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SELECTIONS

TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE
IMAGE OF THE STATE:
CHINA/US RELATIONS, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS, AND THE STATE AS
UNITARY PURPOSEFUL ACTOR

Richard Ian Wright

STRATEGIC STABILITY VS. STRATEGIC
PRIMACY: CHINA'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY
FOLLOWING THE 2018
US NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

Cody Ryan Connolly

WHEN SECURITY HURTS:
CHINA THE MASTER OF COVERT
SANCTIONS

Line Wivi Moerch

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Yonsei Journal of International Studies
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VOLUME 11
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LETTER

FROM THE EDITOR

Recent years has witnessed a rise in Asia as a site for socio-political discourse worldwide. The booming economies of South Korea and China have threatened the hegemony of great powers such as the United States in international trade circuits. Furthermore, East Asian countries have been striving to find a niche in the arenas of hard and soft power as a means to assert their roles in the global stage. In order to maintain international attention, Asian countries have acted as host for several major world sports events, the most notable being the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, last year's 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, and the Tokyo Olympics to be held in 2020. China's successful bid for the Beijing Winter Olympic games in 2022 further ensures that East Asia will remain a central topic in international news outlets, keeping attention on the cultural and political significance of the region. Beyond East Asia, Southeast Asian countries have also risen through the proliferation of soft power, such as the dispersal of cuisine from the Philippines abroad, to create more social and political visibility. Thus, the 2019 Spring/Summer issue of *Yonsei's Journal of International Studies* has paid special attention to literature that addresses the significance of a burgeoning Asian presence in international practices worldwide.

Leading off this discussion in the Papers section of this edition is a piece titled "Towards an Alternative Image of the State: China/US Relations, Economic Institutions, and the State as Unitary Purposive Actor" authored by Richard Wright. Wright argues that economic relations and policy choices between the US and China reveal a need to address an alternative image of the state that augments, rather than replaces, the unitary-actor model popular within IR theory. This alternative image also helps to account for instances within the US and China that reveal cultural motivations as the basis for action over the political. Thus, he concludes, the motivations behind specific decisions made by each respective country in their interactions constitute a state image that is more fallible and pluralistic than the current rational unitary-actor would allow, expanding the theory for more diverse application. Continuing

the discussion of China and US relations is a piece by author Cody R. Connolly from Seoul National University. In his work titled “Strategic Stability vs. Strategic Primacy: China’s Nuclear Strategy Following the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review,” Connolly adds to the extensive body of literature on American and Chinese nuclear strategy. Through a comparative analysis of term interpretation used in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, he reveals a distinct difference in perception of the terms “strategic stability” and “strategic primacy” between the US and China and elaborates on how these interpretations effect nuclear strategy. Rounding off the Papers section is Ji Min Lee’s “Participation in the Pyeongchang 2018 Olympic Winter Games: South Korea’s Public Diplomacy or North Korea’s Strategic Determination?” is an exploration of North Korea’s participation in the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea, and its effects on North-South relations. She identifies the role of South Korean public diplomacy efforts, as well as North Korean internal politics, as vital factors in North Korea’s participation in the event. Lee also implies that the “sports politics” aided in the subsequent peace talks between the two countries that have followed since. Additionally, Lee emphasizes the need for future research to address the significance of sports diplomacy as mediating international relations.

Returning to China as a site for exploration as a major actor within international politics, Line Moerch starts the “Essay” section of this edition with her piece titled “When Security Hurts: China – The Master of “Covert” Sanctions.” Moerch explores the concept of economic sanctions in a theoretical context, narrowing in on David R. Baldwin’s construction of what he calls “covert sanctions” as applied to South Korea by China when THAAD was introduced to the peninsula. The use of covert sanctions, she argues, shows an attempt by the Chinese government to influence international politics without fear of military escalation or future conflict. Jemimah Uy supplies the final entry in the “Essay” section of this edition with her piece: “The Presence/Absence of Nostalgia: Generational Differences in Culinary and Gastronomic Encounters of Filipino Migrants with “Authentic” Filipino Food.” Veering away from international relation theory as a framework for her discussion, Uy chooses an anthropological approach to her discussion of food nostalgia in Filipino diasporic communities. Through focusing on two generations of Filipino migrants, she finds that the question of “authenticity” in regard to culinary and gastronomic discourses is highly contested between each generation. For the first generation, a sense of nostalgia exists. For the second generation, however, the mixing of cultures and foods has created a unique relationship with Filipino cuisine. For this year’s interview portion of the journal, our junior editor Danielle French sat down with Liga Tarvide, an officer for education, culture, and public diplomacy at the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia in South Korea. French’s interview sheds light on the nature of embassy work in South Korea and efforts conducted by the Latvian embassy to generate awareness of their culture and practices among Korean students of all ages. Book contributor Alexandra Micu completes the journal with her book review of Hae Yeon Choo’s *Decentering Citizenship: Gender, Labor, and Migrant Rights in South Korea*. Using ethnographic data collected between 2008 to 2014, Choo’s book purviews the lives of Filipino women in the sectors of

factory work, marriage migrant, and hostess jobs. Micu's review harbors both criticism and praise, calling for more elaboration on Choo's discussion of migrant activism among advocates while still praising the book for its findings and methodology. This semester working on the journal as Editor-in-Chief has not been without its challenges. However, the chance to work together with a dedicated team to overcome those challenges has been not only a rewarding experience, but also highly educational. As such, in the concluding remarks of this letter, I would like to thank my staff editors, Diana Piscarac, Caroline Mahon, Aimee Beatriz Lee, Sue Jeong, Danielle French, and Theophile Begin, for all the work they put into despite the many difficulties we have encountered this semester. Without them, this edition of the journal would not have been possible.

I hope to see many of you again next issue!

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Kendra Hodapp'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Kendra Hodapp
Editor in Chief

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Line Wini Moerch is currently enrolled at the Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies in Seoul, where she is finishing her master's degree in Korean Studies with a minor in International Security and Foreign Policy. Specializing primarily in Korean political history, her current research focuses on the historical development of bureaucratic practices in South Korea and the underlying effects of culture on corruption in a contemporary context. She attained her bachelor's degree in Korean Studies from University of Copenhagen and has hosted various events alongside the University of Copenhagen, the National Museum of Copenhagen, KOTRA, Korea Foundation, and the Korean Embassy in Denmark. Following graduation, she hopes to return to Northern Europe for a PhD in history or cross-cultural studies.

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I went to Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, where I had a double major in Korean Language and Literature and English Language and Literature. After graduating with honors in 2016, I decided to apply to the Korean Government Scholarship Program to continue my studies in South Korea. My research interests include gender and women's studies, international law and organizations, human rights, and migration studies. After graduating from Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies this summer, I wish to join a global center that facilitates the integration of foreigners into South Korean society.

PAPERS

**TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE IMAGE OF THE STATE:
CHINA/US RELATIONS, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, AND THE
STATE AS UNITARY PURPOSEFUL ACTOR**

Richard Ian Wright

**STRATEGIC STABILITY VS. STRATEGIC PRIMACY: CHINA'S
NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOLLOWING THE 2018
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Ji Min Lee

TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE IMAGE OF THE STATE: CHINA/US RELATIONS, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, AND THE STATE AS UNITARY PURPOSEFUL ACTOR

Richard Ian Wright

National Chung Hsing University

The analytical assumption of the state as a rational unitary-actor has become one of the cornerstones of International Relations theory. However, this assumption is not without significant drawbacks, one being the exclusion of a variety of ideational and domestic factors which likely have significant impact on international state behavior. With this in mind, the current work undertakes an exploration of the possibilities for an alternative to the unitary-actor model. Following a preliminary examination of the various strengths and weaknesses of the mainstream neo-realist and neo-liberal theoretical frameworks, an attempt is made to go beyond the dichotomy between security-oriented systemic constraints and the economic neo-liberal development model, through bringing in alternative causal factors. These factors include cultural institutions such as “cosmopolitan” vs “communitarian” group identities, as well as “democratic” vs “authoritarian” forms of government. Ultimately, the conclusion drawn is that there is conceptual space in IR for an alternative theory of the state; one perhaps most useful as an augmentation—rather than as a replacement— of the rational unitary-actor model. This alternative image would need to include the pluralistic and fallible aspects of an individually-mediated nation/state as a political, economic, and socio-cultural entity. The approach taken here is to focus on the economic sphere through an examination of various “free-market” vs “interventionist” institutional variables. China/US economic policies are used throughout as a case study providing a framework for the analysis.

Keywords: *free-market, rational-actor, economic interventionism, state theory, methodological individualism*

Introduction: The “State” of an IR Theory of the State

Mainstream IR theory has largely coalesced around an image of the state as a rational unitary-actor within the international system. Within this perspective, the

state at the international level is personified, as though it were comparable to a “self-interested” individual. However, turning to specific IR scholars, many express ambiguous understandings in terms of the ontological status of the state. For example, in *Theory of International Politics*, Kenneth Waltz “freely admits” that states “are in fact not unitary purposive actors.”¹ In “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” Robert Gilpin comments: “Of course...the state does not really exist,” and warns of the need to avoid “the fallacy of reification.”² Richard Little, in *The Logic of Anarchy*, makes the point that the state as a unitary-actor model is, “simply a form of shorthand,” referring to, “the human agents who represent the state.”³ And Marjo Koivisto discusses, “the widespread (if often implicit) analytical assumption that while the state is a ‘useful’ conceptual abstraction for the analysis of world political analysis, it is not ‘real.’”⁴ Alternatively, Richard Ashley argues that while many IR theorists make efforts to qualify the state as unitary-actor assumption in *principle*; in *practice*, these qualifications tend to be ignored, and consequently, as concerns domestic politics, the state becomes a theoretical black-box subject to various enablements and constraints imposed by top-down systemic forces.⁵ As such, according to Ashley, these qualifications are essentially meaningless.⁶

Ashley and others have pointed out some serious drawbacks that come with the state as unitary-actor abstraction. However, some degree of conceptual abstraction is an indispensable aspect of all theoretical constructs. In order for a theory to focus on particular variables, certain factors must be made *exogenous* and others *endogenous*. Neorealism, for example, has opted to focus on systemic causal forces, making other potential causal factors—e.g. ideas and domestic politics—exogenous to the theory. By contrast, neoliberal institutionalism allows room for economic institutions but remains largely rooted in the assumption that these exist predominantly at the systemic—rather than domestic or individual—level.⁷ Going further than neoliberalism, constructivism brings in more socio-cultural ideational factors, but again—similar to neoliberalism—examines these factors predominantly within a system/unitary-actor framework.⁸ Significantly, all three positions, in order to facilitate making systemic causes fundamental, adhere to the rational unitary-actor

1 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 119.

2 Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 318.

3 Barry Buzan et al, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism and Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 112.

4 Marjo Koivisto, “State Theory in International Relations: Why Realism Matters,” in *Scientific Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 69.

5 Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

6 Ibid.

7 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Longman, New York, 2001).

8 Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

image of the state. This assumption of the state as a rational unitary-actor becomes necessary because once the state is “opened-up,” parsimony is sacrificed to the more complex reality of domestic and individual level ideas and practices. However, while disciplines should not strive for an overly complex theory which tries to mirror reality, IR practitioners should also be wary of theories which are too parsimonious, thereby running the risk of making exogenous what are in fact significant—if not indispensable—explanatory factors.

The unavoidable limitations of any theory are part of the logic behind Robert Cox’s oft-quoted assertion: “theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose.”⁹ In other words, theories are never *value-free*, to the extent that they cannot escape having a particular perspective even in trying to deny one.¹⁰ If this is correct, then there can never be one definitive IR theory which comprehensively explains all international behavior—all theories being (to varying degrees) partisan, partial, and inescapably fallible. As a consequence, there are undoubtedly many possible images of the state; some likely preferable to the unitary-actor model; especially if one’s goal is to develop insights different from those uncovered through the positivistic, materially-oriented theoretical perspectives—or what John Ruggie refers to as the “neo-utilitarian” approaches.¹¹

To investigate the impact of factors outside the neo-utilitarian approach, as a means to assess the need for an alternative model of the state, the current work examines the impact of certain ideational institutions on state behavior. The term institution is a complex one. In IR theory there are at least two senses in which the concept comes into play. There are the systemic institutions of neoliberal institutionalism. These types of institutions have ideational aspects but come into being predominantly through international organizations.¹² In the second sense, the English school understands institutions as essentially comprised of ideational rules and norms which impact state behavior. From this perspective, institutions are social constructs; however, for the English school these constructs are restricted to the systemic level, directing state behavior within what Bull calls “international society.”¹³ The sense in which institutions are intended here is more akin to the social constructs of the English school, rather than the international organizations of neoliberal institutionalism—although most relevant institutions have aspects which exist through organizations. However, against the English school, an argument can be made that the shared ideational institutions relevant for IR can be considered *multi-scaler*, in that they exist at both the domestic and international levels—although

9 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2, (Jun. 1981): 129.

10 Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

11 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” *International Organization*, Vol. 52, (Autumn, 1998): 855-885.

12 Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*.

13 Bull, *The Anarchical Society*.

usually the international level instantiation is not as extensive as the domestic one. A good example of this involves political institutions: democratic political systems of governance, perhaps to a greater degree than authoritarian systems, are based upon a slew of ideational institutions which undergird democratic practices. Some examples include beliefs in the value of universal suffrage, representative government, freedom of speech, equality under the law, etc. Although these institutions have *thicker* instantiations at the domestic level, there are international aspects of democratic values which exist at the systemic level, though in *thinner* form—for example, the idea that all nations should have the right to vote in the UN general assembly, or the belief that certain human rights are universal.

Two important sets of multi-scaler ideational institutions, widely proposed as having an impact on the international behavior of states, are the various *free-market* and *interventionist* sets of ideas involved in the political debate over the economic policies and practices various states should pursue. On one side, free-market neoliberals advocate minimal (if any) government interference—whether at the domestic or international level—while on the other side, a diversity of ideational institutions have developed around a variety of interventionist economic policies.

There are several types of interventionism which derive from a variety of motivations, but at least three types are relevant for IR. The first type is *protectionism*, involving a *security-oriented* form advocated by neorealism. However, there are other institutional motivations behind protectionist policies, having to do with non-rational factors such as fervent nationalism, dogmatic religiosity, and economic and political ideologies. The second type of interventionism is related to *distributive justice*—basically involving the idea that some form of wealth distribution is both feasible and just. Finally, the third type of interventionism tries to alleviate the *tragedy of the commons*; which is essentially the way common resources are often ravaged by unregulated free-market policies. For example, interventionist measures are at times advocated to try and galvanize the protection of shared ecosystems. While all three forms of interventionism are important, due to considerations of space only the various *protectionist* forms of interventionism will be investigated here.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet communism, the Western version of free-market liberal democracy seemed on the verge of becoming the sole political/economic model globally, and as such Francis Fukuyama famously declared “The End of History.”¹⁴ However, as of yet historical issues seem far from settled, with one subsequent occurrence being the development of a form of authoritarian state-capitalism within some former communist countries. Today, Russia and China—both widely considered to be politically authoritarian states—have economic systems in which state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a large role

in the economy (as of 2017, about 30 to 40 percent of GDP by some estimates).¹⁵ At the same time, in the West, proposals to curtail the development of free-trade agreements—increasingly by populist political actors—appear to represent a renewal of more traditional protectionist (or mercantilist) ideas and beliefs. Furthermore, while states with emerging economies seem committed to increased economic integration, state-capitalism can also be understood as a form of protectionism wherein political proponents hope to shield their domestic economies from what they presumably fear will be the negative effects of opening fully to a globalized free-market system.

Mainstream IR theory has basically two theoretical responses to the various *free-market* and *interventionist* institutions, the most prominent being the neo-realist approach, and the second most influential deriving from neo-liberalism. The neo-realist approach focuses on the structural distribution of material capabilities among state, and on the threat this distribution poses to the security interests of various powerful states. Alternatively, the neo-liberal approach brings-in economic integration—and corresponding institutional regimes—at the systemic level.¹⁶ Neoliberals argue that these institutions foster interstate cooperation, consequently mitigating the purely security-oriented pressures considered within neorealism.¹⁷

Neorealism was a great fit for the bipolar international structure, which largely characterized the Cold War era. However, it is widely accepted that the end of the Cold War created doubts about the efficacy of the theory to contend not only with the causes of the end of the Cold War but also explanations for the fundamental causal factors set to shape the emerging era. Initially, it seemed obvious that this era would be largely American dominated, with a globalist-oriented free-market form of economic development at the forefront. But the last three decades have witnessed the significant rise of China towards peer competitor status, challenging American dominance (globally, in economic terms, and increasingly, regionally, in terms of military power). Initially, the mainstream neoliberal belief was that as China opened-up economically, liberalizing political reforms would ensue which would then foster further free-market economic reforms. However, while some degree of economic liberalization has been enacted, this has not seen any corresponding development of broader reforms, with the CCP maintaining significant government control over not only domestic markets, but the internal political and social situation in general.

Due to these varying circumstances, several questions arise: Is the neo-

15 State Department: Office of Investment and Affairs, “China-7-State Owned Enterprises,” July 25, 2017, https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-State-Owned-Enterprises&fbclid=IwAR3_2ucSSakV8Z3TT2HQpEzAuCmgQ80yN7y9QLQmaiV-NeytHN7uLP9Zy0g; Bofit Viikkokatsaus, “State Enterprises and the State May Generate Around 40 Percent of Russian GDP,” Nov. 17, 2017, https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/weekly/2017/vw201746_3/?fbclid=IwAR1i7h5X-HwU34QlqnMvcFCXYvv_znnHvzbSoDPGiCaj0DzZMKBfMG-axKMs

16 Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 32, (Dec. 4, 1988): 381, 386.

17 Ibid.

utilitarian perspective, with its structure/unitary-actor framework, sufficient for explaining and understanding international relations as they relate to the economic policies and practices of China and the US? Alternatively, does IR need a theory that takes greater account of relevant multi-scaler ideational institutions in order to explain the contemporary international practices of powerful states? Ultimately, would this require a different theoretical model of the state, and if so, what would this alternative model look like?

An Alternative Model of the State

In *The Anarchical Society*, Hedley Bull writes, "World order is more fundamental than international order because the ultimate units of the great society of mankind are not states (or nations, tribes, empires, classes or parties) but individual human beings..."¹⁸ From this position, the significance of the individual is not restricted to the domestic level, but rather, permeates the international level through what Bull designates as "world order." In this sense, there are at least two ways to view the international system: one mediated by states as unitary-actors within the international order and the other mediated by individual agents throughout the world order. Of course, these are just different versions of the analytical lenses described by Steve Smith, through which the analyst can alternately view the same reality.¹⁹ Perhaps through the lens of world order, instead of restricting mainstream IR analysis to an image of the state as a kind of "personified" unitary-actor, analysis of the shared ideas—or institutions—and coordinated actions—or practices—of the individuals who comprise the state can prove advantageous to the field.

In viewing the "world order" as more fundamental, Bull indicates the important role individual agency plays in constructing bottom-up collective action, which in turn mitigates the impact of top-down structural forces. If this is true, then a case can be made that any alternative image of the state should involve some form of *methodological individualism*. In *Economy and Society*, Max Weber also advocates for the primacy of the individual as the basic constitutive unit of social reality. Accordingly, Weber understands larger social units (e.g. corporations, political parties, religious organizations, the sovereign state, etc.) as abstractions of aggregated individuals, rather than entities with independent ontological status.²⁰ However, in contrast to the atomistic individualism utilized predominantly within microeconomics—where individuals are viewed as autonomous rational actors—Weber's individualist methodology makes use of collectivities of individuals through

18 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), 21.

19 Steve Smith, "Epistemology, Postmodernism and International Relations Theory: A Reply to Østerud," *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 3 (Aug. 1997): 330-336.

20 Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

his concepts of the *ideal-type* and *averages of groups*.²¹ Weber's "collectivistic" methodological individualism suggests an irreducible individual agency which permeates the various ideational institutions that structure society. It is these individually-mediated institutions (values, norms, ideologies, etc.), and the practices they inspire that largely mitigate what would otherwise be a more deterministic and materialist understanding of both social structure and historical process.

In sections one and two below, the mainstream neorealist and neoliberal explanations for the economic policy choices of states are explored. This exploration is undertaken to evaluate the impact of limitations which arise from each positions making *exogenous* various analytical factors. China/US economic relations and policies are used to assist in this evaluation. If the neorealist and neoliberal perspectives do not adequately explain the international economic policies and behavior of powerful states, then perhaps IR analysis needs to go beyond the neo-utilitarian reliance on the rational unitary-actor assumption. An attempt is made in the final section to construct a preliminary outline of what an alternative state model might look like. Essentially, rather than a *rational-unitary* state, an alternative *pluralistic-fallible* model is suggested. In terms of the *pluralistic* character of the state, various *national components* are proposed including a political, economic, and socio-cultural elite, and various instantiations of the populace. As well, rather than rational actors, that make objective decisions based on material and security interests, the individuals who comprise the national components are understood as *fallible* actors who make decisions based upon all manner of non-rational beliefs, desires, norms, and traditions.

Guided by Weber's collective form of methodological individualism, the social actions of the individual agents who comprise the various national components suggested above, give rise to and develop various ideational institutions—understood as Weberian ideal-types. Several groups of institutions are suggested which seem likely to impact international behavior. First and foremost, for the analysis at hand, are the economic-oriented *free-market* and *interventionist* institutional beliefs which provide the focus of the current investigation. However, neither of these economic institutions can be studied in isolation from various other inter-related political and socio-cultural sets of ideas. These include *cosmopolitan vs communitarian* socio-cultural institutions, and *democratic vs. authoritarian* political institutions. Again, China-US economic relations and policies are used as a case study to evaluate the potential of the various aspects of this alternative model. Hopefully, an alternative *pluralistic-fallible* model of the state can assist in evaluating the impact of individually-mediated institutional factors on state behavior, not only in terms of US/China relations and economic policies but as concerns relations across the international and world orders more generally.

21 *Ibid.*

1) Neorealist “Security-Oriented” Protectionism

In IR, security-oriented protectionism is represented by a Hobbesian-inspired neorealist perspective. Advocates of this position generally view the global economy as a zero-sum competitive arena, where states face a security-dilemma if they allow competitor states to make significant material gains relative to their own. The neorealist framework largely consists of analysis of the structural distribution of power (or material capabilities, in Waltz’s terms) across an anarchically-ordered system, and the assumed fundamental desire of states to maximize either their security (defensive realism)²² or power (offensive realism).²³ Basically, the proliferation of free-market institutions will remain largely unproblematic until a rising power proves to be making relative economic gains over an established power.²⁴ Once these gains become evident, the established power will likely place curbs on economic integration, essentially because, for neo-realists, security concerns supersede economic considerations.²⁵

From within this framework, the US-China relationship provides a fitting example of what Graham Allison calls the *Thucydides’s Trap*, where a rising power comes into conflict with an established power, and both must contend with unavoidably destabilizing structural forces.²⁶ Also within this framework, an image of the state as a rational unitary-actor is considered analytically sufficient.

In terms of China/US relations, neo-realism predicts that as China’s relative power increases, the US will adopt more nationalistic and protectionist economic policies. Basically, political actors in the US will come under increasing pressure to enact policies which conform to state security needs. Consequently, as China strengthens economically and militarily, at some point cooperation should begin to fracture, as Washington implements interventionist policies intended to impede a competitor’s rise. According to the logic of the theory, if it is deemed necessary to restrict China’s relative economic growth, security-oriented political actors will even advocate for policies that impede their own nations’ economic development.

Problems With Security-Oriented Explanations

While the neorealist system/unitary-actor framework admittedly has significant analytical value; does it adequately explain the motivations behind the various economic policies and practices pursued by the US and China? In Allison’s analysis

22 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

23 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001)

24 Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” *International Organization*, Vol. 42 (1988): 485-507.

25 Ibid, 485-507.

26 Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

of Thucydides trap, war occurred in twelve out of the sixteen cases studied. Presumably then, even explanations focused on systemic forces and material power must accept that there are factors which mitigate the probability of war. These mitigating factors likely involve certain non-systemic conditions; in particular, domestic politics as well as individually-mediated—but widely-shared—ideational institutions. The focus here is on the impact these types of factors might have on the choices of powerful states to pursue free-market vs interventionist policies. In this section on neorealism, the question is one of whether or not security-oriented explanations for protectionist economic policies prove adequately comprehensive. One of the main critiques of neorealism concerns the inability of the theory to account for why states have significantly expanded economic interaction following the end of the Cold War, both within Europe and across the globe. However, while this is an important area of inquiry, this is not the focus of analysis here. Rather, the purpose of this investigation is to try and understand why protectionism has seen a resurgence in the early part of the 21st century, to the extent that it appears to be impeding the further development of free-trade policies.

One problem with the neorealist explanation for the protectionist resurgence is that, while security-oriented explanations for interventionism offer a motivation for the economic protectionism of an *established power*, they do not offer any obvious explanation for why a *rising power* would choose interventionist policies. According to most mainstream economic theories, free-market policies provide the maximum potential for economic growth; and in general, the structural realist model does not challenge this assertion. As such, a rising power enjoying relative economic gains compared to its rival should fully support the greatest possible extension of free-market/free-trade conditions. However, China has maintained control of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as restricted foreign access to its domestic markets on a variety of fronts. This is partly why many analysts have labeled China's economic system as "authoritarian capitalist."²⁷ The ideational factors which have likely led to this state of affairs have to do with attitudes of political actors towards the neoliberal free-market ideology, and thus will be examined in the following section. It is sufficient to point out here that security-oriented protectionism is only a part—if admittedly an important part—of the bigger picture.

Another problem is that security-oriented protectionism is also subject to the critique that it potentially creates security threats where none exist, thereby creating unnecessary impediments to economic growth. This idea of the creation of security-threats reflects Ole Wæver's concept of "securitization," where forces within the state ruling apparatus manufacture external security-threats through the manipulation of the discourse around security; sometimes for the purpose of

27 Ang Yuen Yuen, "Autocracy with Chinese Characteristics Beijing's Behind-the-Scenes Reforms," *Foreign Affairs*, (April 16, 2018).

solidifying political authority, rather than actually furthering state security.²⁸ This is a potential explanation for tensions between the US and China, where each side paints the other as a potentially dangerous enemy for their domestic audiences, rather than because they represent imperative existential threats. Certainly, just by being powerful states, both countries present security dilemma type threats to one another. As China grows economically and militarily, the US does have legitimate security concerns, and in turn, China has legitimate concerns that the US will try to stop or limit that growth. Nevertheless, both the CCP's struggle to maintain authority, as well as the rise of populist nationalism in the US—and indeed more broadly across the Western world—mean that both governments tend to use the threat posed by each towards the other as a tool to garner support from their respective populaces. In the US, this is pursued through attempts to increase protectionist measures against China. In China, this condition may in part explain why the CCP government is hesitant to allow a more extensive opening of the economy to the global market.

Given the above conditions, it seems apparent that both US and PRC forms of economic protectionism cannot be adequately explained within the neo-realist security-oriented framework. As such, an argument can be made that the unitary-actor state model proves problematic through making exogenous domestic and ideational factors which might better explain the economic protectionist policies of both states. Ultimately, while the neo-realist perspective remains largely indispensable for the discipline, it may be that its exclusive adherence to explanations involving systemic factors and unitary-actor states is too parsimonious in that it excludes too many significant factors. Unlike neorealism, however, the neoliberal institutional perspective does allow for the inclusion of economic institutions in order to try and explain increased cooperation between states. An examination of the neoliberal argument is the focus of the next section.

2) The Neo-Liberal “Free-Market” Argument

Starting in the late 20th century, international economic relations increasingly developed to favor the interests of a globally-oriented economic elite. This process reflected a Kantian-inspired ideology which claims that free-market policies simultaneously secure the cosmopolitan interests of both the economic elite and the global populace more generally. Essentially, unregulated markets supposedly allow various nations to utilize their comparative advantages (in the case of poor countries, cheap labor, and natural resources) to create the most efficient global economy possible; thereby leading to the highest achievable standards of living

28 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, *A New Framework for Analysis* (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998).

for the greatest number of people.²⁹ If this is indeed the case then, regardless of how well-intentioned, any attempts at intervention—whether through regulations, wealth-redistribution, or other means—will only impede market efficiency leading to increased levels of inflation, poverty, and unemployment.³⁰

In opposition to security-oriented forms of interventionism, free-market advocates suggest that the material benefits of economic cooperation outweigh the security risks;³¹ and consequently, the community of states would be wiser to ignore protectionist impulses in favor of implementing expansive free-trade policies. Furthermore, the most optimistic of the free-market/free-trade advocates argue that an internationally integrated economy will ultimately promote not only prosperity throughout the world order, but peace across the international order as well.³²

Advocacy for unregulated free-markets is often attributed to neoliberalism. However, the term “neoliberal” has various meanings, at least one denoting an *economic* neoliberalism, and another an IR version. The strictly economic version of neoliberalism advocates for a globalized free-market and has been promoted—at least since the end of the Cold War, by the establishment of both major US political parties. However, concerning the unmitigated benefits of this global system, IR neoliberals tend to be somewhat less sanguine than their economist cousins. This is largely due to IR neoliberals generally accepting, along with neorealists, certain structure-oriented features of the international system. These include the state as rational unitary-actor assumption as well as the basic anarchic condition of the overall system. This tends to make IR neoliberals more attuned to the potential for unintended conflict within the international system than it is generally the case with the economic version. Nevertheless, IR neoliberals are inclined to be more optimistic than neorealists about the possibility of states forming peaceful relations through economic ties, especially through fostering institutional regimes.³³

Problems With Neo-Liberal Free-Market Ideology

Against the predictions of the advocates for increased economic globalization; dissatisfaction with globalization—which arguably began in earnest with the APEC protests of 1997—have only continued to grow.³⁴ Today, predominantly in the West, there is significant opposition to the globalization process on both the political left

29 Ludwig Von Mises, *The Theory of Money and Credit* (USA, Pacific Publishing Studio, 2010).

30 Milton Friedman, *Price Theory* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2008).

31 Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).

