PEAR

PAPERS, ESSAYS AND REVIEWS

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FROM THE EDITOR

Conflicts, both violent and nonviolent, are a fundamental manifestation of the human condition. It is impossible to consider a period of time that has not been subject to conflicts in some form. As human societies have evolved through the ages, the nature of conflict itself has also evolved. Interconnectedness has empowered actors outside of the traditional nation-state and subsequently incorporated them into international conflicts. In Asia, regional conflicts over disputed territories have involved a proliferation of actors and interests, complicating the dispute and protracting the conflict. Disputes over the correct interpretation of the past, manifested in competing textbooks and statements by public officials, heighten tensions and warn of escalation. Within other states in the region, the rhetoric in the conflict is being leveraged to encourage support for existing regimes. Globally, the War on Terror, led by the United States and its allies has caused conflict over the legal doctrines that have long underpinned Western thought. The rights of individuals as well as the rights of states have been challenged, and whether these challenges will be incorporated into a new consensus remains to be seen. In Europe, measures of austerity following the economic crisis have divided citizens. The precedence for these measures, and the competing alternatives has generated conflict both among states and within domestic populous. Recent research has shown that violent conflict is currently lower than at any point in human history. Certainly the proliferation of international organizations and international legal emphasis on peace and human rights is to account for this fact. However, with this interconnectedness the incorporation of larger number of actors has increased the potential for conflicts, with many disputes teetering just on the edge of rhetoric and violence.

This issue of the *Yonsei Journal of International Studies* features a collection of submissions, included in the "Papers" section, that deal with conflict in some form. The first submission, "A Neoliberal Institutionalist Approach to the Modern Vietnam-China Maritime Dispute" by Hoang-Anh Nguyen and Hong-Van Tran, examines the realties faced by Vietnam in its ongoing territorial dispute with China. The authors argue that a neoliberal instiutionalist approach best explains Vietnam's position relative to China, and the paper examines the actors within Vietnam that compete for influence. In "A New World Order of Violence: President H. W. Bush, Violent Intervention, and the End of the Cold War," Laurens J. Visser examines the legitimization of violence as a means to settle international problems. The examination of the new decision-making process can, in the Editor's opinion, help explain the current propensity to use of violence in international conflicts. Gregor Konzack in "The Regional Power Balance in East Asia and Its Impact on Korea's Japan Policy," examines the changing environment in East Asia and proposes that an understanding of regional balance of power is useful to explain the confounding region. Finally, in "The Legacy of Austerity: The Eurozone Crisis and the Revival of the Washington Consensus," Cristian Talesco and Brigette S. Valentine examine the similarities between the Washington Consensus and the current European Consensus. They propose the controversial argument that the latter represents a revival of the former, and warn of the dire consequences heralded by this conclusion. All of these submission promise to provide the reader with a thorough analysis of their main topics. When combined, they will challenge readers to consider the changing nature of conflict, both regionally and globally.

In the "Essays" section, the Journal provides further thought provoking works by a selection of excellent scholars. In the first piece, "'We Have Just About Had It': Jack Slessor, The Foreign Office, and the Anglo-American Strategic Debate Over the Escalation of the Korean War, 1950-51," Alexander Nicholas Shaw examines the dynamics between the US and the UK during the Korean War using previously unutilized documents. The following piece by Eryan Ramadhani, "Lost in Southeast Asia: India's 'Look East' Policy Revisited," seeks to explain India's seemingly paradoxical actions in the volatile region. "De-Coding the 'Beijing Consensus': Is It an Alternative Growth Model?" by Amrita Jash examines the distinctness of the new Beijing Consensus from the Washington Consensus, and argues that this new model is a factor for China's ability to weather the recent economic crisis. The final essay, "From Brothers to Strangers: Myanmar's Political Transition And Its Effect on the Sino-Myanmar Paukphaw Relationship" by Hyo Won

Shin, examines the changed nature of the China-Myanmar relationship following the latters exit from military rule.

Included in this issue is a very special interview with the Hon Michael Kirby who chaired the recent Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea. During a recent visit to Seoul I was fortunate enough to be able to sit down with Mr. Kirby and discuss his experience with the commission and his hopes for future development now that the report has been released. This issue also includes Brandon K. Gauthier's timely review of Jang Jin-sung's Dear Leader: Poet, Spy, Escapee-A Look Inside North Korea. This thorough review also places the work in context with existing work on the suffering of the North Korean people while also emphasizing their role as future agents of change.

This issue of the Journal will be my final as editor in chief. The experience has been a valuable learning experience for myself. Throughout my time as editor in chief I have been assisted by a tremendously skilled and motivated staff, without which the Journal would not be possible. I have also been fortunate to meet a collection of brilliant scholars, who have provided their time and energy through their work to help craft what I consider to be one of the finest international studies journals in Korea. My sincere appreciation and thanks goes out to each of these individuals and I wish them all the best in the future. Those being said, please enjoy their work as you read this issue of the *Yonsei Journal of International Studies*. Happy reading and happy trails!

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PAPERS

A NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO THE MODERN VIETNAM-CHINA MARITIME DISPUTE

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The recent escalation of the territorial dispute in the South China Sea between Vietnam and China has received increasing international attention. Being economically, politically and militarily inferior to China, Vietnam has met challenges while raising its voice against China's actions. In this paper, the authors will use the neoliberal institutionalism approach in international relations to analyze Vietnam's current situation, address the causes of the problems, and seek possible solutions for the Vietnamese government.

Recently, considerable attention has been paid to the disputes over maritime territories in the South China Sea, especially the dispute between China and Vietnam over two island groups known in English as the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, in Vietnamese as the Hoang Sa and the Truong Sa, and in Chinese as the Xisha and the Nansha. The fact is that a historical review reveals that this territorial quarrel took root many years ago.[1] However, rela-

1 The origin of this dispute between these two countries can be traced back to 1956, when sovereignty of the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands fell to South Vietnam replacing the French according to the Geneva Agreements. China has politically and diplomatically condemned the decision and reaffirmed their control over the islands. China then gained control over the entire Paracel Islands after a battle with Republic of Vietnam Navy on January 19, 1974, and gained control over a proportion of the Spratly Islands after confrontation with Vietnam People's Navy in 1988. For more information on the history of this dispute, see Min Gyo Koo, "The Island and Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea," in *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York: Springer New York, 2010), 137-66; and Leszek Buszynski, "The development of the South China Sea maritime dispute," National Security College Occasional Paper, no. 5 (September, 2013): 3-7.*

tions have in recent times turned remarkably chillier after the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) placed its deep sea-drilling rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HD-981) in disputed waters south of the Paracel Islands on May 2, 2014. Although Vietnam bitterly denounced this move and claimed that the drilling rig was located within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) according to United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China responded by sending a large flotilla of ships to protect the rig as well as declaring that it "has irrefutable sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and maritime territories in its Exclusive Economic Zone."[2] Tensions severely flared up after Chinese boats repeatedly rammed and attacked Vietnamese ones with water cannons, which consequently led to several anti-Chinese protests and two violent riots against foreign-owned factories in Vietnam. The Haiyang Shiyou 981 stand-off ended with China announcing that the oil platform had completed its commercial exploration operations and would be withdrawing it on July 15, 2014; nevertheless, Vietnam and other claimants did not expect that China would scale back their increasing ambitions in South China Sea expansion as it had published a new map reinforcing territorial claim over the region.[3] For them now, seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute is crucially important.

The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed area of approximately 3.5 million square kilometers extending from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan. It was not by chance that many countries have overlapping territorial claims to these waters, as well as to some of the islands and rocky outcrops in them such as the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. The main driver is the search by all nations for natural resources to fuel economic growth, in this case oil, natural gas, minerals, and fish.[4] Fossil fuel obviously plays an important role in the economic development of China – the emerging superpower of Asia – as well as other developing countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Recent political instability in the Middle East has in particular raised concerns about the availability of oil for economic development and, as a result, prompted East Asian and South-

2 Mark C. Eades, "Why China Is Angry About a Game of Beach Volleyball," *U.S. News,* June 10, 2014, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/0610/china-is-angry-at-vietnam-and-the-philippines-volleyball-dilomacy, (accessed November 10, 2014).

3 Michelle FlorCruz, "China's New Vertical Map Gives Extra Play To Disputed South China Sea Territories," *International Business Times, June 25, 2014,* http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-new-vertical-map-gives-extra-play-disputed-south-china-sea-territories-1611550 (accessed November 10, 2014).

4 Fraser Cameron, "South China Sea Background Note," *EU-ASIAN Centre (2013): 1,* http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=112 (accessed November 10, 2014).

east Asian states to turn to the sea for their energy needs. In addition, according to studies conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources of Philippines, the South China Sea holds one third of the entire world's marine biodiversity thereby making it a very important area not only for the ecosystem but also for fishermen and the fishing industry of surrounding nations. Quite apart from that, worry about the infringement of maritime security and free transit of maritime commerce through those waters has contributed to the focus of international attention on this chronic dispute.[5, 6, 7, 8]

Having already acknowledged the historical, economic, and security significance of the two island groups in dispute, the Vietnamese government immediately implemented some measures, but their efforts have met challenges. On the sea, Vietnamese ships sent to call for the withdrawal of the drilling rig HD-981 from the disputed waters was attacked and China continuously warned Vietnam off "harassing Chinese ships".[9] On the other hand, a group of Vietnamese citizens, mostly young people and nationalists, are criticizing the government for perceived soft policies and urging more drastic action. The Vietnamese government therefore finds itself in a delicate situation where harsh moves can exacerbate the conflict but where limited action will lead to inaction on the part of China and criticism from its citizens.

However, to the authors' best knowledge, scholarly literature encompassing this particular issue is very limited. The Haiyang Shiyou 981 standoff is the worst maritime conflict between these two countries in the last twenty-five years, since 1988 when China fiercely took control of some rocks and sandbanks of the Spratly Islands by military force.[10] The sudden aggravation of the dispute is unexpected not only to governments and international organizations but also researchers. Moreover, as of November 2014,

5 Mark Landler, "Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands," *The New York Times,* July 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html (accessed November 10, 2014).

6 Zachary Keck, "India Wades Into South China Sea Dispute," *The Diplomat,* March 12, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/india-wades-into-south-china-sea-dispute (accessed November 10, 2014).

7 Ian Storey, "Japan's maritime security interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea dispute," *Political Science 65, no. 2 (2013): 135–56, doi:10.1177/0032318713508482 (accessed November 10, 2014).*

8 General Secretariat of EU, "Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia" (paper presented at the meeting for the Council Of The European Union, Brussels, June 15, 2012).

9 "China warns Vietnam over stand-off in South China Sea," *BBC, May 8, 2014,* http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27332723 (accessed November 10, 2014).

10 Min Gyo Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York: Springer New York, 2010), 153-54.*

with the most recent standoff just recently concluded, it is understandable that few relevant scholarly studies have yet been published. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to discuss new problems with which Vietnamese government have to deal in present time and suggest some possible solutions. The authors will tackle these tasks using neoliberal institutionalism approach developed by Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and other scholars.

Dependent and Interdependent Relationship in a Territorial Dispute

The policy of Vietnamese government on settling territorial dispute over the Paracel Islands is quite controversial among the Vietnamese citizenry. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated in his speech at the National Assembly meeting on June 11, 2014: "Vietnam keep consistent stance is that the disputed islands belongs to its sovereignty. We have sufficient evidence and legal history to confirm this. But Vietnam advocates negotiation and peaceful means to settle claims over the Paracel Islands."[11] In harmony with his speech, Vietnam has only sent non-military ships to the disputed waters in order to call for Chinese adherence to international law. The Vietnamese government has also continuously publicly condemned China for its actions in the South China Sea as a way to put China under international pressure. However, this approach did not in fact have a big impact on Chinese behavior. Some Vietnamese as well as foreign scholars believe that Vietnam should sue China at the International Court of Justice if it really wants the dispute settled.[12] The fact that the Philippines has already filed a lawsuit in January 2014 in regards to the South China Sea dispute to challenge China before a UN court at The Hague[13] makes this a plausible move, but the attitude of the Vietnamese government seemed unchangeable. The way governments deal with the dispute will clearly become a topic for consideration by statesmen and researchers in the future. Nonetheless, to the extent of the analysis on this paper, the authors will not try to answer the question "Which dispute settlement policies are better for the Vietnamese government to carry out?" but to the discuss new problems they have to face in the present which could potentially limit their policy choice.

11 Le Phux, "The best way to solve the sovereignty dispute," *VietNamNet Bridge*, June 21, 2014, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/105309/the-best-way-to-solve-the-sovereignty-dispute.html (accessed December 11 2014).

12 "Vietnam should sue China, say scholars," *VietNamNet Bridge,* June 22, 2014*, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/105421/vietnam-should-sue-china--say-scholars.html.*

13 "Philippines files case to UN in South China Sea dispute," *BBC,* March 31, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26781682 (accessed November 10, 2014).

International relations theory analyses relative influence. This influence can be considered as a countries' power. In the traditional view of power, military strength has widely been deemed to be the primary means by which one state gains relative power over another. This view has been criticized by neoliberal institutionalists for its lack of ability to explain the relations between countries in the modern world.[14] They argued that power can be military coercion or it can be the ability to control outcomes. According to Robert O. Keohane, interstate power arises not out of the possession of coercive power resources, but from the asymmetric interdependence in specific issues.[15]

Keohane has developed a new concept of interstate power source – asymmetries interdependence whereby less dependent actors in an interdependent relationship can use their position to influence others. This concept is extremely useful in analyzing the maritime dispute between Vietnam and China. Dependence can be defined as a situation in which a system is contingent on external forces. In contrast, interdependence describes a situation of mutual dependence between social actors which involve state actors and non-state actors.[16] The battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 between the naval forces of the People's Republic of China and Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) is an appropriate example in analyzing the effect of interdependence on state behavior. In 1974, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) was still engaged in war with the South. It therefore needed support, mainly from the Soviet Union and China, particularly after decades of heavy bombings by the United States that led to severe damage to the North Vietnamese economy. Exploiting the situation, China completely took control over the Paracel Islands following naval combat with the Republic of Vietnam Navy on January 19, 1974. North Vietnam's government, however, of course did not want to worsen their relationship with ally the Chinese and simply did nothing to publicly oppose Chinese action. This example therefore exhibits how a country's behavior can be affected by its dependency on the other.

14 Keohane and Nye have given some examples of countries in the modern world and argued that military power did not provide good explanations for the nature of international regimes. For more information, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), 115.*

15 Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik, eds., *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 249.*

16 Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE publications Ltd, 2013), 402.*

Keohane argued that interdependence "might be symmetrical, as in the case of Germany and France; it might be asymmetrical, as in the case of the United States and Guatemala."[17] And only in the asymmetrical case, could a country take advantage of its resources or the needs of the other to influence the latter's behavior. In other words, the country having relatively more resources or relatively less need will have the ability to exert greater power . Ariel Rubinstein has modeled this situation in a study on game theory. As he proved, when two people are trying to reach an agreement on how to divide a pie, the one with a lower fixed bargaining cost in each period will gain the whole pie.[18] In the North Vietnam case, its immediate needs for China's economic and political support during the Vietnam War led to its relatively weaker position preventing it from making any response which could have an adverse impact on the bilateral relationship.

Similarly, Vietnam's economic dependence on China may be the primary reason deterring Vietnamese government action in the present. It is no longer just about using military force to repel Chinese incursions into disputed areas as some Vietnamese nationalists call for as even the denunciation of Chinese claims to the area and appeals for help from the international community can be difficult to politically justify under threat of economic retaliation from China. Until now, no quantitative study has been conducted to determine the extent to which Chinese retaliation might harm the Vietnamese economy given the level of economic dependence. Nevertheless, a simple assumption may be made realizing that the reliance is far enough developed to case the Vietnamese economy to suffer from Chinese retaliation.

In the period of 2000-2013, Vietnam's exports to China accounted for approximately 10 percent of Vietnam's total exports, while import had increased from 10 to 28 percent in the same period.[19] According to the General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Vietnam's exports to China in 2013 was $13 billion while imports reached $37 billion. China's imports from Vietnam are mainly agricultural, forestry, and fishery products whereas Vietnam's imports from China are primarily mechanical, chemical, and input materials for the local garment and textile sector. Deputy Chairman of the Vietnamese Na-

17 *Robert Keohane Interview: Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, 2004, 5.*

18 Ariel Rubinstein, "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model," *Econometrica 50, no. 1 (January, 1982).*

19 General Department of Vietnam Customs, *Statistical Data on Exports and Imports of Vietnam (2000-2013); and International Monetary Fund, Statistics Dept, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (2000-2013).*

tional Assembly's Committee on Economic Affairs Mai Xuan Hung has made it clear that "about 80 percent of Vietnam's input materials are imported from China and 60 percent of agricultural exports are sold to China."[20] This would obviously pose a problem to Vietnam's economic development if trade from China was interrupted. This situation would not be reflected in China considering the fact that exports to and imports from Vietnam accounted for a very small proportion of its economy. In 2012, China's export and import ratio with Vietnam was only 1.49 and 1.13 percent respectively.[21]

China is currently the largest Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contractor in Vietnam. According to the Vietnamese National Assembly's Committee on Financial and Budgetary Affairs 90 percent of EPC contracts, among them thirty of Vietnam's national key projects, were implemented by Chinese enterprises through 2010.[22] In a report of Vietnam National Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering published in April 2014, Chinese contractors were found to have been assigned to deliver EPC contracts for five out of the country's six chemical projects, both of its mineral processing projects, forty-nine of its sixty-two cement projects, and sixteen of twenty-seven thermal power projects. The impact of dependence on China in this field is clearly visible at a construction site in southwestern Hanoi, where a construction of a train line involving Chinese companies has been suspended since May 2014.

However, more concerning is that Chinese contractors prefer to use Chinese equipment and workers,[23] which not only contributes little to local human resource development but also causes technology dependence on China. In some projects funded by Chinese aid, using Chinese technology, equipment and services is a condition attached to concessional loans. But in other projects, Chinese contractors simply enjoy the cheap price of their country's technology.[24] What follows is that most of technology implemented in national projects in Vietnam is Chinese. The problem is that the cheap

20 Le Chau, "Our economy and the South China Sea: Effort to overcome challenges," *VnEconomy*, May 26, 2014, http://vneconomy.vn/thoi-su/kinh-te-va-bien-dong-du-noi-vuot-qua-thach-thuc-20140526025656131.htm (accessed December 10, 2014).

21 The Observatory of Economic Complexity, *Exchange Statistics about China (2012).*

22 "From the incident of EVN to the lesson awakening the dependence on Chinese contractors," *Finance,* June 16, 2014, http://tapchitaichinh.vn/Kinh-te-dau-tu/Tu-su-co-cua-EVN-va-bai-hoc-canh-tinh-viec-le-thuoc-nha-thau-Trung-Quoc/50315.tctc (accessed December 10, 2014).

23 Le Hong Hiep, "The rise of Chinese contractors in Vietnam," *East Asia Forum,* March 14, 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/14/chinese-contractors-rise-in-vietnam-causes-problems-and-implications (accessed November 10, 2014).

24 Ibid.

technology they use is usually out-of-date and costly to operate, which raises serious concerns for statesmen.[25] In fact, there were already some incidents involving Chinese equipment in national projects,[26] the most well-known instance involved two 900 MVA transformers installed at the Hiep Hoa transformer station in Bac Giang Province breaking down within one week of service, leading outages in eight northern provinces.[27] The replacement of such devices with complementary units in a unified system, nevertheless, is daunting and results in reluctance on the part of Vietnamese managers who do not usually proactively replace units until they have broken down. Therefore, Vietnam will obviously have to live with Chinese technology for a long time. This brings on worry about national security, especially with regards to energy security. While Chinese contractors are constructing most of power plants of Vietnam, Vietnam Electricity (EVN) is still contractually obliged to import electricity from China at high rates limiting the purchase of electricity low rate energy produced from domestic hydropower plants.[28] Due to the monopoly of EVN on the Vietnamese electricity market, domestic power plants are hard pressed to find other buyers and are therefore running at only around 70 to 80 percent of their full capacity.[29] This has, as a result, posed a real risk for the energy security as well as hindered the development of the domestic power sector. The technology dependence has another dangerous aspect involving malicious features embedded on Chinese chips, which have been acknowledged to exist by Vietnamese security experts and the local public media.[30]

Although there are other explanations, the reason for the existence of this heavy dependence can be addressed through neoliberal institutionalist theory. The creation of interdependence and dependence, along with attitude changes and the promotion of international pluralism, is thought to be

25 "Vietnam president orders stop to imports of obsolete technologies," *Tuoitre News,* August 29, 2014, http://tuoitrenews.vn/business/21999/vietnam-president-orders-stop-to-imports-of-obsolete-technologies (accessed November 10, 2014).

26 "Vietnamese investors regret Chinese technology purchases," *Vietnamnet, July 31, 2014,* http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/business/108589/vietnamese-investors-regret-chinese-technology-purchases.html (accessed November 10, 2014).

27 Ibid.

28 "Vietnamese power sector risks dependence on China," *Dantri International News, June 20, 2014,* http://www.dtinews.vn/en/news/018/35257/vietnamese-power-sector-risks-dependence-on-china.html (accessed November 10, 2014).

29 Ibid.

30 "Vietnam haunted by hidden threats from Chinese hi-tech devices," *Tuoitre News, August 9, 2014,* http://tuoitrenews.vn/business/22227/vietnam-haunted-by-hidden-threats-from-chinese-hitech-devices (accessed November 10, 2014).

the effect of transnational relations.[31] These relations are in turn, according to neoliberal institutionalists, the interaction among private actors in world politics, as distinct from states and international organizations. Private actors can vary widely from multinational business enterprises to foundations, organizations of scientists, international trade union secretariats.[32] While the realist approach to interstate relations has for the most part accepted the role of states as the only significant actors,[33] liberalism has been asserting the importance of non-state actors in policy formation. Arnold Wolfers has pointed out that "the Vatican, the Arabian-American Oil Company, and a host of other non-state entities are able on occasion to affect the course of international events. In such cases, these entities become actors in the international arena and competitors of the nation-state. Their ability to operate as international or transnational actors may be traced to the fact that individuals are able to identify themselves and their interests with corporate bodies other than the nation-state."[34]

Due to globalization, instances and avenues for transnational relations are increasing and transnational actors are increasingly competitive as they attempt to gain more and more by influencing public policy. These actors typically associate together based on the principle of mutual benefit and form "interest groups." Nye and Keohane have argued that these actors can "affect interstate politics by altering the choices open to statesmen and the costs that must be borne for adopting various courses of action."[35] This would, as a result, lead to a situation in which the states lose control. The loss Neo and Keohane mentioned is not the loss of control over "legal sovereignty" but the loss of "political and economic autonomy."[36] In recent years, the Vietnamese government has acknowledged the increasing influence of interest groups in their country.[37] This is also considered by domestic economists as one of the main reasons of the significant economic dependence on China, as they asserted in a scientific seminar on the topic "Economic Au-

31 Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction," *International Organization 25, no. 3 (Summer, 1971): 337-40.*

32 Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion," *International Organization 25, no. 3 (Summer, 1971): 737.*

33 Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 30.*

34 Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaborations: Essay on International Politics, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 23.*

35 Nye and Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion," 724-25.

36 Ibid, 743.

37 "Vietnam PM admits interest groups sway policymaking," *Thanh Nien News, January 06, 2012, http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnam-pm-admits-interest-groups-sway-policymaking-8743.html*

tonomy in an Interdependent World" held by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry on July 3, 2014.[38] The lack of transparency and integrity in Vietnam's policy making process and the existence of many loopholes as well as serious corruption in the control mechanism of state power have enabled interest groups to collude with some corrupt government officials and influence domestic politics more easily.[39] The fact that Chinese contractors won over 90 percent of Vietnamese government's EPC contracts over the course of ten years is highly questionable while their projects were usually completed behind schedule and localization rates were always low. As of 2014, there are two bauxite and aluminum industrial projects in Vietnam carried out by Chinese contractors with a localization rate of a mere 2 percent; up to fifteen of twenty coal-fired power plants constructed by Chinese contractors have the localization rate of 0 percent.[40] Having imported almost all machinery and equipment from their country, Chinese contractors have not only deepened Vietnamese commercial but also technical dependence on China. In this way, other alternative plans for construction, maintenance, and operation have become relatively more costly to the government and has therefore kept them in the vicious circle of Chinese import dependence. This excessive dependence would without question put Vietnam in the weaker position in an asymmetrical interdependent relationship and reduce its strength over the maritime territorial dispute.

The superior state in an asymmetrical interdependent relationship has many ways to harm its rival. Keohane and Nye have analyzed two aspects of power in interdependence: sensitivity and vulnerability.[41] Assuming that the policy framework is constant, sensitivity is defined as "the speed and magnitude with which a change in one country is felt in another, within one policy framework." The more dependent a country, the more sensitive it is. When a country meets a change in the other country, reliance forces non-state actors to adapt or otherwise fail to acclimatize to the new situation and risk damage. These actors consequently appeal to the government to alter its policies in order to match the changes and protect them. Keohane and Nye's analysis is followed by the definition of vulnerability, which is defined

38 Le Dang Doanh (seminar speech, Hanoi, July 3, 2014).

39 "Vietnam PM admits interest groups sway policymaking," *Thanh Nien News.*

40 Vietnam National Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering, *Report on Foreign Contractors in Vietnam (report presented at the meeting for the summation of 10 years implementing development strategy for mechanical engineering industry held by Ministry of Industry and Trade, Hanoi, April 11, 2014).*

41 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), 9-16.*

as "the relative availability and costliness of alternative policy frameworks, when it becomes necessary to adapt to external changes."[42] Vulnerability importantly imposes costs on other countries. If there are effective alternatives which are not too costly to implement, then the effects of sensitivity can be dealt with ease. A recent example involved China banning bananas imported from Philippines in 2012. At that time, China accounted for more than 30 percent of Philippine banana exports.[43] Failing to find alternative export markets for perishable bananas, the Philippines suffered from a huge loss of $33.6 million.[44] China used this and similar means to influence international disputes through punitive economic actions. Thus, Vietnam also needs to prepare itself in case China decides to do the same in the case of ongoing dispute in the South China Sea, considering Vietnam's heavy dependence on China.

Policy Recommendation

As asserted above, the primary task of the Vietnamese government at present is to keep their country in a political position balanced with China's in the dispute over islands in the South China Sea. Above all, it is impossible to achieve that objective without escaping from the asymmetrical interdependent relationship with China, particularly economic dependence on China. On the one hand, the Vietnamese government needs to boost the potential development of domestic firms, especially those in supporting industries, to increase their country's economic independence. On the other hand, while complete independence is impractical in a deeply globalized world, Vietnam must diversify dependence to other countries and thus reduce dependence on China.

Having pursued the aim of quickly industrializing, Vietnam has invested too much in the manufacturing industry and is now suffering from gaps in the national supply chain. Supporting industries, which provide input materials for manufacturing industry, have received little attention from the government.[45] This, as a result, has led to the country's over-dependence

42 Ibid.

43 "The China-Philippine Banana War," *Asia Sentinel, June 06, 2012, http://www.asiasentinel.com/society/the-china-philippine-banana-war/*

44 Josephine Cuneta and James Hookway, "China Dispute Threatens Philippine Industries," *The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2012,* http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303879604577407730408858666 (accessed November 10, 2014).

45 Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy, "Supporting Industries: A Review of Concepts," in *Building Supporting Industries in Vietnam Vol. 1, ed. Kenichi Ohno (Hanoi: Vietnam Development Forum, March 2007), 27.*

on foreign input materials. Due to their cheap price and diversity, Chinese materials have gradually taken over the Vietnamese domestic market for input materials.[46, 47] To avoid collapse of the national industry sector, Vietnam must develop its supporting industry to gain back market share from China, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of Vietnamese input materials.

One possible solution is reorganization of the industrial system. The Vietnamese government should invest in and support the development of the selective materials manufacturing industries in which Vietnam has a competitive advantage in areas such as mechanical engineering, textiles, footwear, and electronics. In addition, Vietnam must enhance the processing of natural resources and minimize the export of raw resources to China as a way to raise efficiency.

Solutions strengthening the independence of domestic economy should be carried out while simultaneously diversifying external dependence. Among them, focusing on negotiations of pending trade agreements seems highly promising. As of October 2014, Vietnam is expected to sign fourteen free trade agreements (FTA) with fifty-five countries and territories by 2015 including the important Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the Free Trade Agreement with EU.[48] Tariff exemptions and reductions provided by these agreements will allow Vietnam to import more equipment, input materials, and consumer goods from other countries such as the United States of America, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Australia, the EU, Russia, Canada, and South Korea. These opportunities will also give Vietnam's agricultural exports more destinations to go. However, in preparation, Vietnam has to implement new quality standards to meet the demands of those high quality markets.

From the neoliberal institutionalism perspective, the most effective solution for this problem should be sought in its intrinsic nature. That means the Vietnamese government must deal with interest groups in their country first or risk discovering that tackling Chinese dependence will be in vain. Keohane and Nye have described transnational actors' ability to "create a 'control gap' between the aspirations for control over an expanded range

46 "Businesses urged to invest in supporting industries," *Vietnam Plus,* June 19, 2014, http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Businesses-urged-to-invest-in-supporting-industries/20146/51731.vnplus (accessed November 10, 2014).

47 "Vietnamese manufacturers rely on Chinese materials and machinery," *Tuoitre News,* November 12, 2013, *http://tuoitrenews.vn/business/15912/vietnamese-manufacturers-rely-on-chinese-materials-and-machinery.*

48 Hoang Trung Hai, speech presented at the annual investor meeting, Hanoi, October 16, 2014.

of matters and the capability to achieve it."[49] This would cause many difficulties for the government if they do not try to gain back power from these groups before pursuing other policies.

During the process of furthering their interests, interest groups in Vietnam have influenced the policy making process and contributed to the creation of many loopholes in Vietnamese law,[50] which are issues the government should address immediately. For example, due to the lack of a quality control mechanism for imports, Chinese low-quality products have easily penetrated the Vietnamese domestic market.[51] These cheap prices have affected Vietnamese manufacturer preference who desire to cut product costs by any means even if it means forgoing domestic high quality products of the same kind.[52] In this way, Chinese firms have almost completely captured the Vietnamese market and crowded out local firms despite a lack of investment in Vietnam.[53] It is impossible to turn domestic supporting industry around if measures are not imposed to ameliorate this situation, particularly to control the flow of products from China into Vietnam and promote usage of domestic products in local firms.

Another issue needing consideration is in regards to the government's development projects, which usually have a very low localization rate when assigned to Chinese contractors. In order to "fight corruption and to increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of public procurement systems,"[54] the Vietnamese government revised the Vietnam Bidding Law in 2013. The revised law requires "the foreign contractors work in partnership with a Vietnamese company or sign a sub-contract with a local company. Furthermore, foreign contractors are only allowed to employ foreign workers when there are no qualified Vietnamese workers available for the projects." The adoption of this revised law in practice as of July 1, 2014, was expected to create fairness for all contractors and promote human resource improve-

49 Nye and Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion," 743.

50 Le Dang Doanh, "Innovative Thinking and Institutional Reform" in *Macroeconomic Report 2012: From Macroeconomic Instability to the Path of Restructuring, To Trung Thanh et al. (Hanoi: Knowledge Publisher, 2012).*

51 "Vietnam should reproach itself for letting Chinese goods dominate market," *Vietnamnet, May 24, 2013,* http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/business/74782/vietnam-should-reproach-itself-for-letting-chinese-goods-dominate-market.html (accessed November 10, 2014).

52 *Tuoitre News, "Vietnamese manufacturers rely on Chinese materials and machinery."*

53 "In high inflation, Vietnamese consumer prefer cheap goods," *Vietnamnet,* June 12, 2011, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/business/9001/in-high-inflation--vietnamese-consumer-prefer-cheap-goods.html (accessed November 10, 2014).

54 Nguyen Cong Ngo, speech presented at the UN DPADM In-House Seminar, New York, November 22, 2013.

ment. Nonetheless, it is suggested that additional rules or standards be enacted to compel Chinese contractors of projects currently being constructed, which accounted for a large proportion, to use assured quality materials and employ more local workers. For example, the government could impose a special tax on Chinese materials that are currently unavailable in the Vietnamese market and are imported into Vietnam by Chinese contractors. This would prevent Chinese contractors from Chinese over importation and from further damaging the domestic industry which is already over dependent on Chinese materials. The government could also subsidize Vietnamese firms when they provide Chinese contractors with materials on condition that they reduce their price to become more competitive with Chinese brands. This solution would, of course, create a situation where the government would face an increased budget burden, but the benefit may outweigh possible future costs.

Last but not least, the ultimate goal of Vietnam is not simply to reduce dependence on China but to participate in the dispute settlement more actively. However, due to its economic, political, and military inferiority, Vietnam would definitively be at a disadvantage in the case of a military conflict. Therefore, finding a peaceful solution to resolve the dispute is critically important for the Vietnamese government. Liberal institutionalists have already agreed that international institutions have played a decisive role in the promotion of cooperation and peace.[55] Keohane has proposed the approach of "neoliberal institutionalism"[56] whereby international institutions can encourage cooperation through the provision of information about states and reducing transaction costs in the negotiating of agreements.[57] Institutions in this case are not just understood as the United Nations or World Trade Organization but are instead defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."[58] In this sense, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other international laws are obviously seen as the 'institution', through which Vietnam can try to make an agreement with China in this dispute and avoid unnecessary military conflict. The Vietnamese government, therefore, should

55 Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations, 64.

56 Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions And State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).*

57 Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).*

58 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2.*

continue to settle the dispute in accordance with established international laws, as well as through these institutions, joining with other weak countries who also in dispute with China for greater political influence.

Conclusion

The South China Sea, of which China claims approximately 90 percent, is of significant importance to neighboring countries as well as in regards to international sea commerce. In the case of Vietnam, two disputed islands chains have not only economic but also security and political implications. However, Vietnam's efforts to resolve this dispute have been challenged by its relative lack of power in the international arena compared to China. This paper has analyzed and provided some possible solutions to this problem following the approach of the neoliberal institutionalism.

Neorealist theory treats military power as the most important power of a state and argues that because of a state's desire to survive in a world of anarchy, it will develop military capabilities as a means to increase its relative power. This theory is not completely applicable to Vietnam's situation as the government has already acknowledged a military disadvantage and has decided to pursue a peaceful solution. In this case, neoliberal institutionalist theory, which asserted that states can utilize interdependence as a source of power to influence other states' behavior, is reasonably useful in its application.

This paper has shown a historical example of North Vietnamese dependence on China leading to a failure of that state to exercise sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and how the economic dependence on China in the present day has also played a major role in controlling the Vietnamese government's behavior. The authors have analyzed the situation of that dependence as well as the main cause of it, the effect of transnational relations, and how China can exploit it to the detriment of the Vietnamese economy and benefit of China in dispute settlement negotiations. Finally, this paper has suggested several solutions for the Vietnamese government to carry out in order to reduce dependence on China. Nonetheless, statesmen should keep in mind that no progress can be made until the influence of transnational actors in Vietnamese domestic politics is successfully curbed. **Y**

A NEW WORLD ORDER OF VIOLENCE PRESIDENT GEORGE H. W. BUSH, VIOLENT INTERVENTION, AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

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In 1991, United States President George H. W. Bush militarily intervened in Kuwait to force out an occupying Iraqi army, setting a precedent for the use of violence in a post-Cold War World. However, what at first appears to be a routine exercise in global power soon takes on different proportions as the extent of the decision to use violence to correct the international order takes shape. Emerging from the Cold War with the hope that power relations among the great powers had left behind the blood of the 20th century, it is worth considering the effort to which President H. W. Bush lead the United States toward consolidating legitimate, and illegitimate uses of violence. Beginning with the thoughts of Hannah Arendt in 'Reflections on Violence', this essay considers the decision-making of President H. W.Bush as he turned toward violence to confront the challenges emerging in the Persian Gulf in the wake of the Cold War. Beginning with the administration's first military intervention in Panama in December 1989, it is seen that violence gains a wider acceptance as a tool to solve international problems for President Bush as rules and requirements are codified to ensure that it is controlled and serves in the interests of the United States. The result is a political decision-making process that justifies the use of violence in the post-Cold War world.

"I view very seriously our determination to reverse out this aggression. And please believe me, there are an awful lot of countries that are in total accord with what I've just said…They are staunch friends and allies, and we will be working with that all for collective action. This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait."

