

# PEAR

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## **PAPERS, ESSAYS, AND REVIEWS**

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## LETTER

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### FROM THE EDITOR

The timeline of the latter half of 2016 includes major political events like the election of Donald Trump as the 45<sup>th</sup> President of the United States, not to mention the “Choi Soon-shil Gate” scandal, massive public protests, and National Assembly vote for the impeachment of Park Geun-hye here in South Korea, where the Journal is based. Apart from events involving highly visible individuals, hotspots across the world continue to be subject to festering tensions coming from multiple countries. Notably, the South China Sea and the islands it houses remain contested between surrounding countries; the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weaponry and recent testing that showcased that capability are keeping neighbors like South Korea, China, and Japan, as well as the US, on edge; also, terrorism, while still concentrated in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, has spread to other areas, even despite military intervention targeting major terrorist organizations and splinter groups. International relations involve a complex web of individual and collective perception, as well as action – reactions and interactions – within and across physical boundaries. This Fall/Winter 2016 issue of the Yonsei Journal of International Studies (Papers, Essays, and Reviews) features the theme “Interactions Across Borders” and contains seven pieces of writing from a diverse set of scholars, plus an interview and book review.

Starting with “Papers,” Giulia Dondoli challenges the view that LGBTI organizations have been blocked from access to the United Nations through the granting of consultative status by showing how specific country delegates have actually pushed that process forward. Her paper is titled “Searching for an Advocacy Venue: How LGBTI Organizations are Getting Access to the United Nations.” Then, Na Young Lee’s “Post US-DPRK Nuclear Negotiation:

Hidden Cycle of ‘Renege-Warning-Counter Renege’” looks at a more obscured portion of the “crisis-negotiation-resolution” process, revealing a not-so-irrational DPRK that reacts only given certain conditions related to US behavior and the tone of the US-DPRK relationship. These claims may have salience for the US in future DPRK denuclearization efforts. Staying on the topic of the DPRK, joint authors Max Nurnus and Maël ‘Alan’ van Beek focus on perceptions of the country in “North Korea in the European Press: An Analysis of Stereotypes in British, French, and German Newspapers,” showing differences in media portrayal and stereotyped imagery, especially in comparison to the US. Closing the section is Rita Hill’s “Mother Tongue or Master Tongue?: An Examination of English as Medium of Instruction Policies in Post-colonial African Universities,” which historically and theoretically contextualizes the problematic nature of English only educational environments and argues for the incorporation of indigenous languages.

Next, the “Essays” include three pieces that discuss both national and transnational issues involving ethnic minorities in China, overlapping claims in the South China Sea, and the growth of Boko Haram’s terrorism. First, Dr. Geeta Kocchar outlines the concept of the “Chinese Nation” and the progression of racial and ethnic communities in and around China in “The Evolution of the ‘Chinese Nation’: Disharmony in the Coexistence of Ethnic Communities,” pointing out how a unity-based rhetoric has joined different ethnicities together, but has also seen the strengthening of ethnic minority dissent. Reflecting upon the outcome of a major case in the South China Sea dispute – the Philippines v. China ruling made in favor of the former earlier this year – Grant Fellows provides evidence of Russian support for China. His essay, titled “Arctic Echoes: Potential Repercussions of Russia’s Response to the Philippines v. China,” likewise forecasts how this stance may disadvantage as well as benefit Russia in the future, given their own assertion of rights over Arctic waters. Lastly, James Olusegun Adeyeri’s “Boko Haram Islamist Insurgency in Nigeria: Transnational Dimensions and Opportunities for Peace and Security” traces a timeline of Boko Haram’s beginnings and eventual expansion beyond the borders of Nigeria, highlighting the necessity for a concerted, collective opposition effort combining both military and non-military tactics.

As always, the issue ends with an interview and book review, which this time both deal with developments in Asia. Our very own Alexandra Stephenson posed questions to Benoit Hardy-Chartrand, currently Senior Research Associate at the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Canada, who further discusses the content in one of his recent publications and delves

into the dynamics of perception among China, Japan, and South Korea. He also gives his opinion on Donald Trump's Asia policy, President Duterte of the Philippines, aftereffects of the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and more. And in the review of Chung Min Lee's new publication, *Fault Lines in a Rising Asia*, Cheol Bin (Jason) Shin provides a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book, along with balanced critique, reiterating the core of the book's argument that sees Asia as rising, but mired in security dilemmas that deny it from overpowering the US as a hegemonic power.

In closing, I would like to extend my warmest thanks to every member of the Journal staff who has contributed to making this issue a reality. In addition, we deeply appreciate our contributors and are honored to share their voices and insights. This is the first and last time I will fill the position of Editor in Chief by myself, and I take along with me only good memories as I prepare to leave the academic community here. I remain indebted to the YJIS team and Yonsei GSIS in many ways. Looking forward, we also say goodbye to veteran member Gordon Gatlin, who has handled the design and online presence of the Journal for quite some time; we wish him the best in his post-graduate journey. I have faith that the next Editor in Chief will carry out and further strengthen the YJIS legacy, and am excited for the future of the Journal. We hope all our contributors and readers enjoy this issue and continue to support YJIS in the years to come.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Angela Lee Sherman". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Angela" being the most prominent.

Angela Lee Sherman  
Editor in Chief





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## PAPERS

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# SEARCHING FOR AN ADVOCACY VENUE: HOW LGBTI ORGANIZATIONS ARE GETTING ACCESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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Giulia Dondoli

University of Waikato

*Social movement scholars are showing a growing interest for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) activism. This article aims to address the LGBTI advocacy towards international organizations by studying the applications of 12 LGBTI organizations for consultative status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council between 2006 and 2014. In doing so, this article collects official reports from the Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations and the Economic and Social Council. This article argues that the general assumption that LGBTI organizations have had limited or no access to the work of the United Nations is unfounded. Indeed, through textual analysis it is found that LGBTI organizations have had the favor of some sympathetic country delegates who have helped them in achieving consultative status.*

This article discusses the case of the application to consultative status of LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex) organizations. Between 2006 and 2014, the Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs Com) decided on the consultative status of 12 LGBTI organizations.<sup>1</sup> All of these nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have eventually been granted consultative status, but nine had first been rejected by the NGOs Com and then the decision was overturned by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). This paper aims to explain this dynamic with

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1 The 12 organizations include: the European branch of the International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans Intersex Association (ILGA Europe) (2006), Danish National Association for Gays and Lesbians (2006), Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany (2006), Coalition gaie et lesbienne du Québec (2007), Federación Estatal de Lesbianas, Gays, Transexuales y Bisexuales (2008), Federatie van Nederlandse Verenigingen tot Integratie van Homoseksualiteit (COC Nederland) (2008), Associação Brasileira de Gays, Lésbicas e Transgêneros (2009), International Gay Lesbian Human Rights Committee (IGLHRC – now OutRights International) (2010), International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans Intersex Association (ILGA) (2011), Australian Lesbian Medical Association (ALMA) (2013), Homosexuelle Initiative Wien (2013), and Allied Rainbow Community International (ARC International) (2014).

a social movement theoretical framework, and in particular, through the lenses of the political opportunity approach.

LGBTI activism has become critical to the social movement debate.<sup>2</sup> Scholar Sidney Tarrow has noted that the majority of social movement academics study social movements with a primary focus on the domestic perspective,<sup>3</sup> with a particular country focus,<sup>4</sup> or on comparative study between two or more countries.<sup>5</sup> Among these country-focused studies, two essay collections analyzed a large number of country-based LGBTI social movements and then drew conclusions on the LGBTI social movement from a global perspective. First, Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel found that LGBTI social movements are more likely to be successful in consensus democracies; in countries that recognize minority groups; countries with a powerful left-wing coalition; and countries where homosexual conduct is legal.<sup>6</sup> Second, Tremblay, Paternotte, and Johnson found that LGBTI social movements can be more successful in consociational democracies – i.e. countries characterized by several cultural, religious, and ethnic differences; in countries organized as federative states; and when radical state transformations and political ruptures occur.<sup>7</sup> Although both essay collections flagged the relevance of a “global” or “transnational” LGBTI social movement,<sup>8</sup> they still focus on political domestic factors. Indeed,

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2 See especially David Paternotte and Manon Tremblay, *The Ashgate Research Companion to Lesbian and Gay Activism* (Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate, 2015).

3 Sidney G. Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 24.

4 Verta A. Taylor and Mary Bernstein, *The Marrying Kind? Debating Same-Sex Marriage within the Lesbian and Gay Movement* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); Mary Bernstein, “Identities and Politics: Toward a Historical Understanding of the Lesbian and Gay Movement,” *Social Science History* 26, no. 3 (2002); Robert Rhodes-Kubiak, *Activist Citizenship and the LGBT Movement in Serbia: Belonging, Critical Engagement, and Transformation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Lynette J. Chua, “Pragmatic Resistance, Law, and Social Movements in Authoritarian States: The Case of Gay Collective Action in Singapore,” *Law & Society Review* 46, no. 4 (2012); Lynette J. Chua and David Gilbert, “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Minorities in Transition: LGBT Rights and Activism in Myanmar,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 37 (2015).

5 Stephen M. Engel, *The Unfinished Revolution: Social Movement Theory and the Gay and Lesbian Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ana Cristina Santos, *Social Movements and Sexual Citizenship in Southern Europe* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Lynette J. Chua and Timothy Hildebrandt, “From Health Crisis to Rights Advocacy? HIV/AIDS and Gay Activism in China and Singapore,” *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 25, no. 6 (2014).

6 Barry D. Adam, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and André Krouwel, *The Global Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Politics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), 350–369.

7 Manon Tremblay, David Paternotte, and Carol Johnson, *The Lesbian and Gay Movement and the State Comparative Insights into a Transformed Relationship* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 214–218.

8 Adam, *The Global Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Politics*, 368; Tremblay, *The Lesbian and Gay*

there are still a limited number of works that directly use social movement paradigms to explain LGBTI advocacy from a transnational and international perspective.

This article aims to tackle such a gap in the scholarship by addressing LGBTI NGOs' access to the work of the UN. Looking at NGOs as a way to study social movements places the article within the realm of scholarship that recognizes a growing NGOization – intended as professionalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization – of social movements.<sup>9</sup> The formal procedure for NGOs to collaborate with some UN organs is through obtaining consultative status with the ECOSOC. This consultative status comports legal privileges like being able to submit written communications to some UN organs and participating in human rights conferences organized by the UN itself. Moreover, obtaining consultative status is a very important step for NGOs to become recognized as international actors.<sup>10</sup> In particular, Thoreson has noted that the accreditation of LGBTI organizations to the ECOSOC has more important social meanings than the legal privileges because “ECOSOC has been a deeply symbolic venue for LGBT NGOs seeking recognition in the human rights arena.”<sup>11</sup>

The three primary factors that impact the success of social movements at the UN are access, allies, and political alignments.<sup>12</sup> A systematic study of these three factors is useful in uncovering the complex dynamics of the LGBTI advocacy at the UN. However, for reasons of brevity, the scope of this paper is limited to the first two features, because both are strongly related to each other. Indeed, Joachim has explained that when NGOs participate in the work of the UN, they can connect with sympathetic state representatives, UN functionaries, and the media.<sup>13</sup> In other words,

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*Movement and the State Comparative Insights into a Transformed Relationship*, 216.

9 Sabine Lang, *NGOs, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Claire Whitlinger, and Alwyn Lim, “International Human Rights Law and Social Movements: States’ Resistance and Civil Society’s Insistence,” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 8, no. 1 (2012); David Paternotte, “The NGOization of LGBT Activism: ILGA-Europe and the Treaty of Amsterdam,” *Social Movement Studies* 15, no. 4 (2015).

10 Kerstin Martens, “Bypassing Obstacles to Access,” *Human Rights Review* 5, no. 3 (2004): 82.

11 Ryan R. Thoreson, *Transnational LGBT Activism: Working for Sexual Rights Worldwide* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 200.

12 Some social movement theorists add a fourth element called “repression.” However, Sikkink explained that repression can be seen as an aspect of access; indeed, the author continued, repression is an extreme form of excluding social movements to political participation. Kathryn Sikkink, “Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider-Outsider Coalition,” in *Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions and Power*, eds. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney G. Tarrow (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 155.

13 Jutta Joachim, “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women’s Rights,”



when NGOs have access to UN work, they also have the possibility to construct powerful alliances. Since the application for consultative status is obtained with the favorable vote of UN member states, LGBTI NGOs already have allies in sympathetic country delegates, which help them in obtaining access to UN agendas. Although UN member states are highly divided on the topic of LGBTI rights,<sup>14</sup> LGBTI NGOs have had privileged access to the ECOSOC. After all, LGBTI NGOs have powerful allies who have pressured UN agencies – namely the NGOs Com and the ECOSOC – to grant them greater access in a virtuous circle of alliance-access-alliance.

First, the article briefly reviews the literature on LGBTI social movement theories regarding international organizations and political opportunities. Second, it presents a description of the NGOs consultative status decision process. Third, the article presents the case study of NGO applications for consultative status with the ECOSOC. In doing so, the article collects the official reports of the NGOs Com and of the ECOSOC and summarizes the discussions regarding the applications of 12 LGBTI NGOs. The analysis aims to show that LGBTI NGOs have received unusual treatment at the NGOs Com and at the ECOSOC. Finally, the third part of the article presents some conclusions on the consultative status application process.

### **The Political Opportunity Approach: Looking for an Advocacy Venue**

Social movement theories seek to explain why and how people gather together in groups to change some aspects of society, and under which circumstances social movements are successful in their actions. Social movement theories have developed a diverse methodology emphasizing three approaches: identity, resource mobilization, and political opportunity. Identity approaches look at how social movements frame identities to impact the international human rights discourse.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile, resource mobilization approaches study the tactics chosen by social movements, and the ability to access money, labor, and leadership.<sup>16</sup> Finally, political

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*International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 2 (2003): 251–252.

14 Francine D'Amico, "LGBT and (Dis)United Nations: Sexual and Gender Minorities, International Law, and UN Politics," in *Sexualities in World Politics: How LGBTQ Claims Shape International Relations*, eds. Markus Thiel and Manuela Lavinás Picq (London: Routledge, 2015).

15 Kelly Kollman, *The Same-Sex Unions Revolution in Western Democracies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 34.

16 Melinda D. Kane, "Social Movement Policy Success: Decriminalizing State Sodomy Laws, 1969–

opportunity approaches address the political and institutional factors that influence social movements' advocacy. This paper aims to deal primarily with a political opportunity approach.

Tsutsui, Whitlinger, and Lim have used social movement paradigms to study a country's compliance with international human rights law. With regards to the two political opportunity features in analysis in this study, the authors explain that the success or failure of a social movement depends upon the openness/closure of an institutionalized political system (access), and presence/absence of elite allies (alliance).<sup>17</sup> In particular, international human rights NGOs have provided social movements the access to "many new venues for contestation."<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, elite allies as powerful foreign governments and officers of UN agencies – for example, the High Commissioner for Human Rights – have been critical to the development of NGOs' advocacy efforts.

LGBTI NGOs have had difficulties in bringing their claims before the UN. Indeed, Tsutsui, Whitlinger, and Lim have argued that LGBTI NGOs have found serious difficulties in advocating for LGBTI rights at the UN because of a dynamic of "overextension." This means that social movements advocating for human rights might lose support when they advocate for issues that "go beyond what other social actors deem reasonable,"<sup>19</sup> as indeed sexual orientation and gender identity issues do.

Other authors have pointed out that LGBTI movements often find more points of access with European international organizations than at the UN. Ayoub and Paternotte have argued that in the 1980s, LGBTI movements historically preferred the Council of Europe to the UN. Activists considered the Council of Europe a more favorable venue for their advocacy. Indeed, from 1979 activists tried unsuccessfully to make the UN adopt an international convention eliminating all forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, they ceased advocating such a convention when the European Court of Human Rights ruled favorably on the case of *Dudgeon v the United Kingdom*.<sup>20</sup> Dudgeon was a gay rights activist from Northern

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1998," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 8, no. 3 (2003): 317.

17 Tsutsui, "International Human Rights Law," 376.

18 *Ibid.*, 376.

19 *Ibid.*, 385.

20 *Dudgeon v United Kingdom* 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) (1981). For a commentary on the case, see especially Paul R. Johnson, *Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 46–61. For information regarding the nongovernmental advocacy around the case, see Mark Bromley and Kristine Walker, "The Stories of Dudgeon and Toonen: Personal Struggles to Legalize Sexual Identity," in *Human Rights Advocacy Stories*, eds. Deena R. Hurwitz,

Ireland<sup>21</sup> who argued the criminalization of sexual intercourse between same sex consenting adults violated his human rights. The Court found the United Kingdom in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights and was asked to repeal the law. Dudgeon signaled the first international adjudication in favor of a gay applicant. Ayoub and Paternotte have argued that European activists viewed the positive adjudication in Dudgeon as a signal of the different European attitude towards LGBTI issues.<sup>22</sup>

Swiebel has further explained this observation, noting that the political opportunities offered by the European Union (EU) have facilitated LGBTI advocacy in the European region. The LGBTI movement has been more successful at the EU in that it has been able to navigate the EU system by knowing “how the system works and how to work the system.”<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, the LGBTI movement at the UN has been unable to apply the same strategy because it was “not admitted to the ‘game.’”<sup>24</sup> In other words, LGBTI NGOs had acquired limited alliances and limited access at the UN.

On the contrary, this paper argues that LGBTI NGOs have steadily gained influence at the UN. In particular, through strategic and powerful alliances with Western European and American states, LGBTI NGOs have been successful in obtaining ECOSOC consultative status. Prior to analyzing the NGOs Com and ECOSOC official reports, the paper will describe the procedures under which NGOs are granted consultative status.

### **Consultative Status: NGOs Com and ECOSOC's Procedures**

The ECOSOC is composed of 53 member states of the UN, elected by the General Assembly.<sup>25</sup> The ECOSOC can initiate studies, make recommendations – both to UN member states and to UN agencies – and call international conferences on economic, social, cultural, and health-related matters, as well as human rights issues.<sup>26</sup> Article 71 of the Charter

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Margaret L. Satterthwaite, and Douglas B. Ford (New York: Foundation Press, 2008).

21 Michael D. Goldhaber, *A People's History of the European Court of Human Rights* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 33.

22 Phillip M. Ayoub and David Paternotte, “Challenging Borders, Imagining Europe: Transnational LGBT Activism in a New Europe,” in *Border Politics: Social Movements, Collective Identities, and Globalization*, eds. Nancy Naples and Jennifer Bickham Mendez (New York: NYU Press, 2014), 239.

23 Joke Swiebel, “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Human Rights: The Search for an International Strategy,” *Contemporary Politics* 15, no. 1 (2009): 30.

24 Ibid.

25 United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations* art. 61, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.

26 Ibid., art. 62.

of the UN allows the ECOSOC to make arrangements for consultation with NGOs, with resolution 1996/31 regulating such relationships.<sup>27</sup> NGOs can possess general consultative status when they “are concerned with most of the activities of the [ECOSOC];”<sup>28</sup> special consultative status when they “are concerned with some of the activities of the ECOSOC;”<sup>29</sup> and “Roster” status when they do not fall in either of the two categories, but when the ECOSOC considers that they “can make occasional and useful contributions”<sup>30</sup> to its work.

The procedure for granting consultative status to NGOs is as follows. First, the NGOs Com – a standing committee of the ECOSOC composed of 19 members – decides on whether to recommend granting consultative status to an NGO applicant. Second, upon the recommendations of the NGOs Com, the ECOSOC formalizes the decision on whether to grant the status, usually following the recommendations of the NGOs Com.<sup>31</sup> Martens has explained that the NGOs Com’s decisions can be “highly political” and argued that common practice for countries is to reject the application of NGOs that seek to undermine their authorities.<sup>32</sup> Aston has echoed this, saying that deferring NGOs applications and submitting further questions is a usual practice to postpone unwanted controversial decisions.<sup>33</sup> The NGOs Com receives hundreds of requests but can only decide upon a fraction of them. As a consequence, the application process for NGOs often lasts several years.<sup>34</sup> The following sections analyze in detail the LGBTI NGOs’ applications to consultative status.

### Speedy Rejection

Between 2006 and 2014, 12 LGBTI NGOs submitted applications to obtain ECOSOC consultative status. Contrary to Martens and Aston’s observations,

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27 Economic and Social Council Resolution 1996/31, *Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations*, E/RES/1996/31 (25 July 1996).

28 *Ibid.*, para. 22.

29 *Ibid.*, para. 23.

30 *Ibid.*, para. 24.

31 Jurij Daniel Aston, “The United Nations Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations: Guarding the Entrance to a Politically Divided House,” *European Journal of International Law* 12, no. 5 (2001): 949.

32 Martens, “Bypassing Obstacles to Access,” 83.

33 Jurij Daniel Aston, “The United Nations Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations: Guarding the Entrance to a Politically Divided House,” 950.

34 Martens, “Bypassing Obstacles to Access,” 83.

I demonstrate that initially some members of the NGOs Com applied an unusual strategy in order to block LGBTI organizations from obtaining consultative status. Indeed, an analysis of the NGOs Com records shows that some country delegates proposed to vote abruptly on the rejection of consultative status to LGBTI NGOs without allowing even a minimum level of discussion. This strategy was initially successful and LGBTI NGOs were denied access to the work of the UN. However, some country delegates sympathetic to LGBTI issues promoted the overturning of NGOs Com's recommendations at the ECOSOC, initiating a virtuous cycle of alliance that benefitted LGBTI NGOs.

The International Gay Lesbian Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) obtained consultative status at the ECOSOC in 1993, was suspended in 1994 for three years,<sup>35</sup> and was recommended to re-submit an application in 2000; however, this attempt was unsuccessful.<sup>36</sup> ILGA applied again for consultative status in 2006, but at the 5<sup>th</sup> session of the NGOs Com, the representative from Iran maintained that the answers provided by ILGA in its applications were not satisfactory and recommended that the NGOs Com not grant consultative status to ILGA.<sup>37</sup> The German delegate noted that the Iranian proposal was unprecedented because NGOs are usually given the opportunity to respond to additional questions if delegates are not satisfied.<sup>38</sup> Still, the Iranian proposal to deny consultative status to ILGA passed.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, at the same meeting, an application from the Danish National Association for Gays and Lesbians was discussed with the same outcome. Once the request for consultative status was denied, Denmark declared that "so many Committee members stood ready to reject, without deliberation, the application for consultative status of the organization,"<sup>40</sup> and that such behavior went against the principle of freedom from discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.

Four more LGBTI NGOs were rejected without the usual time allowed

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35 ECOSOC Resolution, 1994/L 48, *Arrangement for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations: Status of the International Lesbian and Gay Association with the Council* E/1994/L 48 (25 January 1995). For further information on ILGA's consultative status suspension, see especially David Paternotte, "The International (Lesbian And) Gay Association and the Question of Pedophilia," *Sexualities* 17 (2014); Joshua Gamson, "Messages Of Exclusion: Gender, Movements, and Symbolic Boundaries," *Gender & Society* 11 (1997).

36 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its 2006 Regular Session* para. 36. E/2006/32 (Part I) (19-27 January 2006).

37 Ibid., para. 37.

38 Ibid., para. 41.

39 Ibid., para. 49.

40 Ibid., para. 54.

for discussion in 2006 and 2007. When some countries complained about the Iranian proposal to deny consultative status to the Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany without discussion,<sup>41</sup> the representative from Pakistan backed up the Iranian position, remarking that the NGOs Com should not be forced to ask other questions if it did not wish to do so.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, Iran gave its usual proposal to reject ILGA Europe's application without further discussion. France noted that the speedy rejection was in violation of paragraph 5 of ECOSOC resolution 1996/31, which states that an NGO applying for consultative status "shall have the opportunity to respond to any objections being raised in the Committee before the Committee takes its decision."<sup>43</sup> Despite the controversy, the Iranian application was voted on and passed.<sup>44</sup>

Eventually, the NGOs Com recommended to not provide consultative status to any of the LGBTI NGOs that applied in 2006. However, the ECOSOC overturned all but one of these recommendations by the NGOs Com. The EU members recommended re-discussing the decisions of the NGOs Com on the consultative status of the Danish National Association for Gays and Lesbians, Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany, and ILGA Europe. These three NGOs were granted consultative status with three draft resolutions issued by the ECOSOC. On that occasion, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed concerns that the ECOSOC was undermining the work of the NGOs Com.<sup>45</sup> NGOs Com's decision on ILGA's consultative status was re-discussed at the ECOSOC, but without overturning the NGOs Com's recommendation to deny ILGA consultative status.<sup>46</sup> Similar dynamics where LGBTI NGOs' applications for consultative status occurred in 2007 for the Swedish Federation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights,<sup>47</sup> and Coalition gaie et lesbienne du Québec.<sup>48</sup> Both organizations

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41 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its Resumed 2006 Session* para. 24 E/2006/32 (Part II) (10-19 May 2006).

42 Ibid., para. 32.

43 ECOSOC Resolution, *Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations*.

44 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its Resumed 2006 Session*.

45 ECOSOC Resolution, *Provisional Summary Record of the 47th Meeting: Held at Headquarters E/2006/SR.47*, (11 December 2006).

46 ECOSOC Resolution, *Substantive Session of 2006, General Segment: Provisional Summary Record of the 34<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 5-6. ILGA consultative status was discussed again a few years later, E/2006/SR.34.

47 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its 2007 Regular Session 17*, E/2007/32 (Part I), (22-31 January 2007).

48 Ibid., 13.

found themselves faced with a speedy and unusual rejection at the NGOs Com. In a second round of negotiations, NGOs Com's decisions on the two organizations were overturned by the ECOSOC and both organizations were granted consultative status.<sup>49</sup>

In sum, NGOs Com members had initially proposed to vote on LGBTI NGOs' applications without allowing the usual time for discussion. In stressing this procedure, these countries aimed to prevent LGBTI NGOs from acquiring consultative status. Such a strategy was at first successful, but some country delegates acted as allies to LGBTI organizations, and they forwarded motions to overturn NGOs Com's recommendations at the ECOSOC. Therefore, after 2008, NGOs Com members opposed to LGBTI organizations abandoned the speedy rejection tactic and instead used the usual strategy of indefinitely delaying LGBTI NGOs' applications, as described by Martens and Aston. However, the section below shows that not even such a common strategy worked to block LGBTI NGOs from obtaining consultative status. Again, some country delegates acted as allies of LGBTI NGOs by overturning NGOs Com's recommendations at the ECOSOC, as well as limiting the question and answer sessions at the NGOs Com to speed up the process and grant access to LGBTI NGOs.

### **Attempts to Indefinitely Delay Applications**

As the speedy rejection tactic proved unsuccessful, NGOs Com members began to employ a new tactic of delaying decisions on LGBTI NGOs' consultative status indefinitely. Indeed, in 2008, once the organization *Federatie van Nederlandse Verenigingen tot Integratie van Homoseksualiteit* (COC Nederland) answered all the questions posed to them both in writing and orally, Egypt and Qatar attempted to delay the decision by posing further questions. Frustrated by the attempt to cause delay, the UK cut short the discussion and requested to move to vote on the application; indeed, COC Netherlands was then granted consultative status.<sup>50</sup> In the same year, the UK again pushed the NGOs Com to recommend consultative status for the Spanish NGO *Federación Estatal de Lesbianas, Gays, Transexuales y*

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49 ECOSOC Resolution, *Provisional Summary Record of the 38<sup>th</sup> Meeting: Held at the Palais Des Nations, Geneva, 11, E/2007/SR.38*, (20 July 2007).

50 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its Resumed 2008 Session*, 19, E/2008/32 (Part II), 25 June 2009).



Bisexuales in a speedy manner. Initially, the application was rejected,<sup>51</sup> but it was later overturned at the ECOSOC.<sup>52</sup>

Furthermore, in 2010 at its 27<sup>th</sup> meeting, the NGOs Com discussed the application for consultative status of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission or IGLHRC (now OutRights Action International). The representative from the United States recommended that the NGOs Com grant consultative status to the organization because the members of the NGOs Com had had enough time to consider the 44 questions posed to IGLHRC. As a pretext, the representatives from Egypt and Qatar posed further questions and then proposed a no-action motion to perpetuate the delay. The no-action motion passed.<sup>53</sup> However, not satisfied with the result at the 39<sup>th</sup> meeting of the ECOSOC, the US representative stated that the NGOs Com had refused to grant consultative status to any organization dealing with LGBTI rights for more than a decade, and that “it had become obvious that the application of [IGLHRC] would remain deferred indefinitely.”<sup>54</sup> Therefore, the United States proposed that a draft resolution be voted on at the ECOSOC, which would grant consultative status to IGLHRC.