32 Erich Weede, *Balance of Power, Globalization and the Capitalist Peace* (Potsdam: Liberal Verlag, 2005).

33 Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

34 Maryse Zeidler, “‘We were at this tipping point’: APEC protests at UBC continue to shape politics 20 years later,” Nov. 25, 2017, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/we-were-at-this-tipping-point-apec-protests-at-ubc-continue-to-shape-politics-20-years-later-1.4417358>

and right. However, if neoliberals are correct about the benefits of a global economy, and if states are indeed rational actors, then there should be little impediment to increased economic interconnection. As noted in the last section, security-oriented explanations argue that states fail to develop significant economic cooperation because of security concerns surrounding relative gains, not because of doubts about the potential material benefits of economic integration. But just as security-oriented explanations were not adequate to explain the interventionist policies of a rising power, the neoliberal framework does not offer a satisfactory explanation for why states would reject free-market ideational institutions. There are at least two possible reasons for such rejection. One is that states are *fallible*, as opposed to *rational*, actors; and as such, for a variety of reasons and often against their best interests, fail to pursue economic integration. The other possibility is that states are actually correct in their assessment of economic globalization, essentially coming to the conclusion that it has negative consequences which require them to place limitations on its development. This is different from the neorealist argument that, for security reasons, states sacrifice the economic gains they could otherwise make from increasing free-market policies. Rather, the argument is that states believe that free-market policies in and of themselves have negative economic consequences.

Concerning these negative consequences, the French economist Thomas Piketty has argued that the prosperity developed through globalization has overwhelmingly benefited a small percentage of a global economic elite, with broader income distribution being far less than anticipated.³⁵ Likewise, critics of economic globalization argue that workers in developed countries face high levels of unemployment, as manufacturing jobs have supposedly been outsourced to developing nations, and not replaced by new technology-driven or service industry forms of employment.³⁶ Regardless of causal accuracy, the belief that economic globalization unfairly benefits a global economic elite, and that manufacturing jobs have predominantly been lost to outsourcing rather than automation, has gained political traction in many Western states, cultivating resistance to globalization on both the political left and right.

Ultimately, however, the question of whether states reject free-market policies because they are fallible actors or because free-market policies are fundamentally flawed cannot be definitively answered here. Suffice to say there is likely a certain amount of truth in both assertions. The main point is that, in the current era, there is significant impetus within powerful states to reject the neoliberal globalization project, and the reasons for this rejection is not adequately explained by either the neoliberal or neorealist perspectives. If it turns out that populist resistance to free-market ideology has significant consequences for international relations, then the

35 Thomas Piketty, *Capitalism in the Twenty-First Century* (USA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014).

36 Scott Tong, "What went wrong with globalization," Aug. 07, 2017, <https://www.marketplace.org/2017/08/07/world/trade-stories-globalization-and-backlash/what-went-wrong-with-globalization>

entire neo-utilitarian paradigm falls short of providing adequate explanations for economic interventionism; as such, the theoretical framework constructed around the rational unitary-actor model needs to be subjected to sharper scrutiny, with an eye towards a significant restructuring of IR theory.

The US and Economic Neoliberalism

The “Washington consensus” is the term identified with the economic neoliberal perspective, which generally refers to a group of US-backed policy prescriptions for developing economies. This policy program advocates that all nations (developing or developed) should deregulate any state-owned economic operations and open their economies to unrestrained free-trade and foreign investment.³⁷ In order to bring about conformity, pressure was/is exerted on poor states largely through the denial of loans and funding from American-dominated global development organizations, in particular the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.³⁸

However, if it turns out that the Washington consensus hinders rather than assists economic growth and integration, this would seem to indicate that the assertions of free-market advocates—claiming that merely opening to unrestrained global markets is the best policy choice for all states—is called into question. Indeed the Washington consensus has faced considerable criticism. According to Joseph Stiglitz, the consensus’s set of “one size fits all” policies promotes the interests of a global economic elite without taking account of the varying needs of specific developing nations.³⁹ Furthermore, states have often been pressured to make “shock therapy” reforms they were not ready to absorb, and ultimately this has contributed to economic and political crises.⁴⁰ Echoing many of Stiglitz’s critiques, Ha-Joon Chang has argued that the implementation of protectionist policies by weaker developing nations can help their economies strengthen by fostering more mature industries capable of competing internationally—a practice sometimes called “infant industry protection.”⁴¹ Chang also points out that core states benefit from “kicking away” the same protectionist ladder they used to develop their own economies at earlier historical times, thereby denying to poor states a means of escape from the resource-based economies that tend to be representative of states

37 John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in *Latin American Readjustment: How Much has Happened*, ed. John Williamson (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1989).

38 Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents* (United States: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002).

39 Joseph Stiglitz, *Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy* (USA: W. W. Norton and Company, 2010).

40 Ibid.

41 Ha-Joon Chang, “Kicking Away the Ladder: The Real History of Free Trade,” *Foreign Policy in Focus* (December 2003).

on the periphery.⁴²

If the free-market is the most efficient way to grow the economy, both globally and domestically, then why have so many developing states failed to develop under the Washington consensus? In terms of its promotion of external economic policies, perhaps the US advocacy of the Washington consensus is in part due to a fallible decision-making process within the American-devised international organizations set up to promote global economic development. Maybe these organizations simply misunderstand the correct means towards furthering the prosperity of poor countries. Or alternatively, perhaps the Washington consensus is purposely designed to keep the core nations at the core, and the peripheral nations on the periphery. If the latter scenario is true, then development policies are intentionally designed to be ineffective. The neo-utilitarian paradigm's exclusive use of the rational unitary-actor state model and reliance on systemic level explanations, does not encourage the exploration of any deeper explanations for why the Washington consensus has remained for so long at the forefront of the US-advocated developmental policy for peripheral states, especially considering the evidence that it impedes optimal results.

Concerning the internal economic policies of the US, there seems to be an emerging shift away from the promotion of unrestricted free-trade, and towards increasingly protectionist policies. This trend appears to be part of a broader movement towards increasing populist nationalism across the developed Western world. Again, this could be due to the fallible nature of the state political apparatus and protectionist interests based upon populist nationalism might represent a mistaken evaluation of where American national interests more accurately lie. Potentially, this could be part of a cynical move by populist leaders to garner political support from a fervently nationalistic, but ultimately misinformed, segment of the populace. Alternatively, however, it could also be that elements of the political establishment truly believe protectionism can create more jobs for Americans, thereby strengthening the US economy and garnering political support from working- and middle-class people. In any event, a return to a more *mercantilist* kind of protectionism would indicate doubts concerning the veracity of the neo-liberal economic ideology. The fundamental point, however, is that the neo-utilitarian paradigm only provides a partial explanation for this populist shift towards protectionist interventionism.

China and Economic Neoliberalism

The neorealist security-oriented perspective offers an explanation as to why an established power would pursue protectionist measures; however, if an unregulated free-market is indeed the most efficient way for a state to achieve economic prosperity—as the neoliberal world view suggests—then why would a rising power behave in a protectionist manner? Indeed, rather than exhibiting any unquestionable

acceptance of the neoliberal free-market ideology, Beijing seems to have significant misgivings, in terms of both its externally and internally directed economic policies.

Unlike the Washington consensus, Beijing's overall external economic policies are intentionally designed to *explicitly* reassure authoritarian regimes that they will not be censured on issues such as domestic human rights abuses. Through a set of policies some have labeled the "Beijing consensus," the Chinese government claims not to be concerned with the internal politics of the countries it provides assistance to.⁴³ This position is defended as being a form of respect for the sovereignty of developing nations, as opposed to being, as some critics argue, a lack of concern for "universal" human rights.

The Beijing consensus largely involves significant loans of capital and expertise for the development of much-needed infrastructure projects, predominantly in South East Asia, Africa, and South America. In South America, for example, as of 2017, China was providing more monetary aid than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined.⁴⁴ The Beijing consensus is generally considered part of the CCP's widely discussed "Belt and Road" initiative. Concerning these developmental projects, the increasing debt that Chinese foreign investment creates, along with a tendency of Belt and Road projects towards the extensive use of Chinese equipment and labor, has led some governments to question not only the long-term benefits of Chinese investment but also the goals.⁴⁵ Some argue that the ultimate goal for the CCP is to increase China's regional and global power; and that, while the Beijing developmental model claims to respect the sovereignty of client states, its real-world impact may be to undermine their autonomy, placing them more firmly under Chinese control.⁴⁶

In large part both the Beijing consensus and the Belt and Road initiative can be explained within a neo-utilitarian perspective: i.e. an attempt by Beijing to increase China's global power (neorealism), while also encouraging increasing global economic cooperation (neoliberalism). However, the fact that Beijing is unconcerned with human rights abuses clearly has an impact on international relations, and is one factor the explanation of which needs to consider domestic conditions—especially the authoritarian character of China's political system. Furthermore, there seems to be a sense in which the Belt and Road initiative is more about nationalistic prestige than actual rational material gains in power or wealth. If this is the case, then again the neo-utilitarian framework needs to be reevaluated, and perhaps augmented, utilizing a perspective which considers internal socio-cultural factors, such as the possibility that China has—for whatever historical reasons—a propensity towards

43 Stephan Halper, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Perseus Books, 2010).

44 Jonathan Eckart, "8 things you need to know about China's economy," June 23, 2016, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/8-facts-about-chinas-economy/>

45 Halper, *The Beijing Consensus*.

46 Ibid.

an irrational degree of nationalistic fervor.⁴⁷ Additionally, perhaps an exploration of the degree to which the Belt and Road initiative is a non-rational policy, implemented by a fallible government decision-making process, can also help explain some of its shortcomings.⁴⁸

In terms of internal economic policy, although the neoliberal economic perspective argues that interventionism should work against China's economic interests—slowing optimal growth—China's political leaders seem committed to intervention, especially as concerns certain core industries.

There are a variety of reasons why this might be the case. It may represent attempts to control the economy for neorealist security-oriented concerns; or it could be that the CCP leadership believes state-owned enterprises help secure the continued dominance of the ruling party.⁴⁹ Although from a purely economic standpoint (in the neoliberal sense), SOEs do not appear to be a rational economic strategy, perhaps they allow the Chinese government some measure of control over the pace and direction of development as well as provide a means to offer certain powerful groups and individuals—whose interests are tied up in the prolonged existence of SOEs—incentives to support the continuation of the one-party system. Political elite leaders likely fear that if they relinquish too much economic control, the Party will face greater challenges to its political dominance. However, while such fears may be realistic, any major economic slowdown will also likely threaten continued CCP rule. Consequently, Party leaders walk a tightrope between their desire to maintain political authority, and the need to open up to the free market in order to ensure continued economic success. Viewing the Chinese political elite from this perspective is important because it allows consideration of the degree to which policy decisions are less about pursuing rational state interests and more about the party securing its position of authority.

While many experts argue that Beijing's interventionist policies are unsustainable over the long-term, eventually causing an inevitable economic stagnation,⁵⁰ as yet the CCP seems to have staved off the more dire of these predictions. The possibility remains, however, that such predictions have been averted because adoption of unrestrained free-market policies is not absolutely advantageous, and perhaps aspects of Beijing's interventionism actually help rather than hinder optimal economic growth. If this is the case, then somewhat ironically, in behaving in a manner considered irrational by the neo-utilitarian perspective, Beijing is actually behaving like a self-interested rational actor.

While China's *external* economic policies appear to largely conform to the expectations of the neo-utilitarian paradigm, i.e. designed to maximize power and

47 Martin Hart-Landsberg, A Critical Look at China's One Belt, One Road Initiative, Oct. 5, 2018, <https://mronline.org/2018/10/05/a-critical-look-at-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/>

48 Ibid.

49 Minxin Pei, *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*, (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 2006).

50 Ibid.

material gain, they also partly appear driven by a non-rational nationalism. When we examine China's *internal* economic policies there appears to be significant resistance to any unmitigated acceptance of the neo-liberal free-market ideology, which is not compatible with the security-oriented neorealist predictions of how a rising power should behave. Furthermore, as previously indicated with the US, moves towards a populist nationalist rejection of unmitigated free-market policies are also not explainable by the mainstream IR theories. Importantly then, there are strong indications that domestic factors, such as the desire of a political establishment to gain and maintain control of the states governing apparatus, have significant effects on state policy decisions independent from either top-down structural constraints or rational security and economic interests. If this is indeed the case, the development of a theory of the state which at minimum brings in domestic variables is warranted. Essentially, the analysis of US/China economic relations and policies seems to indicate that the form of government (democratic or authoritarian), the socio-cultural attitudes of the populace towards nationalistic prestige, and the fallible nature of the policymaking process, are all factors which have consequences for international relations and consequently need to be reflected in a more complex theory of the state.

3) Towards an Alternative Image of the State?

The above analysis indicates significant analytical gaps in both the neorealist and neoliberal explanations for the economic policy decisions of China and the US. Neither theory provides a comprehensive explanation for why a rising power, like China, would adopt internal protectionist policies nor adequately explains the motivational agency behind populist moves towards protectionism in the US. Neo-utilitarian approaches also offer no means through which one can explain the differences between the Washington and Beijing consensuses. If states generally behave like rational unitary-actors, then why do the US and China pursue fundamentally different policies in terms of their internal approach to the global free-market and their external economic involvement with developing countries? Perhaps these gaps are indicative of the need for a theory which considers non-systemic causal forces in a more systematic fashion rather than the *ad hoc* or speculative forms of analysis applied within the neo-utilitarian approach. To achieve this would likely require an alternative to the rational unitary-actor model of the state. In terms of economic institutions, this model would need to consider more than just a choice between, on the one hand, protectionism oriented towards state security; and on the other, neoliberal economic develop intended to foster unregulated, though maximum, economic growth.

Moving beyond the duality of either security-oriented interventionism or free-market neoliberalism and in the direction of a more complex theoretical framework—one which explores the role of “ideational institutions” in the formation of state behavior—provides the logic behind an argument for an alternative model of the state. Ideational institutions consist of broadly shared ideas which guide the collective practices of individuals at all levels of analysis. As noted previously,

these ideas are more akin to the English school understanding of the various norms which guide behavior in an *international society*, as opposed to the organizations which neoliberal institutionalists see grounding *regimes*. However, unlike the English school, the concept of ideational institutions utilized here understands these shared ideas as being constituted by individuals, rather than unitary-actor states, and existing at all levels of analysis. So, for example, as an instantiation of an ideational institution, *free-trade* represents all the arguments put forth to justify the implementation of free-trade policies, with the goal of developing a globalized free-trade system. Relevant multi-scaler (i.e. individual, domestic, international, and global level) institutions examined here include the economic institutions which are the focus of the current work—*free-market* vs. *interventionist* as well as the institutions which undergird forms of government in the political sphere—in particular *democratic* vs. *authoritarian* political systems and institutions in the socio-cultural sphere—especially involving shared ideas supporting *cosmopolitan* vs. *communitarian* beliefs and practices (nationalism being an important example).

An Image of the State as Pluralistic-Fallible Nation

If mainstream neo-utilitarian theories do not adequately account for the various institutional motivational factors behind the international policy choices of states, where should any theoretical augmentation or reform be implemented? Perhaps the most obvious and fruitful place to begin is attempting to modify the specific theory of the state adhered to within mainstream IR. Across the discipline, the rational unitary-actor model has become almost theoretical orthodoxy; a position arguably requiring significant reevaluation in the current era. The rational unitary-actor assumption makes at least two specific claims: 1) that states can be usefully understood as *unitary-actor* entities in the international system; 2) that states should be considered *rational actors*. These two aspects of the mainstream model serve to structure the argument for an alternative image of the state as a *pluralistic-fallible* nation.

Limitations of the Systemic/Unitary-Actor Framework?

While some IR theorists (notable Alexander Wendt,⁵¹ along with certain advocates of the scientific realist perspective)⁵² argue that the state is literally some kind of emergent unitary *superorganism*, for most analysts the state as unitary-actor assumption is a useful theoretical abstraction rather than ontological fact. The latter position holds that the unitary-actor model facilitates the analytical isolation

51 Alexander Wendt, "The State as Person in International Theory," *Review of International Studies*

30, no. 2 (April 2004): 289-316.

52 Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight, *Scientific Realism and International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

of top-down systemic forces on state behavior and that once these forces have been conceptually isolated from other factors, analysts can then layer alternative explanations back-in. Consequently, when one understands the systemic pressures on unitary-actor states, one can look at the actions of specific individual leaders for example, in light of those fundamental pressures. This position makes two assertions. First, that theorists should clearly maintain the unitary-actor assumption as a heuristic tool rather than a mirror of reality; and secondly, that top-down systemic constraints are the fundamental factors driving international state behavior, other factors being of lesser impact or of secondary importance.

The problem with the *first* assertion is that IR theorists continuously ignore (or in the case of Wendt and the scientific realists, totally deny) that the unitary-actor image is an analytical abstraction. This abrogates Robert Gilpin's warning against developing the "fallacy of reification" of the state,⁵³ which becomes especially problematic in terms of making predictions about state behavior and correspondingly advocating for specific foreign policies. As it is well known, for a variety of reasons the social sciences are notoriously difficult fields for practitioners to accurately predict events. In some cases, the neo-utilitarian paradigm, with its exclusive reliance on a systemic/unitary-actor framework, causes the predictions and prescriptions which emerge from the discipline to be even more prone to error than might otherwise be the case. With this in mind, perhaps an alternative model of the state, one which facilitates analysis of a variety of multi-level institutional causal factors, as well as a plurality of relevant actors—both within the state and across the international system—might allow for clearer insights into the likely causes and consequences of certain policy prescriptions and state actions.

The second assertion, that systemic constraints are the fundamental causes of state behavior, is also problematic; and has similar consequences for any predictions and policy prescriptions derived from the discipline. The problem is, in some ways, similar to critiques of the economic determinism found in certain versions of Marxism. More Weberian-type *interpretivist* perspectives have tried to understand the impact that ideas have on historical development, seeing ideas as autonomous factors guiding the practice of embodied individual agents, rather than as ephemeral consequences of fundamental material forces. In IR, top-down systemic factors (especially the structural distribution of material capabilities) undoubtedly have an important impact on state behaviors, but it is not at all clear in what sense they are more "fundamental" than the ideas guiding the ordered practices of individuals. Just as one should remain skeptical of the Marxist argument that the material base determines the ideational superstructure, in IR, one can also question the degree to which structural constraints across the international system supersede the ideational as explanatory factors behind state behavior. Ultimately, rather than superfluous, ideational factors may be "fundamental" in their own right.⁵⁴

53 Gilpin, "The Richness and Tradition of Political Realism," 318.

54 Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

Examples of ideational factors having an impact either independent from, or additional to, top-down structural forces abound. In terms of America's external approach to economic globalization, the Washington consensus is comprised of ideological beliefs in the infallibility of unrestrained free-market policies to bring about economic development in poor countries. These ideas have pushed corresponding policies forward even in the face of material evidence that the consensus is seriously flawed. Concerning internal US free-market policies, a recent shift in the public conversation, towards normalizing beliefs amongst certain politicians and segments of the populace regarding a populist nationalism, has pulled American policy in a protectionist direction. Turning to China's external economic approach, the Beijing consensus is imbued with ideas concerning the lack of importance of human rights abuses in sovereign countries, and the Belt and Road initiative has been argued to involve certain policies which are less about gaining material capabilities, and more about furthering nationalistic prestige—a need often fueled by the “century of humiliation” narrative.⁵⁵ The point is not that these ideational forces exist in isolation from systemic forces; rather, it is that they have a degree of independent causality which under certain circumstances might prove more causally primary than systemic forces. As such, their analysis needs be included in the disciplines theories in a more systematic fashion, and one preliminary move in this direction involves an exploration of a modified *pluralistic* model of the state.

Having indicated some significant impact of ideas on international relations, what would an alternative pluralistic model of the state look like? In *The Sources of Social Power*, Michael Mann describes several possible theories of the state which may be of use in this regards.⁵⁶ The first, *economic class theory*, is a rather reductionist vision of the state as merely the political arm of the capitalist class.⁵⁷ However, this perspective indicates that an economic elite should be considered an important component of any pluralistic model of the state. Mann then discusses *pluralist theories* of the state, which he critiques as reducing the state to just one actor among many. Alternatively, Mann understands the state's political apparatus as having some fundamental role in the formation of state policy and action. Mann's third theory of the state he calls *elitist/statist* theory. This perspective sees the state as containing a political class with autonomous “distributive power,” which is basically the ability to direct the “collective power” available to the state.⁵⁸

Mann's various theories provide some guidelines for the potential *national components* which would comprise any pluralistic state model. Clearly these components would need to include a *political elite* and *economic elite*, and an argument could be made for the inclusion of a *socio-cultural elite* (academics and

55 Andy S. Lee, “A Century of Humiliation: Understanding the Chinese Mindset,” Feb. 18. 2018, <https://www.mironline.ca/century-humiliation-understanding-chinese-mindset/>

56 Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: Volume 2, The Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

57 Ibid, 46.

58 Ibid, 48-49.

creators of popular culture for example), the members of which have a broad impact on the way ideas comprising ideational institutions are constructed and disseminated. In terms of the state, the political elite would be distinct from economic and socio-cultural elites in that it would be more than merely the political arm of the capitalist class or just one actor among many other equals. The political elite is distinct in its control of the distributive power of the state, and consequently, all other actors must pursue their interests through the political elite if they hope to impact upon state policy and behavior. Besides elites, other components of a pluralistic state model would involve various instantiations of the populace. Perhaps as political constituents, economic consumers, and the embodied individuals through which the social relations and cultural institutions which comprise the state are constructed and maintained.

Rational Actor vs. Fallible Agent and the Role of Ideational Institutions

Mann describes a fourth state theory, *institutional statism*, which views the state as comprised of certain institutions which constrain all actors, including the political class.⁵⁹ Mann writes: “States are essentially ways in which dynamic social relations become authoritatively institutionalized.”⁶⁰ This theory leans towards a kind of *functionalist* social-order inducing perspective on the state. Perhaps to counter this functionalist tendency, Mann introduces a fifth and final theory of the state which he refers to as *foul-up theory*, which basically tries to grasp the degree to which states are, in Mann’s words “chaotic, irrational, with multiple departmental authorities, presumed erratically and intermittently by capitalists but also by interest groups.”⁶¹ To some extent, the chaotic aspects of the foul-up nature of the state mitigate what would otherwise be the determinative consequences of authoritative institutions. As a result, rather than states being exclusively *rational actors* pursuing material interests oriented towards increased security or economic gains—within the confines of stability inducing state institutions—states are also *fallible agents* formulating policies with imperfect information because of various non-rational motives, including an array of value-oriented beliefs, desires, and social norms

In some ways, it is even more difficult to conceive of the state, in comparison to an individual, as a rational actor. This is because complex collective entities are comprised of sub-groups made up of individuals with shared interests. However, not only do these various sub-groups have divergent interests—and, as a consequence, compete for political influence, economic advantages, and social status—but even the individuals who comprise these groups compete against one another. This essential pluralistic nature of collective entities means that, while states can pursue rational courses of action, this is not an inevitable outcome; as such, the assumption

59 Ibid, 52

60 Ibid, 52

61 Ibid, 53

of the state as rational-actor may obscure vital internal conflicts and contradictions which impact upon any specific state's international behavior. Add to this that the individuals and groups which comprise the state are all fallible actors, operating under partial information and for various non-rational desires and beliefs, and it is remarkable that states manage to function in an apparently rational manner even some of the time. Arguably, one way the appearance of order arises is through the existence of various shared ideational institutions, which although fallible, tend to have at least some relation to external material reality and correspondingly guide the collective actions of broad groups of individuals.

Ideational institutions come in a variety of forms. *Political* and *economic* ideational institutions generally undergird various ideologies—ideational institutions surrounding a free-market ideology, for example. However, when it comes to *socio-cultural* institutions, we are discussing the more deeply rooted ideas through which individuals imbue their lives with meaning and purpose. To that extent, socio-cultural institutions are involved in the construction of each individual's sense of identity, and as such are in many ways psychologically deeper than political and economic institutions; which are generally oriented towards the more objective necessities of social reality—weapons and material resources for example.⁶²

Socio-cultural institutions such as *cosmopolitan* or *communitarian* forms of identity have the potential to influence the international behavior of states. While these institutions may proliferate without intentional direction, once developed, they can be manipulated by various actors (political or otherwise) in attempts to influence various security-oriented and economic foreign policies. One important example of a non-rational force, which has motivated significant international behavior in the modern era, occurs when extremist nationalist movements strongly influence and/or directly control the *distributive power* of the state, to the extent that adherents are willing to make huge sacrifices—of both resources and lives—for irredentist causes which have no practical hope of success. Importantly, however, there are also less virulent forms of nationalism that have an impact on international state relations. Besides nationalism, there are various other kinds of *communitarianism* relevant for IR, including religious extremism, and to some extent more emotional aspects of certain political and class-based ideologies. But for the current analysis of China/US relations, nationalism appears to be the more prominent instantiation of communitarian identity. For example, attempts by elements of the US political elite to enact policies aimed at slowing China's rise may be predominantly security-oriented; however, this process also manipulates a nationalistic narrative, similar to Waeber's "securitization" process,⁶³ through which China is presented as "the enemy." Looking at China, the CCP's authoritarian rulers have also been known to stoke nationalist sentiments as a means to bolster support amongst the populace,

62 Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

63 Buzan et al, *A New Framework for Analysis*.

especially in terms of attitudes within China concerning issues such as Taiwanese independence or Japanese war crimes.⁶⁴ To achieve maximum impact on popular opinion, such nationalistic narratives (whether the need to “make America great again; or China’s “century of humiliation”) will likely contain elements of truth combined with appeals to chauvinistic communitarianism. Once stirred up, these nationalistic narratives have an impact on economic policies, especially in terms of fostering forms of protectionist economic interventionism.

Turning to domestic level *political* institutions, whether a government is predominantly *democratic* or *authoritarian* arguably has some significant impact on economic policy decisions in several divergent ways. In a *democracy*, for example, in the face of economic elite pressure to support unrestrained free-market policies, oppositional interventionist policies are difficult to implement without popular public support. Consequently, various political actors may either try to manipulate the populace into supporting policies which work against their interests, or alternatively, an informed electorate might use the democratic system to pressure governments to implement—where they conflict with economic elite interests—policies which further the interests of the general populace. In terms of *authoritarian* governance, as a one-party state, China’s political elite are, at least in principle, less constrained by public opinion (including the opinions of free-market oriented economic elites) than are political actors in the US. As such, one would expect that the CCP faces less resistance to the implementation of policies favored by the Standing Committee political leadership. But even in an authoritarian system, Chinese leaders cannot completely ignore varying opinions and interests when it comes to policy implementation. Partly as a consequence, China’s policymakers have developed a system many analysts refer to as “authoritarian capitalist.”⁶⁵ While to some extent this political/economic system is constructed to further China’s state interests (economic prosperity and state security, for example), it is also designed with the aim of perpetuating CCP authoritarian rule—which may be a “rational” goal for the CCP political elite, but not necessarily for the state as a whole.

Ultimately, the process through which state constituting fallible sub-groups, representing a plurality of interests, vie for distributive political power and influence within the state must at some point be brought-in to IR analysis. While the parsimony of the neo-utilitarian theories is attractive, the analytical costs in terms of understanding the complexities of state behavior may be too high for the systemic/unitary-actor framework to stand alone, especially as concerns the rational unitary-actor assumption as the principal image of the state in IR. Consequently, IR needs an alternative theory to augment, rather than replace, the unitary purposive actor model. One alternative might be some version of the *pluralistic-fallible* model of the state described above.

64 Peter Hays Gries, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (University of California Press, 2004).

65 Richard Carney, *Authoritarian Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

Conclusion

In IR, neo-realists tend to subscribe to a Hobbesian-inspired type of conflict theory, viewing economic competition as a zero-sum game inevitably producing winners and losers. Consequently, states are seen to cooperate economically only as long as their competitors are not making significant gains relative to their own. States which make significant gains in material resources relative to their competitors shift the distribution of material capabilities, thereby simultaneously increasing their power and magnifying security dilemma induced tensions between themselves and their economic partners. Alternatively, an economic neo-liberal position holds to a Kantian view in which free-market policies utilize non-zero-sum processes to spur economic growth—i.e. as the economy increases everybody benefits. Proponents of this position argue that the benefits of economic integration have the capacity to mitigate the constraints imposed by systemically-structured security threats.

Against the free-market optimism of the neoliberal perspective, neorealists point out that states have security interests which diverge from those of the economic elite.⁶⁶ Accordingly, economic elite actors function in a sphere in which security is assumed because guaranteed by the state.⁶⁷ In other words, corporate actors do not need to prepare for war against competitors (although this could change in the future). As a result, economic elites generally advocate for the proliferation of free-trade policies, whereas the political sphere has a propensity towards security-oriented protectionist interventionism.

This dichotomy between neorealist security concerns and the neoliberal belief that economic integration can mute the more brute aspects of state power under anarchy is one of the major currents which runs through mainstream IR theory. However, critiques of this framework come from a variety of directions, perhaps most prominently the constructivist position outlined by Wendt. Constructivism borrows from sociology the view that ideas have an important role to play in creating the social framework from within which individuals experience the external world.⁶⁸ However, Wendt's constructivism maintains one important continuity with the mainstream IR paradigm; namely, the assumption of states as rational unitary-actors. Against this assumption, the thrust of the argument presented here is that IR needs to develop an alternative model of the state; one which brings in the shared ideational institutions (norms, beliefs, ideologies, etc.) which motivate coordinated, but individually-mediated, social practices. Rather than existing at the systemic-level, and formulated exclusively by the unitary-actor state (as are Wendt's international ideas), these ideas are developed from the bottom-up, through

66 Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 42–63.