– George H. W. Bush, August 5, 1990

In 1969, Hannah Arendt, in *Reflections on Violence*, considered the relationship between violence and power. With the Vietnam War reaching its apex of popular disapproval and the Cold War rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union still edging nuclear apocalypse, Arendt's thoughts had a specific historical context. However, Arendt deconstructed violence down to its instrumental nature. For those who wielded power, or sought to wield more power, violence was a tool that could be used to alter the dynamic of a relationship irrevocably.[1] The implementation of violence broke the status quo through destructiveness. That is not to say that violence, according to Arendt, was the correct tool to break the spine of the status quo, as would a revolutionary, or to reinforce the restraints of the status quo, as would the tyrant. According to Arendt, the option of non-violent action was just as easily considered and "the distinction between violent and non-violent action is that the former is exclusively bent upon the destruction of the old and the latter chiefly concerned with the establishment of something new."[2] However, it could not be doubted that violence and power were intrinsically connected whether for the perceived betterment or detriment of humanity. *Reflections on Violence* deserves more consideration in light of the events that occurred during 1989-1991 when the international community found itself emerging from the shackles of the Cold War and there appeared to be hope for the beginning of something new. Indeed, the largely peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union was contrary to the feared violent conclusion of the Cold War and in light of Arendt's understanding that non-violent action was concerned with the creation of something new, there was every hope that the violence of the 20th century had withered into irrelevance. The promise of a new, non-violent beginning was alluring. Francis Fukuyama still gushed lyrically about the end of history, and the triumph of liberal democracy, in 1992.[3] It is, therefore, worth considering the actions of the United States as it emerged as the world's last remaining superpower, unrivalled in military, economic, and political power in 1989. It is especially worth considering the use of violence by this sole superpower by focusing on the Presidency of George H. W. Bush.

1 Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," The New York Review of Books, (February, 27, 1969). Available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1969/feb/27/a-special-supplement-reflections-on-violence/ See also Hans J. Morgenthau on the role of violence in international relations. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Fifth Edition (Alfred A. Knopf, 1973).

2 Hannah Arendt, 'Reflections on Violence.'

3 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man* (Penguin Books, 1992).

In August 1990, United States President George H. W. Bush was confronted by the violent annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, just one part of an international order that was undergoing convulsions. In 1989, the fall of the Berlin wall would signal the Soviet Union's final death throes; all across the Eastern European bloc nationalist independence had exploded as the stranglehold of communism was weakened; demonstrations in the name of democracy blossomed in China, resulting in the violent repression of student activists in Tiananmen Square; and finally, many years after the end of World War II, Germany had made steps toward reunification, later going on to join the NATO alliance. Engulfed by the conflagration of international events, the newly elected President Bush was aware that his decisions would have unprecedented repercussions. Informed by the foreign policy team he had assembled, and through his own foreign policy experience, President Bush had to reconcile protecting the United States' strategic interests abroad with the responsibilities of an emerging post-Cold War international order, including the United States' newly found status as the only remaining global superpower. The result was a blend of old and new approaches to geo-political problems as President Bush, first, confronted a regional dictator who had threatened his domestic interests and then, confronted the violent annexation of Kuwait by Iraq. In the first case, the Bush administration established the parameters for the efficient use of violence to correct incongruities in their regional interests and proved the United States was beyond the limitations subconsciously imposed by the Vietnam War. Second, President Bush consolidated support through the United Nations Security Council for armed intervention to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, thereby lending a distinct post-Cold War legitimacy to the conduct of violence. By illustrating the invasion of Panama, and working through the decision-making process that led to the intervention in Kuwait, a process emerges that identifies some acts of violence as legitimate, despite that violence ostensibly being used to protect the United States' strategic interests.

Into Panama to Chase a Dictator

Coincidently, President Bush had the credentials to deal with the foreign policy challenges that confronted his administration after having spent the majority of his political life in foreign policy positions. These included United States representative to the United Nations, director of the CIA, and vice president throughout the 80's. President Bush would also be the last of the Great War Generation presidents, having served as a naval pilot in the clos-

ing stages of World War II. These experiences informed President Bush's understanding of foreign policy, the United States' place in the world, and the ultimate costs of violent intervention.[4] This would be influenced at a more practical level by General Colin Powell, a career military officer who agreed to become the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff – the bridge between political and military leadership. General Powell, who had honed his military skill as a young soldier in Vietnam, carried the political and cultural baggage of a generation that had experienced, and in some circumstances distanced itself from, violent intervention. As a result, General Powell had developed a guiding ethos honed from his own experience as a soldier, now in a position in the hands of political leadership.[5] As a military aide to former Secretary of State Caspar Weinberger,[6] General Powell was entwined with the tenets of the, so-called, Weinberger Doctrine. The doctrine had emerged in the wake of the Vietnam War and stipulated, under the guise of lessons-learned, that only in situations where objectives were clearly defined, conflict definitively winnable, and overwhelming force guaranteed should military action be considered an option. Overall, the doctrine created a set of conditions that aimed to rectify the political failings in Vietnam, compelling politicians to commit to a military action by seeing it through successfully, just as the soldiers who were fighting were committed to following their orders. General Powell was the filter between the military and political hierarchies in the United States, and it would be General Powell who had an opportunity to influence not whether President Bush would use force, but when and how.[7]

The first example of armed intervention under the Bush administration was in the final months of 1989, when Operation Just Cause set out into Panama in order to capture and extradite the accused drug smuggler, and incidentally the leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega, on drug trafficking charges. Noriega was a dictator and had become increasingly erratic as a leader in the late 1980s. For President Bush, capturing and extraditing Noriega was a direct carry over from his years as vice president. Bush recalled visiting a crack house in 1988, and wrote about the people he had met

4 Jeffrey A. Engel, "A Better World…but Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On," *Diplomatic History* 34, No. 1 (2010): 29-30.

5 General Powell reflects on the Vietnam War from the perspective of a soldier, carefully criticising the political dimensions of the conflict that overtook the conduct of the war. The sense of comradery and respect for the lives of American soldiers is evident in his memoirs, and help to interpret his actions as Joint Chief of Staff. See Colin Powell; Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995) 103, 132, 145.

6 James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans* (Viking, 2004) 43-4.

7 Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, (Simon and Schuster, 1991) 176-7.

who had "guts and courage and toughness to fight… It's depressing and discouraging but it's heroic…Thank God for those who turn in the cash and fight the drugs."[8] Alongside Bush's personal revulsion of drugs in American society was his equal disgust at the alleged drug smuggling encouraged by Noriega in Panama, a stance exacerbated by President Ronald Reagan who had, in the final years of his presidency, chose to ignore two edicts that were issued in Miami for Noriega's arrest for drug trafficking.[9] Reagan had sought a diplomatic solution where, in exchange for Noriega stepping down from leadership in Panama, the United States would cease pursuing him for drug trafficking.[10] Bush privately ruminated that "we're going to devastate our law enforcement community; we're going to send the wrong signal to the U.S. Attorneys all around; we're going to say that you can drop indictments even without plea bargaining."[11] This was in conjunction with a rumor that Reagan had ignored the edicts because Noriega had incriminating material concerning Bush.[12]

By the time Bush was elected president in 1989, the situation in Panama had deteriorated. Under the auspices of "democracy," elections were held that resulted in an overwhelming loss for Noriega. In response, Noriega instituted martial law in the televised and visceral beating of his winning political opponents on the streets. Noriega soon announced that he was the Maximum Supreme Ruler of Panama and that they were at war with the United States of America.[13] Noriega's power grab presented a problem for Bush because of the 12,000 Americans stationed in Panama and the Panama Canal, scheduled to change into Panamanian hands in 2000.[14] These cascading events enflamed anti-American sentiments in the Panamanian Defense Force and culminated in the death of an American naval serviceman who, along with some friends, had been stopped at a roadblock while on an evening out in Panama City. Compounding matters was the imprisonment and torture of another American serviceman and his partner who had witnessed the shooting.[15] With the death of a member of the United States armed services, President Bush could no longer ignore the situation in Panama and immediately went on the offensive, stating:

8 George H. W. Bush, *All the Best, George* Bush (A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 1999) 387.
9 Timothy Naftali, *George H. W. Bush* (The American Presidents Series, Times Books, 2007) 56-7.
10 Bush, *All the Best, George Bush,* 386-8.
11 Ibid. 388.
12 Ibid. 387.
13 Woodward, *The Commanders*, 159.
14 Ibid. 83.
15 Ibid. 157-8.

> As President, I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of American citizens. And that is why I directed our Armed Forces to protect the lives of American citizens in Panama and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States.[16]

It was of no surprise that President Bush would confront Noriega, as there was no love among the American people for the Panamanian dictator because of the accusations of drug smuggling. However, the death of an American at the hands of a foreign military meant that the nature of the response could not be limited in scope. Powell had an opportunity to influence the options for extraditing Manuel Noriega as he joined the conversation between Bush's foreign policy team. Extraditing Noriega would not be a simple police action, it would require a military response in order to establish order and confront any opposition. Given the freedom to incorporate some dimensions of the Weinberger Doctrine, Powell devised a military operation that utilized a military force of 24,000 armed service members that looked out of proportion for the simple objective of capturing Noriega and confronting a force of 15,000 Panamanian Defense Personnel, of which only 3,000 were combat ready.[17] Asked why such a large and powerful military force would be necessary for such a small country as Panama, Powell replied "I'm always a great believer in making sure you get there with what you need to accomplish the mission and don't go in on the cheap side."[18] In practice, Powell applied this thinking to every aspect of the operation, even expressing concern that "that they might be doing some things just for show. After preaching the importance of a sufficient force or 'mass' during the operation, the chairman was now looking for excesses. He spoke of reducing risks and damages."[19] As a result, the operation quickly subdued the Panamanian Defense Force and reinstated the democratically elected leaders of Panama. However, the primary objective of capturing Noriega was initially unsuccessful. Chairman Powell, after preaching the necessity for clear and attainable military objectives, conceded that "We have not yet located the General… But, as a practical matter, we have decapitated him from the dictatorship of this country and he is now a fugitive and will be treated as such."[20] It would take weeks,

16 George H. W. Bush, Address to the nation announcing United States Military Action in Panama, December 20, 1989.
17 Woodward, *The Commanders*, 164.
18 Ibid. 194.
19 Ibid. 176.
20 Ibid. 188.

and a standoff outside the Vatican's Panamanian embassy, before Noriega would hand himself over to the United States, leading to a deceptively cold end to President Bush's first armed intervention. However, there were lessons for the administration. Military intervention would be supported so long as it was efficient, concise, and the United States was the victor. Riding on a wave of popular support, President Bush began his second year as President.

Disturbance in the Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf had not been of any major domestic concern prior to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Throughout the 80's, relations between the United States and Iraq had been mutual while attention was focused on the traditional rivalries of the Cold War. Despite some opposition to Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the closing stages of the eight-year long Iran-Iraq War, the region was considered little more than a proxy battlefield for the interests of the Soviet Union and United States.[21] In the United States, Iraq was considered an economic partner, one that would buy agricultural material through American companies floated by a convenient credit operation that subsidized American exports.[22] Furthermore, the National Intelligence Estimate of 1989 assured President Bush that an exhausted and war-battered Iraq was in no position to follow through on any saber-rattling threats it might issue to other states in the region - such as the increasingly militant posture toward Kuwait.[23] At the beginning of 1990, Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein, was not considered a major liability or threat to any interests in the region.

It was, therefore, a surprise to President Bush that Saddam annexed Kuwait on August 2, 1990.[24] With a lack of immediate options to respond to the invasion, President Bush froze Kuwaiti assets in the United States fearing that the Iraqi occupiers would steal all that they could. In the early hours of the morning on August 2, President Bush signed the executive order to

21 Early in the 1980s, Donald Rumsfeld (who would later, in 2000, become George W. Bush's Secretary of Defence) was part of a bi-partisan house committee sent to Iraq on an economic mission. His feedback was positive, after having met Saddam, and he reported that the region was ready for investment and full of potential. The picture of Rumsfeld shaking Saddam's hand in 1983 is worth a thousand words. James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans,* 123-4.

22 Richard Haass, *War of Necessity, War of Choice,* (Simon and Schuster, 2009) p 29; 48-9.

23 Ibid. 46-7.

24 There was a potential warning regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but it was lost in the convoluted, ambiguous nature of diplomatic conduct. See United States Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, and her meeting with Saddam on the 25th July, 1990. Cable From Baghdad Embassy to State Department, "Saddam's Message of Friendship to President Bush," July 25, 1990.

do just that, executing the first move in identifying the annexation as illegitimate.[25] However, it was not until the following National Security Council session that the collective ignorance of what to do regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait became apparent. Powell said it clearly when telling General Norman Schwarzkopf during a briefing shortly before the session that "I'd think we'd go to war over Saudi Arabia, but I doubt we'd go to war over Kuwait."[26] Powell's thinking was shared by more than one person in the National Security Council, much to the frustration of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who remarked that he "...was appalled at the undertone of the discussion, which suggested resignation to the invasion and even adaptation to a *fait accompli*. There was a huge gap between those who saw what was happening as the major crisis of our time and those who treated it as the crisis *du jour*."[27]

President Bush, adhering to the advice of Scowcroft, could see that any response to the Iraqi invasion would require an effort to establish any military action as legitimate, and suggested that Congress should be compelled to pass a resolution that would impose unilateral sanctions, commend the United Nations for its actions, and support any position the Bush administration might take.[28] Unlike going after Noriega, President Bush had implicit domestic support or consensus he could utilize to execute a quick intervention in Kuwait against Iraq. And there were also strategic concerns. Iraq had a war-hardened army that was the fourth largest in the world, hardly the Panamanian Defense Force. Despite this, President Bush's first address on the Iraqi invasion left no doubt how the United States was going to respond. President Bush explained:

> There is no place for this sort of naked aggression in today's world, and I've taken a number of steps to indicate the deep concern that I feel over the events that have taken place. Last night I instructed our ambassador at the United Nations, Tom Pickering, to work with Kuwait in convening an emergency meeting of the Security Council. It was convened, and I am grateful for that quick, overwhelming vote condemning the Iraqi action and calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal.[29]

25 George H.W. Bush; Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, (Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) 314.
26 Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 184.
27 Bush; Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 317.
28 Ibid. 317.
29 George H. W. Bush, Remarks and an exchange with reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,

When asked if this meant military intervention was being considered, Bush responded, "...I'm not contemplating such action, and I...would not discuss it if I were."[30] However, Bush was clear in identifying the Iraqi invasion as "naked aggression" that would not be recognized and would be challenged, as acknowledged by the demand issued by the United Nations Security Council that Iraq withdraw immediately, and unconditionally.

Acknowledging the invasion of Kuwait as a threat to vital American interests, President Bush authorized the deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to create a defensive barrier against any further Iraqi expansion efforts. On August 8, President Bush explained to the nation, "Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence"[31] should Iraq expand into the oil fields to their west, into Saudi Arabia. However, President Bush was just as quick to assert that in some cases "appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930's, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors."[32] Leaning on the emotional, as well as strategic, rationalizations for sending American troops into the Saudi Arabian desert, it was obvious that President Bush was searching for the justification that would allow him more freedom to force Iraq from Kuwait. Strategically, President Bush was correct in acknowledging that an expanding Iraq threatened the resources in the region.[33] However, President Bush's comparison of Saddam Hussein with Hitler was against the advice of his foreign policy advisors and would later result in his public speeches being moderated in order to temper his rhetoric.[34] It was clear that in order to use military force to rectify the situation in the Persian Gulf there would have to be explicit justification for such an action, both domestically and diplomatically. According to President Bush, "we agree that this is not an American problem or a European problem or a Middle East problem: It's the world's problem."[35] Therefore, it would be the United Nations Security Council that would be seen to speak for the world.

August 2, 1990.

30 Ibid.

31 George H. W. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, August 8, 1990.

32 Ibid.

33 Richard Nixon gave a realistic appraisal of the reasons America had to repel Iraq's expansion into Kuwait in an Opinion piece written in the New York Times, 1991. See Richard Nixon, "Why?", *The New York Times*, January 6, 1991.

34 Naftali, *George H. W. Bush*, 120-1.

35 Ibid.

Searching for Support

Despite the international dimension of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, Bush faced domestic opposition that manifested in Congress. This opposition was amplified in the fall of 1990 by a deepening budget crisis in which President Bush had to renege on an election promise not to raise taxes. It was not so much that his Democrat opposition in both the House of Representatives and the Senate wanted to bleed all they could from the unenviable reversal of his core election promises; members from the Republican Party were also against his economic agenda. Led by House minority whip Representative Newt Gingrich (R-GA), a group of disgruntled Republicans managed to single-handedly mutilate President Bush's personal approval rating by splitting his conservative base. This had the immediate effect of diminishing the implicit support President Bush had received for the steps he had already taken toward the crisis in the Persian Gulf.[36] When Bush spoke with Gingrich privately, he could only remark, "You are killing us."[37] Despite Gingrich's best efforts, Bush got approval from Congress for a budget, although it hardly represented the budget he had promised his Republican voters, and the partisanship it had created within Congress had a lasting effect on the administration's ability to press for consensus. It made a call for bi-partisanship by Bush in September 1990, before the budget crisis would hit its full peak, sound somewhat hopeful – "if there ever was a time to put country before self and patriotism before party, the time is now."[38] Now that Congress had comfortably challenged the president on the budget, and had won, representatives were soon questioning the purpose of American military forces in Saudi Arabia. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was singled out by Bush as potential opposition to any military action as the Senator might have "picked up on the compromise that some are offering – [that] there should be elections in Kuwait."[39] The compromise that worried Bush was part of a regional approach, dubbed the "Arab Solution," that allowed Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait and required the Kuwaiti government to undertake elections. The "Arab Solution," however, did not confront Iraq for its violent annexation of Kuwait. Bush's concerns were somewhat allayed by the first meeting on September

36 Ibid. 113-4; 116-7.
37 Ibid. 117.
38 George H. W. Bush, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, September 11, 1990.
39 Bush; Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 358.

21 of the bi-partisan leadership committee concerning the United States response to the Iraqi invasion. At the meeting, it was agreed that Congress would support the administration's actions so far. However, warned the leaders, there was no consensus for support of any armed intervention.[40]

Between the budget crisis and lackluster Congressional support, President Bush became jaded towards a domestic consensus that might equal the support that was emerging in the United Nations Security Council. Yet, it was important to Bush that there was a degree of domestic support for armed intervention in Iraq, similar to the support to confront Noriega. A part of the reason for the lack of support stemmed from the lack of explicit justification for an armed intervention in Kuwait. It was understood that there were interests in the region that were strategic to the United States, but that proved difficult to articulate at a domestic level. In the absence of justifications, President Bush wrote in his diaries, "the news is saying some members of Congress feel I might use a minor incident to go to war, and they may be right. We must get this over with. The longer it goes, the longer the erosion."[41] Bush could see that without justification there would not be the quick and overwhelming strike that was necessary to achieve the stated objective of forcing Iraq from Kuwait. The impatience of the political impasse soon led to suggestions that Saddam Hussein could be drawn into attacking American forces, justifying retaliation. In particular, Bush considered identifying the embassy staff still in Kuwait as "hostages," for the purposes of immediately rescuing them.[42] Understandably, Bush's suggestion for finding a provocation to expedite, and justify, an immediate military response did not find support among his advisors, or even United Kingdom Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who argued that any conflict had to be fought on the United States and United Kingdom's terms.[43] Once the dust had settled, and Congress adjourned at the end of October, the administration took stock of the political capital that had been expended over budgetary policy. In particular, it became increasingly obvious just how much support had wavered over the administration's posture toward the Persian Gulf crisis. The Democrat position was clear. They opposed any military action and argued that the president had a constitutional obligation to confer with Congress for a declaration of war before any such action could be made. House speaker Representative Tom Foley (D-WA), warned that "Unless there is a gross

40 Ibid. 372.
41 Ibid. 382.
42 Naftali, *George H. W. Bush*, 118-9.
43 Bush; Scowcroft, *A World Transformed,* 343-4.

provocation you won't have public support."[44] Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), expressed that "there's no question [the country has] moved away from a more hawkish position within the last month. The budget battle pushed Iraq off the front page. The crisis lacks freshness and outrage. The public is less confident that the government knows what it is doing."[45] Although the Democrats appeared united in their opposition, Republicans still exhibited support for Bush. It was the Democrats, however, who held the majority in Congress.

Establishing an Ultimatum

Immediately after the meeting with the congressional team at the end of October, Bush and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft brought together the administration's foreign policy team to discuss what to do next. Secretary of State Jim Baker summarized the general feeling of the group by stating that he believed "sanctions will not get [Saddam] out in a time frame that we can accept."[46] But it was Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney who set the groundwork for an ultimatum. According to Cheney, "We could have an additional hundred and forty thousand [troops] in place by 15 January." Powell, supporting Cheney's recommendation, was careful to stress that a military intervention could not happen any sooner, despite the impatience around the room, and reminded the team, "The forces won't be in place before 15 of January."[47] All that was left was to enshrine the deadline in such a way as to justify the military action, and this required consolidating the support within both the United Nations Security Council and Congress. Publically, Bush was not subtle as to the changing posture of the military operation in Saudi Arabia, approving an increase in the number of troops there and shifting to an offensive posture. "Mr. President," he was asked at a news conference on November 8 discussing the Persian Gulf crisis, "it sounds like you're going to war. You have moved from a defensive position to an offensive position, and you have not said how many more troops you are sending or, really, why." President Bush replied, "Well, I've said why right now. And I hope it's been very clear to the American people... I would love to see a peaceful resolution to this question, and that's what I wanted."[48] Al-

44 Ibid. 391.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. 394.
47 Ibid. 395.
48 George H. W. Bush, The Presidents News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, November 8, 1990

though the troop increase was a standard operational movement to prevent future encounters with logistical difficulties, it ignited a new round of indignation in Congress and across the American media.[49] However, Scowcroft was quick to point out that Congress did not appear concerned over the purpose for American troops in Saudi Arabia. Representatives rather appeared more concerned about "if military action was to be considered, who – the president or congress – had the authority to order it."[50] It was the point of authority that had placed Congress on a collision course with the president.

Bush, however, left Congress to debate the constitutional rights of the executive branch in relation to matters of war and instead focused on the United Nations Security Council. In November, the United States held the presidency of the Security Council and was able to introduce a resolution that would consolidate the January 15 deadline. Secretary Baker coordinated the diplomatic approach of the United States towards securing the consensus of the Security Council, flitting between diplomatic channels throughout November and meeting with each of the Council's foreign representatives. In Baker's words, he "met personally with all [his] Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and occasionally buying votes. Such are the politics of diplomacy."[51] More importantly, this resolution allowed for the opportunity to legitimate violent intervention in the interests of the Security Council. This would be the first real test of the international order in a post-Cold War world. "I need your help," Bush asked Soviet Union Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev at a conference in Paris, mid-November. "We need to get the UN to authorize force to convince Saddam Hussein to do what [it] demands." Gorbachev replied, "let me say it rests on the two of us… in my heart, as yours I am sure, the preference is to solve this without blood… we need one resolution, but one which combines your idea and mine. The first part would contain a deadline for an ultimatum. The second part would state that 'all necessary measures' can be used."[52] On November 29, Secretary Baker chaired a session of the United Nations Security Council and introduced a vote on Resolution 678, asking all member states to authorize the use of any measures necessary to uphold and implement the resolutions concerning Iraq should Iraq fail to un-

49 Bush; Scowcroft, *A World Transformed,* 396.
50 Ibid. 397.
51 James Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons) 305.
52 Bush; Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*. 408-9.

conditionally withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.[53] This was done in order to restore peace and security to the Persian Gulf. The resolution was a success, with only Cuba and Yemen voting against it and China abstaining.[54] Even the Soviet Union had voted in favor of the resolution. For the first time in almost four decades the Security Council had consensus and Bush had a deadline to use as justification to militarily intervene in Kuwait.

Despite the United Nations Security Council resolution, Congress was insistent that sanctions be given more time to work before American troops were used in combat operations. In December, Bush warned against the Congressional opposition in a letter to Senator Robert Byrd (D-VA). Bush wrote:

> "The U.N. Resolution must be fully complied with or else the new promise of the U.N. that we helped bring about will be ground into dust. Kuwait is still being brutalized. That Amnesty Int'l report is devastating. I want congress on board – fully. Saddam will only unconditionally pull out when he is convinced on two points about which he now has doubts: 1. that the united world will use force against him. 2. that is that force is used he will lose."[55]

The ultimatum issued by the Security Council was proving to be just enough justification to draw support from Congress for military action. It was imperative that Congress support the President so that any military action had the greatest chance at success. To bring in the New Year, Bush made a final bid for a unified Congress. Alongside an address to the nation outlining the objectives in the Persian Gulf, Bush sent a letter to House speaker Tom Foley on January 8, insisting, "I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for congress to express its support for the President at this critical time."[56] Four days later, two resolutions were introduced into the House of Representatives and Senate, asking for their support of the resolutions already pledged by the United Nations Security Council concerning the Persian Gulf crisis. This included adhering to the deadline of January 15.

53 United Nations Security Council Meeting, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, S/PV.2963, 29 November 1990. Secretary Baker chaired a meeting of foreign ministers in the Security Council to push for a resolution that would approve the use of force to make Iraq leave Kuwait.

54 Ibid. 64-5.

55 Bush, *All the best, George Bush*, 495.

56 Ibid. 502.

Seven months since the initial invasion, and in an increasingly hostile political environment, Congress finally voted in support of using force against Iraq. The victory was not resounding, however. The vote passed through the House of Representatives 250-183 and by the merest of margins in the Senate by 52-47.[57] In light of the Congressional results, Bush was clear that he, alone, was responsible for the decision to use the military to force Iraq from Kuwait. "It is my decision," admitted President Bush in his diaries, "my decision to send these kids into battle, my decision that may affect the lives of innocence… it is my decision to step back and let sanctions work. Or to move forward [and] in my view, help establish the New World Order."[58] According to President Bush, the "New World Order" would have to distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate violence. The United Nations Security Council was one such way to confer the legitimacy of violent action. As such, the use of military power to correct the international order had been justified through the United Nations Security Council, and violence as a tool of power found a legitimate use in the post-Cold War world.

Wisdom from Experience

Mark Twain observed that there was an extent that decisions could be informed by history. Twain noted, "We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it – and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove lid again – and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one."[59] The analogy can be attributed to President Bush's pursuit for legitimating an armed intervention into Kuwait to force out Iraq. For example, the wisdom that was derived from the Vietnam War was distilled into the guiding ethos of Colin Powell, who applied that wisdom into the experience of the incursion into Panama, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, the more astute observation turns back to Hannah Arendt, her *Reflections on Violence,* and the question of whether violence is inevitable and necessary for change.

The end of the Cold War provided the best opportunity to remodel power relations in a manner that did not reflect violence. Indeed, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and collapse of the Berlin Wall was a largely non-violent affair and provided hope that the 'New World Order' might just be different from the bipolarity of the 'Cold War Order' and the realpolitik of the 'Great

57 Bush; Scowcroft, *A World Transformed,* 446.
58 Bush, *All the Best, George Bush,* 503.
59 Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *War and American Presidency,* (Norton, 2004) 134-5.

War Order' that had preceded it. However, as Arendt notes, the power structure used by a government to pursue its political goals "outlasts all aims, so that power, far from being the means to an end, is actually the very condition that enables a group of people to think and act according to means and ends."[60] At the end of the Cold War, led by Bush, the United States was the world's last remaining superpower. This was unquestionable as the United States had been the beacon of the Western world since the conclusion of the Second World War and had stood firmly against the existential threat touted by Moscow-dominated communism. There was no doubt that the United States, and Bush, were now looked upon for leadership, as that had been an implicit objective of the Cold War. In this period of transition, from Cold War to post-Cold War, there was an opportunity to mold the existing power structures surrounding violence. Arendt is careful to note, "Violence needs justification and it can be justifiable, but its justification loses in plausibility the farther away its intended end recedes into the future. No one will question the use of violence in self-defense because the danger is not only clear but present, and the end to justify the means is immediate."[61] In order for Bush to effectively lead, he would be required to decide to enact violence when necessary. Thus, the focus is returned to President Bush, Panama, and the Persian Gulf.

President Bush, and especially Powell, understood that violence wielded correctly and legitimately was a tool for achieving definable goals quickly. This was apparent from the incursion into Panama, and repeated in Kuwait. Powell micromanaged the level of violence necessary to guarantee a victory in Panama, sending an overwhelming American military force that quickly pacified any resistance. More importantly, the decisive and effective incursion helped Bush promote a brand of American war-fighting that was efficient and legitimate. In the Persian Gulf, from the first Iraqi troops moving into Kuwait, to the beginning of the United States bombing campaign just over six months later, and finally the ground war's conclusion after only 100 hours of combat, everything about the intervention was sharp and concise. In order to establish the legitimacy of the intervention, Bush carefully monitored and exerted his influence in both domestic and diplomatic circles to ensure the broadest acceptance of the recourse to violence. Therefore, the intervention built on the lessons of intervention in Panama, which was, in turn, crafted from the lessons of Vietnam. And it was as Arendt understood

60 Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on Violence."
61 Ibid.

violence to be utilized. However, Arendt also understood the implications of resorting to violence, an observation that is relevant to Bush. Arendt warns:

> The danger of the practice of violence, even if it moves consciously within a non-extremist framework of short-term goals, will always be that the means overwhelm the end. If goals are not achieved rapidly, the result will not merely be defeat but the introduction of the practice of violence into the whole body politic. Action is irreversible, and a return to the status quo in case of defeat is always unlikely. The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is a more violent world.[62]

Although President Bush understood the necessity for using military force to evict Iraq from Kuwait, and Powell understood the reality of using military force in order to achieve success, there is no doubt that the act of legitimating violent intervention through the United Nations Security Council set a precedent for the conduct of violence as a mechanism for change in the post-Cold War world. **Y**

62 Ibid.

THE REGIONAL POWER BALANCE IN EAST ASIA AND ITS IMPACT ON KOREA'S JAPAN POLICY

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The high volatility behind Korea-Japan relations is a conundrum in international relations. Both countries share the same ally, close economic ties, and a vested economic interest in mutual cooperation. Moreover, their geographic proximity to a rising China and a threatening North Korea makes closer military and political cooperation needed to cope with common security threats. However, this cannot be observed today as both countries seem to embark on a confrontational path over history, guilt, and memory on the issue of a shared colonial past. In explaining this puzzle, existing models neglect to incorporate the changing regional power balance. This paper offers an alternative, positing that the overarching balance of power in the region makes cooperation between the two countries less needed. Employing the Correlates of War (COW) from a national capabilities dataset, the paper finds that the international environment evolved favourably for Korea, thereby allowing other factors, such as historical grievances, to play a role in foreign policy formation.

The world of international relations is comprised of theories and scholars. States confront states in a game over power and security, constantly threatened to be permanently extinguished as countless empires before them. The interpretations of underlying forces and even subjects of international relations have been highly debated. For some, states aim to maximize power; for others, capital seeking individuals make use of states' resources for individual gains. On the other hand, many understand power as an act of speech and scholars of international relations have to be highly careful in their understanding of the main driving forces, as this set of chosen theoretical foundations is likely to narrow possible outcomes. Being the most dynamic region of the world today, East Asia forms a perfect laboratory to apply theoretical insights. From a geopolitical perspective, Japan and the

Republic of Korea (thereafter "South Korea" "Korea" or "ROK") seem to be natural allies in East Asia. Both countries share the same ally, the United States, have close economic ties, and a vested economic interest in mutual cooperation. Moreover, the geographic proximity of both countries to a rising China and a threatening Democratic People's Republic of Korea (thereafter "North Korea" or "DPRK") makes closer military and political cooperation between them a necessity in order to cope with common security threats. According to neorealist approaches, propositions would typically result in deeper cooperation and more cooperative foreign policy between the two countries, yet this cannot be observed. Despite incremental and bilateral interests, both countries, overall, seem to embark on a confrontational path over history, guilt, and memory on the issue of a shared colonial past. Surprisingly, such high sensitivity has not been present after the liberalization of Korea in 1945, but it gained increasing influence on Korea's Japan Policy, following the end of the Cold War and the beginning of democratization in Korea after 1987. It seems astonishing that quarrels over historical grievances are able to shape the foreign policy of a country deeply threatened by its regional environment. Moreover, it comes as a surprise that, in the mid-1960s and early 1980s, South Korea took a cooperative approach with the conclusion of the 1965 Treaty establishing bilateral relations and the comprehensive loan agreement in 1984. What has caused the evolution in general, and more precisely, the ability of domestic factors, such as historical grievances, to influence Korea's Japan policy? After discussing the need for a theory of foreign policy, the paper assesses existing models and their explanatory power to describe Korea's Japan Policy. Based on this assessment, the Correlates of War (COW) from the national capabilities dataset is used to offer an explanatory alternative based primarily on the regional international environment, which allows for deterioration in South Korea's Japan Policy.

A Theory of Foreign Policy

For scholars of international relations, there is an ocean of approaches and theories to choose from. One of the most influential and most autochthonous theories in international relations is neorealism. Philosophically originating in the writings of Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, and Niccolò Machiavelli, realism posits a pessimistic image about humankind, refuses teleological notions of progress, and regards the moral as a function of power. In pre-civil times, the individual was in a state of anarchy, relying on his own

strength and understood only his capabilities to survive.[1] Individual units in international relations – be they tribes, city-states, or nations – are similarly placed in an environment of anarchy and absent of any overarching, governing force able to secure the survival of individual states.[2] To ensure the national interest – defined by Hans Morgenthau as "the national pursuit, within certain moral limitations, of the power objectives of the state"[3] – states can only rely on their national capabilities, always fearing stronger states will claim their lands or simply overtaking the state's institutions.[4] As such, what drives the national interest is the security for survival.

Structural realism, as promulgated by Kenneth Waltz's balance-of-power theory, Stephen M. Walt's balance-of-threat theory, and John Mearsheimer's offensive realism, provides a comprehensive analysis of the international system, its structure, and forces. Anarchy, resulting from the continuous drive for survival by states aiming to maximize power or security, leads to recurring systemic outcomes and polarity. Obviously, recurring patterns of the international structure are caused by systemic forces outside the control of individual states. In the long run, they are, to borrow the metaphor of Fareed Zakaria, mere "billiard balls" of outside forces. Fairly accurate predictions of these developments are given by structural realist approaches. Yet, because billiard balls are "made of a different material, affecting its speed, spin, and bounce on the international plane,"[5] their lane on the international plane might be different. The foreign policy of a country at a given time might be fundamentally departing from structural realist predictions precisely due to different specifications. The inability of structural realist approaches to incorporate unit-level variables, however useful for the description of the international system, becomes a hindrance for a neorealist analysis of the foreign policy of a particular country. For an investigation of the distribution of capabilities of states in the system, no internal factors are important. For an investigation of a state's response to this distribution of capabilities,

1 For statements on human nature see Hans MorgenthauScientific Man vs. Power Politics, (Chicago University Press, 1946); Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University, 1959).

2 Steven Lobell et al, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," in: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven Lobell et al (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 14.

3 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 240.

4 Morgenthau defined national security as "integrity of the national territory and its institutions"; ibid. 586.

5 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 9.

however, they are indispensable. Waltz himself described that "[n]either realists nor anyone else believe that unit-level factors can be excluded from foreign policy analysis."[6] His argument rests on a distinction of causality. While theories of international politics regard foreign policy as independent and the international structure as the dependent variable, the causality in a realist theory of foreign policy is reversed. It is therefore critical to distinguish between a theory of international politics and a theory of foreign policy. [7] So how can we integrate domestic factors into a neorealist analysis of foreign policy?

In a 1998 influential review article from *World Politics*, Gideon Rose investigated recent realist scholarly research and found an increasing departure from black-box approaches to the study of international politics.[8] For him, the relative distribution of capabilities shapes the parameters for state action but its content is confined to the country's foreign policy elite, constrained by their ability to extract resources from society. Thus, what Rose labeled neoclassical realism is, in fact, an incorporation of external and internal variables into the investigation of foreign policy decision-making. As a rule, Gideon finds that, with growing resources, states tend to expand their ambitions in the international arena. As the information provided by the international system, however, is indirect and complex, the pressure to be international must be translated through intervening variables. Rose termed this function a "transmission belt,"[9] at which point domestic factors can influence foreign policy making. Though, existing literature expresses that internal debates can exert influence only in a permissive international environment. The realist assumption that states "as a minimum, seek

6 Kenneth Waltz, "International Politics is not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6, no.3, (2007): 56.

7 Note, there are other theories of foreign policy, for example: Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow Essence of Decision-Making. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, 1999); Richard Rosecrance The Rise of the Trading State. Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, (New York: Basic Books, 1986); or Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, (Cleveland: A Meridian Book, 1955).

8 Gideon Rose,"Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998);Michael Brown et alThe Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, (Cambridge: MIT Press; Christensen, 1995); Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict 1947-1958, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy for World Conquest, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); William Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance. Power and Perception during the Cold War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

9 Ibid, 147.

their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination"[10] makes a point in this case. What is sought by a state depends on the relative ability of a state to realize those goals. Already, Machiavelli emphasized that the distribution of capabilities sets necessities for state action, which narrow the range of alternatives for the statesmen to pursue.[11] Similarly, Waltz argues that "in the absence of counterweights, a country's internal impulses prevail."[12] This implies the notion explored by Steven Lobell et al. that "anarchy gives states considerable latitude in defining their security interests."[13] Thus, there is a link between national capabilities and scope of international ambition. Taking this debate further, several authors argue that domestic factors matter in a permissive international environment. Generally, they matter because the external environment "set[s] the parameter… [while] unit-level factors … determin[e] both the character and the venue" of foreign policy.[14] In that way, unit-level factors are of substance as they "constrain or facilitate the ability… to respond to systemic imperatives."[15] Zakaria, for example, aims to take account of the hesitation of the United States of America to become a great power. Investigating the period 30 years prior to 1908, he finds that, despite a permissive international environment, domestic structures prevented a bid to great power status.[16] Importantly, the supremacy of the international over the domestic is defining the scope of ambitions but not the individual response and timing of the state. In this vein, Colin Dueck argues that, because leaders have to manage domestic politics at the same time with international constraints, suboptimal policy outcomes are likely if a permissive international environment prevails.[17] This seems logical as domestic actors place their demands on the state. The state, however, can only be receptive to such demands if they do not threaten its very existence and, as a result, can only be fulfilled in a permissive environment. Applying this linkage to South Korea will shed light upon the underlying factors setting the margins of action for its *Japan Policy*.

