when the concept of exploitation is more clearly defined, it will be possible to conduct tests of it. Finally, Rosen questions the economic liberal notion that the US does not exploit the policy of the Open Door. He shows that in many cases, US economic penetration of countries rises after those countries go authoritarian.

The Chilicote-Edelstein and Rosen-Kurth edited volumes should properly be read together. Since much of the discussion of development over the past 40 years has been clouded in ideology and politics, viewing two perspectives together may allow a more balanced appraisal.

Dependency has been criticized for similar reasons from both the left

10 Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, eds., *Testing Theories of Econoomic Imperialism* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974).

and right. First, the approach does not adequately define or explain its concepts, e.g., dependence, domination, core and periphery. Second, in focusing on economic exploitation, it neglects other forms of power, such as political power among states. It also fails to look at power relationships among left-leaning countries. Third, it is too concerned with the international economic structure, but not enough with domestic political systems. Fourth, in adopting basically static models, it ignores or downplays the most important story among developing countries in the second half of the twentieth century: the rise of the East Asian Tiger economies and China.[11] Even so, in pointing out systemic inequality and the clear failures of conventional development efforts, it sketches a clear and urgent global agenda.

World Systems Theory

The world-system emerged as dependency theory began to fade; it was primarily the brainchild of Immanuel Wallerstein, put forth in The Modern World-System, Vols. I to IV (1974-2011).[12] Applying an historical approach to the development of the Western European economy, his basic thesis is that capitalism was the best solution to the problems caused by the end of feudalism, such as population increases, food supply shifts, new sea trade routes and inflows of New World gold. After a period of expansion, the European economy slowed down in the seventeenth century. This led to the consolidation of Europe into a single market and, as capitalism expanded worldwide, a pattern of core and peripheral states emerged. The European core controlled political, military, and economic power, while the colonial American and Eastern European peripheries exported food and raw materials, and were both exploited by and dependent on the core. In between was a semi-periphery, including countries which enjoyed core-like industrial structures, but also contained large traditional primary sectors. Depending on the degree of development and effectiveness of the state, semi-peripheral states could rise to core status.

Wallerstein employs a conceptual framework that he calls the "world-system." Conceding the difficulty of working theoretically with historical data,

11 Theodore H. Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Longman, 2000), 116-117.

12 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System, Vols. I to IV* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011).

he believes the effort to be important since this has been generally avoided — "a major tragedy of twentieth century social science." Instead of examining individual states and their actions, he looks at how they interact within the world economic as a whole. He believes this method is superior to the stage approach, such as that used by Rostow. Wallerstein then lays out the structures that constitute building blocks of core-periphery relationships, most notably agricultural and labor markets, class divisions and trade patterns.

Wallerstein's brilliant original contribution is to go beyond the stasis of the dependency concept, usually applied to the late-twentieth century and to look for the roots of the modern economy in the distant past. If he can successfully show such core-periphery system rose along with the nation-state, science and other phenomena one associates with modernity, he may prove that it is the driving force of the modern world economy. Various liberal and Marxist economists have taken a similar approach to trace the antecedents of capitalism.

Is he in fact successful? By constructing an original theoretical framework that links long-term socio-political changes in individual nations with the ongoing changes in the world economy, and by thoroughly documenting his thesis, his work may be the best test of whether dependency relationships actually characterize the current international economy. He also avoids many perceived "pitfalls" of dependency noted above, and may have hit on the best-constructed macro-historical approach ever applied to the global economy. It ought to be followed up by similar efforts within other theoretical approaches.

While fascinating, Wallerstein's approach has also attracted significant criticism. First, like dependency, it focuses more on external than internal factors that shaped economic development. Second, as the realist school of international relations notes, it concentrates on economic ties and neglects the states. Development-oriented states have been vital for "late developers" from the nineteenth century US and Germany to the twentieth century Japan and South Korea.[13] Meanwhile, in making state power a factor affecting the relative position of nations, he edges close to the realist or economic nationalist positions. Third, though he writes at length about the overall changes that occurred in Europe, and takes up many of the academic controversies surrounding them, his actual economic analysis is sparse. For example, his discussion of the economic slowdown and consolidation of the pivotal seventeenth century takes

13 Cohn, *Global Political Economy*, 120-121.

up only 24 pages. Fourth, by stating that economic advance, slowdown, and consolidation were systemic, he downplays the contrary motion of several of the leading European states throughout the period. Spain, for one, peaked early and lost ground thereafter (it was variously both a hegemon and an economic basket case). Fifth, he mixes political and social with economic indicators so frequently that his analysis is deemed just another general history of the period, rather than an economically based explanation. Sixth, lumping Eastern Europe and South America into the periphery may be stretching things, since the economic patterns of these two regions throughout the period were quite different. Until world-system theorists overcome the Euro-centered nature and methodological haziness of this analysis, it will have limited applicability to comparative political economy.

Conclusion: Implications for Comparative Politics

Much of the structuralist and dependency literature on economic development, especially that dealing with developing nations, takes a leftist slant. While it is proper that the Left weighed in on this issue and corrected the hidebound conservatism of the earlier neoclassical or liberal economic approaches, the oversimplification of development issues through dependency did not lead to the creation of a new economic paradigm or viable long-term theoretical approach.

One of the most serious drawbacks to dependencista and neo-imperialist approaches is their failure to consider that developing nations are often responsible for much of their own misery, i.e., by way of abysmal governance, ineffective economic policy, and endemic corruption. It is always easy to blame one's problems on an external force, particularly when that force emanates from a large developed country regarded as a hegemonic power. The world-system, exploitation, core and periphery, then become more distracting ideological constructs than measurable empirical concepts.

Dependency has limited usefulness in comparative terms. An approach used to describe development in the specific context of Latin America does little to explain the process in East Asia, where economic patterns swiftly escaped from dependence and per capita income now approaches levels of the advanced nations, or sub-Saharan Africa, where development has hardly begun. Mainstream structure-functionalists and the stage theorists, in seeking more objective, non-ideological measures of developmental phenomena, may be on a

sounder conceptual ground. David Apter,[14] for instance, distinguishes between modernization (a socio-economic process) and development (observable reality). For all their ethnocentrism and pro-Western bias, the modernizationists at least sought universally applicable, politically neutral theory.

But anti-globalization protests and the Occupy movement grab us by the collar and shout that we must discuss global inequality, now more than ever. The task ahead is clear. Development scholars must somehow combine the theoretical comprehensiveness of the mainstream school with the dependencistas' expression of the pain, exploitation, and resentment caused by Western domination of the developing world. If dependency is a genuine phenomenon, it must be better conceptualized and then quantified, not just be proclaimed. Also if it is something with true value as a comparative tool, it must be observed throughout the world, not only in Latin America (or parts of Africa). Radical approaches did the comparative politics and international political economy fields a great service by pointing out the difficulties and costs inherent in the process of development. It is now for the next generation of scholars to devise more balanced analyses and realistic prescriptions for action. **PEAR**

14 David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).





NIXON, KISSINGER AND MUSICAL DIPLOMACY IN THE OPENING OF CHINA, 1971-1973

Adam Cathcart
Pacific Lutheran University

President Nixon: "I think the Prime Minister [Zhou] has outlined a very satisfactory and workable process, and as our Foreign Ministers discuss the problems of normalization of contacts, or trade…

Premier Minister Zhou: Culture…

President Nixon: Culture…."[1]

Music and Diplomacy

Richard Nixon was indeed correct when he wrote that the Chinese leadership "consider[ed] every act purposeful and every event symbolic."[2] As the cultural battlefield of the Cold War unfolded, ceremony remained an essential element in Chinese statecraft.[3] In dealing with the Chinese, Nixon himself remarked that "atmospherics" were often "more important than any day-to-day substance," making cultural exchange all the more potent of an instrument for breaking down the wall of mistrust between the PRC and USA.[4]

1 Memorandum of Conversation between President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State Rogers, and Zhou Enlai, et. al., Beijing, Feb 21, 1972, 9. National Security Archive.

2 Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 869.

3 Chris Tudda, *The Truth is Our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006); Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange & the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).

4 Handwritten note from Nixon to Kissinger, written on Kissinger's June 27, 1972 memo to Nixon entitled "Atmospherics of My Visit to Peking," National Archives, National Security Council Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Box 97 Folder "CHINA – Dr. Kissinger June 1972 Visit."

Jiang Qing

Nixon and his cohort clearly took cognizance of the woman at the heart of the Cultural Revolution and its attendant musical debates, Jiang Qing. Materials vetted by Kissinger and prepared for Nixon's wife, Patricia, would deal most expressly with her role as part of the normal raft of "first lady" activities. Among the briefing materials included in Feburary 1972 for Mrs. Nixon was the full text of Jiang Qing's 1964 speech on reform of Peking Opera.[5] Only permitted by Mao to become a public and political figure via the arts after 1962, Jiang Qing seized and wielded great power in the cultural sphere. Under her influence, institutions of music higher education benefited tremendously, receiving generous food subsidies at a time when rations were scarce.[6] Jiang Qing initiated the reform of the conservatory from a Western music – a Soviet model – into an institution more geared toward Chinese folk music.

However, she was not entirely hostile toward Western instruments and in fact was fascinated by the mobilizing power of music. Jiang Qing's interest in Western music was that of a dilettante aspiring to be beyond reproach in her choices. In her quest to reinforce the genius of Mao Zedong Thought, Jiang Qing listened repeatedly to forbidden Western music, including Brahms' Hungarian Rhapsodies for orchestra. Using the techniques gleaned from the West, Jiang Qing wanted to strengthen the artistic and ideological effectiveness of her own vehicle to power: the musical and dramatic arts. The resultant products, such as the anthem The East is Red, showed clearly the influence of Beethoven's Ninth (and perhaps Shostakovich's Second) symphony. She also clearly influenced Kim Jong-il in his growing grasp and understanding of the power of the North Korean cultural apparatus.[7]

In keeping with her adversarial nature and the series of devastating purges of the Central Committee since 1966, the preparations for Nixon's visits were caught up in cultural struggles between Jiang Qing and her least favorite of

5 John H. Holdridge to Kissinger, NSC document, "Background Memorandum for Mrs. Nixon on Her Participation in the Trip to the People's Republic of China." National Security Council Files. Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Box 91. [Folder: PRC/Briefing Papers Sent to President, February 1972, Folder 1 of 2]. (Jiang Qing's speeches of April 1967 speech to military commission and March 24, 1968 speech were also included, as was Deng Yingqui's speech (Zhou's wife) for balance on the life styles of women in China.