67 *Ibid.*, 42–63.

68 Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

a process of intersubjective communication, leading to coordinated and contested social practices.

The main purpose of this paper has been to evaluate the need in IR for an alternative to the rational unitary-actor model of the state. This evaluation was attempted by focusing on free-market vs. interventionist economic institutions. An investigation of the neo-utilitarian explanations for why states pursue either free-market policies or various forms of economic interventionism was undertaken, with the aim of determining whether mainstream IR explanations for the economic policies of states appear adequate. To assist in this endeavor, US and China economic relations and policies were used as a case study. In the first section, the analysis indicated that while neo-realist explanations involving security-oriented protectionism do explain a significant degree of great power motivations behind protectionism, there appear to be contingent factors, such as nationalism, which are not accounted for by the neorealist structure/unitary-actor framework.

The second section, exploring neoliberal explanations for economic cooperation indicated that even the addition of economic institutional explanations—although a move in the right direction—is still not enough to adequately explain the interventionist economic policies of the US and China. Analysis indicated that both in their respective internal and external economic policies, the US and China have motivations for their policies and actions which go beyond what can be explained by systemic level factors and the rational unitary-actor state model. In terms of the Washington consensus, it was pointed out that faith in the policy's prescriptions went beyond the rational desire to increase the supposedly non-zero-sum economic gains said to come from globalization. Additionally, as for what concerns the so-called Beijing consensus, values surrounding a lack of importance for human rights, as well as cultural concerns over national prestige, appeared to bolster the Belt and Road initiative beyond the rational pursuit of security and material resources. The analysis also indicated that domestic politics had an impact on the internal adoption of unrestrained free-market policies for both states as well. In the US, a populist nationalist movement seems to be pushing the nation towards an increasingly protectionist position. In China, CCP fears of losing political control subordinates free-market openness to a seemingly ineradicable level of state control.

Consequently, it was argued that there is enough analytical need to justify the creation of an alternative image of the state; one intended to *augment* rather than *replace* the unitary-actor model. This alternative image would take account of certain ideational institutions at the various levels-of-analysis. These institutions should be understood as Weberian ideal-types and basically represent the individually-mediated shared ideas that undergird coordinated social practices. Some institutions most likely relevant for IR, beyond the *free-market/interventionist* dichotomy, include socio-cultural *cosmopolitan* and *communitarian*, as well as politically-mediated *democratic* and *authoritarian* sets of institutional ideas.

When it comes to the respective economic policies pursued by the US and China, it goes without saying that the impact of either nations' choices will have far-reaching implications. These implications go beyond the bilateral relations between the US and China affecting the global economy, and by extension, Bull's

international and world orders as well.⁶⁹ Ultimately, whether a tendency towards free-market or interventionist policies characterizes international relations depends on the ability of either *globalist* or *nationalist* narratives to capture the distributive power of the state, and thereby shape the policy implementation process in either nation. Importantly, however, the flourishing of *unrestrained* free-market institutions is not an unquestionably positive outcome for either states' respective domestic populace, or the global populace in general. However, interventionism, especially in the form of protectionism, also contains significant drawbacks. In particular, it may impede economic growth and efficiency with real-world consequences, especially as concerns the quality of life for the hundreds of millions of the previously (and largely still) disenfranchised workers globalization has pulled out of poverty.⁷⁰

In the final analysis, it does appear that the mainstream neo-utilitarian paradigm, and the corresponding rational unitary-actor state model, is able to explain a lot of international behavior, especially the tendency of China and the US towards security-oriented protectionism—reflective of Graham's *Thucydides Trap*.⁷¹ However, there are also indications that the systemic/unitary-actor framework is not sufficient for understanding several important reasons why the US and China have chosen varying aspects of their specific attempts at economic interventionism—varying aspects of the Washington vs Beijing consensuses for example. Consequently, a more adequate explanation will depend in part upon understanding the impact of domestic factors and ideational institutions as mitigating factors of systemic forces, and perhaps this can be accomplished more comprehensively through engagement—at all levels of analysis—with an image of the state as a more *fallible* and *pluralistic* agent than the mainstream image of the state as rational unitary-actor allows.

69 Bull, *The Anarchical Society*.

70 Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents*.

71 Graham, *Destined for War*.

STRATEGIC STABILITY VS. STRATEGIC PRIMACY: PREDICTING CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE 2018 U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

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As the US nuclear posture continues to evolve, so does China's response to it. The US-China rivalry is redefining nuclear crisis stability in the region, and Beijing's reaction to the latest changes to US nuclear policy proposed in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has the potential to impact regional and international security for decades. While much has been written on American and Chinese nuclear strategy, little research has attempted to combine the two to explain this transformative document or the two concepts that define them. By conducting a comparative analysis of both American and Chinese interpretations of the terms "strategic stability" and "strategic primacy," this paper attempts to shed light on the question, "How does China perceive the NPR and what set of actions might Beijing take in response?" This analytical framework presents scholars with a contemporary perspective on China's perception of the report and facilitates discussion on Beijing's most likely course of action. The paper argues that China perceives the proposed changes as a threat to the viability of its nuclear deterrent and interprets them collectively as US pursuit of strategic primacy. Findings suggest China will continue to expand its nuclear and military capabilities, bridge the technological gap between the two, and return the powers to a temporary period of Beijing-defined strategic stability.

Keywords: *Nuclear Deterrence, Crisis Stability, Strategic Stability, Strategic Primacy, Nuclear Posture Review, United States, China*

List of Abbreviations

ATA – Annual Threat Assessment (report)
ALCM – Air-launched cruise missile
BMD – Ballistic missile defense

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C4ISR – Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance & recon

CCP – Chinese Communist Party

ECS – East China Sea

EMP – Electromagnetic pulse (weapon)

GBSD – Ground-based strategic deterrents

ICBM – Inter-continental ballistic missile

INF – International Nuclear Forces (treaty)

MAD – Mutually assured destruction

MDR – Missile Defense Review (report)

MIRV – Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle

NFU – No-first-use (policy)

NPR – Nuclear Posture Review (report)

NC3 – Nuclear command, control, and communications

PLA – People's Liberation Army

POTUS – President of the United States

SLBM – Submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLCM – Submarine-launched cruise missile

SSBN – Nuclear-powered ballistic submarines

Introduction

The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is a document of significant importance to those countries it singles out as adversaries, such as China, and how Beijing perceives and responds to the Trump administration's nuclear policy will play a role in redefining what constitutes a strategically stable security environment in East Asia. These definitions are critical toward maintaining crisis stability in the region, which describes the optimal scenario in which both parties are deterred from using nuclear weapons during crisis. Perhaps most crucially, China's behavior will shape the future of regional and international security. Should Beijing attempt to either accommodate or ignore the administration's nuclear policies, objectives, or strategy, China risks jeopardizing the effectiveness of its own nuclear deterrence. Chinese strategists and scholars argue that such a miscalculation would undermine the strategic stability upon which mutually assured destruction (MAD) rests. On the other hand, should Beijing decide to oppose the NPR, its actions may indeed return the two powers to a period of temporary Beijing-defined strategic stability, only to antagonize neighbors or set off a region-wide arms race. Understanding China's perception of America's chief nuclear policy document is the first step toward developing a solution that addresses the threat to crisis stability.

The Pentagon released the NPR to a cold reception from major powers, nuclear

experts, and academics from around the world.¹ Indeed, several US senators opposed aspects of the NPR; sixteen senators wrote in an open letter to President Trump that “creating new nuclear capabilities and widening their possible use constitute an increase in America’s nuclear war-fighting capacity that will pressure other nuclear weapons states to follow suit.”² This chilly reception can be attributed to three controversial proposed changes found within the lines of the nearly 100-page report: 1) the enlargement and comprehensive modernization of the nuclear triad; 2) the reintroduction of limited nuclear warfare into US nuclear deterrence strategy via low-yield nuclear weapons; and 3) the potential expansion of the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be employed. These proposed changes in America’s nuclear posture will not only have an impact on US-China relations, but also on regional and international security.

Critics of the 2018 NPR argue that enlarging the US nuclear stockpile will undo decades of international nonproliferation efforts, modernizing nuclear forces will antagonize Beijing and accelerate China’s military modernization, and introducing low-yield nuclear weapons might lower the threshold for nuclear war – all of which could undermine crisis stability.³ Certainly, the recent death of the Reagan-era International Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty⁴ and the doubt surrounding the future of Obama-era New START treaty⁵ only exacerbate these concerns. Proponents of the NPR, on the other hand, cite “aggressive” behavior from China and Russia⁶ as evidence that the US must expand its capabilities to meet the threat they pose. Others agree with the NPR’s contention that America’s strategic superiority over these adversaries in fact decreases the risk of miscalculation, thereby sustaining crisis stability, saving lives, and enhancing national security.⁷ Regardless, a lack

1 John Mecklin, “The Experts on the New Nuclear Posture Review,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 2, 2018 (See ‘invited expert commentary’), <https://thebulletin.org/2018/02/the-experts-on-the-new-nuclear-posture-review/>.

2 Kingston Reif, “Trump Seeks Expanded Nuclear Capabilities,” *Arms Control Association*, March 01, 2018. <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-03/news/trump-seeks-expanded-nuclear-capabilities>.

3 Alan Kuperman, “A Nuclear Weapon That Could Change Everything: Don’t Allow Low-yield Atomic Warheads to Be Deployed,” *NY Daily News*, March 09, 2019, <https://www.nydaily-news.com/opinion/ny-oped-a-nuclear-weapon-that-could-change-everything-20190307-story.html>.

4 Ankit Panda, “After the INF Treaty: US Plans First Tests of New Short and Intermediate-Range Missiles,” *The Diplomat*, March 14, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/after-the-inf-treaty-us-plans-first-tests-of-new-short-and-intermediate-range-missiles>.

5 Aaron Mehta, “One Nuclear Treaty Is Dead. Is New START Next?” *Defense News*, October 24, 2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/10/23/one-nuclear-treaty-is-dead-is-new-start-next>.

6 Michaela Dodge, “Trump’s Plan to Protect America’s Nuclear Capabilities,” *National Interest*, February 16, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trumps-plan-protect-americas-nuclear-capabilities-24529>.

7 Aaron Miles, “Keep US Nuclear Options Open to Avoid Using Them,” *National Interest*, September 3, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/keep-us-nuclear-options-open-avoid-using-them-30242>.

of mutual understanding on key security concepts, such as strategic stability, may end up sending the two powers careening toward conflict. Without a mutually agreed upon definition, a growing risk of miscalculation has the potential to lead to escalatory actions neither can manage.

An exploration of the NPR's three major changes through a comparative analysis between the two country's understanding of strategic stability and strategic primacy, based on their respective nuclear strategies, will help answer the question: "How does China perceive the NPR, and what actions might Beijing take in response?" In answering these questions, the paper finds that China perceives the NPR as a threat to its nuclear deterrence strategy and identifies the problem as stemming from contradictory definitions regarding what constitutes a stable nuclear security environment (strategic stability). The findings suggest China will oppose the NPR's proposed changes by expanding its nuclear and military capabilities, most likely in an attempt to neutralize the threat they pose and return the status quo back toward Beijing's own definition of strategic stability.

The significance of this research lies in its timely comparative analysis, its updated presentation of two security concepts as understood from the Chinese strategic community's perspective, and its identification of an important area of future research. The paper is organized into an introductory primer on the relationship between the NPR and Chinese nuclear strategy for introduction into scholarly debate. Finally, this paper is also a direct response to an area of further research identified in "Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability," one of the most contemporary and impactful pieces of research on the subject. In their pathbreaking article, China security experts Fiona Cunningham and Taylor M. Fravel identify the divergence of Chinese views on US intentions as well as the effect of US Strategic developments on China as an area of required analysis.⁸

The following paper is organized as follows: First, the analytical framework of the paper will be outlined, and the definitions of strategic stability and primacy established. Second, the 2018 NPR will be unpacked, and its three major changes will be examined. Third, the nuclear strategies of both the US and China will be explored through relevant literature, and the concepts of strategic stability and primacy, analyzed. Fourth, the NPR's three changes will be analyzed from China's perspective. Finally, Beijing's most likely course of action is identified, followed by an exploration of practical implications and future areas of research.

Analytical Framework

To determine China's perception of the 2018 NPR, the terms strategic stability and

8 Fiona Cunningham and Taylor M. Fravel, "Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability," *International Security* 40, no. 2 (2015): 7-50, doi:10.1162/isec_a_00215, 48-49.

strategic primacy as defined by both American and Chinese strategic communities – that is, the collection of scholars and practitioners primarily concerned with nuclear and military strategy (government leaders, scholars, researchers, strategists, analysts, generals, planners etc.) – should first be established. There are several reasons for employing these two concepts. First and foremost, strategic stability is a key element of nuclear deterrence strategy. Consequently, it is central to both US and Chinese deterrence. It follows that understanding how the two country’s definitions differ provides insight into their behaviors, motivations, ambitions, and intentions.

Second, the 2018 NPR lays out US logic regarding what constitutes a strategically stable security environment. Consequently, the three major changes proposed in the report stem from this definition and will play a pivotal role in the development of crisis stability between the two powers. However, in many Chinese and American security circles,⁹ America’s definition of strategic stability is increasingly characterized as strategic primacy (used interchangeably with ‘superiority’ in many texts). Understanding China’s perspective on strategic primacy assists in understanding a number of issues, from China’s perception of the NPR to the country’s evolving nuclear capabilities and underlying motivations. Exploring the difference between Chinese and American interpretations of strategic primacy offers insight into how each country seeks to maintain crisis stability. In the case of China, strategic primacy illustrates Beijing’s anxieties and concerns and will help explain their understanding of the 2018 NPR.

Furthermore, assessment of China’s perception on the 2018 NPR still lacks an established body of critical literature. To account for this limitation, a brief examination of the philosophies that underpin American and Chinese nuclear strategy acts as a bridge to connect the two concepts to their respective country’s contemporary nuclear strategy. Examination of the two power’s strategies suggests a uniquely Chinese understanding of strategic stability and primacy – wholly unlike America’s understanding of the terms. A comparative analysis of these updated concepts, therefore, provides an apt framework through which to assess the perceptions and intentions of China’s strategic community regarding the three major changes in the NPR, building a case for Beijing’s likely response.

Strategic Stability

James M. Acton, an expert on nuclear policy and senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, defines strategic stability as the “absence of

9 For a comprehensive look into American and Chinese assessments of the US nuclear posture, see Cunningham and Fravel “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” *International Security* 40, no. 2 (2015) and also: Li Bin “Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking: Differences Between Chinese and U.S. Nuclear Thinking and Their Origins,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015.

incentives to use nuclear weapons first (crisis stability) and the absence of incentives to build up a nuclear force (arms race stability).¹⁰ This flexible, multidimensional definition provides a useful foundation for understanding American and Chinese understandings of the term as well as demonstrates succinctly the difficulty of achieving consensus. Ironically, both powers can comfortably fit their opposing definitions within the boundaries of Acton's definition. The United States believes strategic stability lies in a world where "a war that can never be won, is never fought."¹¹ Ergo, denying adversaries the ability to win a nuclear confrontation eliminates incentives to either use or build up one's nuclear arsenal.

Similarly, China's nuclear deterrence strategy aims to limit incentives for nuclear weapons use or arms buildups, too. However, China's methods for achieving this differ. Beijing seeks to establish mutual vulnerability with the US – that is, a situation in which both possess effective second-strike capabilities. In other words, China hopes to ensure that mutually assured destruction remains mutual. Nuclear policy and security expert Li Bin explains China's blueprint for achieving that: "if China is susceptible to attack, there is no longer strategic stability. Therefore, if China develops new tech and applies them to military affairs with a rival which whom it lacks the equivalent technology, the strategic stability between the two will improve and vice versa."¹²

Two factors, therefore, threaten to undermine Beijing's definition of strategic stability, tipping the balance in favor of one state's ability to launch an effective second-strike: technological developments and nuclear forces survivability. First, Beijing has long recognized its technological disadvantages and has sought to catch up to modern nuclear powers in terms of the quality of its nuclear arsenal. As a result, China believes its efforts to finally achieve an effective deterrent simply balances an imbalanced security situation – one in which the US enjoys all-around superiority. Second, China must protect and maintain the efficacy of its second-strike capabilities or it leaves itself vulnerable to attack.

Strategic Primacy

In their article on China's perception of the US nuclear posture, scholars Fiona Cunningham and Taylor Fravel assert that the US has committed to a nuclear posture of "strategic primacy."¹³ Strategic primacy, according to Cunningham and Fravel, describes the situation in which a country "can insulate itself from the retaliatory

10 James M. Acton, "Reclaiming Strategic Stability," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/05/reclaiming-strategic-stability-pub-51032>.

11 U.S. Department of Defense (2018), 16.

12 Li Bin, "Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking: Differences Between Chinese and U.S. Nuclear Thinking and Their Origins," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ChineseNuclearThinking_Final.pdf, 15.

13 Cunningham and Fravel, "Assuring Assured Retaliation," 9-10.

nuclear strike of an adversary.”¹⁴ Not to be confused with the oft used expression “numerically superior,” strategic primacy refers to the comparatively greater impact US nuclear forces can survive (and unleash) in a comparatively greater number of scenarios. In practice, this means the country in question must maintain nuclear, conventional military strike, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and BMD (ballistic missile defense) capabilities superior enough to deter adversaries in any conceivable scenario. These capabilities encompass five attributes the NPR is designed to ensure: survivability, penetration, prompt response, visibility, and diverse nuclear options.¹⁵

In the context of the US-China rivalry, strategic primacy describes the US pursuit of nuclear and conventional military capabilities so overwhelming that it removes all benefit from China’s cost-benefit analysis regarding retaliation. The result of this primacy essentially insulates the US from China’s retaliatory capabilities. However, such superiority, according to Chinese scholars like Bin, undermines China’s ability to ensure MAD,¹⁶ which requires a degree of mutual vulnerability. Strategic primacy, from the view of Chinese analysts, is the US pursuit of absolute security, which ensures “one’s own security at the expense of others and thereby [escapes] mutual vulnerability.”¹⁷ Consequently, China is primarily concerned with the survivability of its nuclear forces and Beijing is deeply concerned by a perceived intent on America’s side to remove Beijing’s second-strike capabilities, rendering its nuclear deterrent impotent. American experts at think tanks like RAND also assess that Chinese leadership likely sees US pursuit of strategic superiority as a way of containing China.¹⁸

The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review

NPR Goals and Objectives

The NPR is the United States’ primary national security statement on nuclear policy. The purpose of the review, commissioned by the President of the United States (POTUS), is threefold. First, the NPR articulates the role and status of the nation’s nuclear weapons. Second, it announces the current presidential administration’s assessment of the international security environment. Finally, the document acts as a report to congress outlining the administration’s overall nuclear strategy, how it seeks to address nuclear-related security concerns, and proposals to carry that strategy out. The NPR, much like the Director of National Intelligence’s Annual

14 Ibid, 10. See: Kier A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2013), pp. 3–12, at p. 5.

15 Aaron Miles, “Keep US Nuclear Options Open to Avoid Using Them.”

16 Bin, “Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking,” 15.

17 Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation,” 15.

18 Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan, “China’s Evolving Approach to “Integrated Strategic Deterrence,” RAND (2016), 48.

Threat Assessment (ATA) and the Department of Defense's Missile Defense Review (MDR), is meant for foreign adversaries as much as it is the American public. Far away from being a collection of tenuous proposals, these documents are guides to US plans and intentions that adversaries take very seriously. Many of the actions proposed in these reports are already well underway or near completion. For example, the Trump administration is starting production on a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)¹⁹ and will begin testing intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) Summer 2019.²⁰

In particular, the 2018 NPR has proven to be significant in several ways. The document announced intentions to reinvigorate the comprehensive modernization of the nuclear triad, expand definitions for the use of nuclear weapons, and hints at the potential reintroduction of nuclear war-fighting tactics into the nation's nuclear posture. These changes are introduced against the backdrop of what the Trump administration perceives to be a resurgence of "great power competition" in international affairs—a hostile trend it sees as a leading cause behind the increasingly uncertain security environment the country finds itself in.²¹ In response to these challenges, the NPR seeks to provide the POTUS with a wide range of flexible nuclear capabilities to address threats.²² However, in the process of doing so, the 2018 NPR is transforming US nuclear deterrence strategy in far-reaching ways.

US Nuclear Deterrence Strategy & Philosophy

Former US Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis revealed the fundamental logic behind the current administration's US nuclear thought when he observed that "a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is there to ensure a war that can never be won, is never fought."²³ This type of deterrence logic is based upon the works of scholars like Glenn H. Snyder and Andre Beaufre in the 1950's and 1960's, which aims to "deny potential aggressors even a wishful-thinking belief that it has a strategy... than can achieve its goals at low risk and cost."²⁴ In other words, a superior nuclear arsenal—that is, qualitative nuclear superiority across the triad—prevents war and a nuclear deterrence strategy based on this concept will save lives.²⁵ The objectives of the strategy are five-fold. Consistent with previous NPRs, the 2018 iteration declares the highest priority of US nuclear policy and strategy to

19 Kuperman, "A Nuclear Weapon That Could Change Everything."

20 Panda, "After the INF Treaty."

21 "2018 Nuclear Posture Review - U.S. Department of Defense,"

<https://www.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx>, 2.

22 U.S. Department of Defense (2018), II.

23 Ibid, 16.

24 André Beaufre, *Deterrence and Strategy*, New York: Praeger, 1965, 53. See also Glenn H. Snyder's *Deterrence by Denial and Punishment*, Center of International Studies, 1959.

25 U.S. Department of Defense (2018), 16-17.

deter nuclear attacks.²⁶ According to the report, US nuclear forces are also designed to deter non-nuclear attacks, assure allies and partners, achieve US objectives if deterrence fails, and most recently, hedge against an uncertain future.²⁷

The US government aims to achieve these deterrence objectives by influencing a potential adversary's "calculations of the prospective benefits of aggression" or limited nuclear escalation. The underlying belief is that adversaries will be less likely to see an advantage to nuclear weapons use if American nuclear forces are strategically superior.²⁸ The US seeks to achieve strategic primacy by maintaining conventional military strike, C4ISR, BMD, and nuclear forces superiority. Regarding the conditions for nuclear use, the NPR states that America will only resort to nuclear weapons use in extreme circumstances to deter aggression, maintain peace and "protect vital U.S. and allied interests."²⁹

NPR's Three Major Changes

The 2018 NPR proposes three major changes that great powers, especially China, will find of major consequence. These changes include: 1) calls for a more vigorous modernization of US nuclear forces than the program initiated by the Obama administration in 2010, one which increases the country's nuclear stockpile; 2) plans to reintroduce increased levels of diversified 'non-strategic' tactical nuclear weapons, which potentially reintroduce nuclear war-fighting tactics into US nuclear deterrence strategy; and 3) a possible expansion of the number of scenarios under which America may conceivably consider using nuclear weapons.

Comprehensive Modernization of Nuclear Forces

First, President Donald Trump remarked on February 12, 2018 that the US would need to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal because other countries were doing the same.³⁰ The president followed this comment by stating the US would create a new nuclear force superior to and in excess of all others, proclaiming: "We will always be number one in that category, certainly as long as I'm president."³¹ The president's comments provide a context and rationale for the NPR's call for a renewed nuclear force modernization effort; in order to protect itself and assert its power, the country must maintain absolute nuclear primacy and remain "number

26 Ibid, 20.

27 Ibid, VII.

28 Ibid, VII.

29 Ibid, 2.

30 Emily Shugerman, "Trump Says He Will Expand US Nuclear Arsenal 'far in Excess of Anybody Else'," *The Independent*, February 12, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-nuclear-arsenal-force-us-military-weapon-a8207586.html>.

31 Ibid.

one.”

The NPR outlines its modernization goals as follows: to “sustain and replace its nuclear capabilities, modernize NC3 (nuclear command, control, and communications), and strengthen the integration of nuclear and non-nuclear military planning.”³² Efforts include upgrading the nuclear triad to include new and diversified SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), ICBMs (inter-continental ballistic missiles), and ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles); COLUMBIA-class SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic submarines); GBSDs (ground-based strategic deterrents); B-21 Raiders, B61-12 gravity bombs; and affixing nuclear capabilities to F-35 and other aircraft.³³ It is important to note that the Trump administration does not break with the previous administration in terms of its desire to modernize the country’s aging nuclear forces. Experts agree this is necessary.³⁴ Instead, they differ in terms of the scope and end goal of modernization. Where the 2010 NPR sought to decrease stockpiles and limit the types of weapons the US employed, for example, the 2018 NPR abandons these goals completely.³⁵

Expanding Low-yield Nuclear Options

Second, the NPR announced intentions to expand US nuclear options to include increased levels of low-yield (smaller explosive power) tactical nuclear weapons with more diverse delivery systems (such as the SLMBs currently in production). The NPR states that expanding these nuclear options are critical to credible deterrence because they raise the nuclear threshold—the point at which conducting nuclear warfare becomes more difficult and less advantageous—by denying adversaries any advantage in the event of limited nuclear escalation.³⁶ The report explains that this proposed action is in direct response to US adversary’s expanding capabilities, which favor limited nuclear escalation and non-nuclear strategic warfare.³⁷ “Non-nuclear” strategic attacks here likely refers to new theaters of conflict, such as cyber warfare, in addition to biological and chemical warfare. The NPR argues that the existence of new tactical nuclear weapons will “counter any mistaken perception of an exploitable ‘gap’ in U.S. regional deterrence.”³⁸ These changes will have a significant impact regionally and, as the NPR states, specifically in Asia, where they are designed to assure allies like South Korea and Japan.³⁹ The US aims to strengthen extended deterrence by modifying SLBM and SLCM warheads with low-

32 U.S. Department of Defense (2018), VIII.

33 Ibid, 10.

34 Cheryl Rofer, “Evaluating the Nuclear Posture Review,” *Physics Today*, January 29, 2018, <https://physicstoday.scitation.org/doi/10.1063/PT.6.3.20180209a/full/>.

35 Ibid.

36 U.S. Department of Defense (2018), 54.

37 Ibid, 17.

38 Ibid, XII.

39 Ibid, XII.

yield nuclear options.⁴⁰

Because low-yield nuclear weapons are designed for deployment in limited nuclear conflicts, their existence provides the US with limited nuclear warfare capabilities and the ability to participate in limited or theater nuclear war. The administration would likely refute the notion that capability alone reflects an active war-fighting strategy. At the very least, the administration is relying on the implication of limited nuclear war to reinforce its nuclear deterrence strategy. Consequently, the US has moved toward, instead of away from, a nuclear war-fighting strategy – a move that concerns many experts and US senators. As mentioned previously, the NPR justifies this proposal by pointing out that its adversaries possess or are developing these capabilities.

Expanded Definition for Nuclear Weapons Use

Finally, the NPR potentially expands upon the definitions of previous NPRs regarding the conditions required to justify the use of nuclear weapons. The 2010 NPR produced under the Obama administration reaffirmed previous administration's declarations that nuclear weapons could only be used in extreme circumstances to defend US and allied vital interests as well as to deter nuclear and extreme non-nuclear attacks, with the overall goal of US nuclear policy to eventually achieve "sole-purpose" nuclear deterrence⁴¹ (sole-purpose refers to the idea that a country will only use nuclear weapons to deter nuclear—a principle tantamount to China's "no-first-use" policy). The US has consistently perceived, however, that a sole-purpose declaration would weaken its ability to deter by removing ambiguity that might otherwise dissuade miscalculation.⁴² In other words, by promising to never use nuclear weapons unless attacked with them first, potential foes could launch conventional or asymmetrical attacks (conventional bomb, cyber, biological, chemical attacks or even a military invasion) of equal or greater destruction without fear of nuclear retaliation. Adversaries, the US argues, might take advantage of such a policy, thereby inviting threats, encouraging escalation, and increasing the change of conflict. Conversely, lack of a sole-purpose policy implies that nuclear weapons might always be on the table. This form of strategic ambiguity aims to dissuade attack and is a core element of American and Russian nuclear postures. In this regard, the 2018 NPR differs in two significant ways. First, the document includes a caveat for the use of nuclear weapons in the event of "significant non-nuclear strategic attacks" which include "attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces,

40 Ibid, XIII.

41 "2010 Nuclear Posture Review - U.S. Department of Defense." https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf, 16

42 U.S. Department of Defense (2010), 16.

their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”⁴³ This new definition regarding the circumstances under which America will use nuclear weapons encompasses a greater number of scenarios than identified in the past. While the NPR under the Obama administration contained a caveat for nuclear weapons use in the event of biological attack, the new NPR’s language could conceivably be manipulated in a number of ways to justify nuclear strikes in response to “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks.”