There was sizeable opposition to the US decision to take action through the ECOSOC. Critics pointed out that an ECOSOC decision on the matter would undermine the authority of the NGOs Com itself. Other countries expressed concern over the number of applications in rotation and similar procedural considerations. The representative from the Russian Federation emphasized this point by explaining that since “over 530 NGO applications were currently under consideration by the [NGOs Com], it was hard to imagine what would happen if the ECOSOC were to consider all of them.”<sup>55</sup> However, the motion of the US representative passed and IGLHR was granted consultative status at the ECOSOC.

The NGOs Com discussion on ILGA's application provides a further example of Western European and American countries acting as allies of LGBTI NGOs. In 2011, the representative of Burundi complained that ILGA deliberately avoided answering the questions posed by members of the

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51 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its 2008 Regular Session*, 14, E/2008/32 (Part I), (21-30 January 2008).

52 ECOSOC Resolution, *Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the Economic and Social Council at Its Substantive Session of 2008*, 126, E/2008/INF/2/Add.1, 30 June 0 25 July 2008).

53 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its 2010 Resumed Session*, 29 E/2010/32 (Part II).

54 ECOSOC Resolution, *Provisional Summary Record of the 39<sup>th</sup> Meeting: Held at Headquarters*, 5, E/2010/SR.39, (19 July 2010).

55 Ibid., 9.



NGOs Com and the representative of Belgium cut short the discussion by asking to move to vote.<sup>56</sup> The attempt did not work out well for ILGA because the proposal to recommend granting consultative status was rejected.<sup>57</sup> However, this decision was contested by Belgium at the 43<sup>rd</sup> meeting of the ECOSOC in July 2011, where ILGA was eventually granted consultative status after a motion promoted by Belgium, Germany, and the US.<sup>58</sup>

The Australian Lesbian Medical Association (ALMA) was also subjected to an overwhelming number of questions. After having responded in a satisfactory manner to 54 questions over seven consecutive sessions, some members of the NGOs Com continued to defer the decision on ALMA's application. As a consequence, Bulgaria asked to vote on the proposal to recommend granting consultative status to the organization without allowing further discussion; eventually, ALMA was recommended for consultative status.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, at the discussion on Homosexuelle Initiative Wien's application, some LGBTI critics expressed concerns that the tactic of delaying NGOs' applications was losing effectiveness. The Sudanese representative emphasized this point, saying that "[r]ushing towards action in the consideration of certain organizations had become a regrettable precedent of the [NGOs Com]." <sup>60</sup>

Finally, the application of Allied Rainbow Community International (ARC International) provides further evidence that some county delegates act as allies of LGBTI NGOs and stretch NGOs Com's procedures. At the 20<sup>th</sup> meeting of the NGOs Com, the representative from Morocco asked whether the organization considered sexual orientation and gender identity to be universal rights as stipulated in international human rights instruments, in order to slow down the approval process.<sup>61</sup> Belgium responded by stating that because the history of the NGOs Com was not to grant consultative status to LGBTI organizations, there was no need to wait several sessions in order to block ARC International for reasons unrelated to ECOSOC resolution 1996/31. Belgium requested a vote, bypassing a more extensive review

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56 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its 2011 Resumed Session*, para. 21-26, E/2011/32 (Part II), (16-24 May 2011 and 16 June 2011).

57 Ibid., para. 27.

58 ECOSOC Resolution, *Provisional Summary Record of the 43<sup>rd</sup> Meeting: Held at the Palais Des Nations, Geneva*, 5, E/2011/SR.43, (25 July 2011).

59 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its 2013 Resumed Session*, 33, E/2013/32 (Part II), (20-29 May and 7 June 2013).

60 Ibid., 36.

61 ECOSOC Resolution, *Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its 2014 Resumed Session*, 31, E/2014/32 (Part II), (19-28 May and 6 June 2014).

period, and the NGOs Com recommended granting consultative status to ARC International.<sup>62</sup> The delegate of the Russian Federation criticized this action, complaining that the NGOs Com was asked to vote while the representative of Pakistan was not present.<sup>63</sup>

In sum, deferring NGOs applications and submitting further questions is a well-known practice to postpone unwanted controversial decisions. However, what is uncommon is the reaction of some pro-LGBTI member states. The ECOSOC usually follows the recommendations of the NGOs Com, but pro-LGBTI delegates stretched the procedures to provide LGBTI organizations with consultative status. Moreover, some pro-LGBTI country delegates promoted speedy reception of LGBTI NGOs' applications, to the point of pushing for decisions when specific country delegates were unable to express their votes.

## Conclusion

This article has used a social movement framework to analyze the case study of LGBTI NGOs' applications to the ECOSOC for consultative status. Its first contributions is demonstrating that the general assumption that LGBTI organization have limited or no access to the work of the UN is unfounded. Indeed, all the LGBTI organizations that tried to gain consultative status between 2006 and 2014 eventually obtained it. For the most part, NGOs often wait for years before having their application considered. In contrast, it is apparent that the applications of LGBTI organizations have undergone a much more rapid and unusual process. This largely stems from the support of sympathetic country delegates from the US and Europe, who have acted as allies to LGBTI NGOs. With the support of these country delegates at the ECOSOC, LGBTI NGOs were able to achieve consultative status and become entitled to be part of the UN "game," along with all the benefits that such a status entails. In particular, country delegates that have supported the applications of LGBTI NGOs have initiated a virtuous cycle of alliance-access-alliance. Moreover, the paper has shown that the LGBTI NGOs' allies stretched the usual NGOs Com and ECOSOC's procedures, for example, by overturning already decided upon NGOs Com recommendations, cutting short discussion sessions, and even calling for a vote when a country

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62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., 32.

delegate – especially one well-known for being a strong opponent of allowing LGBTI NGOs a channel of participation to the UN – was outside the room and therefore unable to participate in the vote.

In conclusion, this paper has provided enough evidence to support the claim that the process of granting consultative status to NGOs is slow and jumbled. The NGOs Com should check whether NGOs comply with the characteristics required by ECOSOC resolution 1996/31. Instead, NGOs Com and ECOSOC's member states use their votes to support or block the NGOs that they "like" or "dislike." A review of the applications mechanisms would be required to promote a more democratic and transparent decision process. However, until the outcomes of consultative status applications are decided upon by bodies formed by governmental delegates, the process will remain highly politicized. **Y**

# POST US-DPRK NUCLEAR NEGOTIATION: HIDDEN CYCLE OF “RENEGE-WARNING- COUNTER RENEGE”

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*For nearly two decades, North Korean (NK or DPRK) nuclear development has been one of the most high-profile issues in Northeast Asia, and the United States has funneled profuse resources and time into denuclearizing North Korea, culminating in agreements such as the Agreed Framework (1994) and the February 13 Action Plan (2007). However, the NK nuclear issue is still presently jeopardizing regional stability. What went wrong? This paper attempts to illustrate why and how the US coercive diplomacy failed to denuclearize North Korea despite two settled agreements. This paper focuses on the events starting from after the “resolution” (signing of an agreement) leading up to the next “crisis.” Instead of segmenting the negotiation history into the typical “crisis-negotiation-resolution” block, this paper attempts to shed light on the obscured other half of the circle, the “renege-warning-counter renege” sequence. I introduce an analytical framework calibrating two variables - type of US renege and tone of the US-DPRK bilateral relationship - and trace how Pyongyang responds to different combinations of the two variables. The findings of this paper reveal a correlation between North Korea’s actions and a specific combination of the type of US renege and tone of the bilateral relationship. North Korea responds to indirect renege with benign negative responses (verbal threats) and responds to direct renege with malignant negative responses (actions). Pyongyang’s provocative actions, which are usually perceived as crisis invoking behavior, are in fact the result of US direct renege and a negative bilateral relationship.*

For nearly two decades, North Korean nuclear development has been one of the most high-profile issues in Northeast Asia. The United States has funneled copious amounts of resources and time in an attempt to denuclearize North Korea. Tactics differed with changing administrations, but the strategy has been coercive diplomacy.<sup>1</sup> Despite tireless attempts by

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1 Thomas Schelling defines coercive diplomacy as the use of force peaceful or physical force

experts and negotiators during the past two decades, US coercive diplomacy has ultimately failed in denuclearizing North Korea. Considering Pyongyang's recent provocative behaviors, the problem is perhaps (even bigger and more festered than when it first oozed out). Then why did US coercive diplomacy fail? This paper attempts to illustrate why and how US coercive diplomacy towards North Korean nuclear issue failed despite the success of signing two monumental agreements: Agreed Framework (1994) and February 13 Action Plan (2007).

## Literature Review

There has been much effort in the academic community to explain North Korea's behavior and deduce a rationale. Scholars with first-hand negotiation experience such as Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci provide a minute-by-minute account of North Korea's brinkmanship diplomacy during the first nuclear crisis.<sup>2</sup> In terms of explaining Pyongyang's motivation for developing nuclear weapons, pro-engagement scholars point to external factors as central driving forces for the North's nuclear aspiration.<sup>3</sup> Structural imperatives such as a security vacuum after the fall of the Soviet Union, the US-ROK military alliance in the post-Cold War era, and neo-conservative politicians' hawkish measures under the Bush administration are identified as culprits forcing North Korea to resort to nuclear capability. This school of pundits contends that Pyongyang would be willing to give up its nuclear capability when the external driving forces are resolved.

On the other hand, more conservative voices point to internal factors for the North's nuclear aspiration. In this literature, North Korea's nuclear ambition stems from the aggressive nature of the regime, use of nuclear capabilities as a bargaining chip for economic concessions, and also as a regime legitimizing tool.<sup>4</sup> This line of approach assumes that Pyongyang

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to stop an adversary from doing something that he has already undertaken, while Alexander George confines the use of coercive diplomacy to defensive diplomacy. George emphasizes the simultaneous use of carrots (inducement) as well as sticks (threats). For more detail, see Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Virginia: Praeger, 1977) and Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009). Also, for a detailed case study of the successful use of coercive diplomacy, see Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who Won Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *International Security* 30 (2005): 47-86.

2 Joel S. Wit, David B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

3 See Charles L. Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), and Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002).

4 Victor D. Cha and David Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New

never had, nor will ever have, the intention of fully denuclearizing.

In terms of explaining North Korea's crisis behavior, its unique negotiation pattern is usually identified as crisis diplomacy or coercive diplomacy against the US.<sup>5</sup> Scott Snyder points to North Korea's historic and cultural attributes to explain her negotiation pattern.<sup>6</sup> Chuck Downs delineated the North's negotiation pattern as "agreeing in principle-reinterpreting the agreement-blaming the other for failure of talks" by analyzing more than a dozen cases of negotiation with North Korea.<sup>7</sup> Leon Sigal contends that the tit-for-tat principle has been strictly followed by the US and DPRK during negotiations despite the common knowledge that North Korea is unreliable and inconsistent.<sup>8</sup>

Previous research bears significant value in that they answer two questions: (1) why does North Korea want to develop nuclear weapons? and (2) how have the US and DPRK attempted to resolve the nuclear issue through negotiation? However, research has not explained why and how the US failed in denuclearizing North Korea. The first and second nuclear crisis repeated the "crisis-negotiation-resolution" sequence without any tangible results pointing towards denuclearization. The agreements signed in the "resolution" stage were the result of an arduous negotiation marathon and they contain detailed motions to achieve not only denuclearization, but also peace in Northeast Asia, at large. If only the Agreed Framework had been realized, we would be living in a peaceful and nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula, and the same goes for the February 13 Action Plan. Implementing the signed agreements presented a whole new level of challenges for both the US and DPRK, and both ultimately failed in realizing the agreements. Therefore, it is crucial to analyze why and how these comprehensive agreements failed to be realized. In performing such a task, I focus on


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York: Columbia University Press, 2005), and Jonathan Pollack, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development: Implications for Future Policy," *Proliferation Papers* 33 (Spring 2010).

- 5 For detailed definitions of NK's "Crisis Diplomacy," see Sang-sook Lee, "North Korea's Third Nuclear Test and Its Crisis Diplomacy," *IFANS Brief* 11 (2013). For detailed definitions of NK's "Coercive Diplomacy," see Hoon Seo, "North Korea's Coercive Diplomacy: Small Power's US Policy," *North Korean Studies* 3, no. 2 (2007), and Tae-Young Yoon, "North Korea Nuclear Issue and US Coercive Diplomacy: Carrots and Sticks," *Korean Journal of International Relations* 43, no. 1 (2003).
- 6 Scott Snyder identifies Kim Il-Sung's own guerrilla partisan experience, Japanese colonial rule experience, Stalinist institutional structure, Confucian norms, and emphasis on atmosphere (*punuigi*) as attributes to NK's negotiation behavior. See Scott Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (Washington D.C.: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 1999) for more detail.
- 7 Chuck Downs, *Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1999).
- 8 Leon Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998).

the events starting from *after* the “resolution” (signing of the agreement) leading up to the next “crisis.” Instead of segmenting the negotiation history into the typical “crisis-negotiation-resolution” block, I attempt to shed light on the obscured other half of the circle: “renege-warning-counter renege.” Diagram 1 illustrates the full circle of the US-NK nuclear negotiation history.

**DIAGRAM 1** Full Cycle of US-DPRK Nuclear Negotiation



While the first half of the circle (crisis-negotiation-resolution) is well researched and abundantly analyzed, the latter half (renege-warning-counter renege/crisis) has hardly been explored.

## Methodology

### *Variables for Coding Events*

In order to analyze and deduce a correlation from the other half of the nuclear negotiation cycle, I categorize the types of US renege, tone of the bilateral relationship, and North Korea’s response as follows:

US Direct Renege is when the US reneges on a commitment stated in written and signed agreements (Agreed Framework, February 13 Action Plan).

US Indirect Renege is when the US does not outright renege, but delays fulfillment due to technical issues or raises suspicions about Pyongyang’s commitment.

North Korea Benign Negative Response is when the DPRK issues verbal threats and warnings towards the US when faced with a renege (only words not action).

North Korea Malignant Negative Response is when the DPRK executes a counter-renege in order to punish a US renege.

Tone of Bilateral Relationship is categorized into either amiable or hostile. The tone of the relationship is the atmosphere (*punuigi*)<sup>9</sup> between the two countries. Willingness to engage in bilateral talk is one of the critical factors in determining the tone of the relationship.

Analytical Framework

Incorporating the variables defined above, the analytical framework for this paper is illustrated in Table 1. The framework attempts to delineate the relationship between a dependent variable (type of NK response: benign/malignant) and two independent variables (type of US renege: indirect/direct; tone of bilateral relationship: amiable/hostile). This framework attempts to provide a better explanation for the complex dynamics of the US-DPRK nuclear negotiation by tracing how the two independent variables affect the outcome.

TABLE 1 Analytical Framework

		Tone of US-DPRK Bilateral Relationship	
		Amiable	Hostile
Type	Indirect	A	B
	Direct	C	D

9 For a more detailed account of what North Korea perceives as atmosphere (*punuigi*) and how it determines the outcome of negotiation, see Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge*.



## Analysis

### *Quadrant A and C: Direct and Indirect Renege under an Amiable Relationship*

Despite the heightened tension during the first nuclear crisis (1992-1993), once the Agreed Framework was signed, the relationship between the Clinton administration and Kim Jong Il's North Korea was amiable. During the implementation of the Agreed Framework, problems arose in all aspects, especially since the US Congress did not favor the deal signed by President Clinton and continued snooping for chances to throw off the agreement and return to hawkish measures. Table 2 lists the cases of indirect renege that manifested during the implementation of the Agreed Framework.

**TABLE 2** Cases of US Indirect Renege under an Amiable Bilateral Relationship

Case No.	Administration	US Indirect Renege	North Korea Response	Negotiation Period	Result of Negotiation
A-1	Clinton	US suspects North Korea's diversion of heavy fuel oil (1995/02/16)	Benign Negative Response	4 months	Resolved. North agrees to allow monitoring of the use of heavy fuel oil (1995/06/13)
A-2		US suspects underground nuclear facility in Kumchang-ri (1998/01/02)	Benign Negative Response	12 months	Resolved. North agrees to allow inspection at Kumchang-ri site (1999/03/15)

Source: Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," Arms Control Association, April 2003.

Indirect as they were, both issues had the potential to throw off the entire agreement. However, as demonstrated from the two cases during the Clinton administration, North Korea can be surprisingly flexible and practical during negotiations. Under an amiable relationship, an indirect renege is addressed and resolved through negotiation, preventing it from escalating to a direct renege. In order to realize the provision of a light water reactor, North Korea promptly responded to US suspicions on various issues and

mostly catered to the US, trying to relieve American concerns. The DPRK agreed to install monitoring devices to confirm that the heavy fuel oil provided was not diverted to the military even when a request for a formal delivery schedule, which they had been demanding, was denied (case A-1). Suspicions regarding the Kumchang-ri site were resolved when Pyongyang allowed the US inspection team to satisfactorily scour the site (case A-2). The fact that the Clinton administration abstained from taking action also aided in a successful negotiated settlement.

*Quadrant B: Indirect Renege under a Hostile Relationship*

The US-DPRK bilateral relationship under the Bush administration was mostly hostile. The Republican president started off his term by essentially denying the Agreed Framework with his ABC (Anything But Clinton) policy and the September 11 terrorist attack hammered in the hostile policy vis-à-vis North Korea for the next decade.<sup>10</sup> Various attempts to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue were made (most famously the Six Party Talks). However, under a hostile relationship, any glitch along the way is enough to thwart the entire implementation process. Unlike the two cases illustrated in Table 2, the two issues that arose during the Bush administration quickly led to the collapse of the Agreed Framework (case B-1) and September 19 Joint Statement (2005) (case B-2), as seen in table 3.

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10 For a detailed explanation on the establishment of Bush's ABC principle and its application to North Korea policy, see Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2009).

**TABLE 3** Cases of US Indirect Renege under a Hostile Bilateral Relationship

Case No.	Administration	US Indirect Renege	North Korean Response	Negotiation Period	Result of Negotiation	North Korean Response
B-1	Bush	US suspect North Korea's secret HEU program (2002/10/16)	Benign Negative	2 days	Unresolved. Direct Renege: US halts provision of heavy fuel oil (2002/11/14)	Malignant Negative
B-2		US enforces "sampling" during verification process (2008/11/13)	Benign Negative	7 days	Unresolved. Direct Renege: US halts provision of heavy fuel oil (2008/12/12)	Malignant Negative

Source: Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," Arms Control Association, April 2003.

As shown in Table 2, the cases belonging to quadrant A (Table 2) had a negotiation period of average eight months. On the other hand, cases belonging to quadrant B (Table 3) were short-lived. When faced with a suspicion or disagreement on a particular issue, the US quickly moved ahead and took action by not delivering its end of the deal. For both cases B-1 and B-2, it took less than a month for the disagreements or suspicions to lead to a direct renege. There were indeed efforts for negotiation on the issues, but either one or both sides gave up too quickly. In case B-1, discussion quickly fell apart when hawks in Washington exploited then DPRK Vice Foreign Minister, Kang Seok-Ju's ambivalent response to announce the death of the Agreed Framework. Hardliners like John Bolton and Robert Joseph during the Bush administration were praying for chances to renounce the Agreed Framework under the ABC principle, and Kang Seok-Ju's vague rhetoric presented them with a perfect opportunity to make it happen. When James Kelly returned from a two-day talk in Pyongyang, Washington quickly announced North Korea's acknowledgement of the Highly-Enriched Uranium Program, proclaimed the end of the Agreed Framework, and halted the provision of heavy fuel oil. Pyongyang responded with counter-renege measures by breaking International Atomic Energy Agency seals, evicting the US inspection team, and announcing their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In case B-2, the Bush administration got weary of dealing with North Korea towards the end of its term and ceased further attempts to do so. North Korea made many verbal threats (benign negative response) when faced with US accusations, but actual actions (malignant negative response) came only *after* the US had reneged on a promise first. Once the US reneged on a commitment directly stated in an agreement, Pyongyang did not hesitate to match it with a counter-renege. From the two cases (B-1 and B-2), it can be concluded that indirect renege under hostile relationship has strong proclivity to escalate to direct renege. Negotiations often fail to resolve the issue under a hostile relationship. Secondly, North Korea responds to indirect renege with a benign negative response (verbal threats) and responds to direct renege with a malignant negative response. North Korea rarely takes action until *after* the US commits direct renege (in these cases, halting heavy fuel oil delivery). From this it can be deduced that North Korea meets the principle of proportionality of response during the implementation process.

#### *Quadrant D: US Direct Renege under Hostile Relationship*

Direct renege under a hostile relationship is always met with a malignant negative response from North Korea. What is usually perceived as North Korea's "crisis" behavior is, in fact, Pyongyang's way of responding to a US direct renege. The cases in Table 4 demonstrate the relationship between a US direct renege and North Korea's response.

Tracing the tit-for-tat relationship between the US and North Korea provides a few insights that help explain how North Korea's provocative behavior is actually a punitive action against a US renege under a hostile relationship. First, the small time gap between US renege and North Korea's provocation suggests a causal relationship between two events. If North Korea was only aiming to provoke the US and the international society for bargaining leverage, then why would they act at the moment that they did? The size of the time gap, as small as one day, suggests that NK's provocations are reactive counter-renege measures against a previous US renege.

Second, a malignant negative response is always preceded by a benign negative response (verbal warning). When faced with a US renege on a specific agreement, Pyongyang issues a prior verbal warning stating an intention to respond with a counter-renege unless the US makes adjustments. North Korea's verbal warnings specifically lay out how the US reneged and how Pyongyang will respond to such a violation. Only *after* their verbal warnings (benign negative response) prove useless in altering US behavior does Pyongyang move on to take actions (malignant negative

response). If North Korea were solely aiming at creating a crisis atmosphere for negotiation leverage, any prior warning would diminish the dramatic effect of a 'crisis.'

Third, even then their actions are confined to meet the principle of proportionality. North Korea undertakes no more or less actions than what they have listed in their verbal warnings and such actions are strictly limited to the scope of the agreement. If the US reneges on a certain promise in the agreement, North Korea counter-reneges on a promise laid out in the same agreement. This suggests that the malignant negative responses (actions) are executed as a punishment towards the US when words alone fail to deliver the message. North Korea does not introduce a new agenda or make a new demand following their malignant negative response.

**TABLE 4** US Direct Renege under a Hostile Relationship

Case No.	Administration	US Direct Renege	North Korean Response
D-1	Bush	Halt heavy fuel oil provision (2002/11/14)	Benign Negative Malignant Negative Break IAEA seal (2002/12/22) Evict IAEA (2002/12/27-31) Leave NPT (2003/01/10)
D-2		Sanction on Banco Delta Asia (2005/09/15)	Benign Negative Malignant Negative Refuse Six-Party Talks (2005/12/11)
D-3		Postpone de-listing from state-sponsored terrorism listing (2008/08/11)	Benign Negative Threaten to evict IAEA (2008/09/23) Malignant Negative Break IAEA seal (2008/09/23)
D-4		Halt heavy fuel oil provision (2008/12/12)	Benign Negative Malignant Negative Slow disablement process by half (2008/12/13)

Source: Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," Arms Control Association, April 2003.

**TABLE 5** Correlation Between NK Response Type and Bilateral Relationship Tone, Type of US Renege

		Tone of US-DPRK Bilateral Relationship	
		Amiable	Hostile
Type of US Renege	Indirect	Benign negative response	Benign negative response
	Direct	-	Malignant negative response

**Findings**

The findings of this paper are summarized in Table 5. In essence, the result of the analysis reveals a correlation between the dependent variable (type of NK response) and the two independent variables (tone of bilateral relationship and type of US renege).

To elaborate, two points can be made from Table 5. First, the type of North Korean response is affected just as much by the overall tone of the bilateral relationship as it is by the type of US renege. Under an amiable relationship, indirect renege is met with a benign negative response and does not escalate to direct renege since the issue is resolved through negotiation. However, under a hostile relationship, US indirect renege quickly escalates to US direct renege and North Korea promptly responds with a malignant negative response (counter-renege). Therefore, in times of a hostile relationship, there is much more action and less talk from both sides.

Second, North Korea's responses meet the principle of proportionality. Despite popular perception about North Korea's innate aggressiveness, Pyongyang regulates their response to correspond with the type of US renege. US indirect renege is met with a North Korean benign negative response, and US direct renege with a North Korean malignant negative response. Adherence to the tit-for-tat principle is also manifest in times of cooperation. Regardless of the tone of the bilateral relationship, cooperation is always met with cooperation. Table 6 provides an illustration of positive exchanges between the US and DPRK.

**TABLE 6** Cases of US Cooperation and North Korea Cooperation

US Cooperation	Administration	North Korea Cooperation
1994 Agreed Framework	Clinton	Freeze 5mw reactor (1994/11/01) Halt construction at 50mw, 200mw reactor Cease reprocessing (1994/11/01) IAEA confirm (1994/11/28)
First heavy fuel oil shipment (1995/01/18) Ease trade sanctions (1995/01/21) US-DPRK talk for liaison office (1995/01/31) Second heavy fuel oil shipment (1995/09/25)		
		North-South Talk (2000/06/15)
US-DPRK high level talk (2000/10/09-24)		
Sanction on Banco Delta Asia lifted	Bush	
		Shut down Yongbyon (2007/07/16) IAEA inspection (2007/09/11-14) North-South talk (2007/10/24)
US-DPRK high level talk (2008/03/13-04/08)		
		Submit declaration report (2008/05/08)
Terminate Trading with Enemy Act (2008/06/26)		
		Demolish Yongbyon cooling tower (2008/06/27)
De-listing from terror-sponsoring states (2008/10/11)		
		Re-freeze and re-seal reactors

Source: Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, April 2003.

Another notable finding is that nuclear testing and missile launching are not directly related with the implementation progress of denuclearization.

The tit-for-tat principle during implementation does not explain those two behaviors. First, the time gap between a renege and the nuclear test/missile launch is too wide to draw a causal relationship between the two events. In the case of the “renege-warning-counter renege” sequence, the response time was a maximum of three months and an average of twenty days. However, the time gap is much larger in the case of a nuclear test and missile launch. The closest US renege prior to North Korea’s first nuclear test was the sanction on Banco Delta Asia, which took place eleven months prior to the test. Also, the second nuclear test occurred five months after the US announced halting provision of heavy fuel oil. If North Korea were to conduct nuclear a test/missile launch in order to counter a US renege and compel them to adjust their behavior, it would be more effective to conduct the tests in a more prompt fashion immediately following a US renege.

Second, the statements released prior to a nuclear test/missile launch do not contain any specific demands or reasons relating to the implementation process. In cases of a “renege-warning-counter renege” sequence, when faced with a US renege on a specific agreement, Pyongyang issues a verbal warning stating its recognition of a US renege and North Korea’s possible counter-renege. The scope of the action mentioned in the statements are very narrow and explicit as to illustrate what type of action committed by the US is considered a renege and what type of counter-renege is forthcoming. However, the statements issued prior to missile launch and nuclear tests are relatively broad and vague. The one reason that Pyongyang recurrently identifies as their motive for pursuing a nuclear deterrent is US hostile policy which could include wide range of actions such as threat of nuclear war, economic sanctions, and a hostile tone. Without providing any specific justification, the statement simply points to US policy as a whole for their negative response. Table 7 illustrates the tit-for-tat relationship in 12 years of implementation process. The outstanding time leap prior to a missile launch or nuclear test event distinguishes the two actions from the rest of the sequence.