6 Interviews with Cultural Revolution-era China Central Conservatory students, Beijing, July 2006.

7 For obvious echoes of Jiang Qing's 1964 talks, see Kim Jong Il, "On the Direction which Musical Creation Should Take," in *Kim Jong Il Selected Works Vol. 1* (Pyongyong: Foreign Langauges Press, 1992), 390-397.

Mao's retainers, Zhou Enlai. Zhou was ascendant in early 1972, benefiting from the turbulence of the Lin Biao affair and the subsequent power vacuum and climate of uncertainty in the Central Committee (which is to say Mao's mind). The whole notion of an opening to the United States, China's great enemy since the Angus Ward affair of 1948, was looked down upon by Jiang Qing, who viewed the flirtations with Nixon as the affair of Zhou Enlai. Zhou, in her view, was seeking to break the dominance of the Lin Biao faction over Chairman Mao. Jiang had long been wary of Zhou Enlai, who was himself expert in the opera, having played female roles in the past, and having had experience directing propaganda troupes since the 1920s in mobilization campaigns in southern China.[8] The internal divisions within the Chinese Communist Party lent importance and extreme symbolic emphasis on the musical choices made for Kissinger and Nixon. Repertoire choices, like every other detail for these visits, received close personal attention of the leaders and were subject to internal debate.

The Americans Are Coming

In preparation for Kissinger's second visit to Beijing, Zhou Enlai arranged for German music to be performed for the envoy. In this request, Zhou was treading on difficult ground, for his prior request to prepare a Central Philharmonic program of European music in honor of the West German foreign minister had been denied by Jiang Qing's coterie of cultural advisors. Yu Huiyong, who controlled China's most prominent orchestra, had "refused to give the Central Philharmonic any time to rehearse."[9]

Li Delun, the director of the Central Philharmonic and close to Zhou Enlai, was at the epicenter of the struggles over the musical preparations for Kissinger and Nixon. Li Delun, in a later interview, said that orchestra was decided upon as entertainment because orchestral music lacked the problems of ballet. Drama, with its scripts, was too specific. According to Li, Zhou Enlai very carefully selected a Beethoven symphony appropriate for Kissinger, asking Li to provide programmatic information for each of the symphonies. Reflecting the potentially "reactionary" label that might be applied to such materials, the

8 Ross Terrill, *The White-Boned Demon: A Biography of Madame Mao Zedong* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984), 166, 322-325.

9 Sheila Melvin and Jindong Cai, *Rhapsody in Red: How Western Classical Music Became Chinese* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2004), 266.

Premier asked that Li Delun leave the study materials at Zhou's private office at the State Council, rather than the more standard drop-off at the Western gate of the leadership compound at Zhongnanhai.

The Central Philharmonic would perform for Kissinger, but which Beethoven symphony they would play for him had not yet been determined. Li Delun was called in for a meeting with Jiang Qing about the matter, and his suggestions to play Beethoven's Fifth (whose fatalism contravened Marxism's teleological bent) and Beethoven's Third (Napoleon being a bourgeois figure). Ultimately the Sixth Symphony, *The Pastoral*, was decided upon.[10]

However, the unorthodox programming of the Beethoven symphony was balanced by its juxtaposition with standard revolutionary opera. Kissinger thus attended a well publicized show *The White Haired Girl*, a revolutionary ballet performed by the Central Ballet Company of China.[11] *The White Haired Girl* (Bai Mao Nü) tells the story of the suffering life of a peasant girl who is saved from a life of servitude by the revolutionary leader.[12] This sought-after story had been portrayed in the movie before the ballet and was extremely effective in provoking feelings of hatred to the old system.[13] The government was impressed by the impact of the movie, and like many others, the CCP artists sought to transform this most moving story into the other artistic sphere of ballet.

As Kissinger later noted: "On the evening of October 22 we were taken to the Great Hall of the People to see a 'revolutionary' Peking opera—an art form of truly stupefying boredom in which villains were the incarnation of evil and wore black, good guys wore red, and as far as I could make out the girl fell in love with a tractor."[14] Kissinger's brusque dismissal in his memoirs is belied in his briefing notes for Nixon on this very opera, which the National Security Advisor called "a command performance," noting that the length of

10 Luo Yunyun, Li Delun Zhuan (Biography of Li Delun), (Beijing: Zuojia Chubanshe, 2001), 406-407.

11 Sheila Melvin and Jindong Cai assert that Kissinger attended *The Red Detachment of Women*, but are erroneous.

12 For critical perspectives on Bai Mao Nu, see Zhang Lianjun, Guan Daxin, Wang Shuyan, Dongsansheng Geming Wenhua Shi 1919.5.4-1949.10.1 (History of Revolutionary Culture in the Three Northeastern Provinces, 1919-1949) (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2003); Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979); Guo Jianmin, Ershi shiji eishi-liushi niandai de zhongguo geju biaoyan yishu ("Representative 20th- century Chinese Operas from the 1920s to the 1960s") Yinyue Yanjiu (Music Research) 2002, March, vol. 1.

13 He Jingzhi, Zhang Songru, words, and Cui Wei, Zhang Lu, and Ma Ke, music, Bai Mao Nü

14 Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), 779.

applause was the important thing and to be noted.[15] The opera, Shijiabang, had been attended by Kissinger's whole group, hosted by Marshal Ye Jianying in small auditorium in the Great Hall of the People (Renmin Dahuitang).[16]

When Nixon was in China, Kissinger showed his awareness that the cultural events masked behind-the-scenes preparations for further discussions, developing ideas at previous sessions. "Slip me a note at the gymnastics," he said to Vice Minister Qiao Guanhua.[17]

Various scenarios had been contemplated for the first meeting, and the role of music played in virtually every one. One early draft noted "POSSIBLE CROWD SITUATION" on the 40 minute drive from Arrival Ceremony in Peking at 11:30 am to residence.[18] On schedule marked "Departure for Guam for Shanghai and Peking, China," Nixon is warned that upon passing through Tiananmen Square on the way from the airport, "There is a possibility the motorcade may stop in the Square so that you may observe some folk dancing." Previewing his itinerary for February 22, Nixon saw that "It is anticipated that the Cultural event will be an opera," for which he was given an attached document entitled "Background on Revolutionized Chinese Opera." "It is anticipated," read a subsequent draft, "that the opera will be *Red Detachment of Women.*" It is interesting that Nixon took such careful note of the content of the performance, even though his main object was likely his plan to retreat at intermission to meet with Zhou Enlai. At the same time, Nixon was aware that extracts of the performance would be aired live in the United States – raising the question of which type of music was influencing whom and more—and wished to assess the potential impact.[19]

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15 Handwritten note from Nixon to Kissinger, written on Kissinger's June 27, 1972 memo to Nixon entitled "Atmospherics of My Visit to Peking," National Archives, National Security Council Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Box 97 Folder "CHINA – Dr. Kissinger June 1972 Visit."

16 National Security Council Files. Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Box 90, Folder "China Visit Record of Previous Visits Arranged by Subject Matter, Book I Feb. 1972 TS Folder 1 of 2." The following Monday night, Oct. 25, the entertainment was everyone, minus Kissinger, going to Guest House "for showing film of July trip followed by movie of the ballet, Red Detachment of Women." National Security Council Files. Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Box 90, Folder "China Visit Record of Previous Visits Arranged by Subject Matter, Book I Feb. 1972 TS Folder 1 of 2."

17 Henry Kissinger, Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai, Qiao Guanhua, et. al., February 23, 1972, reproduced by National Security Archive, 21, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/kissinger/nixzhou/13-01.htm.

18 ROUGH PRESIDENTIAL SCHEDULE For THE TRIP TO CHINA, Dec. 23, 1971, White House Central Files, Box 60, Folder 2.

19 White House Central Files, Subject Files, Trips, Box 60, Folder 6, EX TR 24 China, People's Republic of (Red China) Proposed 1972, Beginning – 7/28/71).

For Nixon's visit, the Chinese leadership again bent the harsh musical protocols of the Cultural Revolution in order to accommodate their foreign guests. Greeting Nixon at the opening banquet at the Great Hall of the People on the night of his arrival was a band playing "Home on the Range." (Playing songs known to be presidential favorites was to become a tradition, but the band mistakenly played the University of Michigan fight song for President Gerald Ford in 1975 when Michigan State was in fact the President's alma mater.) It is not known if the Chinese made a piano available for President Nixon to use in accompanying the group.

Nixon's response to the U.S. national anthem landed him into some domestic problems. The White House received a slew of letters about, in the words of one citizen, "why the president did not place his hand over his heart when the Chinese played the National Anthem of the United States of America." Gulley says "The President is well aware of the protocol and custom pertaining to saluting the flag when it is on display during the playing of our National Anthem. Because the flag was a considerable distance from him, the President felt it would be more appropriate for him to face in the direction of the music and stand at attention. I can assure you the President feels the greatest respect for our flag and his demeanor was not only proper but clearly the most appropriate action under the circumstances." And this was the form response to many complaint letters in the same folder. Ravenswood, WV, even wrote about it in the paper.[20]

Nixon's speech at the banquet not only conquered the hasty preparations for it, but also directly echoed media calls in the US for an intensified cultural engagement with China.[21] The extent to which Chinese people were impacted by the music played for Nixon must remain speculative, although one can speculate by discussing media depictions of the trip. While the Americans hailed the advent of satellite television, few Chinese watched the event live. However, for the musicians involved, the opportunity to play Beethoven and

20 W.L. Gulley replies to Mrs. Magaret Von Nostrand of East Rockaway, NY White House Central Files, Subject Files, Trips, Box 73, Folder 1, EX TR 24 China, People's Republic of (Red China) Proposed 1972, Beginning – 7/28/71)

21 President Nixon's notes on WGN Editorial from Chicago from which he appropriated "the journey of a thousand miles starts with a single step" The April 1971 editorial stated that "the logic proceeds that if we can get along over a ping-pong table, maybe we can get along on other levels." White House Central Files, Subject Files, Trips, Box 59. Folder 1, EX TR 24 China, People's Republic of (Red China) Proposed 1972, Beginning – 7/28/71.

Western songs was savored.