A second possible expansion of US nuclear weapons use can be found on page twenty-one of the NPR, where the report describes a “negative security assurance,”⁴⁴ in which the US reserves “the right to make any adjustment... warranted by the evolution and proliferation of non-nuclear strategic attack technologies and U.S. capabilities to counter that threat.”⁴⁵ Experts are concerned that these two new definitions lower the bar for first use in that the US could respond to “less than fully catastrophic” scenarios with nuclear weapons.⁴⁶

China’s Nuclear Strategy

Security & Nuclear Philosophy

To understand China’s perception of the NPRs major changes, it is important to first understand how Beijing views the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously opined that nuclear weapons were “paper tigers.” On its face, one might think the Chinese leader did not appreciate the immense power of the weapons. It is clear from the historical record, however, that Mao grasped quickly the importance of the atomic bomb, both in international security and politics. China’s first and second-generation leaders established early on a nuclear philosophy and strategy that still dominates Chinese nuclear thought today.⁴⁷

According to one of China’s top nuclear policy experts, Tsinghua University professor Li Bin, China’s philosophy is unique from the traditional Western understanding of the weapon’s role. This divergence resulted in fundamental differences in the way the two countries approach nuclear deterrence. China’s security strategy, Bin posits, focuses on the study of security challenges, while the US focuses on security threats.⁴⁸ Bin argues that this point reflects more than semantics. Instead, it reflects deeply contrasting perceptions of and therefore diverging approaches to security issues like nuclear deterrence. International

43 Ibid, 21.

44 Reif, “Trump Seeks Expanded Nuclear Capabilities.”

45 U.S. Department of Defense (2018), 21.

46 Reif, “Trump Seeks Expanded Nuclear Capabilities.”

47 Taylor M. Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” *International Security* 35, no. 2 (2010): 48-87, doi:10.1162/isec_a_00016, 86.

48 Bin, “Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking,” 4.

security scholars like Robert Jervis and Paul Huth have also argued that other fundamental variables, such as how governments interpret threats – which is further shaped by domestic politics, geopolitics, culture, and the personality of individual leaders, to name a few – have a profound impact on how states approach nuclear deterrence.⁴⁹

Bin’s characterization of the concept of China’s security challenges as comprising a “theory of comprehensive national power” is a useful lens for analyzing China’s views on nuclear weapons.⁵⁰ China tends to view the role of nuclear weapons not simply in terms of military strategy as the US appears to, according to Bin, but comprehensively and in concert with domestic and international economic and political considerations. Jeffery Lewis, professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and an expert on China’s nuclear posture, summarizes this point succinctly when he writes: “Chinese leaders have consistently seen nuclear weapons as, fundamentally, tools of political coercion rather than useful battlefield instruments.”⁵¹ Highlighting Mao’s belief that nuclear weapons were useless as battlefield weapons, the Communist leader remarked, “there is a possibility of great powers waging a world war; it’s just that everyone is afraid to do so because of a few more atomic bombs.”⁵² For China’s leadership, the logic of MAD had rendered these immensely powerful weapons useless “paper tigers” — hunks of metal consigned to collect dust. Mao realized that only a repurposing of the weapon’s role—one along political lines—could extract value from their expensive existence.

From Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leadership has long understood that nuclear weapons are a potent political tool useful for a variety of purposes, such as political coercion, enhancing soft power, buttressing conventional military power, improving China’s national image, and raising the country’s international profile. Emphasizing the coercive aspect of Beijing’s view on nuclear weapons, Mao observed that, “without [nuclear weapons], your words will be taken lightly.”⁵³ Mao’s observation suggests that when a state possesses nuclear weapons, its words are strengthened. Without them, a state is vulnerable to coercion. That strength invariably comes from the threat of force behind those words, thereby increasing the coercive power of the state as well as protecting it from the same.

To illustrate this point, looking to the Sino-Japanese rivalry in the East China

49 Robert Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1989, p. 292–294. See also “Huth, Paul, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988, pp. 201–202.”

50 Bin, “Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking,” 4, 9.

51 Lewis, Jeffrey, “Chinese Views of Nuclear Weapons,” *Adelphi Series* 54, no. 446 (2014): 13–42, doi:10.1080/19445571.2014.995419, 37.

52 Weidi Xu, “Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking: Differences Between Chinese and U.S. Nuclear Thinking and Their Origins,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ChineseNuclearThinking_Final.pdf, 24.

53 *Ibid.*, 8.

Sea (ECS) from 2012-2014 is helpful. China demonstrated the political utility of nuclear weapons in its handling of the ECS crisis, where it relied on nuclear signaling to achieve its goals in the territorial dispute.⁵⁴ Professor of Political Science at Lingnan University and an expert on China's security, Baohui Zhang argues that China employed "implicit nuclear deterrence" to punish Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku Islands in 2012 and to deter further militarization of the ECS.⁵⁵ Beijing accomplished this, in part, by mobilizing its propaganda machine to strategically make high profile announcements on the China's latest nuclear developments, testing new strategic weapon systems, and allowing its military generals to make implicit threats of nuclear war during critical moments of the crisis.⁵⁶ Zhang argues that Beijing's nuclear signaling—in this case, political coercion via nuclear weapons—may have contributed to Japan's relative restraint within the ECS.⁵⁷

Nuclear Deterrence Strategy

China's nuclear and security philosophies play a central role in shaping the nation's nuclear deterrence strategy, which is best characterized by the country's self-defense oriented "no-first-use" (NFU) policy. Often used interchangeably with the terms "minimal deterrence" and "assured retaliation," the NFU policy states that China will not attack with nuclear weapons unless attacked first with nuclear weapons. China announced its the policy immediately after its first nuclear test in 1964⁵⁸ and it remains the focal point around which China's nuclear posture is centered. One defining feature of NFU is the unambiguous threat of assured retaliation. An assured second strike is designed to deter potential aggressors from misinterpreting that China's lack of desire to fight a nuclear war is in any way passive.⁵⁹ In terms of crisis stability, NFU depends entirely on the survivability of nuclear forces. If China is unable perform a second strike because its missile sites are destroyed before it can respond sufficiently, it loses the ability to deter. Any serious threat to the survivability of China's nuclear forces, therefore, undermines the country's deterrence strategy and is an area of perpetual concern for Chinese leadership.

The decision to adhere to NFU can be understood as the result of two factors:

54 Baohui Zhang, "China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International Order," (London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2015), doi:10.4324/9781315756158, 26.

55 Zhang, "China's Assertive Nuclear Posture," 133.

56 Ibid, 133.

PLA General Luo Yuan commented that China could potentially use nuclear weapons against Japan to prevent the destruction of its East China Sea and North Sea naval fleets. (Additionally, see Huanqiu, Shibao, "Yin Zhuo riben ruo zao he daji keneng zhege minzu jiu bu cunzaile" ["Yin Zhuo: If Japan Is Attacked by Nuclear Weapons, This Nation Will No Longer Exist], February 19, 2014, mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-02/4842993.html." General Yin Zhuo stated emphatically that if attacked with nuclear weapons, Japan would "no longer exist.")

57 Zhang, "China's Assertive Nuclear Posture," 139.

58 Weidi, "Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking," 26.

59 Ibid, 56.

China's security challenges paradigm (described earlier) and the PRC's socialist philosophy. For its part, the country's focus on security challenges played a pivotal role in informing Beijing's understanding of its strategic limitations during the Cold War. In assessing the country's nuclear arsenal through the lens of a comprehensive security challenge, leadership recognized the need to develop a deterrence strategy that leveraged its own strengths to counter the US and Soviet Union's (USSR) quantitatively and qualitatively greater arsenals. With this in mind, and in the face of a tremendous economic and technological gap between itself and other major powers, China found its answer in a defense-oriented posture. Strategists and planners realized China had no need to amass thousands of warheads, like the US or USSR. To overcome its limitations, China instead needed to instill the fear of assured retaliation and unacceptable damage in a potential aggressor's cost-benefit calculus. By utilizing a nuclear deterrence strategy that emphasized second-strike capability, leadership effectively leveraged China's comparatively smaller arsenal.⁶⁰ In many ways, China's NFU policy was born out of a need to overcome technological constraints and economic limitations.

Second, the PRC's socialist philosophy is integral to the country's nuclear deterrence strategy. China security expert Weidi Xu argues that, "as a socialist country, China will never seek hegemony or bully others."⁶¹ The emphasis that Chinese socialist thought places on peace and equality among states acts as a powerful ideological driver that has permeated Chinese strategic military discussions for nearly 70 years. Bin agrees with Xu's assessment when he asserts that, unlike American nuclear weapons that play a central role in the maintenance of US hegemony, "China's nuclear weapons serve no other purpose" than deterring nuclear attacks, as evidenced by the country's refusal to participate in nuclear arms races.⁶² A self-defense-oriented policy, however, can be double-edged. No-first-use constrains China's freedom of action and Chinese socialist ideology potentially inhibits the country's ability to react effectively in times of crisis. In other words, by rhetorically and ideologically delegitimizing first use, China places a self-imposed limit on its options and restricts itself from responding in advantageous ways—one reason the US has not declared NFU. However, as scholars Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros point out, so long as the three pillars of China's second-strike capability are assured—survivability, reliability, and penetrability—flexibility is not necessarily required.⁶³

One final key distinction between Chinese and American nuclear and security philosophies can help shed light on both China's NFU policy, as well as its concerns about US behavior. Scholars and practitioners within Chinese and American strategic communities exhibit a fundamentally different understanding regarding the coercive

60 Fravel and Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation," 87.

61 Weidi, "Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking," 56.

62 Bin, "Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking," 13.

63 Fravel and Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation," 87.

nature of nuclear deterrence. The distinction lies in the subtle difference between “deterrence” and “compellence.” Although both concepts are considered forms of coercion, they enjoy differing levels of legitimacy. That level of legitimacy also varies by country. Generally, the former is considered more legitimate than the latter. Deterrence describes the act of one party dissuading another party from taking a particular action, which has not happened yet, by threatening punitive action the party to be deterred finds unacceptable. Deterrence, however, is defensive in nature and seeks to maintain the status quo. Compellence on the other hand describes a situation whereby one party attempts to persuade another party to reverse or halt some ongoing behavior. Crucially, compellence seeks a change in the status quo, either by creating a new status quo or reverting to back the status quo ante. While deterring an action yet to be taken is commonly practiced by states, forcing action is frowned upon because it violates principles of national sovereignty (and is extremely difficult to achieve to boot).

Chinese scholars argue that US deterrence is in fact a form of compellence. In their assessment, US deterrence strategy relies on threats that force adversaries to take actions they do not wish to take.⁶⁴ America’s deterrence strategy, Li Bin argues, is predicated on an implicit assumption that by threatening the use of nuclear weapons, the US can force China to accept changes to the status quo.⁶⁵ For example, in the event of a conflict where one state threatens to use nuclear weapons against another due to some alleged transgression, the threatening state is not simply forcing another state to abandon its actions if the status quo surrounding the actions are difficult to ascertain in the first place. If it is not readily possible to determine which party first altered the status quo leading to the actions that precipitated the nuclear threat, that threat is potentially forcing the threatened state to take actions it does not want to.⁶⁶ Consequently, many in China’s strategic community criticize US nuclear deterrence strategy for exhibiting elements of compellence. From China’s perspective, the NFU policy better satisfies the ‘proper’ definition of deterrence. China insists no-first-use is designed instead to persuade an adversary to abandon an action, rather than forcing it to take a particular one.⁶⁷

Nuclear Modernization

Despite its NFU policy, China has been slowly modernizing and diversifying its nuclear forces over the last two decades. In recent times, Beijing has also begun making technological advances that, coupled with its ever-growing defense spending and increasingly aggressive military posture in the East and South China Seas, have raised concerns among its neighbors and the US regarding its intentions. Developing

64 Bin, “Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking,” 9

65 Ibid, 9.

66 Ibid, 10.

67 Ibid, 10

a snapshot of China's nuclear capabilities is important toward understanding the current state and direction of the country's nuclear deterrence strategy. For example, Michael Tkacik, an expert on China's nuclear capabilities, outlines a modernization program that demonstrates China's research into new nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, past development of a "neutron bomb-like weapon," and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) capabilities.⁶⁸ A study by RAND researchers Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan found that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is likely working toward future developments which include ICBM's with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability, advanced SSBN's and SLBM's, hypersonic-glide vehicles, and space-based early warning systems, to name a few.⁶⁹ Cunningham and Fravel note that China's upgrades also consist of both improvements to the survivability of its ICBM force as well as the size of its missile stockpile.⁷⁰ These specific military technological developments are designed to directly undermine key aspects of America's strategic primacy. Take MIRV capabilities for instance – offensively, the development of MIRV-capable missiles are designed to penetrate US missile defenses to ensure second-strike capability, which the US seeks to avoid with BMD systems. Defensively, increasing the survivability of China's ICBM forces decreases the lethality of America's overwhelming nuclear and conventional first-strike capabilities.

Beijing is also researching and exploring low-yield tactical nuclear warhead options.⁷¹ These trends conflict with China's NFU policy by lending toward a policy of possible first-use in a limited nuclear conflict, and as Tkacik argues, reflects "expanding capabilities far beyond that would be required of an NFU policy or assured retaliation."⁷² James S. Johnson, a military and security expert on China, observes that recent evidence in fact reveals a limited nuclear posture shift toward nuclear war-fighting, citing China's development of solid-fuel road-mobile missiles, MIRV warheads, and nuclear-powered SSBMs.⁷³ The existence and research of these technologies is indicative of nuclear war-fighting intentions, if not already existent capabilities.⁷⁴ At the very least, it reflects the PLA's desire to provide China's leaders with a wide range of flexible nuclear options, even a 'break out' capability if the circumstances require it, much in the same way the NPR seeks to do.

68 Michael Tkacik, "Chinese Nuclear Weapons Enhancements – Implications for Chinese Employment Policy," *Defence Studies* 14, no. 2 (2014): 161-91. doi:10.1080/14702436.2014.889471, 176.

69 Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan, "Chinas Evolving Strategic Deterrence Concepts and Capabilities," *The Washington Quarterly* 39, no. 1 (2016): 117-36. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2016.1170484, 49.

70 Cunningham and Fravel, "Assuring Assured Retaliation," 2.

71 Tkacik, "Chinese Nuclear Weapons Enhancements," 176.

72 Ibid, 178.

73 James Samuel Johnson, "Chinese Evolving Approaches to Nuclear "War-Fighting," An Emerging Intense US–China Security Dilemma and Threats to Crisis Stability in the Asia Pacific," *Asian Security* (2018), 1-18. Doi:10.1080/14799855.2018.1443915, 85.

74 Tkacik, "Chinese Nuclear Weapons Enhancements," 176.

As Jeffery Lewis points out, China's NFU policy still poses constraints on the country's nuclear options.⁷⁵ However, it is not inconceivable that China desires deeper asymmetric capabilities to reinforce its deterrent should it feel handicapped—a debate currently underway among Chinese experts and scholars.⁷⁶ Combined, these developments reflect not only China's comprehensive rejection of American strategic primacy, but its desire to achieve a security environment in line with its own definition of strategic stability. In terms of finding a mutually agreeable definition of the term, efforts are complicated by the fact that the capabilities China is developing appear in excess of the ones required to maintain the level of strategic stability itself describes.

How do Chinese strategists account for the developments making up China's impressive nuclear and military modernization? China's strategic community reasons that the country's modernization efforts are designed to ensure the survivability of its nuclear retaliatory capabilities (second-strike), without which its nuclear forces would have little deterrence effect. MAD has so far proven effective because nuclear powers possess second-strike capability. Without it, a state is believed to be vulnerable to attack and coercion. Concerned by US advances in nuclear and conventional strike, C4ISR, and BMD, China argues that it is simply "upgrading its insurance policy against a massive nuclear first strike by the United States without gaining any new political leverage in the process"⁷⁷ while trying to maintain its second-strike capability (the conditions that constitute Beijing's definition of strategic stability). If the US develops new BMD technologies that threaten the credibility of China's second-strike capability, for example, China must seek new upgrades to its nuclear and conventional arsenal which penetrate those defenses.

China's Perception of the 2018 NPR's Three Major Changes

1. US Nuclear Modernization

Chinese analysts would likely argue that upgrades to US nuclear forces directly undermine China's nuclear deterrent by either widening the technological gap China must then catch up with or compromising the survivability of China's nuclear forces during conflict. In either case, China's strategic community feels the credibility of the country's nuclear deterrent is threatened and potentially neutralized by American strategic primacy, which both leaves China susceptible to attack and inhibits crisis stability.⁷⁸ Logically, Beijing should then seek to improve the effectiveness of its deterrent to level the playing field and achieve strategic stability. The result, however,

75 Lewis, "Chinese Views of Nuclear Weapons," 38.

76 Weidi, "Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking," 38.

77 Thomas J. Christensen, "The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35, no. 4 (2012): 447-87. Doi:10.1080/01402390.2012.714710, 448.

78 Fravel and Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation," 86.

is an endless cycle of reciprocal developments and advancements between the two powers – a classic security dilemma that can lead to arms races and proliferation. While China would prefer to maintain a ‘lean and effective’ nuclear force, the viability of Beijing’s NFU policy is being perpetually challenged by US superiority. US strategic primacy capitalizes on China’s NFU commitment by neutralizing the lethality of its smaller arsenal with asymmetrical advancements provided by superior nuclear, C4ISR, BMD, conventional strike, and ICBM capabilities. China opposes US modernization efforts to upgrade its nuclear triad with new capabilities the PLA has yet to develop or at least deploy. US advances threaten China’s definition of strategic stability.⁷⁹

The 2018 NPR’s modernization efforts will likely prompt China to actively seek solutions that either undermine these advancements or bring China to parity with them. This analysis is consistent with previous studies that found Beijing has been pursuing, with great determination, a rigorous modernization of its own military and nuclear capabilities. It should come as no surprise that China’s own modernization efforts traverse a technological gap widened by many of the same areas the US is enhancing. Consequently, China is likely to continue actively opposing the NPR’s proposed modernization efforts.

2. Reintroduction of Nuclear War-fighting into U.S. Deterrence Strategy

Beijing’s reported pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons and potential development of a nuclear war-fighting doctrine, however, bears no apparent weight on its decision to oppose US efforts in the area. China strongly opposes the idea of limited nuclear warfare, which it calls “Cold War-era.”⁸⁰ When US President George W. Bush announced intentions to develop nuclear bunker busters (a type of tactical nuclear weapon), for instance, the administration faced immediate and harsh criticism from China.⁸¹ The fundamental reason for their position can be observed in China’s opposition to any action that lowers the threshold for nuclear weapons use. Tactical nuclear weapons lower this threshold by enabling limited (as opposed to all-out) nuclear warfare, where the incentives for nuclear use are greater. As China’s strategic community is likely to argue, behaviors that lower the nuclear threshold weaken China’s deterrence, undermine strategic stability, and threaten crisis stability in the region. Conversely, actions that raise the nuclear threshold, such as restricting nuclear arsenals to the possession of high-yield weapons – a move which restricts nuclear weapons use to largely infeasible and unattractive large-scale conflicts – deter attack and strengthen China’s hand.

When the use of nuclear weapons is confined to all-out nuclear war, China’s

79 Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation,” 15.

80 BBC News, “China derides ‘Cold War’ US nuclear plan,” February 4, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42935758>

81 Bin, “Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking,” 6.

smaller arsenal and NFU policy achieve parity with America's larger and more sophisticated arsenal. Under these circumstances, China believes it can maintain strategic stability. However, in the event of a limited nuclear war precipitated by US first-use, China is currently disadvantaged by America's growing insulation from a second-strike and potential incentives for limited nuclear escalation. China fears that its smaller arsenal could lead the US to calculate that its nuclear, C4ISR, and conventional strategic strike capabilities give it an advantage in limited nuclear war. While China is potentially looking into nuclear war-fighting capabilities, the country's lack of transparency makes it difficult to determine if they do indeed possess any proportional retaliatory capabilities in the event of limited nuclear war. As a result, China is likely to oppose this proposed change to US nuclear policy.

3. America's Expanded Conditions for Nuclear Weapons Use

China's NFU policy is as constraining as it is clear: China will only employ nuclear weapons if nuclear weapons are first used against itself. Conditions for nuclear weapons use are subsequently limited and defensive in nature. Deng Xiaoping once observed that "[China's] strategy has always been defense, and it will still be strategic defense after 20 years... Even if [China is] modernized in the future, it would still be strategic defense."⁸² But while China has yet to fundamentally diverge from its defensive approach to nuclear deterrence, the US position on nuclear weapons use is potentially changing with the 2018 NPR's latest proposal.

Much in the same way an increase in tactical nuclear weapons threatens China's strategic stability, expanding the conditions for nuclear weapons use additionally threatens stability. Both actions lower the nuclear threshold and make using the weapons more advantageous. This suggests Beijing likely views the proposal, particularly its negative security assurance (an asserted right to adjust conditions for nuclear weapons use suddenly, potentially even arbitrarily),⁸³ as lowering the bar for first-use dangerously low. The concern surrounding this negative security assurance is that the US asserts the right to use nuclear weapons in less than extreme circumstances, increasing the number of scenarios under which nuclear war could conceivably occur. Ostensibly, China will mostly likely attempt to protect its NFU policy, which it sees as a cornerstone of strategic stability. This suggests China will oppose the report's expanded definition and seek solutions that mitigate the threat it poses to the country's NFU policy.

82 Weidi, "Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking," 56.

83 Reif, "Trump Seeks Expanded Nuclear Capabilities."

Predicting China's Nuclear and Military Response to the 2018 NPR

The CCP's Public Reaction

Following the document's release, China's CCP and media organs reacted with swift and strong condemnation.⁸⁴ Comments by a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman offer an illustrative picture of China's opposition to the 2018 NPR: "We hope that the United States will abandon its Cold War mentality, earnestly assume its special disarmament responsibilities, correctly understand China's strategic intentions and objectively view China's national defense and military build-up."⁸⁵

Predicting China's Nuclear and Military Response

Based on China's perception of the three major changes proposed in the 2018 NPR, there is a compelling case to be made that China's response to the report will be one of active opposition. Due to China's preference for a return to its own interpretation of strategic stability, Beijing will seek to undermine America's strategic primacy by expanding its nuclear and military capabilities. First, China can be expected to continue rejecting US interpretations of strategic stability in, among various other venues, media, scholarly literature, and official bilateral negotiations. As identified in this paper's analytical framework and throughout the piece, China's interpretation of strategic stability can be characterized as mutual vulnerability via assured second-strike capability, with a caveat that China can silently work outside the limits of NFU. The US definition of strategic stability looks markedly different. In the preface of the NPR, General James N. Mattis states emphatically that "... a war that can never be won, is never fought."⁸⁶ The US interpretation of strategic stability, gleaned from the 2018 NPR, is a situation in which stability (peace and the US-led post-Cold War international system) is maintained by a nuclear posture so superior that it removes all benefit from an adversary's cost-benefit analysis. The result is a US interpretation of strategic stability closer to definitions of strategic primacy, which China opposes.

The two powers' interpretations of strategic stability are therefore contradictory: what constitutes a stable nuclear security environment is different in Washington than in Beijing. Certainly, the seismic balance of power transition towards bipolarity occurring in the region right now is exacerbating these misunderstandings. Neither country wishes to concede to the other. In order to fully meet China's strategic stability definition—that is, ensure mutual second-strike capability—the US would need to rescind each of the three major changes proposed in the 2018 report, eventually transition to an NFU policy, and allow Beijing to traverse the current technological

84 BBC News, "China derides 'Cold War' US nuclear plan."

85 Ibid.

86 U.S. Department of Defense (2018), 16.

gap between the two. On one hand, such expectations are somewhat unreasonable and highly unrealistic. Based on both the arguments laid out in the NPR as well as comments made by the POTUS, the country's sense of threat is higher than at any point since 9/11. Concerned by the nation's receding power, the weakening US-led post-Cold War international system, China's growing assertiveness, Russia's expanding asymmetrical capabilities, and the rise in great power competition,⁸⁷ the US desires greater security than ever. Many in the US strategic community, including the POTUS, believe the changes proposed in the 2018 NPR enhance the nation's security and improve crisis stability. Moreover, the US's aging nuclear forces do indeed require an update to ensure the deterrent's credibility. It would be unreasonable to expect the US to allow its nuclear forces to fall into disrepair, an action that would also undermine strategic stability. Finally, the US is unlikely to make the transition to no-first-use anytime soon, as Washington has historically sought a level of strategic ambiguity in its nuclear weapons declaratory policy that NFU eliminates.

On the other hand, however, the US interpretation of strategic stability is unreasonable and, in many ways, counterproductive. It is unreasonable to expect China to accept being placed at a permanent nuclear and conventional disadvantage under the premise that stability and peace will be maintained by the United States. Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese strategic community's claim that MAD rests upon the credibility of China's second-strike capability is persuasive. MAD indeed relies on the fear of mutual nuclear destruction – this must apply across the board. The perceived inferiority of one's nuclear deterrent can manifest itself in nuclear arms races, dangerous escalatory rhetoric, and eventually military confrontation. While these effects themselves may not necessarily lead to war, as Acton points out, it has in the past led to a dangerous change in military postures that include “dispersing mobile forces, redeploying existing systems, or developing entirely new ones.”⁸⁸ Perhaps we are seeing the results of that now – China's military modernization continues to push new boundaries. Without a mutually agreeable definition of what strategic stability means, solutions are difficult to prescribe.⁸⁹

Second, evidence suggests Beijing will actively work towards counteracting the proposed changes by expanding its own nuclear and asymmetric military capabilities. To combat the adverse effects of US nuclear force modernization efforts, tactical nuclear weapons, and expanded conditions for nuclear weapons use on China's nuclear deterrent, Beijing will likely seek to upgrade its comparatively inferior nuclear forces with qualitatively greater capabilities and, potentially, a more flexible nuclear doctrine. One of the most consequential scholarly debates happening in international security right now revolves around whether US activities

87 See: “2019 Annual Threat Assessment – U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf>.

88 Acton, “Reclaiming Strategic Stability.”

89 Ibid.

will eventually force China to abandon its NFU policy.⁹⁰ In response to the US's overall modernization efforts, which include advanced submarines, improved missile defense systems, nuclear capable 5th generation fighter jets, and "bunker busters" (all of which jeopardize the survivability of China's nuclear retaliatory capabilities), Beijing may continue covert research, development, or even production of EMP technologies to disable US infrastructure, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to remove US or Russian advantage in nuclear escalation, space-based early warning systems to prevent an overwhelming US first-strike success, hypersonic or MIRV-capable missiles to penetrate US BMD, and mobile or hidden ICBM forces to increase nuclear forces survivability. These upgrades would effectively balance against and manage America's pursuit of strategic primacy, allowing China to achieve its desired interpretation of strategic stability.

On Beijing's part, a successful campaign to counteract the NPR's major changes may indeed bring about a brief period of strategic stability. However, such stability will likely be short lived as long as the US continues to pursue strategic primacy. Yet, if China's leadership feels confident in the country's second-strike capabilities, China can avoid pressure to change its NFU policy and exorbitant defense spending.⁹¹ One of the effects of achieving strategic stability, however, is that China's neighbors may feel threatened by its aggressive military posture. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and other states throughout the Indo-Pacific region may feel threatened by China's improving nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Given the intensity of disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, the blowback from China's attempt at strategic stability might actually heighten tensions in the region. The implication here is that, ironically, China's perceived security position vis-a-vis the US could improve, while its actions push neighbors toward the US alliance system. China's pursuit of strategic stability could potentially delay American departure from the region for several more decades (if possible at all), delaying China's hegemonic control of the region.

Additionally, while China's leadership possesses a number of options for managing the NPR's changes, it faces several obstacles. For example, China could officially announce the research or production of low-yield nuclear weapons to challenge US advantage in the area. However, doing so would raise the nuclear threshold and undermine the country's NFU policy. Next, Beijing could attempt to traverse the technological gap in a bid to ensure the US does not possess an advantage in limited nuclear escalation, by researching and developing greater asymmetrical and non-nuclear capabilities that deter limited nuclear escalation. Such developments could potentially include but are not limited to conventional strike, ICBM, MIRV, NC3, C4ISR, early warning, space, cyber, or even chemical and biological weapon advancements—although the repercussions of some (chemical/biological, in particular) would be so immense they are virtually impossible to

90 Cunningham and Fravel, "Assuring Assured Retaliation," 1.

91 Ibid, 30.

conceive. Third, and most dramatically, Beijing could abandon no-first-use and adopt an ambiguous first-use policy closer to that of the US. The result of this would both ruin the peaceful socialist image the PRC has attempted to construct and could make the chances of limited nuclear escalation unmanageably dangerous. As mentioned earlier, a debate regarding the merits of NFU is just beginning to take root within China's strategic community, so although an end to NFU is not likely, it is also not inconceivable. This analysis suggests that, first, China will not attempt to counteract the NPR's major changes publicly, and second, will not commit to any measure too extreme. Instead, China will undermine US strategic primacy covertly, selectively, and gradually.

Finally, these actions could come at a steep cost for both powers. Strategic primacy is an expensive endeavor and that strategy might not be viable in 30 years. As China looks to overtake America economically by 2050 (in terms of GDP, not PPP),⁹² it will be difficult for the US to continue increasing an already bloated defense budget in response to China's advancements. At some point, China will be able to outspend the US. In other words, there will come a time when maintaining superiority across the entire spectrum of nuclear and conventional military capabilities is no longer financially possible, and the US will have to pick and choose where it allocates funds. Additionally, increases to the US nuclear stockpile raises concerns about America's dedication to its nonproliferation commitments. If the leader of the liberal, rules-based world order increases its nuclear stockpile, America risks discrediting international nonproliferation regimes entirely. The fallout from such an action could be catastrophic – the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world is a national security threat to the US as well as the international community. The NPR, therefore, could also damage the country's international image, a great source of American power.

Conclusion

This paper identified China's perception of the 2018 NPR's major changes and analyzed them through the concepts of strategic stability and strategic primacy, facilitating a prediction of Beijing's most likely response. Its analysis revealed that China's definition of strategic stability emphasizes mutual vulnerability and second-strike capability as its chief method of limiting the incentives for nuclear weapons use and arm races. At the same time, Beijing allows itself a loophole to circumvent the self-imposed constraints of its no-first-use policy. This interpretation of strategic stability is markedly different from the US interpretation, closer to the definition of strategic primacy, which seeks to achieve stability by maintaining a comprehensive and overwhelming advantage over adversaries. The US aims to decrease the

92 David Fickling, "China Could Outrun the U.S. Next Year. Or Never," *Bloomberg*, March 9, 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-08/will-china-overtake-u-s-gdp-depends-how-you-count>.

incentives for nuclear weapons use by ensuring that a war that cannot be won, is never fought. Based on these definitions, the paper finds that China will likely refuse to conform to US perceptions and interpretations of nuclear deterrence strategy and predicts that Beijing will attempt to counteract the various changes proposed in the transformative document.