**TABLE 7** Tit-for-Tat Relationship Between North Korea and the US During the Implementation Process

Case No.	Type of US Renege	Type of North Korea Response	Response Time
A-1	Indirect Renege US suspects North Korea's diversion of heavy fuel oil (1995/02/16)	Benign Negative	1 day
A-2	Indirect Renege US suspects under ground nuclear facility in Kumchang-ri (1998/01/02)	Benign Negative	1 day
B-1	Indirect Renege US suspects North Korea's secret HEU program (2002/10/16)	Benign Negative	1 day
D-1	Direct Renege US halts heavy fuel oil provision (2002/11/14)	Malignant Negative Break IAEA seal (2002/12/22) Evict IAEA (2002/12/27-31) Leave NPT (2003/01/10)	33 days
D-2	Direct Renege Sanction on Banco Delta Asia (2005/09/15)	Malignant Negative Refuse Six Party Talk (2005/12/11)	3 months
		Missile launch (2006/07/4-5) Nuclear test (2006/10/09)	11 months
D-3	Direct Renege US postpones de-listing from state-sponsoring terrorism (2008/08/11)	Malignant Negative Break IAEA seal (2008/09/23) Slow down fuel rod unloading (2008/11/12)	42 days
B-2	Indirect Renege US enforces "sampling" during verification process (2008/11/13)	Benign Negative	1 day

D-4	Direct Renege Halt heavy fuel oil provision (2008/12/12)	Malignant Negative Slow disablement speed by half (2008/12/13)	1 day
		Missile launch (2009/04/05) Nuclear test (2009/02/25)	5 months

Source: Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, April 2003.

These observations allow for the detachment of nuclear test/missile launch from the quid-pro-quo process of implementation. Instead, the two actions could be affected by other factors not explored in this research. Considering that statements issued prior to nuclear tests repeatedly point to the overall tone of the US-DPRK bilateral relationship, the tone of the relationship can be expected to play a role in North Korea’s missile launch or nuclear test. Also, by the process of elimination, domestic factors, which were not calibrated in this research, could be expected to have an influence. Domestic needs include political needs for regime legitimization (especially during a succession period) and technical needs where nuclear and missile technology requires tests at certain phases during the course of development. Therefore, further research could be designed by tuning into the two factors (overall tone of the relationship and domestic needs) to explain North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test decisions.

TABLE 8 Possible Design of Further Research

			Tone of US-DPRK Bilateral Relationship	
			Amiable	Hostile
North Korea	Domestic need	Low	No test	-
		High	-	Nuclear test

Conclusion

The outcome of this research provides two insights. First, it confirms the belief championed by many scholars today that North Korea is, in fact, rational.<sup>11</sup> Pyongyang negotiates for an agreement that best serves their national interest just as any other state would. Also, North Korea respects the principle of proportionality in retaliation. Even when faced with their

11 David Kang, Leon Sigal, and Selig Harrison are major scholars asserting North Korea’s rationality.

counterpart's renege, they control their response to not risk throwing off the entire process since the agreement serves Pyongyang's interest, as well.

Second, the overall tone of the relationship is just as important to North Korea as is respecting commitments. This suggests that a specific issue-oriented approach is not applicable to tackling the issue of DPRK denuclearization. Trying to maintain an amiable relationship on nuclear issues while taking a hostile tone in economic issues is bound to fail in both areas. The idiosyncrasy of North Korea's negotiation pattern and the historical development of the nuclear issue requires a comprehensive approach, as well as a benevolent overall tone in the US-DPRK relationship for successful implementation.

North Korea's interest for nuclear possession began as a 'deterrence capability' and shifted to a 'bargaining chip' as the US actively engaged in negotiation with the North. However, it bounced back to being a deterrence tool as the US was perceived to be an unreliable counterpart, let alone providing any security guarantee. For the past two decades, the US has been just as unpredictable as North Korea, largely due to changing political line-ups and struggles with the Congress. The unpredictability of the US as perceived and learned by North Korea has strengthened their resolution for self-reliance.

In 2012, North Korea amended the constitution to solidify their status as a nuclear weapon state, and successor Kim Jong-Un seems resolved to rely on nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons have always been primarily for security guarantee, and Pyongyang's engagement in denuclearization negotiation was only possible when another form of security guarantee was provided (e.g. US-DPRK economic/political normalization). States could be security maximizers or power maximizers, but only after security needs are fulfilled, can a state attain further ambitions.<sup>12</sup> North Korea will not prioritize any other issue over their security concern. Therefore, dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue is the same as dealing with North Korea's security issue. A limited measure such as coercive diplomacy is not an appropriate strategy to address the DPRK security issue. A change in policy, not strategy, is called for to resolve the nuclear issue in conjuncture with the Korean Peninsula's security issue. Y

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12 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Illinois: Waveland Pr Inc, 2010).

# **NORTH KOREA IN THE EUROPEAN PRESS: AN ANALYSIS OF STEREOTYPES IN BRITISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN NEWSPAPERS<sup>1</sup>**

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*Although North Korea is a recurring topic in international politics, research analyzing its depiction in the media remains scant, with much of it focused on South Korea and the United States. The perspective of European states, however, has been largely ignored. This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing the coverage of North Korea in 2014 by several major European newspapers from the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. Via a focus on the stereotypes visible in their reporting, the prevalent depictions of North Korea as well as national differences are uncovered. The main findings of the study are that, first, the dominant narrative about North Korea is the same across all analyzed newspapers. It depicts the country as an authoritarian dictatorship that is isolated from the international community and maintains a belligerent stance in dealing with the world. Second, humanitarian and human rights issues receive far less attention in the reporting. Third, the depiction of North Korea as a threat and an object of ridicule varies across the analyzed newspapers. Finally, in contrast to what other studies argue especially about the coverage of American newspapers, North Korea is usually not depicted as falling apart or irrational.*

North Korea is commonly referred to as the Hermit Kingdom, a term that from the outset implies how difficult it is to gain a realistic understanding of the country. Few have direct access to the country, and those who enter as tourists or journalists usually face severe restrictions as to where they

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<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this article was presented at The World Congress for Korean Politics and Society in Gyeongju, South Korea, on August 25, 2015.

can go, what they can see, and to whom they can talk. Regardless – or maybe because – of these constraints, North Korea attracts the attention and interest of the outside world. The release of a variety of books and films about the country over the course of the past years is testament to this. Yet, the common representation of the country in the media has been criticized and called into question from various sides. Recent books consequently explicitly target prevalent clichés that are “largely wrong,”<sup>2</sup> call out “the punditry, misconceptions, and caricatures in the news and entertainment media,”<sup>3</sup> and speak of the “uninformative, unreliable, often sensationalized”<sup>4</sup> reporting in the press.

Much of these criticisms target – explicitly or not – the reporting in the American media in particular, or in the English-language media, in general. Academic studies on North Korea’s representation in popular media also refer primarily to American publications or outlets in the countries surrounding North Korea, namely South Korea, China, and Japan. In contrast to this, little to no attention has been given to how the European media depict North Korea. This is understandable: Europe is geographically distant, not directly affected by the disputes surrounding North Korea, and not part of institutions such as the Six-Party Talks. Therefore, it stands to reason that North Korea would feature less prominently in European newspapers, as well as in the region’s public and political discourses.

At the same time, an analysis of the European media has merits of its own. For one, it provides a useful control group with which the knowledge on the media’s reporting on North Korea in other countries can be compared. It is easy to see why North Korea might be portrayed as a potential threat in South Korea and the United States – and why the relationships of these countries might coincide with caricatures, sensationalism, and ideology-driven depictions of North Korea, as many observers describe it. Is this also the case in the media of European countries, which might be less predisposed towards North Korea due to the geographic distance and the lower political stakes? Secondly, European nations are shifting more attention towards Asia.<sup>5</sup> The European Union has repeatedly expressed its

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2 Andrei Lankov, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xi.

3 Victor Cha, *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future* (London: Bodley Head, 2012), 16.

4 Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York: The New Press, 2004), xii.

5 See for example Sophie Dembinski, “Pivot to Asia Together,” *US News World Report*, September 25, 2014, accessed November 12, 2015, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/09/25/incoming-eu-foreign-policy-chief-sees-benefits-of-pivoting-to-asia>.

ambition to push North Korea towards denuclearization,<sup>6</sup> and analysts have called for a stronger European presence in this context.<sup>7</sup> An understanding of the European media's representation of the region and its issues, as well as the repercussions of these depictions within the public and political discourse, might therefore contribute to the understanding of the region's policies towards Asia and North Korea.

This study aims to shed some light on how North Korea is depicted in the European print media. For this purpose, newspapers from England, France, and Germany were chosen. The decision to focus on the print media (in contrast to television or the internet) was made in light of their comparatively influential nature and the ease of access to large amounts of structured source materials. The three countries were selected not because they are assumed to represent Europe as a whole, but rather because they are the most populous states within the European Union. As such, they are seen as the most representative within the limitations of this study. For the analysis of these newspapers, a special focus on stereotypes was chosen. While previous studies on North Korea's representation in the media, as well as the aforementioned criticism towards the media's reporting on the country, do not explicitly speak of stereotypes, the references to them are ubiquitous in both. In order to see whether these criticisms can equally be applied to the European media and to have a basis for comparisons, this analysis therefore takes stereotypes as a lens through which the media is surveyed.

The guiding research question of this study is the following: What stereotypes about North Korea are visible in the reporting of English, French, and German newspapers? In the first section, the given literature on the topic will be briefly reviewed. Then, the methodology of this article will be outlined, and its terminology defined. The results of the quantitative analysis will be presented in the third section, followed by a discussion of its findings.

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6 See for example Seung-woo Kang, "EU to Help Denuclearize North Korea," *The Korea Times*, October 6, 2016, accessed October 20, 2016, [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/10/116\\_215507.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/10/116_215507.html).

7 See for example Mark Fitzpatrick, "North Korean Proliferation Challenges: The Role of the European Union," *EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Non-Proliferation Papers*, accessed October 20, 2016, [https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC\\_no-18.pdf](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC_no-18.pdf).

## North Korea in the Media

The past decades have seen a number of studies on the depiction of North Korea in the media of other countries, and especially in South Korea, the United States, and China. To the knowledge of the authors, no prior study focused on the European media. Straightforward stereotypes are usually not the sole focus of the existing studies as most of them either analyze the general depiction of North Korea in specific media outlets, for example by comparing specific newspapers<sup>8</sup>, or by focusing on certain issue areas, for example the portrayal of North Korean living standards<sup>9</sup> or the country's athletes at international sporting events.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, many of these studies emphasize the ubiquity of stereotypes in the reporting on North Korea and outline how they form a persistent narrative.

In the past few years, several articles have focused on the depictions of North Korea in South Korean newspapers. In particular, these articles have shown how the ideological orientations of South Korean newspapers impact their depictions of the North. Kyung Hee Kim and Ghee Young Noh, for example, conclude that the representation of North Korea differs between conservative and progressive newspapers.<sup>11</sup> The former generally portrays North Korea as more hostile, less rational, and more distinct from South Korea than their progressive peers. Kim and Noh additionally emphasize the linkage between the newspapers' reporting and the production of generalizations and stereotypes in the audience.<sup>12</sup> Seung-Hee Ha and Min-Kyu Lee found congruent results regarding the effects of the news outlets' positions on the ideological spectrum when they analyzed the depiction of the North Korean population and its living conditions in several newspapers

8 See for example Kyung Hee Kim and Ghee Young Noh, "한국 신문사의 이념과 북한 보도방식에 대한 연구 'han-gug sin-mun-sa-ui i-nyeom-gwa bug-han bo-do-bang-sig-e dae-han yeon-gu' [A Comparative Study of News Reporting About North Korea on Newspapers in South Korea]," *Korean Journal of Journalism & Communication Studies* 55, no. 1 (2011): 361–87.

9 Seung-Hee Ha and Min-Kyu Lee, "북한주민 생활 실태에 관한 국내 신문보도 프레임연구: 조선일보, 동아일보, 한겨레, 경향신문을 중심으로 'bug-han-ju-min saeng-hwal sil-tae-e gwan-han gug-nae sin-mun-bo-do peu-le-im-yeon-gu: jo-seon-il-bo, dong-a-il-bo, han-gyeo-le, gyeong-hyang-sin-mun-eul jung-sim-eu-lo' [A News Frame Analysis by the South Korean Press on the Livelihoods of a North Koreans]," *Korean Journal of Communication & Information* 58 (2012): 222–41.

10 Liv Yoon and Brian Wilson, "'Nice Korea, Naughty Korea': Media framings of North Korea and the Inter-Korean Relationship in the London 2012 Olympic Games," *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 51, no. 5 (2016): 505–28.

11 Kim and Noh, "한국 신문사의 이념과 북한 보도방식에 대한 연구."

12 Ibid., 362.

from South Korea.<sup>13</sup> Both studies also show that newspapers give more or less credit to specific information sources depending on their ideological orientation; conservative publications cite anonymous sources as well as North Korean defectors more frequently, while progressive publications give more space to voices from the United States.

Other authors have analyzed the depiction of North Korea in the American media. With special attention to reporting on the 1994 Agreed Framework, Hugh Gusterson argues that the American print media presents a highly simplified and at times inaccurate image of North Korea and lists a number of elements that constitute “recurrent themes, stereotypes, metaphors, and storylines.”<sup>14</sup> Among these are the portrayal of the country as backwards, its leaders as narcissistic, paranoid, and malicious, and the regime as untrustworthy. As Gusterson furthermore criticizes, expert opinions, voices from outside the United States, and especially the North Korean perspective, are routinely ignored in favor of crafting an entertaining story – which results in the media ultimately becoming a poor source of information for the public as well as for the political discourse on North Korea.<sup>15</sup> The resulting narrative is usually the same regardless of the particular newspaper.

In a study of various American media outlets, Kyung Hye Kim finds a common practice of reporting on North Korea by linking it to certain other countries, regardless of their geographic locations or relations to each other.<sup>16</sup> North Korea is therefore commonly presented with reference to Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. These states are linked together through a narrative that presents them as “unpredictable, secretive, unfriendly, hostile, rogue and terrorist countries.”<sup>17</sup> A similar focus was chosen by Jae Sik Ha in his study of the American media’s portrayal of Kim Jong-Il and former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf in 2001 and 2002.<sup>18</sup> Whereas the latter was

13 Ha and Lee, “북한주민 생활 실태에 관한 국내 신문보도 프레임연구: 조선일보, 동아일보, 한겨레, 경향신문을 중심으로.”

14 Hugh Gusterson, “Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist Gets Nuclear Weapons: How the U.S. Print Media Cover North Korea,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 15, no. 1 (2008): 21-42.

15 Ibid., 36.

16 Kyung Hye Kim, “Examining US News Media Discourses About North Korea: A Corpus-Based Critical Discourse Analysis,” *Discourse & Society* 25, no. 2 (2014): 221-44.

17 Ibid., 239.

18 Jae Sik Ha, “‘적(enemy)’과 ‘친구(friend)’의 차이: 파키스탄의 무샤라프와 북한의 김정일에 대한 미국신문의 프레임 연구 ‘jeog(enemy)’gwa ‘chin-gu(friend)’ui cha-i: pa-ki-seu-tan-ui mu-sya-la-peu-wa bug-han-ui gim-jeong-il-e dae-han mi-gug-sin-mun-ui peu-le-i-ming yeon-gu’ [Framing dictators as ‘Enemy’ vs. ‘Friend’: Comparing Pervez Musharraf and Kim Jong-il in U.S. newspapers],” *Communication Science* 27, no. 1 (2010): 65-91.



seen as an ally and partner in the fight against terrorism, the North Korean ruler was clearly identified as an enemy. As Ha argues, the media's reporting therefore aligned itself with the prevalent political stance of the time and its understanding of the national interest.

Other authors come to equally critical conclusions about the American media and its representations of North Korea, even though these conclusions are usually not based on dedicated studies of the media's reporting. Hazel Smith perceives much of the media reporting (and scholarship) on the country defined by a "securitization prism"<sup>19</sup> that focuses on military factors and perceives the North Korean regime as the exclusive source of the problems surrounding the country. As she argues, this perspective comes with the assumption that North Korea is either "bad" and driven by intrinsically evil intentions, or "mad" and acting in opposition to common logic.<sup>20</sup> Roland Bleiker shows a similarly critical attitude towards perceived simplifications and misrepresentations that can be found in the common narrative presented by the media: the "rhetoric of rogue states obstructs an adequate understanding of the security situation in Korea."<sup>21</sup> The same argument is made by Sung-Yoon Lee, who links it to the common notion of an axis of evil with the prevalence of various myths about North Korea.<sup>22</sup>

Beyond the American media, Hyung Gu Lynn has analyzed the depiction of North Korea in the Japanese TV media and its effects on public perceptions and ultimately on the political agenda. He argues that the media's persistent focus on certain topics, foremost of which are the abduction issue<sup>23</sup> and the threat of North Korean missiles, and their presentation in certain ways, caught the public eye as well as politics in a "self-perpetuating cycle of indignation and hate."<sup>24</sup> This allowed interest groups to establish a

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19 Hazel Smith, "Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the 'Securitization' Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)* 76, no. 3 (2000): 593–617.

20 Ibid., 597, 602.

21 Roland Bleiker, "A Rogue Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 79, no. 4 (2003): 725.

22 Sung-Yoon Lee, "The Mythical Nuclear Kingdom of North Korea," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 29, no. 2 (2005): 125–44.

23 North Korea has officially admitted kidnapping 13 Japanese citizens between 1977 and 1983, and is suspected to have kidnapped many more. This issue is central to Japan's foreign relations with North Korea. For a discussion on how Japan and South Korea have dealt with the issue, see Brad Williams and Erik Mobrand, "Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 69, no. 2 (2010): 507–36.

24 Hyung Gu Lynn, "Vicarious Traumas: Television and Public Opinion in Japan's North Korea Policy," *Pacific Affairs* 79, no. 3 (2006): 508.

conservative agenda as the driving force in the relations between Japan and North Korea.<sup>25</sup> Other studies have focused on the Chinese-Korean media and especially on newspapers published in Korean for the ethnic Koreans living in China's Jilin Province. For two of them, Il-Wook Jeon analyzed the reporting on North and South Korea; he concluded for both Korea that the majority of articles are of a positive nature, although the percentage is notably higher in the case of reporting on the South.<sup>26</sup>

It is noteworthy that these studies come to different conclusions about the relationship between depictions of North Korea in the media and among the political elites, and in particular regarding how the two influence each other. Gusterson implies that the former has the potential to misinform the public and thereby to push policymakers in a misguided direction by explaining, "I have felt that U.S. policy makers might be better off relying only on policy briefs and not reading even our best newspapers."<sup>27</sup> A number of other authors, for example Bleiker,<sup>28</sup> Smith,<sup>29</sup> Ha,<sup>30</sup> and Lee,<sup>31</sup> merely state that the narratives presented by the media usually echo those by scholars and/or policymakers, and especially so in regards to the rhetoric and the vocabulary employed. Kim goes beyond this in her analysis and implies that the media's reporting on North Korea serves specific purposes and ultimately helps to "pursue the political ends of the political elite,"<sup>32</sup> a view seemingly shared by Lynn.<sup>33</sup> In any case, the specific practices of reporting on North Korea are in various studies presented in a larger context and linked to actual policy issues.

Apart from these country-specific analyses of North Korea's representation in the media, a small number of studies have taken a

25 Ibid., 484.

26 See Il-Wook Jeon, "중국 언론매체(연변일보)의 보도내용 비교연구: 남북한 관련보도를 중심으로 'jung-gug eon-lon-mae-che(yeon-byeon-il-bo)ui bo-do-nae-yong bi-gyo-yeon-gu: nam-bug-han gwan-lyeon-bo-do-leul jung-sim-eu-lo' [A Carative(sic) Study of Chinese Media(sic) Report(sic) (Yanbian Daily): Focusing on the Reports(sic) on North and South Korea]," *Journal of North-East Asian Studies* 17, no. 1 (2012): 241–264; Il-Wook Jeon, "중국 언론매체의 남북한 보도태도 비교연구: 길림신문을 중심으로 'jung-gug eon-lon-mae-che-ui nam-bug-han bo-do-tae-do bi-gyo-yeon-gu: gil-lim-sin-mun-eul jung-sim-eu-lo' [A Comparative Study of Chinese Media Report on North and South Korea, Focusing on Jilin Newspaper]," *Journal of Policy Sciences* 22, no. 2 (2013): 79–104.

27 Gusterson, "Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist," 36.

28 Bleiker, "A Rogue Is a Rogue," 725.

29 Smith, "Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor?" 593.

30 Ha, "'적(enemy)'과 '친구(friend)'의 차이: 파키스탄의 무샤라프와 북한의 김정일에 대한 미국신문의 프레임 연구," 87.

31 Lee, "The Mythical Nuclear Kingdom of North Korea," 131.

32 Kim, "Examining US News," 239.

33 Lynn, "Vicarious Traumas," 484.

comparative approach. Liv Yoon and Brian Wilson, for example, compared the reporting of South Korean and Western print and online media on North Korea and the inter-Korean relationship during the 2012 Olympic Games in London.<sup>34</sup> As they concluded, the Western media gave more attention to the conflicts as well as problems surrounding North Korea and showcased a dismissive attitude towards the performances of its athletes, while the reporting in South Korea gave more attention to these athletic achievements. Another example of a comparative approach can be found in a study by Ban, Baek, and Kim, who analyzed the media's framing of the 2006 North Korean nuclear crisis over time for both American as well as South Korean newspapers and their relative impact on their respective audiences.<sup>35</sup>

The media depiction of North Korea in the country's abutters and the United States has thereby received attention in a variety of studies. The situation in the European media, on the other hand, has so far not been considered. This study therefore aims to explore this perspective and provide a foundation for future comparative works researching the representation of North Korea beyond the peninsula's neighbors and the United States.

## Research Methodology

In order to analyze the depictions visible in the European media's reporting on North Korea, six newspapers from three countries were selected: England, France, and Germany. These countries were chosen based on their relative size within Europe. The selection criteria for the specific newspapers required that they should be reasonably influential and available nationwide, generally perceived to be from different sides of the political spectrum, and that the researchers were able to gain access to full-text archives. The selected newspapers include: *The Guardian* (center-left) and *The Times* (center-right) from the United Kingdom; *Frankfurter Rundschau* (thereafter "Rundschau" – center-left) and *Die Welt* (center-right) from Germany; and *Le Monde* (center-left) and *Le Figaro* (right) from France. Of interest for this study were all articles published by these newspapers over the course of 2014.

34 Liv Yoon and Brian Wilson, "'Nice Korea, Naughty Korea.'"

35 Hyun Ban, Kanghui Baek, and Soo Jung Kim, "한미 (韓美) 언론의 북핵 위기 프레임; 효과 연극 - 미디어 프레임, 수용자 프레임, 그리고 스키마를 중심으로 'han-mi (韓美) eon-lon-ui bug-haeg wi-gi peu-le-im; hyo-gwa yeon-gug - mi-di-eo peu-le-im, su-yong-ja peu-le-im, geu-li-go seu-ki-ma-leul jung-sim-eu-lo' [Framing North Korea's Nuclear Crisis - Comparing the Media and Audiences' Frames in U.S. and South Korea]," *Journal of Political Communication* 17 (2010): 123-168.

The decision for this particular year was made to ensure timely relevance of the results. While it saw a number of unusual North Korea-related events—for example, the release of the film *The Interview* and the vanishing of Kim Jong Un for several weeks—the preceding years equally had specific, unprecedented events. One limitation of the research presented here might therefore be that the results vary depending on the year analyzed.

In a first step, via the LexisNexis media database, all articles published by the six newspapers during 2014 that contained one or multiple occurrences of specific keywords were selected. These keywords were “North Korea,” “Pyongyang,” “Kim Jong-un,” “Kim Jong-il,” and “Kim Il-sung,” including their variant spellings, to take into account both different romanization systems and the differences depending on the newspapers’ languages. This search yielded a total of 1,298 individual articles, with 729 of these from the English newspapers, 302 from German ones, and 267 from the French ones. Not all of these articles are necessarily about North Korea, but at least refer to it by name. Table 1, hereafter, provides a breakdown of the different articles by newspaper.

**TABLE 1** Breakdown of Articles (by Newspaper)

<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Times</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>	<i>Rundschau</i>	<i>Le Figaro</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	Total
374	355	189	113	132	135	1298

In a second step, all 1,298 articles were read and coded for which stereotypical depictions occur in them (with the possibility of multiple or no stereotypes occurring in an article). The exclusive focus lay on the text of the articles; images and illustrations were not taken into account. This process did not rely on an existing list of stereotypes or guiding hypotheses, in part because the variety of approaches in the existing studies on the topic make it hard to discern a set of common results that could be the basis for comparison. In the sense of Grounded Theory approaches, the goal was the open-ended discovery of stereotypes within the data and thereby theory generation in contrast to theory testing.<sup>36</sup> Over the course of this process, a preliminary list of stereotypes was created and constantly adapted if new information required so. In case of ambiguities or the absence of a fitting stereotype on the list, the researchers consulted and adapted the list as

36 See Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*, 7th Paperback Printing (New Brunswick: Aldine, 2012), 28.

necessary.

As two researchers analyzed the articles, several indicators were computed to ensure intercoder reliability. Over all articles and stereotypes, the agreement percentage was 90.8 percent, while Scott's Pi and Cohen's Kappa were both 0.672. These numbers are generally seen as an indicator for good intercoder reliability. Eventually, only stereotypes visible in at least 10 percent of the analyzed articles of at least one newspaper were kept on the list. Articles that came up several times in the LexisNexis output were analyzed as if they were distinct articles based on the assumption that they were published several times in different locations (i.e. some articles would have an excerpt printed on the front page with the rest printed further inside).

This analysis was guided by a number of assumptions about stereotypes. The literature knows a variety of distinct definitions for the term, which despite various nuances revolve around a similar understanding: stereotypes exemplify the "qualities perceived to reflect the essence of a group."<sup>37</sup> At their core, stereotypes are a "socially-constructed mental pigeon-hole into which events and individuals can be sorted, thereby making such events and individuals comprehensible"; and which provide us with "categories which we project on the world in order to make sense of it."<sup>38</sup> A more practical definition, and the one we use here, is that stereotypes are "simply generalizations about groups of people."<sup>39</sup> These stereotypes, therefore, occur not only in newspaper articles about North Korea specifically, but can also originate from texts that merely refer to the country, such as, to elaborate on a different issue via a comparison to North Korea.

As a variety of authors stress, the academic understanding of stereotypes does not necessarily equal the common use of the term. While it is often linked to concepts such as prejudice, discrimination, and stigma,<sup>40</sup> stereotypes do not necessarily describe a group in negative terms. While they usually generalize and may oftentimes contain errors, they are not necessarily factually wrong. This understanding of stereotypes has been adopted by a number of other researchers, such as a study on stereotypes

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37 John F. Dovidio et al., "Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Overview," in *The SAGE Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination*, eds. John F. Dovidio et al. (London: SAGE, 2010), 8.

38 Roger Fowler, *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press*, 12th Edition (New York: Routledge, 2013), 17.

39 David Schneider, *The Psychology of Stereotyping* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2005), 562.

40 See John F. Dovidio et al., "Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination"; Paul Martin Lester and Susan Dente Ross, *Images That Injure: Pictorial Stereotypes in the Media* (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 20.

about Germany visible in the British print media.<sup>41</sup>

This use of the term stereotype is therefore close to the common understanding of what a generalization is. Yet, as David Schneider emphasizes, the two concepts differ in their degree of complexity and cultural embeddedness. Generalizations are commonly used for objects instead of people, and stereotypes tend to “have profound consequences for our social behavior.”<sup>42</sup> Especially due to the latter point, this paper therefore speaks of stereotypes instead of generalizations. The literature additionally emphasizes that many stereotypes are held unconsciously and are therefore hard to recognize, to control, and to change, as well as to avoid.

In the context of this analysis, it is worth emphasizing that the presence of stereotypes in the media’s reporting on North Korea can go beyond blunt simplifications. The statement that “all North Koreans suffer from famine” is certainly a stereotype, yet it also constitutes stereotypical reporting if the majority of all articles on North Korea focus on the belligerent rhetoric of the country’s government, even though this stereotype is not expressed in a single phrase. After all, stereotypes are also created through the choice of what to report on, through the sources that are claimed to be reliable, and the contextual knowledge provided in articles.

## Results

The primary result of this study is a list of nine stereotypes about North Korea visible in the six analyzed newspapers. Their number and content are inevitably contentious and a result of the authors’ intent to produce a list that is both comprehensive and parsimonious. Stereotype 5, for example, depicts North Korea as a threat. This could have easily been split into separate stereotypes for the depictions of North Korea as a nuclear and a cyber threat. At the same time, this stereotype could have potentially been merged with Stereotype 4 and the depiction of North Korea as belligerent.

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41 Jonathan Grix and Chantal Lacroix, “Constructing Germany’s Image in the British Press: An Empirical Analysis of Stereotypical Reporting on Germany,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 14, no. 3 (2006): 373–392.