Richard Nixon's attendance at a performance of the revolutionary opera *Red Detachment of Women* marked the closest encounter of the American leader with the Maoist personality cult. The selection of the ballet *Red Detachment of Women* (Hong Ce Niang Zi Jun) was not coincidental.[22] Of the eight model works (yang ban xi), it appeared to the Chinese leadership the most appropriate performance for the occasion. As a ballet, *Red Detachment* had decided advantages: bereft of text, it was performance ready. In 1971, the ballet had been performed for the state visit of North Vietnamese leaders.[23] Most importantly, the ballet conveyed a message highly pertinent to Taiwan, the foremost concern of Chinese leaders during the Nixon summit. Unlike *The White Haired Girl*, *Red Detachment* took place not in the arid ancestral northwestern revolutionary heartland of Shanxi, but on the southernmost island, Hainan. The setting on Hainan, along with the militant brigades of guerilla fighters organized on stage, was intended to remind Nixon not only of the strength of the people's war, but also of the CCP's determination to consolidate that other questionable island—Taiwan—under the red banner. Nixon, in an interview two days later with an American correspondent, indicated a level of discomfort with the performance, saying "of course it had its message," but then went on to praise the opera effusively.[24]

22 Philip Hui-ho Cheng, "The Function of Chinese Opera in Social Control and Change," Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1974.

23 Roxanne Witke, Comrade Chiang Ch'ing (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977).

24 Nixon interview with NPR Correspondent Tom Jarrils, quoted in Beijing Waiyu Guangbo, "Ni'kesong fang Hua: jizhetuan beihou de gu shi (Nixon's Trip to China: The Behind-the-Scenes Story of the Reporter's Group," A.M. 774.com http://am774.rbc.cn/netfm/english_service/movie/201202/t20120222_678266.htm.



6:30 p.m.	Arrive residence.
	Personal Dinner
8:15 p.m.	Depart en route Opera.
	(Driving time: 15 mins.)
8:30 p.m.	Arrive Opera. (Great Hall of the People)
	Attend Opera.
10:30 p.m.	Opera concludes. Depart en route residence.
10:45 p.m.	Arrive residence.
	OVERNIGHT

The performance of Red Detachment of Women was, internally, a concession to Jiang Qing and marked her ability to intercede in foreign relations. As a preface to a conversation that ranged from Taiwan to Tokyo, Zhou hinted at the awkwardness and imbalance of Jiang Qing's chosen art form. "[Zhou Enlai] remarked that none of those on the US side smoked. He said that Madame Mao would attend the ballet that evening and noted that it was difficult to combine classical ballet with revolutionary themes."[25] The internal divisions within the Chinese Communist Party lent importance and extreme symbolic emphasis on the musical choices made for Kissinger and Nixon. Repertoire choices, like every other detail for these visits, received close personal attention of the leaders and were undoubtedly subject to internal debate.

On the Nixon trip to China, cultural components wove their way through virtually every interaction, a good example being the veering into poetry and its interpretation during the discussions between Nixon, Zhou Enlai and Kissinger.[26] The importance of culture as public symbology was made again clear when Zhou Enlai referred to his toast of the night before in a conversation about the Taiwan problem.[27] First Lady Patricia Nixon made a trip to a people's

25 Memorandum of Conversation between President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Zhou Enlai, et. al., in the Great Hall of the People, Beijing, Feb 22, 1972, 1.

26 Ibid.

27 Memorandum of Conversation, Feb. 24, 1972, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, National Security Archive, 6.

commune outside of Beijing, where she was regaled with the opera Xia Jia Bang. Showing the attentiveness of the Americans to the choice, Mrs. Nixon had been briefed by State Department officials about the content of the opera with a one-page memo. [28]

The musical diplomacy continued as important people-to-people contact, but it also revealed fissures within Zhongnanhai, and reflected the difficulties of Zhou Enlai's position within the Chinese leadership. Kissinger went on to sign the Shanghai Communique, enshrining the need for more "people to people contacts" in scientific, athletic, and cultural realms, and, even through the period of leadership transition from 1976-1978, these continued.[29]

By 1979, Deng Xiaoping would shoulder his way forward into China's prime political position, and open his arms to performances by American artists like John Denver. From the Chinese point of view, the musical opening to the West ultimately resulted in tremendous public relations benefits, a prime example being Shirley MacLaine's enthusiastic work as filmmaker, memoirist, and singer to assure mass audiences of Americans that China's culture was to be admired.[30]

Nixon's trip was significant for more specific reasons that lie at the core of this study. Nixon personally brought with him the beginning of the end to the musical hegemony, the cult of the revolutionary opera, that was stifling Chinese music, and brought with him Western music that would lead the way forward to today's thriving Western music scene in cities like Beijing.[31] **PEAR**

28 John H. Holdridge to Kissinger, NSC document, "Background Memorandum for Mrs. Nixon on Her Participation in the Trip to the People's Republic of China." National Security Council Files. Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Box 91, Folder: PRC/Briefing Papers Sent to President, February 1972, Folder 1 of 2; see also Nell Yates to Chapin, Jan. 11, 1972, White House Central Files, Box 60, Folder 3; White House Central Files, Subject Files, Trips, Box 61, Folder 1, EX TR 24 China, People's Republic of (Red China) Proposed 1972, Beginning – 7/28/71).

29 Adam Cathcart, Review of Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., The China Diary of George H.W. Bush: The Making of a Global President, for H-Diplo Reviews Roundtable, Vol. X, No. 18 (June), http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-X-18.pdf.

30 Shirley MacLaine, *You Can Get There From Here* (New York: Norton, 1975). Franz Bleeker is thanked for alerting the author to this often jarring, but never less than revealing, source.

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INTERVIEW

ASIA IN THE AGE OF THE PIVOT: UNDERSTANDING ASIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Interview with Professor Chung-in Moon





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Chung-in Moon is a professor of political science at Yonsei University and Editor in Chief of Global Asia, a new quarterly magazine in English about East Asia. He served as Dean of Yonsei's Graduate School of International Studies. He was also Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, a cabinet-level post, and Ambassador for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Republic of Korea. He has published over 40 books and 230 articles in edited volumes and such scholarly journals as World Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and the World Development. His publications include Debating the Future of China (in Korean) and The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order. He is the only person who attended the 1st and 2nd Pyongyang Korean summit as a special delegate. He is the recipient of Public Policy Scholar Award (the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, D.C.), the Lixian Scholar Award (Beijing University), and the Pacific Leadership Fellowship (UCSD). He served as Vice President of the International Studies Association (ISA) of North America and president of the Korea Peace Research Association.

PEAR: ***America's so-called "Asia pivot" is a popular catchphrase used by many policymakers and academics these days when discussing America's role in Asia. If America is redirecting its attention eastward and stepping up its efforts at engagement in Asia, in what ways do you foresee this happening?***

Professor Moon: I do not know understand why the US is paying "re-attention" to Asia. I am somewhat worried because nowadays the US has become the Midas hand of misfortune. Wherever it has gone, be it Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, war and human misery followed. In the post-Iraq and Afghan era, the US might have to create a new diplomatic agenda. The Asia pivot policy might have emerged in this context. Of course, President Obama has been say-

ing that Asia is the new center of gravity in the world. In fact, economic powerhouses are all concentrated in Asia, and therefore American prosperity hinges on this region.

A rebalancing against China's rise might have been more important rationale than the economic one. I cannot accept the argument that the US should be balancing against China. US policy makers need to craft new and innovative policies aimed at co-evolving with China rather than balancing against it. It is understandable that the US sees the key to its future in its strategic and economic ties with the Asia-Pacific region and thus wants to reposition itself in the region. There are two key elements to this repositioning. One is enhancing economic benefits, and the other is to promote its strategic interests by pursuing a rebalancing strategy to counter China's rise. However, I do not see any wisdom in such a strategic initiative because the US was, still is, and will be here in the future. It can at best be an election year campaign slogan.

One of the pivot strategy's main intentions is to reach out to Southeast Asia and South Asia. Why is the US pushing so far south? Of course, the South China Sea is a global flashpoint, but shifting focus to this area to balance against China, instead of working together with China, will only further worsen the situation. In a similar vein, American ventures into the Indian Ocean will also invite China's countervailing move, opening a new era of naval arms race there.

PEAR: ***If you could have President Obama's ear for ten minutes, what would you suggest as an alternative Asia-Pacific strategy?***

Professor Moon: I would say, "Just continue the old strategy." Please treat China as a friendly partner, while maintaining the traditional system of bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea and increasing engagement with Southeast Asian countries. "Please abstain from using such phrases as China threat, rebalancing against China, and China's hegemonic ascension, while emphasizing the logic of stakeholder relationship, co-evolution, and strategic partnership." I would suggest to President Obama that he read Henry Kissinger's *On China* rather than those works that belong to the "China threat" school.

In fact, this is what the US has been doing for some time until now. A sudden move to Asia under the rhetoric of 're-balancing against China could backfire. I understand that the purpose of American power will become somewhat blurred after the withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. America is inher-

ently insecure without having an outside enemy. China's rise tempts American opinion leaders to follow an old pattern of reasoning. In the presidential election, the politicization of such reasoning becomes all the more visible. That could be good for Obama's election campaign but bad for the region. It is like committing the fallacy of Faustian bargaining. A short-term partisan gain should not undermine comprehensive American national interests. Conservative folks in Asia who are wary of China's rise and conflicts with China want American involvement as a hedging strategy, but lots of people in Asia wish cooperation between the two giants.

PEAR: ***Although the American market is still an important part of economic growth and a major link in the economic production chain for Asia-Pacific nations, China has overtaken the United States as the largest market for exports. This has resulted in a new regional order. Asia-Pacific nations rely on China for trade and economic growth and the US for peace and stability. Which national interest do you think the countries of the Asia-Pacific will prioritize: economic growth or security concerns? What are the implications of a new regional order on the prospects for regional security architecture?***

Professor Moon: Obviously, economics will come first. Simply put: people matter. All these threats and insecurities tend to be contrived and are not reflective of reality. What is most important is creating jobs, sustaining economic growth and ensuring the welfare of the people. Thus, securing the overall well-being of the people is the most important mandate for democratic countries, making it priority number one. But security, although secondary to the economy, is of course a crucial concern. There are plenty of security-related issues in the Asia-Pacific, most notably the North Korean nuclear quagmire, inter-Korean conflict, the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Dokdo/Takeshima islands disputes as well as cross-strait and northern territory issues. However, these issues have, more or less, been managed in the past and will continue to be dealt with in the future through bilateral cooperation and other means. Of course, North Korea is always a flashpoint. However, if North Korea is recognized as a normal state and negotiated with accordingly, issues related to North Korea could be properly dealt with. Thus, in the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in Northeast Asia, we can argue that security issues have been relatively well managed, thus leaving us with economics as

priority number one.