The findings suggest that China's most likely course of action is the one it is currently on: gradually and silently expanding its own nuclear and military capabilities in an attempt to return the security environment to its desired state of strategic stability. Unless Beijing and Washington can find common ground on a mutual definition of strategic stability, however, their attempts to undermine each other's nuclear strategies could prove catastrophic. Compared to other security areas, disagreement in the nuclear arena risks perpetuating an endless cycle of escalatory responses that could precipitate a military or nuclear crisis if not properly addressed. The result is an unstable security situation that encourages hair-trigger responses neither can control. Between China's fear of insecurity and America's desire for absolute security (or control over security), lies a spectrum that leaves room for these two powers to negotiate a definition more closely aligned with their own security preferences. The good news is that both share a common goal: disincentivizing nuclear weapons use. Neither wishes to stumble into a nuclear war. It is the task of scholars and practitioners to identify that sliver of common interest. Agreement on a more strategically stable environment is not impossible. Any policy prescription to this predicament depends on it.

The US and Soviet Union survived a number of terrifying false alarms and barely avoided nuclear war more than once. They accomplished this through a shared commitment to maintaining open channels of communication. Similarly, the US might be more convinced of China's desire to solely possess second-strike capabilities if Beijing was not consistently pursuing actions inconsistent (or in excess) of its NFU policy. The flip side of this is that the US should, at least temporarily, hold off on the three changes proposed in the NPR, if only to observe China's behavior. If China's modernization efforts slow down simultaneously with the temporary freeze, this might give the two countries enough room to put together a series of short, intensive working-level talks designed to establish new nuclear escalation management and crisis stability practices and principles. Establishing these practices will bring the countries one step closer toward a common definition of strategic stability.

Further analysis on this transformative nuclear policy document, however, is critically needed. The academic community has been provided with an impetus to provide American and Chinese policy makers with an answer to the question: "How can the US and China develop a common definition of strategic stability or shorten the gap between their current interpretations?" Further research should attempt to identify points of potential cooperation on the strategic stability spectrum mentioned above, as well as offer practical solutions for bridging the definition gap. Other research avenues include expanding upon China's most likely course of action in response to the NPR based upon new developments, such as ongoing changes to the US or Chinese nuclear posture.

Most importantly, a sincere attempt at understanding these issues from China's perspective is required to bridge the gap and develop a common, yet sustainable, strategic stability definition. When it comes to the possibility of nuclear war, the stakes are too high not to.

PARTICIPATION IN THE PYEONGCHANG 2018 OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES: SOUTH KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OR NORTH KOREA'S STRATEGIC DETERMINATION?

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In 2017, North Korea posed a great threat to world security with its consecutive nuclear tests, which led to very tense relations between North Korea and South Korea. However, ever since North Korea's participation in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games, which was held in South Korea, an atmosphere of peace and co-prosperity has been on the rise. Indeed, the heads of South Korea and North Korea held a summit on April 27th, 2018, which was followed by the summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un on June 12th, 2018. Moreover, peace talks and subsequent agreements have been made between South Korea and North Korea in the last few months. Consequently, it is clear that North Korea's participation in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games contributed in changing the atmosphere between South Korea and North Korea. This paper addresses the reasons and logic as to why North Korea decided to take part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games. Two motives will be considered here: 1) the successful South Korean government public diplomacy efforts; 2) North Korea's internal affairs and needs. This paper will first address the brief history of sports diplomacy between South Korea and North Korea. It will further assess South Korea's efforts to get North Korea to participate in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games, especially in terms of its public diplomacy. Moreover, it will analyze North Korea's domestic affairs and its motivation in taking part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games. The paper will conclude by providing future prospects and ways to further utilize sports diplomacy in international relations.

Keywords: *South Korea, North Korea, PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games, Public Diplomacy, Sports Diplomacy*

Introduction

In 2017, North Korea posed a great threat to world security with its consecutive

nuclear tests, which led to very tense relations between North Korea and South Korea. However, ever since North Korea's participation in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games, an atmosphere of peace and co-prosperity has been on the rise. Officials of South Korea and North Korea held a summit on April 27th, 2018, which was followed by the summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un on June 12th, 2018. Moreover, peace talks and subsequent agreements have been made between South Korea and North Korea in 2018.

Consequently, this paper would like to address the reasons and logic behind North Korea's decision to take part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games. Was this due to the successful public diplomacy efforts by the South Korean government or was it mainly due to North Korea's strategic determination and needs? This paper will first address the brief history of sports diplomacy between South Korea and North Korea. Next, it will assess South Korea's efforts to get North Korea to participate in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games, especially in terms of its public diplomacy. Additionally, North Korea's internal affairs and environment along with its motivation in taking part in the Winter Games will be analyzed. The paper will conclude by providing future prospects and ways to further utilize sports diplomacy in international relations. Indeed, it is argued that the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games were more than a mere sporting event and that North Korea's participation in the Winter Games changed the atmosphere between South Korea and North Korea.

History of Sports Diplomacy Between South Korea and North Korea

South Korea has achieved significant economic growth after its liberation from Japanese colonialism and the devastation of the Korean War. In terms of the traditional measurements of power, it has, as of 2018, the 7th most powerful military in the world and its economy ranks 11th worldwide.¹ After South Korea's democratization and the development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), the South Korean government increased and shifted its focus to *public diplomacy* in order to assert more soft power, which can be exemplified by the success of the "Korean Wave." Although the definition of the term is subject to debate, public diplomacy is a "diplomatic engagement with people" and a "multi-disciplinary area of scholarship that is now receiving more attention from scholars than any other aspect of diplomacy."² It can be understood as a "government-to-foreign people program" and "a governmental or governmentally funded foreign policy activity."³ Other classifications oppose traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy, mainly because

1 "2018 Military Strength Ranking," GlobalFirepower.com - World Military Strengths Detailed. Accessed July 08, 2018. <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.

2 Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman, *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

3 Roberts W. R., "What Is Public Diplomacy? Past Practices, Present Conduct, Possible Future," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (2007): 36-52.

of the latter's acknowledgment of foreign publics.⁴ Furthermore, the concept of new public diplomacy is defined by its recognition of new actors and various objectives.⁵

Likewise, the objective of public diplomacy is "to create, for a given country, as positive a climate as possible among foreign publics in order to facilitate the explanation and hopefully acceptance of its foreign policy."⁶ Because sports diplomacy should be understood as one form of public diplomacy, it appears important to outline its characteristics and influences. The main strategic objectives of sport diplomacy are:

*"(a) providing an unofficial reason and location for international leaders to meet and begin a dialogue; (b) providing insights into the host country and educating others about it; (c) bridging cultural and linguistic differences among nations and seeking common ground through sports; (d) creating a platform for new trade agreements or legislation; (e) creating awareness for the international relationship through sport ambassadors; (f) creating a legacy for the host country, improving its image in the world; and (g) using sport to provide legitimacy for a new nation."*⁷

Moreover, soft power, a term coined by Joseph Nye, points to the influence a country has over other states and over the public based on its "attraction". The notion of soft power is built upon three state resources: "its culture (in places where it is attractive to others); its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad); and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority)."⁸ The promotion of one's soft power is widespread and has led to fierce competition among Northeast Asian countries, such as China and Japan. As Hall pointed out: "There are two arms races happening in Asia today: one for military capabilities and another for the weapons of 'soft power.'"⁹ Another useful concept is "nation branding," which is defined as "a conscious effort to influence the social imaginary of a nation."¹⁰ In recent days, a development from soft power to smart power—understood here as "the ability to combine hard and soft power into

4 Geun Lee and Kadir Ayhan, "Why Do We Need Non-state Actors in Public Diplomacy? Theoretical Discussion of Relational, Networked and Collaborative Public Diplomacy," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 22, no. 1 (2015): 57-77.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Judit Trunkos and Bob Heere, *Sport Diplomacy: A Review of How Sports Can Be Used to Improve International Relations* (2017).

8 Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power the Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009).

9 Ian Hall and Frank Smith, "The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional Competition," *Asian Security* (2013): 1-18.

10 Felicia Istad, "A Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy in South Korea," *Korea's Public Diplomacy* (December 2016): 49-80.

a successful strategy”—is on the rise.¹¹ The importance of non-state actors is being reevaluated as well. Indeed, as Lee argues, “both from a pragmatic and normative perspective, state agencies should look for partners actively as well as opening the channels for passive partnerships (contractor and collaboration).”¹²

Table 1. Comparison of Three Types of Public Diplomacy

	Conventional Diplomacy	Old Public Diplomacy	New Public Diplomacy
Subject	Government	Government	Government, Non-governmental Actors
Resources/ Assets	Hard Power	Soft Power	Foreign Publics; Government; Virtual Global Space
Medium/ Carrier	Governmental Dialogues & Negotiations	Public Relations (PR) Campaign; Propaganda; Old Media	Diverse Media, Including New Digital Media
Communication Type	Horizontal, Closed Negotiations	One-way, Unilateral, Asymmetric, Closed	Two-way, Horizontal, Symmetric, Open

Kim, Taehwan. “Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy: A Conceptual Model for Korea’s “New Public Diplomacy”.” *Korea Observer* 43, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 527-55.

Table 2. Categories of Public Diplomacy

Resources	Soft Power Assets	Public Diplomacy (PD) Realms
Political Economic Expense, Values & Institutions	Information Knowledge	Knowledge Diplomacy
Cultural Heritage	Korean Wave	Culture Diplomacy
Language & Academic Resources	Korean Language, Korean Studies	Korean Studies Diplomacy

11 Joseph Nye, “Smart Power,” *The Huffington Post* (May 25, 2011). Accessed July 10, 2018. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/smart-power_b_74725.html.

12 Geun Lee and Kadir Ayhan, “Why Do We Need Non-state Actors in Public Diplomacy? Theoretical Discussion of Relational, Networked and Collaborative Public Diplomacy,” 57-77.

Corporate Resources	Corporate Competitiveness, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)	Corporate Diplomacy
Sports & Tourism Resources	Competitiveness Tourism Package	Sports & Tourism Diplomacy

Kim, Taehwan. "Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy: A Conceptual Model for Korea's "New Public Diplomacy"." *Korea Observer* 43, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 527-55.

Among the many themes related to public diplomacy in the context of hard and soft power, and with the rise of the relevance of soft power, sports diplomacy can essentially be explained by two distinct perspectives. First, sports diplomacy creates a "convenient opportunity for politicians or diplomats to meet," and it may be utilized as "a direct diplomatic tool and sometimes a driver for political rapprochement."¹³ Similarly, David Rowe states that "sports diplomacy is a fairly safe and mild means of 'making friends' and defusing conflicts."¹⁴ Jacquie L'Etang explains that governments utilize sports as a medium to signal their intention to enhance current relations.¹⁵ The second perspective is somehow of a wider scope. It asserts that "sport is used as a tool to enhance – or, sometimes, aggravate – diplomatic relations between two parties."¹⁶ This outlook is different in that it draws "attention to problematic relations."¹⁷ Moreover, sports boycott and sports isolation are the two main methods for states to express dissatisfaction or expose international conflicts through sports.¹⁸ Nygard and Gates further explain that sport is employed for four main objectives: 1) image building; 2) creating a platform for discussion; 3) building trust toward reconciliation; 4) as a vehicle for integration and anti-racism.¹⁹ In this sense, and because such interactions are regarded as low-politics, sports diplomacy is especially influential in that it can facilitate the trust-building process between states that have tense political relationships. As Larson argues: "Events such as the Olympics and the World Cup are highly desirable venues even if they are not especially profitable because they further embed a country in both the global economy and the minds of

13 Michał Marcin Kobierecki, "Sports Diplomacy of Norway," *Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* 20, no. 1 (2017): 131-46.

14 David Rowe, *Global Media Sport: Flows, Forms and Futures* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).

15 Jacquie L'Etang, *Sports Public Relations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013).

16 Michał Marcin Kobierecki, "Sports Diplomacy of Norway," 131-46.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Nygard and Gates, "Soft Power at Home and Abroad: Sport Diplomacy, Politics and Peace Building," *International Area Studies Review* 16, no. 3 (2013): 235-43.

global citizens.”²⁰ Considering the peculiar relationship between South Korea and North Korea, sports diplomacy can be applied extensively and with great potential.

The sporting interactions between South and North Korea can be divided into two categories, one being sporting events that take place between the two countries, and the other, international sporting events in which the two countries are taking part together, whether it is as one unified team or as two separated entities. If they compete as one team, there are certain elements that the two countries have to agree upon, such as the official name, the flag, and the anthem of the unified team. For the Winter Games, the official name of the unified team was Korea and the flag, one with a white background showing the Korean peninsula in the middle, painted blue.²¹ The anthem was the 1920s version of Arirang.²² Some of the more sensitive agendas were the athletes selection process, who the head of the unified team should be, how to train the athletes and the organization that will be in charge of the entire process. Nonetheless, North and South Korea have experience in negotiating with each other.

The trends of sports diplomacy between South Korea and North Korea and the meaning they imply has changed over time. South Korea first took part in international sporting games when it joined the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in June 1947. In the 1960s, President Park Chung-hee put more emphasis on sports and the participation of South Korea in international sporting events increased, as demonstrated in the graph below (Figure 1).²³ The number of people taking part in international sporting events increased from 1,543 in 1969 to 5,313 in 1980 and to 8,091 in 1991. The number of total events increased from 108 in 1969 to 429 in 1980 and to 527 in 1991 as well. This trend continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Interestingly, during the 1980s, South Korea hosted two major international sporting events: the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympics. South Korea went to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup, 2014 Asian Games, and the most recent 2018 Olympic Winter Games.

The objectives and participation of North Korea changed over time as well, which affected the global political atmosphere. During the Cold War, ideology and propaganda were one of the main objectives of sports diplomacy. However, after the Cold War, a different approach—one that attempted to ease tensions between states and to normalize international relations, and that emphasized the branding of one’s

20 Chris Larson, “South Korean Sports Diplomacy and Soft Power,” *International Journal of Foreign Studies* 9, no. 1 (2016): 93-116.


21 Kim Chae-Woon, “The Current State of Sports Exchange between South and North Korea and Solutions for Vitalization,” *Journal of Sport and Leisure Studies* 63 (February 2016): 23-33.

22 Ibid.

23 Kim Youngin, “Rethinking of Korean Foreign Policy’s Practical Strategy: Focusing on Sports Diplomacy toward the Communist Bloc during the Cold War Era,” *East and West Studies* 29, no. 4 (2017): 5-38.

national image—emerged. In the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, communication between South Korea and North Korea was highly limited. Nonetheless, there were still limited interactions between the two countries during sporting events. The hope was that such interaction might potentially influence both states’ politics. Indeed, efforts were made to form a unified team at the 59th International Olympic Committee (IOC) council in Moscow on June 14th, 1962. Additionally, three meetings between the two countries took place, where the formation of a unified team for the 1964 Summer Olympics was discussed. Unfortunately, those efforts failed. The 1970s were significant in terms of sports diplomacy because of the success of the US/China “détente” and its famous ping-pong diplomacy. This, once again, proved how sports can be used to reach political goals, such as the development of peaceful relations between countries. Similar strategies were further implemented between South and North Korea.

Figure 1. North-South International Sports Exchange



The Relative Success of South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Efforts

Successful public diplomacy is determined by the achievement of one state’s objective and goals through public diplomacy. In the particular case of the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games, North Korea’s participation was the criteria of success in conducting public diplomacy. In this context, although rankings are not absolute figures, it does indicate a general understanding of how influential a state could be in conducting public diplomacy. Rankings and the success of public diplomacy

efforts of a state are correlated, which means that the higher a state's ranking is, the higher the general influence and possibility of success in conducting public diplomacy could be. This, in turn, relates to the probability of a state achieving its diplomatic goals by conducting public diplomacy. Therefore, examining such figures can help to provide a broad overview of the possibilities and influence of a state's public diplomacy efforts.

Several measurements will be observed in order to assess how effective South Korea's public diplomacy has been, especially in exerting its soft power. These measurements provide a general overview of how much influence South Korea's public diplomacy efforts can have on North Korea. The first measurements discussed here is the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) World Competitiveness Rankings: "The IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) is the world's most thorough and comprehensive annual report on the competitiveness of nations, published without interruption since 1989."²⁴ Moreover, it analyzes "the totality of their competencies to achieve increased prosperity," with the belief that "an economy's competitiveness cannot be reduced only to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and productivity because enterprises must also cope with political, social and cultural dimensions."²⁵ The ranking considers four categories, namely: 1) economic performance (domestic economy, international trade, inter-nation investment, employment, prices) with 5 subfields and 83 criteria of assessment; 2) government efficiency (public finance, fiscal policy, institutional framework, business legislation, societal framework) with 5 subfields and 73 criteria of assessment; 3) business efficiency (productivity, labor market, finance, management practices, attitudes and values) with 5 subfields and 71 criteria of assessment; 4) infrastructure (basic infrastructure, technological infrastructure, scientific infrastructure, health and environment, education) with 5 subfields and 115 criteria of assessment. South Korea's rankings show continuous improvements, as demonstrated in the graph below.

Another notable factor is the IMD Digital Competitive Rankings, which "introduces several new criteria to measure countries' ability to adopt and explore digital technologies leading to transformation in government practices, business models and society in general."²⁶ This analysis is based on three themes and 10 subcategories of knowledge (talent, training & education), technology (scientific concentration, regulatory framework, capital), and future readiness (technological framework, adaptive attitudes, business agility, IT integration). The IMD Competitive Rankings and the IMD Digital Competitive Rankings of South Korea point to two conclusions. First, despite some fluctuations, South Korea has shown continuous improvements in its IMD Competitive Rankings. Second, according to the IMD


24 "Copyright," IMD World Competitiveness Online. Accessed July 08, 2018. <https://world-competitiveness.imd.org/>.

25 Ibid.

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Digital Competitive Rankings, South Korea has a comparative advantage in the field of digital diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy. Considering South Korea’s unique advantages as well as its overall performance, it is very likely that South Korea’s public diplomacy efforts had an influence on North Korea’s decision to partake in the Winter Games.

Figure 2. World Competitive Rankings and World Digital Rankings



“Copyright,” IMD Competitiveness Online. Accessed July 08, 2018. [https:// worldcompetitiveness.imd.org/](https://worldcompetitiveness.imd.org/).

A second important form of assessment is the BBC World Service Polls. This poll indicates if people perceive a specific country as either “mainly positive” or “mainly negative.” The results change every year and are related to both the domestic and international conditions of that specific year. In 2013, 36% held positive views while 31% had negative sentiments towards South Korea and in 2014 South Korea polled 38% mainly positive and 34% mainly negative reviews. In 2017, South Korea received 37% mainly positive and 36% mainly negative critics. These numbers are quite competitive and indicate how South Korea’s public diplomacy efforts could have a significant influence on North Korea.

Thirdly, there are sources that rank the value of a nation’s brand such as the Anholt/GfK Roper Nation Brands Index,²⁷ the Bloom Consulting Country Branding Rankings, and the fDi Intelligence brand rankings.²⁸ The Anholt/GfK Roper Nation Brands Index assesses the brand value of a country based on six criteria, which are people, tourism, exports, governance, culture and heritage, as well as investment and immigration. In 2008, South Korea ranked 33rd and in 2009, South Korea

27 “Nation Brands Index,” Nation Brands Index. May 07, 2018. Accessed July 08, 2018. <https://nation-brands.gfk.com/>.

28 “Home.” FDI - FDIIntelligence.com. Accessed July 08, 2018. <https://www.fdiintelligence.com/>.

ranked 31st. In addition, the Bloom Consulting Country Brand Ranking on Trade and Tourism is published annually “to extensively analyze the brand performance of 193 countries and territories worldwide and the Digital Country Index - Measuring the Brand appeal of countries and territories in the Digital World.”²⁹ This analysis is based on variables such as economic performance, digital demand, CBS rating, and online performance. The global top 25 performers were the United States of America, Thailand, Spain, Hong Kong, Australia, France, China, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Turkey, Macao, Singapore, Japan, Canada, Mexico, Switzerland, Austria, Greece, Portugal, Republic of Korea, India, Malaysia, Netherlands, and Taiwan. Moreover, the fDi Intelligence brand rankings³⁰ has a brand ranking score that ranges from 0 to 100. 0 points, 20 points, 35 points, 50 points, 65 points and 80 points are respectively for falling brand ratings, weak brand ratings, average brand ratings, strong brand ratings, very strong brand ratings, and extremely strong brand ratings. The top 10 best-performing brands of 2017 were Iceland, Spain, China, Vietnam, South Korea, Greece, Estonia, Philippines, and Thailand. The top 10 most valuable brands of 2017 were the US, China, Germany, Japan, UK, France, Canada, India, Italy, and South Korea.

The will of the South Korean government to further promote public diplomacy as an important element of their national agenda is reflected in government documents. One of the most representative is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs report “South Korea, First Plan on Public Diplomacy: 2017-2021.” This report offers an overall blueprint on the strategies and policy directions of South Korea’s public diplomacy. The report states its vision as, “South Korea’s charm, communicating to the world with its citizens,” and its five main objectives are described as follows: “strengthening the national image by utilizing abundant cultural assets, expanding a correct understanding and perception of South Korea, creating a friendly strategic environment in implementing policies, settlement of mutual cooperation systems and strengthening public diplomacy actors.”³¹ The specific strategies to reach such goals are divided into four categories: “cultural public diplomacy, knowledge public diplomacy, policy public diplomacy, public diplomacy conducted with citizens, and public diplomacy infrastructure.”³² One notable feature is that under the fourth objective, i.e. “creating a friendly strategic environment to implement policies,” the report claims “securing the support of the international community in achieving peace and unification on the Korean peninsula.”³³ This indicates how the South Korean government hopes to use public diplomacy to achieve peace and unification on the

29 “Bloom Consulting | COUNTRY BRAND RANKING,” Bloom Consulting | Nation Branding & City Branding. Accessed July 08, 2018. <https://www.bloom-consulting.com/en/country-brand-ranking>.

30 “Home.” FDI - FDIIntelligence.com. Accessed July 08, 2018. <https://www.fdiintelligence.com/>.

31 South Korea. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2017.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

Korean peninsula. The three related specific plans are: “implementing unification public diplomacy to each states considering their perception of the situation on the Korean peninsula, creating strategic contents analyzing the benefits of unification to each states and passing on the public opinions of the foreign state, and expanding general sentiments of agreement on Korean unification among foreign students and Koreans living abroad.”³⁴

Furthermore, public diplomacy is systematically organized and analyzed, in various regional and administrative levels. “South Korea, First Plan on Public Diplomacy: 2017-2021” provides an overall blueprint, while the 2018 Public Diplomacy Ministry of Foreign Affairs annual report is more of a guidance report for the central government, the local government, and the major cities. For instance, there are separate reports on big cities such as Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Daejeon, Incheon, Gwangju, Ulsan and Sejong. The concept of sports diplomacy is mentioned in each of these reports. The report promotes the “strengthening [of] the national image by utilizing abundant cultural assets,” such as the “effective utilization of international sporting events.”³⁵ Especially, it emphasizes “the promotion of the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games and the Paralympics.”³⁶ The goals and expected outcomes are stated as: “spreading awareness of South Korea and seeking to improve the national image via successful bids of international sporting events and successfully hosting such events.”³⁷ The report also states that South Korea should continue cooperation and benefit from the momentum with various people in the sports industry even after the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games. In addition, another policy related to sports diplomacy is hosting Taekwondo competitions. The goals and expected outcomes are as follow:

“Expanding public diplomacy efforts and improving the national image via Taekwondo, expanding intimate acquaintances by introducing Taekwondo and Korean culture in general, arranging infrastructure needed by expanding the supply of Taekwondo and keeping its stance in future Olympic games reaffirming the stance of being a Taekwondo suzerain.”³⁸

The value of Taekwondo in terms of sports diplomacy has been broadly studied. Indeed, “Taekwondo is an effective traditional cultural diplomacy means which can diffuse Korea’s traditional values with low cost among the international cooperation’s main projects such as short-term invitation for training, dispatching medical staff, providing grants, dispatching performers.”³⁹ Therefore, the government hopes to

34 Ibid.

35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea, 2018.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Yoon Kyu Choi, “The Role of Taekwondo as a Means of Sports Diplomacy,” *The International Conference of Taekwondo* (2017): 67-72.

expand Taekwondo by holding national competitions and strengthening the global Taekwondo network. Taekwondo has an important presence in South Korea in that it is an official Olympic sport since 2000, has a long history and originated from South Korea.

Moreover, by observing South Korean government documents from the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, one can observe the emphasis put in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games by the South Korean government. The government seems to be increasing its awareness and focus on sports diplomacy. According to the 2018 annual plan, the most urgent issue is indeed the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games. First, the report considers the preparation for the games, i.e. how they should prepare for the cold weather by providing blankets and heaters.⁴⁰ The documents also emphasize safety (medical service) and terrorism prevention. Marketing tickets for the games was mentioned as well. Finally, it clearly states the hope to generate “peace Olympics,” by “successfully cooperating with other agencies and supporting North Korea’s participation in the Olympics as well as promoting cultural exchange.”⁴¹ Secondly, in terms of receiving guests, plans to create a comfortable environment are illustrated.⁴² For instance, improving accommodation facilities, transportation, and also providing basic guidance in touring the region. Thirdly, improving the competitions by providing experts and medical care are elaborated.⁴³ Fourthly, an accessible environment for the disabled was mentioned.⁴⁴ Finally, by active promotion, an exciting atmosphere was hoped for. For instance, promotion could be done via various media platforms and by promoting specific symbolic events to create a passionate atmosphere.⁴⁵ A variety of cultural events were also introduced.

South Korea sought North Korea’s participation in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games as it would draw more international attention and increase the significance of the event. The participation of North Korea in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games drew much attention from international media and head of states. The official report from the International Olympic Committee (IOC) stated North Korea’s participation as the historic moment of the event.⁴⁶ Furthermore, PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games enjoyed the largest amount of broadcast coverage and was the most digitally watched games in history.⁴⁷ Other benefits could also be expected with North Korea’s participation. For instance, a peaceful

40 Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, South Korea, 2018, 1-38.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 International Olympic Committee, Factsheet the Olympic Winter Games, June 5, 2018, accessed November 28, 2018, <https://www.olympic.org/documents/games-pyeongchang-2018-olympic-winter-games>.

47 Ibid.

atmosphere between South Korea and North Korea could lead to more international investments and business opportunities in South Korea, with the reevaluation of economic risk factors.

In addition, North Korea's participation was beneficial in increasing support for the Moon Jae-in administration in terms of South Korea's domestic politics. Although Moon Jae-in became the president of South Korea with an overwhelming support rate of 81 percent, the success of hosting the Olympics was crucial to the president and the administration. The president ascended to the presidency in May 2017 with the sudden impeachment of the former president Park Geun-hae. Considering the special circumstances of South Korea, such as the timeline of hosting the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics and how president Moon Jae-in emphasized peace and harmony with North Korea, the success of the event was crucial to the evaluation of his administration in its early stages.

Furthermore, North Korea's participation in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games was considered to soften South Korea and North Korea relations in the context of sports diplomacy. There have been many cases in which the success of major sporting events led to warm relations between states. One of the most representative is the ping-pong diplomacy between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States during the Cold War. There are also other successful cases such as the baseball games between the United States and Japan after World War II, which were instrumental in re-engaging Japan into the international sphere. In this sense, it is natural that South Korea also sought to exert sports diplomacy for its benefit.

North Korea's Strategic Determination

In terms of public diplomacy, there was almost no interaction and no channel of communication between South Korea and North Korea before 2018, especially with the high level of sanctions due to North Korea's nuclear tests. There are various kinds of sanctions imposed on North Korea. Some are imposed by international organizations like the United Nations while some are imposed by individual entities such as the United States, South Korea, Japan, the European Union, and China. The United Nations, specifically, imposed a series of sanctions (as demonstrated in the graph below). In addition, the United States imposed various restrictions, such as the Trading with the Enemy Act, starting from the 1950s. In 2016, President Barack Obama enacted the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act followed by the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act in 2017. Travel was also banned to North Korea after the death of Otto Warmbier on July 2017. Recently, President Donald Trump imposed Executive Order 13810 as well. Similarly, South Korea imposed separate sanctions, especially after the sinking of the South Korean naval ship, the Cheonan, in 2010. This incident is known as the 24 May Measure. President Park also evacuated the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) as a response to the nuclear tests in 2016. KIC is an economic collaboration project launched in 2004, largely financed by South Korea and located in North Korea near

the demilitarized zone.⁴⁸ 124 companies from various industries including “clothing and textiles, car parts and semiconductors”⁴⁹ are situated in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Moreover, Japan also imposed separate sanctions starting from 2016 and the European Union imposed a series of sanctions starting from 2006.