42 Schneider, *The Psychology of Stereotyping*, 564.

*Stereotype 1: North Korea is an oppressive dictatorship.*

The country is led by its dictator Kim Jong-un who holds absolute authority over decision making. The government practices dynasticism, restricts civil liberties (freedom of press, expression, movement, etc.) of its citizens, and exercises wide-ranging control over their everyday lives. Kim is usually referred to in the analyzed articles as “dictator” or “leader” and almost never by any of his political titles (as is the case for decision makers in other countries). The stereotype is also visible in the common usage of North Korea as the archetypical standard for non-democratic governance as visible in this quote:

Three months after the bloody purge of his uncle Chang Song-taek, Kim Jon-Eun rules without anyone to contest him. [...] The brutal execution of the party’s previous number two, December 12th, after a swift trial has eliminated the only person able to challenge the young dictator-wannabee raised in Switzerland.<sup>43</sup>

*Stereotype 2: North Korea is a humanitarian failure.*

This stereotype includes not only references to extreme poverty and famine and the scarcity of goods and resources (such as medical supplies), but also the reliance of North Korea on foreign aid to feed its population. This element of North Korea’s portrayal is frequently presented as a matter of fact that needs no further elaboration, such as through statistical data; at other times, it is illustrated through anecdotes:

Money, in this year of famine, is much needed in Korea. ‘Everybody was very gaunt. One of my [North Korean] guides would ingest so much food during official dinners that we had to help him vomit everything when were done with our food.’<sup>44</sup>

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43 Sébastien Falletti, “Corée du Nord: Kim Jong-un assoit son pouvoir absolu,” *Le Figaro*, March 10, 2014, translated by the authors.

44 Serge Michel, “Transnistrie, la preuve par l’image,” *Le Monde*, November 1, 2014, translated by the authors.

*Stereotype 3: North Korea commits crimes against humanity.*

Unlike Stereotype 1, which includes comparatively “softer” restrictions on the welfare of the North Korean population, this stereotype focuses on laws and practices affecting directly the chances of survival of individuals. It also includes any reference to North Korea as being “malicious” or “evil,” as well as comparisons to the Nazi regime and its practices. For example, articles on the UN report published in early 2014 frequently featured this stereotype, often describing gruesome details of North Korea’s crimes against humanity:

The UN report on the human rights situation in North Korea earlier this year contained almost unreadable details of life for the estimated 80,000-120,000 political prisoners. One former inmate told the panel his duties involved burning the bodies of those who had starved to death and using the remains as fertilizer. Another watched a female prisoner forced by guards to drown her new born baby in a bucket because it was presumed to have a Chinese father.<sup>45</sup>

*Stereotype 4: North Korea is belligerent.*

This stereotype encompasses hostile and aggressive practices of international significance, both in terms of rhetoric and military practices, such as castigations of the South Korean leadership, military provocations, and specific references to the militaristic nature of the country. This is commonly illustrated with quotes from official statements by the North Korean government, such as:

Mr. Fowle is the third American currently held in the country, which does not have formal diplomatic relations with the US and which threatened last year to turn Washington into a ‘sea of fire’ with atomic weapons.<sup>46</sup>

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45 Peter Walker, “The ‘I’m so ronery’ jokes mask the real evil of North Korea; The horror of a recent UN report on North Korea punctures the quirky Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un representations of Team America and The Interview for good,” *The Guardian*, December 23, 2014.

46 Leo Lewis, “North Koreans Arrest US Tourist,” *The Times* (London), June 7, 2014.



*Stereotype 5: North Korea is a threat.*

North Korea's military, including its nuclear and cyber capabilities, are posing a threat to foreign nations, especially the United States and South Korea, as well as their allies, industry, and even lifestyle. Of special importance is the fact that the threat posed by North Korea is generally assumed to be a matter of fact, rarely questioned, and presented without further analysis of context and intentions:

Japan and the Philippines are locked in territorial disputes with China, while tensions between South Korea and Japan affect partnerships on security, including the nuclear threat from North Korea, which called the Obama trip 'reactionary and dangerous.'<sup>47</sup>

*Stereotype 6: North Korea is an international outcast.*

The country does not conform to the norms of international society, suffers from sanctions, and is isolated from other nations. This includes the lack of normalized relations with other nations as well as North Korean actions that go against the *zeitgeist* of the international society, including selling arms or kidnapping foreign citizens. An example for this stereotype is the following depiction of the government's status:

But the internationally isolated and outlawed leadership in Pyongyang, which is heavily sanctioned by the UN due to its nuclear and rocket tests and which is about to be denounced for the first time by the United Nations due to its especially gruesome human rights violations, follows its own rational.<sup>48</sup>

*Stereotype 7: North Korea is an enigma.*

This stereotype consists of references to how difficult it is to get reliable information on North Korea, its leadership, and the situation on the ground.

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47 David Taylor, "Obama Heads East on Trip to Smooth Asian Rivalries," *The Times* (London), April 22, 2014.

48 Johnny Erling, "Kims Kalkül: Amerikaner sind frei; Nordkorea entlässt die letzten beiden US-Bürger aus der Haft. Geheimdienstchef Clapper brachte Brief Obamas nach Pjöngjang," *Die Welt*, November 10, 2014, translated by the authors.

As in the following quote, this is at times used to qualify – and express uncertainty about – the information presented:

According to North Korea watchers, who scrutinise the smallest of signals from the isolated and secretive state, Mr. Kim has engaged in a programme of promotions, demotions and re-promotions of senior army officers, in a bizarre military version of snakes and ladders.<sup>49</sup>

*Stereotype 8: North Korea is an object of ridicule.*

While mostly consisting of jokes at the expense of Kim Jong-un, this section also includes references to the presumably weird or bizarre characteristics of the regime. While this stereotype occurs frequently in a wide range of articles, it is especially present in reporting focused exclusively on North Korean absurdities:

Kim's latest (non-nuclear) mission shows he's a real funghi: Its most recent, and slightly dubious, discoveries were a lair for unicorns and waterproofing liquid. Now the world's most secretive state claims to have given the globe a brand new first: a sports drink made from mushroom fungus.<sup>50</sup>

*Stereotype 9: North Korea has a special relationship with the People's Republic of China.*

This stereotype comprises references to the support granted by the PRC to its proclaimed ally, the strategic position of the North Korean state in China's East Asian strategy, and references to China as having a special influence on North Korea's actions. This depiction frequently casts North Korea as ultimately dependent on – and lacking agency beyond that granted by – Beijing:

To fend off further cyber attacks, the United States asked its arch

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
49 Richard Lloyd Parry, "Kim Plays 'Snakes and Ladders' with His Generals," *The Times* (London), February 12, 2014.

50 Robin Pagnamenta, "Kim's Latest (Non-Nuclear) Mission Shows He's a Real Funghi," *The Times* (London), May 31, 2014.

rival and North Korea-ally China for ‘cooperation,’ as a spokesman of the government said.<sup>51</sup>

Across all the 1,298 analyzed articles from the six newspapers, the most common stereotype about North Korea concerns its authoritarian and dictatorial nature (Stereotype 1). It is visible in slightly more than half of all articles (50.6 percent) and thereby in almost twice as many times as the second most prevalent stereotype. North Korea as belligerent (Stereotype 4) appears in slightly less than one third of articles (29.4 percent), while the nature of the state as an object of ridicule (Stereotype 8) and as an outcast (Stereotype 6) both appear in roughly one out of four texts - that is in 24.3 percent and 24.1 percent of all articles, respectively. North Korea is represented as a threat (Stereotype 5) in 17.4 percent of all articles. The suffering of the North Korean people is addressed in terms of human rights abuses (Stereotype 3) and humanitarian failure (Stereotype 2) in 11.1 percent and 9.8 percent of the articles, respectively. The enigmatic nature of North Korea (Stereotype 8) is also mentioned at a similar frequency (9.1 percent). Ranking last is the special relation North Korea has with China (Stereotype 9), which is only highlighted in 7.9 percent of all articles; it owes its inclusion in this list only to the occurrences in articles from the French newspapers.

**FIGURE 1** Frequency of Stereotypes Across All Analyzed Articles



51 “Nordkorea droht mit Cyber-Krieg,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, December 22, 2014, translated by the authors.

On average, each of the analyzed articles contained slightly less than two stereotypical depictions of North Korea (on average 1.87 stereotypes per article). This number varies only slightly across newspapers; the only exception is the *Rundschau* where on average only 1.60 stereotypes are visible per article. When the newspapers are grouped by country, the differences in the average number of stereotypes per article are equally small (see *Table 2*). Of the articles surveyed, only 151 (11.6 percent) contained no stereotypes from our list, most of which mention North Korea only in passing.

TABLE 2 Average Number of Stereotypes per Article by Newspaper


<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Times</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>	<i>Rundschau</i>	<i>Le Figaro</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	Average
2.01	1.83	1.89	1.60	1.83	1.87	1.87

TABLE 3 Average Number of Stereotypes per Article by Country

United Kingdom	Germany	France
1.92	1.75	1.85

The frequency of specific stereotypes' occurrence is relatively similar across the analyzed newspapers and their countries of origin. It is noteworthy that there are no significant differences in the occurrence of the stereotypes depending on whether the analyzed newspapers are considered progressive/ liberal or conservative. At the same time, there are cases in which the portrayal of North Korea varies depending on the newspaper and the country (even though the overall frequency is similar). These differences are most pronounced in the case of Stereotype 8 and the depiction of North Korea as an object of ridicule. Its frequency varies from 8.9 percent of articles in *Le Monde* to 35.6 percent in *The Guardian*. Furthermore there is a pattern visible with British newspapers showcasing the most ridicule and French publications comparatively little. Differences are also visible for the case of Stereotype 5 and the depiction of North Korea as a threat. While it occurs in slightly more than a fifth of the articles from British and French newspapers, it is only present in roughly one in ten articles from the two German sources. But, as the focus of this analysis lies on the depiction of North Korea in the European print media in general, we refrain at this point from possibly over-interpreting these differences based on newspapers' countries of origin.

**FIGURE 2** Frequency of Stereotypes in Articles of Reviewed Newspapers by Country



## Findings

*General Finding 1: The stereotypical picture of North Korea in the analyzed newspapers is one of an authoritarian dictatorship that is isolated on the international stage and showcases a belligerent stance in dealing with the world.*

This narrative usually comes with several noteworthy characteristics, specifically that all analyzed newspapers make use of this narrative, regardless of their country of origin and political orientation. Similar to the narrative visible in American print media, Gunderson observes, “Whichever newspaper one reads, ‘the story’ is roughly the same.”<sup>52</sup> While there are differences in the stereotypes they employ (see below), they are less pronounced than is the case for South Korean newspapers.<sup>53</sup> This might reflect the fact that North Korea and the engagement with it is not a

<sup>52</sup> Gunderson, “Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist,” 29.

<sup>53</sup> Kim and Noh, “한국 신문사의 이념과 북한 보도방식에 대한 연구,” 362; see also Ha and Lee, “북한주민 생활 실태에 관한 국내 신문보도 프레임연구: 조선일보, 동아일보, 한겨레, 경향신문을 중심으로.”

particularly divisive issue in the three countries this study looks at (which stands in marked contrast to the situation in South Korea).

In the context of this over arching narrative, equally noteworthy is the portrayal of Kim Jong-un as yielding absolute power, having a role in all decisions made, and being the only actual agent in North Korea. The population is ascribed an exclusively passive role; even the elites surrounding the dictator only appear in relation to him and his actions. A common stereotype about North Korea is hence the idea that “L’État, c’est Kim” and that North Korea as a dictatorship plays in a league of its own internationally. This goes hand-in-hand with the depiction of the government as illegitimate. With singular exceptions, none of the articles analyzed refer to Kim with any of his political titles and usually label him as “dictator,” “leader,” or “ruler.” Combined with repeated ridicule of Kim and those surrounding him, this is a testament to the unique degree of contempt held by journalists towards the North Korean head of state.<sup>54</sup>

While the reporting thereby focuses on a single person, a third characteristic of this dominant narrative is that usually no explicit information about Kim’s rationale and motivations is provided. This represents a broader trend of superficial reporting that does not delve into the history of North Korea or its internal affairs – and ultimately the underpinnings of its behavior. In this sense, the focus of the analyzed European newspaper articles lies much more on mere reporting rather than explaining. To employ the terminology introduced by Smith, the analyzed articles hence make few explicit assumptions about whether the country and its leadership is a bad, mad, or sad actor.<sup>55</sup> At the same time, the question arises whether this absence of clear information in combination with stereotypes that depict North Korea as belligerent and run by a despicable, and at times ridiculous, dictator ultimately evoke certain impressions upon the audience on their own.

Another aspect of Smith’s argument is clearly visible: the “securitization paradigm” through which all issues relating to North Korea are seen through a lens that emphasizes military power, threats, and security. Depending on the newspaper, roughly a fourth to a third of all articles depict North Korea as belligerent, and especially so in the context of its cyber warfare capabilities and the nuclear program. One of the dominant themes in the analyzed newspapers’ reporting on North Korea

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54 See Gusterson, “Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist,” 30.

55 Smith, “Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor?”

are therefore the effects of the country's actions on the security of other nations. Yet, this depiction as belligerent does not necessarily translate into that of an actual threat. A potential danger for European countries and their citizens is visible in virtually none of the analyzed articles. Over the course of 2014, the only threat implied came from the belligerent North Korean reaction to the release of the film *The Interview*. In a number of cases, the bellicose rhetoric of North Korea is even explicitly called out for not going beyond mere words. Even the country's nuclear weapons are commonly treated in a matter-of-fact fashion without any portrayal of an imminent danger.

*General Finding 2: Humanitarian issues receive comparatively little attention*

Across all newspapers, the humanitarian situation in North Korea as well as the behavior of the government in this context occupy less space than reporting on the Kim regime, its belligerence, and its quirks. This ties in with the "securitization paradigm" and the observation that the reporting focuses on the man in power, not the wider population (see above). It also confirms what can be observed in the coverage of North Korea by the wider English-language press. The study by Gusterson,<sup>56</sup> for example, does not even mention humanitarian issues as a significant part of their reporting on North Korea. An obvious explanation for this relative absence is that there are fewer "newsworthy" developments in the context of humanitarian and human rights issues. As the reporting on the release of the UN Commission's report on North Korea illustrates, these topics become visible in the newspapers' reporting only once new material becomes available.

While humanitarian issues thereby occupy comparatively little space, all six analyzed newspapers nevertheless showcase a clear stance in this context. North Korea is commonly depicted as "the worst place on earth"<sup>57</sup> whenever this side of the country is brought up. This depiction is oftentimes linked to the Kim family whose members are, for one, described as directly responsible for the situation and, secondly, put in absolute contrast to this suffering via references to their life in luxury. Once again, this depiction puts the ruling family into focus and relates all

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<sup>56</sup> Gusterson, "Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist."

<sup>57</sup> Cha, *The Impossible State*, 166.

other things in North Korea back to them.

We got used to Kim Jong-Un being one of the bad guys. [...] His people starve while he feasts and whores and splurges on weapons just like his father did before him.<sup>58</sup>

*General Finding 3: The portrayal of North Korea does not vary depending on the ideological dispositions of the analyzed newspapers.*

In contrast to the results of several studies about the depiction of North Korea in South Korean newspapers, the occurrence and content of the stereotypes found here do not vary depending on newspapers' position on the ideological spectrum. One obvious explanation is that the European discourse on North Korea is far less shaped by ideological cleavages than is the case in South Korea.

*General Finding 4: North Korea is usually not depicted as collapsing or irrational – contrary to the prevalent view that this is part of the common knowledge about the country.*

While the articles analyzed describe North Korea as poor, backward, and dependent on Chinese support, there is no larger narrative illustrating that the government is losing power or the country is on the verge of collapse. This is furthermore expressed in the depiction of the North Korean population as passive, and thereby devoid of any bottom-up threat to the regime. The dire situation of the population is consequently not extended to the state of the country as a whole, as argued by David Shim and Dirk Nabers in their analysis of North Korea's visual representation in the media.<sup>59</sup> In similar contrast to another argument made elsewhere, the government is at times depicted as strange and prone to emotional outbursts, yet there is no overarching narrative according to which it defies rationality or is "crazy." In fact, a number of articles seek to rationalize the behavior of North Korea:

58 Sophie Mühlmann, "Polit-Porno Nordkorea - Was mancher skurril oder cool findet, ist die übelste Diktatur der Welt," *Die Welt*, February 19, 2014, translated by the authors.

59 Dirk Nabers, and David Shim, "North Korea and the Politics of Visual Representation," *GIGA Working Paper No. 164* (2011): 14, accessed November 12, 2015, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1823289](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1823289).



What did Sony think it was doing by allowing the movie to be made in the first place? Did it not anticipate that there would be a backlash? The plot, which involves the CIA encouraging two journalists to assassinate Kim, could not be more controversial. It was bound to provoke anger. And an angry rogue was unlikely to turn the other cheek.<sup>60</sup>

The absence of stereotypes about North Korea's weakness and irrationality calls into question whether the picture of the country promoted by the media is as biased by these stereotypes as oftentimes claimed.<sup>61</sup> This criticism usually targets the English-language and specifically the American media. The results of this study imply that it might not apply to the reporting on North Korea in European newspapers.

## Conclusion

The goal of this article was to shine light on the stereotypes found in European newspapers in their reporting on North Korea. As was previously noted, stereotypes are an inevitability, possibly even a necessity, and can be both correct and incorrect. Consequently, this text merely aims to analyze, not judge, the newspapers' coverage. Against this backdrop, three results of this analysis are especially noteworthy. First, the coverage of North Korea is remarkably similar across the newspapers in focus here. Their country of origin as well as their political orientation seem to have little effect on the narrative and the stereotypes they display. A possible explanation is that the discourse on North Korea is far less contentious and polarized—and thereby less politicized—in Europe than in other places, especially in South Korea and the United States.

Second, the stereotypes on display paint a picture of North Korea in which certain elements are more dominant than others. Among these are the dictatorial character of the country, the strong focus on Kim Jong-Un, the international isolation of the country, and its belligerent rhetoric. In contrast, the depiction of North Korea as a threat, as an object of ridicule, and especially as a humanitarian disaster receives less attention. North Korea is therefore portrayed, first and foremost, as a loudmouthed and

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60 Roy Greenslade, "Why Did Sony Pictures Make a Movie About Assassinating Kim Jong-Un?," *The Guardian*, December 18, 2014.

61 See Cumings, *North Korea*, xii; Lankov, *The Real North Korea*, xi.

isolated dictatorship, and only after that as a security threat, a joke, or a tragedy. Furthermore, few assumptions are made about underlying rationale and interests, and beyond articles poking fun at the regime, few depict the country as crazy or mad. One implication is that the common criticism from academics and pundits about the depiction of North Korea as irrational might not necessarily hold true in the case of European newspapers.

Finally, the depiction of North Korea in European newspapers appears to be different from those in the United States and South Korea. While a precise comparison is difficult due to a lack of empirical data, the depiction of North Korea as a threat, a joke, and a crazy rogue seems to be less frequent in the articles analyzed here than elsewhere. The European portrayal of the country can therefore be viewed as less hysterical, concerned, and ideologically driven than elsewhere – which might be a mirror image of the actual relationships of Britain, Germany, and France with North Korea. This is not to say that the result is necessarily a realistic and unbiased picture of the country, but possibly one that comes from a more detached perspective than in countries with an immediate stake in North Korea, whether due to geographic or security reasons. Media reporting and political realities might therefore correspond to some degree, although it remains open whether and how these two factors determine each other.

These results come with a number of caveats. One is that the focus on print media excludes television and the internet, and thus the news sources that are of possibly more relevant today. Further, the sample size of six newspapers from three countries is obviously limited and can provide only qualified findings. Third, and as was mentioned before, only publications from 2014 were taken into account. The specific events from this year – among them no large-scale security crisis but odd happenings such as the dispute about *The Interview* – certainly shaped the newspaper reporting and the results of this analysis. Finally, the focus on the articles' text inevitably excluded images, illustrations, and caricatures, and consequently aspects of reporting in European newspapers that certainly have their own effect on the audience.<sup>62</sup> In conclusion, further research is necessary to explore the depictions of North Korea in other media, in other countries, and ultimately in comparison to the results presented here. Y

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62 See Nabers and Shim, "North Korea and the Politics of Visual Representation."

# MOTHER TONGUE OR MASTER TONGUE: AN EXAMINATION OF ENGLISH AS MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION POLICIES IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES

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*This paper examines policies that enforce English as the medium of instruction for students at post-colonial African universities. It will look at how colorblind racism, perpetuated through notions of globalization, is used as a mechanism to promote English as the medium of instruction and in turn risks silencing voices of students whose mother tongue is a language other than English. Similarly, English as medium of instruction policies can unintentionally uphold notions of Whiteness as property and hierarchies of cultural capital through the reinforcement of post-colonial hierarchal ideals that deny linguistic freedom in academic spaces. Through the application of Critical Race Theory and aspects of Post-Colonial Theory, I will argue that university policies enforcing English as the medium of instruction must take into account the socio-historic context of the language in both social and academic realms. Intentional efforts must be made to remember and resist these mechanisms of racial and linguistic dominance that plagued many African nations during colonization, and to ensure that these systems are not replicated in modern times through colorblindness, reassertion of Whiteness as property, and denial of expression of cultural wealth. Having English as the medium of instruction at universities in former colonial nations in Africa is not without benefits. However, these benefits should not come at the expense of linguistic freedoms for students.*

The revolutions have ended. Many previously colonized African countries have gained their independence from the White-dominated imperial forces,

as seen through the wave of independence and liberation movements across Africa from the 1940s-1994.<sup>1</sup> With these movements came a strong force of African nationalism, having pride in the newly achieved political independence as well as in the recovery of culture and identity outside the influence of colonial command. However, legacies of colonialism have remained. Among them is the residue of racial and linguistic hierarchies imposed on colonial African communities' education systems.

Presently, English has become a global trend dominating the medium through which knowledge is passed in academic spaces from primary to tertiary levels, especially in post-colonial African states.<sup>2</sup> This paper will examine policies that enforce English as the medium of instruction (MOI) for students at post-colonial Anglophone African universities. It will look at how colorblind racism, or the belief that the recognition of race is of little value that consequently upholds racism itself, is perpetuated through notions of globalization and is used as a mechanism to promote English as the MOI. This, in turn, risks silencing voices of students whose mother tongue is a language other than English. Similarly, English as MOI policies can unintentionally uphold notions of Whiteness as property, where physical spaces, such as college campuses, are dominated by White interests and culture and ultimately maintains structures of White supremacy. Similarly, hierarchies of cultural capital can be created through the reinforcement of post-colonial hierarchal ideals that deny linguistic freedom in academic spaces.

With the application of Critical Race Theory (CRT), this paper argues that university policies enforcing English as the MOI must account for the socio-historical context of the usage of English in social and academic realms and how the language interacts with race, racism, and racial ideologies of their colonial past. Furthermore, the integration of a post-colonial theoretical framework with CRT will be used to examine MOI policies from a racial lens in the context of colonial history and will illuminate the adverse effects of the continued usage of colonial languages in academic spaces. Looking through this interdisciplinary lens challenges ahistoricism

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1 Carol Becker, "A Conversation with Okwui Enwezor," *Art Journal* 61, no. 2 (2002): 11.

2 Elana Shohamy, "A Critical Perspective on the Use of English as Medium of Instruction at Universities," in *English-Medium Instruction at Universities- Global Challenges*, eds. Aintzane Doiz, David Lasagabaster, and Juan Manuel Sierra (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2012), 202; Julie Dearden, "English as a Medium of Instruction—A Growing Global Phenomenon," *British Council* (2014): 29; Philip G. Altbach, Liz Reisberg, and Laura E. Rumbley, *Trends in Global Higher Education: Tracking an Academic Revolution* (Paris: UNESCO, 2009), 11.

and helps to reveal historical and present-day side effects of English as MOI in post-colonial African universities.

Exploring the connectedness of language, Black African identity, and culture, this paper will emphasize the need for using African mother tongue languages for Black African pupils in their academic spaces of higher education. Having English as the MOI is not without benefits, such as allowing students to access opportunities in which English communication is required. However, these benefits should not come at the expense of linguistic freedom for students. Recommendations for the reconstruction of systems and structures at these universities will be provided, so that they can become more inclusive and celebratory of the mother tongue languages of their pupils.

## Theoretical Background

### *The Application of Critical Race Theory and Post-Colonial Theory*

Critical Race Theory (CRT) grew out of Critical Legal Studies, which is rooted in the desire to examine the influence of structures within legal systems as well as the effects of legal ideology on particular groups. CRT formed organically in order to examine critically and constructively structures within American systems, both inside and outside the legal realm, and how they interact with the concept and social implications of race.<sup>3</sup> CRT stands on five major tenets that are foundational to its application. These include: (1) race as a central focus in the examination of social norms and, more specifically, viewing constructions of racism as endemic to American life; (2) the challenge of dominant discourses that promote neutrality, objectivity, colorblindness, and meritocracy; (3) acknowledging the necessity of a platform for the recognition of voices and experiences of people of color to create a counter-narrative against dominant ideologies and perceived racial norms; (4) the engagement of many disciplines for interdisciplinary approaches in the examination of race and racism; (5) continued progress toward the achievement of social justice in all spheres and in occasions where injustice exists.<sup>4</sup>

3 Gloria Ladson-Billings, "Just What is Critical Race Theory and What's It Doing in a Nice Field Like Education?" *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 11, no. 1 (1998): 11-13.

4 Ibid., 10-14; Tara J. Yosso, "Whose Culture has Capital? A Critical Race Theory Discussion of Community Cultural Wealth," *Race and Ethnicity and Education* 8, no. 1 (2005): 73-74; Tracy

Through the incorporation of CRT, aspects of each tenet will be applied to the issue of medium of instruction at post-colonial African universities. Considering the application of tenet (1), looking at race relations and the systems of power and (dis)advantage that weave among them, racism is not only endemic to American society but to global society as well. The active thread of racism can be especially seen in nations that were once under colonial domination, where most racial and cultural subordination took place by structures supporting Whiteness.<sup>5</sup> In applying tenets (2) and (3), a multidisciplinary approach, with overarching historical, social, and racial frames, will incorporate a post-colonial theoretical framework with CRT in order to sharpen the lens through which language of instruction in post-colonial, Anglophone African universities is examined. With the application of these two frameworks, one can consider the socio-historic context of language usage and the power dynamics based around language within social and academic achievement spheres in post-colonial states.

Post-Colonial Theory involves discussions concerning the experience of liberated communities formerly under colonial rule on topics of “migration, slavery, suppression, resistance, representation, difference, race, gender, place, and responses to the influential master discourse of imperial Europe, such as history, philosophy, linguistics.”<sup>6</sup> More specifically, Post-Colonial Theory provides room to examine how former colonial-ruled communities respond to the residue of colonial structures and adapt to them by resisting or maintaining their influence. It further looks at how these structures do or do not influence present-day matters within a given community.<sup>7</sup>

The application of tenet (4) in the examination of MOI policies emphasizes the need for students’ voices in their mother tongue not only to be heard but also valued. Students’ voices in their mother tongue should be harnessed to produce a cultural climate within spaces of higher education that are inclusive and do not perpetuate the colonial linguistic domination

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Lachica Buenavista, Uma M. Jayakumar, and Kimberly Misa Escalante, “Contextualizing Asian American Education through Critical Race Theory: An Example of U.S. Pilipino College Student Experiences,” *New Directions For Institutional Research* 142 (2009): 71-73.

5 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 7-8, 10; Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (London: J. Currey, 1986), 4-5; David C. Woolman, “Educational Reconstruction and Post-Colonial Curriculum Development: A Comparative Study of Four African Countries,” *International Education Journal* 2, no. 5 (2001): 29.

6 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2.

7 Ibid., 2-5; Bill Ashcroft, *Caliban’s Voice: The Transformation of English in Post-Colonial Literatures* (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 3-4, 36-37.

of times past. Giving intentional space to students to speak in their mother tongue allows them to share their experiential knowledge and validates their individual experiences and the cultural wealth embedded in the use of their mother tongues.

Lastly, for tenet (5), an examination of MOI will provide the opportunity to reveal injustices related to language policies within education that stigmatize or value one language over the other. CRT's commitment to social justice provides opportunities not only to deconstruct systems that perpetuate these injustices but leaves room for their reconstruction as well.

This paper works to highlight the issues related to a multidisciplinary approach and intersectionality; specifically how race interacts with those who possess non-dominant power relations in terms of racial and linguistic characteristics of identity. It will also focus on challenging dominant discourses, such as colorblindness.