Take the case of South Korea, for example. As of 2011, China accounts for almost 23.5 percent of South Korea's total trade. Therefore, our trade with China is greater than our trade with Japan and the US combined. Last year alone, we enjoyed a trade surplus totaling over $48.1 billion with China; we have a trade deficit with Japan of almost $30 billion and an almost $11.7 billion trade surplus with the US. As these statistics prove, we are making money with China to pay for our trade deficit with Japan. How can we then neglect the China factor? More than 40,000 firms are doing business in China; the share controlled by China in the South Korean bond market is increasing. And South Korea's future macroeconomic stability will hinge on China's macroeconomic stability. Thus, from an economic interdependence perspective, South Korea has become an inseparable part of the Chinese economy.

However, as far as security goes, it is up to the discretion of the South Korean government. Take the Lee Myeong-bak administration's bandwagoning approach. His administration has joined what Taro Aso called the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" by joining the US, India, Japan, Australia and New Zealand in a move to encircle China. This security strategy seems problematic. Just like for Singapore, which is similarly dependent on China's market for economic growth and looks to the US for security, countries in the Asia-Pacific have to recognize and deal with economic reality.

Security assurances can be sought with the US as a sort-of insurance policy, but good relations must absolutely be maintained with China. The same goes for Vietnam. If Vietnam could attract a large amount of investment from Japan and the US, then perhaps it would be different. But the reality is that Vietnam relies on China for massive amounts of foreign direct investment. All countries in the Asia-Pacific must deal with the reality that China is the engine of economic growth in the region and craft their economic and security policies accordingly.

PEAR: ***How do you foresee the next South Korean administration handling this balancing act?***

Professor Moon: Regardless of who is elected, Park Geun-hye or Ahn Cheol-soo, their approach will be similarly prudent towards China. Neither one of them will pursue a policy similar to that of Lee Myong-bak. They will avoid

putting all of their eggs in the US basket. The new government that will be inaugurated in February 2013 is most likely to pursue a balanced diplomacy.

PEAR: ***What potential do you see for adjustments amidst the frictional historical relationship between South Korea and Japan, especially as China rises? For instance, could a common South Korean and Japanese security concern with China and possibly North Korea overcome the stresses Japan's past and lead to a more harmonized relationship?***

Professor Moon: Most people fail to read what is actually going on between South Korea and Japan from a geopolitical and geoeconomic point-of-view. The G-2 world, or a bi-gemonic system under US and Chinese leadership, has become a reality. Thus, if South Korea and Japan do not cooperate with each other, they will allow the US and China alone to dictate the political and economic future of Northeast Asia. We should not let this sort of thing happen.

The prevailing mentality is this: South Korea and Japan should team-up and bandwagon on US power to balance against China. This may be particularly important for regional security, because if China's power grows to a level that forces the US to deal directly with China, then the US will pass over both Japan and South Korea to confront a challenge to its power. This sort of situation would be disastrous for both South Korea and Japan. Thus, in order to avoid this situation, South Korea and Japan should work together very closely to forge a new multilateral security cooperation regime that is markedly different from the Cold War-era ROK-Japan-US axis that balanced against the Northern Axis of China-North Korea-Russia.

South Korea and Japan, working together, can rival the influence of China and the US, but not in a way that fosters military competition. Instead, a joint middle power effort between South Korea and Japan – making what can be seen as a new major power – can produce an even playing field by establishing themselves as a wedge between the two hegemonic powers. This will prevent arbitrary acts by the US or China that could be inherent in the so-called G2 formula. In short, geopolitical priorities necessitate deeper cooperation between the two countries as well as common efforts to overcome past historical issues and other ideational conflicts.

PEAR: ***Currently, there are a number of issues that threaten the stability of East and Northeast Asia, namely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and North Korea's missile launches and nuclear weapons program. How could these issues be effectively managed in order to decrease the perceived threat level in the region? Do you see any potential for the institutionalization of multilateral security cooperation, such as the Six Party Talk framework?***

Professor Moon: I think multilateral cooperation is the mandate. These sorts of issues cannot be dealt with unilaterally or bilaterally. Bilateral negotiations, especially over territorial issues, will lead nowhere, primarily due to the tempestuous nature of political and territorial sovereignty issues. Nobody is willing to budge. There is perhaps nowhere else in the world where the concept of Westphalian sovereignty is as sensitive and volatile an issue as it is in Northeast Asia. Due in large part to their colonial pasts, countries in this region of the world – China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan – are extremely sensitive when it comes to territorial issues. Therefore, dealing with these issues bilaterally will never work.

The whole point is this: if we can create some sort of multilateral security cooperation regime, and if this multilateral cooperation regime can mitigate bilateral tensions by acting as a mediator, then overt tension in the region can be effectively contained and we can provide ourselves a real shot at comprehensive security in the region. In this regard, the Six Party Talks can be seen as a very positive step toward multilateral cooperation. Although the Six Party Talks are now stalled over the issue of North Korea's unruly behavior, I personally hope the talks can resume soon.

PEAR: ***Which institution do you feel is best suited to serve the role as a pilot agency for a multilateral security cooperation regime in Northeast Asia?***

Professor Moon: With their talks for talks-sake and consensus building focus, organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other Northeast Asia-related organizations, like ASEAN +3, are far too ineffectual. I observed this in my position as co-chair of EEP (Eminent and Expert Persons) of the ARF. I thus strongly support the Six Party Talks formula.

For example, go back to the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement that

outlined details on "words for words" and "action for action" or look at the February 13, 2007 agreement that established a working group on Northeast Asian security and peace mechanism. Although the outcome of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula has not come to fruition, the Six Party formula shows the potential for the establishment of a multilateral security cooperation regime.

More broadly, if Southeast Asia, through the ARF or other regional forums, could also create a multilateral security cooperation regime, then Southeast and Northeast Asia could look into creating something similar to the European Union's forerunners: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) for economic cooperation or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for security concerns. But that is some time off in the future. Under current conditions, the creation of Northeast Asian security architecture seems inconceivable. Therefore, for now at least, Southeast Asia should pursue its own formula, like the ARF, and Northeast Asia should seek its own formula such as the institutionalization of the Six Party Talks. Up until very recently, countries in Northeast Asia had a hard time even talking to each other and therefore relied on using the ARF. However, if possible, countries in Northeast Asia should seek their own formula, such as the Six Party formula, so as to aid in the development of regional security architecture.

PEAR: ***In 2012, there will be major elections taking place in the US, China and South Korea. Also, Russia recently had an election, which Vladimir Putin won. What effect will these elections have on politics in Asia?***

Professor Moon: It all depends on the coalitional configurations that result following each country's respective elections.

If Obama wins in America and Ahn Cheol-soo, Moon Jae-in or any other liberal wins in South Korea, and if Xi Jinping pursues a more open and liberal policy in China along with Kim Jong-un opting for Chinese-style economic reform, we will have a liberal coalition. Putin, too, will choose a more liberal option if all other major actors are doing the same – and this will be a sign of good things to come for the region. There will be less tension, more cooperation and an overall positive outlook for Northeast Asia.

But suppose we wind up with what I call the scenario of "conservative clashes:" Romney wins the election in the US, Pak Geun-hye wins here, and Xi Jingping pursues more conservative policies, which, for China, is a very real

possibility. People in China talk about how Mao Zedong consolidated political power, Deng Xiaoping consolidated economic power and now it is time for China's next leader – Xi Jingping – to consolidate military power. If Xi Jingping pursues this route, along with Kim Jung-un continuing a policy of military-first politics, then we will have quite a nightmarish situation in the region. Because such development is most likely to foster a new divide between the Northern axis (China, Russia, and North Korea) and the Southern axis (US, Japan, and South Korea). In reality, we will probably wind up somewhere between the two scenarios. In any case, it is not certain that all these democratic changes in Northeast Asia will be good for the geopolitical situation in 2013 and after.

One positive development is the stance of Park Geun-hye. In her Foreign Affairs article, she pledged to a more balanced diplomacy, with an emphasis on improving ties with North Korea. Thus, overall situation on the Korean peninsula could be better than that during the Lee Myung-bak government.

PEAR: ***Do you foresee a Sunshine Policy 2.0 forthcoming, regardless of whether a conservative or liberal candidate is elected?***

Professor Moon: I would label it as Engagement 2.0 rather than Sunshine Policy 2.0. The term Sunshine Policy is a kind of President Kim Dae-jung's invention. Meanwhile, engagement is a generic term to describe a policy on North Korea that emphasizes recognition, dialogue, reconciliation and cooperation. My book, "Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea," will be published in late April by Yonsei University Press. As I argue in my book, there is no other alternative but to pursue engagement, be it hawk, dove, or something else. How can we solve the current issues without engaging with North Korea? I really do not think war can be an option. Sanctions have been imposed on North Korea since the end of the Korean War in 1953, but they were not effective.

PEAR: ***Many believe that before Korean unification can even be considered, the North Korean economy must first be developed to a level comparable to other developed or developing countries. How should policymakers in the United States and South Korea approach Kim Jong-un's regime in order to promote economic growth in North Korea?***

Professor Moon: I fully agree with you. We can discuss about peaceful unification without first leveling up the North Korean economy. This is even applied to the case of unification by absorption. The North Korean economy must be revitalized and leveled-up. To make it possible, we should work hard to create an environment that can be favorable to North Korea's opening and reform, as China experienced in 1979. If we look to China as a model, lessons can be drawn. First, the normalization of diplomatic relations with the US in 1979 removed external security concerns that impeded economic opening and reform.

Vietnam also serves as a model to emulate. The economic reform policies known as doi moi ("reform and newness") was made possible primarily because of improving relations with the US. Improved relations with China also abetted this process of opening and reform. It is under this favorable external development that Vietnam could have expedited the process of opening and reform and achieved impressive economic growth.

PEAR: ***What does détente with North Korea look like?***

Professor Moon: Using China and Vietnam as models, we can see that improving the external environment is a necessary prerequisite to North Korea's economic reform and growth. Thus, assuring security for the North Korean regime is the first step that must be taken in order to encourage the type of reform necessary for economic development. Without such a security guarantee, economic reform and growth is inconceivable.

PEAR: ***Alongside fellow Yonsei professor John Delury, you have put forward the idea of security-plus-prosperity as a way of creating the conditions necessary for economic development in North Korea. Could you explain this concept?***

Professor Moon: North Korea is in a Catch-22. Its leadership is committed to the "military first politics" as a way of ensuring regime and national security. It was in this context that the North has been engaging in nuclear testing and missile launching. However, such moves have entailed negative consequences such as economic sanctions and international isolation, which have in turn worsened economic conditions in North Korea. But the new leadership in the North can-

not enhance its legitimacy without resolving its protracted economic hardship as well as deteriorating food and energy situation. In order to tackle economic problems, Kim Jong-un should get food, energy and economic assistance from the outside world. However, the US, South Korea and Japan are highly unlikely to provide such assistance unless the North makes substantive concessions in nuclear weapons and missiles. Thus, Kim Jong-un is currently facing the horn of dilemma.