China has been one of the traditional allies of North Korea due to its political interests. Nonetheless, because of high international pressures, China has also banned exports of some petroleum products and limited trade with North Korea, therefore aligning with the sanctions of the United Nations. A series of sanctions were imposed on North Korea by the UN Security Council; Resolution 825 (1993) was first imposed as a response to North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), urging North Korea to reconsider.⁵⁰ Later, Resolution 1695 (2006) banned selling materials needed to bolster North Korea’s ballistic missiles program.⁵¹ After each nuclear tests, Resolution 1874 (2009) expanded trade embargos and member states were encouraged to inspect and destroy ships or cargo suspected of carrying nuclear weapons. Resolution 2094 (2013) imposed sanctions on money transfers with the objective to exclude North Korea from the international financial system. Resolution 2270 (2016) banned the export of gold, vanadium, titanium, rare earth metals, coal and iron to North Korea.⁵² The recent Resolution 2397 (2017) was a response to the launch of Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile. It condemned the missile launch and tightened sanctions, restricting fuel imports, trade, and North Koreans working abroad as well as freezing assets.⁵³ Therefore, in this international and domestic context, where imposing sanctions and secluding North Korea is common, it is unlikely that South Korea was able to greatly influence or exert its public diplomacy efforts over North Korea.

In addition, documents from the Ministry of Unification of South Korea further illustrate how there was almost no communication between South Korea and North Korea before the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games. For instance, aid to North Korea can be categorized into governmental aid and non-governmental aid. Both governmental and non-governmental aid have been on the decrease and there was almost no aid since 2016. Moreover, in terms of North-South interchange, there was almost no interchange of vehicles and vessels since 2016. There was almost no interchange of people since 2015, but there was a sudden increase in 2018, which can be attributed to North Korean’s participation in the PyeongChang

48 “What Is the Kaesong Industrial Complex?” BBC, February 10, 2016. Accessed February 11, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-22011178>.

49 Ibid.

50 “Security Council, SC, UNSC, Security, Peace, Sanctions, Veto, Resolution, President, United Nations, UN, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution, Prevention,” United Nations. Accessed November 28, 2018. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions>.


51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.


2018 Olympic Winter Games. Additionally, the total amount of trade between South Korea and North Korea drastically decreased since 2016, with the close of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and because of additional sanctions imposed on North Korea. Finally, the number of summits held at various governmental levels continuously decreased since 2008 and reached zero in the years of 2012, 2016, and 2017. However, this number slightly increased in 2018. Likewise, there are no infrastructures that facilitate any kind of public diplomacy efforts in North Korea, which differentiates North Korea from other states that South Korea has successfully exerted public diplomacy over. For instance, most North Koreans do not have access to the internet and the television. Even among the elite, which has access to the internet, a large proportion of data is censored by the North Korean government. Even South Korean diplomats and embassies are non-existent in North Korea.

Figure 3. Aid to North Korea




South Korea, Ministry of Unification, Humanitarian Cooperation, September, 2018, accessed November 29, 2018, <https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/business/statistics/>.

Figure 4. North-South Interactions




South Korea, Ministry of Unification, North Korea-South Korea Exchange of Human and Material Resources, May 2018, accessed November 29, 2018. <https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/business/statistics/>

Figure 5. North-South Trade in Million Dollars



South Korea, Ministry of Unification, North Korea-South Korea Interchange and Cooperation, 2017, accessed November 29, 2018, <https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/business/statistics/>.

Figure 6. Total Number of North-South Summits



South Korea, Ministry of Unification, North Korea-South Korea Summits, September 30, 2018, accessed November 29, 2018, <https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/business/statistics/>.

Taking into account the political atmosphere, it seems that North Korea’s participation in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games was mainly due to its strategic determination. North Korea considered itself to have enough political leverage for negotiations mainly because of the success of its nuclear weapon development programs. It is likely that North Korea could not take part in negotiations even if it had such intentions, as North Korea is an internationally secluded state and does not possess any significant economic or military leverage. For such a state to have enough political leverage and succeed in negotiations, unconventional methods are one of the few ways to accumulate power at a quick pace. As demonstrated in the table below, North Korea conducted a total of six recorded nuclear tests. The first nuclear test took place on October 9th, 2006, the second on May 25th, 2009, the third on February 12th, 2013, the fourth on January 6th, 2016, the fifth on September 9th, 2016, and the most recent on September 4th, 2017. The magnitude and the frequency of nuclear tests increased over time. Almost three years passed between the first nuclear test and the second nuclear test, and four years between the second nuclear test and the third nuclear test. However, the

three most recent nuclear tests occurred within an approximately two-year time gap. Interestingly, four out of six nuclear tests were conducted during the reign of Kim Jong-un, which indicates Kim Jong-un's will to fully develop its nuclear weapons within a short time frame.

Table 2. North Korea's Nuclear Tests

Time	2006.10.9	2009.5.25	2013.2.12	2016.1.6	2016.9.9	2017.9.4
Artificial Earthquake	Magnitude of 3.9	4.5	4.9	4.8	5.0	5.7 (South Korea) 6.3 (U.S. & China)
(Estimated) Power of Explosion	1kt	2~6kt	6~7kt	6kt	10kt	Over 10kt
Nuclear Test Ingredients	Plutonium	Plutonium	Presumed Uranium	Hydrogen bomb (North Korea) Boosted fission weapon assessed	Presumed Boosted fission weapon	Hydrogen bomb (North Korea)

An, Jihye. "[그래픽] 북한 1~6 차 핵실험 비교." Joongang Daily, September 4, 2017. Accessed November 28, 2018. <https://news. Joins.com/article/21902510>.

North Korea's ambition to become a nuclear state cannot be explained solely through concepts such as deterrence or political leverage. Rather, it directly relates to its state legitimacy as well as its state identity. For instance, the country's constitution clearly states that North Korea is a nuclear state. This gives the government more reason to develop its nuclear weapons before negotiating with other major states in the international arena. Indeed, "in accordance with *Byungjin*, North Korea has proclaimed itself a nuclear state."⁵⁴ *Byungjin* refers to the parallel development policy of nuclear weapons and economic development that was adopted by the country in 2013. Moreover, Kim Jong-un's speech at the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea demonstrates the importance that nuclear weapons have for its government. He promoted "the resilience of the DPRK in maintaining its independence with 'powerful arms' and boasted of North Korea's strengths in 'politics, military affairs, the economy, science and technology, and culture."⁵⁵

In addition, the rather sudden decision to take part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games found in Kim Jong-un's 2018 New Year speech indicates that this was a strategic internal decision. Kim Jong-un's New Year speech of 2018 is especially significant as North Korea is a communist authoritarian regime in which

54 Leif-Eric Easley, "North Korean Identity as a Challenge to East Asia's Regional Order," *Korean Social Science Research Council* (June 2017): 51-71.

55 Ibid.

the leader's voice represents the narrative of the entire state. In the 2018 New Year speech, Kim Jong-un directly states that: "in terms of the Winter Olympics that will be held soon in South Korea, it will be a good opportunity to signify the status of our entire ethnic group and we sincerely hope that the games will be a success. Likewise, we have intentions to take part in necessary measures such as dispatching representatives and the North and the South could meet to discuss such matters."⁵⁶

Furthermore, Kim Jong-un emphasized how North Korea has completed its nuclear development and claims that the United States will no longer be able to wage war against them. Such statements also indicate how North Korea felt the danger of impending war considering the aggressive and spontaneous statements made by President Trump, which were different from other previous moderate and predictable comments made by leaders of the United States. In this sense, North Korea might have speculated that it had enough political leverage to take part in direct negotiations because of its successful development of nuclear weapons and opened up to the world. Additionally, the short time span between the nuclear tests and the sudden unilateral declaration of North Korea to take part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games makes it difficult to interpret North Korea's participation as a consequence of South Korea's successful public diplomacy efforts. The most recent nuclear test took place in September 2017 and North Korea declared that it will take part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games in the New Year's speech by Kim Jong-un. There was only a four-month span between such drastic changes of narratives.

In this context, it is important to observe the most recent New Year speech of 2019. Kim Jong-un continued his narrative of peace and denuclearization stating his "full, complete, and unchanging stance of total denuclearization."⁵⁷ He also claimed that "North Korea declared to stop producing, testing, using, and spreading nuclear weapons and that they took many practical steps accordingly."⁵⁸ In addition, he expressed his will to further negotiate with the United States on relevant issues. Although Kim Jong-un also sent warnings and requests, his main policy stance did not change. Another interesting element is how Kim Jong-un presented himself in the New Year speech of 2019. Traditionally, he would stand in front of a podium and read his speech. However, in the New Year speech of 2019, he sat in a luxurious room which resembles the settings of the White House. It seems that Kim Jong-un was hoping to present North Korea as a normal state and to emphasize its power and prosperity. Sitting in a chair also indicates how relaxed his position in North Korea may be, such as his stabilized stance within North Korea after his father's death. Moreover, the way the video was structured reflects some similarities with

56 Minjung Lee. *JoongAng Daily*, January 1, 2018. Accessed November 28, 2018. <https://news.joins.com/article/22250044>.

57 Kim Jong-un, "New Year's Speech," 2019.

58 Ibid.

China. For instance, the video starts with the nightscape of the building and slowly zooms in on Kim Jong-un. This style of formatting can also be seen in Xi Jing Ping’s New Year address. There were portraits of his grandfather and his father in the background, signaling his political legitimacy and tradition. Therefore, the New Year speech of 2019 demonstrates how North Korea had its strategic reasons and motivations in taking part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games.

Table 3. Comparison of New Year Speeches

Year	Format	North/South Relations	North Korea/U.S. Relations & Nuclear Issues
2014	Kim Jong-un’s Speech (Chosun Chungang TV)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Respect for the North-South Summit Declarations and pursue independent international relations 2. Preparation for improving North-South relations, request to stop propaganda efforts 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If there is a war on this peninsula, it will be a nuclear disaster and the U.S. will not be safe
2015	Kim Jong-un’s Speech (Chosun Chungang TV)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Possibility of Summits 2. Possibility of resuming high-level talks 3. North-South talks, negotiations, communication and contact should become active in order to achieve major transition of North-South relations 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Criticism of U.S. hostile policies towards North Korea, urging a change of policy narratives 2. Criticism on U.S. offensive on humanitarian issues
2016	Kim Jong-un’s Speech (Chosun Chungang TV)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Request to adhere to 6.15 and 10.4 Declarations 2. Request to stop cooperation with foreign states, South Korea-U.S. military drills, and ideological rivalry 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Criticism of U.S. hostile policies and avoiding offers of peace talks 2. Criticism on U.S. offensive on humanitarian issues

2017	Kim Jong-un's Speech (Chosun Chungang TV)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improving ties, active measures in terms of potential military clashes and reducing the possibility of war 2. Request to stop criticism, anti-communist acts, increasing military might and military drills. 3. Achieving peaceful unification 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Claimed to be in the phase of developing intercontinental ballistic missiles 2. Request to stop aggressive policies towards North Korea 3. Continuous strengthening of self-defense capabilities based on nuclear weapons
2018	Kim Jong-un's Speech (Chosun Chungang TV)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Expressing support for South Korea's successful host of the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games 2. Intention to dispatch delegates to the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games and request for summits to discuss related issues 3. Open to talks and communication 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Achieved national nuclear objectives last year 2. With the conclusion of nuclear weapons, the U.S. will not be able to start a war against North Korea
2019	Kim Jong-un's Speech (Chosun Chungang TV)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Request to stop joint military drills 2. Willing to take further measures toward denuclearization and peace 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Open to summits 2. Request to stop joint military drills 3. Warnings that they may take a different policy route if no further compensations are given

MK News, January 01, 2018, accessed November 28, 2018, <http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2018&no=1029>.

Furthermore, compared to other major international sporting events that were hosted in South Korea, the reactions and narratives of North Korea are decidedly

different the Winter Games. Indeed, when South Korea hosted the 1986 Asian Games, North Korea did not participate in the event, although it took part in the previous three Asian Games. This trend continued in the case of the 1988 Summer Olympics in which North Korea boycotted the event. The same applies in the case of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, which was hosted by South Korea and Japan. North Korea did not take part and even tried to hinder the successful launch of the World Cups by increasing propaganda efforts near the borders. However, in the case of the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games, North Korea eagerly expressed its intentions to participate and to contribute. Furthermore, not getting involved in international sporting events hosted by South Korea was based on different reasons, both domestic and international. For instance, it might have been to politically negate the comparative political and economic development of South Korea and the prestige of hosting an international sporting event. It could also have been to undermine the legitimacy of the South Korean government. Therefore, reversing previous patterns of behavior occurred with specific logic, reasons, and objectives, such as utilizing the notion of participation in major international sporting events for political and economic benefit.

All things considered, North Korea is using sports diplomacy and participation in major sporting events to achieve specific goals. First, international sporting events help to establish a stronger national identity. Udo Merkel stated that:

*“the participation in international competitions and hosting of sports events and festivals offer North Korea a versatile platform to nurture and promote two identities: first, a pan-Korean identity that stresses the close links between the strong ethnic ties and common cultural heritage of the Korean people in both states; second, a distinctive North Korean identity that emphasizes differences to the South and celebrates the uniqueness of the country, in particular its political system, the Kim dynasty, the ideological framework and achievements.”*⁵⁹

In this sense, one of the objectives of North Korea is to nurture a pan-Korean identity as well as its distinct national identity.

Secondly, North Korea seeks to enhance and strengthen the legitimacy of its state by participating in international sporting events. Taking part in an international sporting event greatly enhances and normalizes the national image of North Korea, which is often associated with a broad range of negative impressions such as being a failed state, one of the poorest states in the world, nuclear tests, and low humanitarian standards. However, by taking part in international sporting events, people, including athletes from other participating states, realize that North Koreans are also normal human beings. Such realization also became apparent in the case of the ping-pong diplomacy. One of the players from the United States stated in

59 Udo Merkel, “The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 31, no. 3 (2014): 376-90.

an interview that “the people are just like us. They are real, they’re genuine, they got feeling. I made friends, I made genuine friends, you see. The country is similar to America, but still very different. It’s beautiful.”⁶⁰ In addition, North Korea and its athletes are exposed to the world. The International Olympic Committee reports that: “the performances of the athletes were watched by over a quarter of the world’s population, making PyeongChang the most digitally viewed Olympic Winter Games ever – an increase of 124 percent from Sochi and 870 percent from Vancouver. PyeongChang also enjoyed the largest amount of broadcast coverage in the history of the Olympic Winter Games, up 38 percent from Sochi.”⁶¹ Moreover, as legitimate states are generally entitled to take part as an independent entity in international sporting events, this greatly enhances the stance of North Korea in the international arena.

Thirdly, sports diplomacy utilizes the trust-building process between hostile states by starting with cooperation on low-politics, which often leads to successful cooperation in high-politics. Low-politics refers to the state’s welfare and is the field that is not vital for a state’s survival. On the other hand, high-politics refers to matters crucial to a state’s survival such as national security, international security and economics. States in hostile or not so good relations feel less pressure in cooperating in the realm of low-politics. Through communicating and learning the ways of the opponent, they often move on to cooperation on high-politics, which contains more sensitive agendas. North Korea seems to be heading towards this direction, especially regarding the recent summits between South Korea and North Korea as well as the summit between the U.S. and North Korea. In addition, there are various successful cases that took a similar path. “Sports diplomacy has demonstrated its potential to normalize hostile relations (US/Iran), ease domestic sociopolitical anxieties (Afghanistan), exert pressures from stakeholders concerning international laws and norms (South Africa), and contribute to the reunification of a divided state (Yemen).”⁶² Another representative case is the ping-pong diplomacy between the U.S. and mainland China during the cold war. This was an event in which the U.S. table tennis team received an invitation to visit China while they were in Nagoya, Japan in 1971 for the 31st World Table Tennis Championships. This led to Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and the ultimate normalization of U.S.-China relations.

Finally, the characteristics of the Winter Olympics in itself is noteworthy. Hosting the Winter Olympics is prestigious, in that the winter sporting facilities are very costly. Moreover, the costs of training athletes is expensive, which partly explains

60 “1971 Year in Review, Foreign Policy: Red China and Russia,” UPI Year in Review 1970-1979. United Press International. Retrieved Apr 24, 2013.

61 International Olympic Committee. FACTSHEET THE OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES. June 5, 2018. Accessed November 28, 2018. <https://www.olympic.org/documents/games-pyeongchang-2018-olympic-winter-games>.

62 Chris Larson, “South Korean Sports Diplomacy and Soft Power,” *International Journal of Foreign Studies* 9, no. 1 (2016): 93-116.

why most states that reap great results in the Winter Olympics are from developed nations. On top of everything, the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games was a great success. According to the International Olympic Committee's official report, the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics lasted from February 9th to the 25th and a total of 2,833 athletes, 22,400 volunteers, 2,853 written and photographic press, and 10,898 broadcasters took part in the event.⁶³ Four new medal events were included, which were the curling mixed doubles, speed skating mass start, alpine skiing team event, and snowboard big air. The event also set a record in terms of participation, "with more National Olympic Committees (NOCs) taking part and more female athletes competing than ever before."⁶⁴ The report further states that "the historic moment of these Games was when the athletes of the two Koreans marched together as one team at the opening ceremony,"⁶⁵ which emphasizes how much the international community found North Korea's participation meaningful and significant. In addition, the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games recorded the highest level of Olympic partnerships with the top 13 partners being Coca-Cola, Alibaba, ATOS, Bridgestone, DOW, GE, Samsung, Toyota, Visa, P&G, Panasonic, Omega, and Intel.⁶⁶ There also were a range of domestic partnerships such as McDonald's, KT, The North Face, Korean Air, POSCO, Hyundai and Kia Motors, and KEPCO.⁶⁷ Therefore, taking part in such a successful international event could not have hurt North Korea's chances in any way.

North Korea took part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games due to domestic reasons and for its own benefit. Considering the recent events between South Korea and North Korea, it seems obvious that the trend that began with the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games will continue. After the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games, there were summits between South Korea and North Korea followed by a summit between the United States and North Korea. Afterward, talks on the topic such as denuclearization and the official end of the Korean War continued as well. There also are some material results, such as North Korea bombing the 10 guard posts (GP) as promised and planning to build a road through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Finally, there is high anticipation of a North Korea and U.S. high-level meeting in 2019.

The statistics and measurements in terms of South Korea's public diplomacy and soft power indicate how South Korea has an evident influence in exerting its soft power. Moreover, the South Korean government may have special policy

63 International Olympic Committee. FACTSHEET THE OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES. June 5, 2018. Accessed November 28, 2018. <https://www.olympic.org/documents/games-pyeongchang-2018-olympic-winter-games>.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 International Olympic Committee. IOC MARKETING REPORT OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES PYEONGCHANG 2018. July 25, 2018. Accessed November 28, 2018. <https://www.olympic.org/documents/games-pyeongchang-2018-olympic-winter-games>.

67 Ibid.

focus on promoting public diplomacy. However, it is not clear how South Korea's public diplomacy affected North Korea's decision to participate in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games. Even if public diplomacy efforts had some influence in North Korea, this would have been before the years of 2015 and 2016. Unlike traditional diplomatic channels, public diplomacy requires a certain amount of time to achieve tangible results. Likewise, it is unlikely that South Korea influenced North Korea to take part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games with its public diplomacy efforts.

Conclusion

The sudden declaration of North Korea to take part in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games was unexpected. Some claimed that it was due to the successful public diplomacy efforts by South Korea while others claimed that it was due to North Korea's strategic determination. In order to weigh these two perspectives, academic articles, government documents, and history were analyzed. Based on various systems of measurement, South Korea seems to be influential in terms of its public diplomacy and exerting its soft power. Moreover, government documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea indicate the policy focus on public diplomacy and sports diplomacy. Documents from the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism of South Korea further illustrates the emphasis and importance of the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics to the administration. There also were sufficient reasons as to why South Korea wanted to engage North Korea in the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics. However, due to the sanctions imposed and the lack of infrastructure, it is difficult for South Korea's public diplomacy efforts to be sufficiently influential. Furthermore, data from the Ministry of Unification also indicate how there were almost no communication and exchange between South Korea and North Korea, especially after Kim Jong-un succeeded his father. In addition, North Korea's successful and intense nuclear tests and the narratives of Kim Jong-un's New Year Speech imply that North Korea had strong internal reasons for taking part in the Winter Games. North Korea's decision to participate is especially striking when compared to the past international sporting events hosted by South Korea. The success of the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games and the effectiveness of sports diplomacy seems to have influenced North Korea's decision-making process. In conclusion, although South Korea has its merits and influence with its public diplomacy, in the specific case of North Korea and the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games, North Korea seems to have had more internal motivations and reasons for participating in the international sporting event.

In order to be more effective in exerting sports diplomacy, there are some policy suggestions. First, North Korea and South Korea should try to form a unified team and go further than simply participating in the same sporting events. Secondly, they should expand the sports exchange from professionals to sports exchange at the university-level. The government should also expand the age groups as well as the number of sports. Nonetheless, the South Korean government should communicate actively with the public to create a consensus in terms of forming a unified team.

Opposition such as degrading the performance of the South Korean athletes and realistic issues such as training and facilities should be directly addressed to counter opposition and to increase the general performance of the unified team. Thirdly, mechanisms should be established so that politics do not hinder, or halt sports diplomacy. An organization responsible for such matters will facilitate sports exchange. Finally, the government should seek creative ways to expand sports diplomacy into generating economic interest such as producing sport related products at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The South Korean government could also cooperate in sharing their directors and facilities with North Korean athletes. The International Olympic Committee Code of Ethics states in its preamble that “the Olympic parties undertake to disseminate the culture of ethics and integrity within their respective areas of competence and to serve as role models.”⁶⁸ North Korea and South Korea ought to adhere to such measures and achieve peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

68 International Olympic Committee. IOC Code of Ethics. 2016. Accessed November 29, 2018.

ESSAYS

**WHEN SECURITY HURTS:
CHINA THE MASTER OF COVERT SANCTIONS**

Line Moersch

**THE PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF NOSTALGIA:
GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN CULINARY AND
GASTRONOMIC ENCOUNTERS OF FILIPINO MIGRANTS
WITH AUTHENTIC FILIPINO FOOD**

Ma. Jemimah R. Uy

WHEN SECURITY HURTS: CHINA - THE MASTER OF “COVERT” SANCTIONS

Line Wini Moerch

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In the summer of 2016, the South Korean government announced that the US-ROK alliance had agreed to work together on the installment of one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system battery in order to guard itself against potential nuclear threats from North Korea. Despite Chinese claims to not have enforced any sanctions with regards to South Korean economic activities in Mainland China following the installation of the THAAD system, it quickly became evident that the Chinese government was making conscious efforts to hinder economic endeavors by Korean entrepreneurs and companies in China. This paper utilizes economic sanctions theory in order to investigate the covert nature of the Chinese government's attempts at punishing South Korean businesses for political initiatives undertaken by the Korean government. The paper will proceed in two parts. The first part introduces the literature on economic sanctions theory and its utility in the Chinese context and proceeds to account for the political events leading up to and following the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea. It especially aims to emphasize Chinese reactions to the rationales and actions of the South Korean government, using primary sources and statements made by Chinese officials involved in the matter. The second part of the paper consists of a case study of Korean pop manufacturer SM Entertainment, in which the THAAD deployment's effects on SM Entertainment's activities in Mainland China will be accounted for. Utilizing primary and secondary sources, the second part of this paper presents data, which argues that SM Entertainment was not observably affected by the crisis, but that it also made deliberate efforts to redirect its activities to Japan following the THAAD deployment, in response to severe restrictions on Korean popular culture products in China. Findings reveal that the Chinese government not only has a significant history of enforcing covert sanctions against sovereign nations in response to political decisions made by their governments, but that it also is highly likely to continue this form of punishment, in an attempt to influence foreign politics without running the risk of military escalation or further conflict.

Introduction

Following a series of nuclear tests in North Korea in 2016, tensions increased on the Korean Peninsula, leading South Korea and the United States to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (henceforth referred to as THAAD) as a means to amp up security measures against the DPRK. As China expressed serious concerns regarding the deployment due to its significant increase in radar visibility and reach, the immediate cancellation of several Korean pop artists' tours in China revealed an apparent overlap of national security issues and economics. This paper investigates the Chinese view of the THAAD deployment and the subsequent actions taken by the Chinese government against South Korean musicians and performers' activities in China. Utilizing economic sanctions theory and the case study of pop culture manufacturing giant SM Entertainment, this paper illuminates the observable effects of indirect economic sanctions on South Korea through the illustration of SM Entertainment's redirection of their artists' activities in Mainland China to Japan. Despite Chinese claims to not have enforced any sanctions with regards to South Korean economic activities in Mainland China, this paper argues that the Chinese government made covert attempts at punishing the entertainment industry for a political decision made by the South Korean government.

Economic Sanctions in Theory

Economic sanctions theory has mainly been led by discussions of whether or not economic sanctions work and, if so, under what conditions they work better than others. For contemporary scholars, the consensus has mostly been that sanctions do not work.¹ Hovi, Huseby and Spring identify three main characteristics of economic sanctions that render them difficult to impose. First, it is difficult to properly ensure that sanctions hurt where they are meant to hurt. Next, sanctions may have costly effects on the imposer and may even affect neighbors of the target state or the imposing state itself. Finally, sanctions may cause the 'rally around the flag' effect, further arousing popular support for the regime it is meant to target or undermine.² However, this consensus has been dominated by the dichotomous orientation of economic sanctions as either successful or failures rather than as a degree of success and failure. Rather than asking whether sanctions work in general, Mastanduno argues that one must instead ask under what circumstances or conditions economic statecraft is a *feasible option* to realize one's objectives.³ Economic sanctions are built upon the foundational logic that intense pressure

1 Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, and Detlef F. Spring, "When Do Economic Sanctions Work?" *World Politics* 57, no. 4 (2005): 80

2 *Ibid.*, 480-481.

3 Michael Mastanduno, "Economic Statecraft, Interdependent and National Security: Agendas for Research," *Security Studies* 9 no.1-2 (1999): 292.

on a target's economy may eventually lead to the target government capitulating. Economic pain, however, does not necessarily translate directly into political gain, and thus Mastanduno argues that there is no linear relationship between economic pain and political winnings.⁴ David M. Rowe argues for a more objective-oriented approach to sanctions. Rather than dichotomizing failure and success, he calls for more focus on what the actual objectives for economic sanctions are and what their imposition is then meant to achieve.⁵ He believes that a proper identification of the reasons and purpose of their imposition is crucial to the study of sanctions because it naturally is impossible to declare something a relative failure or success if one has failed to properly identify the logic behind said economic sanctions in the first place. The two authors of the most dominant, contending viewpoints on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, David A. Baldwin and Robert A. Pape, define as instruments of statecraft and as strategies for the use of instruments of statecraft respectively. Pape in particular emphasizes the need to separate economic sanctions as strategy from the strategies of trade war and economic warfare because each of them brings about the realization of different goals.⁶

Baldwin contends Pape's strict view of economic sanctions because he does not believe that a broad definition of power to include military and economic power will erase the distinction between the two.⁷ He pushes for the definition of economic sanctions as encompassing all forms of economic means "by which foreign policy makers might try to influence other international actors."⁸ In this view, economic sanctions can then include not just measures taken to achieve one specific end goal, such as coercion in trade disputes or the reduction of the target state's military, but also the subtler acts of illustrating resolve or inflicting punishment. He also between imposing economic sanctions as an undertaking and making a target state pay a price for noncompliance as an outcome. As such, Baldwin's approach allows for *degrees* of success rather than a dichotomy of failure or success as in Pape's view.⁹

Baldwin introduces the assumption of policymakers as rational by discussing the use of economic sanctions vis-à-vis other tools of statecraft as a rational calculation of cost-benefit. He argues that when policymakers decide whether to use economic sanctions or not, it is not a matter of whether economic sanctions can alter the target state's behavior without the use of military force but rather whether economic sanctions have more utility than military force may be likely to. Here, it is thus a matter of comparative utility and not solely of the comparative effectiveness of military force or economic sanctions. Baldwin emphasizes that it is therefore

4 Mastanduno, "Economic Statecraft, Interdependent and National Security," 294.

5 David M. Rowe, "Economic sanctions do work: Economic statecraft and the oil embargo of Rhodesia," *Security Studies* 9, no. 1-2 (1999): 255.

6 David A. Baldwin and Robert A. Pape, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," *International Security*, 23 no. 2 (1998): 189.

7 *Ibid.*, 191.

8 *Ibid.*, 196.

9 Baldwin and Pape, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," 192.

quite possible for sanctions to prove themselves more useful than military force, even in situations where they are comparatively less effective.¹⁰ This argument is further developed in a later article published by Baldwin in *International Security*. Here, he emphasizes that when discussing the effectiveness of a policy choice, it is important to consider the policy choices (in this case, economic sanctions) costs and benefits in comparison to the costs and benefits of other options (military action, for example).¹¹ Baldwin writes: “from the standpoint of the logic of choice, any discussion of economic sanctions that fails to compare their likely cost-effectiveness with that of alternative courses of action provides no useful policy guidance with respect to deciding whether sanctions should be used in a given situation.”¹² In this view, rather than seeing the options for action in isolation and as alternatives to one another, he calls for a proper analysis of exactly what these ‘alternatives’ may cost, relative to a policymaker’s other options. Put differently, rather than expecting that policymakers consider sanctions as an *effective* tool, one ought to consider the use of sanctions as depending on the expected utility of said sanctions relative to a policymaker’s other options. As Baldwin observes, the rationale for the use of sanctions is “*more likely to rest on the high cost of the alternative of military action, than on a naïve expectation that sanctions will be effective.*”¹³ As such, the imposition of sanctions is not necessarily to obtain great diplomatic ‘victories’ but because they are cost effective. Employing sanctions even when their expected success is low is not irrational, provided that the expected utility of other options is even lower.¹⁴ As economic sanctions are a form of statecraft, their utility must thus be considered relative to other such forms of statecraft: military force, diplomacy and propaganda.¹⁵

Chinese Economic Diplomacy in Action

Chinese economic diplomacy has, until recently, been mostly exercised in South and North East Asia, and its willingness to use economic sanctions and trade restrictions as a means of statecraft has been illustrated on several occasions. In 2003, it shut down an oil pipeline to North Korea, arguably to pressure the North Korean regime into attending a Beijing-hosted trilateral meeting on denuclearization. In 2010, it imposed massive bans on Norwegian salmon following the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Liu Xiaobo. It has also suspended exports of raw materials to Japan following the detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain by Japanese authorities in 2011. It imposed restrictions on banana imports from the Philippines

10 Ibid., 194.

11 David A. Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,” *International Security* 24, no. 3 (1999-2000): 85.

12 Ibid., 86

13 Ibid., 99.

14 Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,” 106.