10 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Long Grove: Waveland, 1979), 118.
11 Bernard Crick, Machiavelli: The Discourses, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), 62-63.
12 Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War" in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power. Ed. John Ikenberry (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 5.
13 Steven Lobell et al (2009), 7.
14 Ibid, 3.
15 Ibid, 4.
16 Fareed Zakaria, (1998),. 11
17 Colin Dueck, "Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military Intervention" in: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven Lobell et al (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Existing Models

The relationship between Korea and Japan has been studied extensively and competing explanatory models have emerged. This section explores, at first, the five most prominent explanatory models and is followed by the authors' critique of them[18]

Quasi-Alliance Model

The most cited approach is Victor Cha's "quasi-alliance model." Accordingly, the cooperation between the two countries cannot be explained by psycho-historical approaches emphasizing historical animosity alone. Neither is the balance-of-threat model able to fully account for changes in cooperation and conflict. He suggested an understanding of the bilateral relations between Korea and Japan as a function of patron-commitment by the US. Hence, existing threats are seen through the perception of patron-commitment in Japan and Korea. Differences in abandonment or entrapment fears cause either friction or cooperation.[19] He argued that, in cases of asymmetrical feelings of abandonment/entrapment, friction is likely to prevail. Conversely, if both countries experience symmetrical fears, then cooperation is likely.[20] Therefore, "promises of the great power patron can influence alignment behavior more than external threats."[21] A vital point to his model is that security engagement with the US allows the two countries to have a "free-ride" on security by relieving the pressure to cooperate.[22] In scholarly literature there are three critiques to his model. First, Woo Seung-ji points out that it does not explain the period prior to diplomatic normalization in 1965. In this time, the US exerted extensive pressure and this can be interpreted as engagement. However, the result was cooperation and not friction.[23] Sec-

18 There are more explanatory models. However, the five presented form a comprehensive overview of underlying forces. Further studies include: Gilbert Rozmann and Shinhwa Lee,"Unravelling the Japan-South Korea "Virtual Alliance.", Asian Survey 16, no. 5 (2006); Kevin Cooney and Alex Scarbrough, " Japan and South Korea: Can These Two Nations Work Together?," Asian Affairs 35, no. 5 (2008); Kil J.Yi, "In Search of a Panacea: Japan-Korea Rapprochement and America's "Far Eastern Problems"," Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 4 (2008); or Hyon Joo Yoo, "Domestic Hurdles for System-Driven Behaviour: Neoclassical Realism and Missile Defence Policies in Japan and South Korea," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 12, no. 2 (2012).

19 Abandonment is "the fear that the ally may leave the alliance" while "entrapment occurs when an alliance commitment turns detrimental to one's interests..." Victor Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia," International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000): 265.

20 Ibid, 269-273.

21 Ibid, 283.

22 Ibid, 284-285.

23 SJ Woo, "[Korean] Puzzle of Korea-Japan Cooperation in the Cold War," Korean Journal of Political

ond, Hwang Ji-hwan raises the point that disengagement of the US from Korea and Japan is likely to result in competitive internal balancing and, thus, competition between the two.[24] Third, Park Cheol-hee criticizes that historical animosity is treated as a constant factor, while, for Park, it can "either be escalated or de-escalated by political leaders and civic groups"[25] and has to be understood as a variable, not as a constant.

Colonial Legacy Model

Hwang developed the "colonial-legacy model" to account for the volatile relationship, despite common threats and patrons. He argued that, in times of US disengagement, both countries did cooperate, but only to a limited extent. Investigating those periods, he found that they engaged in extensive military build-up and only marginal cooperation, indicating both countries were balancing against each other. For Hwang, the underlying cause of this antagonism rests in historical animosity.[26] However, the necessity to cooperate as directed by the international environment is likely to outweigh domestic concerns, such as historical animosity, if threats are significant. Cha argues similarly, where, according to his investigation, the cooperation between 1969 and 1971 resulted in the 1969 Korea clause, and the Okinawa base agreement was clearly attributed to US President Nixon's Guam Doctrine, which foresaw a disengagement of the US from the region.[27]

Net Threat Theory

Yoon Tae-ryong developed a threat model to further explain the relationship. Accordingly, Yoon combines the common threat perceived by Japan and Korea with the commitment of the US into one threat variable, called "net threat." He shows that increases in net threat result in increasing cooperation incentives, as structural realism would predict. However, he limits his predictions since incentives alone cannot adequately account for the actual cooperation or friction observed.[28] For him, the crucial intervening variable

Science, 37, no. 3 (2003): 143; Note, the author is unable to read Korean. Therefore the information in Woo (2003) is derived from Cheol Hee Park, "Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts: Korean Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," Asia-Pacific Review 15, no. 2 (2008).

24 Jihwan Hwang, „Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power: Historical Antagonism, Internal Balancing, and the Korea-Japanese Security Relationship," World Affairs 166, no. 2 (2003).

25 Park, C. (2008) p. 16

26 Hwang (2003).

27 Cha (2000), 273-276.

28 Tae-Ryong Yoon, "Fragile Cooperation: Net Threat Theory and Japan-Korea-US Relations," (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2006).

is historical animosity[29] and, thus, Park criticizes Yoon's "net threat theory" on two grounds. First, he argues that it fails to take into account diverging/converging threat perception and, second, works with concepts of conflict that are too broad to be useful for predictive purposes.[30]

Engagement-Coalition Model

Woo developed an "engagement-coalition model" incorporating US engagement with the domestic politics of the two countries. Even though he acknowledges the role of the US, as can be seen in Cha's model, he stated that the party politics of domestic Japanese politics can either facilitate or hamper cooperation. Different from Cha, however, he regards the engagement with the US as promoting cooperation. In times of US engagement what makes the difference is whether there are "Alpha coalitions" or "Beta coalitions" in power in Korea and Japan. "Alpha coalitions" are anti-communist and promote closer alignment with the US "Beta coalitions." represented by centrist governments, balance between cooperation with the US and neighboring countries. He predicted that, in times of US engagement, cooperation would occur if the same coalitions were in power between the two countries. Astonishingly, however, he attributed a pro-cooperation attitude to Korea, thereby limiting the role of coalitions to Japan[31] and, subsequently, Park grounds his two criticisms on this assumption. First, with rising progressive forces in Korea, the pro-cooperation stance cannot be assumed anymore. Second, the changed political climate in South Korea favors historical animosity in order to influence bilateral relations.[32]

Convergent-Management Model

Park developed a "convergent-management model." whereby, basing his argument on Cha, he argues, firstly, that the "perception about the threatening third, not the allied third, party"[33] is crucial for determining cooperation. Thus, if faced with symmetric threats the two countries will enhance cooperation. Moreover, he takes into account the point of Hwang's model that historical memory matters. For him, historical animosity matters but is a variable in itself that can be engraved or tampered by elites or societal actors.

29 Ibid, 24-26.
30 Park, (2008), 18.
31 Woo (2003).
32 Park (2008), 17.
33 Ibid, 19.

Therefore, historical animosity can be de-escalating or escalating, leading to either cooperation or friction. Next to these two independent variables, he includes the alliance management of the US as an intervening variable that can either enhance cooperation, if done symmetrically, or lead to friction, if asymmetrically performed.[34]

Critique

In conclusion, some points of critique could be voiced about these models. First, a difference between threat by a third party and threat of abandonment or entrapment is inherent in the models. Theoretically, it seems not deducible that the source of threat makes a difference for foreign policy decisions. One can regard threat in the form of a reduced ally commitment to be the same as threat of an increasing adversary. In the wording of Walt, what counts is that "one state or coalition appears especially dangerous."[35] Thus, threat remains threat regardless of the source. Second, all models involved do regard the relative distribution of power capabilities fixed throughout time. As will be seen in the following part, significant changes in the regional distribution of power are neglected. Third, the China factor is understudied by the models, because, after all, opportunities to choose cooperation with third countries effect costs/benefits calculation of cooperation with Japan. Since the end of Cold War, the relationship of trilateral China-Korea-Japan opened diverging opportunities for cooperation. For Korea, China presents a potential partner, while there still remain significant obstacles between Japan and China.[36] Thus, a new model recognizing the effects of changes to the relative distribution of power in the region, in general, and for Korea, in particular, is essential.

Evolution of the International Environment in East Asia

To assess the relative distribution of power in East Asia and its evolution throughout the last decades, the paper employs the Correlates of War (COW) from the national capabilities dataset. It categorizes power in three components: (i) military, representing current force level; (ii) industrial strength, measuring war potential; and (iii) demographic data, mirroring the power of

34 Ibid, 19-21.
35 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987): 263.
36 See, for example, Suk-hee Han, South Korea Seeks to Balance Relations with China and the United States. Current Issues in U.S.-ROK Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, Other Reports, 2012.

endurance and the capability of increasing the level of forces. Each category is divided into two subcomponents: for military strength, it is the number of military personnel and expenditure; the industrial component is measured by the production of pig iron before 1900 and ingot steel after 1900, as well as by primary energy consumption; finally, the demographic aspect is described by the total and urban population.[37] The accuracy of data and the ability to measure power as a function of three broad categories might be disputable. However, by making the measurement transparent, it reaches a coherence that allows for the reliable comparison of countries across different times. Moreover, Schweller, in his study on inter-war Europe, tested the reliability of the COW dataset. He added eight other indices and found no significant effect.[38] The countries selected represent the members of the Six-party talks, as they are assumed to be the most influential members in the region. The time frame is from 1960 to 2003, as data on the DPRK's military expenditure is missing from 2004 and onwards.

The author computed: (i) the relative strength as a percentage share of the six components, as well as (ii) the overall strength as a percentage share of total major power-capabilities. To compare these figures more effectively (iii), the relative strength as power ration with 5 as the top score was calculated.[39] While these findings are presented in table 1 in a 5 years cycle, figure 1 shows the power distribution of major regional actors since 1960. Three trends are visible, which are discussed in this section, followed by an analysis of their long-term impact on Korea's *Japan Policy*.



Figure 1: Evolution of COW Capabilities, 1960-2003, in %

37 For a detailed discussion of the COW project, see: Correlates of War Project. National Material Capabilities Data Documentation Version 4.0 2010, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/

38 Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances. Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, (New York: Columbia University Press Appendix, 1998).

39 See for a similar approach Schweller (1998), 26-31.

		Industrial Strength		Military Strength		Demographic		Overall Strength	Relative Strength*
		Iron and Steel	Petroleum Consumption	Military Personnel	Military Expenditure	Urban Population	Total Population		
USA	1960	45,75	58,05	22,06	50,52	23,95	15,29	35,94	5
	1965	44,99	57,55	29,33	45,89	19,72	15,03	35,42	5
	1970	42,96	56,91	28,95	50,82	19,17	14,91	31,52	5
	1975	39,55	57,64	30,14	51,84	18,74	14,77	26,27	4,00
	1980	39,23	57,19	30,30	49,45	18,25	14,62	25,02	3,83
	1985	38,10	55,67	29,43	47,33	18,68	14,47	24,73	3,83
	1990	34,18	52,18	26,61	42,90	18,92	14,36	28,13	5
	1995	31,85	50,58	24,93	41,02	18,44	14,25	29,49	4,21
	2000	32,65	50,02	21,73	40,33	17,92	14,13	29,81	3,85
CHN	1960	9,48	11,92	30,94	7,49	30,96	55,66	24,41	3,40
	1965	4,61	6,12	26,47	12,21	35,88	56,39	23,61	3,33
	1970	5,10	9,64	24,70	13,10	33,38	58,15	24,01	3,81
	1975	6,28	11,72	36,33	11,25	33,39	59,42	26,40	4,02
	1980	8,88	12,87	38,30	7,35	35,32	60,00	27,12	4,15
	1985	11,32	13,28	34,54	1,16	36,88	60,58	26,30	4,08
	1990	14,65	13,99	31,31	1,29	37,44	61,67	26,73	4,75
	1995	25,02	17,82	36,44	7,12	56,91	66,91	35,04	5
	2000	29,05	18,03	39,27	9,18	69,83	67,22	38,77	5
RUS	1960	33,17	25,72	34,44	41,15	24,08	18,14	29,45	4,10
	1965	34,34	29,53	30,66	40,73	24,45	17,86	29,59	4,12
	1970	33,23	29,81	37,26	42,55	25,73	17,00	30,93	4,90
	1975	37,07	32,49	34,64	50,50	26,11	16,30	32,85	5
	1980	35,39	34,14	32,12	51,87	26,48	15,95	32,66	5
	1985	37,60	31,26	32,86	50,05	26,12	15,70	32,26	5
	1990	34,01	27,20	30,41	27,45	24,47	15,02	26,43	4,70
	1995	13,54	14,09	17,42	17,73	11,47	8,10	13,72	1,96
	2000	13,50	12,44	14,03	11,37	7,89	7,73	11,16	1,44
JPN	1960	11,25	3,78	2,52	0,51	17,98	7,89	7,32	1,02
	1965	15,53	5,67	2,71	0,75	16,94	7,57	8,20	1,16
	1970	26,73	7,07	2,05	0,91	18,26	7,24	10,38	1,65
	1975	26,90	8,63	2,00	1,79	18,38	7,15	10,81	1,64
	1980	26,64	8,03	1,99	2,40	17,29	7,02	10,56	1,62
	1985	25,54	14,56	2,03	2,58	16,19	6,84	11,29	1,75
	1990	24,36	14,63	2,24	6,12	15,87	6,59	11,63	2,07
	1995	26,67	16,16	2,99	10,86	12,89	6,88	12,74	1,82
	2000	24,30	15,71	3,31	9,91	9,11	6,67	11,50	1,48
ROK	1960	0,03	0,16	6,22	0,11	2,73	2,12	1,89	0,26
	1965	0,07	0,57	6,66	0,10	2,68	2,22	2,05	0,29
	1970	0,14	0,69	5,59	0,15	3,28	2,26	2,02	0,32
	1975	0,53	0,83	5,32	0,23	4,77	2,26	2,32	0,35
	1980	3,45	1,07	4,94	0,85	5,14	2,29	2,96	0,45
	1985	4,52	2,21	5,06	0,83	5,89	2,31	3,47	0,54
	1990	5,40	2,88	5,81	2,26	6,60	2,29	4,21	0,75
	1995	9,65	5,18	9,33	3,07	5,85	2,47	5,92	0,85
	2000	9,84	6,88	9,55	2,79	3,25	2,46	5,79	0,75
DPRK	1960	0,33	0,37	3,83	0,22	0,31	0,89	0,99	0,14
	1965	0,46	0,56	4,18	0,31	0,33	0,93	1,13	0,16
	1970	0,63	0,61	3,80	0,39	0,43	1,00	1,14	0,18
	1975	1,37	0,74	3,97	0,35	0,59	1,04	1,34	0,20
	1980	1,39	0,79	5,77	0,37	0,73	1,06	1,68	0,26
	1985	1,58	0,79	6,61	0,76	0,90	1,07	1,95	0,30
	1990	1,77	0,97	10,73	1,11	1,57	1,09	2,87	0,51
	1995	0,16	0,94	13,68	1,13	1,35	1,21	3,08	0,44
	2000	0,07	0,27	14,74	0,46	0,99	1,26	2,97	0,38

*Table 1: Evolution of COW Capabilities, 1960-2000, in % (*Relative strength has 5 as a top score)*

From a Tripolar to Bipolar System

First, there is a move from tripolarity to bipolarity that is observable. During the Cold War, there have been three powers in the region: the Soviet Union, the United States, and China. Intuitively, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia ceased to be among the major powers. Instead, the US and China, account for more than 60 percent of regional capabilities from 1990 and onwards. What are the effects of the move from tripolarity to bipolarity? First, there should be a conceptual note on polarity. The concept itself seems to be under-defined and can be understood to mean both: (i) the number of states as poles and (ii) the number of alignments within a system.[40] In Cold War terms, this distinction would mean to regard the US and Soviet Union as poles or, alternatively, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. This can only be meaningfully incorporated when assuming that there is a stable alliance between Russia and China, which did, in fact, once briefly exist.[41] Moreover, as the Cold War was not confined to East Asia, the figures would not give a meaningful indication for the distribution of power beyond the region. Therefore, the analysis below deals with poles understood as individual countries and reveals a move from tripolarity to bipolarity, as can be seen in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Distribution of Capabilities, Major Power 1960-2003

In scholarly literature there are supportive and opposing views about the stability of tripolar systems. Note: stability is defined as "the preservation of all actors in the system."[42] Unipolar and bipolar systems are assumed to be

40 Ibid, 39-40.
41 A striking example of Sino-Soviet confrontation is the 1969 border clash.
42 Schweller (1998), 42.

most stable because balancing is achieved through internal means– say domestic build-up – rather than external means – say alliance formation – involving lower transaction costs and higher certainty.[43] In contrast, opinions diverge on the stability of tripolar systems. Schweller identifies that different interpretations on the meaning of tripolarity cause this friction. While advocates of stability regard tripolar systems generally as any triadic relationship, those in the instability camp regard tripolarity as three actors of roughly equal size.[44] Proponents of instability include Robert Gilpin, who posits that "almost all agree that a tripolar system is the most unstable configuration"[45] or Morton Kaplan arguing that two actors are likely to form an alliance to eliminate the third.[46] Supporting Kaplan, Waltz finds that "[t]wo of the powers can easily gang up on the third."[47] Likewise, Schweller attributes the instability of tripolar systems to the odd number of powers. For him, it is "obvious that all even-numbered systems are capable of balance, while all odd-numbered systems are not."[48] Accordingly, in cases in which the main actors are endowed with roughly equal capabilities, one can observe that bipolar systems, even debatable ones, tend to be more stable than tripolar systems. This allows for the conclusion that the East Asian region, *ceteris paribus*, enhanced its stability over the course of the last half-century as it moved from a dangerous tripolar system to a more predictable bipolar system, in which China and the US. remain the two dominant powers.

Increasing Relative Power of Korea Towards Japan

The second observation is a rise in the relative power of Korea vis-à-vis Japan. At the outset of 1960, the national capabilities of Korea approximated around 1.9 percent of capabilities in the region, which contrasted with 7.3 percent for Japan. The dyadic power distribution evolved favorably for Korea as it improved to 5.5 percent in capabilities for Korea and 10.3 percent for Japan in 2003. Hence, the bilateral distribution ratio improved for Korea from 26 percent to 53 percent. As can be seen in Figure 3, the gap is narrowing.

43 Ibid, 44.
44 Ibid, 41.
45 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 235.
46 Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Relations, (New York: Wiley, 1957).
47 Waltz (1979),163.
48 Schwelle (1998), 42.



Figure 3: Distribution of COW Capabilities between ROK and JPN

Indeed, Korea has experienced a rapid increase in nearly all political fields. The economy sky-rocketed in the period of investigation and, while its GDP in 1970 was only 8.1 Billion USD, it stood at 1.128 Billion USD in 2012, an increase of 140 times in 40 years.[49] Similarly, Korea is one of the most industrialized countries in the world, symbolized by the accession to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996.[50] As such, the manufacturing base is remarkable, ranking first in mobile phone production, second in semiconductors and shipbuilding and fifth in automotive production. Ranking fourth in patent registration shows the advance of its economy.[51] With its economic rise, Korea positioned itself among the main international institutions.The creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations "plus 3" (ASEAN+3) platform resulted from an initiative of South Korea. Moreover, it engaged in regional security dialogues as a member of the Six-Party Talks, the North East Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), the North East Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) and the North East Asian Cooperation Initiative (NACI).[52] In addition, the country was

49 See, Economic Statistic System of the Bank of Korea, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/ (accessed November 3, 2013).

50 See, Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.kr (accessed November 3, 2013).

51 Korea International Trade Association, Korea, Seen by Statistic Figures, (2013), www.global.kita.net (accessed Novebmer 3, 2013).

52 For a good overview of the aspirations of South Korea, see David Shim, "A Shrimp Amongst Whales? Assessing South Korea's Regional-Power Status," GIGA Research Programme, no. 107 (2009).

supporting the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) by tremendously pursuing a "central role" with the provision of personnel and light water reactors until it was terminated in 2006.[53]

In direct comparison, Japan recognizes Korea as "influential in terms of security in the Asia-Pacific region."[54] Table 2 shows a direct comparison on strength, according to the military segment. The military build-up is especially astonishing in regard to the navy. Under the assumption of countering North Korea, the military would center on ground and air forces, and, with the existence of a fleet of nearly half the tonnage of Japan, this is remarkable. Traditionally, Japan is regarded as a maritime power, while Korea historically tended to put emphasis on ground forces.[55] Recent debates have sparked on the usefulness of a blue-water navy for Korean national interests. In a direct conflict with the North, the navy would represent a marginal factor only and could, in this light, be interpreted as a waste of resources. However, if seen through the lens of regional action, a powerful navy might divert threats from other neighboring countries and function as a symbol of self-confidence.[56]

	Ground Forces	Naval Vessels	Combat Aircraft
South Korea	547 000 Troops	190 Vessels 193 000 Tons	620 Aircraft
Japan	140 000 Troops	141 Vessels 452 000 Tons	410 Aircraft

Table 2: Military Forces of South Korea and Japan, adapted from The Military Balance 2013

Thus, Korea today plays a crucial role as an economic stronghold, with increasing military sophistication and an active engagement in regional security dialogues. So much for the famous notion of Korea as "Shrimp amongst Whales" that was applicable half a century ago; we have to regard Korea now as an influential actor in the region, especially towards Japan. Moreo-

53 Charles Kartman, R. Carlin, and J. Witt, "A History of KEDO 1994-2006", Policy Brief. Stanford Centre for International Security and Cooperation, June 2012.

54 Japanese Ministry of Defence,. Defence of Japan 2013, http://www.mod.go.jp (accessed on December 2, 2014), 4.

55 For a distinction between maritime powers and land based powers in East Asia, see: Ki Chan Bae, Korea at the Crossroads. The History and Future of East Asia (Seoul: Happy Reading, 2007), 26-39.

56 On the debate, see: Sung-ki Jung, "Korea Launches AEGIS Warship," Korea Times, May 25, 2007; Kyle Mizokami, "South Korea's New Navy is Impressive ... and Pointless," The War is Boring Blog,October 19, 2013, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/513b93e52b84 (accessed on November 4, 2013); or Richard Farley, "Why South Korea's Building an Impressive Navy," The Diplomat, October 24, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/10/24/why-south-koreas-building-an-impressive-navy/ (accessed on October 24, 2013).

ver, scholars identify a qualitative improvement in South Korea's military. Given the absence of these factors in the COW project itself, they add significance to the purely quantitative findings. Moon Chung-in and Lee Jin-young argue that, in the 1970s, Korea's procurement policy was mainly centered on conventional arms, such as armored vehicles or short-range artillery. In the 1990s, however, it approached the characterization of a revolution in military affairs (RAM) pioneered by the US, which refers to the application of "multiple innovations in technology, device, system, operational concept, and military doctrine and force structure [*sic*]." manifested in the investment in surveillance and networks, such as the acquisition of AWACS.[57] As a second tendency, South Korea is aiming to increase its own military technology and, therewith, reduces the importance of military technology transfers from abroad. Therefore, they argue, the South Korean military industry was better able to enhance self-sufficiency than other second-tier military countries. Moon attributes the incentives in the "waning US hegemonic power" in the region.[58] Clearly, be it in military technology, international outreach, or raw capabilities data, South Korea advanced rapidly, effectively creating a more favorable power balance between Korea and Japan.

A Rising China

The third observation is a relative decline in the capabilities of the US in light of a rising China. While China is the strongest state in the region since 1993, the US declined from a level on par to only 70 percent of China's capabilities. This trend seems to continue despite the "Asian Pivot" envisioned by US President Obama.[59] The diverging trend line between US and Chinese capabilities in figure 4 indicates this development.

57 Chung-iin Moon and Jin-Young Lee, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Defense Industry in South Korea," Security Challenges 4, no. 4 (2008): 118.

58 Hee-Jung Moon, "The Diamond Approach to the Competitiveness of Korea's Defense Industry: From Park, Chung Hee to Lee, Myung Bak Era," Journal of International Business and Economy11, no. 1 (2010):101.

59 The Asian Pivot was first elaborated upon in Hilary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011.



Figure 4: COW Trend Evolution US and CHN, 1960-2003

How is this perceived by South Korea and Japan? In overall terms, China, with 41 percent of capabilities in 2003, was equating the combined capabilities of the US, Japan, and South Korea. The effects are, however, regarded differently in Japan and Korea. The Japanese *Defense White Paper 2013* stresses the development of Chinese military capabilities combined with unclear intensions as a "matter of concern for Japan."[60] In contrast, the Korean pendant highlights the cooperation between Korea and China and is more cautious in its formulation of security threats describing them as a result of "competition for regional ascendancy." Moreover, Korea identifies a security threat in the "perceptions of past histories, territorial disputes, and demarcation of territorial waters"[61], a claim directly connected to the Korea-Japan contestations about islets as well as Japan's *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. While, for both countries, China matters in economic terms with about 18 percent percent of total trade for each[62], security relations are different. In South Korea, relations with China are seen through a lens of rational gains. Robert Sutter attributes five motives for enhanced cooperation with Seoul, namely (i) facilitation of trade and investment, (ii) deal with contingencies of North Korean threat, (iii) guard against a potentially assertive China, (iv) broaden foreign policy options, and (v) act as a mediator in the

60 Japanese Ministry of Defense (2013): 3.

61 Korean Ministry of Defense,2012 Defense White Paper, http://www.mnd.go.kr, (accesed December 2, 2014).

62 For South Korea it is 17.7 percent; for Japan it is 18.1 percent, see Commission of the European Communities,EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World, (Brussels: European Commission, 2013).

region.[63] Zhiqun Zhu argues that the rise of China, alongside a reduced level of overall threat, "helped South Korea to pursue a more independent foreign policy."[64] In contrast, Japanese tensions with China have also given rise to the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute. The Japanese *Defense White Paper* regards the motives of China as a means "to weaken the effective control of other countries over the islands which China claims."[65] Japan recently even threatened to open fire on unarmed Chinese drones intruding within Japanese airspace.[66] Overall, as Paul Smith argues, the relationship between the two states is overshadowed by: (i) the islet dispute; (ii) historical grievances; (iii) the status of Taiwan; (iv) the declining leadership role of Japan in the region; and (v) the Japan-US alliance. Moreover, it is in this period, for the first time in history, that both Japan and China are strong at the same time. This could result in increasing competition.[67]

In summary, while a rising China poses similar challenges in regard to material capabilities, the opportunities for Japan and Korea are different. For Japan, the aspirations of a rising China depict direct challenges to its security, while this also creates possibilities for South Korea to diversify its foreign policy. This allows for the conclusion that the international environment evolved favorably for Korea and that cooperation with Japan is less needed than in the past, given new alternatives.

Impact of the Changed Security Context on Japan-Korea Relations

While the security framework remained relatively fixed during the times of the Cold War, there were tremendous changes in its aftermath. Where, according to Cha's model, patron commitment was the main driver of confrontation and friction, the empirical findings above signify a different causality. A more independent South Korea, confronted with an increasing menu of foreign policy choices, experienced a rise in relative power alongside a reduction in overall threat. Notwithstanding, specific instances in time identified by Cha, such as Nixon's Guam doctrine or the asymmetrical fear of abandonment

63 Robert Sutter, "Korea: Improved South Korea-Chinese Relations. Motives and Implications," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1997.

64 Zhiqun Zhu, „Small Power, Big Ambition. South Korea's Role in Northeast Asian Security under President Roh Moo-hyun," Asian Affairs34, no. 2 (2007): 74.

65 Japanese Ministry of Defence (2013), 42.

66 Carsten Germis, [German] Streit um Senkaku-Inseln. Japan droht mit Abschuss chinesischer Drohnen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 28, 2013, http://www.faz.net (accessed December 17, 2013).

67 Paul Smith, "China-Japan Relations and the Future Geopolitics of East Asia." Asian Affairs 35, no. 4(2010).

during the Sino-American détente, suggests that overall there are three developments in the long run – a move from tripolarity to bipolarity, a relative increase of Korea towards Japan, and a rising China. A long run investigation of those trends allows for an elimination of other factors involved. There are three arguments about how these developments can diminish the cooperation benefits of Japan with Korea and, therewith, increase the possibility for domestic factors to influence its *Japan Policy*.

First, South Korea seems to internally balance against Japan with the establishment of a sophisticated defense industry and the aspiration of a blue-water navy. Of course, one could argue that the military build-up is mainly designed to enhance its security vis-à-vis a nuclear capable North Korea. However, from the COW dataset, it becomes clear that the South Korean military outweighs the North by a factor of two. In addition, the build-up of naval capabilities is unlikely to be directed towards the North but, rather, represents an increasing aspiration to become a power in the region. Therefore, Korea and Japan enter, overall, in a more competitive environment, which, of course, is mitigated by a common ally but equally by a more assertive Korea willing to defend what it perceives to be its national interest.

Second, an overall reduction in the threat level reduces the necessity of cooperation between the two countries. While North Korea was typically described as "main enemy" by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, the *Defense White Paper 2012* tuned down the wording, describing only the North Korean military and regime as "enemies of the South."[68] A second source of reduced threat level is increasing cooperation with China. With the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992, cooperation increased, leading to closer coordination regarding North Korea, the planning of a free trade agreement (FTA), and warm relations. This reduced threat level makes cooperation with Japan less needed as the benefits reduce in light of ongoing disputes on territory and wartime history. This argumentation is in line with Yoon's "net threat model." as reductions in the overall threat should lead to a more confrontational outlook on Korea's *Japan Policy*.

Third, a fundamental change is observable in the bilateral relationship. While it could be described as hierarchical in the period after decoloniza-

68 Officially North Korea is referred to as follows: "The North has posed serious threats to the South's security with its large-scale conventional military forces, development and enhancement of WMDs, including nuclear weapons and missiles, and constant armed provocations as shown by the attack on the ROK ship Cheonan and the artillery firing at Yeonpyeong Island. As long as such threats continue, the main agents of the provocative acts, which are the North Korean regime and its military, will remain enemies of the South." see Korean Ministry of Defence (2012): 24.

tion, it evolved into a horizontal relationship. This has important effects on the bargaining power of the two countries. Seoul was very cautious when Japan renegotiated the US-Japan treaty so as to include the Korea clause in 1969. Today, in times of reduced threat level and capabilities to defend itself, Japan is about to lose these bargaining chips in bilateral negotiations. In numbers, 1960s Japan was able to provide five times the capabilities of Korea to a conflict, but it would only double them today. As a consequence, it should be observed that the cooperative outlook of Korea should reduce as the benefits of Japan can provide a diminishing outcome. Again, this increases the window of influence for domestic factors and is equally expressed in a changed economic relationship. The China factor is crucial in this regard, as the historical alliance and close connection with the US and South Korea is aspiring towards a more active role regarding economic integration of the region.[69] For example, while it was initially envisioned to form a trilateral free-trade agreement between China, Korea and Japan, CJK-FTA talks stalled due to historical animosities and territorial disputes between China and Korea confronting Japan. Acknowledging the competitive character of economic integration, this paper interprets an alternative to a CJK-FTA in the bilateral China-South Korea FTA. As of September 2013, both countries tentatively agreed on a tariff reduction of 90 percent and turned to "sensitive issues."[70] This stage is far ahead of CJK-FTA negotiations, despite being initiated at a later stage.[71] Choi Nakgyoon argues that the motives of the Korean government rest next to economic gains in the achievement of a more independent foreign policy, while enhancing the diplomatic and geopolitical relationship between Korea and China, mainly by creating deeper interdependence as well as "help the Chinese leadership and private sector to realize the importance of political as well as military security in the Korean Peninsula [sic]."[72] Still, rapprochement of Korea and China should not suggest an abandonment of the US as a strategic ally in the future. Some even call for an engagement of the US on the Korean Peninsula after unifica-

69 Since the end of the Cold War a more independent foreign policy evolved, see for example the Nordpolitik of Roh Tae-woo, the Sunshine policy of Kim Dae-jung, the mediator role envisioned by Roh Moo-hyun or the Trustpolitik of Park Geun-hye, see for a good overview Shim(2009).

70 Seoul, Beijing agree on interim 90 percent Trade liberalization," MK Business News, Septermber 6, 2013, http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2013&no=816756 (accessed December 2, 2014).

71 In contrast, CJK FTA just completed the joint feasibility study, see www.mofa.go.kr/ENG.

72 Nakgyoon Choi, Impacts and Main Issues of the Korea-China FTA. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2012): 32,, www.keia.org(accessed December 2, 2014).

tion.[73] However, as the China factor seems to be understudied in the existing models, it should receive a more prominent role here.

Conclusion

Despite many concerns, cooperation between Japan and Korea has never become superfluous. After all, both countries share similar security concerns, but, with a more favorable international environment, the benefits of cooperation with Japan are likely to diminish, effectively allowing for the deterioration of Korea's *Japan Policy*. A relatively stable regional environment, South Korea's catch up with Japan as well as different opportunity structures in regard to a rising China work as a break mechanism in the long run and allow other factors to exert influence on South Korea's *Japan Policy.* Therefore, cooperation was never a foregone conclusion and is today less "commanded" by the international system than ever before. Different models have been suggested in scholarly literature on the high volatility of bilateral relations between Korea and Japan. They neither take the changed security environment into account nor enable reduction under the pressure to cooperate. Despite clear, long-term developments, there have been times of rising cooperation or friction in a relatively short period of time. These short term fluctuations cannot be understood by investigating the long term capabilities alone. However, they set the stage on which the other factors, be it ally commitment, are the perceived threat or where the historical antagonism needs to be analyzed from. In this vein, the broad evolutions of material capability are the benchmark for any investigation to start with and should redefine our understanding of Korea's Japan Policy. **Y**

73 See for example, the comments of Wang, F. at the Korea Institute for Unification (KINU) Forum 2011, see US-China Relations and Korean Unification, ed. by Jiwon Choi, KINU Report Grand Plan for Korean Unification (2011):05, http://www.kinu.or.kr (accessed December 2, 2014).

THE LEGACY OF AUSTERITY: THE EUROZONE CRISIS AND THE REVIVAL OF THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

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Since the 1990s, scholars have debated the efficacy of the policies set out in the Washington Consensus; however, their views contrast greatly. According to the interpretation given by Stiglitz (2002), such policies consist of three pillars: fiscal austerity, privatization, and liberalization.[2] *With the current European crisis, the term was again thrust upon the stage, but now with a new name highlighting the nationality of its key endorser: The Berlin-Frankfurt Consensus. Nowadays, many of the policies the Consensus encapsulates - especially fiscal austerity – top the agendas of most European institutions. Nevertheless, can we actually talk of a European revival of the Washington Consensus? If this be the case, do European citizens need to worry about the future of the European Union (EU)? This essay is an attempt to answer these questions. The essay develops in three parts. The first part introduces the Washington Consensus policies of the 1980s-1990s and considers the current meaning of the Consensus, including proof of the overlaps between the original policies and the policies of today's European Consensus. The second part explains the details of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is the main evidence of the revival of the Washington Consensus in Europe. The third part deals with the political debate about fiscal austerity in Europe, and it attempts to explain why Europeans should be concerned about such policies, and the consequent future of the European Union.*

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2 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002).

It is now widely accepted that the policies of the original Washington Consensus, more often than not, failed to achieve the expected objectives. Many commentators assert that the Washington Consensus is dead. This includes former president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, former British Premier Gordon Brown, and former IMF chief, Dominique Strauss-Kahn.[3] With Europe's current crisis, the term has again came to vanguard, but with a new name: The Berlin-Frankfurt Consensus.

In the last few years, in fact, the media has widely reported disputes regarding austerity reform in Europe. One of the most striking stories is related to the Netherlands. On April 21, 2012, the Dutch far-right politician, Geert Wilders, walked away from a budget cut meeting. He explained that such a cut was not in the interest of the Netherlands. This led to the collapse of the Dutch government, which then resigned.[4] Unwillingness to meet the deficit and debt limits imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), were the reasons behind the collapse of the Dutch government. European countries are resisting fiscal constraints (i.e. austerity) because it appears that the new Berlin-Frankfurt Consensus is built on the same foundations as the well-known Washington Consensus, and, like its predecessor, is deepening the current crisis. Yet, can we actually talk of a European revival of the Washington Consensus? If this be the case, do European citizens need to worry about the future of the European Union (EU)? This essay is an attempt to answer these real concerns.

The essay develops in three parts. The first part introduces the Washington Consensus policies of the 1980s-1990s, while considering the consensus' current meaning, and giving proof of the link between its policies and those of the current European Consensus. The second part gives details of the SGP, which is the main expression of the policies of the Washington Consensus in Europe. The third part deals with the political debate over the feasibility of fiscal austerity in Europe. It attempts to explain why Europeans

3 See James D. Wolfensohn, "Opening Remarks at the Shanghai Conference on Scaling Up Poverty Reduction" (speech, Shanghai, May 26, 2004), World Bank. Jonathan Weisman and Alistair Macdonald, "Obama, Brown Strike Similar Notes on Economy," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 3, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB123871661163384723, (accessed August 21, 2014). Dominique Strauss-Kahn, "Economic Policy Challenges in the Post-Crisis Period" (speech, Cambridge, UK, April 10, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/041010.htm (accessed August 29, 2014).