The US and South Korea should help the North overcome the current dilemma by providing a favorable security environment, despite the rocket launch on April 13. In this regard, the US needs to rethink about its diplomatic normalization with North Korea. Recognizing and normalizing with North Korea does not cost anything. It is simply a matter of recognition. Use recognition as an incentive to make North Korea to abide by the September 19 Joint Statement, the February 13 Agreement, and even the February 29 Agreement, so that it can undertake concrete measures to dismantle its nuclear facilities, programs, materials and even weapons in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Yes, North Korea can cheat. But the threat of severing diplomatic ties will be a more effective tool than the promise of diplomatic normalization in return for denuclearization. In addition, some sort of deal regarding missiles should also be considered. In any case, the important thing to remember here is that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons last, so it is important to start with the nuclear facilities and materials first. Under conditions of security guarantee and negotiated settlement, North Korea will go for opening and reform. This, then, will be followed by a massive influx of assistance to North Korea. Once reform begins and the market develops, there will be no way for North Korea to reverse the trend. Market will entail the expansion of civil society and the birth of middle class. All this can take place within five to six years after market opening.

Consider China, for example. Reforms started in China around 1979 and within ten years Tiananmen took place. The speed of social change could be much faster in North Korea, depending specifically on how North Korean society handles change. In any case, the main idea regarding security-plus-prosperity is this: there is a trade-off between prosperity and security. To foster prosperity we have to try to satisfy North Korea's security need first.

PEAR: ***It has been a few months since the death of Kim Jong-il. What is your assessment of power transition in North Korea thus far? What is the main threat to Kim Jong-un's consolidation of power?***

Professor Moon: The situation in North Korea seems very stable. In order to make the succession process stable and successful, Kim Jong-un should satisfy four things: legitimacy, power, institutional consolidation and winning the hearts of the people.

Kim Jong-un is born with legitimacy, what the North Koreans call the Paektu bloodline. Being a grandson of Kim Il-sung and a son of Kim Jong-il gives Kim Jong-un an innate and uncontestable legitimacy; no one in North Korea would challenge it. As far as power goes, Kim Jong-un has all the power necessary to consolidate his rule, augmented by three layers of support. The first layer is inner-circle support given to him by his immediate family members, including his aunt Kim Kyung-hee and her husband Jang Song-taek. Second is the Korean Workers' Party, which has been completely resuscitated to provide institutional support for Kim Jong-un. Finally, the complete and unified backing of him by the military, which since his ascension to power following his father's death, has indicated its unwavering loyalty to and support for the young leader. If one looks at the North Korean system, there is no conceivable threat to his power. So, as far as that goes, he is in good shape.

For institutional consolidation, Kim Jong-un was elected as the first Secretary of the Korea Workers' Party and Chairman of party's Central Military Committee at the 4th Workers Party Delegates' Conference on April 11. He was also elected as First Chairman of the National Defense Commission at the Supreme People's Congress, which was held on April 13. Kim Jong-un has thus completed the process of institutional consolidation over the party (first Secretary), the state (Chairman of the National Defense Commission) and the military (Supreme Commander, Chairman of both KWP's Central Military Committee and National Defense Commission).

As far as the first three conditions are concerned, I do not see any problems. The last condition, however, is much more difficult. Winning the hearts of the North Korean people can be achieved through strengthening the domestic economy and satisfying people's basic human needs. However, Kim Jong-un's ruling strategy so far may have been hurting more than helping the economy. The rocket launch on April 13 is a good example. As a result of the

happening, North Korea is currently facing tough sanction measures from international community. The US also decided to suspend food aid. North Korea will be further isolated. Thus, it will be harder for Kim Jong-un to win the hearts of the North Korean people.

Whatever domestic benefits he may reap by taking a non-conciliatory approach to negotiations with foreign powers may be offset by creating a situation that hurts the domestic economy. Playing tough with foreign powers, particularly the US and South Korea, has negative consequences for international assistance and foreign direct investment, which will hinder economic growth. It is extremely difficult for Kim Jong-un to both appease the military and satisfy the people concurrently.

I am not sure how long Kim Jong-un will be able to maintain this approach. The people will evaluate the legitimacy of Kim Jong-un based on three things: the provision of food, energy and the overall status of the economy. If he can address these three concerns of the people, then Kim Jong-un will have fully satisfied the fourth and most difficult requirement for power transition and will rule for quite some time. If not, sometime in the not-to-distant future, he may face a serious challenge from the bottom-up.

PEAR: ***Do you think the recent politicization of the North Korean defector issue is a positive or negative development? In what ways should South Korea and the United States approach China about the legal status of North Korean defectors residing inside China?***

Professor Moon: I think it has two conflicting implications. It is positive in the sense that the campaign has publicized the plights of North Korean defectors in China. But it is negative in the sense that they will be facing much tougher environment in both China and North Korea. Whereas China will be taking much stringent measures in detecting and deporting North Korean defectors, North Korea will be intensifying border control that would make it harder for North Koreans to cross the China-DPRK border. I think quiet diplomacy is still the best method, if the concern is really about the human rights of North Korean defectors. Regarding the status of refugees, the more politicized the issue becomes, the less cooperative China will be.

A lot of people are claiming that as a result of pressure from South Korea and the US, China released the four North Korean defectors that had taken

up political asylum in the South Korean embassy in Beijing for the last three years. I do not agree. It has more to do with the rocket issue than bending to international pressure. China will not be as harsh as South Korea and the US expect it to be. Beijing did not concede to pressure from Seoul or Washington. Instead it was more likely a move to save face for President Lee Myong-bak right before the parliamentary elections. Chinese politics is not as one-sided as it is often thought to be. Face-saving is a very important part of operational-logic in Chinese diplomacy. **PEAR**





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WHOSE CENTURY SHALL IT BE?

John J. Corrigan IV

John J. Corrigan IV is a third semester master's candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He is also a Senior Print Editor for PEAR.

Michael Beckley of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government critically addresses a snowballing assumption in contemporary academic, journalistic and foreign policy discourse in "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure."[1] This premise is that the US-led unipolar order is in decay, and with the rise of China international relations are entering uncertain territory. "China's Century?" arrives in the midst of this erstwhile assumption's steady transformation into popular fact. Beckley argues instead that though the US has experienced increased hegemonic burdens in recent decades, its strengths in wealth, innovation and military capability vis-à-vis China have in fact increased over the last twenty years. By contrasting the positions and presumptions of the growing US declinist camp with those like himself who foresee enduring US predominance throughout this century, Beckley compels readers to more carefully examine the starting points of current debates on global issues, many of which hinge on US-China relations. This call for discursive prudence is therefore vital and the author's case well argued, as the US remains in many ways an economic and military Goliath. However, in presenting Chinese development as a mirror of sorts for American concerns of decline, Beckley neglects pressing domestic troubles at the core of Americans' fears of having lost their edge, China notwithstanding. In this regard it is essential to ask whether declinist fears pertain to American decline in and of itself, decline while China rises, decline because China rises, or some combination of the three. "China's Century?" bears the microscope down upon Beijing, but its true focus is indeed the US and the liberal order it created and taxes itself maintaining.

It is surprisingly not until the piece's final pages that Beckley delves into what are serious internal crises in the US by discussing the debt crisis of

1 Michael Beckley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," *International Security* 36, no. 3 (2011): 41-78.

2011 and accompanying political gridlock that illustrate deep partisan fissures in Washington. Issues up for debate in the US Congress that Beckley ignores, like education policy, health care, decrepit infrastructure and income inequality, have all to some extent been amplified in the context of American perceptions of relative decline aside dynamic Asian societies, primarily China.[2] Of these, income inequality is both the most pressing issue within the US and most intertwined in commercial interaction with China, as technological diffusion associated with globalization, increased trade and unemployment all directly affect US incomes. It is also a weak point of Beckley's analysis.

"China's Century?" focuses on three categories of empirical evidence to measure national power: wealth, innovation and conventional military capabilities. In discussing the first of these, Beckley cautions that declinists put too much weight on non-comprehensive and static measures like China's ever-expanding GDP and snapshot economic reports. He prefers instead to measure national wealth with a balance of total GDP and per capita GDP, a reasonable and more precise comparison of two large economies, and one which will tip the scales in US favor far past the approaching year in which China's economy outgrows its US counterpart. Accompanying data shows US per capita incomes from 1991 to 2010 outpacing Chinese income growth, ostensibly supporting Beckley's central claim that, "China is rising, but it is not catching up."[3] The troubling growth in US income inequality during that period, however, is conveniently ignored, as are sound and unsound arguments for trade with China and technological diffusion exacerbating the problem. This inattention to connections between US domestic problems related to China's rise and the international macroeconomic picture Beckley discusses in detail permeates the paper.

Analysis of innovation points to sustained or expanding US leads over Chinese scientists in research and development, patent awards and academic excellence amidst reports of a surging Chinese scientific juggernaut. It is essential to consider, as Beckley does, that quality matters more than quantity. He notes the US produces approximately half the world's most cited scientific articles and that 70 percent of inward FDI to China is now directed to wholly for-

2 These domestic issues are discussed at length in relation to "China's Century?" and Robert Kagan's "Not Fade Away" in: Michael Cohen, "Rotting From the Inside Out," *Foreign Policy*, February 21, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/rotting_from_the_inside_out?page=full (accessed April 18, 2012).

3 Beckley, "China's Century?," 44.

eign-owned enterprises, making China's tech exports in fact, "not very Chinese, and not very high tech."[4] That the majority of Chinese students awarded science doctorates in the US between 1987 and 2007 chose to remain there, as professionals in a business structure better tuned than China's to capitalize on breakthroughs and absorb knowledge from competitors, advances the argument. But again, Beckley ignores more fundamental domestic innovation and educational issues. As multinational corporations based in the US invest in China and reap profits from labor there, displaced American workers despair as to how narrowly profits return to the US amidst broader concerns on intellectual property protection. Moreover, regardless of how much data Beckley provides for the continued dominance of US universities and the success of Chinese students in them, American panic at its nonperforming primary and secondary educational systems is a more rudimentary and long-term competitiveness problem. Initial fears about education focused inward, but recent American awareness of Shanghai students' PISA scores escalates concerns of decline, like those on income inequality, in a more international context.[5]

This inattention to US domestic unease in "China's Century?" does not work both ways. Beckley wisely raises the crucial issues of the looming Chinese demographic crisis and the evaporation of onetime sources of competitiveness like low-wage labor and amenable export markets. Growing income inequality and inflation afflicting the poor in the PRC could also have been addressed. His empirical analysis of the burgeoning Chinese military notes the PLA must secure China's nineteen land and sea borders, making its mission fundamentally different from US forces spread globally. Readers are left, perhaps more than the author, aware that both China and the US face profound and unique challenges. These problems do not, however, necessarily involve superpower rivalry. Domestic focus on these issues by the US and Chinese governments would best position each country to healthily compete with the other in a win-win manner.