15 Ibid., 92.

in 2012 due to territorial disputes in the South China Sea and more recently in 2017 by restricting oil exports to North Korea following nuclear tests. This led to the subsequent implementation of UNSCR sanctions. In all of these cases, however, the Chinese government, or representatives hereof, have denied imposing any such sanctions, giving causes such as “technical difficulties” or “concerns about whether payment would be made” in order to explain the actions taken at the time.¹⁶

In a comprehensive study of China's use of coercive economic diplomacy, Christina Lai observes that China's imposition of economic sanctions is a means to achieve short-term political objectives.¹⁷ She argues that the covert use of economic sanctions by the Chinese government is tied to their self-proclaimed ‘peaceful rise’ in the region, and it therefore poses a curious challenge to scholars due to Beijing's consistent denial of ever imposing such sanctions in the first place.¹⁸ This denial, Lai notes, may jeopardize China's image as a peaceful ‘riser’ in the region due to its inconsistent and unpredictable nature. The fact that China relies on strategic denial of action while evidently imposing some forms of economic sanctions may lean against the self-perceived peaceful rise of the nation as perpetuated during the tenure of Deng Xiaoping. This observation is supported by Lai, who notes that the Chinese reliance on denial while still imposing sanctions covertly may actually jeopardize the surrounding states' perception of the so-called ‘peaceful’ rise of China as it raises questions with regards to the predictability with which they can count on Chinese economic retaliation in future disputes.¹⁹ Following the nuclear tests by the DPRK in 2003 and 2006, China cut off oil supplies briefly yet refused to comment on the matter. In 2011, they cut off oil supplies again following the shelling of South Korean navy ship, the Cheonan, under the guise that the cut-off was due to technical error. They, yet again, refused to acknowledge the linkage.²⁰ Lai believes that this particular refusal to acknowledge measures taken against North Korea may actually represent a strategic calculation in terms of national interests combined with a concern for international reputation. She notes that if China ever fails to actually rebuke North Korea through overt economic sanctions or leverage, China may fear the risk of being put in a rather embarrassing position in the face of North Korean provocations.²¹

Chinese export restrictions on rare earth materials against Japan following the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain in 2010 were justified as a means of environmental protection as well as human and plant safety. As the US, the EU, and Japan took the case to the WTO, China may have managed to put pressure on Japan, as the captain *did* get released, but they also arguably lost face greatly in

16 Christina Lai, “Acting one way and talking another: China's coercive economic diplomacy in East Asia and beyond,” *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 2 (2018): 170.

17 *Ibid.*, 174.

18 Lai, “Acting one way and talking another,” 171-172.

19 *Ibid.*, 173.

20 *Ibid.*, 176.

21 *Ibid.*, 177.

the international community.²²

In 2011, China imposed serious restrictions on the import of salmon from Norway, and until recent normalization of relations in 2017, these restrictions had serious effects on Norway's salmon exports, resulting in an observable 60% decrease in 2011.²³ Before imposing sanctions, China had warned the Nobel committee that awarding Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo would have serious consequences for bilateral relations and even pressured other nations into boycotting the ceremony in Oslo — all this despite the fact that the Nobel Prize Committee is independent from the Norwegian government. China publicly stated that any country's choice to attend such a ceremony, challenging the Chinese judicial system, would have to bear the consequences of such actions.²⁴

The following year, following increased tension between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, China imposed restrictions on the import of Philippines bananas, claiming that pests had been found in its banana imports — a sudden first of its kind. Simultaneously, a large Chinese travel agency suspended all trips to the Philippines under the guise of safety concerns. Lai observes that while no concrete statements were made by the Chinese government at the time, officials' statements hinted at the possibility of import bans being related to disputes in the South China Sea, noting that if the situation kept deteriorating, it could have serious consequences for bilateral ties, trade included.²⁵

Thus, China has, on several occasions, utilized economic sanctions in situations where it did not view military force as a viable, cost-effective option. According to Baldwin's logic, this is not necessarily because the Chinese government believed that economic sanctions would be an effective deterrent or means of pressure (though it did result in the eventual release of the fishing boat captain by Japan). Rather, the repeated use of economic sanctions has been the more cost-effective choice for the regime when they wanted to punish other states for their actions, whether they be political or not in nature and whether they directly related to foreign policy measures or not.

If one considers this explanation as well as Lai's observations that China may be utilizing these sanctions and denial of such strategy as a means of protecting their regional reputation as a peaceful riser and have been doing so over the past 15 years; Lai's observation that China's impositions of these sanctions, and subsequent denial, may compromise the surrounding neighbor's perception of China's consistency becomes less persuasive. This is mainly because her assertion that China's "pretense" affects her neighbor's perception of her as predictable appears to hinge on surrounding neighbors' assumed 'resetting' of their expectations

22 Ibid. 178.

23 Bonni S. Glaser, "China's Coercive Economic Diplomacy: A New and Worrying Trend," *Center for Strategic International Studies*, August 6, 2012, accessed Dec. 10, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-coercive-economic-diplomacy-new-and-worrying-trend>.

24 Lai, "Acting one way and talking another," 182.

25 Ibid., 179.

of China, which is hardly a plausible assumption in international politics.

It is highly unlikely that other states, in their dealings with China, do not consider China's history of foreign policy behavior at all and thus do not learn from past experiences. Thus, the surrounding countries, having witnessed such behavior from China over almost 2 decades, ought to have come to the realization that economic sanctions are a viable tool in China's arsenal of statecraft, and that they can expect China to use it in situations where military action would not be cost-effective, but where China obviously would still wish to at least punish their political behavior. The argument that China's behavior ought to make her neighbor's uneasy based on her repeated use of economic sanctions is therefore not persuasive. While the notion of a peaceful rise may be questioned in the process, China's neighbors are likely to consider the probability of economic sanctions being imposed, when weighing their foreign policy options. Thus, while China denies its use of economic sanctions, it has a long history of imposing them. However, in China's view sanctions are not necessarily imposed to make the target state change its mind; rather, they are means of punishing target states for their political decisions in a cost-effective manner.

The THAAD Issue

The US hinted at the possibility of THAAD being deployed already in 2014, with official statements by the US commander of forces in South Korea admitting to having recommended the deployment of THAAD in South Korea to the US government.²⁶ South Korea, however, was hesitant and expressed clear preferences to developing its own original Korean defense system over joining a US-led BMD system.

Following the fourth nuclear test by North Korea in early 2016, however, this stance took an abrupt turn. While no official agreement had been reached at the time, the confirmation of such undertaking came a month later, when the US and South Korea announced that they were in the planning stages of possibly deploying the THAAD defense system on South Korean territory.²⁷ This announcement came following a direct ROK presidential attempt at including China in the process, calling on Chinese President Xi Jinping and his administration to actively cooperate with South Korea on finding a productive solution to the North Korean nuclear problem.²⁸ With the Korean government under intense pressure from the political scandals of the Park Geun-hye administration lurking in the background, the THAAD deployment

26 Ju-min Park, "U.S. troop leader in South Korea wants deployment of new missile defense against North," *Reuters*, June 3, 2014, accessed Dec. 15, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-southkorea-missile/u-s-troop-leader-in-south-korea-wants-deployment-of-new-missile-defense-against-north-idUSKBN0EE09120140603>.

27 United States Forces Korea statement, February 7, 2016, accessed Dec. 15, 2018, <http://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/651588/rok-us-joint-announcement/>.

28 Koike, Osamu, "Deployment of the THAAD System to South Korea – Background and Issues," *NIDS Commentary* 58 (2017): 2.

was finally made official in July of 2016.²⁹ The Moon administration, however, taking office in May that following year, suspended the deployment of the THAAD system after it had been declared operational in April. While Moon's administration was steadfast in their assertion that the suspension was to give due time to following proper protocol (more specifically a legal requirement to properly assess environment effects of the area) in light of recent political scandals and accusations of corruption, some speculate that the suspension was given as concession to China and as an illustration of a less hostile stance against North Korea. However, following a series of missile tests by the North, Moon was forced to take action and called his National Security Council into meeting.³⁰ Moon accelerated the finalization of THAAD following North Korea's nuclear test in early September that same year despite his initial opposition to the system in the first place. Since the initial announcement of the deployment in early 2016, and especially since the finalization of the THAAD deployment in early 2017, Sino-ROK relations have been increasingly chillier.

China's View on THAAD

It is hardly surprising that China expressed serious concerns regarding the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui expressed this clearly in a statement issued on July 8, 2016, shortly after the confirmation of the THAAD system's deployment in South Korea had been announced by the ROK-US alliance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statement reads: "China firmly opposes to this and strongly urges the US and the ROK to stop relevant courses. China's will and ability to safeguard its strategic security interests are beyond doubt."³¹ This was repeated three days later by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang, who commented at a press conference, when asked about regional protests in South Korea regarding the THAAD deployment: "China is strongly opposed to the decision because it in particular severely undermines China's strategic security interests. We strongly ask the US and the ROK to change course."³² Chinese opposition to the deployment of the THAAD system was also reiterated by Chinese head of state Xi Jinping when he met with President Barack Obama on September 3, 2016, for the

29 United States Forces Korea statement, July 8, 2016, accessed Dec. 15, 2018, <http://www.usfk.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article/831166/rok-us-alliance-agrees-to-deploy-thaad/>.

30 Motoko Rich, "North Korea Fires More Missiles as Seoul Puts Off U.S. Defense System," *The New York Times*, June 7, 2017, accessed Dec. 15, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/asia/south-korea-thaad-missile-defense-us.html>.

31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China statement, "Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui Summons US and ROK Ambassadors to China and Lodges Solemn Representations on the Two Countries' Decision to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense System in ROK," July 8, 2016, accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjwb_663304/zygy_663314/gyhd_663338/t1379343.shtml.

32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China statement, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang's Regular Press Conference on July 11, 2016," July 11, 2016, accessed December 15, 2018. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1379216.shtml.

G20 Huangzhou Summit.³³ Since the announcement of the THAAD deployment by the ROK-US alliance, China has consistently opposed its installment and has not hesitated to make its stance very clear at every opportunity given. In fact, most Ministry of Foreign Affairs regular press conferences and speeches made by relevant spokespersons of the ministry have, without fail, mentioned the Chinese stance against THAAD.³⁴

Chinese concerns are mainly rooted in the THAAD radar's ability to (at forward based mode) gain a horizontal view that spans across up to 3,000 km. They see the deployment of THAAD as a US guise to contain China's rise in the region and undermine its second strike capabilities, by installing safety measures that are ultimately aimed at spying on Chinese (and North Korean) territory.³⁵ More importantly, China sees South Korea's sudden turn to US-driven security initiatives as a form of betrayal. This notion is highly supported by Liu Tiancong in her article "ROK Factor for the Deployment of THAAD." She takes the alleged 'betrayal' by South Korea against China almost personally, and writes that as soon as South Korea saw North Korea nuclear issues becoming more complicated, they turned their back against China and fell into the arms of the US, embracing THAAD, and in the process neglected not only the relationship between China and the ROK, which had taken "decades" to develop, but also Chinese feelings in general on the matter.³⁶ Tiancong firmly asserts that the deployment of THAAD was something South Korea actively worked towards and that it was not a matter of South Korea passively being forced to accept US initiatives. She blames the conservative nature of the Korean government and even attributes its alleged hostility towards China to Park Geun-hye's personal upbringing in a military family surrounded by conservative individuals as a contributing factor to the swift deployment of THAAD, conveniently ignoring the aforementioned ROK attempts at getting China actively involved in solving the issue.³⁷ In fact, Tiancong claims that Park's use of the "Three No's" (no request, no consultation and no decision) was nothing but propaganda as well as a tool to crudely dismiss Chinese concerns for the deployment.³⁸ As Swaine puts it, "by accepting the THAAD system, a friendly Seoul had joined a growing U.S.-led anti-

33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China statement, "Xi Jinping Meets with President Barack Obama of US," September 3, 2016, accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/bmdyzs_664814/xwlb_664816/t1395073.shtml

34 These statements have been consistently made over a long period since the first discussions regarding THAAD were made in 2014, and up until now, in 2018. Spokespersons Lu Kang, Geng Shuang and Hua Chunying have all in one way or other expressed the "consistent and firm stance of China." List of conferences: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/default.shtml

35 Michael D. Swaine, "China's Reaction to THAAD," *China Leadership Monitor*, 53 (2017): 9.

36 Liu Tiancong, "ROK Factor for the Deployment of THAAD," *Contemporary International Relations* 27, no. 3 (2017): 31.

37 *Ibid.*, 26-28.

38 *Ibid.*, 28.

China security network in Asia centered on an invigorated U.S.-Japan alliance.”³⁹

In addition to the fear of US alliances tightening in the region and the radar compromising Chinese security interests, China also believes that the THAAD system may spark arms races due to its excessive capabilities relative to the North Korean nuclear issue, rather than ensuring the security of South Korea.⁴⁰ In response to Chinese concerns, the US has asserted that the THAAD system would be locked in ‘*terminal mode*,’ assuring China that this mode has a significantly shorter range (of 600-800km) than forward based mode (which has a range of 2,000-3,000km), and thus would not have substantial coverage of Chinese territory unless said territory was close to the North Korean border.⁴¹

On February 26th, 2016, before the confirmation of the deployment, Foreign Minister Wang Yi had said: “It’s up to the ROK government to make a final decision. We of course will not interfere with ROK’s internal affair. *We understand that under such a complex environment, the United States and the Republic of Korea have an urgent need to ensure their own security* [...] when the US and the ROK discuss the deployment of THAAD, China’s legitimate security concerns must be taken into consideration, and a credible and convincing explanation must be provided to China.”⁴² This viewpoint, however, quite clearly changed rapidly following the announcement in July, and as such, China has since been furious with the South’s decision. At a press conference on September 7, 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Geng Shuang reiterated the Chinese stance against THAAD: “We again urge the US and the ROK to value the security interests and concerns of China and other regional countries and immediately stop the relevant deployment and remove the relevant equipment. The Chinese side has lodged stern representations with the ROK regarding this issue.”⁴³ These statements show consistent disdain for THAAD and emphasize Chinese concerns for their national security and interests overall as key factors that oppose them to its installation on the Korean peninsula.

39 Swaine, “China’s Reaction to THAAD,” 9.

40 Robert C. Watts, “ROCKETS’ RED GLARE – Why Does China Oppose THAAD in South Korea, and What Does It Mean for U.S. Policy?,” *Naval War College Review* 71, no. 2 (2018): 85-113.

41 Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hildreth, and Susan V. Lawrence, “Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition,” *Congressional Research Service*, April 3, 2015, 12.

42 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, “A Changing China and Its Diplomacy - Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi At Center for Strategic and International Studies,” February 26, 2016, accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1345211.shtml.

43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China statement, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on September 7, 2017,” September 7, 2017, accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1490884.shtml.

Sanctions Following THAAD

Other than acknowledging that ROK's decision to deploy the THAAD system would have adverse effects on trade relations, China has not expressed any outright intentions to impose sanctions or to retaliate against South Korea. When asked whether the deployment of THAAD would have any effect on Sino-ROK trade or economic relations, Gao Feng, spokesperson of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, said that "deployment of THAAD in Korea seriously injured China's strategic security interest, hurt the friendly sentiments of Chinese people, and therefore will inevitably have adverse effect on the healthy development of bilateral economic cooperation."⁴⁴ However, no overt statements have been made that hinted at China deliberately blocking certain Korean industries or companies from doing business in China - not from the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor from the higher officials in government. This follows the aforementioned pattern of the absence of overt threats and of direct acknowledgment of any measures taken. China has consistently adhered to the method of encouraging the ROK to back out of the deal and condemnation of the deployment of THAAD in general.

The first signs of boycotts came in the form of an unofficial ban of Korean popular culture products in Chinese media. This included banning Korean dramas, movies and advertisements featuring Korean idols. On August 1, 2016, News1 reported that restrictions had been imposed on the activities of Korean celebrities in China due to "international factors." The restrictions were also expected to affect Korean models working in China, though overall commentators did not expect it to be a long-term policy.⁴⁵ In extension, the Chinese government made it suspiciously difficult for Korean acts to gain work permits in China, leading to the postponement or outright cancellation of planned fan meetings, concerts, and promotions in China. According to the New York Times, however, the Chinese government had faxed a response to their inquiry regarding visas being revoked: "China attaches great importance to facilitating the personnel exchanges between China and South Korea, and will continue to provide convenience for South Korean nationals visiting China."⁴⁶ A feigning of ignorance as in this response, or simply no reply at all, appear to be the go-to Chinese approach when being confronted with regards to their covert sanctions.

44 Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China, "Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of Commerce, September 14, 2017," September 15, 2017, accessed December 15, 2018, <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201710/20171002655990.shtml>.

45 Eunji Jeong, "China: The restriction on Korean celebrities' activities in China become reality - Tensions over THAAD deployment," *NEWS1*, August 1, 2016, accessed December 15, 2018, <https://news.v.daum.net/v/20160801105212772> (Orig. Korean).

46 Amy Qin and Sang-Hun Choe, "South Korean Missile Defense Deal Appears to Sour China's Taste for K-pop," *The New York Times*, August 7, 2016, accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/world/asia/china-korea-thaad.html?_r=0.

Another victim of seeming Chinese retaliation was Korean conglomerate giant Lotte, whose department store branch in China lost a total of over US\$160 million between 2016-2018 alone, while Lotte Mart (its grocery store branch) lost over US\$225 million according to a 2017 financial report.⁴⁷ Following the announcement that Lotte was in talks with the Korean government to turn over a plot of land for the deployment of the THAAD system, a Xinhua article concluded that “one misjudged step could have severe consequences,” warning that handing over the land for THAAD-purposes would result in Lotte hurting the Chinese people, and consequences would be “severe.”⁴⁸ According to Quartz, since signing over the land Lotte faced a \$6,400 fine for the use of exaggerated advertisements, they have had machinery confiscated and been fined another \$3,000, had partners pull out of long-standing deals and been forced to halt construction of a massive real-estate project in Shenyang, due to a fire inspection.⁴⁹ On March 2, 2017, when asked about potential retaliation against Lotte by the press, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce said, “As for Lotte Group, I’ve noted the sentiments aired by Chinese netizens and would like to emphasize that the Chinese government sees its commercial cooperation with South Korea as important and welcomes Korean companies, among other foreign businesses, to invest and grow in China. China will, as always, protect the legitimate interests of foreign companies in China on condition that the operations of related companies in China are law-abiding and compliant.”⁵⁰ Not surprisingly, the Ministry of Commerce leaped elegantly over the option to admit any retaliation and emphasized that law-abiding companies are always welcome, insinuating that Lotte is being punished because it broke the law, not because of biased retaliation by official institutions in China.

Finally, a large blow to the Korean economy came in the form of Chinese bans on group tours to South Korea. As a pattern of retaliation began to emerge against Lotte, Yonhap News reported simultaneously that the Chinese government had instructed travel agencies to stop selling trips to South Korea.⁵¹ These bans apparently targeting the enormous Chinese tourist flow to South Korea entailed the suspension of all travel packages online and offline. According to Yonhap’s sources, the orders

47 “South Korea’s Lotte seeks to exit China after investing \$9.6 billion, as THAAD fallout ensures.” *The Strait Times*, March 13, 2019, accessed May 1, 2019, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-koreas-lotte-seeks-to-exit-china-after-investing-96-billion>.

48 Gu Liping (ed.), “Lotte should avoid playing with fire in letting THAAD in,” *Xinhua*, February 20, 2017, accessed December 15, 2018, www.ecns.cn/voices/2017/02-20/245993.shtml.

49 Echo Huang, “The maker of Choco Pies is facing a revolt in China from customers, partners, and hackers” *QUARTZ*, March 3, 2017, accessed December 15, 2018, <https://qz.com/922792/choco-pie-maker-lotte-group-is-facing-a-revolt-in-china-from-customers-partners-and-hackers-over-a-deal-involving-the-thaad-antimissile-systems/>.

50 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, “Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of Commerce, March 2, 2017,” March 4, 2017, accessed December 15, 2018, <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201703/20170302529366.shtml>.

51 “China bans trip sales to Korea.” *Yonhap News Agency*, March 2, 2017, accessed December 15, 2018, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170302012700320>.

had been verbally transmitted by the China National Tourism Administration. While the ban was eased in late November, it was restored following President Moon's visit to Beijing in late December 2017.⁵² When asked about the slight ease of the ban at a press conference on November 28, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang replied, "I'm not aware of the information you mentioned. China remains positive and open towards exchange and cooperation in various fields with the ROK. We hope the ROK will work with China to create sound conditions for exchange and cooperation."⁵³ Following the reinstatement of the group travel ban, the Chinese government and its ministries have refused to comment on the matter.⁵⁴

In the above 3 instances, it is not difficult to identify and confirm the pattern observed by Lai. Quite evidently, China is utilizing its leverage as an East Asian economic powerhouse to punish its neighbors in various economic ways, and it is doing it in a poorly coveted way, with the only inconspicuous aspect of its sanctions being Chinese officials' relentless denial of such actions taking place. China manages to not only enforce economic sanctions and punish targeted nations economically, but also, to put it frankly, to irritate them by feigning ignorance or simply refusing to respond to any inquiries regarding their actions. China keeps its hands clean by never confirming any sanctions and by giving vague responses, making it difficult for the affected to actually do anything to confront the issue directly.

Case Study: SM Entertainment

With the first industry targeted by the Chinese government being the Korean entertainment industry, it seemed only appropriate to choose a case study that resides in that particular sector of the economy. The impact that Chinese economic sanctions had on the Korean pop culture industry has been quite impressive, and as such, this paper presents and analyzes the case of top tier pop culture content producer, SM Entertainment (henceforth referred to as SM Ent.). SM Ent. is heralded one of the top 3 entertainment agencies in South Korea. It was founded by Sooman Lee in 1995 and has since produced widely popular Korean pop acts such as Girls Generation, Super Junior, SHINee, DBSK, BoA, Red Velvet and EXO. Since its founding, it has expanded and invested heavily into surrounding markets in both

52 Cheang Ming, "China does another policy U-turn and THAAD-linked South Korean stocks aren't taking it well," *CNBC*, December 20, 2017, accessed December 15, 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/20/china-south-korea-thaad-linked-stocks-slide-on-tour-group-ban.html>.

53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference on November 28, 2017," accessed December 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1514728.shtml.

54 Reuters, "South Korean inbound travel agency says China bans group tours to South." *Channel NewsAsia*, December 20, 2017, accessed December 15, 2018, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/south-korean-inbound-travel-agency-says-china-bans-group-tours-to-south-9512390>.

China and Japan, and it holds annual auditions all over the world to scout for new talents for its artist pool. This section accounts for SM Ent.'s marketing strategies and overt intentions to expand into the Chinese market from late 2013 as well as tracks these ambitions into the post-THAAD period to observe and analyze the more direct impact of THAAD on SM Ent.'s activities in Mainland China as well as how SM Ent.'s focus has subsequently shifted to the Japanese market instead.

SM Entertainment Before the THAAD crisis (2013-2015/16)

In a financial statement from November 2013, SM Ent. revealed plans to expand into the Chinese market and focus numerous activities in Mainland China. By looking into establishing joint ventures with local companies, SM Ent. expected 2014 to bring prosperity from the Chinese market. More specifically, it aimed for a broad presence in broadcasting, including advertising and commercials, dramas and movies.⁵⁵ Since the debut of two-unit boy group, EXO, in 2012, SM Ent. made their goals to take over the Chinese market quite evident. The two-unit group consisted of 12 members, six of which were dedicated to EXO-K, set to promote in Korea, and six members dedicated to EXO-M, of which 4 were Chinese, set to promote in China. In 2013, 25 percent of SM Ent.'s album sales came from EXO, constituting about 1.2 million albums, illustrative of the positive feedback EXO received from fans. According to another report, dated April 21, 2014, EXO were scheduled to hold 15 concerts in China from June and beyond, accommodating 10,000 people per show.⁵⁶ The Beijing SM Town concert in October 2013 drew over 70,000 audiences, and the report expressed optimism with regards to China's role in its growth over the following decade.⁵⁷ A financial report from late 2014, however, reflected the troubles of the company; two members had left the Chinese unit of EXO, a girl group member had been involved in a scandal, Japanese earnings had been poor due to yen depreciation, and the company had received a significant tax fine. As such, the company saw a delay in its further expansion into China. A May 2015 report served positive predictions with regards to the Chinese market, as overall revenue in China rose from 9.4 percent in 2013 to 16.1 percent in the first quarter of 2015. SM China came about in 2016 in the form of subsidiary Dream Maker gaining a business license from the Chinese government and establishing two branches in Shanghai and Beijing.⁵⁸ With these branches, SM Ent. had great plans to debut NCT China, a boy group intended to promote in China, and this group was expected to debut in early 2016, taking advantage of the positive responses SM's artists had received in China in previous terms.

Overall, SM Entertainment showed clear intentions of wanting to expand into

55 KBD Daewoo Securities report, SM Entertainment (041510 KQ), November 14, 2013, 1.

56 KBD Daewoo Securities report, SM Entertainment (041510 KQ/Buy), April 21, 2014.

57 KBD Daewoo Securities report, SM Entertainment (041510 KQ), November 14, 2013.

58 KBD Daewoo Securities report, SM Entertainment (041510 KQ), November 14, 2016.

a growing Chinese market, as they were experiencing not just increased revenues due to increased exposure but also through actively seeking out business partners and establishing local branches in China.

SM Strategies Post-THAAD (2016-)

While the aforementioned reports reflect a positive outlook on the future for SM Entertainment in China, the deployment of THAAD undeniably brought with it a bit of turmoil. In emphasizing the potential for a resumption of business, a report from November 2017 affirms suspicions that SM's Chinese endeavors indeed suffered as it notes "growing expectations [...] for the *likely resumption* of Chinese business."⁵⁹ This indicates business must have been thriving or at the very least somewhat satisfactory before the THAAD crisis. Furthermore, the same report acknowledges economic losses due to delayed exports as well as delays in licensing of the company's dramas to China. The statement directly notes "*thawing Sino- Korean relations are raising expectations for exports to China, limiting China risks,*" and thus references the direct influence of foreign policy on its conduct of business in the Chinese market.⁶⁰ The two 2017 reports (from October 11th and November 15th) are the first to reflect a deliberate shift away from China's market. Before these two reports, one report from 2013, two from 2014, four from 2015 and three from 2016 all reflect a keen interest in committing to the Chinese market, and all include detailed plans to do so.

With the 2017 October report, however, results from the Japanese market are more prevalent in analyses, and these two reports leave out results from China altogether.⁶¹ This abrupt change in market focus is further reflected in the suspension of concerts by SM artists following the restrictions by the Chinese government.⁶² According to some sources, the bans on Hallyu content began in October 2016 and included the ban of contents funded by Korean companies as well as Korean artists appearing on TV being blurred out.⁶³

According to APPENDIX II, the significant difference between activities in Japan vis-à-vis activities in China throughout 2016-2017 is remarkable. The pivot to the Chinese market as relentlessly promoted in the previous financial statements dating back to 2013 is hardly anywhere to be seen in their tour schedules. Out of 48 shows in 2016, only five were held in China, despite SM's reports clearly indicating

59 KBD Daewoo Securities report, SM Entertainment (041510 KQ), November 15, 2017.

60 KBD Daewoo Securities report. SM Entertainment (041510 KQ).

61 See Appendix I.

62 "EXO's China concert postponed amid row over THAAD," *Yonhap News Agency*, December 7, 2016. Online. Accessed December 15, 2018. <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20161207005900315>

63 Daniel Sanchez, "China Bans All Korean Music and Entertainment," *Digital Music News*, November 29, 2016, accessed December 15, 2018, <https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2016/11/29/china-bans-korean-hallyu-kpop/>.

that they would be betting on the Chinese market for 2016, and these shows were all held before the ban was imposed in October. Where EXO was supposed to hold a concert in Nanjing on December 10, 2016, there were instead three consecutive shows in Japan from December 9-11. Furthermore, there has been no shows scheduled in China in 2017 and only recently have events been listed for 2018. In contrast, the Japanese tour schedules have been packed for many SM artists such as SHINee, Super Junior, their solo artists and sub-units, and for EXO. Only one show for EXO has been scheduled for 2018 in Macao so far. Finally, NCT China, reported to be set for debut in 2016 directly into the Chinese market only to be pushed back to the summer of 2018, was finally scheduled this year to debut in November. While China and South Korea have agreed to normalize relations, there has been no news regarding the group's debut in China since October this year. As such, it appears not only that SM suffered quite tremendously due to THAAD, but it also appears that they are slightly hesitant to actually commit NCT China to the Chinese market just yet, despite several news articles confirming that China has loosened its grip on Hallyu and is ready to resume business with South Korea as usual.

From this data, it is remarkably evident that the THAAD issue and the following cooling relations between China and South Korea had severe effects on the market and on SM Entertainment in particular. According to Hyundai Research Institute, South Korea's Hallyu industry lost nearly \$7.5 billion in 2017 alone, equivalent to approx. 0.5 percent of the country's nominal GDP.⁶⁴ As such, China has most definitely illustrated its ability to teach South Korea a lesson, and with that, it has succeeded in severely punishing South Korea for the deployment of THAAD without recognizing such measures at all. This ability appears to have left its mark, as SM Ent. is still hesitant to commit NCT China to the market and appears to be holding back any announcements of a Chinese debut as of yet.