4 Matt Steinglass, "Dutch government falls after budget talks," *Financial Times*, April 22, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/889f4108-8c2e-11e1-9a1c-00144feab49a.html#axzz3E25P7Dt0 (accessed February 28, 2014).

do need to worry about such a policy, and investigates consequences for the EU's future.

From the Washington Consensus to the Berlin-Frankfurt Consensus

The Washington Consensus has been known as a set of development policies enshrined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the US Government. The term was coined by John Williamson in 1989 during a conference on Latin America.[5] The Consensus policies mandated minimal state intervention and supported private sector development. Central banks were to discipline the state, promoting austerity in order to establish a balanced budget.[6] The central banks in this sense would be independent from any other body, and this is how the European Central Bank (ECB) appears today. Therefore, growth would rise via the private sector as tough fiscal discipline would have prevented governments from deciding freely regarding fiscal expansion.

In Latin American countries the consensus proved widely ineffective: limited growth, high unemployment, and rampant scandals peppered the private sector.[7] This eventually led to the consensus' rejection. In 2005, the World Bank published a book in which orthodox economists analyzed at which point the Washington Consensus shifted from its original 1989 meaning. In the foreword, the former World Bank vice-president for Africa, Gobind Nankani, said "the central message of the volume is that there is no unique universal set of rules…we need to get away from formulae and the search for elusive "best practices," and rely on deeper economic analysis to identify the binding constraints on growth. The choice of specific policy and institutional reforms should flow from these growth diagnostics."[8] The book emphasizes the need for humility, policy diversity, and experimentation, while recognizing that the principles of macroeconomic stability, domestic liber-

5 John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," in *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?*, ed. John Williamson (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 7-20.

6 John Williamson, "The strange history of the Washington consensus," *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics* 27, no. 2 (2004): 195-206.

7 Mark Weisbrot, "Left Hook," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61742/mark-weisbrot/left-hook (accessed August 24, 2014). Milford Bateman et al., "A post-Washington consensus approach to local economic development in Latin America? An example from Medellin, Colombia," *Overseas Development Institute*, April 2011, http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7054.pdf (accessed August 24, 2014).

8 World Bank, *Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005), xiii.

alization, and openness have been wrongly interpreted narrowly to mean fiscal discipline, minimal inflation, tariff restriction, maximum privatization, and maximization of the liberalization of finances. The general question has been if more of the suggested changes had occurred in any one country, would the final outcome have been better? Notwithstanding this assertion is the belief that the principles can actually be implemented in different ways. For example, macroeconomic stability does not always involve fiscal discipline which very often leads to reduced long-run growth and consequent decreased tax revenue. This can also generate a higher fiscal deficit in depressed countries.[9] The publication admitted the failure of a one size fits all approach, and was the first step towards a new consensus which takes into consideration cross-country differences.

Nevertheless, in the 1980s and 1990s, European integration already acclimatized the EU nations to the dismantlement of the state's presence in the country's economic affairs. The three pillars of the Washington Consensus, and above all the idea of minimal state intervention, were all considered as "must-dos" in order to establish a supranational framework in the EU to limit the role of the nation-states. The main objective was to spur integration. Therefore, European policy makers in the 1990s embraced the orthodox pillars of the Washington Consensus, confident that they would have enhanced the integration process. Hence, policy makers inserted them into several European Treaties. Starting with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty (Euro Convergence Criteria), and the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, with their well-known SGP, both drastically limited the fiscal expansion of European states. From this moment, the Washington Consensus entered the life of Europeans, albeit assuming a new "name," the "Berlin-Frankfurt Consensus."

The European Consensus is, in fact, a shared consensus: with both Berlin and Frankfurt at the center. The Frankfurt-based ECB is not just demanding austerity, but also structural reforms across all deficit peripheries. By the same token, the Berlin Consensus is dictating rules and conditions to the deficit countries, actions which clearly illustrate that Europe has failed to learn anything from the mistakes of the Washington Consensus. The European integration project is currently at a standstill as a consequence of the financial crisis spreading throughout Europe, the lack of a federal government to face fiscal problems, and the limits on fiscal expansion of member states.

9 Ibid., 11-12.

Until recently, Germany, France, and the Netherlands have led the European Consensus, but it has also shown its weaknesses with the last presidential election in France and the fall of the Dutch government. In particular, the outcome of the 2012 French presidential elections revealed the willingness of the people to abandon the consensus and its prescriptions of fiscal austerity.[10] The electorate decided in favor of the socialist François Hollande because he promoted a plan of growth rather than austerity. However, France and the Netherlands are not new resistors to the European Consensus. In 2005, they both rejected the European Constitutional Treaty. Today, they provide a reason of alarm for Germany's austerity plan. *The Economist* says both are "kicking against austerity."[11] Moreover, France and the Netherlands have also seen a rise in political support for the far right and left, demonstrating an increasing part of the electorate rejects the old projects of Europe. Until recently, the triad Merkel-Sarkozy-Rutte - hence Germany-France-Netherlands - were the rigorous European leaders who imposed austerity. However, Rutte resigned in 2012 because of an impasse on the talk for austerity, although he was later re-elected. Nowadays, for Merkel, it is a different story. Her austerity plan is not fully backed by Hollande or Matteo Renzi, the Italian Prime Minister.

EU Fiscal Policy: Stability and Growth Path

The SGP is a supranational tool for governing and preserving fiscal discipline in the EU. Its main aim is to control the national deficits and debts within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and to continue enforcing fiscal discipline upon the new euro countries who have already met the euro convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty. The pact prescribes a member state to submit an annual stability or convergence program. States need to show how they will achieve a balance or a surplus in the medium-term and their policy related to this plan. The pact applies to all member states, but in the case of those belonging to the euro-area, there is also the possibility of sanctions through the excessive deficit procedure.[12] This procedure is

10 Noam Karkin, "Analysis: Greek, French voters reject German-led austerity," *Reuters*, May 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/06/us-europe-elections-idUSBRE8450CY20120506 (accessed August 24, 2014).

11 "Kicking against austerity: France and the Netherlands once again resist the European consensus," *The Economist*, April 28, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21553464 (accessed July 14, 2014).

12 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is delineated in: Resolution of the European Council C236/01 on the Stability and Growth Pact, June 17, 1997; Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strength-

at the core of the pact, and it carries out sanctions upon those states who break the three percent limit on the planned or actual government deficit to GDP ratio and the limit of 60 percent on the government debt to GDP ratio.[13] This visibly limits fiscal expansion at the national level.

Controls on national deficits, mainly within the Eurozone, are at the heart of the German Chancellor's thoughts as it was for former French President Sarkozy and the ECB. This is because the Delors Report in 1989 established the need for "binding rules governing the size and the financing of national budget deficit," for the reason that "uncoordinated and divergent national budgetary policies would undermine monetary stability and generate imbalances in the real and financial sectors of the Community."[14]

The evil spirit of the deficit has always been related to the need for borrowing- excessive borrowing- and the SGP was supposed to control and limit this tendency. This is because borrowing by one member of the Eurozone would lead to additional costs for the other member states. Mainly, any euro country in deficit would seek to borrow money from the capital markets increasing internal demand for euro and therefore raising its interest rates. Nevertheless, excessive borrowing may lead to increased inflation. This in turn would induce the ECB to adopt disinflationary policies in order to tighten borrowing and spending throughout the Eurozone. Additionally, a higher interest rate would also oblige other euro countries not currently in deficit to borrow with less convenient conditions.[15]

Fitoussi (2004) gives some counter-arguments to this. He said that inflationary pressure in the borrowing country will be counter-balanced by reduced competitiveness. And, if the fiscal expansion occurred due to a slump in production, then it would have contributed to boost demand and consequently- income and imports. In those two cases, the borrowing country would import more and reduce the deficit of the other euro-countries while

ening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, July 7, 1997; Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, July 7, 1997.

13 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. [126], 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at [99].

14 Jacques Delors, *Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community* (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union: April 17, 1989), http://aei.pitt.edu/1007/1/monetary_delors.pdf, (accessed September 12, 2014).

15 Willem H. Buiter, "The 'Sense and Nonsense of Maastricht' Revisited: What Have We Learnt About Stabilization In EMU?," *CEPR Discussion Papers* 5405 (2005), http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/5405.html, (accessed May 9, 2014).

counterbalancing the additional costs they supported as a consequence of other member's excessive borrowing.[16]

Another supportive argument for the SGP is related to credibility. A country running an excessive deficit may eventually become insolvent. Insolvency would force the ECB to bail out the country. This would undermine the ECB's credibility to fight inflation. On the other hand, the ECB has already been involved in numerous bailouts with Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Latvia, Hungary, Romania, etc. Moreover, at the time the SGP was established, member states were required to save during growth periods and to use those surpluses in slump periods. This picture, however, needs time to come to fruition. Yet European countries were forced into fiscal austerity without consideration to their individual "business cycle phase."[17] The consequence for the Eurozone is clear: depressed growth and pro-cyclical fiscal policy are increasing unemployment and putting in danger the future of the EU.[18]

Given monetary policy has been granted to the ECB, fiscal policy was the only kind of policy left in the hands of the Eurozone national governments. Therefore, without the SGP, a national government could have implemented their own fiscal policy which best fit their personal situation; such as raising taxes in a period of fast growth to reduce demand, or reducing taxes by invigorating the private sector during periods of depression. Alternatively, public expenditure could have been increased or decreased, in order to enhance the economy or to reduce economic activity. However, in both cases, reducing taxes and/or increasing public expenditure may lead to excessive borrowing, which, as above mentioned, inflicts severe costs upon other member states. Nevertheless, European policy makers did not take into account the full story of the Delors Report and the need for coordination of national budgetary policies in order to create the basis of a wider Community fiscal policy. Only such coordination would have led the Community, according to Delors, to establish a fiscal/monetary policy appropriate for the preservation of internal balance.[19] As per Delors, economic policy coordination should have aimed at promoting growth, employment and external balance; in a Community where prices need to be stable. However, such coordination re-

16 Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Francesco Saraceno, "The Brussels-Frankfurt-Washington Consensus Old and New Tradeoffs in Economics," *Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques, Working Papers*, (2004), http://www.ceistorvergata.it/conferenze&convegni/mondragone/XVI_papers/paper-fitoussi%20saraceno.pdf , (accessed August 28, 2014).

17 Ibid., 22.

18 Ibid., 22.

19 Delors, *Report on Economic*, 20.

quired the setting of a budgetary policy within the Union where such a policy contemplated the need to fix an upper limit on budget deficits of individual member countries. Delors did not neglect the importance of fiscal discipline, but he pointed out the need for coordination between economic policies to ultimately produce growth.[20]

The SGP in itself was not a sign of madness of European policy makers. At that time, it was relevant to the foundational basis necessary for the birth of the euro. The EU lacked, and lacks also today, a federal government and a president. Therefore an agenda creating the foundation of the financial discipline was needed in order to secure the establishment of the currency union. It was widely accepted that an integrated economy would have spurred political integration. This, however, did not really pan-out as anticipated. The higher probability is that the pact needs to be restructured to create the right coordination between members as mentioned by Delors in 1989. It is also true that the SGP's credibility has been undermined by the case brought before the European Court of Justice by the Commission, against the Council. The latter, in fact, adopted a flexible measure against France and Germany, who have already broken the 3 percent deficit limit since the early 2000s.[21]

The Austerity Trap: the Economic Suicide of Europe

Cutting on public expenditure, without a real plan for growth, can be understood as European economic suicide. It is a mistake which European leaders are currently undertaking, but no one, including Angela Merkel, is ready to admit. The widespread belief that austerity is the solution to Europe's debt crisis has been inculcated in the mind of the German electorate.[22] European leaders maintain commitment to the economic principles of the Washington Consensus policies, which according to Paul Krugman on his blog on *The New York Times*, is actually what is responsible for the current crisis.[23] But why do our leaders believe austerity is the solution to the crisis? Krugman explains that while cutting public expenditure worsens

20 Ibid., 24.

21 See Case C-27/04 Commission v Council (Stability and Growth Pact) [2004] ECR I-6649. Cit. in Damian Chalmers et al., *European Union Law* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 401.

22 "Europe's Failed Course," *The New York Times*, February 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/opinion/europes-failed-course-on-the-economy.html?_r=0, (accessed August 18, 2014).

23 Paul Krugman, "Pain Without Gain," *The New York Times*, February 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/opinion/krugman-pain-without-gain.html, (accessed September 12, 2014).

the unemployment rate, many believe such negative effects will be counterbalanced by the rising of confidence in the Eurozone; meaning consumer and business spending should increase. Those countries who avoided fiscal discipline would have seen capital flight and high interest rates. However, economic history proves a different outcome: failed confidence and a plummeting private sector. The result is an increase in unemployment and the shrinking of the GDP.[24]

Therefore, as highlighted by Dominique Strauss-Kahn in September 2009 during a conference at the Bundesbank, austerity can be a very harmful policy.[25] His words sound unfathomable to believers of fiscal austerity and the Washington Consensus policies: "Unwinding the stimulus too soon runs a real risk of derailing the recovery, with potentially significant implications for growth and unemployment."[26] He stated recovery cannot be taken for granted, merely through glimpses of stabilization by some countries.

Of the same opinion is Gordon Brown. In 2012, *The Washington Post* published his attacks on the austerity policies of Europe. He states that European leaders are sticking "to policies that the whole world can see have already failed."[27] Continuing-on, he argues that European leaders are miscalculating the Greek crisis, oddly believing "that if austerity is failing, it is because there is not enough of it."[28] Unfortunately, according to Brown, the future for Europe is not florid: a permanent and irrevocable loss of prosperity is what awaits European citizens.[29] Loss of prosperity is already affecting the living standards of people. In other words, paraphrasing Amartya Sen, loss of prosperity is affecting the capabilities of Europeans to live a life they have reason to desire and value.[30] Europe is facing massive challenges to its living standards, and austerity is leading to social exclusion and high unemployment, which are both deprivations of capabilities.

Nevertheless, the dispute over the role of austerity is also strongly hitting the United Kingdom's economy and its Chancellor of the Exchequer, George

24 Ibid.

25 "IMF chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn says stopping stimulus too soon could hurt recovery," *The Telegraph*, September 4, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/g20-summit/6138738/IMF-chief-Dominique-Strauss-Kahn-says-stopping-stimulus-too-soon-could-hurt-recovery.html, (accessed August 19, 2014).

26 Ibid.

27 Gordon Brown, "Latest Greek bailout reveals Europe's shortsightedness," *The Washington Post*, February 21, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/europes-role-in-the-world-reshaped-by-economic-crises/2012/02/21/gIQAoNUiRR_story.html, (accessed August 30, 2014).

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Amartya Sen, *Development as freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Osborne, who believes that deficit reduction - through austerity - is a growth policy that later will be proved correct through its outcomes.[31] But austerity, as economic historian Robert Skidelsky asserts, is for the boom years and not for the slump. More austerity, at this moment, will lead to higher unemployment.[32]

During an interview with *Le Monde*, Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission (1985 – 1994), was asked "What do you think about the remedies imposed to Greece?" He replied with this statement, "We are assisting [in Europe] to the revival of the Washington Consensus and the IMF policies: Teaching at the countries in crisis how to die cured" (Apprendre aux pays en difficulté à mourir guéri).[33] In other words, those countries who follow the principles of the consensus will attempt to reduce their deficit through an austerity plan; however, this eventually leads GDP loss, as in the case of Greece. By heavily cutting public expenditure, and with limited incentives for the private sector, Greece has lost a relevant percentage of its GDP making it increasingly difficult for the country to repay its debt and further reduce its deficit. Austerity, in terms of the policies aligned with the Washington Consensus is actually seen as outdated and dangerous but only on one side of the Atlantic. Strikingly meanwhile, in Europe, it is considered the only avenue capable of curing the current crisis.

A very clear example of a country which is dying "cured," is Portugal. While Greece is struggling to meet European imposed austerity, Portugal is the "good guy," as the Portuguese accepted austerity (more peacefully than the Greeks) in the hope of a new awakening of the economy. Former Portuguese Finance Minister, Vitor Gaspar, applied everything required by the Berlin-Frankfurt Consensus, in order to receive assistance. He managed to decrease government's budget deficit by cutting expenditure and salaries, pension rollbacks and increasing taxes.[34] But those cuts, scholars agree,[35]

31 Larry Elliott, "George Osborne's deficit reduction plan: a blunt axe, blindly wielded," *The Guardian*, September 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/23/osborne-deficit-plan-rethink, (accessed August 24, 2014).

32 Robert Skidelsky, "George Osborne is wrong. Austerity is for the boom years, not the slump," *The Guardian*, March 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/23/deficit-reduction-george-osborne-budget, (accessed August 30, 2014).

33 "M. Delors Dénonce le "coup de poker" de Sarkozy et Merket," *Le Monde*, October 19, 2011, http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2011/10/19/jacques-delors-denonce-le-coup-de-poker-de-sarkozy-et-merkel_1589753_3234.html, (accessed August 30, 2014).

34 Thomas Jr. Landon, "Portugal's Debt Efforts May Be Warning for Greece," *The New York Times*, February 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/business/global/portugals-debt-efforts-may-be-a-warning-for-greece.html?pagewanted=all, (accessed August 27, 2014).

35 Brian Blackstone et al., "Europe's Growth Woes Worsen," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 15,

contributed to the contraction of the economy. As a result, it was expected that Portugal would have seen a rise in the ratio of its debt to GDP from 107 percent to 118 percent in 2013.[36] In practice, the debt to GDP ratio rose to 124 percent in 2013 and 129 percent in 2014.[37] The Portuguese economy is shrinking, and with no growth, it will be hard for the country to repay its debt.

On the other hand, the bad guy is Greece, in the sense that the country is not able to cope with the bailout requirements imposed by the EU financial institutions and the IMF. This is undermining the integrity and cohesion of Europe, and the future of the euro, to the point where the German Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, suggested Greece exit the Eurozone. He claims the only way Greece can stay in the Eurozone is if it follows the path agreed.[38] But what is this path about? The path expects Greece to respect the deficit criteria of the SGP and thus keep the deficit below 3 percent of GDP.

Nevertheless, the Troika of lenders (IMF, ECB and the European Commission) went even further in making Greece worse off. They demanded cuts in wages and health, as well as firing workers. Greece, then, in order to get the necessary bailout, tried to comply with the policies; but consequently brought about the unemployment of hundreds of thousands of people, and the closure of thousands of businesses.[39]

Any government promoting wage cuts would face public discontent, above all because those cuts most adversely affect the working class, while leaving the upper class mostly untouched. Hollande had held this in mind very clearly when during his campaign he claimed that once president he would raise taxes on the rich: "75 percent for those earning more than one million euro a year,"[40] he said. More strikingly, he pronounced, "Austerity

2012, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204883304577222603697078904, (accessed August 25, 2014).

36 Thomas Jr. Landon, "Portugal's Debt Efforts".

37 "Portugal Government Debt to GDP", *Trading Economics*, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/portugal/government-debt-to-gdp, (accessed August 27, 2014).

38 Matthew Dalton and Laurence Norman, "Euro Zone Considers Delay of the Next Greek Payment," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 9, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304070304577393993915783720.html?mod=WSJEurope_hpp_LEFTTopStories, (accessed August 27, 2014).

39 Andy Dabilis, "New Troika Demands: Firings, Pay Cuts, Slashed Health and Defence Spending," *Greek Reporter*, January 26, 2012. Rachel Donadio, "Greek Premier Faces Impasse Over Demand to Cut Private Wages," *The New York Times*, February 3, 2012.

40 Steven Erlanger, "Hollande Ousts Sarkozy in French Presidential Election," *The New York Times*, May 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/world/europe/hollande-and-sarkozy-in-crucial-run-off-in-france.html?pagewanted=all (accessed August 29, 2014).

need not be Europe's fate."[41] Austerity versus Growth- this is the dilemma Europe is facing today. French voters have already confronted it during the last presidential elections,[42] and evidently, they rejected the Sarkozy-austerity plan.

Unfortunately, the Berlin belief that austerity is the only way to emerge from a crisis, is heading them towards a worse situation. Reducing public spending is at the top of the agenda of those who promote austerity, but as we have seen in the case of Portugal and Greece, reducing public spending poses also a huge risk, because the economy shrinks, and in turn the GDP, prompting further recession. In the 1980s in Latin America, the IMF's persistent austerity command was an obstacle to growth, but which was wrongly believed to be the requisite for those countries to pay down debt. Portugal and Ireland, which managed to drastically cut their public expenditure, are still deeply in trouble, and may also be insolvent.

Austerity, in the form of saving, should be promoted at the time of economic boom. Nevertheless, during a period of slump it is a pro-cyclical policy that can hurt further a country's economy. Austerity reduces prosperity, increases unemployment, creates new poor, and as a consequence eventually leads to an increase in public deficits- as more people demand unemployment benefits. Unemployment, in fact, not only makes people poor, it also reduces the revenues of the state, by reducing the number of tax payers. Austerity for Europeans appears in the form of public expenditure cuts and/or increase in taxes. However, if people pay more taxes, they will basically buy less, and demand for goods will decrease from both the public and the private sectors. Austerity, therefore, will eventually cause an increase to the overall deficit and to the debt to GDP ratio of depressed countries - making the situation unsustainable - and maybe leading to the long-run collapse of the EU.

Conclusion

The Washington Consensus' policies have clearly been rejected by many on the other side of the Atlantic yet are still the policies preserved in several European treaties. European policy makers have viewed the pillars of the Washington Consensus as the feasible avenue to limit the sovereignty of Eu-

41 Ibid.

42 Tom Burgis, "Voters face choice between austerity and growth," *The Financial Times*, April 22, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2c072728-8c72-11e1-9758-00144feab49a.html (accessed September 2, 2014).

ropean nation-states. They enshrined the dictum of the Washington Consensus within the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, and they implemented the SGP to control the deficit and the debt of the European countries. The aim was to limit the potential fiscal expansion and the excessive borrowing of the member states. Such a pact was updated in 2005 and in 2011, where it became even more restricted, tightening the fiscal rules. Austerity became, since the appearance of the financial crisis, the only rule necessary for countries to follow in order to be bailed out and ironically, an end in itself, rather than a means to growth.

The debt crisis has been worsened by insufficient and failed coordination in fiscal policies; the same coordination mentioned by Delors in his report in 1989. This failure led the Eurozone to instability, and the current situation is far from being resolved. Instability, lack of growth and unemployment are already undermining the future of the EU. This situation is bringing down any hope of further integration in Europe, paving the possibility of a breakup of the Union. For the first time in the history of the European integration, politicians have started to seriously consider the possibility of a country being removed, either voluntarily or through expulsion, from the Eurozone. This is the very real situation for Greece.

German politicians said that the euro is an irreversible process, but at this stage and with this current situation, the only cure coming from the European Consensus is more austerity. Nevertheless, it has been widely proven since 2007 that austerity has only brought further recession to many of the peripheral countries. What would be a possible solution to rise out of this impasse? Krugman[43] states two solutions: exit from the euro or looking for an alternative course. Exit from the euro means restoration of the national currencies and therefore the reluctant acceptance of the Economic and Monetary Union's (EMU) failure. This solution seems unconceivable to many, yet to Europeans already suffering first-hand the dire effects of austerity- it seems unconceivable to further tighten fiscal policies in countries already severely depressed. Additionally, as unconceivable as admitting a currency failure might be, it has been done before through the exit from the gold standard in the 1930s. Saving the euro, on the other hand, would require an alternative course of action. Krugman suggests expansion of monetary policy by the ECB, accepting higher inflation, and expansionary fiscal

43 Paul Krugman, "Europe's Economic Suicide," *The New York Times*, April 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/opinion/krugman-europes-economic-suicide.html, (accessed September 3, 2014).

policy in the form of budgets in Germany in order to compensate austerity in Spain and the peripheral European countries. Perhaps this will give hope to a long run recovery. Hope, after all, is the word all Europeans are longing to hear, particularly in place of “austerity” and “unemployment.” **Y**

ESSAYS

"WE HAVE JUST ABOUT HAD IT": JACK SLESSOR, THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC DEBATE OVER ESCALATION OF THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-51[1]

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This paper develops a new understanding of the Anglo-American strategic debate during the first year of the Korean War, using hitherto absent material from the personal papers of one of its major participants: the British Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal John "Jack" Slessor. In deciding to intervene in the Korean conflict, Britain and the United States were united in motivations: reacting out of geopolitical, international and Cold War psychological considerations. But the enhanced vulnerability of British territorial possessions in East Asia, in addition to the proximity of the British homeland to Soviet nuclear forces in Europe, conditioned a more cautious strategic policy. In response to the strategic conflict with the escalatory policies of General Douglas MacArthur, the British state was not a unitary actor. Slessor and the military lobby engaged in vocal criticism of the Pentagon's war prosecution, using their own channels in Washington to articulate concern. Conversely, Ernest Bevin's Foreign Office was reluctant to take measures that could jeopardize his vision of an enduring transatlantic alliance. Building on the research of authors including Peter Lowe, the paper argues that this inter-departmental dissension within the British decision-making establishment was a vital determinant of transatlantic strategic policy. Only once the Foreign Office became confident that the alliance was sufficiently solidified did it emerge in full support of Slessor's position. As a consequence of this newly established unity, the opinions of MacArthur's London-based detractors were to prove an vital factor in precipitating President Truman's decision to dismiss the controversial General.

1 I would like to thank my university supervisor Dr Adam Cathcart for his advice and encouragement, and my friend Bryony O'Neill, for all her help, support and friendship during my research.

Paradoxically, the Korean War of 1950-53 produced both operational unity and strategic disunity within the Anglo-American alliance to an unprecedented extent. On the battlefield, relations between the two powers remained close throughout the war, but possibly achieved their zenith during the period of February-March 1951 when the United States aircraft carrier *USS Bataan* was subordinated to the British chain of command, conducting joint operations with the heavy cruiser *HMS Belfast*.[2] This is indicative of integrated cooperation on a truly remarkable level, symbolizing the strength of attachment between the military forces of the two allies.

Nonetheless, behind this impressive cooperation lay a potentially dangerous strategic dispute. The high-risk, escalatory policy of General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, garnered strong criticism from the British Chiefs of Staff, led by the vocal Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John 'Jack' Slessor.[3] This allied criticism contributed significantly to the leadership crisis which resulted in MacArthur's summary dismissal by President Truman in April 1951. MacArthur had previously endured complex personal relations with the British, unwilling to grant a substantial influence in his Japanese occupation regime despite being on good terms with Alvary Gascoigne, the British Political Representative, but sharing the British contempt for previous American incoherency in East Asia, castigating that the United States only went to war "step by hesitant step."[4]

Undoubtedly, MacArthur had some qualities of a brilliant general, as demonstrated by the Inchon gambit of September 15, 1950, but he was also unpredictable and potentially escalatory, once suggesting it would have been valid to lay a field of radioactive waste to sever Korea from Manchuria.[5] This extreme example typifies the approach of the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, who interpreted his mandate as to take whatever measures were necessary to unify Korea under anti-Communist control. In contrast, the British professed unease with strategic policies which could lead to escalation into wider war, such as MacArthur's suggestion for pre-

2 Telegram from Vice-Admiral William Andrewes, Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Royal Navy Far East Station, to Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, 'Report of Proceedings, February 2-15, 1951', March 9, 1951, Kew, The National Archives: Public Record Office [TNA: PRO], ADM 116/6211; Admiral Alan Scott-Moncrieff, Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Station, 'Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January-July 1951', Part 3: Operational, Section 1: Air, Kew, TNA: PRO, ADM 116/6230.

3 The institutional title "Chiefs of Staff" is used in this paper in reference to the British military leadership, as distinct from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4 Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (London: Heinemann, 1964), 331.

5 Ibid., 384.

ventive airstrikes against Chinese airfields in Manchuria, and proved more willing to accept a permanent division of Korea if this enabled the southern Republic to survive. This strategic crisis culminated in a situation whereby, in the words of one senior British diplomat, the junior partner felt that "we have just about had it."[6]

This strategic crisis is well narrated by the historian Peter Lowe, arguing that British criticism of MacArthur was an influential – if not the main determining – factor in provoking President Truman's decision.[7] Lowe correctly identifies Slessor as one of MacArthur's staunchest critics, interpreting this crisis as evidence of the poor state of Anglo-American coordination, noting that "relations between Great Britain were marked by a bitter-sweet quality on the eve of the Korean War," and that as a result of such disagreements, "the former quality rather than the latter was to become more pronounced in the course of the conflict."[8] Lowe's research conforms to a dominant revisionist paradigm, moving away from the rose-tinted views of contemporary claims, such as that of British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that "[we] were treated as partners, unequal no doubt in power but still equal in counsel."[9]

More recently, Thomas Hennessey's research into diplomatic relations during the Korean War has signaled the possibilities for an emerging post-revisionist, or neo-traditionalist interpretation, greater reflecting the contemporary optimism of decision-makers.[10] Although meritorious for reversing the revisionist trend, Hennessey's study is limited by its overt focus on the diplomatic aspects of the conflict to the expense of more detailed analysis of military issues. This post-revisionist agenda entails opportunities to recast the Anglo-American relationship in order to reflect levels of British influence over strategic decision-making which exceed Lowe's bleak outlook on the state of relations. Applied to the strategic problem, this approach, whilst

6 Telegram from Jebb (New York) to William Strang, Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary, April 6, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/92061, F 1017/11G.

7 Peter Lowe, "An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950-1," *English Historical Review* 105, no. 416 (1990): 624-653 (652). See also: Michael L. Dockrill, "The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951," *International Affairs* 62, no. 3 (1986): 459-476; William Whitney Stueck, "The Limits of Influence: British Policy and American Expansion of the War in Korea," *Pacific Historical Review* 55, no. 1 (1986): 65-95.

8 Peter Lowe, "The Frustrations of Alliance: Britain, the United States, and the Korean War, 1950-51," in *The Korean War in History*, ed. James Cotton and Ian Neary (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 80.

9 Telegram from Attlee (Ottawa) to Bevin (London), December 10, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, PREM 8/1200, telegram 1297.

10 Thomas Hennessey, *Britain's Korean War: Cold War Diplomacy, Strategy and Security, 1950-53* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 3-4.

acknowledging the existence of strong divisions of policy, suggests that relations were not permanently or significantly undermined.

This paper seeks to revise the prevailing revisionist understanding to provide a more nuanced, post-revisionist analysis of the strategic debate, in order to form conclusions as to the extent of British influence over United States military policy. Examining British decision-making on a non-unitary basis, it is possible to determine both the effectiveness of individual British actors in reacting to strategic divergence, in addition to the ultimate impact of British criticism in bringing about the downfall of MacArthur. To properly evaluate this critical strain upon the alliance, a sound understanding of the respective British and American war aims is first required. By utilizing previously absent sources including the private papers of Jack Slessor, contained within the Air Ministry records at the British National Archives, it becomes apparent that a major gulf existed between the Foreign Office and military lobby over the appropriate response to MacArthur's brinkmanship. Under the leadership of the Atlanticist Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, the former was much more reluctant to engage in a challenge to United States Department of Defense supremacy in strategic decision-making. As a crucial architect of the NATO alliance in Europe, Bevin's prioritization of transatlantic unity was sacrosanct; only after diplomatic relations had been cemented by the Truman-Attlee summit of December 1950 did the Foreign Office feel sufficiently secure to attack the escalatory policies which General MacArthur had been following since crossing the 38th Parallel.

Slessor was possibly MacArthur's strongest consistent critic, but it required pressure from his more reserved diplomatic colleagues before actors in Washington became responsive to British concerns. Through Foreign Office intervention in the strategic debate, something akin to Attlee's equality of counsel was finally achieved. It is therefore apparent that, during the first year of the Korean War, the power dynamics and priorities within the British decision-making establishment were vital in determining war strategy, necessitating this move beyond the traditional Anglo-American historical framework. Slessor's personal records reveal intense frustration with the Foreign Office agenda, but, as will be demonstrated, through diplomatic engagement as well as military criticism, British actors would ultimately play a decisive role in persuading President Truman to relieve MacArthur of his command in April 1951, to a greater extent than acknowledged hitherto.

Therefore, this discussion moves beyond more orthodox diplomatic histories to analyze how the domestic interactions of the different organs of the British decision-making establishment impacted upon alliance war policy.

Whilst it is somewhat true that, as put by the outspoken Chief of the Air Staff, "Anglo-American relations tend to suffer from being talked about too much," given the subsequent history of the alliance in the Asian Cold War, it is important to note that the situation in Korea was very different to that in Vietnam, characterized by the poor personal relationship of President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson.[11] If Korea can be said to form a historical precedent for Anglo-American intervention in local conflicts on behalf of the international community in the post-1991 world order, then a proper understanding of the process of military decision-making within the coalition is far from irrelevant to the world today.

With Equal Promptitude: Decisions for War and Strategic War Aims

The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 and subsequent United Nations resolution two days later provoked quick, determined reactions by both Britain and the United States. Speaking before the House of Commons, Prime Minister Attlee declared that "the world is indebted to the Government of the United States for its prompt action. With equal promptitude, His Majesty's Government resolved to support this action."[12]

In determining intervention, the two key members of the Western alliance shared a general framework of motivations, suggesting that the subsequent strategic dispute was not the inevitable result of previous divergence in East Asian policy. Rather, relations were strained as a specific consequence of MacArthur's drive for Korean unity at any cost and proposals for escalatory action against Chinese mainland targets. Following lengthy disagreement over the line to be taken towards the People's Republic of China during 1949-50, the Korean War appeared to provide for a renaissance in alliance cooperation.[13] This expectation was immediately fulfilled on the battlefield,

11 Letter from Slessor to Lord De L'Isle and Dudley (Secretary of State for Air), December 19, 1952, Kew, TNA: PRO, AIR 75/107 (Slessor Papers XXXIV). Anglo-American relations during the Vietnam War are dealt with well in: Sylvia Ellis, *Britain, America and the Vietnam War* (Westport: Praeger, 2004).

12 Statement by Clement Attlee, July 5, 1950, Hansard House of Commons, Volume 477, 491-492, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/jul/05/korea#S5CV0477P0_19500705_HOC_286, (accessed October 16, 2014).

13 The China dispute has generated considerable historiographical controversy. For negative interpretations of the state of Anglo-American relations, see: Robert Emmerson Watson, "The Foreign Office and Policy-Making in China 1945-1950: Anglo-American Relations and the Recognition of Communist China" (PhD diss., University of Leeds, 1996), 1; Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 42-43. This position has been challenged by authors claiming, more persuasively that the high degree of consultation represented a prevailing unity, see: James Tuck-Hong Tang,

with the British aircraft carrier *HMS Triumph* working in partnership with its United States counterpart *USS Valley Forge* – the first two carriers in Korean waters – to conduct coordinated airstrikes against Communist airstrips on July 3, 1950.[14] Thus from the very outset of the war, the transatlantic allies appeared to be united in their response, although this unity would ultimately provide the genesis of the strategic debate.

To the Communist leaderships in Pyongyang and Moscow, the vivacity of the Anglo-American response was greatly unexpected. Previously, neither Western power had regarded the peninsula as an area of vital strategic importance: the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had infamously omitted South Korea from the defensive perimeter in his National Press Club speech of January 1950, whilst the Attlee government had demonstrated no discontent at their lack of influence in the preceding postwar period.[15] To some extent, this attachment of little inherent importance to Korea continued: in a statement anachronistic with the intense concern over the military setbacks in Korea, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Slim, succeeded in July 1950 in persuading the Australian Prime Minister that the Malayan Emergency – to which Australia was committing strategic bombers – had "first priority in the Cold War."[16]

Yet this imperial preoccupation is not unsurprising. As Michael Schaller has demonstrated with regards to the position of Japan in United States strategic calculations, the importance of territorial possessions in Asia conditioned British decision-makers in favor of a strong reaction to the blatant aggression in Korea.[17] James Griffiths, the British Colonial Secretary, explained that "a United Nations defeat in Korea would have had the most se-

Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China, 1949-54 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 67; Qiang Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1994), 2. Other noteworthy articles or monographs on this well-analyzed topic include: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Ritchie Ovendale, "Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China," *Historical Journal* 26, no. 1 (1983): 139-158; Xiang, Lanxin, "The Recognition Controversy: Anglo-American Relations in China, 1949," *Journal of Contemporary History* 18, no. 2 (1992): 319-343.

14 Telegram from Andrewes to Brind, July 4, 1950, Kew, TNA:PRO, FO 371/84058, FK 1015/71.

15 Acheson's statement to the National Press Club, January 12, 1950, *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume 22: The Emergence of an Asian Pacific Rim in American Foreign Policy: Korea, Japan, and Formosa*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1998), 96-97. On British disinterest, see: Ra Jong-yil, "Political Settlement in Korea: British Views and Policies, Autumn 1950," in *The Korean War in History*, ed. Cotton and Neary, 51.