Despite the difference between the racial makeup of American society—where CRT originally evolved— and the racial makeup of many post-colonial African states, CRT can still be applied. Although former Anglo-colonial African colonies, such as South Africa and Kenya have populations where Black Africans are the majority, these nations' long history with institutionalized racism and White supremacy through apartheid and colonization validates the use of CRT to examine social, political, and economic structures and their interplay with race and racism.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, this paper will highlight the tenet concerning the global hegemonic nature of racism, emphasizing that racism is not only endemic to American society but is a force that moves freely across national borders if left unchecked.

## Race, Language, and Identity in Education

The connectedness of race, language, and identity, from its semantics to how all these forces interact to create myriad combinations of cultural expressions, warrants the application of CRT when examining how race, language, and post-colonial power relations interact in educational arenas.

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8 Hassana Alidou, "Medium of Instruction in Post-Colonial Africa," in *Medium of Instruction Policies: Which Agenda? Whose Agenda?* eds. James W. Tollefson and Amy Bin Tsui (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 199; Angelina N. Kioko and Margaret J. Muthwii, "The Demands of a Changing Society: English in Education in Kenya Today," *Language Culture and Curriculum* 14, no. 3 (2001): 202-204; Vic Webb, "Language Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa," in *Medium of Instruction Policies: Which Agenda? Whose Agenda?* eds. James W. Tollefson and Amy Bin Tsui (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 222.

Language is undoubtedly tied to one's identity. Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o states that language is both a mechanism for communication as well as a carrier of culture.<sup>9</sup> In his book, *Decolonising the Mind*, he emphasizes the connection of language to meaning, culture, and identity. A similar point is made by Bill Ashcroft who posits that humans inhabit language, and inversely, language inhabits us.<sup>10</sup> Language is not solely a means to communicate but is the platform humans use to identify with the world.

Ashcroft even delves into examining the linguistic development of the term "race" and the labeling of different races. In other words, the semantics at the foundation of labels of racial categories such as "black" and "white" were established to signify power relations between races. The use of these labels, from their birth through the colonial period to current post-colonial times, has embedded these power relations throughout time, causing, what one can claim, racism itself.<sup>11</sup> Later sections will mirror this point and further assess how language continues to be used as a tool to perpetuate racism.

### *Historical and Present-Day Contexts of Race and Racism in Education in Post-Colonial States*

During the colonial periods of many African states, educational structures served as mechanisms to promote White linguistic and racial domination.<sup>12</sup> In order to inject both physical and ideological control, colonists used academic spaces as a tool to maintain political, economic, social, and cultural power over local populations.<sup>13</sup> This section reflects on how this occurred during times of colonization and how remnants of linguistic domination in education are evident in post-colonial African universities today.

By devaluing mother tongue languages for pupils and elevating the use of colonial languages, the domination of colonial languages, such as English, was crucial to the authority over "the mental universe of the colonized."<sup>14</sup> By fully transforming pupils' language to colonists' language

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9 Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind*, 13.

10 Ashcroft, *Caliban's Voice*, 2-3.

11 Ibid., 57-58.

12 Ibid., 36-37; Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind*, 16-18; Woolman, "Educational Reconstruction," 29.

13 Ashcroft, *The Empire Writes Back*, 7-8; Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind*, 12-13; Woolman, "Educational Reconstruction," 29, 33; Alidou, "Medium of Instruction," 212.

14 Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind*, 16.



in education, as well as in the realms of government and commerce, colonizers ensured local languages were less likely to be used by youth in academic spaces, which ultimately led to their devaluation in relation to colonial languages.<sup>15</sup> Colonial education systems aimed to change the histories, knowledge, and cultural norms of the colonized by marginalizing any deviance from what was deemed as “proper” according to White colonial standards.<sup>16</sup> Ashcroft et al. (2003) states, “Language becomes the medium through which a hierarchal structure of power is perpetuated and the medium through which conceptions of ‘truth,’ ‘order,’ and reality become established.”<sup>17</sup> Consequently, as seen during colonial Africa, language within the realms of education goes beyond a mere means of communication by sending signals to pupils of a broader social hierarchy.

In pursuit of linguistic domination, colonists used coercive tools such as public shaming or physical punishment of pupils who spoke in their mother tongue in school settings, which, in worst cases, led to damaging physical and emotional effects on the students.<sup>18</sup> This further limited the use of mother tongue languages and enforced the connection of colonial languages to academic success and upward mobility in society, advancing the restriction of power and value of indigenous languages.

Moving ahead to today, as with any institutionalized structure of oppression, remnants of colonial linguistic domination in education are difficult to erase. While mechanisms to promote linguistic domination in educational spheres are less overt currently, structures that value the languages of former colonial masters more so than indigenous languages remain, particularly the MOI policies that institute former colonial languages, such as English, as the standard.

At many African universities whose MOI is English (or another colonial language), students must prove their competency in English in order to be admitted. At the University of Cape Town, for example, prospective undergraduates must show their English proficiency by submitting scores from an international English assessment, such as TOEFL or the International English Testing System. For South African nationals, a passing grade or certain score on English assessment sections of grade 12 matriculation

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15 Ashcroft, *Caliban's Voice*, 2-3, 9, 36.

16 Ibid., 38; Ashcroft, *The Empire Writes Back*, 3.

17 Ibid., 7.

18 Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind*, 11-13, 17; Alidou, “Medium of Instruction,” 212; Kioko and Muthwii, “English in Education,” 203.

exams are needed to prove English competency.<sup>19</sup> For the University of Nairobi, students who are applying from non-English speaking countries are required to submit proof of their competency in English. Specific requirements for proof of English for Kenyan nationals are not mentioned. However, online applications for admission to the University of Nairobi were only available in English.<sup>20</sup> English MOI runs the risk of unintentionally excluding prospective students as well as perpetuating mechanisms that hinder usage of mother tongues of current students, both inside and outside of the classroom.

## Mechanisms Perpetuating English Language Dominance

Through what mechanisms is English language dominance perpetuated? Aspects of colorblindness, Whiteness as property, and hierarchies of cultural capital serve as primary forces.

### *Colorblind Racism*

Colorblindness promotes notions of false social progress that presumes race is not a mechanism used to oppress some and elevate others.<sup>21</sup> It is used to deny the pervasiveness of racism. However, it is through this failure to acknowledge race that racism is further perpetuated.<sup>22</sup> Eduardo Bonilla-Silva explains that colorblind racism is activated through four major ideological frames. These include abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and the minimization of racism. Colorblindness being used to promote English MOI policies is mostly seen through the evidence of abstract liberalism.<sup>23</sup>

Abstract liberalism, which emphasizes equal opportunity, individualism, meritocracy, and minimization of racial inequality, can also be manifested through notions of globalization.<sup>24</sup> Abstract liberalism assumes the playing field of opportunity is level for all and that success is solely

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19 "Language Requirements - English Proficiency," University of Cape Town, <http://www.uct.ac.za/apply/criteria/language/>.

20 "Undergraduate Admission," University of Nairobi, <http://www.uonbi.ac.ke/node/13>.

21 Jessica T. DeCuir and Adrienne D. Dixon, "So When It Comes Out, They Aren't That Surprised That It Is There' Using Critical Race Theory as a Tool of Analysis of Race and Racism," *Educational Researcher* 33, no. 5 (2004): 29.

22 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States* (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2003), 73-74.

23 Ibid., 74.

24 Ibid., 76.

dependent on an individual's hard work, without considering the influence of outside institutionalized barriers, such as racism, on one's ability to achieve objective success.<sup>25</sup>

Globalization recognizes the interdependence and increasingly integrated economy, knowledge base, methods of communication, and forces of development in our world.<sup>26</sup> Doiz et al. views language as a prime tool for globalization, where English has become a major "commodity" in globalization efforts.<sup>27</sup> Globalization has been used as an argument supporting English as the MOI at universities in order to ensure that students are able to compete in global job markets.<sup>28</sup>

However, this connectedness of globalization and language can have adverse effects on pupils of higher education whose mother tongue is not English and in whose histories the use of English acquisition was a mechanism for social and cultural devaluing of indigenous languages. While the argument for English MOI to create more competitive students does hold some truth, it fails to recognize the inequities within the global market as well as the inequalities created by the imposition of English as MOI. Globalization being used to support English MOI policies views the effects of language policy on university students as neutral or only for the supposed economic benefit of the student when entering the job market. However, these policies do affect students beyond perceived economic benefits and interact with race, racism, and racial ideologies of their colonial histories that may still be present in post-colonial realities today.<sup>29</sup> Considering the global hegemonic reach of racism, one must reflect upon the extent to which the acquisition of English makes Black African pupils more competitive and question whether English acquisition alone is enough to propel students forward in the job market in the face of additional hurdles, such as racism. What aspects of

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25 Ibid., 76.

26 Altbach et al., *Trends in Global Higher Education*, 11.

27 Aintzane Doiz, David Lasagabaster, and Juan Sierra, "Globalisation, Internationalisation, Multilingualism and Linguistic Strains in Higher Education," *Studies in Higher Education* 38, no. 9 (2013): 1407.

28 Saran Kaur Gill, "Medium-of-Instruction Policy in Higher Education in Malaysia: Nationalism versus Internationalization," in *Medium of Instruction Policies: Which Agenda? Whose Agenda?* eds. James W. Tollefson and Amy Bin Tsui (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 138; Aceme Nyika, "Mother Tongue as the Medium of Instruction at Developing Country Universities in a Global Context," *South African Journal of Science* 111, no. 1-2 (2015): 3; Dearden, "Growing Global Phenomenon," 16.

29 Maria C. Ledesma and Dolores Calderón, "Critical Race Theory in Education: A Review of Past Literature and a Look to the Future," *Qualitative Inquiry* 21, no. 3 (2015): 211, 217; Altbach et al., *Trends in Global Higher Education*, 5.

identity and expression are students sacrificing to add English as another merit of their employable worth? While the answer to this question depends on the student body at hand as well as the individual students, the frames of race, culture, and identity at post-colonial African universities utilizing former colonial languages as their MOI cannot be disregarded.

Furthermore, not all schools are created equal. In many post-colonial states where English is not only the MOI for universities but also at primary and secondary levels of education as well, certain schools will have the resources to teach and assess their pupils in English properly.<sup>30</sup> However, many schools do not have the adequate resources or have teaching staff that rely heavily on code switching, or the frequent use of indigenous languages in the classroom rather than the institutionalized language of instruction, to teach and assess their students in English. Ultimately, this creates gaps in English acquisition and academic achievement in English.<sup>31</sup> At the tertiary level, students from a variety of educational backgrounds may have vastly different English skills and learning needs. However, with English as the MOI, they are equally forced to prove their subject and topical knowledge in English, serving as a measuring stick of their academic success.<sup>32</sup> This reveals inequities within the application of MOI and the potential difficulties students who are pressured to learn English face, particularly those who struggle with English acquisition, when it comes to assessment of their knowledge.

Cultural racism is another frame of colorblind racism that reveals itself in unspoken effects of English as MOI in post-colonial universities. Colonists viewed indigenous people's progress as stagnant and unable to advance without colonial influence.<sup>33</sup> To them, indigenous languages represented the opposite of modernization and what it meant to be civilized.<sup>34</sup> Since the acquisition of colonial languages, and cultural practices in general, were tied to academic, economic, and social success, the belittling of indigenous language and culture was embedded in notions of cultural racism. Since the acquisition of English and other colonial languages is still tied to academic success and social mobility as seen through admission requirements, assessments in English, and notions of globalization, cultural racism - or the exclusion of groups based on the belief of their inherent inferiority is

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30 Nyika, "Mother Tongue as the Medium of Instruction," 4.

31 Dearden, "Growing Global Phenomenon," 25; Alidou, "Medium of Instruction," 207.

32 Shohamy, "A Critical Perspective," 197, 202.

33 Ashcroft, *Caliban's Voice*, 36.

34 Ibid., 36; Woolman, "Educational Reconstruction," 29.

perpetuated by modern-day academic institutions that fail to incorporate mother tongue languages of students as an integral part of student life and mechanisms for intellectual exploration.<sup>35</sup>

### *Whiteness as Property*

Formal academic institutions during colonial Africa were literally White property and served to meet interests of colonizers.<sup>36</sup> As previously mentioned, these were spaces where the minds of students could be inhabited by efforts to belittle and exclude linguistic and cultural practices and knowledge of indigenous livelihoods.<sup>37</sup> Of the key functions of Whiteness as property, which include the right of disposition, the right to use and enjoyment, and the use of reputation as status property, the right to exclude stands at the forefront in the application of MOI policies.<sup>38</sup> As academic institutions during colonization sought to exclude those who failed to adhere to aspects of whiteness, particularly in the adoption of colonial languages, institutions of higher education may unintentionally be doing the same today with the imposition of English language as a requirement of admission and a key to overall academic success.

Historically in the United States, the treatment of people as property as well as the use of property rights in land ownership were used as a means to oppress people of color racially and socioeconomically.<sup>39</sup> It was through slavery and the denial of property rights that “race and economic domination were merged,” which mirrors the outcomes of mechanisms used for domination by colonists throughout the continent of Africa.<sup>40</sup> Through the exclusion of people of color in the United States from ownership of property, a system of entitlement within social, economic, and legal interactions was developed. In other words, a system of “codified territoriality” was

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35 Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists*, 77.

36 Woolman, “Educational Reconstruction,” 29-30; Leigh Patel, “Desiring Diversity and Backlash: White Property Rights in Higher Education,” *The Urban Review* 47, no. 4 (2015): 663.

37 Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind*, 12, 16.

38 Cheryl Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” in *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement*, eds. Kimberle Crenshaw, et. al., (New York: The New Press, 1995), 281-283; Dana N. Thompson Dorsey and Terah T. Venzant Chambers “Growing C-D-R (Cedar): Working the intersections of interest convergence and whiteness as property in the affirmative action legal debate” in *Race, Ethnicity and Education*, 17, no. 1 (2014): 62-63.

39 Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” 280-281; Dorsey and Chambers, “Growing C-D-R,” 62; Patel, “Desiring Diversity,” 661.

40 Thompson Dorsey, “Growing C-D-R,” 62.

developed that not only marked limits of access to physical property, but in social arenas as well.<sup>41</sup> Over time, the continued advantage of Whites in the ownership of property and other spaces, such as educational arenas, has translated to Whiteness as a dominant norm in both literal and figurative spaces, such as campuses where Whites can often dominate the physical and cultural space.<sup>42</sup> In the context of post-colonial African universities with English MOI, the continued use of English promotes White domination of academic and cultural space on campuses, as they once were used during colonial periods. This reinforces academic institutions as a physical property teeming with forced assimilation to White colonial language and culture and requires present-day Black African pupils to exist within White colonial social and cultural property.

### *Cultural Capital*

While the lack of cultural capital is similar to cultural racism because it reinforces a hierarchy of cultural and linguistic values and beliefs, cultural capital also corresponds to values linked to sources of knowledge and how knowledge, from a cultural perspective, is negotiated in physical spaces and in the overall climate of interaction among individuals.<sup>43</sup>

Cultural capital refers to one's ability to negotiate and utilize aspects of one's identity in physical spaces as well as in situational interactions with others. It refers to the actual negotiating and bargaining power of an individual or group of individuals with a shared culture, within a space deemed as valued, appropriate, and normal.

In an academic context, for example, cultural capital relates to the bargaining power Black African pupils have for their experiential knowledge to be included and validated in academic spaces. Cultural capital is used to explore evidence, or lack thereof, of the interaction, interpretation, and inclusion of mother tongues of Black African pupils at Anglophone universities and the cultures they represent in academic spaces. If culture is viewed as a currency where one can exchange and incorporate values, narratives, and practices into both tangible and ideological spaces on campus, having limited opportunities for students to employ their mother tongue in academic spaces, in academic research application, and in production of knowledge

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41 Patel, "Desiring Diversity," 660; Harris, "Whiteness as Property," 285.

42 Patel, "Desiring Diversity," 660-661.

43 Yosso, "Whose culture has capital," 76-77.

force students to compromise on opportunities to incorporate their culture in a valued and safe space merely in exchange for adherence to linguistic practices of former colonial masters.

The placement of value exclusively on a language other than their own limits cultural capital and opportunities for university students to express themselves through the cultural and linguistic lens of their choice and ultimately alters the cultural and linguistic bargaining power students have at their academic institution.<sup>44</sup>

### Arguments Supporting English as the Medium of Instruction

As previously stated, there are risks that surround English MOI. However, English MOI policies at universities are not without support. In fact, proponents of English MOI at the university level argue for the potential economic benefits an English-speaking generation may bring. As previously mentioned, supporters of English MOI believe that English is necessary for students to compete in global markets and increase their odds of employability.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, others claim that there is a need to have a common language in the midst of linguistic diversity of many African societies.<sup>46</sup> In order to avoid linguistic and cultural isolation of one particular ethnic group, former colonial languages serve as a default *lingua franca* and mechanism for communication between diverse groups.<sup>47</sup> Additional claims for the need of English as MOI at the university level is to attract more international students, allowing universities to expand its doors to a larger pool of global students.<sup>48</sup>

While these points are valid, the institution of MOI policies must be considered holistically and be viewed from other realms emphasizing student needs as well, such as the socio-historic context of the communities in which students come from, the CRT lens, and the Post-Colonial Theory analysis. Despite its benefits, English as MOI must not perpetuate inequities seen within power dynamics related to language use during colonial times that limited the expression of cultural wealth, silenced voices in mother

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44 Ibid., 78-81.

45 Dearden, "Growing Global Phenomenon," 32; Gill, "Medium-of-Instruction," 141; Nyika, "Mother Tongue as the Medium of Instruction," 3; Doiz et al., "Globalisation, Internationalisation," 1414.

46 Nyika, "Mother Tongue as the Medium of Instruction," 3.

47 Ibid., 3-4.

48 Dearden, "Growing Global Phenomenon," 16, 29; Gill, "Medium-of-Instruction," 140; Shohamy, "A Critical Perspective," 202.

tongues, and made English a mechanism for social mobility. Universities can and should be a place where the mother tongues of pupils are openly and equally celebrated alongside the utilization of English.

## Recommendations

Opportunities to create a counter culture related to the use of colonial languages can reshape the inherent power relations of language-use passed down from colonial periods. Since removing English MOI completely would be difficult and impractical, supporting better integration of mother tongues in campus curriculum, instruction, and overall climate is both possible and necessary. Moving towards a more hybrid structure related to English as the medium of instruction and the incorporation of mother tongue languages of students in overall campus culture, safer and more linguistically integrated spaces for mother tongue usage and linguistic expression can be created. This can be achieved through institutionalized mechanisms at universities that promote the recognition of mother tongue languages, providing physical and ideological space for students to express themselves in their mother tongue. Furthermore, the application and use of English can be used in resistance to colonial ideologies of racial and linguistic domination, if executed in a manner that also upholds and celebrates the mother tongues that were once oppressed by former colonial masters alongside the utilization of English.<sup>49</sup> In order to create opportunities to challenge power relations within language usage in tertiary academic spheres, efforts must be made on multiple levels by university administrators.

A) *Universities must have linguistic diversity statements that seek to engage mother tongue languages of students.* These statements must clearly explain reasons for having English as the MOI and lay out plans to provide opportunities for the integration of mother tongue languages of students on campus. While statements are mere words on paper, they serve as a mechanism of accountability for university administration. While there are no formalized standards that exist for the development and execution of linguistic diversity statements, through the input of various stakeholders, including a variety of university staff members and student representatives, a statement and written commitment can be developed and edited

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49 Ashcroft, *Caliban's Voice*, 3.



periodically to fit the needs of students. Linguistic diversity statements can be publicized and distributed via student notification systems such as mass emails or among campus wide resource centers, such as the library or an electronic database to let students know of the university's commitment. Accountability can be ensured through the development of a committee supporting linguistic diversity, made up of staff members and students who are passionate about ensuring safe spaces for linguistic expression in social and academic realms at a university.

B) *Actions must be taken to allow students ample opportunity for mother tongue usage and expression.* Universities must follow through with stated policies to not hamper the use of mother tongue languages through the provision of ample spaces for students to speak in their mother tongues through formal programs and events. Transparency on the side of administration can create an environment that welcomes mother tongue expression and counteracts potential sentiments of linguistic oppression that may exist on campus. Additional efforts can include forming affinity groups and linguistic organizations and utilizing a variety of departments at the university (linguistics, art, drama, etc.). These efforts should ideally provide opportunities for counter-storytelling with an emphasis on students speaking in their mother tongue. Furthermore, incorporation of mother tongue instruction in teaching pedagogies and curriculum will be essential in breaking notions of English holding higher value. Having professors that are not only competent in English, but also embrace the use of mother tongues in teaching strategies and in the work of students, can assist with this. Incorporating mother tongue usage, not to replace but to be included alongside English in classrooms, could include classroom discussions on how local languages can address students' various cultures and linguistic backgrounds. Above all, universities must recognize mother tongue languages as a tool and a strength in the academic and intellectual growth of students.<sup>50</sup>

C) *Students who do not possess a "qualified" level of proficiency in English for admission to many English MOI universities should not be automatically excluded.* Rather, their performance in the subject matter they wish to

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50 Tara J. Yosso, "Toward a Critical Race Curriculum," *Equity and Excellence* 35, no. 2 (2002): 101-102.

pursue should be considered more heavily. Since admission applications for universities with English MOI are rarely offered in a local language, a prospective student would still need at least a basic level of English to complete an application. However, preparedness for university based on their credentials outside of English acquisition must also be considered. Furthermore, universities should meet students who show potential competency in academic subjects and assess their English acquisition separately. Support systems to foster mastery in English alongside the academic application of the mother tongue of a student are necessary.<sup>51</sup> These can include testing accommodations being made for students who show great knowledge of content in their mother tongue to be able to test in their desired language. This will help prevent the student's level of English from masking their academic performance.<sup>52</sup>

If universities fail to recognize the potential for bias in assessments administered in English, they risk continuing the legacy of colonialism that excludes individuals from obtaining or continuing their education based on their ability to grasp English. Universities who do not recognize the varying levels of student proficiency in English, but still have equal expectations for passing assessments of content knowledge in English, re-create colonial structures where student success or failure depended on the understanding of English as much as it did on knowledge of the content.<sup>53</sup>

D) *Evaluation of student perception of English as MOI.* Student voice should be at the forefront of MOI policy discussions because students are likely to have informed ideas on how to create mother tongue-inclusive pedagogies, curriculum, and campus climates. Opportunities for feedback through events such as open fora and school-sponsored sessions can be harnessed to gauge feedback from the student body on the matter of linguistic expression on campus. This is necessary to ensure that universities with English as MOI are not continuing as a system of linguistic oppression as so many educational institutions did in the colonial past.

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51 Shohamy, "A Critical Perspective," 203, 207.

52 Ibid., 203, 206.

53 Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind*, 12.

## Conclusion

Policies that exclude mother tongue languages in higher education curriculum, teaching pedagogies, and campus cultures must coincide with purposeful evaluation of the mother tongue usage in the lives, cultural expression, and overall identity of pupils. With the application of CRT and aspects of Post-Colonial Theory, recognition of the role linguistic hierarchies play within academic realms that have subordinated indigenous languages in the past must be considered. Resisting these mechanisms of racial and linguistic domination, universities must ensure that these systems are not replicated in modern times at the expense of reinforcing colorblindness, reassertion of Whiteness as property, and denial of the expression of cultural wealth.

While English as the medium of instruction undoubtedly has its benefits, these instruction policies must be also be considered outside of their potential for positive economic outcomes for students and institutions of higher education themselves. Additionally, MOI policies should take into account the socio-historic, racial, and linguistic frames represented by their student population. Without intellectually honest and intentional mechanisms to value and make space for mother tongue expression alongside the utility of English in academic spaces, present-day African universities run the risk of continuing their role of racial and linguistic domination. **Y**



## **ESSAYS**

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### **THE EVOLUTION OF THE “CHINESE NATION”: DISHARMONY IN THE COEXISTENCE OF ETHNIC COMMUNITIES**

*Dr. Geeta Kochhar*

### **ARCTIC ECHOES: POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS OF RUSSIA’S RESPONSE TO THE PHILIPPINES V. CHINA**

*Grant Fellows*

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*James Olusegun Adeyeri*

# THE EVOLUTION OF THE “CHINESE NATION”: DISHARMONY IN THE COEXISTENCE OF ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

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Dr. Geeta Kochhar

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*In present-day China, ethnic communities have become more conscious of their relationship with the state and their status within it. This has created a disharmony of coexistence in relation to the set parameters of China's territorial boundaries, posing challenges to a unified “Chinese Nation.” This paper looks at the concept and evolution of the notion of ‘Chinese Nation’ (Zhōnghuá Mínzú 中华民族) as a unified entity to represent various ethnic communities at a time when China is confronted with questions of identity and whom it represents. As China's leader President Xi Jinping promotes the tag ‘China Dream’ to consolidate the unity of the nation, dissenting voices within continue to seek their own localised identities, a desire that can challenge the very existence of the Chinese Nation.*

Today's world is interconnected yet divided by visible and invisible boundaries. Visible boundaries are those that have been defined by land, sea, and air, though ambiguously. Invisible boundaries are those in the process of being defined in cyber space. Hence, as connections exist, communities within a particular boundary have become more conscious of their relationship with the state and their status within it. In particular, countries that have a multiplicity of communities coexisting within the set parameters of a boundary face greater challenges of sustaining a unified nation. These examples have recently become prominent. This paper looks at China as such a case, which has all along advocated the notion of “Chinese Nation” (Zhōnghuá Mínzú 中华民族) as a unified entity to represent various communities. However, even with the phenomenal growth of its economy, communities within it have started to question their status in this nation-state. This has created a disharmony of coexistence of ethnic

communities, and China is consequently confronted with issues of what the Chinese nation is and whom it represents. Does the People's Republic of China with the Communist Party as the sole ruling authority represent all 56 nationalities? Are there strong dissenting voices? What is the broader framework of 'Greater China' and who are the represented entities of this political ideological pursuit? Can the dominating Han nationality remain the main representative of China? More importantly, within the Han community, are there voices of fragmentation and a demand for a separate state? As the leader President Xi Jinping advocates the tag 'China Dream' to consolidate the unity of the nation, dissenting voices within continue to seek their own localized identities, which is a desire that can challenge the very existence of the "Chinese Nation."

### Evolution of the Term "Chinese Nation"

Before expounding upon the evolution of the term "Chinese Nation," it is essential to have a basic understanding of terms such as "state," "nation," and "nation-state." The term "state" in a broad sense relates to a body of government, which is more a political terminology. The term "nation" is more associated with the people living in the politically defined state, a specifically referring to the notion that the people living together have shared belief of being connected to each other. However, "nation-state" linked people with shared culture and common language. Benedict Anderson, in his book, *Imagined Communities*, pointed out that a nation is a socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group.<sup>1</sup> Hence, it is to be explored whether the people and communities in China perceive themselves as a part of China as a nation or if there are differing opinions.

The term "Chinese Nation" dates back to the early twentieth century. In 1902, the term "Chinese Nation" was first used by Liang Qichao in the article, "General Development Trends of Academic Ideology in China," "published in the journal *Xīn Mǐn Cóng Bào*.<sup>2</sup> Later in 1905, Liang Qichao used the term "Chinese Nation" more than seven times in his article "Observations Concerning the Chinese Nation in History (*Zhōnghuá Mǐnzú*)," referring to Han nationality as the main nationality and the inheritor of the

1 Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 6-7.