Beckley's conclusion states unwarranted fears of American decline resulting from worried looks in this Chinese mirror may create difficulties greater than the problems on which those concerns are based. Declinist fear mongering

4 Ibid., 68.

5 Sam Dillon, "Top Test Scores From Shanghai Stun Educators," *New York Times*, December 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/education/07education.html?pagewanted=all (accessed April 18, 2012).

leading to trade conflicts and immigration curtailment can only impair sources of US power, particularly as America's relative immigration flexibility is a crucial competitive advantage over China's demographic dilemma. Pernicious effects on foreign policy, such as calls for aggressiveness while the US is still at its most dominant, contrast with demands for retrenchment. Beckley argues these divergent policies would be as equally unwise as they are rooted in identical anxieties. Rather, as a non-declinist, he calls for the sustainment of the US-led liberal economic order and an increased military and economic presence in Asia. This policy prescription is remarkably similar to the American pivot to the Pacific laid out in speeches across Asia by President Obama and Secretary Clinton just as "China's Century?" went to press. Regardless, pivoting with eyes focused more closely on China's rise than on real US domestic problems may be for naught. **PEAR**

STRATEGIC DISTRUST IN THE AGE OF CHINA'S RISE

Steven C. Denney

Steven C. Denney is a third semester master's candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He is the Editor in Chief of PEAR and an Assistant Editor at the website SinoNK.com.

How is the US responding to "China's rise?" In an age of China-centered growth and American strategic realignments, an honest answer to this question is as common as a four-leaf clover. Unfortunately, a majority of responses are coated in political correctness or rendered meaningless by the use of political clichés, making a candid answer hard to come by. Fortunately, a recent monograph released by the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, entitled "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,"[1] shirks political niceties and overly vague language in an attempt to spark candid and realistic dialogue about the current status, and likely future, of Sino-American relations.

The monograph gives space to two prominent academics, one American and the other Chinese, whose analyses represent the views and opinions of each country's leadership on the status of Sino-American relations. Kenneth Lieberthal sketches an appraisal of the American perspective, while Wang Jisi spills ink for China. The ultimate purpose of the monograph is to give the authors, both of whom have a long history in US-China relations, an opportunity to discuss their countries' level of "strategic distrust" towards the other. Distrust is a straightforward word, but its counterpart, strategic, is awarded a precise definition worthy of a full quote:

> '[S]trategic' means expectations about the nature of the bilateral relationship over the long run; it is not a synonym for 'military.' 'Strategic distrust' therefore means a perception that the other side will seek to achieve its key long-term goals at concerted cost to your own side's core prospects and interests.[2]

Stated alternatively, the level of strategic distrust in the Sino-American relation-

1 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust," *China Center at Brookings, John. L. Thorton Center Monograph Series*, No. 4, March 2012.
2 Ibid., 5.

ship represents the degree to which one side perceives itself to be in a zero-sum game with the other. Lieberthal and Jisi write for the stated purpose of "explaining candidly the perceptions each side has of the other's motivations, the concerns each leadership consequently has as it looks to the long-term future, and the implications of this analysis for future efforts to reduce strategic distrust in U.S.-China relations."[3] To accomplish this, the authors cover issues related to differences or misunderstandings between political and value systems, diplomacy, economics and trade and the military, with each difference or misunderstanding representing a source of strategic distrust. Both authors provide insightful analysis from each country's perspective; however, it seems that one does it better than the other.

Lieberthal's Elephant in the Geopolitical Room

The American perspective presented by Lieberthal may not strike the reader as entirely candid — with emphasis on the word entirely.[4] Sources of US distrust towards China mentioned in the monograph are: intellectual property theft, currency manipulation, the withholding of rare earth materials, an offensive posture taken in the South China Sea and China-based cyber theft of highly sensitive information. This, in addition to the US belief that authoritarian nations are inherently less stable and trustworthy, particularly regarding human rights, does not create conditions conducive to cultivating strategic trust.

The elephant in Lieberthal's room, however, is his failure to make a convincing counterargument against claims that since the winding down of America's efforts at social engineering in far away deserts, the US "will move its strategic spearhead away from the Greater Middle East and redirect it at China as its greatest security threat." Jisi's analysis reveals that America's current "rebalancing" strategy (known alternatively as the "Asia pivot") is not perceived as a benign strategy with the goal of simply maintaining peace and stability in the region, but is instead interpreted as a neo-containment strategy aimed at reigning in China's regional influence in order to secure the continuation of American hegemony.[5]

3 Ibid.
4 The American perspective for understanding strategic distrust is found on pages 20-34.
5 Lieberthal and Jisi, 18.

From Beijing's perspective,[6] America's rebalancing in China's backyard aggravates a number of sensitive issues, all of which swell strategic distrust. These issues range from political and values issues to military strategy and freedom to navigate in territorial waters.[7] Consider this quote from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's article entitled "America's Pacific Century,"[8] which may, in due time, be compared to George Kennan's "Long Telegram" as a document responsible for shaping an American policy of containment in the Asia-Pacific:

> In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to **sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values**. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region. [emphasis mine]

Without even reading the quoted text, the title of Secretary Clinton's article must be menacing enough for Chinese policy planners, politicians and the educated elites, especially given China's recent history of exploitation and domination by foreign powers — China' so-called "100 years of humiliation."[9] The quote itself, and the rest of Clinton's article for that matter, most likely heightens fears in China "that the ultimate goal of the U.S. […] is to maintain its global hegemony [… and] seek to constrain or even upset China's rise."[10]

Lieberthal's shortcomings make Jisi's analysis all the more signifi-

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6 The Chinese perspective for understanding strategic distrust is found on pages 7-19.

7 These issues are considered by many within the Chinese leadership to be part of China's "core interests." For more on China's core interests, see: Edward Wong, "China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea Is a 'Core Interest' Worth War," *New York Times*, March 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/asia/31beijing.html (accessed April 20, 2012); "Political System Now China's Core Interest," *Global Times*, September 7, 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/674311/Political-system-now-Chinas-core-interest.aspx (accessed April 20, 2012); and Michael J. Green, "China the Aggressor?" *The National Interest*, September 2, 2010, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-the-aggressor-4017 (accessed April 20, 2012).

8 Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?page=full (accessed April 18, 2012).

9 For more on China's "100 years of humiliation," see: Alison Adcock Kaufman, "The 'Century of Humiliation,' Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order," *Pacific Focus*, 24, no. 1 (2010): 1-33.

10 Lieberthal and Jisi, 15.

cant. The main theme running through Jisi's analysis is that the US time as the world's lone superpower and arbiter of global institutions is coming to an end. Contrary to times past, the opinion of contemporary Chinese leaders, with support from the news media and the education system, is that the US is "on the wrong side of history."[11] For the Chinese, America has lost its appeal as a great and prosperous nation and is no longer worthy of emulation. Many Chinese are convinced that it is only a matter of years before China overtakes the US as the world's largest economy — a perception reinforced by the 2008 financial crisis.[12] According to Jisi's analysis, the fact that America continues to assert itself as global hegemon and regional superpower, while China's economy is ascending to the top spot, gives more than enough reason for Chinese leaders to have a high level of strategic distrust towards the US. Despite repeated verbal and written assurances by US officials and academics that the US is not containing China, policymakers and politicians in Beijing are not buying it. Why else would the US be rebalancing towards Beijing's region of the world if it did not feel threatened by China's rise?

Hegemonic Responsibility

Let us return to the question posed at the beginning of this review: How is the US responding to China's rise? Both authors propose an answer. Lieberthal's answer, although not necessarily wrong, is left wanting, while Jisi's answer more accurately reflects geopolitical reality: The US is moving to consolidate its power and contain the spread of Chinese power and influence in the Asia-Pacific through a neo-containment policy. US rebalancing a la containment, and the subsequent Chinese response, have resulted in a cyclical pattern of distrust begetting distrust, best highlighted by this quote from Lieberthal:

11 Ibid., 10.

12 The view that China's economy is poised to overtake America's as the largest economy is not the exclusive view of some in China. See: Robert Fogel, "$123,000,000,000,000*," *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/123000000000000?hidecomments=yes (accessed April 22, 2012); and "Dating Game: When Will China Overtake America?" *The Economist*, December 16, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17733177 (accessed April 22, 2012).

> Various sources indicate that the Chinese side thinks in terms of a long-term zero-sum game, and this requires that America prepare to defend its interests against potential Chinese efforts to undermine them as China grows stronger.[13]

Has the perception that China has little strategic trust with the US convinced Washington that containing China by renewing America's strategic focus towards the Asia-Pacific is the best response? If a peaceful and a conflict-free Asia is the end goal, Washington must take the necessary steps to avoid great power conflict. As the father of Power Transition Theory, A.F.K. Organski, asserted more than fifty years ago, whether a conflict arises between a hegemon and rising power is largely determined by how the dominant power responds to the rise of a new great power.[14] In order to avoid a more turbulent future, US policy planners should study this monograph and adjust accordingly. **PEAR**

13 Lieberthal and Jisi, ix.

14 See A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), esp. 334-336.

EAMONN FINGLETON'S LOST DECADE DEBATE

Brian Gleason

Brian Gleason is a third semester master's candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He is a Staff Editor at PEAR and a contributor at the website SinoNK.com.

In 1995, Irish journalist and author Eamonn Fingleton published a book called, Blindside: Why Japan is Still on Track to Overtake the US by the Year 2000, in which he contended that the commonly accepted view of an "economically dysfunctional" Japan in the wake of the Tokyo stock market crash was not only inaccurate, but contrived.[1] Ever since, Fingleton has relentlessly argued that on many accounts, the Japanese economy has continuously outperformed the US economy since the early 1990s, thus questioning the characterization of Japan's economic performance from 1991-2001 as the "Lost Decade." More provocatively, Mr. Fingleton asserts that a wide range of individuals and other entities — including foreign sales representatives, Japanese foundations, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and even American investment bankers — stood to benefit from Japan's "doom and gloom story" that was readily gobbled up and regurgitated by the "gullible" Western media. Fingleton has written numerous articles on these matters, and has even publicly challenged ten different individuals — whom he regards as the biggest promoters of the "Lost Decade"— to a one-on-one debate for which he will pay them $10,000.[2] None of these individuals have accepted his offer, and since many aspects of Fingleton's "Lost Decade Hoax" theory have remained unchallenged, they warrant serious evaluation and further discussion. The complexity of his overall argument demands a thorough assessment, and in an attempt to facilitate that assessment, this review aims to provide a broad overview of the debate to encourage further exploration.