16 Cabinet conclusions, July 17, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, CAB 128/18/6, CM (50) 46.

17 Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 233, 293.

rious results [in Malaya] and the consequences of the involvement of China in the Korean War would of course be grave."[18]

The Malayan Emergency was a counterinsurgency campaign against Communist guerrillas hiding their Marxism behind national liberationist rhetoric, therefore interpreted by British policy-makers as comparable with the containment action against North Korea. Intervention in Korea was an expression of a preference to fight a hot war on the periphery of these adjacent interests, rather than wait until the conflict moved much closer to their doorstep. This was certainly a powerful argument given the Cold War struggle simultaneously being waged in the jungles of Malaya, and the fears shared by both Foreign and Colonial Office as to the possibility of a Chinese attack on Hong Kong. From May-September 1949, Britain had significantly augmented its forces in the latter, but remained under no illusions as to their inability to survive should the Korean War expand into wider regional conflict.[19]

With Hong Kong and Malaya thus hanging on a knife-edge, it appeared prudent to fight a localized war in Korea to prevent a more general Asian-Pacific war which could lead to the loss of Britain's colonial possessions just as easily as United States strategic interests in Japan or Taiwan. It is by no accident that Dean Acheson reminisces that the North Korean invasion "was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally-accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance of the security of American-occupied Japan."[20] Likewise, for Britain, the importance of Korea was to some extent predicated upon the more crucial importance of Malaya, as implicit in Field Marshal Slim's statement.

This geopolitical mentality resulted from the Domino Theory formulated by Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General for South-East Asia. Reporting on the situation in Indochina, MacDonald argued that "if Indo-China is lost, then Siam and Burma will probably go the same way shortly afterwards. That will bring the power of international Communism to the border of Malaya."[21] Korea represented another link in this chain, heightening

18 Memorandum by Griffiths for the Cabinet Defence Committee, November 15, 1950, *British Documents on the End of Empire: Series B, Volume 3: Malaya: Part II, The Communist Insurrection, 1948-1953*, ed. A. J. Stockwell (London: HMSO, 1995), 264.

19 Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 'Hong Kong Policy in War', October 10 1949, Kew, TNA: PRO, DEFE 6/10, JP (49) 118(O).

20 Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), 405.

21 Telegram from Murray (Singapore) to Foreign Office on behalf of Malcolm MacDonald, December 19, 1949, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/75983, F 19106/1055/86.

fears as to the long-term impact of Communist ascendency upon Britain's imperial positon. Consequently, these geopolitical motivations strongly conditioned both London and Washington in favor of sticking out the Korean War even during the bleak winter of 1950-51: by perceiving direct stakes which both powers stood to lose, retreat was not an option. Korea may not have been important to Britain and the United States in itself, but as a line in the sand, it was to be held at all costs.

However, whilst in the case of the White House this produced certain acquiescence to some of General MacArthur's strategic idiosyncrasies, demonstrated through consideration of his Manchurian airstrike proposals as a possible last resort, Britain's geopolitical goals influenced a starkly different attitude. Because of the shared belief in the domino effect, the Attlee government became reticent at taking action in Korea which could provoke a widening of Communist intervention to areas such as Hong Kong. Thus Anglo-American involvement in Korea threatened to bring about the very ends it had been designed to prevent. Given Britain's greater geopolitical stake in East and South-East Asia, this was an understandable cause for concern.

In addition to the perceived direct consequences of unchecked Communist aggression, the partners in the 'special relationship' were equally worried by the broader implications of isolationism. In his memoirs, President Truman, at home in Missouri when Dean Acheson informed him of the attack, commented that "Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years earlier."[22] This indicates the importance attached to historical memories of the 1930s, illustrating a psychological motivation for involvement in the defense of a state so recently condemned as peripheral. As the historian Peter Farrar has noted, for Britain in particular, Munich remained a haunting memory; to follow a course of appeasement would endanger the credibility of the collective security system of the United Nations just as the crises of the 1930s from Manchuria to the Rhineland had destroyed that of the League of Nations.[23] Whilst the transatlantic allies had already demonstrated strength in resisting more subtle Soviet aggression in crises over the Dardanelles Straits in 1946 and Berlin in 1948, the unambiguous inter-state invasion challenged

22 Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), 351.

23 Peter N. Farrar, "Britain's Proposal for a Buffer Zone South of the Yalu in November 1950: Was it a Neglected Opportunity to End the Fighting in Korea?," *Journal of Contemporary History* 18, no. 2 (1983): 327-351 (327).

not only Western resolve but also hopes for the new international order, thus requiring a more belligerent response.

Whilst these concerns were not unimportant, on both sides of the Atlantic, Cold War perceptions were of far greater consequence, particularly in translating somewhat abstract *casus belli* into strategic policy. The Anglo-Americans were convinced of Soviet instigation behind the North Korean attack, making the war the latest but also the most serious crisis to emerge between the opposing blocs. The day following the invasion, the British Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) noted that although there was no direct evidence of Soviet involvement, given the nature of the Soviet-North Korean relationship "it would appear unlikely that this invasion could have been undertaken without the approval of the Soviet leaders." [24] This presumption was based upon the prevailing mentality in 1950 that all Communist movements were to greater or lesser extent subservient to Stalin. Of course, this is not to say that contemporary decision-makers were blind to the differences between various Communist groups, but that they chose to apply conscious 'constructions' which universalized their public policies, as suggested by Mark Lawrence with regards to the Indochina debacle.[25]

The JIS also theorized "it is possible that the invasion has been provoked with Soviet connivance to exert pressure on the Western Powers in order to test their reactions" or "to divert attention from some other area, such as Formosa."[26] In meeting this threat, it was somberly concluded that arms supplies alone would be insufficient to save the South Korean regime, proving that even before the crucial Security Council resolution of June 27, the British establishment was already preparing to make a direct military commitment without waiting to consult Washington. Britain was, as this document proves, an actor in Korea of its own volition, joining the United States war effort as the result of shared conclusions independently arrived at, not merely bandwagoning due to alliance pressure. Britain's Chiefs of Staff agreed with the JIS assessment, believing that, despite the lack of solid evidence of Soviet instigation, the North Korean action was most probably a deliberate proxy war to offset the lack of Communist success in South-East Asia, test western resolve, and to divert Anglo-American resources from more vital theatres of the Cold War.[27]

24 Note by the Joint Intelligence Staff, June 26, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, DEFE 11/193.
25 Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 3-9.
26 Note by the Joint Intelligence Staff, June 26, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, DEFE 11/193.
27 Circular telegram from the Chiefs of Staff to various military commands, July 10, 1950, Kew, TNA:

Subsequent evidence available to decision-makers apparently confirmed these preconceptions. On July 3, 1950, a telegram from the British Political Representative in Japan, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, detailed intelligence confirming aircraft types used by the North Korean air force, ranging from obsolete Second World War dive-bombers to modern (if poor-performing) Yak-15 jet fighters.[28] Superficially, this intelligence seems insignificant, as North Korea was known to be a Soviet military-industrial client. But the appearance of Yak-15s supported the inference that Moscow had escalated support for its satellite due to foreknowledge of the invasion. Given the pervasive Cold War mentality, coupled with the initial JIS inclination to treat Stalin as guilty until proven innocent, foreknowledge implied responsibility.

More explicitly, Gascoigne's message conveys a G-2 intelligence summary of the interrogation of a North Korean Air Force major shot down near Suwon. The unnamed major ominously confirms that a Soviet colonel assumed operational command of the DPRK Air Force on June 27, with fifteen Soviet officers serving as "advisers".[29] This intelligence is highly important because, although Britain had committed naval forces on June 27, the decision to send ground troops was not made until July 25, 1950. Consequently, this seeming confirmation of pre-existing Cold War assumptions affected the background mentality from which the Cabinet decided to escalate their commitment. Later conversations with the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry revealed that Moscow had seriously considered sending a Spanish Civil War-style International Brigade from their Eastern European satellites, further justifying Western concern.[30] Whilst the accuracy of this information is dubious given the deep rift between Tito's Yugoslavia and Stalin's Soviet Union, this does not diminish the importance of such reports in influencing the psychological parameters of decision-making.

These motivations for involvement in the Korean War are vitally important in understanding the evolution of war aims on both sides of the Atlantic, therefore having a direct influence upon subsequent strategic perceptions. Although in complete agreement as to the necessity for involvement in the peninsula from a Cold War perspective, as well as from more tangible ge-

PRO, AIR 75/108 (Slessor Papers XXXV).

28 Telegram from Gascoigne (Tokyo) to Foreign Office, July 3, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/84059, FK 1015/82G.

29 Ibid.

30 Telegram from Peake (Belgrade) to Foreign Office, December 2, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/84121, FK 1023/218.

opolitical and international considerations, ultimately this unity of motive would be a major factor in explaining the growing strategic disunity.

To borrow words from British Major Ellery Anderson, the conflict in Korea had the potential to erupt "into a third Great War or first Nuclear War, and the end of civilization as we knew it," as a result of its position in the Cold War struggle.[31] In 1950, Britain was within reach of the Soviet atomic bomber fleet, unlike the United States mainland, thus accentuating fears as to the eruption of such a situation as Anderson envisaged. Accordingly, preoccupation with Korea's position in the Cold War, rather than in any intrinsic importance attached to the Seoul regime, produced in Britain a more cautious strategic outlook than the all-or-nothing gamble advocated by General MacArthur. Unlike Britain, United States decision-makers could afford the luxury of treating the Korean War as a zero-sum game. Consequently, it was in the direct interest of the British military lobby to engender caution upon their more bellicose allies.

There is Little Hope of Restoring Sanity: The Anglo-American Strategic Dispute

Phase I: The 38th Parallel Decision

Initially, Britain and the United States were in reasonable concurrence over the prosecution of the war, mirroring their strong alignment of motivations. Peter Lowe correctly notes that containment, previously envisaged in more defensive terms, evolved into a doctrine of "rollback," with both partners supporting the decision to advance beyond the 38th Parallel in late-September 1950.[32] Underneath the agreement of the decision-making establishments, however, lay deep reservation from the British Chiefs of Staff, particularly Sir John Slessor, who would become the most outspoken transatlantic critic of MacArthur's inflammatory policies. Slessor, an experienced wartime commander and strong proponent of the decisive role of air warfare, argued persuasively that crossing the Parallel would be too great a military commitment. Such action would produce a prolonged occupation or "another Malaya" of irregular, counterinsurgency warfare, and was unnecessary given that the political objective of throwing back Communist aggression had

31 Ellery Anderson, *Banner Over Pusan* (London: Evans Brothers, 1960), 112. Anderson was a special operations expert who led joint US-UK-ROK teams behind enemy lines to inflict sabotage and train guerrillas.

32 Peter Lowe, "An Ally and a Recalcitrant General," 631. On Britain's support for this decision, see: Cabinet Conclusions, September 26, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, CAB 128/18/21, CM (50) 61.

already been achieved.[33] But despite his position at the top of the British military establishment, as *primus inter pares* of the three Chiefs of Staff, Slessor lacked the political capital to achieve dividends on his reservations.

By October 1950, isolated Foreign Office officials were also beginning to question MacArthur, representing the start of an alliance crisis which would not abate until the President took the momentous decision to remove the General of his command. Sir Roger Makins, Deputy Under-Secretary of State to Bevin, and a future Ambassador to Washington, noted on October 6 that the Chiefs of Staff were highly concerned about the potential for escalation. Britain's principal objectives in Korea were enunciated as being to restrain China from intervention and to localize the fighting. But Makins and the Foreign Office were not prepared to risk the global relationship they had been nurturing since 1945, stating that "we have no desire to take the very heavy responsibility of pressing the Americans to abandon any operations which may be contemplated north of the Parallel."[34] Merely the suggestion was made that North Korea be given time to consider UN calls for peace before proceeding with the advance.

Instead of heeding Slessor's warnings over the actual operation under planning, Makins articulated greater concern with the perennial British fear of the hypothetical scenario in which MacArthur might contemplate strikes against Chinese airbases in Manchuria, threatening to spark general war.[35] By focusing on the worst case scenario rather than the situation at hand, the expert opinion of Britain's military leaders was sidelined in favor of blind faith in the political benefits of maintaining the Anglo-American alliance. This, however, does not indicate a high degree of confidence by the Foreign Office in the integrity of the transatlantic relationship, which would ultimately prove far more durable than Makins feared by surviving the strategic dispute to emerge stronger than ever before.

In response to these much diluted concerns, Oliver Franks, the influential British Ambassador to the United States, extracted from the State Department reassurances that MacArthur's instructions debarred him from conducting military operations outside Korea. Further, Washington granted the modest concession of allowing a small gap between the UN resolution authorizing the advance beyond the 38th Parallel and its implementation.[36]

33 Memorandum by Slessor, October 2, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, AIR 75/108.
34 Minute by Roger Makins (Foreign Office), October 6, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/84100, FK 1022/401G.
35 Ibid.
36 Telegram from Franks (Washington) to Foreign Office, October 6, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO

Such an outcome can hardly be regarded as a victory for British sanity over United States impulsiveness given that this was the Truman administration's consistent policy all along. Instead, it represents the lowest common denominator between the shrewd judgments of the Chiefs of Staff, the political calculations of the Foreign Office, and the more cynical appreciation by the State Department of the necessity for a limited degree of strategic accord.

Nevertheless, this appeared to satisfy the upper tier of the Foreign Office, whilst Slessor's colleagues had meanwhile become convinced, on the basis of warnings emanating via India, that China would intervene if UN forces pressed north. The British Chiefs advocated pushing Washington for a two-week breathing period for North Korea to agree terms. This was overruled by the Foreign Office, more politically committed to the Anglo-American alliance and possessed of the erroneous belief that the likelihood of a major Chinese intervention was not an "undue risk."[37]

This dismissal of the warnings emanating from the professional military and intelligence lobby must stand alongside Neville Chamberlain's Munich euphoria as grave warning to the optimism of future politicians. Disillusioned by this blasé attitude, the British Ministry of Defence instructed their liaison representative in Washington, Lord Tedder, to communicate the Chiefs' anxieties, along with the belief that a crossing of the Parallel was not militarily necessary given the state of near-collapse of the communist armed forces. Tedder, Slessor's predecessor as Chief of the Air Staff, fulfilled a vital role as head of the British Joint Services Mission, allowing for more direct communication between the military leaders in Britain and the Pentagon (the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense), bypassing cumbersome diplomatic channels. This particular directive from his London colleagues was implicitly most critical of the current strategic situation, relaying Slessor's concern lest "the manner in which General MacArthur was taking the bit between his teeth in Korea should lead to a general conflagration in the Far East."[38] Such a venting of steam was far in advance of the cynical pragmatism demonstrated by the Foreign Office, but did not achieve any practical outcome.

During this first stage of the strategic debate, it can therefore be surmised that the disunity between the level of concern demonstrated by the British political and military lobbies was of fundamental importance in en-

371/84100, FK 1022/402G.

37 Minute by Roger Makins, October 5, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/84100, FK 1022/416G.

38 Telegram from Ministry of Defence to Tedder (Washington), October 5, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/84100, FK 1022/416G.

suring the lack of any meaningful influence upon allied war policy. Contrary to Attlee's epithet, in the period of September-October 1950, it was the inequality of power rather than any equality of counsel which appeared most striking in this element of the Anglo-American relationship. This would begin to change in response to the more urgent fears generated by Chinese intervention, prompting the Foreign Office to move closer to the Ministry of Defence line.

Phase II: Responding to Chinese Intervention

Following first contact against Chinese forces on November 6, 1950, MacArthur's doubters became more influential in London, producing a vocal response to the perceived hardline of the United States. In Britain, this culminated in the Chiefs of Staff plan on November 13 for a demilitarized buffer zone north of the Hungnam-Chongju line.[39] The buffer zone proposal, formulated by the outspoken Slessor, was communicated to the State Department by the more diplomatic Bevin, demonstrating a move on the part of the Foreign Office towards acceptance of the reservations of their military colleagues.

Perhaps unfortunately, given the carnage to be endured in the remaining 32 months of war, this otherwise not unreasonable plan was subsequently rejected because military events had already overtaken such a proposal, with UN forces north of this position and MacArthur planning for his end-the-war offensive of November 24. As related to the French, the United States was anxious "to demonstrate their military strength to the Russians," rendering the British proposal, which would have entailed a withdrawal from the current front line, unacceptable.[40] Again, linkage can be drawn between this intransigence and the abstract, Cold War calculations which influenced the decisions for war by both the Truman and Attlee governments. Whilst for Britain, Chinese intervention was another step closer towards unacceptable escalation, thus warranting a cautious reaction to forestall the potential Russian blitzkrieg lurking on the psychological horizon, the same understanding of events prompted MacArthur and the Pentagon to follow a policy of strength through brinkmanship. Ultimately, for the United States military, there was potentially far less to lose. Thus MacArthur's reaction to British

39 Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, November 13, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, DEFE 4/37, COS (50) 178.

40 Minute by R. H. Scott (Foreign Office), November 28, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/84121, FK 1023/239G.

arguments in favor of a negotiated solution was to dismiss them as a retreat to the appeasement mentality of the 1930s, claiming shortly before this particular proposal that his closest ally's policy "finds its historic precedent in the action taken at Munich."[41]

For Britain, the dilemma was to either risk a major breach in Anglo-American relations or blindly accept policies which could bring the great powers over the brink of global war. The buffer solution could have allowed time for political measures to forestall either unattractive eventuality. R. H. Scott, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, formerly head of the South-East Asian department where he had gained valuable experience in containing Communist power, suggested a more bold line: to bluntly ask the United States, "are they ready for a war in the Far East which might develop into a global war?"[42] Ultimately, this level of pressure was not applied due to the pervasive timidity with which the Americophile lobby approached alliance relations. Bevin's vision of transatlantic unity remained sacrosanct, debarring any meaningful intervention in the strategic debate.

In the diplomatic sphere, the Truman-Attlee summit of December 4-8, 1950, essentially called to resolve the strategic question over the potential usage of the atomic bomb, is significant in altering Foreign Office perceptions of this decision-making dilemma. British military fears at this time centered upon an ambiguous statement given by the President on November 30, implying active consideration was being given to the use of atomic weapons, before suggesting that the final decision could rest with the commander in the field: General MacArthur. Given MacArthur's role as the fundamental source of the Anglo-American strategic dispute, the extent to which the White House were willing to assuage Attlee's concerns was a key step in establishing a strategic accord directly between the political leaders, over the heads of their warring military advisers. It is therefore apparent that the primary question on the *political* agenda had become the *military* escalation which MacArthur had begun through his refusal to countenance any caution in his drive to the Yalu.

Although producing a fairly anodyne joint declaration, the conference played a vital role in changing the psychology of the Anglo-American alliance. Attlee reported to Bevin that "it was significant that the United States Government implicitly and on occasion explicitly assumed that we are their

41 Telegram from MacArthur (Tokyo) to Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 9, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950, Volume VII: Korea* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), 1108.

42 Minute by R. H. Scott, November 28, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/84121, FK 1023/224.

principal ally and that we must be prepared in the last resort to continue the struggle together and alone."[43] Whilst little of substance was achieved beyond a very vague assurance on atomic weapons, albeit one which symbolized a major concession to British sensibilities, the discussions were instrumental in creating an atmosphere of trust previously absent between the administrations over East Asian policy. Significantly, this would enable the Foreign Office to go further than before in pressing the Truman administration to exert greater centralized control over war policy.

Further, the leadership summit produced a working understanding on the differences over China. As Attlee explained to the National Press Club:

> The objectives of our two countries are the same, but it is inevitable that with our different geographical conditions, and in view of the particular responsibilities which we each carry, there should be some difference of emphasis. We see things from different views, with lights and shadows from one direction and from another.[44]

By recognizing and respecting the way in which their differing interests in East Asia resulted in different policies, the diplomatic transatlantic relationship was finally able to move beyond the stalemate over this topic which had festered since the abortive September 1949 Acheson-Bevin discussions on recognizing Communist China, which had aborted in recognition of their fundamental differences. Consequently, agreement was possible on two questions with direct relevance to the strategic debate.

Firstly, Acheson agreed to give careful considerations to Attlee's objections to the United States Department of Defense plan for a "limited war" against China, which would thankfully never be accepted by the more restrained State Department.[45] Of greater immediate importance, in private conversation, Truman gave the Prime Minister the desired assurance on atomic weapons, thus explicitly restraining MacArthur's influence. Regarding this assurance, the British and American records differ. In Attlee's official minutes, "the President said that he had reaffirmed to the Prime Minister that the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada were partners

43 Telegram from Attlee to Bevin, December 10, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, PREM 8/1200, telegram 1297.

44 Speech by the Prime Minister at the National Press Club, December 6, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, PREM 8/1200. This is a theme repeated by Attlee in an article of 1954, see: Clement R. Attlee, "Britain and America: Common Aims, Different Opinions," *Foreign Affairs* 32, no. 2 (1954): 190-202.

45 British record of fifth Truman-Attlee meeting, December 7, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, PREM 8/1200.

with the United States in the atomic weapon and that the United States would not consider its use without *consulting* the United Kingdom."[46] However, this discussion is omitted from the main United States record, instead noted in a separate memorandum in which Truman asserts only that "he would not consider the use of the bomb without *consulting* the United Kingdom," not pretending to agree to joint ownership, and refusing to put anything in writing because "if a man's word wasn't any good it wasn't made any better by writing it down."[47]

Further diluted, the public joint communiqué stated that "it was [the President's] hope that world conditions would never call for use of the atomic bomb… [and] also his desire to keep the Prime Minister *informed* of developments which might bring about a change in the situation."[48] It would appear that, owing to the domestic difficulties hounding the Truman administration, the White House was unwilling to reveal that they had pledged full consultation, albeit in an informal agreement only valid whilst Truman was still in office. Nonetheless, this was a considerable concession by the senior partner, indicative of a move towards more genuine compromise, and the British delegation remained "entirely satisfied" with the understanding reached.[49]

This accord opened up the opportunity for a new phase in relations, allowing British strategic concerns to finally influence alliance war policy. The atomic question therefore represents a significant watershed, providing the Foreign Office with the confidence to adopt a more assertive line.

Phase III: Retreat and Dismissal

The strategic dispute culminated in the final controversy surrounding MacArthur's prosecution of the war in 1951. Criticizing the so-called "big bug out," the retreat in face of massive Communist advances, Slessor suggested following the precedent of Burma in 1943 – falling back to the best defensive position and holding it at all costs, contrary to the accepted cut-and-run approach.[50] This marked a deeper phase of disunity: one in which the more

46 Ibid. Emphasis added.

47 Memorandum for the record by Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup, December 7, 1950, *FRUS: 1950, Volume VII*, 1462. Emphasis added.

48 Press communiqué issued jointly by the President and Prime Minister, December 8, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, PREM 8/1200. Emphasis added.

49 Cabinet conclusions, December 12, 1950, Kew, TNA: PRO, CAB 128/18/45, CM (50) 85.

50 Draft message for transmission to the United States, January 5, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, AIR 75/108. In this message, Slessor rather audaciously suggests that his prescriptions and criticism could be suitably transmitted directly from Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman, but in the end a more sedate approach was followed via the British military liaison in Washington, see: Telegram from

precise tactics adopted by the United States were under question as equally as their wider strategic gambits. Yet surprisingly, given their previous reluctance, it was the attacks of the Foreign Office upon MacArthur's potential for escalation which proved more decisive in bringing President Truman's decision to a head.

As aforementioned, Foreign Office criticism of strategic policy had its roots in October 1950, with isolated civil servants such as R. H. Scott noting that "until the three figures, MacArthur, Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-Shek disappear from the scene, there is little hope of restoring sanity." This theme of despotism was taken up later by Alvary Gascoigne in Tokyo, terming MacArthur "a dictator whose every word was law, even in Washington."[51] Such mounting criticism was not missed by the "dictator," who in a remarkable demonstration of pettiness banned any Americans from visiting Tokyo airport to bid Gascoigne farewell at the end of his tenure in February 1951, which the British had no doubt was intended as a deliberate insult.[52] However, before the new transatlantic accord established by the Truman-Attlee summit, the Foreign Office had proved unwilling to go as far as the Chiefs of Staff in openly criticizing the Pentagon and its choice of commander, rendering such forthright opinions essentially marginal, unrepresentative of official policy.

Reflecting upon this taut period, Jack Slessor's private papers reveal that the crucial issue behind his disaffection was not only disagreement with MacArthur's decisions – hardly a novel situation for senior commanders in coalition warfare – but at the lack of consultation granted to British military representatives. Writing to a prominent military analyst at the New York Herald Tribune, he noted that "we are prepared loyally to back you in your new world position, as long as you treat us like the Great Power we still are and not (as you sometimes do) as though we were on a level with Portugal."[53] Slessor continued to castigate, in this remarkably forthright message, the lack of Pentagon control over their general, the ease with which the UN front line was allowed to capitulate, before stating ominously that "MacArthur's

Ministry of Defence to British Joint Services Mission, January 5, 1951, *DBPO: Korea*, 296-299.

51 Minute by R. H. Scott, 'General MacArthur's Policy in Korea', October 19, 1950, Kew, TNA:PRO, FO 371/84108, FK 1022/581G; Memorandum by Gascoigne, February 6, 1951, Kew, TNA:PRO, FO 371/92061, F 1017/5.

52 Minute by R. H. Scott, February 17, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/92706, FJ 1891/4.

53 Letter from Slessor to Major George Fielding Eliot, October 18, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, AIR 75/107.

'leadership' in Korea... shook us to the core... We are in the atomic front line and you are still the hell of a long way from it."[54]

This final comment cuts to the heart of this difference on strategic opinion. Because Korea was part of the wider Cold War framework, the strategic vulnerability of Britain to Soviet atomic attack could not be ignored as a decision-making factor. In addition to concerns over the potential impact escalation could have upon Hong Kong, to some extent the survival of the British state hinged upon military action taken on the other side of the world in the defense of a nation previously dismissed as insignificant. MacArthur was just too much of a risk for this fragile balance to endure.

The Chief of the Air Staff personally visited Washington as head of a military envoy in January 1951 to follow up on the Truman-Attlee summit, where his private preparatory notes reveal he was committed to persuade the United States to grant greater consultation to the British *military* lobby, rather than the previously ineffective Foreign Office. Consequently, it appears from study of his personal papers that, by this time, Slessor was no longer content to allow the Foreign Office to dilute his opinions and was ready to take matters into his own hands. With interesting candor, Britain's air force leader bitterly recalled, in this highly personal document, that he had opposed crossing the 38th Parallel but was overruled by the political establishment, following blindly in MacArthur's wake, and leaving the disillusioned Chiefs of Staff "hanging on to the Cabinet's coat-tails."[55] During these talks, the respected air marshal met with mixed success, reaching agreement with General Bradley on the point that refraining from bombing Manchurian airbases forestalled greater Communist intervention and enabled the UN to maintain their vital air superiority, but crucially failed to persuade the Pentagon to give up their defense of MacArthur.[56]

Following unapproved, unilateral action, such as his ultimatum to the Communists on March 24, 1951, the Foreign Office finally increased their pressure upon the comparably sane State Department to have MacArthur rebuked. Even Gladwyn Jebb, British representative at the United Nations, joined the military in outright criticism, characterizing the situation as "a classic instance of the tail wagging the dog."[57] The separate organs of the British decision-making establishment had emerged in unity, with the depth of feeling now so strong that, as ranted by Jebb, "unless [MacArthur] is

54 Ibid.
55 Preparatory note for Anglo-American staff talks, January 15, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, AIR 75/108.
56 British record of a meeting in the Pentagon, January 15, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, AIR 75/108.
57 Telegram from Jebb to Strang, March 26, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/92061, F 1017/10G.

shortly repudiated publicly, we have just about had it."[58] The situation had reached a climax so desperate that the previously paramount anxiety of upsetting the United States, in light of the strengthening of political relations since December 1950, now appeared less urgent than the need to restore order to proceedings. Fortunately for Britain, the State Department was responsive to their anxieties, admitting in March 1951 that they were struggling to restrain MacArthur.[59] This candor implies a fundamental shift in the Washington balance of power: through pressure, the Foreign Office had reinforced the anti-MacArthur lobby in the State Department which remained highly sympathetic to British views.

Whilst Truman's decision to remove MacArthur was precipitated in the short-term by his exchange of condemnatory letters with a leading Republican, challenging the collective face of foreign policy, in the longer-term it was not United States but British concerns which provide the most important cause of this watershed. By applying consistent indirect pressure through their military channels, Slessor and his colleagues had done little to influence Washington policy. However, by eventually persuading the Foreign Office to relay their concerns directly to State Department officials and through direct contacts including the January 1951 Pentagon talks, Slessor's criticisms created a background of mistrust which the President could not ignore. As a consequence of British interference, the balance within the United States administration was tipped against the escalatory MacArthur, in part due to the strong personal sympathies of Truman and Acheson for their British counterparts.

Provoking strategic crises with Britain provided many of the nails in MacArthur's coffin, for it was unacceptable to Truman that his closest ally was questioning the extent to which he was in control of his own governmental policy.[60] For Attlee, it had always seemed a suspicious situation in which, during the Wake Island Conference of October 1950, it was the head of state that had to fly out to visit his subordinate general and not the other way round.[61] Certainly by spring 1951, the Truman administration had also realized the many abnormalities in this relationship, emerging in full accord with MacArthur's critics in the Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff. In achieving this transformation in strategic policy, the influence of British actors in tipping the balance within the United States administration cannot be over-stated.

58 Telegram from Jebb to Strang, April 6, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/92061, F 1017/11G.
59 Minute by R. H. Scott, March 10, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, FO 371/92061, F 1017/9G.
60 Lowe, "An Ally and a Recalcitrant General," 652; Truman, 375-376.
61 Clement R. Attlee, *As It Happened* (London: William Heinemann, 1954), 199-200.

It is noteworthy that this otherwise surprising level of British influence was not achieved in isolation. Similarly, in the diplomatic discussions over whether to brand China an aggressor and impose sanctions through the United Nations, shortly after the Slessor-Pentagon talks of January 1951, British doubts had decisively altered United States policy. On January 22, the British Cabinet had voted to oppose the United States resolution unless revisions were implemented delaying the sanctions question until after a final mediatory attempt by the United Nations Good Offices Committee. Representatives of the State Department met with British Ambassador Oliver Franks to reach a compromise ultimately favoring the Foreign Office line, leading to the Cabinet conclusion that their "patience and firmness" had less to "considerable modification" of their senior ally's diplomatic policy.[62] Although separate from the MacArthur debate, this evidence would suggest that, in the period following the direct political and military summits of December-January 1951, the United States was increasingly willing to sacrifice their decision-making sovereignty, following the British lead in order to maintain alliance unity. In a war fought in the name of an international coalition, such unity was a vital consideration for the Truman administration, even if this entailed challenging the wisdom of the Pentagon over its support for General MacArthur.

Truman's momentous decision was treated with undisguised approval from Slessor, exclaiming in a letter to the Princeton military guru Edward Mead Earle that "thank God the President has grasped the nettle."[63] Not only had the former hero of the Pacific alienated the British by risking general war, but he had seriously shaken NATO confidence in United States leadership, threatening to undermine the cornerstone of Western defense. Because NATO was still very much in its infancy, trust between its leading partners was still of paramount importance.

Following MacArthur's removal, the ongoing Anglo-American strategic dispute was not entirely resolved, but division never again reached the proportions of 1950-51. Even in 1952, Slessor continued to disagree with his Pentagon counterparts over issues including the military efficacy of bombing mainland China (Slessor opposed such action not on moral grounds but because it would likely solidify the Sino-Soviet alliance and invite an escalation of the war), and the propaganda gift to the communists of indis-

62 Cabinet conclusions, 22 January 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, CAB 128/19/5, CM (51) 5; Cabinet conclusions, 29 January 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, CAB 128/19/10, CM (51) 10.

63 Letter from Slessor to Professor Edward Mead Earle, April 12, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, AIR 75/108.

criminate blind bombing.[64] But with the absence of the particularly divisive personality of Douglas MacArthur, these concerns were more easily ameliorated: the alliance had learned its lessons from the first year of war, and the United States would prove willing to grant Britain greater consultation rights through the eventual appointment of a British deputy to General Mark Clark.

Conclusion: British Governmental Politics and Strategic Policy

Whilst the allies were never entirely in agreement over the higher prosecution of the war, the efforts of the Foreign Office and State Department to preserve unity over the heads of their more belligerent military colleagues clearly represent the dynamics of an alliance much solidified since the China dispute of 1949-50. Over the issue of recognizing Communist China, it was sufficient for the political establishments in London and Washington to agree to differ, but by late 1950, a public face of unity was a vital concern for both parties.

As a logical conclusion from the shared Anglo-American perception of Korea as a vital Cold War battleground, the conflict contained an inherent risk of escalation which could damage both British and United States interests in East Asia. Nevertheless, despite this agreement over motivations, the more formal, long-term control exerted by Britain over its Asian colonies than the United States occupation regime in Japan, made it clear to British policy-makers that they stood to lose far more than their allies from an expansion of the war. This perennial fear received reinforcement from the sobering acknowledgement of the strategic vulnerability of the British homeland to Soviet attack. Thus the disagreement over strategic policy had its roots in the very high level of agreement between the two powers upon the origins of the war.

This analysis of records from both the Foreign Office and the personal papers of Jack Slessor reveals the disunity with which the British decision-making establishment approached General MacArthur's war prosecution. Slessor and his colleagues were entirely justified in their military judgments, but Bevin's Foreign Office was also vindicated in its hesitant approach, withholding from overt criticism until it was certain that the alliance could survive such dissension. Because of this delay, diplomatic relations were built to a new peak by displays of unity typified by the rhetoric of the Truman-At-

64 Letter from Slessor to Brigadier Ewbank, March 13, 1952, Kew, TNA: PRO, AIR 75/108; Letter from Slessor to Sir Kenneth McLean, Chief Staff Officer at the Ministry of Defence, August 2, 1951, Kew, TNA: PRO, AIR 75/108.

tlee summit. Consequently, when Bevin's diplomats emerged in unequivocal support of Slessor's ardent position by 1951, the dynamics of the alliance enabled an accord to be reached and unity maintained. Accordingly, it is evident that the differing priorities of British decision-makers played a decisive role in determining the strategies adopted by the senior member of the alliance in a conflict zone on the other side of the world.

The greatest significance of this new understanding is found in the implication of these internal British divisions upon President Truman's decision to remove MacArthur from his command. Whilst Slessor's opinions were more vocal, their indirect transmission via the British Joint Services Mission and the opposition of the Foreign Office significantly diluted his potential to influence his counterparts in the Pentagon before the face-to-face meetings of January 1951. In contrast, because of the less confrontational approach adopted by the Foreign Office, Bevin was able to cultivate opinion within the State Department – itself much more influential than the Pentagon with the White House – against MacArthur's escalatory brinkmanship. Overall, the dynamics of this political dichotomy produced sustained pressure upon the Washington establishment. Once united, MacArthur's British doubters were therefore able to capitalize on this legacy to ensure their voices were both heard and acted upon. Throughout this process, British and United States decision-makers had come to better understand their points of agreement as well as their differences, as best exemplified by the consensus reached during the Truman-Attlee summit, thus enabling a new degree of consultation to arise from the ashes left by General MacArthur.

Anglo-American relations survived the strategic crisis much solidified, in great part the result of the cautious policy implemented by the Foreign Office. In this sense, strategic divisions actually contributed to a strengthening of the "special relationship," by providing for the necessity of greater diplomatic unity. Because British detractors successfully persuaded their United States counterparts of the validity of their reservations, the removal of MacArthur was thus symbolic of the start of a new period, not necessarily of strategic agreement, but of greater strategic compromise. The astounding level of coordination between British and United States units on the operational level further facilitated this surprisingly smooth transition from confrontation to cooperation.

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that British opinions were the vital long-term factor in forcing President Truman's hand, in addition to providing an important short-term impetus during the more assertive period of January-April 1951. Although, as Peter Lowe suggests, it was the military estab-

lishment under the leadership of Jack Slessor which provided the strongest consistent criticism, Slessor's private papers reveal the extent to which his opinions were marginalized during the period preceding the military summit of January 1951. It would thus appear that the calculated approach of the Foreign Office paid off in both laying the groundwork for British influence and in executing it. It is by no accident that Dean Acheson, in the interim between the President's fateful decision and its announcement, warned the Foreign Office against further public criticism of MacArthur.[65] The State Department feared creating the impression that the British had played a major role in MacArthur's downfall, thus playing a determining role in United States military policy. But from the records contained within the British National Archives, this interpretation would appear very close to the truth.

Such a conclusion is of more than mere historical interest. With extensive Anglo-American military commitments to the Middle East in the current century, which themselves have generated considerable tactical and strategic debate, it is important to understand the genuine equality of counsel that has at times characterized this relationship. The enduring lesson of the MacArthur crisis would appear to be that British policy-makers can best achieve transatlantic influence through caution and persistence, not outright criticism. Through proving their worth as loyal allies during the Korean War, Britain was successful in exerting a restraining influence, indicating that transatlantic military relations can be far more than just a one-way street. **Y**

65 Hennessey, 185.

LOST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: INDIA'S "LOOK EAST" POLICY REVISITED

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Ever since its break-up with Soviet Union in the wake of the Cold War, India has embarked on a newly transformed relationship with the neighboring Southeast Asian region. The "Look East" policy, the backbone of India's foreign policy toward Southeast Asian nations which went into effect in 1992, is the indicator to gauge how far India has been engaged with its "extended neighborhood". Having been implemented for more than two decades, this policy has not yet resulted in a more frequent presence of India in the region, especially when it is compared to the other rising power in the region, China. While Indian leaders share the same view that Southeast Asia is of strategic importance, what has been done is below expectations. This study reveals that India's "Look East" policy's lack of success is based on three factors: domestic political issues, an unfavorable regional dynamic centered in China's active involvement in South Asia, and, to some degree, the US' "Pivot to Asia" policy.