2 Jin Chongji, "The Formation of the Chinese Nation," *Qiushi Journal*, 2 no. 1, (2010).

Yánhuáng (炎黄). Hence, it was Liang Qichao who had defined the notion of China from simply being an old civilization to a modern territorial nation-state.<sup>3</sup>

The term “Chinese Nation” (*Zhōnghuá Mínzú* 中华民族) was then propagated by Zou Rong, a revolutionary of the anti-Qing and anti-Manchu, to link the Han race to the Chinese Nation, see Chart I. In his book *The Revolutionary Army* (*Gémìngjūn* 革命军) published in 1903, he divided the entire “Yellow Race” into two sub-categories: the Siberian Race and the Chinese Race. While the Siberian race included the Mongols, Manchus, Turks, Hungarians, and other people in Europe, the Chinese race was further divided into two categories: the Chinese (specifically referring to the Han Race), and those who were Koreans, Tibetans, and other East Asians. In this sense, Zou Rong only looked at the Han race as representing the entire Chinese Nation. The term “Chinese Nation,” hence, denoted the racial-kinship bond of the Chinese and their ties to the land.<sup>4</sup>

Later, Zhang Binglin (also known as Zhang Taiyan), who was a philologist and a philosopher, used a similar correlation to relate Han nationality with the Chinese Nation. In his arguments in 1907, he explained the terms Hua, Xia, and Han, whereby he defined Hua as land, with Xia and Han denoting race. He pointed out that as per the Chinese dictionary, “the people of the Middle Kingdom” (*Zhōngguórén* 中国人) were known as Xia. By correlating the terms Xia and Han, he justified his argument that the Han nationality (*Hànzú* 汉族) was equivalent to the Chinese Nation (*Zhōnghuá Mínzú* 中华民族).<sup>5</sup>

However, Yang Du, a political reformer, expounded on a systematic exploration of the term “Chinese Nation” in his article, “Theory of Gold and Iron Doctorine (*Jīntiě zhǔyǐ shuō* 金铁主义说),” published in 1907.<sup>6</sup> He argued that the Chinese Nation was not related to one ethnic nationality, but was a geographic and cultural concept. He stated that the monarch was an agent of the nation and a representation of all people, thereby refuting the distinction between the Manchus and the Han Chinese.<sup>7</sup> While all these

3 Zhao Suisheng, *A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 45.

4 Zou Rong in Frank Dikötter, “Race in China: The Construction of the Han” in *China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism*, eds., Pal Nyiri Joana and Breidenbach (Budapest and New York: central European University Press, 2005), 190.

5 Frank Dikötter ed., *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspective* (UK: C. Hurst & Co., 1997), 50.


6 Jin Chongji, “The Formation of the Chinese Nation.”

7 Wang Hui, “Zhang Taiyan’s Concept of the Individual and Modern Chinese Identity,” in *Becoming*



discourses existed in the early twentieth century to define the Chinese Nation, John Fitzgerald, a professor at La Trobe University, opines that, traditionally, Chinese people had a custom of referring to their historical community by the names of dynasties (such as Qin, Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing) rather than by country, implying that there was no concrete concept of a nation existing till that time.<sup>8</sup>

**CHART I** Zou Rong's Classification of Races



Source: Zou Rong *The Revolutionary Army* (1903) in Frank Dikötter, "Race in China: The Construction of the Han" in *China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism* eds. Pal Nyiri Joana and Breidenbach (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 190.

*Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond*, ed. Wen Hsin-yeh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 258.

- 8 John Fitzgerald, "The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism" in *Chinese Nationalism*, ed., Jonathan Unger (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 57. Quoted in Zhao Suisheng, *A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 45.

The term was widely used after 1912, when the President of the New Republic, Yuan Shikai, espoused the concept of the “Chinese Nation” that was later expanded by Sun Yat-sen. The abdication of the Qing Emperor led to controversy over the status of Tibet’s and Mongolia, as they owed no allegiance to the New Republic even when the Qing territories were formally handed over. Tibet and Mongolia’s position was rejected by the new Chinese state, both by the Republic of China and later by the PRC. Sun Yat-sen reinterpreted the term to have broader reach and to include Han (Hàn 汉, the red), Manchus (Mǎn 满, the yellow), Mongolian (Měng 蒙, the blue), Hui (Huí 回, the white)<sup>9</sup>, and Tibetans (Zàng 藏, the black). He put forth the concept of the “Republic of Five Nationalities” (or Five Races under One Union, Wǔ zú gōnghé / Wǔ zú hé wèi yī tǐ 五族共和 / 五族合为一体). Sun Yat-sen in his famous *Three Principles of the People* (*Sān mǐn Zhǔyì* 三民主义) proposed the idea of unity of the nation based on blood ties. He wrote:

The greatest force is common blood. The Chinese belong to the Yellow race because they come from the blood stock of the Yellow race. The blood of the ancestors is transmitted by heredity down through the race, making blood kinship a powerful force.<sup>10</sup>

Historically, the Chinese have had a very strong concept of “insider” and “outsider.” Those under the domain of the central state’s territories were distinguished from those outside. Apart from the “civilized” people, such as the *Xia* within the territories, the peripheral communities were viewed as barbarians: *Yi* (*Dōngyí* 东夷) in the east, *Rong* (*Xīróng* 西戎) in the west, *Dì* (*Běidí* 北狄) in the north, and the *Man* (*Nánmán* 南蛮) in the south. Hence, the five nationalities incorporated in the concept of the “Republic of Five Nationalities” was an inclusion of barbarians in the Chinese state, while the exclusion from the majority and dominating nationality continued. The term

9 This refers to the Turkish people living in the western part of China and representing the Muslim community. In the present day, they are the Uighur nationality.

10 Sun Yat-sen, *Three Principles of the People* (1932), 9, quoted in Elena Barabantseva, *Overseas Chinese Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-centering China* (London & New York: Routledge, 2011), 30.

is different from “*Huáxià*” (华夏),<sup>11</sup> Han people (*Hànrén* 汉人),<sup>12</sup> and Tang people (*Tángrén* 唐人),<sup>13</sup> descendants of the Yellow Emperor (*Yánhuáng Zǐsūn* 炎黄子孙).<sup>14</sup> By the 1980s, the use of the term Hua people (*Huárén* 华人)<sup>15</sup> was a representative term for the majority nationality. This led to a debate over what the representative nationality of China (*Gúozú* 国族) was.

Jin Chongji, in an article written in the authoritative magazine *Seeking Truth* (*Qíushì* 求是), argues that the Chinese Nation is formed over a long historical period and now represents all the people of various ethnic groups in China, and even the overseas Chinese diaspora who identify with the Chinese nation. This course of development can be divided into two phases: the earlier phase of gradual evolution that took thousands of years; and a gradual process of identification of all ethnic nationalities with the Chinese Nation in modern history to struggle against foreign aggressors.<sup>16</sup> Hence, ethnicity as a factor was placed at the heart of the unity of the nation.

### Nationalism and “Greater China”; Defining the “Chinese Nation”

The vision of a “Chinese Nation” was reinterpreted in the concept of “Greater China” (*Dà Zhōnghuá Qū* 大中华区). This concept did not originate in China, but was propagated by Western scholars. In 1934, the American geographer George Cressey used the term “Greater China,” a geographic extension of the Chinese Empire that included China proper (18 provinces directly under the central administrative bureaucracy, consisting of a mostly Han population) and Outer China (also called ‘dependencies’; ethnic

11 *Huá* means “illustrious,” for the beautiful clothing of the Chinese people; and *Xià* means “grand” to signify the ceremonial etiquettes of China. *Huáxià* referred to a confederation of tribes existing on the banks of the Yellow River, the descendants of which were later the Han ethnic group. They represented a more civilized society in contrast to the barbarians. *Huáxià* was a term used collectively to represent the three successive dynasties of the Xià, Shāng, and Zhōu, in which three different ethnic groups or tribes ruled China that were merged later.

12 Han Wendi and Han Jingdi were the main rulers of the Han dynasty, who made Han into one of the most prosperous dynastic rule. As Han is still the majority ethnic group in China, many Chinese are referred to as Han people.

13 The Tang was arguably the most prosperous and flourishing dynasty. The reign of Zhengguan at the peak of the Tang dynasty was a result of ethnic intermixing. Hence, overseas Chinese communities in Chinatowns are generally referred to as Tang people.

14 The Yellow River is regarded as the cradle of Chinese civilization. In Chinese mythology, the Yan and Yellow Emperor belonged to two tribes and were responsible for assimilating the two cultures.

15 Refer to the overseas Chinese living in the peripheral regions of Mainland China.

16 Chongji, “The Formation of the Chinese Nation.”

minority areas of Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet that were under Chinese state suzerainty).<sup>17</sup> Later in 1940, Owen Lattimore redefined it to incorporate “China with the Great Wall” (China proper) and six “frontier zones” (Manchukuo, Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, Tibet proper, and the Tibet-Chinese frontier provinces of Qinghai and Xikang).<sup>18</sup> The assimilationist vision stressed the organic entity of all the people living within the political boundaries of China and also the fusion of non-Han groups into a broader Chinese Nation with the Han nationality remaining dominant.<sup>19</sup> This vision conceptualizes unity based on biological factors rather than territorial boundaries. Hence, racial discourse was the underlining factor to define the “Chinese Nation” in modern times whether in Western or Chinese scholarship.

In late 1970, the term “Greater China” reappeared with a different definition to promote economic linkages with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, and the Chinese mainland.<sup>20</sup> Thereafter, the emphasis was put on creating a Chinese community with international linkages as a united group. Subsequently, the underlining factors of “Chinese Nation” were envisaged to assimilate all nationalities in the concept of “Greater China” with ethnic and racial affiliations becoming transnational.

The concept of nationalism is related to a feeling of oneness in relation to the territorial limitations of a nation-state, whereby the construction of the “people” of the state distinguish them from the members of another political community.<sup>21</sup> The discourse takes territorial boundaries as politically defining factors for the rise of nationalist sentiments. In modern times, of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies, this simple formulation of nationalist sentiments based on the nation-state concept is being challenged with issues relating to citizenship, inclusion, and exclusion within a state. This is also due to the fact that sovereign borders no longer exist as rigid boundaries dividing people across nations. The fluid nature of territory is contested and networks beyond territories play bigger roles in linking communities based on race, ethnicity, clan, etc.

Kang Youwei (1858-1927), the leader of monarchist reformers, was

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17 Harry Harding, “The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variations, and Reservations,” *The China Quarterly* 136 (1993): 662.

18 Ibid.

19 Dikötter, “Race in China,” 180.

20 Harding, “The Concept of ‘Greater China,’” 663.

21 Elena Barabantseva, *Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-centering China* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 5.

the first to formulate the modern ideology of Chinese nationalism and nation-state under the Qing dynasty with the stress on common ancestry and race. The 1909 nationality law reflected this importance of blood and introduced the principle of *jus sanguinis*.<sup>22</sup> While Kang Youwei was only referring to the “Yellow race,” the later antimonarchist, especially Sun Yat-sen, used it in terms of a nation with the inclusion of overseas Chinese.<sup>23</sup> The same idea of ethnic linkages of the Chinese Nation became the link to forging a feeling of oneness.

However, the deep-rooted sense of distinguishing barbarians with the civilized Han nationality defines the parameters of individual identity. Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* encapsulates this idea of nationalism that transcends national boundaries to link communities as homogenous entities.<sup>24</sup> The imagination of the self attached to a particular community creates the notion of identity whereby the insider is clearly delinked with the outsider. In China’s case, the invoking of this identity was primarily based on the politically defined boundaries of the nation-state, while the Manchu, Tibetan, and Turkish groups fell under the category of ‘outsiders.’ These communities never perceived themselves in the same way as the Han, but there was a factor of alienation even when the territorial nation-state system redefined their existence as elements under a unified political body.

### Identity Issues in the Reform Period – Post 1978

The state apparatus has defined minorities based on ethno-racial linkages, but there also exists categories whereby individuals have their own ethnic self-identification. Most minority communities lived in a subservient way within the institutional structures as their voices did not have strong support. However, increasing globalization and access to technology along with relatively better living standards have aroused the consciousness of their own cultural identity. The demands for an independent cultural identity are more prominent, as the conditions provide them the opportunity to link

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22 See Pal Nyiri on the history of China-Overseas Chinese relations cited in *China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism*, eds. Pal Nyiri Joana and Breidenbach (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 148.

23 See Pal Nyiri on the history of China-Overseas Chinese relations cited in *China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism*, eds. Pal Nyiri Joana and Breidenbach (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 149.

24 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

it to the idea of racism. The issue of identity has also gained supranational mobilization because of transnational actors of multiple nationalities and ethnicity. It has connected them with overseas ethnic populations to help drive the movement.

Prasenjit Duara, a historian of China, looks at the incorporation of minorities in the territorial nation-state narrative, which was dominant before 1980. However, since then a new cultural narrative has led to deterritorialization and the minorities link themselves with newly defined constituencies that have foreign linkages.<sup>25</sup> In modern times, the idea of rights has also undergone a transformation. In the nation-building project, the state implicitly gives certain rights to its citizens, like the right to free speech, in exchange for assimilation or incorporation within the territorial nation-state. In the case of China, these rights have been placed under a very broad category of “collective rights of citizens.” When the minority communities demand individual rights like the right to freedom of religion or freedom of expression, these demands often clash with the politically defined national rights granted to the citizens of China. This is because it challenges the Chinese Communist Party ideology, which underplays the role of religion in a state. Although in recent decades the Chinese state has made it clear that it allows all religions to co-exist, religious followers need to do so without explicitly challenging the state.

Even if a state has well-defined and fixed boundaries with a clear sense of territory, the issue is whether the people or groups within the territory have national loyalties associated with the territorial state or not. Scholars also talk of “multi-ethnicity” within the Han nationality, whereby regional dialects and ethnic regions segregate them from one another. The difference in food, dialect, and local gods based on region is why Dikötter considers “Han” to be an artificial construct.<sup>26</sup> Hence, within the Han nationality variations exist based on regional affiliations. These in the reform era have become more prominent as the local economies make efforts to grow based on overseas investments and remittances. The *guānxi* relations<sup>27</sup> attracted money inflow based on linkages to particular communities where differences of regions and loyalties to territorial groups play a significant role.

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25 Prasenjit Duara, “The Legacy of Empires and Nations in East Asia” in *China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism*, eds. Pal Nyiri Joana and Breidenbach (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 37.

26 Dikötter, “Race in China,” 114.

27 *Guanxi* relations refer to relationship networks for business in China, which are mostly based on clan networks and regional ties.

In January 1994, a group of Chinese scholars from Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong even suggested an idea of a “Federal Republic of China.”<sup>28</sup> The proposed draft of the formulated constitution announced in San Francisco called for making a free, democratic Federal Republic of China composed of Autonomous States (including Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Guangxi), Special Regions (Hong Kong and Macau), and the rest as Provinces and Cities of China. Yan Jiaqi defined the notion of federation as having the characteristics of a confederation, which would consist of two kinds of republics: Loose Republics (Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia) and Close Republics.<sup>29</sup> While on the one hand, the idea was based on ethnic affiliations based on identity; on the other, it incorporated the desire of local economies to have autonomous decision making powers. Although the idea was never formalized it nonetheless strongly reflected the desires of local culture, local religion, and local languages as a significant factor in building *guānxi* and strengthening relations over and above the unified notion of Han nationality.

### Voices of Discontent within China

The March-April 2008 Tibetan uprising, followed by the July 2009 violent clashes between Uyghurs and Han in Urumqi, Xinjiang province, sparked debate within and outside China over the People’s Republic’s policy towards ethnic minorities. Although the Western world greatly sympathized with the minority nationalities, the nationalist sentiments were a total rejection of such actions, arguing ethnic minorities were creating divisions in the Chinese state. Given the incredibly rapid growth of the Chinese economy, what are the reasons behind dissatisfaction among the minority nationalities?

Many tensions arise due to the enhanced migration of the Han population to minority areas. As the Han population is seen as the threat to local culture and language, there is greater animosity among the local communities and the Han population. While historically the Han population was viewed as the “insider” and the main representative nationality of China, the minority communities believe that in the PRC, whereby politically the regions are assimilated, the Han population is the real “outsider” in

28 “Draft Constitution for a Federal China-Gives Referendum to Tibet,” *Central Tibetan Administration Website*, accessed October 23 2007, [www.tibet.com/China/drchcon.html](http://www.tibet.com/China/drchcon.html).

29 “Yan Jiaqi, Dissident Essay on Tibet: Towards the Federal Republic of China,” *Free Tibet Website*, accessed October 23 2007, [www.freetibet.org/info/file/file21.html](http://www.freetibet.org/info/file/file21.html).

their regions. The tensions arise due to state policies in which minority communities perceive themselves as unprivileged and subordinate, and the Han population is viewed as the privileged group. The state policy of standardizing language and culture by migrating and amalgamating the Han population in huge numbers into minority community-dominated regions has created greater divide among nationalities.

Although in recent decades there has been a greater focus on developing the minority nationality dominated regions, the minority population remains deeply dissatisfied. One of the factors behind this is that China's economic development has been uneven. The western region, where most of the minority groups are concentrated, lags behind the eastern area concentrated along the coast. Although there has been improvement in the lives of the majority of the population, the minority-dominant areas have increasingly become active in raising dissent against the Communist state. With the spate of events in 2008 and 2009, the Chinese government immediately identified economic development as the central task of ethnic regions. The September 2009 White Paper on Ethnic Policy stated that "the state is convinced that quickening the economic and social development of minority communities and minority areas is the fundamental solution to China's ethnic issues."<sup>30</sup> In relation to this, the official media launched propaganda against the anti-China forces operating from outside. It puts the blame of discontent by the ethnic minorities on the forces existing beyond Chinese territories, rather than recognizing that the communities within the territories also demand recognition of their identity along with equal citizenship status.

The recent self-immolation protests of Tibetan monks against Communist rule highlight the fact that the ethnic minorities within China, although assimilated within the political boundaries of the PRC, are not able to enjoy religious and cultural freedom. These issues have been suppressed under the state concept of racial affinities and blood ties of minority nationalities within the PRC. But the transnational linkage of these communities, which was a tool of state nationalism, has become a strong support for raising dissent and awareness at international forums. Hence, in this sense, the concept of the Chinese Nation that was used by the Chinese state to stifle feelings and affinity with the PRC has become a double edged sword. The linkages endorsed by the Chinese state in order to

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30 Elena Barabantseva, *Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-centering China* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 161.



promote local economies have transcended beyond economic development objectives to create awareness of the exclusion of communities within the state parameters.

Moreover, the linkages of the Han nationality with overseas Chinese communities are also bringing the issues of language and regional affinities to greater prominence. For example, in Guangdong province, a debate is unfolding over the protection of the Cantonese dialect while the Standard Chinese (*Pǔtōnghuà* 普通话) continues to be the officially approved language for public purposes. The Cantonese communities have started to view the propagation of *Pǔtōnghuà* as suppression of the Cantonese language, which may gradually fall out of use. Hence, the local governments are being pressurized to run TV news broadcasts, serials, and basic teaching programs in schools encouraging the local language. These issues reaffirm the idea of China becoming a federal state, where local power centers would want to play an autonomous and decisive role in local economies and promote local culture.

## Conclusion

The leadership of Xi Jinping as the President of the PRC has advocated for realizing the “China Dream.” As discussion over what constitutes the China Dream continues, various interpretations link it to the rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. This concept transcends the political boundaries of the PRC and links it to communities based on racial affinities. The emergence of the concept can be traced back to the pre-liberation era. However, the Chinese Revolutionary period tried to bring about the unity of all 56 nationalities of the PRC in fighting together against foreign forces.

Although China has made great strides in economic development, the issue of ethnic minorities has become significant. The reason for this also lies in the historic conceptualization of differentiating the *Xià* (civilized) with the *Yí* (barbarians). As the peripheral communities and those outside the core state were viewed as “outsiders,” assimilation remains a political subject, rather than actual recognition by the communities as a unified entity. In the reform era, transnational linkages and technologies have provided adequate avenues for minority communities to raise issues of suppression, exclusion, and citizenship. The demand for inclusion as “equal citizens and equal treatment” has actually intensified.

In addition, the dominant Han nationality is creating overseas

networks that are supplementing the feelings of local identities and cultures. In order to promote local economies, the idea of Greater China and cultural linkages based on the Chinese Nation were promoted by the state, but these ties have gone beyond sub-national economic development agendas and are fermenting a sense of federalism. Yet, the Chinese Nation remains a binding force linking communities within and outside China as “Chinese.” **Y**

# ARCTIC ECHOES: POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS OF RUSSIA'S RESPONSE TO THE PHILIPPINES V. CHINA

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*China's dismissal of the award by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Philippines vs. China presents a singular challenge to the international maritime regime centered on the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While the regional consequences of China's rejection will be profound, there is great potential for the effects of China's stance to set a precedent for more nations to shirk their obligations as parties to UNCLOS. Although a handful of smaller countries have signaled their support for China, likely as a quid pro quo for Chinese aid, of particular note has been Russia's reaction to China's rejection of the ruling. Russian officials have signaled support for the Chinese based on statements that ubiquitously insist that Russia is not choosing sides and that the dispute should be settled by bilateral negotiations. However, such statements signal support for China, as anything other than support for the PCA's ruling undermines the treaty. Russia's backing of China in its dispute illustrates the importance of the Sino-Russian alliance holds in Russian foreign policy and could set a precedent that allows Russia to avoid its obligations under UNCLOS.*

As anticipated, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (PCA) decided in favor of the Philippines in its territorial dispute with China. Chinese officials were predictably incensed over the ruling with Foreign Minister Wang Yi heatedly accusing the proceedings of being "completely a political farce staged under legal pretext"<sup>1</sup> and the Chinese Foreign Ministry declaring "that the award is null and void and has no binding force. China

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1 "Chinese Foreign Minister Says South China Sea Arbitration a Political Farce," *Xinhua*, July 12, 2016, accessed December 19 2016, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/13/c\\_135508275.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/13/c_135508275.htm).

neither accepts nor recognizes it.”<sup>2</sup> China’s stance has been backed by dozens of nations but of particular significance has been Russia’s response to the award. Russian officials have not always resoundingly endorsed Beijing’s stance in the South China Sea but instead have implicitly supported China by arguing against outside interference in the dispute so that the involved parties can settle it through bilateral negotiations. In contrast, the United States,<sup>3</sup> Canada,<sup>4</sup> Australia,<sup>5</sup> New Zealand,<sup>6</sup> India,<sup>7</sup> Vietnam,<sup>8</sup> and Japan,<sup>9</sup> among others,<sup>10</sup> have issued statements noting clearly that China is legally bound to heed the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal. Thus, Russia’s muted support is meaningful because it not only reveals potential Russian reservations about China’s actions, but also demonstrates Russia’s willingness to overcome these reservations and fully commit to its alliance with China, which has become a centerpiece of Russian foreign policy during Vladimir Putin’s tenure. The Russian response is also of particular relevance to the Arctic region because Russia is itself currently a party to maritime boundary arbitration proceedings under the UN Commission on the Limits of

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2 “Chinese Leaders Reject S. China Sea Arbitration Award,” *Xinhua* July 12, 2016, accessed December 19 2016, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/12/c\\_135507946.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/12/c_135507946.htm).

3 John Kirby, U.S. Department of State, “Decision in the Philippines-China Arbitration,” Press Statement, July 12 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm>.

4 Stéphane Dion, Global Affairs Canada, “Canadian Statement on South China Sea Arbitration,” News Release, July 21, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1102379>.

5 Julie Bishop, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Australia, “Australia Supports Peaceful Dispute Resolution in the South China Sea,” Media Release, July 12, 2016, accessed December 19 2016, [http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2016/jb\\_mr\\_160712a.aspx](http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2016/jb_mr_160712a.aspx).

6 Murray McCully, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand, “NZ Comment on South China Sea Tribunal Ruling,” Press Release, July 12, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-comment-south-china-sea-tribunal-ruling>.

7 Ministry of External Affairs of India, “Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South China Sea Under Annexure VII of UNCLOS,” Press Release, July 12, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, [http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/27019/Statement\\_on\\_Award\\_of\\_Arbitral\\_Tribunal\\_on\\_South\\_China\\_Sea\\_Under\\_Annexure\\_VII\\_of UNCLOS](http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/27019/Statement_on_Award_of_Arbitral_Tribunal_on_South_China_Sea_Under_Annexure_VII_of UNCLOS).

8 “Vietnam Welcomes South China Sea Ruling, Reasserts its Own Claims,” *Reuters*, July 12, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-vietnam-idUSKCN0ZS17A>.

9 Fumio Kishida, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China regarding the South China Sea,” Press Release, July 12 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e\\_001204.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001204.html).

10 Matthew Pennington, “Picking Sides: A World of Opinions on South China Sea Case,” June 13, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/f77d182647754042a31862481421cacc/picking-sides-world-opinions-south-china-sea-case>.

the Continental Shelf (CLCS).<sup>11</sup> Vladimir Putin's decision to support China's repudiation of UNCLOS could portend a similar Russian reaction in the future if the CLCS produces an unfavorable ruling. Ultimately, Russian responses to the PCA's award reveal a reluctance to fully diminish UNCLOS but also an acknowledgement of the precedence the Chinese alliance has assumed in Russian foreign policy under Putin.

The depth of the Chinese anger at the PCA's ruling can perhaps be explained by how comprehensively it undercuts their claims to the lands, waters, and resources of the South China Sea. The PCA rendered a unanimous award in the South China Sea maritime boundary dispute between China and the Philippines, ruling that "there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line.'"<sup>12</sup> Nullifying the foundation for Chinese claims in the region even further, the PCA ruled that maritime features being disputed were in fact rocks and reefs incapable of sustaining permanent habitation, both currently and historically, and are not entitled to the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under UNCLOS.<sup>13</sup> The court also publicly censured China for violating its treaty obligations set out in UNCLOS by its actions in the South China Sea, and specifically rebuked the People's Republic for interfering with the Philippines' fishing and petroleum exploration activities in its EEZ, constructing artificial islands, failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from operating in the Philippines' EEZ, and causing "severe harm" to the coral reef environment and its wildlife in the South China Sea.<sup>14</sup>

The wording of the Russian Foreign Ministry's statement, delivered two days after the ruling, reflects the opposing forces motivating Russia's response but fails to acknowledge the totality of the award. On one hand, Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova noted Russian support for the "efforts of ASEAN and the Chinese People's Republic towards working out a code of conduct in the South China Sea" and that "we are not taking any sides in principle... we believe that the involved parties must hold relevant consultations and negotiations in the format they themselves

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11 "Donskoi: Russia's Arctic Shelf Expansion Application to Be Reviewed despite Disagreements with Other Countries," *Arctic.ru*, October 3, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://arctic.ru/geographics/20161003/454690.html>.

12 Permanent Court of Arbitration, "The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China)," Press Release, July 12, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/pca-press-release-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-the-republic-of-the-philippines-v-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

determine.”<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, she added that “we highly value the role of the Convention in ensuring supremacy of law in the world ocean,” and that “it is important to have the provisions of this universal international treaty applied consistently.”<sup>16</sup> This could be seen as problematic by the Chinese, as UNCLOS’ legal supremacy and consistent application would result in China being forced to abandon its disputed claims with the Philippines in the Spratly Islands. Still, by merely playing lip service to respect for UNCLOS, and not acknowledging the legality of the PCA’s award, Russia is affirming its support for China’s position.

Russia’s leaders have continued the strategy of implicitly siding with China by advocating for bilateral negotiations, criticizing the United States and its allies, usually obliquely referred to as outside parties, for interfering, and stating that Russia ostensibly has no horse in the race. This stance was established before the PCA’s ruling, with Russian Ambassador to China, Andrey Denisov, mounting a vocal, if still vague, defense of Beijing in the dispute in a June 21, 2016 interview with Russian journalists. He argued that claims by “some world capitals regarding restrictions if not say a threat for the freedom of navigation” are “artificial and have no relation to reality.”<sup>17</sup> He goes on to make calls for discussions between the relevant parties. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev commented that Russia opposes internationalization of the dispute and called for bilateral negotiations when speaking on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Ulaanbaatar on July 15, 2016.<sup>18</sup>

After meeting with Xi Jinping, President Putin tried to add some cohesion to the Russian stance by tying together the sometimes oppositional positions asserted by influential Russians on the issue at the G20 summit in Hangzhou on September 5, 2016. There, like other Russian officials, he issued a warning against interference by outside parties and assured his Chinese allies that Russia stands behind their non-recognition of the PCA’s ruling. However, he took great pains to avoid entirely delegitimizing UNCLOS, adding, “this is not a political position, but purely legal. It lies in the fact that any arbitration proceedings should be initiated by the disputing parties,

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15 “Moscow Set to Avoid Being Dragged into South China Sea Dispute,” TASS, July 14, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://tass.ru/en/politics/888205>.

16 Ibid.

17 “Russian Ambassador: Tensions in South China Sea Created Artificially,” Tass, June 21, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://tass.ru/en/politics/883678>.