Although the definition of Japan's Lost Decade varies from source to

1 Eamonn Fingleton, "Sun Still Rising," *The Prospect*, April 19, 2005, http://prospect.org/article/sun-still-rising (accessed March 3, 2012).

2 Eamonn Fingleton, "A $10,000 offer for Robby Feldman and Ed Lincoln," *Sandcastle Empire*, June 20, 2011, http://www.fingleton.net/a-10000-offer-for-robbie-feldman-and-ed-lincoln/ (accessed March 5, 2012).

source, the general idea is that the Japanese economy in the 1990s shifted toward an extremely low growth trend caused by the bursting of speculative stock and real estate bubbles in the late 1980s. Subsequently, bad loans were issued for Japanese financial institutions, a credit crunch was generated, the assets of firms and households worsened and uninterrupted business failures were compounded by a vicious circle of asset deflation.[3] Fingleton does not completely dispute these assessments of the Japanese economy, but argues that their overall effects were often exaggerated. For example, despite all of the aforementioned problems, Japan made consistent improvements to its infrastructure and erected 81 high-rise buildings[4] in Tokyo since the Lost Decade began–more than any major city in the US during that time. Overall, Fingleton points out that other indicators more accurately reflect Japan's economic strength, affluence and quality of life during the "Lost Decade; thus, he highlights a plethora of encouraging data during the purported Lost Decade to eschew the characterizations of Japan's economy as a "basket case" or the "laughingstock of the business pages." Japan's average life expectancy at birth grew by 4.2 years between 1989-2009, indicating that the Japanese now typically live 4.8 years longer than Americans (mainly because of better healthcare). Moreover, Japan's unemployment rate is considerably lower than that of the US. Since 1989, the yen has risen 87 percent against the US dollar and 94 percent against the British pound (although some of Fingleton's critics cite the yen's rise as evidence of a crippling deflationary trend in the Japanese economy).[5] Perhaps the data most favorable to Fingleton's argument is that Japan's current account surplus totaled $196 billion in 2010, up more than threefold since 1989. In contrast, America's current account deficit swelled to $471 billion from $99 billion in that same timeframe.

Nevertheless, one major reason that the 1990s are commonly labeled as a lost decade for Japan is because its economy was performing below maximum output. By simply using official gross domestic product data as a point of comparison between the US and Japan, the US has ostensibly outperformed Japan for many years. Yet on a per capita basis, Japanese and US economic performances are not far apart, and some economists have underscored the sta-

3 Makoto Itoh, *The Japanese Economy Reconsidered*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 76-109.

4 The definition for "high-rise building" is any building taller than 500 feet (152.4 meters)

5 John Tammy, "The Myth About the Myth of Japan's Two Lost Decades," *Forbes*, April 23, 2011 http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2011/04/23/the-myth-about-the-myth-of-japans-two-lost-decades/3/ (accessed March 5, 2012).

tistical discrepancies between the two data sets due to US statisticians use of the so-called hedonic method of adjusting for inflation, which may artificially boost the nation's apparent growth rate.[6] Yet another important contrast is that income distribution is more equitable in Japan than in the US, highlighting the potential difference between how economies compare on paper versus assessing the quality of life for the citizens in each country.

Japan has also made important industrial advances during the Lost Decade. By establishing monopolistic leadership in areas of advanced manufacturing, especially in producers' goods such as materials, components and machine tools, Japan has made US industrial sectors and even the US military heavily reliant on essential technologies that Japan monopolizes. Some of these trends have been cause for a considerable amount of concern among some US citizens, businesses, industrial sectors and policymakers, which leads to the second half of Fingleton's theory.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Fingleton's argument is that the Lost Decade was actually a "hoax" concocted by the Japanese public relations program in order to fool the Western media and especially the American people. This exaggeration of the Lost Decade, in Fingleton's view, is mainly an attempt to deflect mounting criticism and alarm about America's rising trade deficits with Japan. Fingleton explains:

> The upbeat propaganda of the 1980s had been intended primarily as a defense in dumping lawsuits. Thus the American media were induced to publish greatly exaggerated claims of Japanese productivity. After major American corporations laid off the factory workforces and switch to outsourcing, Japan's propaganda needs changed abruptly… America's trade deficits with Japan widened rapidly, prompting Washington to view Tokyo more and more as a power rival. In the new circumstances, Japan's old super–economy image was not so much an irrelevance as a liability. Washington's mood softened remarkably, however, after the Tokyo stock market crashed in 1990. Assuming quite wrongly that the crash signified fundamental problems in Japan, Washington began expressing gentlemanly concern for the 'fallen giant.'[7]

6 In this context, hedonic accounting refers to the way that statisticians account for inflation when measuring the GDP. Hedonic accounting makes the rate of inflation look lower than it actually is, which massages GDP figures upwards. Fingleton argues that the difference between US and Japanese GDP accounting methods during the "Lost Decade" distorts comparative GDP analyses between the two countries.

7 Fingleton, "Sun Still Rising."

Fingleton goes on to claim that in the early 1990s, homeless people were encouraged to come out of the ghettos and camp out in Tokyo's most upscale neighborhoods as a nice photo-op to demonstrate the deteriorating situation in Japan. Continuing to mislead, Japanese officials publicly lamented the supposedly disastrous deterioration in public finance, but omitted the "footnote" that Japan's official foreign exchange reserves had skyrocketed from $85.1 billion in 1989 to over $840 billion according to the latest available data.

Finally, aside from the gullible Western media and American public, the reason that this charade has been able to continue is that it benefits so many different entities and individuals. Foreign sales representatives who do not reach their quotas have an excuse, as do Japanese foundations that seek to reject solicitations from American universities and other needy nonprofits. The same goes for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when tempering the expectations of foreign aid recipients. Most notably, Fingleton contends that American investment bankers also have reason to emphasize bad news because of the investment strategy, called the yen–carry trade, in which the well informed can benefit from periodic bouts of weakness in the Japanese yen. **PEAR**

NORTH KOREA AND INFORMATION: ON THE USE OF UNDERCOVER REPORTING IN NORTH KOREA ANALYSIS

Joe Litt

Joe Litt is a second semester master's candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. Joe is an avid North Korea watcher and part-time translator at the website SinoNK.com.

Perhaps out of all the former Communist Bloc states, North Korea remained the most impenetrable for outside observers to pierce. Using the pretext of an imminent US invasion and a contrived persecution complex, the North's dynastic rulers successfully kept prying eyes from learning too much about the veracity of the minutiae of daily life inside the country for most of the Cold War era. This, however, changed with the so-called "Arduous March," an unprecedented man-made famine caused by economic mismanagement and the collapse of Communist Bloc aid compounded by catastrophic natural disasters that by some estimates killed off as much as 15% of the North's population and left a great deal more disfigured from the effects of malnutrition. At the height of the famine, the North's rulers relented from their staunch socialist line and turned a blind eye to markets and informal cross-border trade with and travel to China. The result: the North's hermetic seal was permanently pierced. Not only was information about the outside world flooding in, but for the first time, a steady stream of information was getting out.

By the early 2000s, NGOs and other agencies such as the DailyNK, Radio Free Chosun, RFA, Imjingang and others were making use of a network of in-country informants and defectors armed with cell phones and other technology to bring to light the on-the-ground situation north of the 38th parallel. But with this flood of data came a new problem for Pyongyang watchers: how to gauge the reliability of this data. The difficulty of evaluating this type of citizen reporting is due to the fact that it is attributed anonymously to "sources" (soshikdong) and simply cannot be corroborated independently. Of course this is unavoidable when working in an environment with an all-pervasive security apparatus, and one in which speaking to foreigners without permission is tanta-

mount to treason. Also, relying solely on the testimony of individual defectors is unwise. Defectors naturally have an overly-negative view of the country; after all they did leave while possibly endangering the lives and livelihoods of their families, friends and coworkers. Their lives were so bad that they willingly left behind the "known" for a potentially very dangerous "unknown" and perilous trek through hostile China.

But these restrictions do not imply that all hope is lost and that such sources should be cast aside. Individual data points are not to be trusted, but the sum-totality of data points can help point us in the right direction. This process, borrowed from the natural sciences, is called "consilience." In the words of English philosopher William Whewell,"The Consilience of Inductions takes place when an induction, obtained from one class of facts, coincides with an Induction obtained from another different class." Or in less esoteric language: consilience occurs when multiple, independent strands of evidence point to the same conclusion. The classic example here is the link between smoking and cancer. When studies began emerging that showed a link between smoking and lung cancer, the tobacco companies were correct to point out that correlation is not causation and that other factors may be to blame for the link. But independent evidence began to mount: smoking unfiltered instead of filtered cigarettes increased the risk of getting cancer, quitting smoking was shown to decrease the risk, long-term smokers were more likely to develop cancer than short-term smokers and so on. Taken together, these strands of evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that smoking was not merely correlated with cancer, but was actually a major causative factor.

For the case of North Korea, individual defector testimony may not reliably tell us much about North Korean society, but when multiple defectors from different regions who are leaving at different times are painting the same broad picture, we can be relatively confident in the veracity of our understanding of domestic conditions. The same is true with undercover reporting. When multiple individuals working with different media sources start reporting on growing disgruntlement and unrest (or any other story), and this reporting is corroborated (directly or indirectly) by NGOs, Chinese businessmen who deal frequently with the North and diplomatic sources, we can be relatively more certain in our conclusions.

The natural sciences also provide Pyongyang watchers with two other valuable analytical tools for parsing undercover reporting and defector testimo-

ny: hypothesis prediction and falsifiability. After building up a constellation of data points, the next natural step is for the analyst to develop a hypothesis, and this hypothesis allows for the making of predictions. This can be accomplished simply by asking: "If the hypothesis were true, what would we expect to see happen?" Hypothetically, let us say we formulated a hypothesis to the effect that civil unrest was breaking out in the North's third largest city, Chongjin. Such a story would be unlikely to be reported by Pyongyang's propaganda organs, and it is even less likely that foreign reporters would be allowed to enter the city to independently report. Instead we would have to come up with a laundry list of indicators that would be consistent with an outbreak of civil unrest: quarantine of the city to prevent news from spreading, disruption in scheduled domestic transportation services to the city, a stepped up security presence and deployment of troops in the city's vicinity, a change up in local government officials, nationwide editorials that call for stepped up national unity and hint at foreign interference in domestic affairs, stepped up ideological training for the general populace, government concessions and so on.