India's influence in Southeast Asia can be traced back thousands of years. In G. V. C. Naidu's words, "no other country has influenced the region as much as India by way of religion, language, culture, and civilization... [proven by] enormous historical evidence to suggest that there were flourishing economic and cultural relations between India and the countries of Southeast Asia in the pre-colonial era."[1] The interactions between the two were significantly high, especially during the era of colonialism.[2] Having been struggling for independence from the British for centuries, India, under Jawaharal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, was an ardent supporter of decolonization in Southeast Asia, encouraging self-reliant countries to emerge. Nehru was a close friend of Indonesia's Sukarno, a leader of a country besieged by

1 G. V. C. Naidu, "Whither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia," *Strategic Analysis* 28, no. 2 (April-June, 2004): 333.

2 Baladas Ghoshal, "India and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence," *Akdemika* 54 (Januari, 1999): 105-130.

centuries of Dutch colonialism. India was among the first nations to recognize Indonesian independence in 1945 amid its own struggle for self-determination. After gaining independence in August 1947, India did not cease to support the Indonesian people who were at that time fighting the returned Dutch.[3] In November 1947, Nehru brought before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) a proposal concerning the worsening situation in Indonesia.[4] Later on, Delhi convened a Special Conference on Indonesia, inviting fifteen countries to support the action of pressuring the Security Council to take actions pertaining to Dutch re-colonialism.[5] Indonesia was the only country outside the British Commonwealth with which India held a joint naval exercise.[6]

During the Cold War era, India, along with several Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia and Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, organized a Bandung Conference, created for the purpose of establishing the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1955. The primary goal of this "movement" was to stay neutral and not to lean toward either the United States (US) or the Soviet Union (USSR), among others.[7] In the 1960s, the relationship between India and Southeast Asia started to change when Nehru opted to cling to the USSR, raising questions of India's commitment to the nonaligned norm. Succeeding Nehru, Indira Gandhi's foreign policy did not significantly depart from that of her predecessor, including the support for decolonization in the Third World and a relationship with the USSR.[8] When Delhi got even closer to Moscow, culminating in the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1971, the gap with its neighbors in Southeast Asia widened. India became indifferent toward the Association of Southeast Asian

3 In 1942 the Japanese drove out the Dutch from Indonesia, marking the beginning of three year-long Japanese occupation. After the Japanese surrendered to the Allied forces in 1945, Indonesian leaders made use of the power vacuum to declare its independence. The Dutch refused to recognize the independence and instead made a return to re-colonize Indonesia. Following intense pressure from India and Australia through the UNSC, the Dutch finally recognized Indonesian independence in 1949.

4 Ghoshal, "India and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence," 112.

5 The fifteen countries were Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudia Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

6 Naidu, "Whither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia," 333.

7 The other goals, for instance, are the support of self-determination, national independence, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and rejection of the use or threat of use of force in international relations. See Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India, "History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement," http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement (accessed August 20, 2014).

8 Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, "Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy," *India Review* 8, no. 1 (January-March, 2009): 9.

Nations (ASEAN), accusing the organization of being the "West's Trojan horse."[9] Through the 1980s, the relationships between India and Southeast Asian states were marked by disquietude rooted in political disparities, jeopardizing their nascent economic cooperation.[10] The discordant relationship India had with ASEAN was exacerbated by Delhi's preference of backing Hanoi amid the organization's ostracism with respect to Vietnam's invasion to Cambodia in 1978. India's relationship with Vietnam rested on the shared history of war with China, notable the Indian border war in 1962 and the Vietnamese border war in 1979.[11] For India during the Cold War, "maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union and Vietnam was more important than its relation with ASEAN."[12]

The underdeveloped relationship between India and its Southeast Asian neighbors improved with the demise of the USSR in the early 1990s, thus forcing India to reexamine its foreign policy. The economic miracle of East Asia that largely captivated India, compelling Delhi to re-evaluate its inward-looking policy to a more Southeast Asia-centric one. Southeast Asia once again gained importance with regard to India's renewed foreign policy. The importance of Southeast Asia to India was perfectly depicted by the introduction of the "Look East" policy announced by former Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao in 1991. Rao introduced this policy to his Southeast Asian counterparts during his official visit to Singapore in 1992. In the same year, India received the status of ASEAN sectoral partner and a full dialogue partner in 1996. India's road seemed smooth when ASEAN conferred a membership upon India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1996, followed by India's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 as a precondition to take part in the East Asia Summit (EAS).

India is by nature seen by Southeast Asian nations as a benign rising power.[13] In contrast to China, India's foreign policy analyst, Francine R. Fran-

9 Christophe Jaffrelot, "India's Look East Policy: An Asianist Strategy in Perspective," *India Review* 2, no. 2 (2003): 44.

10 Mohit Anand, "India-ASEAN Relations: Analysing Regional Implications," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report* 72 (2009): 1, http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR72-Final.pdf (accessed March 31, 2013).

11 Pankaj Kumar Jha, "India's Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Defence Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 2011): 57.

12 Tan Tai Yong and See Chak Mun, "The Evolution of India-ASEAN Relations," *India Review* 8, no. 1 (2009): 24.

13 Raul Mishra, "China in India's Southeast Asia Strategy," in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations, RSIS Monograph No. 28*, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013): 106, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/monographs/Monograph28.pdf (accessed November 19, 2013).

kel, asserts that India appears "weaker and less threatening" that makes for an amiable partner for smaller Southeast Asian states to work with.[14] Eloquently articulated by former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the rise of India "does not generate the same fear as China."[15] Support for India's tighter relations with ASEAN come from those who anticipate China's growing weight in the balance of power mechanism in the region.[16] Besides, it is in ASEAN's interest to have "a number of major powers [including India]... [be] actively involved in the region."[17]

India's presence in Southeast Asia has been a source of comparison between Delhi and Beijing's ability to wield their influence in Southeast Asia. Compared to Beijing, Delhi is not as effective or efficient in engaging with Southeast Asian countries.[18] China's influence is strongly discernible while India's is barely felt. Even as the new decade rolls on and India moves steadily towards a closer and more robust relationship with Southeast Asia, China's prowess looms signifigantly larger than that of India. This then brings the question of why India seems to play it safe in the geopolitical contest taking place in the region with which India has had a strong bond since ancient times. This paper aims to show that the contradiction between India's great power ambition and the current reality is due to domestic constraints, regional containtment, and the reliance on US military power are the reasons behind India's inactive approach towards Southeast Asian countries.

The "Look East" Policy: Where India Has "Lost"

India's "Look East" policy was designed as a framework for Delhi to reestablish its relationship with Southeast Asian states in the early 1990s, brought to life by then Prime Minister Rao. Although his decision to set about an engagement with Southeast Asia was commonly deemed as a means of economic liberalization, he thought of simultaneous politico-military cooperation aimed to win a strategic friend after the collapse of the USSR and to fend off China's domination in the region.[19] Indian scholar, Baladal Ghosal,

14 Francine R Frankel, "The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean," *Journal of International Affairs* 64, no. 2 (Spring/Summer, 2011): 14.

15 C. Raja Mohan, and Alyssa Ayres, "Situating the Realignment," in *Power realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States*, ed. Alyssa Ayres and C. Raja Mohan. (New Delhi: SAGE Publications India, 2009): 313.

16 Ibid.

17 Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (Winter, 2007/2008): 129.

18 Ibid., 151-152.

19 Ganguly and Pardesi, "Explaining Sixty Years," 14.

lays out three phases of the 'Look East' policy: 1992 to 2003 as the first phase, 2003 to 2010 as the second phase, and 2010 to present as the third phase.[20] The first phase was mainly economically-motivated, "so as to divert trade away from its main trading partners in North America and Europe."[21] India started to play a more active role in dialogue partnership, annual meetings, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF can be seen as one of India's major achievements in the first phase of the 'Look East' policy. The ARF is crucial because it puts India on par with other powers, e.g. the US, Russia, China, Japan, Australia, and the European Union (EU), exhibiting India's growing prominence in the region.[22] Joining the ARF signaled India's shift from an opposition to a supporter of multilateral security frameworks.[23] Moreover, this phase veered India closer to ASEAN with respect to trade, industry and politics.[24] Unfortunately, according to Ghosal, the scant rise in trade did not meet expectations.[25]

The second phase began with India's accession to the TAC, leading to India's full membership of EAS in 2005. At this stage, India's presence began to grab China's attention. Beijing felt threatened in some way by India's involvement in the EAS, a forum where China could claim prominence vis-à-vis other non-ASEAN states. Before being admitted to EAS, India was invited to become a summit level partner by ASEAN in 2002. India and ASEAN then signed an ASEAN-Indian Partnership for Peace, Progress, and Shared Prosperity document in 2004.[26] The third phase witnesses India's increasing integration with Southeast Asia.

20 Institute of Strategic and International Studies, "India's Look East Policy: From Economic Integration to Strategic Stakeholder in the Asia Pacific Region," *ISIS Focus* 9 (2012): 1-5, http://www.isis.org.my/files/ISIS_FOCUS_2012/IF9_2012/IF9_Index1.pdf (accessed March 21, 2013).

21 Zhao Hong, "India's Changing Relations with ASEAN in China's Perspective," *East Asian Institute (EAI) Background Brief*, No. 13 (December 7, 2006): 3.

22 Frankel, "The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean," 11. Evelyn Goh makes a good analysis on the hierarchy of power in Southeast Asia with the US on top as 'superpower overlay', China as 'regional great power', Japan and India as 'major regional powers'. Altough the distribution of power within ARF can be seen from this hierarchy, that ASEAN remains the Forum's driver, India to some extent enjoys equal status with others. See Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," 113-157.

23 Walter C. Ladwig III, "Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, "Look East," and India's Emerging Influences in the Asia-Pacific," *Asian Security* 5 no. 2 (2009): 87-113.

24 Homeswar Kalita, "India's Look East Policy: Challenges and Opportunities Ahead," *Global* Journal of Human Social Science, Art & Humanities 12, no. 13 (2012): 32.

25 Institute of Strategic and International Studies, "India's Look East Policy: From Economic Integration to Strategic Stakeholder in the Asia Pacific Region," 2.

26 Hong, "India's Changing Relations with ASEAN in China's Perspective," 3.

There have been contentious arguments among scholars regarding the real objectives of the "Look East" policy. According to Naidu, there are three main goals of this policy that go in line with the three phases mentioned by Ghosal: "to institutionalize linkages with ASEAN and its affiliates; to strengthen the bilateral relationship with member states; and to carve a suitable place for India so that Southeast Asia will not fall within the influence of any major power, especially China."[27] In addition to that, India favors "rebuild[ing] frayed political relations... during the Cold War era,"[28] and making a "strategic policy of meeting the growing threat of China in the region."[29]

India's economic relations with ASEAN became more institutionalized following the commencement of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) on January 1, 2010 with the early participation of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The remaining member states will follow suit after they cope with their respective domestic requirements as of December 31, 2016. In December 2012, ASEAN and India reached an agreement on an FTA on services and investment. However, ASEAN countries have never been among India's number one trading partners. The EU, West Asia (including the Gulf Cooperation Countries or GCC), Northeast Asia, and North America are the regions with which India extensively conducts its trade. The other side of the coin is that India is not ASEAN's first option to turn to either. China remains on top of the list followed by EU-27, Japan, and the United States. China contributes 12.9 percent of ASEAN total trade (value) in 2012, leaving India behind with 2.9 percent.[30] India's trade with ASEAN in the past year has been unsatisfactory to the point expected by both Delhi and its trading partners in Southeast Asia.

In the security field, India has made several significant contributions. India holds defense agreements with Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. India also initiated the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008 to display its willingness to take up multilateral actions by inviting Southeast Asian littoral states to participate, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The MILAN project, a naval gathering of the Indian Ocean's littoral states initiated by Indian Navy in 1995, is further proof of India's active engagement with Southeast Asian neighbors.

27 Naidu, "Whither the Look East Policy," 332.

28 C. Raja Mohan, "India's Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2008): 45.

29 Hong, "India's Changing Relations with ASEAN in China's Perspective," 8.

30 ASEAN, "ASEAN Community in Figures, ACIF 2011," http://www.asean.org/resources/publications/asean-publications/item/asean-community-in-figures-acif-2011-3 (accessed November 14, 2013).

In addition, "India had been participating in joint military exercises in non-combat activities, for example disaster response, peacekeeping, and other humanitarian actions within the framework of the ARF and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) activities."[31] These activities delineate India's intention to broaden its engagement with ASEAN in non-traditional security field.

Tracing the track record of India's relations with Southeast Asia since the 1990s, further engagement with ASEAN under the "Look East" policy is indispensable. Nonetheless, ASEAN's expectation to see a more active India in the Southeast Asian power contest falls short of realization. The South China Sea dispute can be used as an example. India has been trying to disentangle itself from related disputes regardless of the admitted importance of the area shared among Indian leaders. With the escalated tensions in the South China Sea expected to persist long into the future; India is regarded by some ASEAN states as the perfect candidate to counterbalance China's overwhelming predominance. Nevertheless, India demurs that intervention in the South China Sea is not an option.[32] It is understandable that India needs to avoid itself being dragged into a conflict with China in Southeast Asia, but this decision, to some degree, comes at a price of the region's perception whether India can be counted on. Bearing the title of emerging power, India's Southeast Asia policy is a source of comparison with that of China's. A respected Indian scholar, C. Raja Mohan, cogently argues that, "unlike China whose strategic community and government have shown great self-consciousness of their country's rise and articulated a clear set of regional goals, India has been relatively mute… [and] chosen to keep its head down."[33]

The trajectory for India's engagement with Southeast Asian states has been articulated in the "Look East" policy that officially got off the ground in 1991. Starting with strengthened economic cooperation culminating in the establishment of AIFTA, India reaches out to its neighbors by means of playing a greater role in politics and security field. These endeavors, none-

31 Mely Caballero-Anthony, "ASEAN's Strategic Perspectives of India," in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations, RSIS Monograph 28*, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013): 34, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/monographs/Monograph28.pdf (accessed November 19, 2013).

32 C. Raja Mohan, "An Uncertain Trumpet? India's Role in Southeast Asian Security," in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations, RSIS Monograph No. 28*, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013): 8, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/monographs/Monograph28.pdf (accessed November 19, 2013).

33 Mohan, "An Uncertain Trumpet? India's Role in Southeast Asian Security," 15.

theless, do not suffice. The next part will assess India's half-hearted engagement with Southeast Asia.

Ignorance in Question: India's Passiveness in Southeast Asia

Since the inception of the "Look East" policy, India has not yet taken on the responsibilities that its Southeast Asian peers expected. China's aura still cloaks the region. ASEAN has been long expressing distaste of having one nation domineering over its peers. Driven by the shared commitment on which ASEAN is founded, regional leaders have aspired to keep the balance in their vicinity among great powers, without one triumphing over the other; hence, India is generally welcomed as a balance against China's ascendancy.[34] Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew reiterated that India's presence at the East Asian Summit (EAS) is of importance "because they did not want it to be dominated by China."[35] When India's bid for membership in the ARF was accepted, ASEAN nations reached an agreement that India's involvement was not negligible in balancing China. For Delhi, its "Look East" policy serves as a fundamental role in containing China's encirclement of India[36].

Many believe that India is supposed to do more in Southeast Asia to ensure the regional balance of power, yet Delhi appears to be inordinately cautious about getting a thorough engagement with the region off the ground.[37] India is relatively passive in conducting relations with neighboring states in Southeast Asia. There are at least three factors that steer India to the unprofitable corner of geopolitical contest in Southeast Asia. First, domestic issues that contribute to a troubled foreign policy-making process. Second, regional containtment resulting from the volatile environment of South Asia and China's outreach strategy in the region. Third, the rapproachement be-

34 Prashanth Parameswaran, "Strengthening ASEAN-India Relations in the 21st Century," *The Project 2049 Institute* (2010): 5, http://project2049.net/documents/strengthening_asean_india_relations_21st_century_parameswaran.pdf (accessed March 21, 2013).

35 Amitav Acharya, *Asia Rising: Who is Leading?* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2008): 32.

36 China's geopolitical strategy does not end in Southeast Asia. It stretches to India's backyard. China's 'string of pearls' is ascribed as the encirclement strategy in which Beijing builds several ports in Bangladesh (Chittagong), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), and Pakistan (Gwadar); hence, encircling India. The 'Look East' policy aimed at abridging India with Southeast Asian states can serve as a tool for Delhi to cut the encirclement.

37 David Brewster, "India'sDefence Strategy and the India-ASEAN Relationship," in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations, RSIS Monograph 28*, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013): 135, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/monographs/Monograph28.pdf (accessed November 19, 2013).

tween India and the US that provides for the former's reliance on the later's security umbrella in Southeast Asia.

The Effect of Underdeveloped Domestic Power Projection on Indian Foreign Policy

The making of foreign policy cannot be disentangled from domestic politics. In India the case is of no difference. It is argued that India's passiveness in Southeast Asia results from its foreign policy-making. Two things merit special attention: power projection and domestic constraints. Indian scholar, Khilani, says that India lacks "an instinct for power" which affects India's inability to follow through its aspiration to become great power to be reckoned with.[38] In the same vein, Indian Former Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Shingh, propounds that "Indian political elites lack the ability to think strategically about foreign policy and defense issues."[39] Pratap Bhanu Mehta, an Indian foreign policy scholar, coined the term "cautious prudene" to delineate India's foreign policy thinking. By "cautious", he points out the nature of "India's sense of incapacity and unwillingness to use force… [and of recognition of] a limit in an ability to effect change elsewhere."[40] This "caution", however, does not negate India's "prudence" that power matters; thus it needs to be attained. Hence, there is an extant dualistic approach to India's foreign policy: an ambition of being a great power alloyed with a sense of reluctance to pursue such status. [41]

India is overwhelmed with domestic political matters.[42] Despite rapid economic growth in the past decades, India is still struggling with domestic socio-economic development problems. Inequality remains a problem in India where 60 percent of the population lives below the poverty line as of 2010. Internal security challenges emanated from the Naxalite or Maoist

38 Quoted in Harsh V. Pant, "A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy," *Orbis* 53, no. 2 (2009): 255.
39 Ibid., 260.
40 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Still under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India," *India Review* 8, no. 3 (2009): 230.
41 This lack of power projection does not mean that India does not have an ambition to become a great power. India has ingrained yearning for a right place in the global order: an equal footing with other great powers, namely the US, Europe, China, Russia, and Japan, known as the six-power constellation as drawn out by Nehru in the 1940s. See C. Raja Mohan, "Changing Global Order," in *Crux of Asia: China, India, and the Emerging Global Order*, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013): 53, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/crux_of_asia.pdf (accessed October 25, 2014).
42 Poorvi Chitalkar and David M. Malone, "Democracy, Politics and India's Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 17, no. 1 (2011): 75-91.

insurgencies in the country. The never ending Kashmir crisis and Hindu-Muslim spats sum up the list of India's domestic flaws. The overbearing of domestic and socio-economic issues are seemingly more important for Indian politicians to be successful than foreign policy.[43] Compounding the quandary of India's lack of consciousness pertaining to foreign policy, the decision-making process in this realm is individualistic. India's leaders' agenda features a less foreign policy-oriented program, let alone one with a long-term strategy. Instead, a day-to-day thinking dominates their most attention.[44] Such day-to-day thinking is preoccupied with domestic problems.

The nature of India's domestic politics contributes also to volatile foreign policy-making. The political field is highly fragmented where coalitions compete with one another. The decision-making of domestic and foreign policy is a long, tedious, and circuitous process. India's parliamentary system dictates that foreign policy-making rest upon the party or parties in power, or the incumbent, and the opposition parties.[45] This process is a struggle of interests among top-level bureaucrats, such as the prime minister and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), confounded by the political parties as well as media and public opinion.[46] The implication is that India's foreign policy is less tied by an international dimension than that of internal dynamics.

India's political system allows multifarious political parties, representing a wide array of social groups, to balance against each other in the pursuit of their own interests. The overlapping and crisscrossing interests boil down to considerable difficulty in reaching a unanimous voice on a single issue of foreign affairs. Imagining the number of issues spanning from economic to security concerns with which India has to cope, combined with a complicated bureaucracy, it is not realistic to expect India to be more responsive to the relentless change in international affairs-related issues. India's political fragmentation contributes to undermining the ability of the state to give an effective response to security threats in a quick pace not only in the domestic but also regional and international domains.[47]

43 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, "India's Feeble Foreign Policy: A Would-be Great Power Resists Its Own Rise," *Foreign Affairs* May/June (2013): 14-19.

44 Ibid.

45 Sukhwant S. Bindra, "Domestic Milieu of India and Foreign Policy Making Process: A Theoretical Perspective," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 65, no. 2 (April-June, 2004): 253.

46 Nitya Singh, "How to Tame your Dragon: An Evaluation of India's Foreign Policy toward China," *India Review* 11, no. 3 (2012): 140.

47 Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, "Indian Foreign Policy and Contemporary Security Challenges," *International Affairs* 87, no. 1 (2011): 87-104.

This troubled foreign policy-making has a negative implication on the "Look East" policy. The "Look East" policy is said to be India's grand design of an outward-looking foreign policy, something India had never done even during the Cold War. It was crafted under the spirit of economic and foreign policy reform.[48] Therefore, it can be argued that despite the 'lack of power projection' among Indian leaders, some, like Rao and Vajpayee, are able to contrive a foreign policy that brings India closer to fulfilling its great power ambition. However, one problem endures. A South Asian expert, Rajpal Budania, summarizes that India's problem does not lay in its incapacity to devise "intellectual debates on policy choices but [in its] lack of effort to develop the capability to implement policy."[49] The problem of implementation springs from India's domestic constraints. It sometimes results in a delayed or even cancelled strategic decision.[50] One example is illustrative of this. Prior to the signing of ASEAN-India FTA in 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had a difficult time assuring the cabinet that the FTA was not just about economics, but also politics. It is a similar reason that causes India to approach relatively slowly to multilateral cooperation, not to mention cooperation with ASEAN. A dualism stands out: on one hand India is cognizant of the needs to increase its participation in the multilateral domain, while on the other hand its domestic constituents hold it back.[51] On one hand India is intent on making the most of the "Look East Policy", on the other hand it has to confront domestic hurdles to live up to its aim.

India's Regional Containment

India is surrounded by unstable neighbors that consistently threaten both regional as well as India's own stability. Nepal's Maoist rebellion is accused of having a connection with the Nexalite of India. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgency causes domestic insecurity in Sri Lanka. The bleak future of Afghanistan following US withdrawal will certainly shake the stability of the already unstable South Asia. The endless conflict of India and Pakistan also adds to the inexorably complicated region India has to attend to. Additionally, the threat of terrorism primarily targeting India continues to increase. There is, however, an increasing shared belief among a coterie of

48 James Manor, "India's Reform Strengths," in *Asia's Giants: Comparing China and India*, ed. Edward Friedman and Bruce Gilley (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005): 109.

49 Rajpal Budania, "Domestic Constraints in India's Defence Policy-Making," *Strategic Analysis* 26, no. 3 (2002): 390.

50 Ibid.

51 Chitalkar and Malone, "Democracy, Politics and India's Foreign Policy," 83.

Indian leaders and scholars that a stable and secure region is chief to India's own economic growth.[52] In order for regional cooperation to succeed, bilateral relations have to be fortified beforehand.[53] Instead, in South Asia the opposite happens. Even though bilateralism is more assuring and alluring through which India's predilection of security can be furthered, this one-on-one relationship with the neighbors has its own downside. India's treatment is largely ill perceived by its neighbors, thanks to the touch-and-go approach utilized by Delhi to exhaust cooperation only when there is something on which to cooperate.

Moving for a while from the perturbing neighborhood policy of India, it is true that the unreliable and unfeasible South Asia compels India to move beyond its region as clearly stated on the 'extended neighborhood' strategy.[54] It is also true that India has been trying to loosen up its grip on South Asia, for the sake of better engagement with the more promising yet auspicious Southeast Asia.[55] The story changes when China starts to "look south".

Both China and India have the same ambition to advance their influence beyond borders. In this contest, China is one step ahead of India. While India's "Look East" policy moves sluggishly, China expands its area of interest to cover South Asia. The all-weather China-Pakistan relationship has long been alarming the leaders in Delhi. China has deployed more troops to the disputed boundary in Arunachal Pradesh leading to a skirmish with India in 2008 and been reported to encroach into Indian territory. China has transformed Tibet into a militarized zone through structural military development and infrastructure building (e.g. direct railway from Beijing to Lasha in 2008). China has also conducted several military exercises in Tibet such as in 2012. China's "string of pearls" project resonates an unpleasant memo to Delhi that Beijing has encircled India by way of building ports around

52 Ashok K. Behuria, Smruti S. Pattanaik, and Arvind Gupta, "Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?" *Strategic Analysis* 36, no. 2 (2012): 229-246.

53 Partha S. Ghosh, "An Enigma that is South Asia: India versus the Region," *Asia-Pacific Review* 20, no. 1 (2013): 106.

54 The term 'extended neighborhood' is part of India's foreign policy strategy firstly introduced and pushed under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led administration of Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998-2004). The core of this strategy is that India's concerns lie beyond South Asia which includes other neighbors and countries adjoining South Asia—the so-called 'extended neighborhood'. This thought is believed to be relevant still as India's foreign policy-making handbook. For comprehensive analysis on this policy, see David Scott, "India's 'Extended Neighborhood' Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power," *India Review* 8, no. 2 (2009): 107-143 and Ashley J. Tellis, "US and Indian Interests in India's Extended Neighbourhood," in *Power realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States*, ed. Alyssa Ayres and C. Raja Mohan (New Delhi: SAGE Publications India, 2009).

55 Robert Hathaway, "India Transformed: Parsing India's "New" Foreign Policy," *India Review* 2, no. 4 (2003): 3-4.

South Asia that includes Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

China's "charm" approach towards South Asian states dissuades the latter to keep India away. Varun Sahni puts it bluntly, "filling the abyss left by India's incapacity to present a feasible regional vision and to invest heavily in it, China has worked in a systemic and piecemeal manner to create an alternative for India's neighboring countries."[56] Using economic cooperation as a cover-up, China's policy in South Asia teems with strategic interests. An Indian foreign policy analyst, Vikram Sood, identifies China's tactics to rein India in the subcontinent by means of "keep[ing] the borders with India tranquil but not solving the [border] dispute", while at the same time "trade[ing] with India but arm Pakistan and wean away Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar."[57] On the same page, a defense analyst, Iskander Rehman, argues that "China's strategy is to divert India's attention from East Asia and to head it off reaching out beyond South Asia, by keeping it focused on the western front and by using Pakistan as a form of "proxy deterrent" against India in its backyard".[58] To upset India even more while strengthening its footing in the region, China bids for representation in the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a moribund regional organization that includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. All member states, excluding India, unsurprisingly support China's entry into the regional organization.[59]

China's presence in the Indian Ocean cannot be disentangled from the rapid modernization of naval capability aimed to protect China's interests in securing the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) and to check India's power.[60] In "retaliation", Indian navy was dispatched to the South China Sea for the same reason as China's Indian Ocean agenda.[61] India, intent to

56 Varun Sahni, "India's Foreign Policy: Key Drivers," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 14, no. 2 (2007): 25.

57 Vikram Sood, "India and Regional Security Interests," in *Power realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States*, ed. Alyssa Ayres and C. Raja Mohan (New Delhi: SAGE Publications India, 2009): 261.

58 Iskander Rehman, "Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India's Counter-containment of China in Asia," *Asian Security* 5, no. 2 (2009): 118.

59 Amardeep Athwal, *China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics* (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2008): 46.

60 Niclas D. Weimar, "Sino-Indian Power Preponderance in Maritime Asia: A (Re-)Source of Conflict in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 25, no. 1 (2013): 17-19.

61 India's first naval dispatch to South China Sea was in 2000 under a joint exercise with Vietnam. Singapore is another Southeast Asian states with which India has conducted the same joint naval exercise. However, these are not rotational. In contrast to India, China's naval acitivities in the South China Sea is far extensive. Instead, China has expanded its maritime interest right beyond the South China Sea. China has a blue-water ambition aimed at breaking away its first- and second-island

keep China at arm's length, is a proponent of Iranian-based mega project of Chahbahar port and an eager actor poised to make use Kazakhstan's air base and Mongolian space-monitoring.[62] Even so, it is not an equal contest when one side toddles, the other runs.

India is facing a furtive two-pronged containment in its own region by its neighbors and China. Whereas the former is, to some extent, the unsolicited result of Delhi's homespun ambiguous foreign policy towards the neighbors, the latter gives credit to India's indecisiveness to follow through its passion to become a great power worthy of attention. Either way, both are lethal to the well-being of India as a "destined" great power.

That India being hemmed in its home region of South Asia affects the way the "Look East" policy is carried out. Despite the leaders' longing for breaking away the sluggish development of their immediate neighborhood, they are conscious that the region needs it as the model of vibrant democracy and economic development. Added to their strand of thinking is China's rapid engagement with India's neighbors. The feeling of being the natural leader of South Asia bears the leaders in Delhi a responsibility to secure their backyard from any interlopers. There is no doubt that China appears on their radar. This has a consequence on India-made 'Look East' policy whose main goal is engaging Southeast Asian states: that India cannot give its all attention to its extended neighbors by ignoring the neighbors next door.

The Effect of India's Reliance on the US Security Umbrella

China's strategy to contain India, by expelling Delhi from Southeast Asia and stepping in South Asia, seems to be the reason that India has been rather reluctant to engage with ASEAN countries despite the language and intent of its "Look East" policy. When China moves to India's own milieu, the likely option for Delhi is securing its own backyard. One factor related to China that underpins India's decision to play less aggressively in Southeast Asia is the protracted security umbrella of the US featured by the 'pivot to Asia' policy. Being a democratic friend of the US, India enjoys assurance that whatever disservice Beijing does Washington will react. A secured Southeast Asia, es-

chains. Indian Ocean falls within the domain in which Chinese Navy or the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can operate beyond its home waters. In 2008 China successfully deployed its navy to Indian Ocean in the mission to secure the SLOCs threatened by Somalia pirates. It was the first PLAN's overseas operation. China's incessant naval build-up is concomitant with realizing its blue-water agenda.

62 Harsh V. Pant, "Rising China in India's Vicinity: A Rivalry Takes Shape in Asia," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2013): 9, doi: 10.1080/09557571.2012.734781 (accessed April 11, 2013).

pecially the South China Sea, remains the US pivotal priority in Asia. Knowing this, India seems to believe that there is no urgent need to pour all attention to Southeast Asia while concurrently impeding a conflict with China that may convolute the already distrustful relations between the two.

Counting the US factor in India's Southeast Asian policy can lead to misconception. India began to matter in the eyes of Washington after the successful conduct of nuclear test in 1998.[63] The test was held during the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) administration under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. India at that juncture did not face any security threat that might justify the development of nuclear weapons. The government, however, alleged China's threat as the main catalyst for the test.[64] The decision was apparently well crafted by Vajpayee's government to attract US attention, even though it was highly risky.[65] India-US relations thrive further following the commitment to strategic partnership carved out in 2005. Nonetheless, the relationship between India and the United States is not flawless. Whereas it seems that India-US rapprochement is entering a new phase that draws both democracies closer, starting with the 1998 nuclear test when Clinton started to notice India's capability as a rising power, the level of trust between the two has never been that high. Regardless the status of strategic partners pinned on each self, several discrepancies of point of view prevail. Delhi's project to diversify its energy sources by cooperating with Iran vexes Washington.[66] India's long pretension of a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been objected by the US.

Despite the fact that Indian leaders have carefully reiterated that Delhi seeks no alliance with the US, India welcomes US overarching naval prowess to roam the Indian Ocean for the sake of keeping the stability and security of the region intact. On the other hand, China, being unduly sensitive to the US containment strategy of which it fell victim, does not want to lose grip on any possibilities. India is well aware, according to Mohan, that "Beijing's real concerns might have less to do with what India does in Southeast Asia than

63 James Chiriyankandath, "Realigning India: Indian Foreign Policy after the Cold War," *The Round Table: the Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 97, no. 374 (2004): 206.

64 David M., Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, "India-US Relations: The Shock of the New," *International Journal* 64, no. 4 (Autumn, 2009): 1069.

65 Hathaway, "India Transformed: Parsing India's "New" Foreign Policy," 4-5.

66 Aside from economic cooperation, India and Iran share similar concerns in other fields, such as geopolitics concerning the stability of Afghanistan and security, through military modernization and training. Harsh V. Pant, *Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates Its Rise in the International System* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008): 113-129.

the prospects of Delhi joining Washington in an alliance to contain China."[67] From Delhi's perspective, playing it safe is preferable to sailing against the tide of the power contest involving China and the US. India can minimize the risk of frontal conflict with China both in its respective backyard, South Asia, and Southeast Asia with regard to its 'Look East' policy. However, at the same time it costs India's desire to draw on the hailed 'Look East' policy devised to advocate its interests beyond South Asia.

Conclusion: India's Re- "Look East" Policy

The US Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once boldly encouraged India to "not just look east, but to engage east and act east as well."[68] She was right, but the follow-up was below expectation. India, a rising giant with great power aspirations, has failed to fulfil what the world expected to see.[69] India understands the importance of Southeast Asia as a gate to Northeast Asia and the Pacific, but its actions to influence it have been limited. India is by nature located in South Asia, a region full of domestic clashes within its states and is prone to instability. India has never been content with the slow pace of South Asian regional development. That India borders troublesome neighbors justifies the dissatisfaction frustrating Indian leaders to alter their focus to the "extended neighborhood". The idea is well founded but not sufficiently adopted. India has been identified as a capable and emerging power endowed with an ambition to become a global power, but it is rarely takes an active role. India still lacks experience in how best to come to grips with foreign countries. Unlike its "rival" China, India's foreign policy has never been expansive. In some way, India poses no threats to others. In another way, it signals a dubious intention of what Delhi genuinely hopes for by playing behind the scene. The concoction of problematic links between domestic politics and foreign policy-making, a nearly failed home region of South Asia and the pressures originated from Sino-India rivalry emasculates India's performance to project its "great power" dream. India must not play safe for good. Realizing the daunting threat emanating from China's more frequent presence in South Asia, the Vajpayee administration had begun accelerating

67 Mohan, "India's Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security," 53.

68 Quoted in Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, "Can China and India Rise Peacefully?," *Orbis* 56, no. 3 (2012): 482.

69 The US is one of the proponent of India's playing greater role in Southeast Asia. See Brewster, "India's Defense Strategy and the India-ASEAN Relationship," 136.

Rao's "Look East" policy since 1998 onwards. The record, notwithstanding, does not look convincing.

In 2012 Vietnam granted an Indian oil company, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh Limited, an oil exploration rights in the areas near the disputed Paracel Islands. When China sent out a signal to India to reconsider the contract, the later appeared staunch. Later on, India took takes the defense cooperation with Vietnam to a new level. India has agreed to train 500 Vietnamese submarine operators and to transfer four naval boats under a $100-million credit line.[70] Furthermore, Indian Navy Chief Admiral D.K. Joshi states that India is prepared to send naval ships into the South China Sea in order to protect its interests in the area.[71] Prime Minister Singh's official visit to Japan and Thailand in 2013 might set the tone for re-activating the "Look East" policy, but the region craves more. Delhi is in dire need to revise its "Look East" policy by adding 'active and thorough engagement' as the key to a successful implementation of its foreign policy towards Southeast Asia.

When Narenda Modi was elected a new prime minister in May 2014, India's foreign policy was hoped to change course to include something the previous leaders were reluctant to pursue. The depiction is rather bleak. In the new government's foreign policy statement Southeast Asia is not mentioned. Myanmar was the only representative from Southeast Asia invited for consultation with the new Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj in June.[72] Modi seems more interested in embracing his adjacent neighbors of South Asia under the umbrella of SAARC, alongside his national-security-comes-first rhetoric. There are still some straws in the wind, nonetheless. Modi's recent move to improve India's relations with Japan cannot be dissociated from his strategy to keep Delhi's grip in the region alive, albeit limited. India is also likely to continue with its defense program with Vietnam around

70 Sandeep Dikshit, "Vietnam Offers India Seven Oil Blocks in South China Sea," *The Hindu*, November 21, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/vietnam-offers-india-seven-oil-blocks-in-south-china-sea/article5372744.ece (accessed February 20, 2014).

71 Zachary Keck, "India's South China Sea Gambit," *The Diplomat*, December 5, 2012, http://the-diplomat.com/2012/12/indias-south-china-sea-gambit/ (accessed February 18, 2014). This view is incompatible with what the Indian government has been retained that India will stay out of the South China Sea dispute. Mohan asserts that there is discordant stance between Indian military and government. The later prefers not to agitate China by interfering in the territorial and maritime disputes that pit Beijing against four Southeast Asian states (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam). See Mohan, "India-ASEAN Defence Relations," 30.