18 “Russia Opposes Internationalizing South China Sea Issue: Medvedev,” *Xinhua*, July 15, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/15/c\\_135516298.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/15/c_135516298.htm).

while the arbitration court should hear the arguments and positions of the disputing parties.”<sup>19</sup> Putin’s strong defense of China, relative to Medvedev and Zakharova, is noteworthy because of the explicit reasoning he lays out to support China’s position. He studiously did not attack the legitimacy of UNCLOS and the PCA but questioned its jurisdiction in this specific case. By advocating for this interpretation of the dispute in a high-profile setting on Chinese soil, Putin surely intended it to be the definitive Russian statement on the issue.

Statements by the leaders of the United States and regional powers, Japan and Australia, highlight the divide between their position and the one taken by Vladimir Putin. Australia’s Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe piqued China by vigorously defending the legitimacy of the PCA’s ruling at the ASEAN summit on September 8, 2016 as they both emphasized its binding nature. Turnbull commented that “the decision in The Hague is a fact, it is a reality,”<sup>20</sup> and Abe said, “I hope that both parties to the dispute in the South China Sea will abide by the ruling of the China-Philippines tribunal court, which legally binds the parties to the dispute.”<sup>21</sup> A week earlier in an interview with CNN, US President Barack Obama chided China for its rejection of the judgement, stating that “if you sign a treaty that calls for international arbitration around maritime issues, the fact that you’re bigger than the Philippines or Vietnam or other countries ... is not a reason for you to go around and flex your muscles.”<sup>22</sup>

The rhetoric employed by these leaders plainly spells out recognition of and support for the PCA’s decision, in contrast to the Russians calling for bilateral negotiations and Putin’s argument that the PCA lacks the authority to issue a binding ruling in this specific case. It is important to note that not every traditional US ally has signaled their support for the American position.

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19 “Russia Supports China’s Stance on South China Sea,” *Sputnik International*, September 5, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <https://sputniknews.com/world/20160905/1044988523/russia-china-putin.html>.

20 Liam Cochrane, “Malcolm Turnbull Calls for Peaceful Resolution to East Asia and South China Sea Disputes,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation News*, September 8, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-08/turnbull-calls-for-calm-in-south-china-sea/7827470>.

21 “Abe Tells Asian Leaders of ‘Serious Concern’ with China Posturing in South China Sea,” *The Japan Times*, September 8, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/07/national/abe-tells-asean-that-japan-is-seriously-concerned-by-south-china-sea-tension/#.WA1fC1QrLIW>.

22 “Obama Urges China to Stop Flexing Muscles over South China Sea: CNN,” *Reuters*, September 2, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-obama-relations-idUSKCN1182KX>.

Some European nations have hesitated to jeopardize Chinese business ties and investment by publicly urging Beijing to adhere to the PCA's ruling. Due to these divides, the EU statement on the issue makes no mention of treaty obligations and strenuously avoids using any language that could upset Beijing, but also fails to support Beijing's decision to not recognize the verdict.<sup>23</sup>

Vladimir Putin's approach to the South China Sea dispute has crucial implications for Russia's foreign policy and potentially for its Arctic policy. The alliance with China is the most important consideration for Russia's Asian policy. Putting aside decades of mistrust and hostility fostered by Cold War rivalry and historic enmity, the nations signed the Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 2001, which finally settled their border disputes and set out arrangements for deeper economic and military cooperation. Since that agreement, the states have closed many business deals, including landmark oil and gas agreements, the most notable of which was signed in 2014 and will be worth \$400 billion over thirty years.<sup>24</sup> The two nations also have close defense ties, with China importing over \$3 billion in arms from Russia in 2013.<sup>25</sup> This September, they held joint naval drills in the South China Sea to further demonstrate their solidarity in the wake of the PCA's judgement.<sup>26</sup>

Given the trade and defense benefits of the alliance with China, it is unsurprising that Russia would back Beijing in the dispute; however, Russia does risk alienating some of its partners in the region. Vietnam also has territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea and has sided with the Philippines in the dispute. Meanwhile, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi has moved to strengthen ties with Vietnam and urged both parties to respect the Arbitral Tribunal's decision in the South China Sea.<sup>27</sup> India is

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23 Robin Emmott, "EU's silence on South China Sea ruling highlights inner discord," *Reuters*, July 14, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-southchinasea-ruling-eu-idUKKCN0ZU1CS>.

24 Jane Perlez, "China and Russia Reach 30-Year Gas Deal," *The New York Times*, May 22, 2014, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/world/asia/china-russia-gas-deal.html>.

25 Allan Smith and Skye Gould, "This Map of US and Russian Arms Sales Says It All," *Business Insider*, August 13, 2014, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.businessinsider.com/arms-sales-by-the-us-and-russia-2014-8>.

26 "China Says to Hold Drills with Russia in South China Sea," *Reuters*, July 28, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-drills-idUSKCN108008>.

27 Sanghamitra Sarma, "India-Vietnam Relations After Modi's Visit," *The Diplomat*, September 5, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/india-vietnam-relations-after-modis-visit>.



the largest importer of Russian arms and Vietnam also has significant arms deals with Russia. Thus, Putin's decision to stand behind China signals that the Sino-Russian alliance is the most significant determinant for Russian foreign policy in Asia, possibly to the detriment of Vietnamese-Russian relations and Indo-Russian relations.

Unlike China, Russia has participated in the international legal proceedings to determine its continental shelf rights in the Arctic Ocean. Russia has submitted a claim for continental shelf rights to a Texas-sized patch of the Arctic seafloor to the CLCS, which confers less rights and differs from China's claims to an EEZ in the South China Sea. However, they are consequential when it comes to transit rights and natural resource extraction and Russia has vigorously defended and enhanced its claim in the Arctic.

Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian practice of *maskirovka*, or Russian military deception, has enjoyed a comeback. He has obfuscated the truth during the Russian takeover of Crimea,<sup>28</sup> Russian sources have frequently changed their story in regards to flight MH 17 while always denying any Russian participation.<sup>29</sup> Putin insisted that the priority of the Russian campaign in Syria is to fight Islamic extremists, when evidence has shown that they often target the moderate opposition and their main goal is propping up the Assad regime.<sup>30</sup> If the CLCS eventually rules unfavorably for Russia, it is conceivable that Putin could still assert Russia's rights to the territory by seizing upon the same rationalization as China because of the profound lack of any serious mechanism to enforce an award. This possibility cannot be dismissed as far-fetched because by annexing Crimea, Putin has demonstrated that he is unafraid to upset the rules-based international order. Not to mention, his comments on the ruling were hardly a resounding commitment to UNCLOS.

China is well positioned to ignore the PCA's award because its hard military power resources in the South China Sea are far greater than other nations in the region, especially with the ongoing construction of the so-called "Great Wall of Sand"<sup>31</sup> in the South China Sea. Due to the imbalance of its

28 "Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia's Crimea Takeover Plot," *BBC News*, March 9, 2015, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226>.

29 Olga Ivshina, "Flight MH17: Russia and its Changing Story," *BBC News*, October 16, 2015, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34538142>.

30 Laura Smith-Spark, Jomana Karadesh, and, Euan McKirdy, "Activists: 3,800 Syrian civilians killed in a year of Russian airstrikes," *CNN*, September 30, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/30/middleeast/un-aleppo-condemnation/>.

31 Bill Gertz, "China's South China Sea Island Buildup 'For Military Purposes,'" *The National Interest*, October 11, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/>

military resources in the area compared to the Chinese, the only possible way Manila could enforce the ruling is with American support. However, ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the need to check Russian expansion in Eastern Europe leave American forces overcommitted and such a scenario seems altogether unlikely.

Comparable to China's position in the South China Sea, Russia has far more strategic assets in the Arctic than the US and its NATO partners. In the summer of 2016, Russia launched the *Arktika*, the first of three new generation nuclear-powered icebreakers intended to patrol the Northern Sea Route.<sup>32</sup> In total, the Russians currently have six nuclear-powered icebreakers besides *Arktika*, in addition to more than 30 diesel vessels, while the Americans have three, non-nuclear icebreakers. If Russia were to reject an unfavorable CLCS award, Russia's support for China in the South China Sea would almost certainly result in a quid pro quo resulting in Chinese backing Russian claims in the Arctic.

Subsequently, Putin's strong defense of China's position at the G20 summit—in contrast to the Foreign Ministry's earlier more cautious statement—is the result of Russian policymakers assessing that a firm commitment to the Sino-Russian alliance is of primary importance in their foreign policy. But, because of this posture, Russia risks alienating previously friendly countries in Asia, particularly Vietnam and India, because of their historic grievances and stated opposition to China's expansionism in the South China Sea. Putin's legal maneuvering that allowed him to back China's rationalization of its decision to not participate in the PCA's proceedings not only weakens the legitimacy of UNCLOS, but it also opens the possibility that Russia may be willing to abandon its commitment to the international maritime order founded on UNCLOS if it loses its case at the CLCS. As a result, the consequences of China's actions in the South China Sea may ripple outwards from the balmy waters of the South China Sea all the way to the frigid depths of the Arctic. Y

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32 David Hambling, "Russia Built a Big, Bad Nuclear-Powered Icebreaker to Win the Arctic," *Popular Mechanics*, June 23, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a21484/russia-nuclear-powered-icebreaker/>.

# **BOKO HARAM ISLAMIST INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY**

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*Unlike previous anti-state movements in Nigeria, Boko Haram is unique in terms of its avowed objectives, organization, tenacity, sophisticated strategy, weaponry, and audacious operations. Causes of the insurgency are varied and complex. While some observers conceive of Boko Haram as an extremist Islamist sect bent on Islamizing Northern Nigeria by any means, others see it as a mere nihilist movement with the sole intent of bloodletting, destruction, panic, and chaos. Yet, in some other quarters, Boko Haram is viewed as the epitome of the political agenda of certain Northern elements. In spite of the government's efforts, the crisis persists unabated, leaving in its wake the wholesale destruction of lives and property, palpable tension, and fear of the unknown. Over time, the conflict transnationalized across international borders within the West African region. This paper therefore examines the transnational dimensions and challenges of the Nigeria-Boko Haram conflict, as well as the opportunities for achieving sustainable peace and security. The study adopts the historical descriptive and analytical method.*

Boko Haram is an Islamist terrorist movement that had been in latent existence in Northeastern Nigeria for many decades before its full emergence in 2009 when it launched its first terrorist operations against the Nigerian state, individuals, and institutions. During the early stages of its life, Boko Haram's operations occurred mainly in Nigeria's northeast region, particularly in the Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. However, Boko Haram's attack on the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in Nigeria's capital of Abuja on August 26, 2011 signaled the transformation of the movement from a solely Nigerian phenomenon into an international Salafist jihadist organization. Ever since, the internationalization of the Boko Haram conflict has manifested in the

extension of attacks and operations by the group to areas around and within the sovereign territories of states like Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Mali. This paper is a historical discourse of the evolving transnational dimensions and challenges of the Nigeria-Boko Haram conflict. The study shall also explore available opportunities within multinational frameworks for successfully resolving the insurgency and achieving sustainable peace and security in Africa.

### **Evolving Transnational Dimensions and Challenges of Boko Haram Operations**

Since its audacious attack on the UN building in Abuja in 2011, Boko Haram's profile as an international terrorist organization has continued to soar. However, the origin of Boko Haram's evolution towards international orientation dates back to August 2009 when its interim leader, Sanni Umaru (instated after the death of former substantive leader, Mohammed Yusuf), announced an ideological declaration regarding the movement's objectives and mode of operations. According to Umaru:

In fact, we are spread across all the 36 States in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of Al-Qaeda, which we align with and respect. We support Osama Bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is completely converted to Islam, which is according to the wish of Allah.<sup>1</sup>

It was thus not surprising that documents discovered in Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, many years later indicated that very senior Boko Haram leaders had maintained contacts with Al-Qaeda since one and a half years prior.<sup>2</sup> There is reason to believe that Ansaru, Boko Haram's dominant splinter group, was indeed a creation by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and that a close operational relationship exists between the two organizations. Ansaru, though a splinter group, operates as the transnational wing of Boko Haram. In early 2010, AQIM's

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1 David Doukhan, "Who are You, Boko Haram?" *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, accessed September 4, 2015, <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/991/Registration.aspx>.

2 Jason Burke, "Bin Laden Files Show Al-Qaeda and Taliban Leaders in Close Contact," *The Guardian*, April 29, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/29/bin-laden-al-qaida-taliban-contact>.

leader, Abdelmalik Droukdel, publicly presented an offer of assistance to Boko Haram. In early July of the same year, Abubakar Shekau, who had claimed leadership of the organization, declared in a video statement his preparedness to launch attacks against western targets in Nigeria. Then on July 13 of that year, Shekau in another statement expressed solidarity with Al-Qaeda and openly threatened the US. It was within the context of these and other assertions of international intent that Boko Haram launched a suicide bomb attack against the UN building in Abuja on August 26, 2011, killing 23 people and injuring over 80 others. Significantly, that attack was the first time the group struck an international, non-Nigerian target. Nigerian authorities later identified the key organizer of the attack as Mamman Nur, described as “a notorious Boko Haram element with Al-Qaeda links who returned recently from Somalia.”<sup>3</sup>

Boko Haram fighters played a prominent role in the assault on Algeria’s consulate in Gao, northern Mali, in April 2011. Then, in November 2012, Boko Haram reinforced AQIM and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) to capture the town of Menaka in Gao of eastern Mali. On December 19, 2012, Ansaru claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of a 63-year-old French engineer, Francis Colump, after 30 gunmen attacked his residence in Katsina State in Northern Nigeria. The sect acted in retaliation against certain French government policies such as the ban on wearing the Islamic veil and its intervention in Northern Mali.<sup>4</sup> On February 19, 2013, Boko Haram militants kidnapped a French family of seven on vacation near the Waza National Park in northern Cameroon. Although the armed group had earlier threatened to kill the hostages if they were not paid a ransom fee of three million dollars, the captives were released two months later after weeks of secret meetings between the group and the French government.<sup>5</sup>

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3 “Profile: Boko Haram,” *Aljazeera English*, January 19, 2015, accessed September 4, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121974241393331.html>; “UN Bombing: SSS Declares al-Qaeda Associate Wanted,” *Gboozza! The African Social News Network*, September 1, 2011, accessed September 4, 2015, <http://www.gboozza.com/group/crime/forum/topics/un-bombing-sss-declares-al-queda-associate-wanted#axzz2qjiBFKy5>.

4 Anne Look, “Nigerian Islamist Sect Claims Kidnap of French Engineer,” *VOA News*, December 24, 2012, accessed September 7, 2015, <http://www.voanews.com/a/nigerian-islamist-sect-claims-it-kidnapped-french-engineer/1571379.html>; Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s International Connections,” *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, January 14, 2013, accessed September 7, 2015, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-harams-international-connections>; Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Evolving Tactics and Alliances in Nigeria,” *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, June 25, 2013, accessed September 7, 2015, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-harams-evolving-tactics-and-alliances-in-nigeria>.

5 Tansa Musa, “Kidnapped French Family of Seven Released in Cameroon,” *Reuters*, April 19, 2013, accessed September 7, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cameroon-kidnapping>.

Further, Boko Haram killed a Nigerian Christian missionary affiliated with the Christian Missionary Foundation (CMF), David Mataware, and burnt many churches in Cameroon on November 13, 2013. The same day, Boko Haram and Ansaru coordinated the kidnapping of a French Priest, Father Georges Vandenbeusch.<sup>6</sup> From November 15-17 that year, the Islamist militants also launched violent attacks along the porous Nigeria-Cameroon border, resulting in the death of at least four people and injuring many, and the destruction of several properties, including churches.<sup>7</sup> On December 19, 2013, Boko Haram fighters launched a cross-border attack from Cameroon against the Kur Mohammed Military Barracks in Bama, Borno State, Nigeria. The assault by hundreds of Boko Haram insurgents resulted in the sacking of the barracks, as well as the death of five civilians, 15 Nigerian soldiers, and over 50 insurgents.<sup>8</sup>

Boko Haram's international terror campaign intensified significantly from 2014 with attacks in countries like Niger and Chad, in addition to Cameroon, which had been a consistent target since 2013. In 2014 alone, Boko Haram attacks accounted for about one third of civilian deaths from conflicts throughout Africa.<sup>9</sup> An AFP news agency report from January 12, 2015 revealed that the Islamist terror group had attacked a military base in Kolofata, northwestern Cameroon, making its inhabitants flee the city.<sup>10</sup> The attack also compelled Cameroon President Paul Biya to call for urgent international military help to stop the incessant cross-border attacks

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idUSBRE93101820130419; "Nigeria's Boko Haram 'Got \$3m Ransom' to Free Hostages," *BBC News*, April 27, 2013, accessed September 7, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22320077>.

6 "Nigeria's Boko Haram Strikes Again in Cameroon," *World Watch Monitor*, December 4, 2013, accessed September 7, 2015, [https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2013/11/article\\_2858300.html/](https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2013/11/article_2858300.html/).

7 *Ibid.*

8 Nnenna Ibeh, "15 Soldiers, 50 Boko Haram Terrorists, Five Civilians Killed in Bama Attack, Counterattack-Nigerian Military," *Premium Times*, December 24, 2013, accessed September 7, 2013; Kingsley Omonobi and Chris Ochayi, "We Lost 15 Soldiers to Boko Haram Attack -Defence Hdqtrs," *Vanguard*, December 25, 2013, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/12/lost-15-soldiers-boko-haram-attack-defence-hqtrs>.

9 Lonel Zamfir, "African-led Counter-terrorism Measures Against Boko Haram," *European Parliamentary Research Service*, March 9, 2015, accessed September 3, 2015, <https://epthinktank.eu/2015/03/09/african-led-counter-terrorism-measures-against-boko-haram/>; "ACAPS Briefing Note - Nigeria: Boko Haram Insurgency," *Reliefweb*, January 20, 2015, accessed September 8, 2015, <http://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/acaps-briefing-note-nigeria-boko-haram-insurgency-20-january-2015>.

10 "Boko Haram Raids Cameroon Army Base," *Aljazeera*, January 13, 2015, accessed October 31, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/01/boko-haram-attacks-cameroon-military-base-2015112133225785766.html>.

into Cameroon by Boko Haram fighters, who were reportedly controlling Nigerian territories bordering Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. It is worth noting that Nigeria's national borders with Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger stretch about 4,047 square kilometers, are complex to manage, and also cut across ethnic groups, communities, and families, with centuries of close socio-cultural and economic links that defy the physical separation posed by borders alone.<sup>11</sup> Boko Haram has clearly taken advantage of this permeability, expanding past borders and adding areas neighboring Nigeria with relative ease of access to their terrorism agenda.

The insurgency spread to Chad on February 13, 2015, when the militants crossed Lake Chad in four motorized boats and attacked the Ngouboua village, killing at least 12 persons, including the village chief, and setting parts of the village ablaze before being repelled by Chadian soldiers.<sup>12</sup> On June 15, 2015, following a foiled attack on Niger earlier in February, Boko Haram attacked two Nigerian villages, Lamina and Ungumawo on in the Diffa region, where its fighters killed at least 38 persons and set fire to many houses. Boko Haram again attacked Chad on the nights of July 4 and 5, 2015. During the night attacks on two Chadian villages, Merom and Tiskra on Lake Chad, the terror group killed 26 persons and burned down several houses.<sup>13</sup> The insurgents also staged other cross-border attacks in July, resulting in many deaths and the destruction of property.<sup>14</sup> On September 3, 2015, female Boko Haram suicide bombers attacked a crowded market in Kerewa, and an infirmary near a military camp in Northern Cameroon, where explosions killed about 30 people and injured 145 others.<sup>15</sup> In December 2015, Boko Haram insurgents launched four attacks within 24 hours on villages in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, resulting in the death of at least seven people.<sup>16</sup> More recently, on June 3, 2016, the Islamist insurgents launched

11 "Report: Boko Haram Attacks Cameroon," *Deutsche Welle*, December 1, 2015, , <http://dw.com/p/1EJ2l>; Oghogho Obayuwana, "Global Coalition Against Terrorism in Nigeria," *Guardian News*, May 21, 2014, accessed September 9, 2015, <http://barasolutions.com/mainGuardian/news/national-news/162432-global-coalition-against-terrorism-in-nigeria>.

12 "Boko Haram Launches First Attack in Chad," *VOA News*, February 13, 2015, accessed September 8, 2015, <http://www.voanews.com/a/boko-haram-attack-on-chad-village/2641872.html>.

13 "Boko Haram Crisis: Attack in Niger Kills Dozens," *BBC News*, June 18, 2015, accessed September 10, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33186154>.

14 Ibid.; "Boko Haram Slit Throats of 26 Civilians in Chad," *Aljazeera*, July 9, 2015, accessed September 10, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/haram-slit-throats-26-civilians-chad-150708171934359.html>.

15 Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, "Female Suicide Bombers Continue to Strike in West Africa," *Long War Journal*, December 4, 2015, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://lonwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/female-suicide-bombers-continue-to-strike-in-west-africa.php>.

16 Madjiasra Nako and Abdoulaye Massalaki, "Suspected Boko Haram Fighters Launch Four Strikes



a devastating attack on a military outpost in Bosso, a town in southeastern Niger, on the Nigeria-Niger border, and killed at least 32 people (30 Nigerian civilians and two Nigerian soldiers), and forced about 50,000 others to flee.<sup>17</sup> The recent spate of cross-border attacks against Cameroon, Chad, and Niger by Boko Haram may have been launched in retaliation against the evolving West Africa multinational military intervention. The preceding rendition of the litany of Boko Haram's cross-border operations within the West African sub-region is a clear indication that the group has now fully transformed from an originally Nigerian problem into a sub-regional threat that presents serious transnational challenges.

Threats to national security and destabilization currently confront Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and even the entire region due to Boko Haram's mounting terror campaign. Human security is also threatened in view of the huge and growing casualties of the insurgency, spate of kidnappings, and wanton destruction of property. It is even alleged that Boko Haram has taken possession of some missing Libyan shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles called Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), for likely attacks against commercial planes flying into Chad, Niger, and possibly Nigeria.<sup>18</sup> The humanitarian problems and challenges created by the heightening cross-border violence are increasingly serious and complex. Apart from the huge number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) created by the conflict within Nigeria itself, about 40,000 Nigerian refugees are currently in Niger, and about 28,000 in Cameroon.<sup>19</sup> Due to the destruction of hospitals and other health facilities in Northeastern Nigeria by Boko Haram, many residents now seek medical attention in neighboring countries, particularly Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, further stretching the limited facilities in those countries. In addition, Boko Haram's cross-border kidnappings and violence have acted as disincentives to tourism and economic development in countries such as

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on Lake Chad Area," *Reuters*, December 23, 2015, accessed November 1, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence-chad-idUSKBN0U614M20151223>.

17 "32 Troopes Killed in Clash with Boko Haram Fighters - Defense Ministry," *Vanguard*, June 4, 2016, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://vanguardngr.com/2016/06/32-troopes-killed-clash-boko-haram-fighters-defence-ministry/>.

18 Freedom C. Onuoha, "A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone – Boko Haram's Transnational Reach and Regional Responses," Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Series No. 17, [http://www.academia.edu/9605960/A\\_Danger\\_not\\_to\\_Nigeria\\_Alone\\_Boko\\_Haram\\_s\\_Transnational\\_Reach\\_and\\_Regional\\_Responses](http://www.academia.edu/9605960/A_Danger_not_to_Nigeria_Alone_Boko_Haram_s_Transnational_Reach_and_Regional_Responses); David Ignatius, "Libyan Missiles on the Loose," *The Washington Post*, May 8, 2012, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/libyan-missiles-on-the-loose/2012/05/08/gIQA1FCUBU\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/libyan-missiles-on-the-loose/2012/05/08/gIQA1FCUBU_story.html).

19 Onuoha, "A Danger Not To Nigeria Alone"; Ignatius, "Libyan Missiles on the Loose."



Benin, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, whose economies are tied to Nigeria's.<sup>20</sup> The net effect of the Boko Haram insurgency on West Africa is an additional heavy burden on the stability and well-being of an already fragile sub-region.

### **Transnational Opportunities for Peace and Security**

Transnational initiatives against crime in West Africa date back to the period before Boko Haram's creation and uprising. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising Nigeria, Chad, and Niger was established in 1998 to fight international crime within the Lake Chad region.<sup>21</sup> The force, however, remained inactive for the most part until 2012 when it was restarted to tackle the Boko Haram menace. There is need to note that at the onset of the insurgency in Nigeria in 2009, Nigeria's West African neighbors did not display any serious concern about the crisis. It would appear that they viewed Boko Haram as simply a Nigerian problem to be solved by Nigeria alone. The escalation of the conflict and its attendant threats into Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Mali, and other regions since 2011 was the main factor that changed this perception. Thus, the transnational threats and challenges of Boko Haram opened up opportunities for the restoration of peace and security to the affected countries though multilateral channels and approaches.

On May 17, 2014, the Paris Summit among the heads of the government of Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger, along with representatives of the US, United Kingdom (UK), and European Union (EU), was hosted by France, resolving to strengthen African regional collaboration and strategy against Boko Haram through the pooling and sharing of intelligence and information, coordinated border surveillance, and patrols. In October 2014, member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) agreed upon greater cooperation on measures against Boko Haram, and pledged contribution of military forces to the MNJTF, which was scheduled to begin counterinsurgency operations within national borders from November 2014. But by early 2015, Boko Haram captured the MNJTF headquarters and its host town, Baga, in Northeast Nigeria.<sup>22</sup> The raiding of the task force from its headquarters was a huge blow to the West African multinational anti-Boko Haram initiative at its rudimentary stage. For the terror group, the territorial

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Zamfir, "African-led Counter-terrorism Measures against Boko Haram."

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.; Martin Williams and agencies, "African Leaders Pledge 'Total War' on Boko Haram after Nigeria Kidnap," *The Guardian*, May 17, 2014, accessed September 11, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/17/west-african-countries-must-unite-fight-boko-haram-nigeria>.

gains meant greater mobility and maneuverability to launch further cross-border attacks.

Following the call by the UN Security Council (UNSC) President for a boost in the operational capacity of the MNJTF on January 20, 2015, the government leaders of 13 West African and Central African States, excluding Nigeria, converged to deliberate upon the establishment of a multinational counterinsurgency force. The African Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) endorsed the MNJTF during its meeting on January 29, 2015. The AU gave approval for the deployment of the MNJTF, which was made up of 7,500 military and non-military personnel, for a period of 12 months in the first instance, and this was to be renewable.<sup>23</sup> Under this arrangement, the mission would seek to ensure a secure environment, restore state authority, and facilitate humanitarian assistance in the affected areas. Experts of the MNJTF member states assisted by AU experts met in Yaounde, Cameroon from February 5-7, 2015 to wrap up the operational details of the mission against Boko Haram. Some other African regional, bilateral, and multi-lateral stakeholders such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), UN, EU, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also participated in the expert summit. The meeting made the following decisions to proceed with:

- a. Establishment of a new headquarters in N'Djamena, Chad;
- b. Establishment of a safe and secure environment in the territories affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in order to drastically reduce violence against civilians and other abuses such as sexual and gender-based violence;
- c. Enhancement of the implementation of overall stabilization programs by the LCBC member-states and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees; and
- d. Facilitation of humanitarian operations and delivery of

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23 Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin, "Experts Meeting on the Elaboration of Operational Documents for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Member States of the Lake Chad Commission and Benin Against the Boko Haram Terrorist Group," February 5-7, 2015, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/final-communique-7-2-2015.pdf>.

assistance to the affected populations.<sup>24</sup>

In addition, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin announced contributions of 8,700 military, police, and civilian personnel to the force.<sup>25</sup> These meetings, plans, and expressions of intent have not halted the growing transnationalization of Boko Haram and its accompanying threat largely because the AU, ECOWAS, and other regional economic communities (RECs) have not implemented adequate African ownership and leadership of the multinational peace and security interventionist project.

Boko Haram's Islamist extremism has also provided an opportunity for further US intervention in the region. Since Muhammadu Buhari's new presidency began, the US has provided more decisive deployments of military personnel including advisers, training, intelligence and logistical personnel, and equipment for Nigeria and the MNJTF to combat Boko Haram. Previously in 2014, the US launched regular drone missions over Nigeria. In 2015, the US government provided quiet support to the militaries of Cameroon, Niger, and Chad in their cross-border counter insurgency operations in Northeast Nigeria. The US is currently providing about \$71 million dollars' worth of equipment, logistical support, and training for Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad to effectively execute the MNJTF mandate.<sup>26</sup> There are, however, concerns that the fresh impetus for US interventions against Boko Haram is largely motivated by the need to curb the growing influence of China in West Africa.<sup>27</sup> While outside help may be useful, it is crucial for Nigeria and Africa as a whole to take full responsibility, ownership, and leadership of the fight against Boko Haram and other threats to regional peace and security.