But no matter how exhaustive our laundry list may be, it is important to keep in mind that multiple scenarios may be consistent with the reported data. This is where the concept of falsifiability—a concept popularized by philosopher of science Karl Popper—comes into play. A viable hypothesis must be stated in such a way that a possible counterexample can be brought to bear that would, if proven true, render the hypothesis false. For our purposes, we must ask: what evidence, if found, would refute our hypothesis, and then search for that evidence. If we were working with the hypothetical hypothesis above, such evidence might include testimony from multiple defectors who left the area after the incident in question who were able to refute the claims, satellite imagery of the city that shows no obvious signs of unrest and testimony from trusted diplomatic and intelligence sources. It is important to spin multiple hypotheses out of a data set and tentatively accept those best supported by what we know while always keeping in mind Carl Sagan's maxim, "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."

When reading undercover reporting and defector testimony, a healthy dose of skepticism is required, but this does not mean that these sources are of little value. Quite the contrary, if used properly, they provide an important and rare insight into North Korean society outside of the narrow and sugar-coated (and often false) picture presented in official North Korean government sources.

The use of consilience, hypothesis prediction and falsifiability are just three of the many tools that can be deployed to make full use of these sources. Thanks to those unnamed brave individuals who risk their lives to bring forth the truth, North Korea analysts are able to sink their teeth into new, illuminating data sets, and as a result, North Korean society is becoming increasingly less enigmatic.

PEAR

A WORLD POLITICS THEORY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CAN DICTATORS BE CIRCUMSCRIBED OF THEIR POWER?

So Hyun Jeon

So Hyun Jeon is a fourth semester master's candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. She is also a Print Editor for PEAR. Her areas of studies include world politics, international relations, economics, history of diplomacy, international law and Spanish.

de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno; Alastair Smith. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York: Perseus Books Group, 2011. 325 pages. Kindle Edition. eISBN : 978-1-610-39045-3

The structural realist view on the world system provided by Kenneth Waltz is acclaimed for its brilliant parsimony.[1] Although it is the very attribute that becomes a target of criticism, this nevertheless counts to be a merit igniting further discussions. By the same token, the biggest merit of this book by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith is the simplicity of their theory on world politics. Based on the presumption that leaders want to obtain and maintain power: "politicians are all the same," the authors focus on key domestic maneuvers of leaders to meet these ends (p. 20). The book, page after page, is filled with ample evidence, which the authors acknowledge was accumulated through nearly two decades of research (p. 283). The accumulated case studies of countries from all over the world that the authors present as sources of evidence are another strong point of this book in providing empirical support to their theory.

This book provides insights into today's world, in which civil violence in countries such as Syria, Libya, Iran and North Korea poses as one of the major threats to the security of world community. Contemporary global community (represented by the UN, for example) has evolved to develop the notion of security—which was narrowly used for indicating the absence of military

1 Kenneth Waltz brings forth the world system model based on anarchy and states relying on self-help for aggregating power and eventually, their own survival.

conflict—to encompass conditions under which the most basic human rights and needs are protected. Under these conditions, any human discrimination based on social, political and economic status should be mitigated. These types of human discrimination still take place in many countries; even worse, there are many countries that leave their citizens in starvation. Although the authors emphasize in the beginning of the book their effort to keep normative approach to a minimum: "we would focus on what is rather than what ought to be" (p. 252), the last chapter clearly expresses the authors' aspiration of giving solutions for ameliorating human security problems based on their findings.

As a way to improve human security, the authors point to enlarging the size of the groups that are involved in different stages of choosing leaders. This is applicable not only to countries in deep erosion by corrupted dictators but also to democratized countries such as the US and even to big private corporations such as Hewlett-Packard because "just about all of political life revolves around the size of [them]" (p. 281). Such structural set-up would constrain the few—that have access to their country's or company's revenue—from engaging in corruptive exploitation for their own private benefits. The fairest way of democratization[2] is necessary, as the authors argue, to achieve good governance aimed at the best distribution of public goods—be it an access to clean water or protection of the full-respected human rights—to largest possible number of citizens.[3]

While the authors give more practicable and less abstract explanations of political groups that are more prone to corruption, there still remain some questions. How should citizens incorporate such anti-corruptive structure into their states' existing system? What would be the best way to mitigate the costs and casualties when such changes occur? Even after the change, would the citizens be able to sustain the new political system? Although the authors came up with one overall diagnosis for political ill occurring throughout the world, it may be impossible to find one treatment that can cure them all. For example, the democratization of Afghanistan is taking a different course from that of Egypt, which is different from Mozambique's. A question of long standing is to

2 The definition of democratization, in regard to the book can be read as the following: a change to the political structure that ensures maximum inclusion of public in choosing its leaders.

3 Author's argument of achieving good governance through democratization applies to private firms as well; lessoning the illustrated corruptive behavior by corporate executives would help their firms to maintain strong standing, which in turn would benefit by and large, the shareholders and the employers.

find out ways for various states to achieve successful transition of their political systems.

This book brings forth a world politics theory in the twenty-first century based on leaders' aspiration of obtaining and prolonging power in their ruling spheres. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of inter-state conflicts has been in decline. Moreover, in today's world, sovereignty within states is universally accepted as an international norm and intervention in other states' internal affairs, especially by the use of military means, is prohibited by international rule of law. While these norms relieve the leaders' anxiety of defending their states' territory from turf wars, it made them susceptible to accumulating its own wealth and power at the expense of public resources, citizens' labor or at times, even their lives.

As the book illustrates, it is apparent that there are large numbers of people suffering from bad governance by their own leaders in many countries. Based on the authors' extensive research, the book provides explanations of the ways in which those leaders keep their power. Built on this study, it is left for further contemplation how to build the political structure that can inhibit power-hungry leaders from abusing their sovereign power against their citizens. **PEAR**





CHALLENGING THE PREDOMINANT MODES OF THOUGHT: SOCIAL STATES

Mark Olson

Mark Olson is a fifth semester master's candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He is currently completing his Master's Thesis on security architecture and is expected to graduate this fall.

Iain Johnston, Alastair. *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 273 pages. ISBN: 978-0691134536.

International Relations students have all taken at least one course on the core theories of IR, such as realism, liberalism and constructivism, which teach them how to make sense of a chaotic world. A basic course gives students an understanding of the original theories' origins and their implications for war and peace. Upon closer reading of these theories, diligent students may notice that there are theoretical drawbacks to the myriad books that expound upon the manifold theories and ask themselves: how is this book different and why should I read it?

At the Department of Government in Harvard, Alastair Iain Johnston has written extensively about China's foreign policy. In his new work, Johnston's book Social States, presents a refreshing alternative perspective to students interested in China and its involvement in international security institutions. The dominant literature has tended to focus on the US-China bilateral relationship through a realist or liberal lens. However, Johnston takes a novel approach that may yield some new insight on how China interacts within international security institutions through the lens of socialization, a constructivist theory.

First, very few books or journal articles go beyond conventional methods of explaining Chinese foreign policy behavior. Academics and political pundits tend to focus on China's growing military forces or dominance in economics. Most analysis tends to focus on macro-aggregate indicators that show which states have more power than the other. Johnston takes the issue of

China's international behavior and tests it to find the underlying causes of cooperation. Specifically, his research looks at socialization and the micro-processes that may operate to induce cooperative behavior in international institutions. He outlines these as mimicking, persuasion and social influence.

Second, Johnston outlines why he chose China. By all accounts, China is a relative novice in international institutions and has a realpolitik orientation inherited from the Mao era. His research focuses from the 1980s to 2000s. His main question revolves around the motivations behind China's willingness to cooperate on security issues that affect its relative security – a quintessential realist look at things. Also, from a contractual institutionalist perspective[1], Johnston looks for instances where side payments or sanctions where used to induce Chinese compliance. This is important because China is operating in an era of unipolarity and US military predominance. Through careful work, Johnston demonstrates the theoretical drawbacks to realism and contractual institutionalism.

In order to flesh out a new perspective on China's behavior, Johnston dives head first into a critique of the conventional realist or contractual intuitionalist approach by highlighting by demonstrating the superior explanatory power of the social psychological and sociological institutionalist approach towards understanding micro-processes that operate on the agent level of analysis. Johnston demonstrates why these micro-processes are important. He underlines how agents operate in complex environments that shape their perceptions of a certain group and create pressures inside said environments to conform to group behavior. The research utilizes much background from social psychology and sociological institutionalism to demonstrate Johnston's claims.

The cases cited in which China decided to join an international institution are the UN Conference on Disarmament, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Convention on Conventional Weapons and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). Johnston does mention there are cases in which side payments (contractualist) were offered, but these are unimportant to socialization; instead why China joined is the bigger question and the subsequent micro-processes that occurred, will enable students to understand which conditions may lead to cooperation that do not required side-payments

1 Contractual institutionalists assume that preferences, interests and ideology are fixed in international institutions. They are not concerned with social interaction specifically, but focus on pro-group behavior and issue-linkages. Moreover, they view social interaction as having little impact on actors.

or threats. Johnston also mentions cases that may disprove his theory that discusses China's refusal to sign the Ottawa Treaty and its refusal over human rights condemnation.

Johnston's evidence stems largely from interviews with government officials in China, the US and Canada. Interviews were conducted from 1996-2001, and were all anonymous. Thus, this may lead the reader to question how Chinese thinking has changed since the time of his interviews and what sort of impact that might have in international institutions. Johnston does admit that this type of research is difficult, especially due to the high levels of secrecy that surround Chinese security policy.

As Social States is written from an international security-institutions perspective, Johnston's theory can prove interesting when applied to North Korea, particularly regarding China's behavior within the Six Party Talks framework. The difficulty in this, though, is collecting the necessary evidence to support Johnston's claim that the three micro-processes caused a change a agent behavior which led to a change in China's international behavior. Much of the argument in Johnston's book focuses on the Chinese side being socialized, but no attention is paid to other participants. After interacting with other parties, how other actors are socialized and the sort of reaction or interpretation created is left unaddressed. In his defense, Johnston outlines why his research is important and why his approach may offer greater understanding of cooperation.

In sum, Johnston's *Social States* remains an important contribution to the field of international relations theory regarding Chinese foreign policy behavior and international security institutions from an alternative theoretical perspective. This book represents a good springboard from which students can begin to challenge predominant thinking. **PEAR**





GUIDELINES

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