72 Nayan Chandra, "S-E Asia Stil Important to India's Development and Security," *The Strait Times*, June 26, 2014, http://www.straitstimes.com/news/opinion/eye-the-world/story/s-e-asia-still-important-indias-development-and-security-20140626 (accessed September 18, 2014).

military training. But again, these are not sufficient. What is left for India to do, Mohan says, is to "demonstrate its policy commitment and expanded capabilities for power projection beyond India's shores."[73] It cannot simply jettison the idea of refurbishing the relations with Southeast Asian states as a gateway to reach out to the great power aspiration. Otherwise, India will always be a second-rate power under the shadow of China's preponderance sway in Southeast Asia and, possibly, in other regions where their power ambitions overlap.

The two-decade old "Look East" policy is still relevant to serving India's desire to act parallel to its growing power. The foundered domestic economy in the late 1980s was brought back to life once the reform set off, of which an outward-looking policy was the main ingredient. That heretofore India's 'Look East' policy has not yet reached its zenith, the three factors laid out earlier are still likely play their detrimental roles. To overcome these hindrances, India needs to reconsider its policies. First, India should continue to engage Southeast Asia although such action is not large. India might not be able to match China's economic package or to offer a security umbrella as the US does to Southeast Asian states. India has simply not arrived at that point yet. What India can do hitherto is provide assurance that, regardless of the size or intensity of its own "package", it will stay in the region. Continuity is what matters, for it is better to be around than aloof. Second, India needs to balance its priorities: the one in the domestic and regional domain with the one beyond that. India can still champion regional leadership in South Asia while simultaneously wining the hearts and minds of its neighbors in Southeast Asia. Delhi can also be a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. The relationship between the two region sis modicum at best. If India could draft cooperation between these abutting regions, not only will it receive accolade from the neighbors but also an upgraded power status. Third, India already has the guideline named the 'Look East' policy. It is ripe for being harnessed. What is left to do is to ensure its implementation. This, however, is no easy task given India's half-hearted commitment to reach out to its "extended neighborhood". Its leaders however, should not forget that great power with global reach does not stay at home. **Y**

73 Frankel, "The Breakout of China-India," 7.

DE-CODING THE "BEIJING CONSENSUS": IS IT AN ALTERNATIVE GROWTH MODEL?

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China's robust economic growth and development, as a result of its reform and opening policies, has produced phenomenal success. The most striking feature has been China's survival in the global financial and economic crisis, which has led to the dramatic contraction of the world economies, mainly the United States and the European Union. Here, the quintessential question that requires attention is: 'How did China survive the economic catastrophe when big powers contracted?' In this aspect, the Chinese growth and development model - collectively known as the 'Beijing Consensus' - is argued to be China's success factor in the economic crisis. Whereby, the prospect of rapid economic development without political liberalization has become the new jargon of development, which comes with 'no strings attached'. Therefore, based on the available sources, this paper seeks to provide an understanding of this new alternative model called the "Beijing Consensus" and how it is distinct from the Western-led model of the "Washington Consensus."

The ongoing global financial and economic crisis has led to the decline of the neo-liberal policies of economic growth and development. Fighting against the odds of this economic hardship has led to the dramatic contraction of the world economies, mainly the United States and the European Union. But the greater shock lies in China's survival in the phase of economic slowdown. The quintessential question is: "how did China survive the economic catastrophe when big powers contracted?" This puzzle has been debated for years since the rise of China in the global sphere amidst the debacles of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. In this aspect, the economic success of China is often argued in the rubric of the Beijing Consensus, which, unlike the western growth model, is said to cause rapid economic development without any political liberalization. As Andrew J. Nathan posits, the main threat, according to Stefan Halper, is not that of military or economics but, rather, it is the threat of the Chinese strategy to dominate the world in the

realm of values, which Halper calls the market authoritarian model[1] or the Beijing Consensus - a rival model to the Washington Consensus[2] of democratic capitalism.

Therefore, to understand China's economic success in the phase of declining neo-liberal economic policy framework, this present paper seeks to analyze it through the framework of the "Beijing Consensus." Here, the Beijing Consensus would be examined as a framework of Chinese growth and development. In doing so, the paper adopts a descriptive approach to examining the following key questions: first, what is the "Beijing Consensus?"; second, how does it differ from the Western-led model of the "Washington Consensus?"; and, finally, does it offer an alternative growth model?

CONTEXTUALISING THE "BEIJING CONSENSUS"

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the global balance of power was transformed, where both the scales and weights came into the hands of the United States as it emerged as the sole superpower. There was no hard-balancing by second-tier states against this "hegemon." But with the coming of the new millennium, the world envisaged the rise of an Asian power - "China" in the global sphere. The dragon became powerful amongst all giants, as China emerged as the "Second World Economy." surpassing the erstwhile powerful Japan in the international sphere. It came out strong from the debacles of the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 and the economic downturn of the worldwide inflation of 2007. These incidental changes witnessed that there was already a change in the making of the global balance of power, replacing the American hegemony in the international sphere. Seeking this viewpoint, Barry Naughton contends that:

> "It is no doubt true that power and influence are shifting. 'Washington is declining and the Washington consensus is crumbling, while Beijing is rising and...' and it is tempting to fill in the dots with a

1 Andrew J. Nathan, "Book Review: The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty First Century," *Foreign Affair*s, May/June, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66379/stefan-halper/the-beijing-consensus-how-chinas-authoritarian-model-will-domina (accessed November 10, 2014).

2 Washington Consensus was first conceived by economist John Williamson in 1989. This Consensus became generally accepted as the most effective model by which developing nations could spur growth. Embracing ideals of free-market capitalism, which included open trade policies, privatization, and deregulation, the Washington Consensus provided a prescription for development in the Third World.

> 'rising Beijing consensus.' It is attractive in approach as 'Beijing Consensus' is a concept that draws its power from its key position in a whole system of interacting concepts: as the polar opposite of the Washington Consensus, the term expresses compactly the collapse of the Washington Consensus and the success of the Chinese growth experience and the rising role of China in the world today."[3]

This shift in the econometrics can be equated in terms of China's average economic growth rate of 9.7 percent per annum from 1978 to 2008. With this steadfast growth, as *The Growth Commission 2008* report suggests, China became one of the 13 successful economies that have managed to grow at a rate of 7 per cent or higher for 25 years or more since World War II. With that, the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by a factor of 12 in real terms to reach US$3400 in 2008.[4] With these statistical shifts, China moved from a planned economy to a mixed economy, making the private sector account for two-thirds of the national GDP. Thereby, in this economic leap that fostered China's unparalleled growth, it becomes imperative to understand the question: "How did China build this path to rapid growth?" The answer to this question lies in the understanding of China's growth and developmental model, where the success is viewed in China's model of authoritarianism. That is to say, the authoritarian government, as opposed to the Western Democratic Model with its heavy involvement in the state economy, has been able to mobilize the large amounts of resources to tackle the imminent bottlenecks that impede the growth and institutional transition.[5] With this heavy state control, Beijing has developed a hybrid form of capitalism in which it has opened its economy to some extent, but it also ensures the government controls strategic industries, picks corporate winners, determines investments by state funds, and pushes the banking sector to support national champion firms.[6]

With this transition related to the shift in power balance in global politics, the change here, in the calculus, testifies and verifies the contested claims

3 Barry Naughton, "China's Distinctive System: can it be a model for others?," *Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 65 (2010): 437.

4 Yao Yang, *China Model and its future* (ANU Press Library: Australian National University), http://press.anu.edu.au/apps/bookworm/view/China%3A+The+Next+Twenty+Years+of+Reform+and+Development/7021/ch03.xhtml (accessed May 12, 2014).

5 Ibid.

6 Joshus Kurlantzick, "China's Model of Development and the "Beijing Consensus."" *China-US Focus*, April 29, 2013. http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/chinas-model-of-development-and-the-beijing-consensus/ (accessed November 10, 2014).

of two juxtapositions- Gerald Segal posing the quintessential question of China's existence in world politics as he demands: "Does China Matter?."[7] While Robert Sutter's interrogation lies in the understandable question: "Why Does China Matter?".[8] Segal and Sutter, writing at different points in time, analyze China's worthiness, but by taking two analogous stands. Where, one (Segal) doubts that China is an important actor in the international sphere, the other (Sutter) sees China as a significant actor in the international sphere. Therefore, these contested claims contextualize the validity of the concept for the "Beijing Consensus" vis-a-vis the decline of the "Washington Consensus" in the 21st Century. Here, we see a shift in "consensus" with that of the shift in power equations and this is because China's market-led authoritarian developmental model has consistently produced a double digit economic growth in the past two decades. This is increasingly challenging the West led free-market liberal-democratic thoughts (Washington Consensus), subsequently making the "China model" more suitable for the developing countries in "achieving equitable and high quality growth."[9]

THE BEIJING CONSENSUS- THE CHINA MODEL OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

The Beijing Consensus is a model of development based on China's model for economic growth and political principles of non-interference and self-determination. The term "Beijing Consensus" appeared for the first time in the international lexicon in 2004, coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in his influential position-paper titled "The Beijing Consensus." In understanding China's rapid growth over the past 30 years, Ramo defined the "Beijing Con-

7 Gerald Segal (1999) in "Does China Matter?" argues that "China is a small market that matters relatively less to the world, especially outside Asia." China matters in the same way as any other middle-power adversary matters. China is a beacon to no one and an ally to no one. He states that "China is a political pariah." And, Segal concludes that there is a greater degree of exaggeration to China's influence that is apparent and not real and that it needs to be treated as a normal middle power in order to probe into its shortcomings and limitations. See, Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 5 (1999): 24-36.

8 Robert Sutter (2003) in "Why Does China Matter?" argues in response to Segal that China is an important global actor, which is evitable from its rapidly growing economy and its increasing integration into the world economy. He bases his arguments on the U.S. and China's relative significance in the world affairs. He states that China is growing at an extraordinary pace and this implies that with sufficiency of power it will adopt a different and more assertive approach to international affairs. It is likely that China might pose a greater challenge to the United States. See, Robert Sutter, "Why Does China Matter?," *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2003): 75-89.

9 K. I. Woo, "Beijing Consensus: Model for Sustainable Development?," *Asia-Pacific Housing Journal*, http://www.ghbhomecenter.com/journal/download.php?file=1521Apr11rtOP7d9.50-59_Beijing.pdf (accessed April 11, 2014).

sensus" as the "new physics of Chinese power."[10] According to Ramo, with this developmental model:

> "China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity. I call this new centre and physics of power and development the Beijing Consensus."[11]

The central argument is that China's economic growth challenges every single principle of the Washington Consensus. It is based upon three overarching ideals behind Chinese development, which in turn suggests "how to organize the place of a developing country in the world."[12] The three theorems are: first, innovation based development - use of innovation as a driver to progress, foreign direct investment and expansion of education to create human resource assets (for example, China is now a world leader of clean energy technology and has the world's largest educational system); second, economic success not measured by per capita GDP growth but by its sustainability and level of equality using economics to improve society and enhance the quality of life and development that is people-focused; and, lastly, the theory of self-determination in order to oppose hegemonic powers by seeking independence from outside pressure.[13]

The essential elements of the "Beijing Consensus" are- financial support for the state sector, restrictions on private sector development, and tight political controls, which form the core of China's development.[14] Therefore, as opposed to the "ten policy recommendations"[15] of the Washington Con-

10 Joshua Cooper Ramo, "The Beijing Consensus," *Foreign Policy Centre*, (2004): 2, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/TheBeijingConsensus.

11 Max Rebol (2010), "Why the Beijing Consensus is a non-consensus: Implications for contemporary China-Africa relations," *Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies*, 9, no. 1 (2010): 6.

12 Ramo, "The Beijing Consensus."

13 Ibid; World Foresight Forum 2011, "The Beijing Consensus: An alternative approach to development," *Issue Brief 02*, April 2011, accessed from http://www.hcss.nl/reports/issue-brief-no-2-the-beijing-consensus-an-alternative-approach-to-development/81/ (accessed May 12, 2014).

14 Huang Yasheng, "Debating China's economic growth: the Beijing consensus or the Washington Consensus," *Academy of Management Perspectives* (2010): 31-47.

15 Ten Propositions of the "Washington Consensus" are: Fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure

sensus, the hallmark of the "Beijing Consensus" lies in the fact that it does not dictate final policy points to those who may seek to use it. And this major contradiction to the Washington Consensus has led to the success of China. Upholding this characteristic trait of the "Beijing Consensus." Ramo states that:

> "the key ingredient of the China model is its ideological and operating dexterity. China has not bothered to follow any set economic and political prescriptions but has experimented boldly and innovatively. The eclectic approach purportedly used by China encompasses a variety of institutional forms. If state ownership promotes growth, why privatize? If a one-party system works wonders in generating GDP growth, why democratize? If state financial controls are effective in resource mobilization, why liberalize?"[16]

Thus, it can be argued that the advantage of the Beijing Consensus lies in its unconventional route to development, which defies the conventional neoliberal institutional policies laid out in the Washington Consensus. As the western model tries to impose a "one size fits all" solution on different structures, systems, and needs, this becomes problematic when emulated by developing and underdeveloped economies. For example, the Latin American economic crisis was a result of its emulation of the Washington Consensus model of free market capitalism rather than adopting developmental paths that specifically suited the Latin American conditions. On the contrary, China's developmental path offers a distinct framework that deviates from the Washington Consensus where China's success does not offer a "big bang" reform and shock therapy. It is not a process where economic liberalization necessarily leads to democratization; it is not jettisoning state control over key sectors; it is not full neo-liberalization (particularly in financial sectors); it is not the western way of doing things; it is not following a model or a pre-

priorities away from non-merit subsidies and toward public goods (e.g. health and education), tax reform that combines broad tax base with moderate marginal rates, liberalized interest rates , a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization , deregulation to ease barriers of firms for entry and exit of sectors and strong protection of property rights. See, Scott Kennedy, "The Myth of the Beijing Consensus," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 19, no. 65 (2010): 461-477.

16 Huang Yasheng, "Rethinking the Beijing Consensus," *Asia Policy* 11 (2011): 3.

scription; it is not being told what to do by others; and it is not telling others what to do.[17]

THE "BEIJING CONSENSUS": IS IT AN ALTERNATE MODEL OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT?

With the parallels drawn between the two "Consensuses"- Washington versus Beijing - the two frameworks provide distinct ways of development. Therefore, against the background of the Washington Consensus, it becomes imperative to understand whether the "Beijing Consensus" acts as an alternative model of growth and development." Often viewed in a multidimensional framework, the "Beijing Consensus" is broadly understood in terms of China's investments, aid, and trade and not conditioned by the demands of western states and international institutions. It appears that there is no real consensus on one definition of the "Beijing Consensus" in contrast to the Washington Consensus. Unlike the Washington Consensus, which has a codified ten-point policy recommendation, the "Beijing Consensus" lacks a codified policy framework or guidelines.

It is this ambiguity that makes the claims over "Beijing Consensus" as an alternative model of development contested. Arif Dirlik, with his reservations, questions the very etymology of the "Beijing Consensus" and states that "it is a notion, rather than a concept or an idea, as there is no coherence that we associate with either of those terms."[18] He also critiques the downside of China's economic prosperity, which has led to greater marginalization and environmental degradation in the name of development. On the same note, Yao Yang[19] evaluates the "Beijing Consensus" to nearing its end, as the CCP's free-market policies have led to greater income disparities. This is evident in its Gini coefficient, which has reached 0.47 and also China's experience of the highest urban-rural income gap in the world. This asymmetric economic growth is slowly leading China into the dangerous "middle-income trap,"[20] which has been experienced by other develop-

17 Shaun Breslin, "The 'China model' and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of governance?," *International Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2011): 1338-1339.

18 Arif Dirlik, "Beijing Consensus: Beijing 'Gongshi': Who recognizes whom and to what end," *Position Paper, Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium*, 2006, http://www.globalautonomy.ca, (accessed April 11, 2014).

19 Yao Yang, "The End of the Beijing Consensus: Can China's Model Authoritarian Growth Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-consensus (accessed April 11, 2014).

20 Middle-income trap is a situation that often arises when a country's per-capita GDP reaches the range of $3,000 to $8,000, the economy stops growing, income inequality increases, and social

ing countries. Hence, these negative evaluations make Ramo's argument quite weak and fallible. It is these gaps that make the "Beijing Consensus" inadequate in terms of being an alternative model of development for developing countries. It is thereby argued to be a "trial and error"[21] model where policies that succeed are adopted, while the ones that fail are abandoned. Williamson, so as to strengthen his claim of the "Washington Consensus." states that China's pursuance of unparalleled growth is based not on "three theorems" but on five developmental policies: incremental reform, innovation and experimentation, export-led growth, state capitalism, and authoritarianism.[22] In bifurcating the two "Consensus" led growth models, Bruce Dickson states that, in contrast to the Washington Consensus, which sees state intervention as non-conducive to economic development and that political liberties and democracy is integral to development, the "Beijing Consensus" suggests that:

> "[R]apid economic development requires active leadership by political elites committed to growth and that authoritarian rule is necessary to sustain these pro-growth policies and limit demands for greater equity and social welfare. The Beijing Consensus therefore is antithetical to the Washington Consensus and has so far defied the logic that economic development inevitably leads to political change."[23]

Therefore, some of these assumptions make the "Beijing Consensus" highly narrow and, thereby, make it less universal and general in its adoption as an alternative model of development. As Scott Kennedy argues that the Beijing Consensus is "a myth." it is misguided and inaccurate in assessing China's actual reform experience.[24] While Barry Naughton argues that the concept of the "Beijing Consensus" is an "oxymoron"[25], he states that the specific character of the Chinese system and the way in which government and business relations have been structured cannot be readily replicated in

conflicts erupt. See, Yao Yang, "The End of the Beijing Consensus."

21 Huang, "Debating China's economic growth."

22 John Williamson, "Is the "Beijing Consensus" Now Dominant?," *Asia Policy* 13 (2012): 1-16.

23 Bruce J. Dickson, 2010, "Who consents to the 'Beijing Consensus'? Crony communism in China," Manuscript, (The Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC) i.

24 Scott Kennedy, "The Myth of the Beijing Consensus." *Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 65 (2010): 461-477.

25 Naughton, "China's Distinctive System."

other countries. Therefore, these scholarship claims completely falsify Ramo's construct of the "Beijing Consensus" as opposed to the "Washington Consensus." These contending claims make the "Beijing Consensus" model look more like a dystopia rather than a utopia in terms of an alternative developmental model. Thus, there is an uncertainty that prevails in terms of adaptability with this growth model.

Apart from these reservations, in assessing the applicability of the Beijing model to the outer world as an alternative, the argument remains two-fold[26]: first, on one end, the "Beijing Consensus" is seen to be limited by China's own unique experience (the idea of socialism, having world's largest population, the maintaining the old Confucian traditions, and a unified national identity), making it distinctly Chinese. Secondly, on the other end, it is seen to act as a convenient starting point for identifying a mode of development that is independent of the accepted Western model, thereby serving to enhance the voice of the developing nations in global affairs.

To this variant aspect, Turin[27] argues that the "Beijing Consensus" is not actually a "consensus" in the same way as that of the Washington Consensus or as an ideal form of government. It is, rather, a new way of thinking of the global order that is intended to be "contrarian" - an alternative to the current dominant ideology. While Breslin[28] contends that, as a "dissatisfied responsible Great Power." China has been represented by its elites as a force for responsible but fair change to the global distribution of power that should result in a greater voice and role for developing states. Despite his challenge to the Beijing Consensus as a "model" or a "consensus." Dirlik too recognizes the importance of the Beijing Consensus, as he posits that:

> "[For] PRC, the search for autonomy and self-determination has taken the form not only of maintaining controls over the economy internally, but also by taking a multilateralist approach to global relationships which contrasts sharply with the increasingly unilateralist direction US policy has taken over the last two decades. The most important aspect of the Beijing Consensus may be an approach to global relationships that seeks, in multinational relationships, a new global order founded on economic relationships, but which also recognizes political and cultural difference as well

26 Dustin R. Turin, "China and the Beijing Consensus: An Alternative Model for Development," *Student Pulse Academic Journal* 2, no. 1 (2010): 10.

27 Dustin R. Turin, "China and the Beijing Consensus," 11.

28 Breslin, "The 'China model' and the global crisis," 1323-1343.

> as differences in regional and national practices within a common global framework. This global order would also be founded, not upon homogenizing universalisms that inevitably lead to hegemonism, but on a simultaneous recognition of commonality and difference. Deng Xiaoping's reforms beginning in the 1980s gave priority to economic intercourse over political correctness. [...] A century of revolutionary socialist search for autonomy, bolstered by recent economic success, qualifies the PRC eminently to provide leadership in the formation of an alternative global order."[29]

Hence, the consensus on the "Beijing Consensus" is highly ambiguous and uncertain, as there is no common understanding of what it means and whether it implies uniqueness or not. It has a multidimensional interpretation, thereby lacking specificity in terms of applicability. Whether it is transferable or not still remains uncertain.

CONCLUSION

From the above analysis, it can, therefore, be construed that the "Beijing Consensus" is an alternative idea of growth and development that is devoid of set neo-liberal norms and regulations. This new thinking process has gradually emerged more as a tool for expanding China's soft power throughout the world. There is veracity in the uniqueness of this thinking process, which lies in its distinct character of providing economic growth without political democratization. It can, therefore, be argued that, since there is no common or agreed upon understanding of the Beijing Consensus, this concept is still in the phase of becoming more concrete in terms of providing an alternative growth and development model. As a result, the Beijing Consensus needs to adopt a more structured framework in terms of its applicability. **Y**

29 Dirlik, "Beijing Consensus," 5.

FROM BROTHERS TO STRANGERS: MYANMAR'S POLITICAL TRANSITION IN 2011 AND ITS EFFECT ON THE SINO-MYANMAR PAUKPHAW RELATIONSHIP

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Myanmar's political transition from a military dictatorship to a civilian-led government in 2011 took the world by surprise, especially their longtime ally, China. What was believed to a paukphaw or sibling-like relationship of Myanmar and China took an abrupt turn as Myanmar halted the Myitsone Dam project, one of China's three largest investments in Myanmar, but also rapidly improved its relations with the United States under Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy. This paper argues Myanmar's political reform primarily resulted from the internal desires as dissatisfaction grew amongst the civilians and the military in response to the nation's failing economy and governance. The government's decision for reform was further enhanced by China's growing assertiveness in the country as Beijing took Myanmar's international isolation and dependence in gaining both economic and political leverage. Furthermore, Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy was favorable to Myanmar as it allowed the government to balance its asymmetrical partnership with China. Since the reform, China has taken a "wait and see" stance with Myanmar, which will most likely continue until the upcoming 2015 elections.

The once strong Sino-Myanmar *paukphaw*[1] relationship took a rapid turn in 2011 when Myanmar transitioned from a military dictatorship to a civilian-led government. The radical changes in Myanmar's domestic political sys-

1 *Paukphaw*, a Burmese word for siblings or kinsfolk, is commonly used to describe the cordial Sino-Myanmar relationship, where Myanmar plays the role of the younger brother and China is perceived as the older brother. Myanmar reserves this term exclusively to describe her relations with China. China also accepts it. Within the *Paukphaw* relationship, although the Sino-Myanmar relationship is asymmetric, tilted in favor of Beijing, Myanmar has skillfully played the "China card" and enjoys considerable space in her conduct of foreign relations. Maung Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China Policy Since 1948," Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, (2011), 8.

tem challenged both China's existing interests in the country and its strategic planning for the future. Earlier in 2012, after the March inauguration of the new president, China radiated confidence in its asymmetrical *paukphaw* relationship with Myanmar and attempted to maintain the status quo bilateral relationship by following this traditional and well-developed foreign policy.[2] China's strategic blueprint for Myanmar consisted of border stability, energy transportation, economic cooperation and strategic cooperation,[3] all of which required continuation of the traditional fraternal relationship and economic ties between the two countries.

Taking into consideration the harsh political and economic situation of Myanmar's pre-2011 transition, continuation of the fraternal relationship seemed like the optimal choice. China, well aware of this, was confident that Myanmar's transition would prompt no fundamental changes and the Sino-Myanmar brotherly relationship would continue. From August 2011, however, a series of events soured the China-Myanmar relationship. The unexpected suspension of the Myitsone Dam project[4] and Myanmar's rapid improvement in relations with the United States overturned the general assumption of China's overwhelming influence in Myanmar and shook the foundation of its strategic blueprint.[5] Therefore, China was compelled to modify its expectations about Myanmar and readjust its policies and commitments.

The deterioration of the Sino-Myanmar relationship puts the legitimacy of China's regional influence in Asia into question. China, known for its diplomatic protection of pariah states,[6] has maintained monopolistic relation-

2 Yun Sun, "China's Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmar," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 31, no. 1 (2012): 74.

3 Li Chenyang and Lye Liang Fook, "China's Policies Towards Myanmar: A Successful Model for Dealing with the Myanmar Issue?" *China: An International Journal* 7, no. 2 (2009): 258-261.

4 In 2011, the US$3.6 billion Myitsone dam project was suspended by the civilian led government in Myanmar in response to significant local opposition. The project developed by a state-run Chinese company and brought Chinese workers into the area, faced significant opposition from the local Kachin population who were sidelined. The project involved government troops, which came into tension with the ethnic opposition group, Kachin Independence Organization. Stakeholders voiced their concern over the project over controversial issues such as manipulated environmental impact assessment, lack of transparency and corruption associated with the negotiation, negative ecological, environmental and social impacts, displacement of villagers, etc. Cook, A. D. B. "Myanmar's China Policy: Agendas, Strategies and Challenges." *China Report* 48, no. 3 (Sage Publication, 2012): 276-277.

5 Narayanan Ganesan, "Myanmar-China Relations: Interlocking Interests but Independent Output," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2011): 96.

6 According to Robert E. Harkavy, a pariah state is a small power with only marginal and tenuous control over its own fate, whose security dilemma cannot easily be solved by neutrality, nonalignment, or appeasement, and lacking dependable big-power support. Robert E. Harkavy, "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation," *International Organization* 35, no. 1 (1981): 136.

ships with reclusive nations in the past such as North Korea, Iran, Darfur, and Myanmar.[7] Whereas China provided diplomatic protection, these pariah states satisfied China's need for economic expansion and energy and natural resource securement in the absence of Western competition.[8] Since these states were heavily dependent on China for political and economic support, which were unattainable elsewhere due to international condemnation and isolation, China was certain of uncontested influence. The political transition of Myanmar, however, contradicted the orthodox view of China's monopolistic relationship with pariah states. In turn, such "humiliation" for China raised doubts about the future of its influence in other pariah states, especially North Korea. Specifically, whether its influence will remain or wane. And if so, would it trigger Chinese policy makers to adjust its foreign policies in order to maintain its regional influence in Asia?[9]

This paper will deal with the history of the Sino-Myanmar paukphaw relationship, analyzing the factors that triggered Myanmar's rapid improving relations with the West and deterioration with China. This study will then evaluate China's post-2011 foreign policies towards Myanmar and speculate the future of the Sino-Myanmar relationship. Finally, the paper will present the implications it has on China's future foreign policies towards Asia's sole pariah state, North Korea, and the lessons North Korea could take away from the Myanmar case.

Paukphaw: Sino-Myanmar Relationship

Myanmar, after its independence from the British in 1948, was one of the first countries to welcome and recognize the establishment of People's Republic of China. The two countries have since then enjoyed an amicable relationship where China considered Myanmar "essential" to its security and the latter stood "high in the degree of importance China attaches to its peripheral areas."[10] Over the period of six decades, the Sino-Myanmar relationship was premised upon the five principles of peaceful co-existence[11] and

7 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, "China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?" *Foreign Affairs* (January/February2008): 38.

8 Ibid, 41.

9 John Kim and Daniel Freedman. "What North Korea could learn from Myanmar," *CNN*, May 14, 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/14/opinion/kim-freedman-north-korea/ (accessed November 8, 2014)

10 Daw Than Han, "Common Vision: Burma's Regional Outlook," Occasional Paper, *Institute for the Study of Diplomacy School of Foreign Service*, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University (1988), 62.

11 Five principles of peaceful co-existence agreed upon by Myanmar, China and India was signed at Peking on 29 April 19. It includes mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sover-

was further strengthened by personal diplomacy from both sides, initiated by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to Myanmar in June 1954 followed by President U Nu's visit to China in November 1954. The result of high-level diplomatic exchange between the two countries gave birth to the *paukphaw* relationship, which was a high water mark of the bilateral relationship.

The Sino-Myanmar *paukphaw* relationship rapidly improved in 1988 as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) of Myanmar came into power, putting an end to the protest against its former government Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).[12] The rise of the new government led to the disintegration of the Burma Communist Party (BCP),[13] thus improving bilateral relations with China at a time when the Western states and Japan withheld ODA and imposed sanctions and weapon embargoes in response to Burma's crackdown on the protestors. During the initial period of Western ostracism and condemnation, SLORC's number two leader and Chief of Army Lt. General Than Shwe visited China. This became the watershed moment to the Myanmar-China relationship under the junta. The events of 1988 solidified China's "big brother" position in the *paukphaw* relationship and marked the beginning of a period where China would be Myanmar's staunchest supporter.

As the *paukphaw* relationship was based on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, China actively protected Myanmar from Western condemnation and the imposition of punitive measures on issues of democracy, human rights, and forced labor. China, within international fora such as the UN and ILO congresses, refused to accept sharp language and concrete measures on Myanmar due to the mutual interest between leaders of both countries in opposing "western values", which threatened the non-interference principle. China's protection of Myanmar from international criticisms and actions was reciprocated by Myanmar's support for China on various controversial issues such as Taiwan, bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the spy plane incident with the U.S.[14] Such political support was followed by high level exchanges of leaders and officials, which included

eignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, respect for mutual equality to work for mutual benefits, and peaceful co-existence.

12 The SLORC came into power through a military coup in 1988 after violently suppressing the 8888 Nationwide Popular Pro-democracy Protests, which accounted for thousands of civilian deaths.

13 In the 1950s, the People's Republic of China supported the Burma Communist Party, which was in direct opposition to the military government and was also a source to tension between the two countries.

14 Maxwell Harrington, "Conference Report: China– Myanmar Relations: The Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, no. 1 (2012): 134.

President Jiang Zemin's visit to Myanmar in December 2001 with a large entourage of 135 government officials. His visit once again gave reassurance of the *paukphaw* relationship between the two countries as he stressed the importance of "good neighborly foreign policy" and gave assurance that "this... will not change."[15]

China also provided relatively modern armaments that the Burmese government was forbidden to procure under sanctions imposed by Western states. Although Myanmar practiced strict neutrality during the Cold War, strong sanctions led Myanmar to rely heavily on its neighbor for not only small arms and ammunition but also large armaments. Two major deals with China were made in 1989 and 1994 involving weapons and military equipment worth US$1.2 billion for the former, and US$400 million for the latter.[16] In addition to arms trade, China trained Myanmar security personnel both in China and Myanmar, and provided facilities for production of mines, small arms and ammunition. Through Chinese assistance, Myanmar was able to make up for the lost time in enhancing its military capabilities to establish a credible defense of the state against internal and external aggression.

The trade border regularization between Myanmar and China in 1988 paved the way for substantial economic exchange, in which China became the major supplier of Myanmar's consumer products. Trade developed as Myanmar adopted an "open door policy" in 1990. Myanmar liberalized its economy and the volume of Chinese imports increased, ranking China as one of the top five traders with the nation.[17] In addition to contributing to Myanmar's economy along with booming trade, China was also involved in Myanmar's industrial and infrastructure development. Since Than Shwe's visit to China in 1989, Chinese, particularly Yunnanese, companies began to play a major role in the economic reconstruction of northern Myanmar. Examples of their roles included building power stations, roads, bridges and telecommunication facilities.[18] The vacuum created by Western sanctions was filled

15 "China-Myanmar Friendship Highlighted in Yangon," *People's Daily Online,* December 13, 2001,http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200112/13/eng20011213_86540.shtml (accessed November 8, 2014)

16 Poon Kim Shee, "The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions," *Southeast Asia* 19, no. 1 (1997): 36-37.

17 Toshihiro Kudo, "6: Myanmar's Economic Relations with China: Who Benefits and Who Pays?" *Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar* (2008): 90-91.

18 Jurgen Haacke, *Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and International Implications* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 17.

by China to meet Myanmar's attempt to modernize its archaic industries and infrastructure by providing the necessary machinery and equipment.

From Paukphaw to "Just" Neighbors

In 2011, the Sino-Myanmar *paukphaw* relationship took a turn as Myanmar underwent a rapid political reform unexpected by many, including China. The democratic reform began with President Thein Sein's historical meeting with National League of Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi, followed by a series of dramatic reform procedures such as the release of political prisoners, greater media and Internet freedom, and implementation of new labor laws. However, the most significant reform measures was the NLD's participation in the by-elections, winning 43 out of the 45 seats, giving them a key role in the domestic politics since the 1990 elections.[19]

The political reform in Myanmar was welcomed by the U.S. and in turn, rekindled the long abandoned U.S.-Myanmar relationship. President Barack Obama and US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton visited Myanmar in 2011 and 2012 signifying American support for the newly established democratic government, and the two historic visits were reciprocated by President Thein Sein's visit to the White House in May 2013. All of which signified the thawing of the U.S.-Myanmar relations after twenty years of sanctions and deadlock.

China's initial response to the Myanmar's political reform was doubt over the legitimacy of its transition. China believed the political change was in name only and its strategic blueprint for Myanmar, mainly concerning border stability, energy transportation, and economic cooperation, would continue as it had previously.[20] China's confidence in the *paukphaw* relationship was strengthened as the fourth highest ranking military leader of China's Central Military Commission visited Myanmar six weeks after the inauguration of Thein Sein's government and pushed for a "comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership" which was established two weeks thereafter.[21] China's expectations, however, were miscalculated as a series of events taking place from August 2012 frustrated China's Myanmar aspirations. The decision to suspend the Myitsone Dam project and Myanmar's

19 The NLD won 392 out of 492 seats in the 1990 elections. The military government, however, refused to recognize the results of the elections and put Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for 21 years until 2010 (BBC 2010).

20 Yun Sun, "China's Strategic Misjudgment on Myanmar," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 31, no. 3 (2012): 87.

21 Ibid, 83.

rapid improvement in its relations with the U.S. betrayed China's long held belief that it was one of Myanmar's few "loyal friends" and shook the foundation of China's strategic blueprint.

Myanmar's decision to transition primarily stemmed from the military's decreasing confidence as dissatisfaction grew among amongst civilians and the military itself in reflection of the nation's failing economy and governance. Top leaders, therefore, possessed great desire to change for better governance and economic performance. Since the crackdown on protesters in 1988, an incompetent and inexperienced government had searched for a way to return to civilian rule without relinquishing de facto military control of the government.[22] The first election in 1990 put the government's desires on hold as NLD had a landslide electoral victory increasing the military junta's anxiety and prolonged their plans for a gradual political reform. The central government, in efforts to simultaneously attain political reform and maintain its power, carefully planned out a seven-stage roadmap to "disciplined democracy,"[23] which called for the building of a modern, developed and democratic nation under old authorities.[24] In addition, the fall of dictators, such as Gaddafi in Libya and Mubarak in Egypt, from popular domestic uprisings left the regime restless.[25]

The key external factor for Myanmar's transition was China's large and growing presence in the Myanmar. In the initial stages of the *paukphaw* relationship, Myanmar enjoyed unconditional aid and support from China under the non-interference principle. However as China's strategic blueprint soon revealed its asymmetrical characteristics, which stemmed from Myanmar's international ostracism and heavy dependence on Beijing, the junta started considering the alternative of breaking out from isolation and diversifying its foreign relations to liberalize from its overdependence on China. Prior to the transition, anti-Chinese sentiments grew amongst military members and civilians as resources were sold at ridiculously cheap prices, and its infrastructure projects such as the Myitsone Dam project[26] brought on

22 Morten B. Pedersen, "The Politics of Burma's "democratic" Transition: Prospects for Change and Options for Democrats," *Critical Asian Studies* 43, no. 1 (2011): 56.

23 The seven-step Roadmap to Democracy, constituted in 2003, took eight long years to reach its final step as it was difficult to juggle between proceeding reform and retaining old powers.

24 Marco Bünte, "Burma's Transition to" Disciplined Democracy": Abdication Or Institutionalization of Military Rule?" German Institute of Global and Area Studies no. 177 (2011): 16.

25 Yun Sun, "China and the Changing Myanmar." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 31, no. 4 (2012), 56.

26 Until three years ago, China was not the largest investor in Myanmar, as ASEAN partners Thailand and Singapore surpassed China's levels of investments. In 2010, however, China invested more

negative ecological, environmental and social impacts displacing tens of thousands of local villagers. In addition, China's attempt for political leverage forced Myanmar to reluctantly accept China's de facto interference on ethnic border group issues and adjust its diplomatic positions for China in regional forums such as ASEAN. Initially, the junta continued the *paukphaw* relationship as it allowed military power maintenance while progressing with its gradual democratic transition, but when China's influence reached its paramount, Myanmar's leaders turned away from China beginning with the suspension of the Myitsone dam project in 2011. The transition led to a drastic reduction of Chinese investments and political interests in Myanmar. On the other hand, waned Chinese influence allowed the diversification of investments from U.S., Europe, Japan and Korean companies and increased political freedom for the new government.