## Conclusion

On the basis of its ideology, strategy, funding, and operational targets and reach, Boko Haram has transformed from an originally Nigerian insurgency

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24 Ibid.; Zamfir, "African-led Counter-terrorism Measures against Boko Haram."

25 Ibid.

26 "United States Support to Counter Boko Haram," US Department of State, February 11, 2016, accessed November 1, 2016, accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252399.htm>.

27 Thomas Gaist, "US Preparing Direct Military Intervention in Nigeria," *World Socialist Web Site*, May 30, 2015, accessed September 16, 2015 <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/05/30/nige-j12.html>; Lindsey German, "Western Intervention will turn Nigeria into an African Afghanistan," *The Guardian*, May 6, 2014, accessed December 19, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/06/western-intervention-nigeria-kidnapped-girls-corruption-boko-haram>.

into a West African phenomenon, with the potential for further extension to other parts of Africa. Boko Haram transformed into a transnational Islamist insurgent activist (within West Africa so far) due to the Nigerian government's inability to nip it in the bud at the outset. The West African and other African governments are culpable, too, for not providing an appropriate regional response to help Nigeria check the insurgency before it got out of hand and ultimately developed a regional dimension. West Africa's porous international borders also provided additional impetus for the transnationalization of Boko Haram. Instead of a swift collective response to Boko Haram's emergence, other African states, especially Nigeria's West African neighbors, adopted a nonchalant attitude in the false belief that the conflict was strictly a Nigerian problem that would remain localized and was to be solved by her alone.

The resultant transnational challenges and threats of Boko Haram eventually compelled collective responses from West African states and the rest of Africa in the form of interventions and initiatives from multilateral and regional organizations. But the desired de-escalation and termination of the conflict and its destructive effects has yet to be achieved. In order to effectively tackle the menace of Boko Haram and similar insurgent movements, there is an urgent need for African states to adequately strengthen cross-border security so as to deny militant anti-state organizations of resources and strategic opportunities, space, and maneuverability. Second, for prompt and result-oriented operationalization of the multinational force, member countries have to change their age-old attitude of focusing more on their respective national interests and pride to emphasize a regional approach. Third, although the exact number of Boko Haram's militants is yet unknown, the sheer devastating magnitude of its operations and vast recruitment opportunities suggest the need for a substantial increase in the size of the multinational force fighting against this threat. Fourth, to address the crucial issue of financing multinational military operations, the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and other African RECs should jointly create a broad-based international fund. Related to this, the aforementioned international stakeholders and others alike should also take decisive steps to undermine Boko Haram's funding, particularly from international sources. Finally, non-military counter-insurgency measures are also required. It is imperative for the Nigerian and other African governments to seriously tackle the seemingly intractable issues of youth unemployment, poverty, and flagrant violations of the fundamental rights of ordinary citizens by state security forces, which are strong pull-factors for radicalization, extremism, and insurgent recruitment. For the Nigerian and multinational military forces to win the insurgency war,

they have to win the confidence, trust, and support of their host communities and other affected territories. **Y**



# INTERVIEW

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## **THE POLITICS OF (MIS)PERCEPTION**

*Interview with Benoit Hardy-Chartrand*

# THE POLITICS OF (MIS)PERCEPTION

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## *Interview with Benoit Hardy-Chartrand*

*Benoit Hardy-Chartrand is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), a non-profit, independent think tank in Canada, and a lecturer in international relations at the Université de Montréal. Benoit is also an associate researcher at the Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies in Montreal, Canada. Previously he was a junior fellow at United Nations University (UNU) in Tokyo, in addition to conducting research at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS). Benoit has a BA in Political Science from Université de Montréal, and a Master of Arts in International Relations from Université du Québec à Montréal. He also studied international relations at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea.*

*The Journal's own junior staff editor, Alexandra Stephenson, conducted the following interview, which discusses research from Mr. Hardy-Chartrand's recent publication, *Misperceptions, Threat Inflation and Mistrust in China-Japan Relations*. The paper discusses relations between East Asia's two pre-eminent powers, China and Japan, from 2012 to 2014, when they reached their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972. The bitter territorial dispute in the East China Sea, as well as contrasting views of their shared history, have been the primary drivers of tensions. The discord at the official level has also been reflected in public opinion, with mutual perceptions between the Japanese and Chinese populations reaching unprecedented levels of negativity in 2013 and 2014. The rhetoric of threat has permeated the media and official discourse in both countries. Through an analysis of these discourses, this paper explores mutual perceptions in China and Japan, in the end arguing that each side overestimates the level of threat that the other poses. This systematic overestimation leads to consequences for bilateral relations and regional stability.*



**Y: How will the coming presidency of Donald Trump affect issues such as Japan-US relations as well as Japan-China relations?**

There's a lot of uncertainty surrounding his policy toward Asia. Now, although we don't know exactly what direction or orientation he will take with his Asia policy, Asia and foreign policy, overall, figured very little into any of his policy pronouncements during the campaign, and still to this day, a few weeks after the election, we still don't know that much about it.

However, the few things that he has let on about his ideas on Asia make it seem as though he could be more or less an isolationist when it comes to international affairs. Not an old school pre-WWII isolationist, but a lot less committed to America's traditional role in the world. When I say traditional role, I'm talking about its security commitments everywhere, and especially in Asia since WWII, where it has been very, very present. We have to remember that it has treaty commitments with five allies, five partners in the region. Therefore, if there was any sort of lack of commitment, or even a slight turnaround from United States' commitment to Asia, it might change quite a lot of things.

Let's remember his campaign pronouncements regarding the fact that Japan and South Korea needed to pay more for their security, despite the fact that they're already paying approximately half of the costs of hosting American bases. Even if South Korea and Japan were paying for everything, which is about five billion a year, it still would be just a drop, just a small drop in the grand scheme of things considering that the American yearly defense budget is about five hundred thirty billion dollars.

But regardless, he's talking about forcing or asking these two allies to pay more. He also suggested that perhaps these two countries would need to be armed with nuclear weapons, as well, which would be a sea change in the region. I don't think it will happen because there's little appetite for this in both Japan and South Korea. Obviously the hawks in both countries, in both South Korea and Japan, were happy to hear that because there's always been a faction in politics in both places that favor the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but the reality is that there's still a lot of resistance. It would be very unwise for both of them to do that, but that doesn't matter because the fact that he made these pronouncements, the fact that he showed less than enthusiastic commitment to these two alliances, has made these two countries very worried about Trump's administration. That was very clearly illustrated by the fact that Abe was one of the first people to call him, and the very first one to meet him. We have to remember that this was a completely impromptu meeting. He was going to South America

for the APEC Summit, and on the way to Peru, and I arranged to meet Trump in New York. And although Abe made it seem as if everything went well, and according to what we have heard, it seemed like the meeting did go well, it's still a very clear illustration of deep worries in the region among American allies regarding the future of their relations with the United States.

**Y: What do you think about the increase in rhetoric from President Duterte in the Philippines?**

Duterte is very much a loose cannon. His antipathy towards the United States goes back to when he was the mayor of Davao in the southern island of Mindanao. In a way, this so-called separation, or this decline in the relationship between United States and the Philippines was almost to be foreseen when he was elected, based on how he has always viewed the United States. He's viewed them as an unwelcome presence in the Philippines. Again, a lot of things that he has said cannot be taken seriously because he often goes back on his own words. On October 21, after he had said he would separate from the United States, he turned around and said, "No, we're only separating in terms of foreign policy."

The reality is that ever since he came to power in June, there have been clear moves to distance the Philippines from the United States and bring it closer to the orbit of China. For instance, he has decided to cancel, starting next year, some military joint exercises, and he said that he would expel US troops from the south of the country, where they have been for a while. There's a lot of uncertainty regarding the future of the alliance because we have to remember that in 2014, when it was Benigno Aquino, the predecessor of Duterte, the alliance between the United States and the Philippines was actually enhanced and was looking up at that time.

And now, so not only has he drifted a little bit away from the US, but gotten closer to China, and that's certainly grounds for worry on the part of the United States. It's not a complete separation, and he's completely committed to China. Sure, he's gotten close to China, but what I feel will probably happen is he will probably try, to a certain extent, to play both powers against one another, to try to extract things from both. But there's no doubt that, regardless of what has been said about his fickleness and his lack of seriousness in his policy pronouncements, there's a real drift in the Philippine's foreign policy that has been undertaken since June, and that cannot be denied, no matter what officials in Manila say.

**Y: Are there some similarities with this case and the situation in Japan**

## and China?

I'd be wary of comparison between Duterte and US and Japan, China, with regards to threat perception. Are you referring to the South China Sea, for instance, or just the way that Duterte perceives China or the US?

**Y: One thing of note in your article is that Japan doesn't actually see China as a real threat. They just read what China's doing as rhetoric. So China says really angry things, but Japan kind of sees behind that and realizes that they don't actually mean war, for example.**

Yes, you're right, but at the same time, they are worried about Chinese moves. They are worried about Chinese actions around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which is an important point in the paper. In its yearly white defense paper, what Japan says it's worried about is the China, North Korea, and their actions in their surroundings. Whenever I speak to Japanese officials about that, Chinese moves come to the forefront of their security concerns, with North Korea. The fact that they believe the Chinese are not really worried about the Japanese threat doesn't mean that they don't see Chinese actions as threatening or worrying.

But to go back to your question about comparing the situation with Duterte with Japan and China, I'm not sure if there's any comparison that I can make. In this case, for the last two or three years before Duterte came to power, Benigno Aquino and his administration were very worried and saw China as a threat to its interests in the South China Sea. So that threat perception seems to have completely changed now that they have gotten closer to China and agreed to settle this dispute bilaterally. There's no doubt that there's a very different threat perception in the two most recent administrations in Manila.

**Y: How do you think particular issues (US withdrawal from the TPP, for example) could affect threat misperception in the region?**

The TPP is a very interesting issue because although the TPP does not affect misperception or perception related to threat, specifically, it does really affect perception of US intent and US commitment to the region. An important thing to remember here is that when the US announced its pivot to Asia, it had several different spheres or areas, if you will. One is the defense pivot, reinforcing US defense commitment to the region, and its military presence in the region, which it has done to a certain extent. There's the political pivot, which meant reinforcing its alliance with traditional partners like Japan and

South Korea, which it has also done. And the third important leg of the pivot was the economic pivot, and the TPP was going to be a very large part of that.

So now it's very likely that the US is going out of the TPP, as that's actually one thing Trump promised he would follow through with. Exiting the TPP is a big deal because the TPP would have increased the US economic presence and made the US a more important economic partner for pretty much all countries in Asia that are a part of the TPP. At the same time, it would have helped to make countries in the region less dependent economically on China because almost all countries in the region have China as their first trading partner. So the TPP would have really reduced this dependency on China, and by the same token, made the United States a more important partner for these countries. Now that it's gone, it's one of the most important aspects of the pivot that is basically dead. That does make a big difference, obviously.

Regarding the pivot, the main way that this will affect threat perception or misperception in the region is that, if Trump is indeed less committed to alliances with Japan and South Korea, the way that Seoul and Tokyo react to a Trump administration will very likely affect threat perception in the region, especially in China. It's quite possible that South Korea and Japan will feel compelled to increase their armaments, defense commitments or defense budgets, and that will undoubtedly make China a little more wary of Japanese and South Korean intentions. So I would say that what will mostly affect threat perception really hinges on how Japan and South Korea react, or how they go forward under the Trump administration.

**Y: Can you tell me more about how these same issues play out between different countries either in Asia or around the world?**

There are other examples in other parts of the world, and in Asia, as well. I think one of the issues is that threat perception or misperception affects bilateral relations to a much greater extent than is often recognized. We think that actual capabilities from countries are the main factor here, but capabilities do not always matter, it's the perception of these capabilities that really matter. That's what drives foreign policy of states in the vast majority of cases.

If we look at Asia, one of the best examples of that are North Korea and South Korea relations, and the way that threat perceptions affect North Korea's foreign policy. North Korea has always, ever since it was founded in 1948, felt hugely threatened by its neighbors and always believed that it lives in a very hostile environment surrounded by countries that want nothing but its collapse, like Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

And this threat perception has been the main, if not the only, driver of the North Korean initiative to acquire nuclear weapons since the 1980s, which is when its nuclear program started. There were various factors that motivated the acquisition of nuclear weapons in North Korea, and one of them was prestige, which has always played an important part for internal propaganda, among other reasons. But if it had not been for the real perception that it was threatened by its neighbors, there is very little chance that North Korea would have gone ahead and acquired nuclear weapons.

So I think North Korea is a very, very interesting case, and threat perception has also driven a lot of its actions internally. The securitization theory, from the Copenhagen School of international relations helps understand the case. It just goes to show, basically, that the fact North Korea felt it was in a very hostile environment has forced it to take measures that go outside of the realm of normal policies, and that has allowed it to justify very drastic measures, such as nuclear weapons, but also very repressive policies, internally. It was a lot easier to justify these drastic measures using the threat that it felt it was under. That's why North Korea is a very interesting example.

If we look outside of Asia, as you asked, I think one of the main countries that come to mind when we talk about threat perception and how it affects relations in other parts of the world, to me, is Israel. Israel is in a very particular environment, it's been threatened by a lot of its neighbors ever since it was founded in 1948. Israel fought two wars with its neighbors and has been under constant threat internally and externally. Its relations with Iran, for instance, have been driven, to a large extent, by how they both perceive each other as an existential threat. We've heard, in the last few years, that at some point it seemed relatively likely that Israel was actually going to strike the nuclear facilities in Iran. At the same time, this threat from Israel was also affecting the way that the Revolutionary Guard and the Iranian leader - especially under the very conservative leadership of Ahmadinejad, the was conducting his foreign policy.

But we have to remember here that Israel is one of the nine nuclear states in the world. Although it has never come out and admitted to its nuclear weapons, everybody knows that it does have them. The only reason why it went forward with such a program was the idea that it felt existentially threatened by its Arab neighbors, and history has tended to validate that view because of the fact that on two occasions it was attacked in a sudden fashion by its neighbors. When we look at the way that threat perception affects a country's foreign policy, I think Israel is a very potent example of this.

Y: Can you talk more about the role of certain individuals in this situation? How do Xi Jinping or Shinzo Abe in particular play into this? Is the situation depend on them, in particular, or is it more about the nation? Will the situation change when they are replaced?

It's both a national thing and a personality thing. When I say a 'national thing,' due to the nature of geopolitics if you will, there's always going to be a certain level of, maybe not antipathy, but basic tension or rivalry between China and Japan. As much as South Korea and Japan should be natural allies, and I say 'should' here because of the fact that they have very similar security interests, they have similar cultures and similar ecosystems, Japan and China are, to a certain extent, natural rivals. They are both giant players in the region and they have very contradictory, opposing objectives in the region. They have different systems that make it difficult to not see each other as rivals and because of that, regardless of who is in power - and we've seen this historically ever since the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 although they have not been at war, there has almost always been a certain basic level of tension. That's because of geopolitics, and also because of their very torturous history, the fact that they've fought two wars - the First Sino-Japanese War and the Japanese Invasion of Manchuria. History features very prominently in the national psyche in China. For these reasons, it would hard, regardless of the leaders, for these countries to be completely comfortable with the others' policies or proximity.

With that being said, I strongly think that leaders play an important role, especially, I would say, in democracies like Japan. As you know, in China, it's traditionally more of a collective leadership in the form of a Standing Politoburo. Due to that tradition, the personalities of the leaders have been more diluted, except Mao who was a very strong leader, and Deng Xiaoping as well. And now Xi Jinping is coming back to that style of very strong leadership. A couple weeks ago, he was named - and it's not an official title - but he was named 'the Core.' Although 'the Core' is nothing official, it sends a very clear signal that Xi Jinping is the one leader among leaders, and while he's always been the President and the General Secretary, as a core leader it sends an even stronger signal that he's not to be messed with. Due to that, I think his personality has a greater influence on the conduct of Chinese policy. Overall, though, before Xi Jinping, with the last few leaders, especially with Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, I think their personalities were maybe a little less central, or their policy leanings as individuals, may have been a little less important because of the collective leadership.

In Japan, however, I think it's very clear that personalities have an important impact on bilateral relations. Look at Abe - he is a staunch nationalist and he has revisionist leanings, although recently he has calmed down a little bit when it comes to incendiary comments about the past. It's clear that after he was elected he said a lot of things that were rather revisionist, such as when he said that it wasn't clear that Japan had committed aggression during WWII. Specifically he said that there was not an agreed upon definition of aggression, which meant that, 'Well, we can't say we committed aggression because there's no set definition of aggression,' which obviously made Japan's neighbors very unhappy.

Also, there's the fact that Shinzo Abe has named quite a few prominent revisionists to important positions, such as the head of NHK, the national broadcasting corporation. These are people that have made moves to portray Japan or Japan's history in a certain light and in a way that made it seem as though certain past transgressions or crimes were less important than they really were. This has made Japan's neighbors, China and to a lesser extent South Korea, very wary of Japanese politics. It made it a lot harder for South Korea, but mostly China, to trust Shinzo Abe and feel like he was a leader that they could work with. And his actions, the fact that he's very nationalistic and is a revisionist, has made his moves on the defense front even harder to or swallow for Japan's neighbors.

Right now, there's a lot of talk about the decision to reinterpret the constitution so that Japan could exercise their right to collective self-defense, and that move, specifically, because of the past and the way that Abe has treated history, has been perceived very negatively by its neighbors. We have to remember here that most political parties, especially those that are outside of the ruling coalition, were completely opposed to this. I would say that even if it was another leader from the Liberal Democratic Party, I'm not sure that Japan would have gone ahead with that much steam to reinterpret the constitution, and hence my assertion that him as a leader or as an individual has made a big difference on Japan-China relations, and Japan-South Korea relations. That has increased, of course, threat perception among neighbors. In a nutshell, that's what I would have to say about the role of individuals. I think in a democracy like Japan it's easier for leaders to shape the direction of politics.

**Y: That's all the questions that I have, but was there anything else that you had to say regarding the topics we've discussed today?**

There was something else that I wanted to say about Abe that I was thinking of while I was talking about the perception of Japan's moves on the defense side. If you look at, and I mention this in my paper, but a lot of the declarations, if you read Chinese pronouncements, whether they be official pronouncements or coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or national or private media, the way they portrayed Abe's moves often link these moves to history or link these moves to Abe's revisionist tendencies. So they've very clearly pinpointed Abe himself as one of the main reasons, one of the chief reasons for perceiving Japan as a threat and painting it as a dangerous country. You see that very clearly in the rhetoric and the discourse coming from China. So that's one thing that I wanted to say.

One last thing relates to the common idea in Japan that the Chinese are willingly exaggerating the level of threat that Japan poses. There are many reasons for doing that. For instance, they want to put Japan on the defensive, as it's always good for a one party dictatorship like they have in China to have a clear enemy, if you will, to galvanize support for the Communist Party. That's one of the reasons they do that. But as a result, it makes it very hard for Japan to trust its neighbor. I talked about the lack of trust coming from China with regards to Japan, but when a country like Japan feels like its neighbor is constantly, willingly portraying it in a very negative light, or portraying it in a way that it is not, it makes it a lot harder for both countries to reach out to each other. There's basically no trust that would build a foundation for a real partnership between the two countries. They're able to cooperate on various levels, but it's very hard to create deeper trust between the two because of the extent of the threat discourse emanating from both countries. **Y**



## REVIEW

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### THE EVOLUTION INTO THE ASIAN CENTURY

Fault Lines in a Rising Asia

*Cheol Bin (Jason) Shin*

# THE EVOLUTION INTO THE ASIAN CENTURY

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*Cheol Bin (Jason) Shin*

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Chung Min Lee, *Fault Lines in a Rising Asia* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016); 350 pages; \$19.95 (paperback).

One of the most profound questions in 21<sup>st</sup> century international politics is how Asia's rise will coincide with any potential shifts in the international political order. Currently, the United States stands as the global hegemon as the champion of the West and democracy, a position that it has enjoyed since the collapse of the USSR at the end of the Cold War. However, after two decades of hegemonic stewardship, the US has to an extent seen itself bogged down by various foreign interventions abroad, as well as domestic disturbances, for the last several years. Due to this instability, some observers have identified the current era as a time when US and western power will decline, only to be replaced by a rapidly increasing Asian power. In *Fault Lines in a Rising Asia*, author Chung Min Lee argues that the inexorable rise of Asia does not necessarily translate to the demise of the West.

The author argues that by most hard power measures, Asia has already risen. Hard power is the use of military and economic means to influence the behavior or interest of other political bodies. As the book mentions, in 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the world's second largest economy in terms of GDP. In the same vein, in 2014, the combined GDP of China, Japan, India, and South Korea (\$33.26 trillion) easily surpassed the GDP of the United States, Germany, France, and Britain (\$26 trillion). From a military perspective, while the United States far outspends the combined military budgets of all other nations in the world, the defense budget of Asia eclipsed that of Europe. Asia is also home to five countries with nuclear weapons (China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).

What Lee aims to accomplish in the book is to maneuver away from the frequent comparison based on numbers alone, toward a comprehensive overview of all parts of the "Asian story." To do this, it is necessary to look at both the upsides of Asia's rise, as well as the downsides. The main objective

of the book lies in analyzing the reasons for the “Asian paradox.” Lee defines contemporary Asia as a “region that has seen unparalleled economic success, but that is also home to the world’s most dangerous, diverse, and divisive security, military, political challenges.”<sup>1</sup> This is not to suggest that Asia’s rise was unlikely. On the contrary, no one disputes Asia’s rise, even with the slowing of China’s economic growth. What Asia needs to do, Lee argues, is demonstrate to the rest of the world its ability to prevent, mitigate, and overcome unmatched security and political dilemmas. Until Asia can offer an ideal alternative system to the current liberal democratic order of the West, its rise will not upset the existing world order and the hegemonic leadership of the US. Additionally, the West has been comparatively stable in terms of intra/regional conflict, while Asia today has some of the most pronounced security problems. In addition, Lee notes how “the sheer multiplicity and magnitude of Asia’s security threats dwarf those of other regions.”<sup>2</sup> No other region in the world is like Asia because of the amalgamation of wide ranging political deficits mixed with the historical tensions and legacies that continue to fester nearly 70 years after the end of WWII.

The book is divided into six distinct chapters grounded in a proposed theoretical framework. While some books on international security provide explanations of theories in a clearly disjointed, almost robotic manner, Lee skillfully sets the pace of the book so that each chapter paves the foundation for the contents of the next chapter, thus ensuring that an average reader will be able to understand every single concept that follows from one chapter to the next. One drawback is that rather than a proposed theoretical framework as the author claims, what is provided is a multitude of valid, but external, theories that are used as evidence and support.

The first chapter is a historical overview or a recap of the events that allowed Asia to rise in the first place in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The well-known narrative of Asia’s accelerated economic growth and development is provided, including an analysis of the Asian Tigers: South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. These regions were among the first newly industrialized countries in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century behind Japan, which had become the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest economy in the world at the time. The end of the chapter, as mentioned before, lays down the roots for the next chapter as Lee discusses the more salient features of Asia’s core challenges, such as

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1 Chung Min Lee, *Fault Lines in a Rising Asia* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 2.

2 Ibid.

great power rivalries and growing military competition. While Lee makes his best effort to cater to a general audience who may not be informed on all facets of Asian history, it seems like the earlier parts of the book are bogged down by a review of the same oft-repeated historical narratives.

The second chapter deals with the potential political challenges that face Asia today. This is accomplished through the lens of the various types of political governments that presently exist in Asia. To give a counterexample, most of the Western European and North American continent is dominated by either democracies or republic type governments. However, Asia has established democracies, one-party communist states, fragile states, failed states, authoritarian states, and mostly importantly, states in transition. While there have been success stories of Asian democracies that have emulated the successful western model, there are also failed democratic states and countries where the army has assumed power, such as in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Thailand. Due to the lack of a common governing style, this has allowed divergent values and norms to develop, continually creating security problems and common mistrust within the region.

Chapter 3 mostly explains the intended motives and aspirations of the current leaders of the international system towards Asia. These include those from countries such as the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan. Among the examples that Lee provides are that of US President Obama's pivot to Asia and Japan's current quest for a more normal security posture under President Abe. Also, while some security experts have adamantly denied the concept of a "China/Russia" alliance to counterbalance the US, Lee brings attention to this, as well as gives an explanation behind Russia's latest actions on the international scene, including its invasion of Crimea and the establishment of its own "tilt" toward Asia. The chapter concludes with a highly plausible forecast that for the next two to three decades, an intensifying struggle for mastery is going to be the new normal across Asia. Lee claims that it would be hard pressed to see a return to the tributary system that ancient Imperial China once held over its neighboring countries from the 500s all the way to the 1800s.

An issue that has been very contentious in the last several years is the power politics regarding the governance and ownership of the South China Sea. Chapter 4 discusses the growing prominence of the Indo-Pacific region as a major maritime zone of competition. From an economic and strategic perspective, the Strait of Malacca is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. It is the main shipping channel that connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean and about one fourth of the world's traded

goods are carried across it per year.<sup>3</sup> Lee states that as China's People's Liberation Army evolves into a more modern force with upgraded technology and munitions in both its air force and navy, other countries will grow wary and look to counterbalance China's aspirations in the South China Sea. The chapter also looks at the growing problem in North Korea as it develops its weapons program, namely with nuclear technology. These security-conscious actions highlight the possibility for escalation. That is, if one country in Asia aims to increase its military capacity, then this can create potential hotspots in the region as neighboring countries might seek to do the same, as well. While the manner of content organization is very sound throughout the book, in this chapter there seems to be a concentrated effort to try and force a storyline in the explanation of China's actions. For example, some of the actions by the People's Liberation Army may be attributable to simple defensive posturing rather than as part of a grander picture of a rising Asia.

The remaining two chapters deal with nuclear programs in Asia. Chapter 5 primarily covers the role of nuclear weapons from an Asian context. Aside from the initial countries that owned nuclear technology, both India and Pakistan managed to test and develop nuclear weapons in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Lee goes back and discusses the "genesis of the nuclear competition in South Asia"<sup>4</sup> and details an overview of the two countries' different road to nuclear sovereignty. The last chapter deals with an explanation of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, as well as how this connects to Pyongyang's array of weapons exporting networks and collaboration with Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria over the last three decades. What Lee does best in this chapter is to define and describe the asymmetric relationship and correlation between the increased development of North Korea's nuclear weapons program with the defensive postures of its two biggest neighbors (South Korea and Japan). Notably, North Korea's increased nuclear weapons technology capabilities might force Seoul's hand in devising an effective anti-ballistic missile system, and in Japan's case, trigger Japan's Self Defense Forces to adopt more proactive defense measures.

Overall, what Lee successfully explains in his book is that while Asia has had unparalleled economic success in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it likewise has its share of entrenched security dilemmas. Instead of a black and white portrayal of Asia rising up as an unstoppable force in the 20<sup>th</sup> century with a helpless West observing from the sidelines, Lee explains that whether

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3 Donald Freeman, *The Straits of Malacca* (Toronto: McGill-Queen University Press, 2003), 37.

4 Lee, *Fault Lines in a Rising Asia*, 53.

Asia manages to improve or overcome traditional geopolitical problems and potential new zones of strategic competition in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will have more of an impact on the shaping of the regional order. Until such problems are resolved, Asia's rise may persist, but will not be synonymous with an Asian-centric world order. Lee concludes that even if the current century can be labelled an "Asian Century," it is impossible to label the region itself as a place where political cohesion or collective action will be easy to make. As mentioned in the book, "Asia is much too broad, diverse, and complex to conveniently include it under one huge geographic roof."<sup>5</sup> A very enjoyable read for an avid follower of either international politics or security studies, *Fault Lines in a Rising Asia*, instead of providing an alternate explanation to the rise of Asia, seeks to clarify many of the misconceptions that laymen and scholars alike may have regarding the topic. Y

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5 Lee, *Fault Lines in a Rising Asia*, 78.



# GUIDELINES

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4. Papers should include an abstract of no longer than 250 words.
5. A short biography of the author should be included with each submission.
6. American spelling should be used in all submitted pieces.
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    Japanese: Revised Hepburn  
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