The junta's desire to diversify foreign relations, in order to wane Chinese influences, was fulfilled as the Obama administration pursued the "Pivot to Asia" policy in 2011. Obama's "Pivot to Asia" discovered that engagement with Myanmar had geopolitical value as a counter to China and thereby served as a critical factor for the U.S. to pave a pathway to Asia.[27] The correspondence of Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy and Myanmar's struggle against an asymmetrical partnership with China overlapping at a similar period of time helped the Myanmar government make its transition from a military dictatorship to a civilian-led government.

Betrayal of a Loyal Friend

Myanmar's "China-unfriendly" moves, like the suspension of the Myitsone Dam project in 2011 and its rapid improvement in relations with the U.S., discouraged further aggressive investments and foreign policies from China. In response to Myanmar's actions after political reforms, China dramatically reduced its economic investments, intentionally cooled down its bilateral political ties and launched a massive public campaign inside Myanmar aimed at improving its image and relationship with local communities.[28]

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than $8 billion in three major projects, the Myitsone Dam project, Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines and the Letpadaung Copper Mine project. The locals did not welcome these projects as they had detrimental environmental and societal effects, leading to mass local protests and demonstrations. As a result, the Myitsone Dam was suspended in September 2011 and the Letpadaung Copper Mine has been suspended since November 2012.

27 Wei Ling, "Rebalancing Or De-Balancing: US Pivot and East Asian Order," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 35, no. 3 (2013): 152.

28 Yun Sun, "China and the Changing Myanmar." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 31, no. 4

From 2008 to 2011, China's total investment in Myanmar was an equivalent of US$13 billion, including the US$8 billion invested in its grand three projects.[29] Myanmar's political reform since 2011 led to a sharp decline in Chinese investments where in the fiscal year 2012/2013, Chinese companies investments fell to US$407 million,[30] a major decrease compared to that of the previous two years. Myanmar's sudden halt of the Myitsone Dam project and increased local anti-Chinese sentiment created problems and uncertainties for Chinese investors. As a result, China as of now perceives Myanmar as a relatively unfriendly and risky nation to invest in.[31] China was furthermore displeased by the government's inaction of protection measures for Chinese interests in the country.[32] For China, the "Chinese-unfriendly" actions taken by the reformist Burmese government were a hindrance to Beijing's strategic blueprint, especially in its energy security, which had always been China's priority.

Not only did China turn passive in terms of investments but also its foreign policies towards Myanmar were readjusted to reflect an increasingly tepid bilateral relationship. The intentional cooling of the Sino-Myanmar relationship was evident from the absence of Myanmar from China's recent regional itineraries. For example, no member of the Chinese Politburo Standing Committee visited Myanmar since its inauguration in November 2012,[33] and during China's regional charm offensive of 2013, President Xi and Premier Li's back-to-back visits of five ASEAN member countries did not include Myanmar.[34]

Myanmar's rapid shift from an over-dependent "little brother" to a reformist, more independent government not only caught Beijing off guard but put them in an uncertain position. China's officials have, at the moment, decreased political contact with Myanmar but still fear that the continuance of waning Chinese influence will threaten its strategic blueprint in Myanmar. Therefore, Beijing has launched massive public relations campaigns

(2012): 67.

29 China's grand three investments in Myanmar include Myitsone Dam project, the Letpadaung Copper Mine and the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines.

30 "Myanmar Attracts More than 8bl USD Foreign Investment in 2011," Xinhua News Agency, Mar 13, 2012.

31 Yun Sun, "Chinese Investment in Myanmar: What Lies Ahead?" *Great Powers and the Changing Myanmar Issue Brief* no. 1 (Sept 2013): 1.

32 *Ibid.*

33 Yun Sun, "China adapts to new Myanmar reality," *Asia Times Online*, December 23, 2013, http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-04-231213.html (accessed November 8, 2014).

34 Phuong Nguyen, "China's Charm Offensive Signals a New Strategic Era in Southeast Asia," *Center for Strategic International Studies* 5, Issue 21 (Oct 17, 2013): 5.

inside Myanmar aimed at improving China's image and relations with the local communities.[35] They have worked to build better relations with Myanmar's democratic opposition and civil society groups, including its attempts to raise the political influence, especially of NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, as demonstrated in China's domestic and foreign policies.[36] Furthermore, as a part of diplomatic outreach, dozens of groups of Burmese journalists, civil society leaders and political parties were invited to China, including members of the NLD.

At the moment, the Sino-Myanmar relationship shows little indication of refurbishment. As China has little faith in Myanmar to become its strategic corridor into the Indian Ocean and its loyal supporter at ASEAN, the government has shifted to take on a "wait and see" policy towards Myanmar.[37] In other words, it seems that Beijing will at least temporarily refrain from additional commitments and only focus on the existing ones. Some speculate the Chinese government resents President Thein Sein for Myanmar's turning away from the *paukphaw* relationship. It hopes the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)[38] remains a China-friendly political force and discreetly praises the political influence and ambition of Shwe Mann, current USDP chairman and speaker of the Lower House, and a strong presidential candidate in the 2015 elections.[39] In turn, Beijing has been working to cultivate close relations with Shwe Mann and assist the USDP in capacity building, alongside its massive public relations campaign as mentioned above.

Implications for North Korea

The wane of China's influence in Myanmar may alarm and cause Beijing to readjust its North Korean policy. Despite Myanmar and North Korea's black sheep status in the international community, the two have maintained a fairly stable relationship with China. In 2011, however, Beijing was caught in turmoil as Myanmar turned away from its *paukphaw* relationship and North

35 C.S. Kuppuswamy, "Myanmar-China Relations – Post Myitsone Suspension," *South Asia Analysis Group* No. 5380 (Jan 28, 2013).

36 Yun Sun, "China adapts to new Myanmar reality," *Asia Times Online*, December 23, 2013, http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-04-231213.html (accessed November 8, 2014).

37 Ishida Masami, "What Myanmar Can Learn on FDI from Other East Asian Countries: Positive and Negative Effects of FDI," *Institute of Developing Economic Japan External Trade Organization,* no.6 (Sept 2012), :.

38 Union Solidarity and Development Party is headed by President Thein Sein and its headquarters are in Naypyidaw.

39 Yun Sun, "China adapts to new Myanmar reality," *Asia Times Online*, December 23, 2013, http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-04-231213.html (accessed November 8, 2014).

Korea underwent a power transition. While Myanmar's reform caught China by surprise, Pyongyang has continued to put Beijing in the dark. From North Korea's nuclear program development to Jang Song-thaek's purge, it has become evident that Beijing's grip on North Korea is no stronger than that over Myanmar. China's failure in Myanmar, therefore, may signal the possibility of another weakening relationship, which in turn may humiliate China by indicating waning Chinese regional influence in Asia. The consequence could be detrimental to China's strategic blueprint in North Korea. Though China has signed on tougher U.N. sanctions after North Korea's third nuclear test in 2013, it has been criticized for failing to implement them by western countries and experts. Taking as a possibility of another Myanmar-type fiasco and North Korea's upcoming fourth nuclear test into consideration, China may feel compelled to take stronger measures in violation of its non-interference principle. Such steps would in all likelihood severely impair North Korea's economy and nuclear ambitions.

Myanmar's recent developments can also offer useful lessons for North Korea's political future. Many predict the only way for North Korea to rejoin the international community is through regime collapse and unification under South Korean authority, which may further enhance North Korea's anxiety and hostility. But Myanmar's peaceful power transition can show North Korea an alternative method of re-engaging with the international society whilst retaining its power. Though there stand critical differences between the two countries, such as North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, its *juche* system and absence of political opposition parties, North Korea can take away three valuable lessons from Myanmar's reforms. Firstly, reforms need to be in the interest of the ruling elite, ensuring their political survival. North Korea's one-man power concentration makes Arab Spring-like revolution difficult and therefore reforms will only take place if incentives and guarantee of political survival are assured. Second, foreign powers should effectively employ both sticks and carrots for North Korea. For example, it was a combination of Western sanctions and ASEAN's efforts to include Myanmar in its community that motivated Myanmar to progress. As such, foreign powers must cooperate to lay down clear punishments and rewards for North Korea, which will help build North Korean trust in the international community and counter perceptions that disarmament is a policy for regime change.[40] Lastly, Myanmar's successful transition will demonstrate the ben-

40 Jonathan T. Chow and Leif-Eric Easley, "No Hope Without Change: Myanmar's Reforms and Lessons for North Korea" *The Asan Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief* no. 36 (Nov. 30, 2012): 11.

efits of reform. Myanmar's friendly relations with the U.S., survival of old leaders, removal of sanctions and increased aid to Myanmar will signal to the North Korea regime that reforms need not mean a death sentence.

Conclusion

The strong, important and expansive Sino-Myanmar *paukphaw* relationship took an abrupt turn in 2011 when Myanmar underwent a political reform from a military dictatorship to a civilian-led government. Myanmar's political transition, supported by series of dramatic reform procedures such as welcoming Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD party to parliament along with increased media and Internet freedom, was triggered by three crucial factors. First, the military junta's decreasing confidence that stemmed from surmounting dissatisfaction amongst civilians and the military created internal desire to undertake a political reform. Second, China's overbearing presence in Myanmar, in which the "little brother" was over-dependent on its "big brother", pushed the military junta to consider the alternative of breaking out from isolation and diversify its foreign relations. Lastly, the correspondence of Obama's "Pivot to Asia" and Myanmar's struggle against the asymmetrical partnership with China happening simultaneously served as catalysts to the momentum of a great change taking place inside the once military dictatorship.

After Myanmar's transition in 2011, Beijing shifted to a "wait and see" policy, where for a time being China will refrain from additional commitments and only focus on existing ones. Though China's influence in Myanmar today is not as strong as that of the pre-transition period, Beijing remains critical to the future of Myanmar. As Myanmar's democratic reforms are still in its early stages, the country remains chaotic, incohesive and vulnerable. Though Myanmar, in order to refrain from relying heavily upon China, has diversified its foreign relations, no country knows Myanmar better than its *paukphaw*, China. Given that Myanmar still remains in early stages of national reconciliation, which may take years or if not decades to progress, western investors are extra cautious in their economic engagements. Therefore, the chances of western investment aiding Myanmar to bring national stability are weak. On the other hand, China will only continue to mature and grow in capacity, which in turn will make China indispensable for the future of Myanmar. In order for the relationship to recover, China may have to re-adjust its policies towards Myanmar so that Naypyidaw will once again regain its trust for China. To end, the Sino-Myanmar partnership is currently experiencing a

standstill, but considering the circumstances, this will only be temporary as the two have much to gain and improve from the *paukphaw* relationship. **Y**

INTERVIEW

A NEEDED INQUIRY

Interview with The Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG
Chair of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

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Established in 2013 by the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has provided new and valuable information to those concerned with the situation inside North Korea. Through the conducting of public hearings in Seoul, Tokyo, London and Washington D.C., the commission collected information and released a report in February 2014 which detailed many crimes occurred within North Korea, including crimes against humanity. The Hon Michael Kirby, former Justice of the High Court of Australia, was appointed to lead this inquiry. During a recent visit to Yonsei University in Seoul, Yonsei Journal of International Studies Editor in Chief Eric Watson was able to interview The Hon Michael Kirby.

Eric Watson: How did you become involved with the commission?

Michael Kirby: I was at a conference of statisticians in England. I was asked if I would accept a nomination to become a member of the commission. After reflecting on this with my partner I agreed and a few weeks later I was notified to this commission as chairman. I suspected the background behind my nomination was my earlier work in the 1990s as special representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations for Human Rights in Cambodia. That was dealing with human rights in a very vulnerable country at a vulnerable time with respect to the Khmer Rouge regime. I believe that this may have influenced the decision of the United Nations Human Rights Council and the High Commission for Human Rights to advance my name.

Eric Watson: Had the previous work in Cambodia benefited you during your work with this commission?

Michael Kirby: Yes it had. As I was the special representative of the Secretary General my job was to go on mission to Cambodia to investigate aspects of human rights in the country, to express the good and the bad that was happening, to report them to the Human Rights Commission as it then was

in Geneva and the Third Committee of the General Assembly in New York. It therefore gave me experience in the UN special procedures, specifically special procedures for human rights. I also insisted that I take a very active part in the writing of the reports as the special representative. In fact, I wrote all of the reports as a special representative. This was not feasible in the case of the DPRK report, but I weighed every word in the draft and made many suggestions and substantially the report reflects the input of the commissioners. It is not a bureaucratic report that has been written by others, into which the commissioners had little say. In fact, all of us contributed significantly to the style and content of the report. I believe the report on the DPRK is one of the most readable reports of the UN in recent years.

Eric Watson: Certainly it is extremely readable, and I believe you mentioned cutting down some parts to make it that way. However, it still remains very strategic in its use of language.

Michael Kirby: Related to that is the fact that we used the quotations from the transcript of the witnesses' oral testimony to the Commission of Inquiry (COI), which means that the report has a great vividness. It speaks in a very direct way from the viewpoint of the witnesses. It tells the stories of human rights deprivation in the context of the nine headings of the mandate of the COI. All of this adds to the sharpness and readability of the report's contents.

Eric Watson: In creating the mandate, what was the process to decide these nine headings and the scope of the COI?

Michael Kirby: The mandate had been decided before I was appointed and was determined by the Human Rights Council. I believe it grew out of the debates between the supporting member countries and the international civil society organization that were active proponents of the creation of a special COI. These international organizations included Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and other international bodies based in Geneva that work around and with the members of the Human Rights Council.

Eric Watson: How did your previous impression and knowledge of North Korea and its regime impact you during your work?

Michael Kirby: I had no great knowledge of North Korea beyond the knowledge of an informed layperson who reads the Economist and is therefore

kept up to date with developments in North Korea, but not as a specialist. I could therefore approach the North Korea investigation in a highly professional way as a person who had spent 34 years as a judge, investigating a whole multitude of issues both big and small, at different levels. It was good training for report writing and for the analysis of issues. People ask me, "How was I able to cope with the stress of the Human Rights stories that were told to us by witnesses?" To be completely honest, I didn't find it that difficult because for most of my life I had been dealing with stories of many wrongs that had been done by one person to another or one institution to another. Therefore, it takes a lot to cause emotion, in a raw kind, on the part of a person like me. In that sense, coming to the issue of North Korea as a person, not an expert, as a person who has professionally for decades been analyzing problems, I was able to address the issues of North Korea with a great degree of dispassion. I did not approach it with hostility to North Korea. I did not know enough about North Korea to feel hostile toward the regime. I had curiosity. Even at the end of the inquiry I did not have hostility to North Korea, I just reported the human rights abuses that had been described and that this commission had found had occurred. This was exactly what we were asked to do.

Eric Watson: This use of testimonies is unique. What was the motivation to make these testimonies public and to host them online for viewing?

Michael Kirby: First of all, my experience was in a common law country. In such countries, it is common that these inquiries are held in public. This may be an aspect of general attitudes to transparency or it may be simply a long tradition that has been followed. It does tend to add to cost and time, but it serves a role as an educational process for the community involved. It also allows those making the decisions to be themselves the subject of judgment and scrutiny. There was an additional consideration in the case of North Korea. They did not permit the COI to enter the country despite the resolution established by the Human Rights Council that urged them to cooperate. Therefore, we had the risk that our inquiry would be disrespected because we were not able to enter North Korea. The way to resolve that risk was to ensure that we proceeded in a fair process and that a wide audience could scrutinize the witnesses. Since there is not a wider audience than those that have access to the Internet, we decided it was useful and wise in the circumstances to put the testimony online. This was as long as the witnesses consented and that we judged that there was no risk to them or

their families in North Korea. I believe that our decision was vindicated and that the process of the public hearings was a definite plus to methodology of the COI. I believe it is also likely that in the future the UN COI's will in many cases be conducted in public. It fulfills the information gathering purpose, it stimulates interest, it raises expectations that something will be done, and finally it is more transparent and therefore a more modern way in which to gather evidence.

Eric Watson: In post-apartheid South Africa there was a truth and reconciliation commission. It has been noted that some of those who had been victimized found in a sort of healing or redemptive quality to the public hearings and discussions. Did you find any sort of similar comments from those who gave testimonies? What was the general feeling from some of those who gave testimonies?

Michael Kirby: In a rather formal way, we did not have a lot of contact with the witnesses outside the hearing room of the commission. Therefore, I haven't had the benefit of reflection by them on their experience from their point of view. Perhaps this displays the attitude of someone who worked for 34 years as a judge. I didn't tend to meet people before or after they gave testimony. There is an element of objectivity and independence from the witnesses. We were not working closely with civil society organizations. We simply heard the testimony, analyzed it, and then reported on it. It will fall to others to talk to the witnesses and see if they found it redemptive. What was most striking about the witnesses was that in a manner not unlike witnesses of the Holocaust, they gave their testimony in a very low-key, matter of fact way. They did not appear, with perhaps one or two exceptions, emotionally charged or furious or hostile with the DPRK. They were simply recounting some horrible experiences in their life, and on the whole doing so in a very restrained way. Sometimes they would acknowledge aspects of life in North Korea that were favorable to North Korea. This bolstered the credibility of his or her testimony, as someone who is simply a hostile witness normally wouldn't do this.

Eric Watson: In the report, there was an intentional distinction between crimes against humanity and genocide. The commission stopped short of saying this was genocide, but noted that there were grounds for further investigation. What was the thought process behind this?

Michael Kirby: This can be found in the report. The commission was not entitled to decide that genocide had been proved without regard to the technical definition of genocide in international law. The Genocide Convention substantially provides that technical definition. The Genocide Convention was negotiated in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and therefore reflected the concerns of genocide that had came to the fore after 1945. Those concerns related mostly, but not only, to the Jewish population that had been exterminated in concentration camps established by the Nazi regimes in the occupied territories of Europe. Therefore, the Genocide Convention defines genocide as the extermination of a population or part of a population by state policy with reference to the ethnicity, nationality, race, or religion of the group in question. In the case of the DPRK, the main reason between the extermination of portions of the population of North Korea was not race or religion. It was rather, actual or presumed, hostility to the politics of the regime. Therefore, the grounds of the violent killing of portions of the population did not fit comfortably into the definition of genocide as expressed in the Genocide Convention.

A question then arose as to whether the commission of inquiry should consider that the modern definition of genocide had expanded somewhat form the definition in 1948 in the Genocide Convention. There were arguments both ways on this issue. On the one hand, the convention is a very important document. Genocide is an extremely significant international crime and therefore it should advance to a more modern appreciation to include political genocide. On the other hand, the COI considered that it should adhere to the Genocide Convention and the definition there entailed, subject to one matter that I will mention. The COI therefore concluded that genocide could not be found, at least not found on the standard of proof that was accepted by the COI. Namely, the standard of proof that the presence of reasonable grounds for concluding the crime had been made out by the testimony.

There was one subordinate question that arose, which arose out of the fact that a portion of the population had been radically reduced by a reference to religion. The Christian population of North Korea at the time of partition was approximately 24%, roughly the same percent as the current Christian population of South Korea. At the time of the commissions report, according to the statistics of the DPRK, the Christian population is at 0.8%. The question arose as to whether this was due to extermination or due to the discouragement of religion by communist ideology, which declares that religion is the “opiate of the people”. In other words, something into which people are seduced. This is of course not rational. As we could not definitely decide

this question and did not feel we had reasonable ground in favor of finding genocide, we ultimately concluded that a finding of genocide should not be be announced by the COI. Additionally, we had consulted international scholars, including William Schabas, who is a world scholar on the issues of crimes against humanity and genocide. The important point he made to us was the we should not look to genocide as the international crime equal to the "gold standard", feeling that in someway we had fallen short of the most serious international crime because we could not find genocide as an established crime in the case of North Korea. He points out that crimes against humanity are themselves extremely serious international crimes and therefore there should be no feeling of any obligation to press further to an equally serious crime of genocide. That being the case, we did not have to press our conclusion that the crime of genocide had perhaps advanced beyond the definition of the Genocide Convention. It was enough to find that crimes against humanity, which we did, and that is where we left the matter. We did indicate however, that the opinions of the three commissioners, that genocide might have indeed advanced to include political genocide. That is a matter that should have further consideration by the international community. International crimes can expand in content; however, great care must be adopted in a very serious crime like genocide. This is so you do not push it beyond which it can legitimately carry.

Eric Watson: What do you hope this report provides for those working on the human rights situation in North Korea?

Michael Kirby: First and foremost, it gives a voice to the victims and people who have been found to be probable victims of very serious crimes against human rights or crimes against humanity. Second, it gives respect to the international human rights organizations which have been supporting and listening to those victims and vindicates their efforts over the years. Third, it compresses into one document a huge amount of knowledge and expertise that has been compressed to about 400 pages. People spend their whole lives studying North Korea, and most people do not have time to consider every aspect of the crimes in North Korea. Now, in a relatively short space, there is a complete review of the crimes that we have found on the nine headings that were provided by the Human Rights Council to the commission. Therefore, the greatest value is that it brings knowledge in a compressed form of a very wide range of crimes, and a huge amount of information to a very large audience. It is available online, the public hearings

are online, as are the transcripts in multiple languages including Korean. The challenge now is to get the report and the background information into the hands of people in North Korea. The people of North Korea have a right to know what the United Nations has found in respect to human rights in their country. The government of North Korea should make that available to them. The commission constantly requested access to North Korea and has indicated it has prepared to go to North Korea to justify this to the regime and to answer questions. So far, that invitation has not been taken up but the offer still stands.

Eric Watson: We know that China has in instances opposed sanctions against North Korea. Do you feel that this report will put pressure on China and its use of veto power in the Security Council?

Michael Kirby: China is very prudent in its use of veto power given to it as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council under the charter. In the whole history of the occupation of the China Sea by the PRC, China has only used the veto ten times. Including in the most recent instance of the suggestion that Syria should be referred to the International Criminal Court. That is a very small number in contrast to the Russian Federation and the US, which has used the veto power many more times. So, it can't be assumed that China will use its veto power, and in any case it is a decision China will have to make. It will have to face the people of the world and the pages of history. Already in blogs in China, in the new openness of China, are beginning to ask why their government is not supporting the actions of the UN in respect to the horrible acts reported on the part of North Korea. It is a question of China's assessment of itself and of China's assessment of its role as a permanent member of the Security Council. It is one of the countries with the gateway keys to the responsibility to protect. The responsibility to protect exists in international law, at least in cases where the crimes are crimes against humanity or genocide, and the country concerned will not protect its citizens, such as North Korea.

Eric Watson: One of the findings was the poor welfare of children, specifically those that participate in the mass games that are a tourist draw in North Korea. What is your personal opinion of tourism toward the DPRK?

Michael Kirby: On the whole, I think tourism is a contribution to human peace and human rights. Many countries try to control what tourists do and where they go. No country is as emphatic in its control as North Korea. Therefore people who go to North Korea have to understand that they are going to a country where they will not be able to just wander around and visit where they would like to. They will be under the control of their guardians who watch their every move and ensure that they do not make contact with ordinary Korean people. It is not really tourism, as we would normally understand the word. I believe the mass games stand as a case apart. We found evidence that the children that participate in the mass games do so at the expense of their education. They are taken from their classes, they have to endure extremely long hours often in harsh weather conditions, all for a relatively short time of glorifying the regime and its supreme leader and the supreme leaders family. For my part, I can see some reasons as to why people would visit North Korea as a tourist. It would give them some idea, and perhaps some opportunities to express their beliefs, and express the solidarity of the international community. But, at the moment, I do not think I would visit the mass games. They might have magnificent choreography, but so were the Nazi parades. It isn't an attribute of a free society to have thousands of people and thousands of school children engaged in a mindless set of exercises where the only beauty of it is that they are all in locked step doing the bidding of the supreme leader.

Eric Watson: During your time in Seoul, you met with researchers and public officials. What have been the responses from these individuals when discussing this report with you?

Michael Kirby: First, I hope that the commission's report does not simply gather dust as is often the case with UN reports. Second, I hope that the momentum that has been built up by very widespread publicity of the report will continue. North Korea has been an expert at avoiding publicity of their wrongs and it is important that the world knows, and addresses these wrongs that have occurred over decades to the people of North Korea. Third, I hope that the field office that will be created in South Korea will become a place where victims can go and have their stories recorded. Hopefully these stories will become in due course possibly part of the brief for the prosecutorial services of the ICC or other judicial tribunals, and certainly for the history of the Korea people it is important that this chapter is recorded and kept for posterity. Only those who recall and learn from the lessons of history will

avoid repeating them. Finally, I hope that the case of North Korea will once again illustrate the importance of universal human rights. The ambassador for North Korea said that they have a saying in Korea, “mind your own business”. Human rights are the business of the whole world, and it is important that we constantly acknowledge that and renew our conviction. We must do something when we are informed of serious crimes, particularly crimes against humanity and genocide. **Y**

REVIEW

AN INDIVIDUAL TRANSFORMED

A Review of Dear Leader: Poet, Spy, Escapee—A Look Inside North Korea

Brandon K. Gauthier

AN INDIVIDUAL TRANSFORMED

Brandon K. Gauthier
Fordham University

Jang Jin-sung, *Dear Leader: Poet, Spy, Escapee—A Look Inside North Korea* (New York: Atria, 2014)

Jang Jin-sung's *Dear Leader* is the real-life account of a high-ranking member of the Korean Workers' Party forced to defect from North Korea, exchanging a life of privilege in Pyeongyang for desperation in China. Jang's story, however, is more than a tale of survival—it is an indictment of the North Korean political system, a narrative about losing faith and coming to terms with the hypocrisy of a government one was supposed to love unquestioningly. In that account, the author describes experiences that not only brought him face-to-face with Kim Jong Il, but also top-secret documents on the history of the Dear Leader's rise to power. Kim Jong Il, Jang argues, gained complete control of the North Korean government in the early 1980s by purging enemies and manipulating Kim Il Sung as a figure-head. These arguments—interwoven with the story of Jang's struggle for survival after defecting—are as fascinating as they are often startling.

But *Dear Leader* is most valuable not as an insider's account of the North Korean government but as the story of one individual transformed by that system. This book, first and foremost, is a narrative of woe, anger, and enduring loss—the account of a man that not only hates the North Korean state, but despises the actions it forced him to take. Jang's story is the tortured tale of what happens when an individual realizes that everything he once thought was real is a tragic farce.

Dear Leader stands out prominently from a burgeoning defector literature in English. Unlike Kang's Chol-hwan's *The Aquariums of Pyongyang*, Shin Dong-hyuk's *Escape from Camp 14*, or Kang Hyok's *This is Paradise! My North Korean Childhood*, this book is the rare chronicle of a person from the very top of the North Korean power structure.[1] Rivaled only by the ac-

1 Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, *The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag* (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Blaine Harden, *Escape From Camp 14: One Man's Remark-*

counts of the late Hwang Jang-yop—detailed in *Exit Emperor Kim Jong-il*—Jang's story describes how a high-ranking member of the Korean Workers' Party managed to defect when his life was threatened.[2]

A Question of Faith

That narrative begins with Jang meeting Kim Jong Il in 1999—an experience that left the author deeply shaken. Whisked away in the middle of the night alongside a small number of party elites, Jang expected to meet a god-like figure; instead, he found himself "confronted by an old man who looks like nothing like the familiar image of the People's Leader." (xvii) At that extravagant dinner party, complete with flaming ice cream and mood lighting for each course, Jang watched with horror as the "Dear Leader" used crass language towards his obsequious subordinates. "For the first time in my life," Jang recalls of that dinner, "loyal obedience makes me cringe." (xxii)

It was Jang's fidelity, however, that had earned him the rare opportunity to dine with "the General" in the first place. At just the age of 27, he had received an appointment to work in the DPRK's United Font Department (UFD), a top-secret division of the Workers' Party tasked with policy-making and espionage. The author worked as a poet in the UFD's literature section—Office 101 (no 1984 pun-intended)—tasked with studying materials from the ROK to "inhabit South Korea's collective psyche so as to undermine and triumph over it." (9) In that role, Jang authored a poem on "Seongun Korea" that gained him widespread acclaim and a seat at the dinner table alongside Kim Jong Il. If that latter experience disturbed Jang, it also classed him as one of the "Admitted"—a citizen outside the reach of security services without the permission of Kim Jong Il. "I was loyal and fearless," the author recalled of his standing in society thereafter. (3)

The internal contradictions of North Korean life rendered that contentment short-lived. After the UFD tasked the author with writing a new poem dedicated to Kim Il Sung, Jang returned to his hometown of Sariweon, some 40 miles south of Pyeongyang. The place he found, ravaged by the ghoulish realities of the "Arduous March," was barely recognizable. Starving and exhausted townspeople marveled at him everywhere he went—"We heard you

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able Odyssey From North Korea to Freedom in the West (London: Penguin Books, 2012); Kang Hyok and Philippe Grangereau, *This is Paradise: My North Korean Childhood* (London: Abacus, 2007).

2 John H. Cha and K.J. Sohn, *Exit Emperor Kim Jong-il: Notes from His Former Mentor* (Bloomington, IN: Abbott Press, 2012).

had dinner with the General! What kind of porridge does he like to eat?" a jaundiced neighbor asked Jang; "Oh, you know the song, 'The Rice Balls of the General'?" the author replied, "Just like in that song, he shared a rice ball with us." Jang, privileged and well fed, became a reluctant participant in a morally repugnant charade.

Thereafter, Jang couldn't write praise for the leadership without envisioning the misery of Sariweon. In private, he wrote poetry expressing his anger towards the regime and shared his frustration with a trusted friend, Hwang Young-min. Eventually, Jang lent that friend a South Korean book from the UFD—an action punishable by death. When Hwang knocked on his door late on January 10, 2004, explaining that he had left the book on the Pyeongyang Metro, the two men realized that authorities would trace it back to them. They had no choice but to defect to China or face execution.

The next morning, Jang left his parents' home for the last time, wearing sunglasses to hide his tears and remaining silent about his impending defection. (This, he thought, would prevent them from having to lie to interrogators after his escape.) "I knew that the Workers' Party could take away my right to life," the author writes with rage of that moment, "but it had also taken away my right to say good-bye to my family." Just as the DPRK had made Jang write on its behalf, it also forced him to turn his back on his own family without a word of regret.

Throughout Jang and Hwang's desperate efforts to reach the South Korean embassy in Beijing thereafter, the author finds himself tormented by new questions about the DPRK. How had China achieved so much economic success and North Korea remained so impoverished? How could the North Korean government let human traffickers sell North Korean women as "pigs" in Manchuria? The author focuses his anger on the "Dear Leader," writing: "I felt disgust for Kim Jong-il, who didn't seem to be humiliated at all by what he had reduced his nation's women to, or to care enough to intervene." (165) The man Jang had encouraged others to worship was guilty of so much more than he had ever realized.

The Secrets Are Too Much

It is in this regard that the author explains how his work in the UFD contributed to his mounting resentment of Kim Jong Il before his defection. Selected in 1999 to participate in writing the *Annals of the Kim Dynasty,* an official history of Kim Il Sung's rule, Jang examined top-secret documents that revealed the "Dear Leader" had organized against his father's support-

ers throughout the 1970s, building his own faction in the "Organization and Guidance Department" of the Workers' Party (an all-powerful entity, the author contends, that still dominates the DPRK today). By 1982, Jang argues, Kim Jong Il had silently seized power, leaving his father a weak figurehead.

These discoveries, the author states, deeply disquieted him. "I became terrified by the knowledge," he writes, "that the Dear Leader was neither compassionate nor divine, and had acquired his power by acts of terror, betrayal, and revenge." (135) Jang's position—promoting a government he had begun to loathe—became unbearable. "I want out," he told a trusted co-worker of his work for the UFD. "The secrets are too much for me to bear. I don't think I can ever have a free conscience again, knowing the truths behind the lies." (136) "Don't be stupid," Jang's friend replied, "...keep it all shut inside you..." That is largely what Jang did until his defection in 2004.

In the present, Jang's *Dear Leader* is an effort to clear his conscience—to exercise the residue of anger and guilt that remain with him from his life in North Korea. If the story of his desperate efforts to avoid arrest in China and attain freedom in South Korea ultimately prove successful, it's clear that the burden of the author's salvation still looms large. So many defectors—Jang understands all too well—were not as fortunate as him. Chinese authorities captured his friend, Hwang Young-min, who then threw himself off a cliff to avoid deportation to North Korea. Countless other defectors have found themselves held as slaves by Chinese flesh traders or tortured in North Korean labor camps.

This reality weighs heavily on the author, and he has thus used his freedom to challenge the tyranny of the North Korean regime in *Dear Leader*. His earlier book of poetry, *Nae Ttaleul Baek Wone Bapnida* (*I Sell My Daughter for 100 Won*)[3], recounts the grim realities of the "Arduous March," and his new publication, *New Focus International*[4], provides in depth analysis of political and economic developments in North Korea. However, the author's newest work is his most powerful contribution to the plight of the North Korean people to date. That story shares his experiences with a larger audience beyond South Korea and is a reminder that the North Korean people are the strongest force north of the Korean DMZ. As they learn more about the crimes of their government, they, too, will struggle with the same emo-

3 Jin Seong Jang, Nae Ttaleul Baek Wone Bapnida (Seoul: Jogamjae, 2008); available in English by: Sun Young Soon (trans.) and Jang Jin-sung, *Selling My Daughter for 100 won* (Tokyo: Banseisha, 2009).

4 See: *New Focus International: Authentic North Korea News, Analysis and Features,* (www.newfocusintl.com).

tions of the author and find themselves compelled to take greater risks for the sake of change and freedom. As Jang Jin-sung states in closing: “We must place our faith in the people of North Korea, not in the system that imprisons them.” (317) We would be well advised to heed that advice. **Y**

Erreta

The following errata apply to Volume 6 Issue 1 of the Yonsei Journal of International Studies. The appropriate updates have been made and are reflected on the official website.

Page 3: “Geoffrey Fatting” should be changed to “Geoffrey Fattig”.

Page 12: “Geoffrey Fatting” and “grfatting@gmail.com” should changed to “Geoffrey Fattig” and “grfattig@gmail.com.”

Page 125: “Geoffrey Fatting” should be changed to “Geoffrey Fattig”.

Page 127: “Geoffrey Fatting” should be changed to “Geoffrey Fattig”.

Page 147: ”The American-Korean Friendship And Information Center And North Korean Public Diplomacy, 1971-1979” should be changed to ”The American-Korean Friendship And Information Center And North Korean Public Diplomacy, 1971-1976”

Page 147: The indicated abstract should be replaced with “While scholars of the “new diplomatic history” have extensively a*nalyzed the role of culture and ideology in the history of American foreign relations, the histori- ography of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) reflects a complete lack of understanding of the cultural, intellectual, and political narratives that have long shaped how Americans imagine North Korea in a domestic and global context. Specifically, historians*

have yet to consider how American attitudes about North Korea were increasingly informed by a transnational flow of ideas in the 1970s. With this understanding, this paper details the history of the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center (AKFIC) in New York City, a North Korean funded "anti- imperialist peace organization," that sought to generate public support for the DPRK and force the withdrawal of American troops from the Korean peninsula. Utilizing interviews with former members of the group and its journal: Korea Fo- cus, this paper makes two arguments: first, the DPRK used its close relationship with the AKFIC—alongside other "friendship societies" across the world—to har- ness the power of globalization for its own ends in the 1970s; second, members of the AKFIC sought to manipulate public anger over the Vietnam War and pro- mote North Korean demands that US forces should withdraw from the Republic of Korea (ROK)."

GUIDELINES

FOR SUBMISSION

PEAR (Papers, Essays and Reviews) welcomes submissions from all scholars, most notably graduate students, regarding the diverse field of International Studies, particularly those topics that challenge the conventional wisdom of any given issue. Each issue of the printed Journal will contain the following three sections:

PAPERS This section includes feature-length articles of original research and must include proper citations. This section showcases compelling and stimulating research that provides a collage of situations and cases. Inclusions should range from 3,000 to 8,000 words.

ESSAYS Dedicated to editorials, recommendations and reflections, this section includes essays that takes stances on issues and develop sophisticated argumentations. Though not limited to a particular theme, these essays can discuss past events, current situations and future perspectives. Inclusions should range from 1,500 to 3,000 words.

REVIEWS This section focuses on evaluations and reviews of existing arguments contained in essays, articles and books, in addition to policy reviews or previously published material in the Journal. The pros and cons of each argument or policy reviewed should be provided for a broader and more comprehensive understanding of not only the argument, but the situation in a greater context. Inclusions should be no longer than 2,000 words.

The following guidelines should be adhered to for all submissions to the Journal:

1. All submissions must be sent as a Microsoft Word file.
2. Citations should appear as endnotes as per the *Chicago Manual of Style.*
3. Pages should not be numbered or marked with the author's name.
4. Papers should include an abstract of no longer than 250 words as a separate document.
5. A short biography of the author should be included with each submission.
6. American spelling should be used in all submitted pieces.
7. Foreign words should be Romanized according to the following systems:
   Japanese: Revised Hepburn
   Korean: Revised Romanization
   Chinese: Pinyin

Submissions that neglect these guidelines will take longer to review and may be sent back to the author for revisions.

Each article submitted to the Journal is blind peer reviewed. All articles are judged on the basis of relevance to the theme (if applicable), originality, argumentation and prose. The editor in chief holds final authority as to inclusions and rejections of articles for publication.

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