Conclusion

As Baldwin defines economic sanctions quite broadly, China's "covert" sanctions on its neighbors adhere to his conceptualization of economic statecraft quite appropriately. Following the deployment of the THAAD system to South Korean territory, China made it very clear that it was unhappy with South Korea's decision, and despite various attempts at encouraging the ROK to change its mind, China was unsuccessful. Thus began two long years of economic sanctions, though these sanctions were never publicly warned or threatened, but, on the contrary, were quite often outright denied by spokespersons of the Chinese regime. While the giant corporation, Lotte, took its personal hits and tourism experienced serious cuts

64 "THAAD may lead to \$7.5b economic loss in 2017: South Korean media," *CHINADAILY*, updated September 20, 2017, accessed December 16, 2018, www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-09/20/content_32245052.htm.

in group travels, SM Entertainment – and the Hallyu industry overall – perhaps took the hardest punch from the conflict. Artists were denied visas, shows were cancelled, idols were blurred out on national TV in China and contents were outright banned from being broadcast. On top of that, licenses were withheld, and dramas were blocked.

The case study of SM Entertainment has shown that while SM had actually planned for almost 3 years to extend its Hallyu business into China, wanting to invest heavily in its consumer market, plans were abruptly changed following Chinese retaliation for THAAD. SM had to redirect tours and activities overall to Japan, which is reflected not only in the financial statements from Daewoo but also in its tour schedule changes. Furthermore, the company's debut of a group to China was delayed for almost two years following the THAAD crisis.

While China has not threatened any overt actions, it has become quite the master of wielding the sword of economic sanctions, and gladly does so while feigning ignorance of its evident impact on targeted states. This paper has shown not only that China has a pattern of covert economic sanctions but also that as China is possibly aware that these sanctions do not necessarily change any target state's mind or actions; these sanctions may rather be intended to punish them for their actions. As such, China has quite successfully sanctioned Norway, Japan, the Philippines, and, most recently, South Korea. The case study of SM entertainment showed some of the more direct effects that these sanctions had on the industry, while the analysis of speeches and press conferences held by spokespersons of the Chinese government revealed a pattern of them saying one thing while doing another. While Pape may argue that Chinese sanctions were unsuccessful in that they did not make South Korea change its mind or back out of the THAAD deal with the US, Baldwin would definitely argue that if the main goal of such sanctions was to make South Korea pay for their choice, they were most definitely successful, and this study has shown more precisely how.

With this study, it has thus become evident that while China is continuously hesitant to challenge any neighbors militarily or diplomatically, they do not hesitate to punish them for their unsatisfying actions economically. The delay of NCT China and the serious lack of shows and appearances in Mainland China following THAAD have taken their toll on SM's revenues, and as relations between China and South Korea thaw, SM may still be hesitant to commit their new boy group to China, due to fears of having some members from the group banned from performing in China, should diplomatic relations take another turn for the worse.

As China continues to grow as an economic power house in the Asia-Pacific, further studies on its economic diplomatic ways – particularly on how it sanctions its neighbors and why/when – will be of great help in guiding companies caught between China and its target states. While China's tendency to deny any retaliation may constitute an annoyance to the international community, it is hardly likely to change, and China is likely to continue punishing other countries economically, as long as such endeavors continue to be utility cost-efficient. Furthermore, it is likely that while China could of course hope for a change of course in its target states' policies, it is well aware that its sanctions will not change their stances or policy

decisions, and, as such, it would be appropriate to assume that China's objectives are not to compel but rather to punish. As this study has shown, China is willing to go to great lengths to punish any target state for its choices if these do not fall within the preferences of the Chinese government.

THE PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF NOSTALGIA: GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE CULINARY AND GASTRONOMIC ENCOUNTERS OF FILIPINO MIGRANTS WITH “AUTHENTIC” FILIPINO FOOD

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*Food has always been tied to identity. It allows us to locate people and make sense of who we are. However, with the advent of globalization—wherein human mobility is inevitable, the process of “locating” things and persons becomes no easy feat. With the Filipino palate continuously acquiring new tastes, I argue that there is both a presence and an absence of nostalgia in the varying encounters of Filipino migrants with “authentic” Filipino food. In this paper, I examine two generations of the Filipino diaspora. The first generation is comprised of Filipinos who moved out of the Philippines and settled in different parts of the globe. The second generation is comprised of the children of these Filipino migrants. This group is further divided into two categories: a) children of two ethnically Filipino parents and b) children of multicultural families. This particular study asks the following questions: 1) What criteria are involved in considering a specific food to be “authentically” Filipino? 2) Is there really such a thing as “authentic” Filipino food? 3) How does the presence/absence of nostalgia affect the two generations’ identity formation processes? To answer these questions, I shall look into the history of Filipino migration, and specifically how food acts as a driving force behind migration. I will also analyse an episode of *The Migrant Kitchen* and a short story published in *Moving Portraits: Life Stories of Children of Migrant and Multicultural Families in Asia* in order to contextualize my study on the second generation’s encounters with Filipino food. Both of these texts look into the presence and absence of nostalgic longings for the homeland through culinary and gastronomic discourses, particularly through the second generation’s creation and/or consumption of fusion dishes.*

Keywords: *diaspora, authenticity, nostalgia, alienation, identity, migration*

Introduction

Food has always been an intrinsic part of our lives. Every time the stomach grumbles and demands to be fed, we satiate this hunger by fixing up meals or visiting our favourite restaurants. Often, we find ourselves craving a particular food. In the Philippines on hot summer days, *halo-halo* [shaved ice dessert] topped with *ube* [purple yam] ice cream becomes a staple and during the rainy season, bowls of piping hot *sinigang* [sour stew] is paired with rice. Come the holiday season, *puto bumbong* [purple rice cake cooked in bamboo tubes] and the classic Christmas ham, the Filipino counterpart for America's turkey, is served. The gastronomic experience is very much an affective and sensual experience. Food tickles our senses. It is an experience that allows us to travel places and occupy spaces without the need to move physically. Food allows us to travel through time, as it acts as a trigger for memories.

Considering the affective power of food and its ubiquity, it is thus important to also look at it as an important area of discourse. What we decide to cook or crave to eat invites us to look into the mechanism behind our choices. Food, for the most part, has always been tied to identity formation, and thus, the coining of the popular saying, "You are what you eat." We must note, however, that this saying follows from the idea of an authentic self. For instance, in Hindu Indian culture, food is "closely tied to the moral and social status of individuals and groups. Food taboos and prescriptions divide men from women, gods from humans, upper from lower castes, one sect from another."¹ From this, we can consider how our food choices are influenced by our notions of identity.

Early in 2018, local actress of Filipino-American heritage Liza Soberano, was criticized by many for her lead role in the fantasy series *Bagani*—a show set in pre-colonial Philippines. She made waves on the internet after defending herself in a tweet saying "I loooooove sinigang I think that's as Pinoy [colloquial term for Filipino] as Pinoy can get."² By blatantly stating her love for *sinigang*, Soberano hoped to justify her Filipino-ness. In this situation, we see how the actress used food to try and "legitimize" her ethnic identity. What prompted her to give such statement? According to anthropology Professor Martin Manalansan, "Being able to 'place' things and persons is a way to legitimize one's own knowledge and to assess the relative strangeness and/or acceptability of the thing or person in question. It is also a way of differentiating oneself from others."³ Considering Manalansan's argument, we can say that the relationship between food and identity exists through the notion of locus, specifically that of origin. When we meet someone new or unfamiliar, we

1 Arjun Appadurai, "How to Make a National Cuisine: Cookbooks in Contemporary India," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30, no. 1 (January 1988): 10.

2 Liza Soberano, Twitter post, February 2018, 4:51 a.m., <https://twitter.com/lizasoberano>.

3 Martin F. Manalansan IV, "Beyond Authenticity: Rerouting the Filipino Culinary Diaspora," in *Eating Asian America: A Food Studies Reader*, eds. Robert Ji-Song Ku, Martin F. Manalansan IV, and Anita Mannur (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 290.

always ask, as if by reflex, the question: “Where are you from?” as an attempt to make sense of what the person is like. The same thing happens when we encounter a dish unfamiliar to us, unconsciously, we somehow always try to “locate” it. However, given the diasporic tendencies of humans, the process of “locating” things and persons becomes difficult. At this point, certain questions arise: what exactly makes dishes like *sinigang* distinctly Filipino? What criterion is required for a specific dish to be authentically Filipino?

Considering the terms “distinct” and “authentic,” both of which pivot on the idea of purity and a fixed identity, it is interesting to note that Filipino cuisine is no stranger to fusion dishes. Even before the diaspora of Filipinos, through cruel yet vibrant colonial history, a complex palate developed. Before the arrival of the Spanish in 1565, Filipinos’ staple foods included chicken, pork, goat, *carabao* [water buffalo], meat, milk, seafood, rice, coconuts, bananas, and mangoes.⁴ During their conquest, the Spanish brought with them olive oil, ham, sausages, tomatoes, and wine.⁵ Soon after, Chinese traders arrived, introducing the Philippine archipelago to noodles, bean curd, bean sprouts, soy sauce, and dishes like *lumpia* [fried spring rolls, now a common Filipino party dish].⁶ Filipinos have since indigenized the foods brought by these colonizers and created “Filipinized” versions of them.

During the American occupation, the colonizers did not just bring food with them, they appropriated the American palate into Filipino taste buds. With the goal of “shaping loyal servants of the empire,”⁷ one of the main initiatives of the American regime was to establish a national public school system focused on teaching home economics. This institutionalized the American palate by teaching students the “nutritional superiority of refined sugars, red meats like beef, animals, hydrogenated fats like shortenings, and highly processed foods.”⁸ Students were prevented from practicing certain Filipino eating rituals such as having *merienda* [afternoon snacks] and eating with bare hands. Instead, they were taught to eat three square meals a day and to use a spoon and fork. This appropriation of American taste was further fortified by the entrance of American food corporations into the archipelago. Companies like Nestlé, Lea & Perrins, and Heinz “encouraged a generation of Filipinos to crave canned products such as corned beef and SPAM, white bread, pies, chiffon cakes, cookies and biscuits, salads made of American canned fruit, and mayonnaise-slathered macaroni salads.”⁹ We can understand this as the Americans’ means of colonizing the Philippines through food.

4 Doreen Fernandez, *Tikim: Essays on Philippine Food and Culture* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 1994), 224.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Dawn Mabalon, “As American as Jackrabbit Adobo: Cooking, Eating, and Becoming Filipina/o before World War II,” in *Eating Asian America: A Food Studies Reader*, eds. Robert Ji-Song Ku, Martin Manalansan IV, and Anita Mannur (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 152.

8 Ibid., 153.

9 Mabalon, “As American as Jackrabbit Adobo.”

Indeed, much of Filipinos' culinary and gastronomic practices changed throughout the colonial years. Now, with the advent of globalization—wherein human mobility is understood as inevitable,¹⁰ the Filipino palate continues to acquire new tastes and preferences. In this paper, I shall examine variations in the Filipino palate brought about by diaspora.

Rogers Brubaker's seminal article, "The 'diaspora' diaspora" delves into three core elements of diaspora: 1) dispersion, 2) homeland orientation, and 3) boundary maintenance. These three elements work hand-in-hand explaining the concept of authenticity. Authenticity mainly stems from the idea of homeland orientation, wherein displaced people continue to adhere to ideas and practices of their "conceptual homeland" despite existing outside of it. Authenticity becomes a massive point of debate when we consider whether or not migrants would choose to maintain the borders of their "authenticity." In his article, Brubaker specifically pointed out that "the interesting question, and the question relevant to the existence of diaspora, is to what extent and in what forms boundaries are maintained by second, third, and subsequent generations."¹¹

My main argument is that there is both a *presence* and an *absence* of nostalgia in the varying encounters of Filipino migrants with "authentic" Filipino food. In my discussion, I specifically examine two generations of the Filipino diaspora. The first generation is comprised of Filipinos who moved out of the Philippines and settled in different parts of the globe. This group, more often than not, tends to keep ties with the homeland. They constantly try to relive memories and certain experiences through "nostalgic" food. The second generation is comprised of the children of these first-generation Filipino migrants. This group is made up of Filipinos who have been born and/or raised outside the country. Unlike the first generation, these people are those who experience a feeling of alienation when they encounter "authentic" Filipino dishes. This feeling of alienation prompts them to create new spaces for themselves, as illustrated in the Filipino episode of Emmy award-winning food series, *The Migrant Kitchen*. This group is further divided into two categories: a) children of two ethnically Filipino parents and b) children of multicultural families. The children of multicultural families try to come to terms with their *plural* identities through their encounters with food. In probing this issue, analysis of the short story written by Hanna Norimatsu, published in *Moving Portraits: Life Stories of Children of Migrant and Multicultural Families in Asia* provides necessary context. Both of these texts look into the presence/absence of nostalgic longings for the homeland through

10 According to Castles et al., "a key indicator of globalization is a rapid increase in *cross-border flows* of all sorts, starting with finance and trade, but also including democratic values, cultural and media products, and – most important in our context – people."

Castles, Stephen, Hein De Haas, and Mark J. Miller, "Theories of Migration," in *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York: Guilford Publications, 2014), 33.

11 Rogers Brubaker, "The 'diaspora' diaspora," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (August 2006): 7.

culinary and gastronomic discourses, particularly through the second generation's creation and/or consumption of fusion dishes.

First Generation

Filipino Migration to the United States

The colonial food history of the Philippines is a narrative of how Filipinos acquired the taste for more extravagant foods such as wine, noodles, cakes, biscuits, red meat, and mayonnaise-slathered macaroni salads. We must note, however, that not all Filipinos had the opportunity to enjoy these extravagant foods. For lower-/middle-class Filipino families with small landholdings and who relied on subsistence-level farming, seafood, rice, bananas, corn, or anything that was locally available constituted their daily diet. These families mostly came from the provinces of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Pangasinan, Tarlac, La Union, and the Visayan islands of Panay and Cebu.¹² Crop failures, typhoons, and droughts negatively affected families who relied on subsistence farming and caused a massive emigration of Filipinos. According to history Professor Dawn Mabalon, "For Filipinas/os in the province, a diet of fish, rice, and vegetables was not monotonous and tiresome; only hunger was unbearable."¹³ An example raised by Henry T. Lewis in his book, *Ilocano Rice Farmers*¹⁴ illustrates how the proto-typical family of Alberta Alcoy Asis of Cebu was recruited to work in the sugar plantations of Hawaii after a 1904 drought killed their crops. The family initially farmed five acres of sugarcane, corn, and vegetables such as *munggo* [mung beans], *langka* [jackfruit], *sitaw* [long beans], and *ube* [purple yam]. Following both the drought and their father's death in 1908, the Asis family thus decided to emigrate. Much like the Asises, other Filipino families from Ilocos and the Visayan region decided to respond to the burdens of hunger, poverty, colonialism, and land loss by finding employment opportunities abroad. Thus, we can argue that food, or rather the shortage of it, was one of the main driving forces behind the Filipino diaspora for lower and middle class families who relied on farming.

The emigration of Filipinos before and during World War II was mediated not only by their desire to escape hunger and poverty in the Philippines, but also by the drive to move into places where food was abundant. During this period, American food advertising portrayed "America as a paradise in which macaroni chicken salads, steaks, biscuits, pies, cakes, and frozen fruit salad were abundant."¹⁵ The advertised image of this irresistibly delicious country, the influence of the institutionalized home economics curriculum, the socio-economic suffering in the Philippines, and the

12 Mabalon, "As American as Jackrabbit Adobo," 151.

13 Ibid.

14 Henry T. Lewis, *Ilocano Rice Farmers: A Comparative Study of Two Philippine Barrios* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1971), 24-25, quoted in Mabalon "As American as Jackrabbit Adobo," 152.

15 Mabalon, "As American as Jackrabbit Adobo," 153.

appealing prospect of attaining a college degree in America have prompted a large scale movement of Filipinos to the United States. In 1906, the first Filipino migrants moved to the islands of Hawaii to work in the sugar plantations and fruit orchards. By 1934, more than 100,000 Filipinos were based in America.¹⁶ Aside from Hawaii, Filipinos also worked in the salmon canneries in Alaska and the farmlands of California and Washington State. Those in the navy stayed on bases in Brooklyn, Vallejo, and San Diego while others who worked as domestics and busboys settled in Los Angeles, Seattle, and San Francisco.

However, these Filipino migrants soon found out that the projected image of the “American food paradise” advertised by food corporations was a far cry from the reality they faced in the United States. Instead of feasting on the extravagant foods they had initially fantasized about, Filipinos, especially those working in the *campo* [Filipino nickname for the farm labor camp], had to resort back to their initial diet of fish, vegetables, and rice. Luckily, rice was an abundant produce in the States. Other familiar food products like noodles, soy sauce, coconuts and vegetables such as tomatoes, okra, *patola* [Filipino squash], *tanglad* [lemongrass], eggplant, and sweet potatoes were also accessible, as they were either grown in the *campo* or imported by their fellow Asian immigrant farmers. Even though the reality in America was different from what these Filipino migrants initially had in mind, they still “occasionally afforded a richer and more varied diet than what they had subsisted on in the province.”¹⁷ As a response to the limitations on food, Filipinos took to their surroundings in order to feed themselves. When scholar Dawn Mabalon interviewed Filipina migrant Rizaline Raymundo about her family’s migration experience, Raymundo shared “You name it, we ate it.... Filipinos have a knack for making any kind of food edible and delicious.” This was how these Filipino migrants survived and thrived—by making the best out of what was available to them. Using local meats, they whipped up familiar Filipino dishes, some of which included jackrabbit *adobo* [meat marinated and cooked in soy sauce, vinegar, garlic, and pepper], bear *nilaga* [meat broth], and salmon head *sinigang*.

When the Depression hit, Filipino workers stayed together in tiny rooms in residential hotels, and shared food expenses in order to save money and survive. American exclusionists like Judge D.W. Rohrbach of Watsonville, California criticized these Filipinos for eating unfamiliar foods in poor conditions and thus deemed them “morally and culturally unassimilable and racially unfit for citizenship.”¹⁸ In response, Hilario Moncado, founder of Filipino Federation of America (FFA), prompted his fellow members to avoid the American red meat diet and opt for vegetarian options instead, as an act of defiance. Brubaker’s concept of ‘boundary maintenance’ is recognisable in this situation. Here, we see these Filipino migrants attempting to

16 Center for Migrant Advocacy, “History of Philippine migration,” <https://centerformigrantadvocacy.com/philippine-migration/history-of-philippine-migration/>.

17 Mabalon, “As American as Jackrabbit Adobo,” 157.

18 Ibid., 155.

preserve a “distinctive” identity—a certain Filipino-ness tied to their culinary and gastronomic choices—in a host country which denies them. The rejection and non-acceptance of American exclusionists towards these migrants prompted them to find spaces of their own, particularly by choosing to cook and eat food which connects them to their Filipino “roots.”

Filipino Migration to Other Parts of the Globe

The blatant non-acceptance of the host country could be one of the triggers for boundary maintenance. Moreover, the mere unfamiliarity in terms of food—the taste, could make one feel like an outsider, which prompts one to identify with something closer to home—food that brings nostalgia.

After World War II ended, the United States implemented strict immigration restrictions, thus limiting the migration of Filipinos to America. This prompted Filipinos to move to other parts of the globe. During the 1950s, Filipinos started moving to other Asian countries. Approximately 250,000 Filipinos migrated to Sabah and Sarawak to work in the logging industry.¹⁹ By the 1960s, others moved to Western Europe to work as domestic workers and nurses.²⁰ Come the 1970s, Filipinos migrated as technicians and engineers to Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Iraq.²¹ These movements introduced Filipinos to a plethora of new tastes, most of which were unfamiliar to Filipino taste buds.

Encounters with the unfamiliar can leave one feeling disconnected and searching for food that one can easily identify with is an automatic response. A case to consider is the predominantly Catholic Filipino migrant community in Seoul, South Korea. Reacting to the unfamiliar language, culture, and cuisine of Korea, Filipino immigrants eventually formed an ethnic enclave around the Hyehwa-dong Catholic Church. Hyehwa-dong became a cultural nexus—a space of familiarity for Filipino migrants—where practical conveniences and social services such as “shopping, banking, legal counselling on their rights and status as migrant workers, shelter, and medical treatment” are provided.²² Among these practical conveniences is the establishment of the Sunday market, dubbed Little Manila. According to Hyung Chull Jang in his study for the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, there occurs a certain shift in locality, wherein Hyehwa-dong, as part of the larger Korean society, is temporarily deterritorialized and subsequently reterritorialized as a Filipino site on Sundays.²³ Every Sunday, the place transforms into a hub where

19 Center for Migrant Advocacy, “History of Philippine migration,” <https://centerformigrantadvocacy.com/philippine-migration/history-of-philippine-migration/>.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Hyung Chull Jang, “Practicing Filipino Catholicism in Korea: Characteristics of Hyehwa-dong Filipino Catholic Community (HFCC) in Seoul,” in *Korea Journal* (Seoul: Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 2017), 93.

23 Ibid., 92.

Filipinos congregate. It is a market where one can purchase familiar products—from vegetables and fruits to snacks and skincare products. In Little Manila, you can hear various Filipino dialects being spoken as vendors and customers, originating from different parts of the Philippines, converse with each other. Little Manila is the perfect place to grab a nostalgic Filipino lunch. The menu usually consists of the famous chicken *inasal* [roasted chicken], pork barbecue, *pancit*, *nilaga*, *ginisang monggo* [sautéed mung bean soup], *piniritong bangus* [fried milkfish], *kare-kare* [stew made of oxtail, vegetables, and peanut sauce], *menudo* [stew made of pork and tomato sauce], and many more. Ate²⁴ Vee (not her real name), one of the pioneer vendors in Little Manila, offers her customers free *papaitan* [soup made of cow or goat innards]. Her customers are a mix of Filipinos and Koreans, but mostly Filipinos, who come to eat after the mass. The wooden chopsticks placed at the tables remain untouched. Filipino customers have abandoned the chopsticks—the common eating tools in Korea—and instead opted to use the more familiar spoon and fork. This cultural switch can be perceived as the Filipinos' way of maintaining boundaries.

I sat down with Ate Vee for an interview and asked her how Little Manila in Hyehwa-dong came about. I also inquired about how she ultimately decided to sell Filipino food in Korea. Ate Vee has lived in South Korea for fifteen years now and she runs her stall together with her Korean husband. “I do most of the cooking,” says Ate Vee. “I spend the whole Saturday cooking up these dishes and then I set up my stall early Sunday morning.” She also owns a Filipino restaurant and a meat shop, both of which are located in Hyehwa-dong as well.

With a pensive smile, she recalls how her thriving Filipino food business in Korea all started with her hauling a suitcase full of Filipino goods to sell near the Hyehwa-dong Catholic Church. Life wasn't very easy back then, according to her. Her husband did a lot of manual labor but was eventually forced to stop after an accident prompting Ate Vee to help out. With the large number of Filipinos attending mass at Hyehwa-dong, she figured she could set up shop near the Catholic Church and sell Filipino goods to her *kababayans* [countrymen]. At first, the City Hall apprehended them for selling unfamiliar products. Ate Vee shared that her husband had to speak with the authorities several times in order to clear her name. Eventually, the City Hall permitted Filipinos to set up shop in Hyehwa-dong and Ate Vee, along with other Filipino vendors, grew into what would make up the Little Manila we know today.

“When I first got here, I found the food really spicy, especially kimchi,” she laughs. Ate Ligaya, another Filipina migrant and a friend of Ate Vee's who was with us during the interview, quips “I even got an ulcer [from eating kimchi]!” However, Ate Vee says that she has now acquired the Korean taste. “I enjoy kimchi now. It's very healthy for the body.” Before she learned to love the spiciness of kimchi, she often cooked up Filipino meals at home. Ate Vee shares that she always had

24 “Ate” is a Filipino term for older sister, often used as a sign of respect for referring to older women (not necessarily within biological family kinships).

an affinity for food, and back in her Filipino hometown of Cauayan, Isabela, her family owns a vegetable stand and a meat shop. I talked to several of her Filipino customers and most of them remarked: “Her food tastes really authentic!”, “It tastes just like the food back home,” and “I feel like I’m back in the Philippines.” Indeed, Ate Vee’s food does not fail to induce nostalgia. However, this brings us back to the question of authenticity. How can we say that a certain food is authentically Filipino? Is Ate Vee’s food considered Filipino because it was cooked by her—a Filipina? Is it because we’re eating the food in Little Manila—a Filipino environment? Or is it authentically Filipino simply because, as her customers remarked, it reminds them of home?

It is hard to describe what a distinctly “authentic” Filipino taste is to begin with since most Filipino cuisine consists of fusion dishes—products of our colonial history. While most Filipinos would claim *adobo* as the “unofficial” national dish of the Philippines, some would counter this by saying that it is not representatively Filipino since we got the *adobo* recipe from interactions with Mexico during the Spanish colonial era. Others, like actress Liza Soberano, would argue that *sinigang* is the representative dish of the Philippines.

According to cultural historian Doreen Fernandez, the four main flavors that dominate Philippine cooking are salty, sour, sweet, and bitter.²⁵ These flavors vary depending on which part of the country you are visiting. The Philippines, a country made up of over 7,000 islands, a fairly vast territory, means there exists an abundance of culinary and gastronomic variations. Similar to how Arjun Appadurai describes Indian national cuisine as a cuisine “in which regional cuisines play an important role,”²⁶ Filipino national cuisine is also very regional. When tourist guide Ivan Man Dy tours Anthony Bourdain around Manila for his show, he describes food from the North as fairly “bitter” and food from the south as “spicy.” Considering these variations, it becomes even harder to pinpoint exactly what components make up an authentic Filipino dish.

Another important point of discussion to consider is whether the ingredients that constitute a dish make it authentic. During the interview, I asked Ate Vee where she gets her Filipino ingredients from. She says that she imports some of her ingredients, such as vegetables and spices, from the Philippines through connections with Korean businessmen. However, she sources meat locally. I particularly noticed that she uses *Sinigang* Mix in cooking up her *sinigang* dish. While this isn’t uncommon in Filipino culinary practices, it does, in a way, raise questions about authenticity. Mixes have allowed us to whip up dishes that taste like the “real” thing without having to source a whole lot of other ingredients. These instant mixes are especially convenient for migrants like Ate Vee, who do not have easy access to many Filipino ingredients. With just one sachet of *Sinigang* Mix, she can recreate the “authentic” taste of *sinigang*.

25 Fernandez, *Tikim*, 224.

26 Appadurai, “How to Make a National Cuisine,” 5.

On a similar note, Robert Ji-Song Ku, in his book *Dubious Gastronomy*, talks about MSG (monosodium glutamate)—which, like *Sinigang Mix*, instantly adds “authentic” flavour to dishes. He contends that for contemporary diners in the US, “MSG is an apocryphal flavouring agent and the antithesis of culinary authenticity at a time when the seemingly unstoppable forces of technology and globalization appear to threaten both the sanctity of indigenous foodways and the integrity of the human food supply.”²⁷ MSG, as a “dubious” food/ingredient, pushes forward the notion of culinary inauthenticity, which can feel troubling to immigrants who “often invent an image of the homeland as an *unchanging* and enduring cultural *essence* and are often singular about the ontological coherency of their national cuisines.”²⁸ Here, we can observe the interaction between nostalgia and the authenticity of food—how nostalgic longings for the familiar tend to create imaginary fictions posed as “authentic” memories.

According to Indian American cultural critic Ketu Katrak, “culinary narratives, suffused with nostalgia, often manage immigrant memories and imagined returns to the ‘homeland.’”²⁹ These memories of the familiar, however, are fragmentary, partial and “irretrievably lost.”³⁰ Nostalgia is thus structured more as “feelings”: “the search for a past and a place leads them to reconstitute their lives in narrative form, a story designed to reassemble a broken history into a new whole.”³¹ For immigrants, culinary culture is equated to “feelings” that take on monolithic and mythological proportions. There exists an “anxiety to reproduce authenticity while trying to create a sense of home and belonging in adopted homes and kitchens.”³² Therefore, for first generation Filipino migrants, nostalgic longings for the familiar turn into attempts to achieve or fabricate authenticity in their preparation and consumption of Filipino food.

Second Generation

Alienation

Unlike the first generation of Filipino migrants, the second generation consists of those who did not necessarily leave the country, but rather, were born or raised outside of

27 Robert Ji-Song Ku, “MSG Monosodium Glutamate,” in *Dubious Gastronomy: The Cultural Politics of Eating Asian in the USA*, (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2013), 163.

28 Anita Mannur, “Culinary Nostalgia: Authenticity, Nationalism, and Diaspora,” in *Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States (MELUS)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 12.

29 Ketu H. Katrak, “Food and Belonging: At ‘Home’ in ‘Alien-Kitchens,” in *Through the Kitchen Window: Women Writers Explore the Intimate Meanings of Food and Cooking* (Boston: Beacon, 1997), 263-75, quoted in Mannur, “Culinary Nostalgia,” 11.

30 Salman Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands* (London: Granta, 1991), quoted in Mannur, “Culinary Nostalgia,” 12.

31 Kathleen Stewart, “Nostalgia—A Polemic,” in *Rereading Cultural Anthropology* (Durham: Duke UP, 1992), 261, quoted in Mannur, “Culinary Nostalgia,” 15.

32 Mannur, “Culinary Nostalgia,” 15.

the Philippines. These second-generation Filipinos grew up in a different country, adapted to that country, and acquired the taste for their food. They usually do not speak Filipino, as learning the language is not necessary in their given environment. When asked about their identity, they usually refer to themselves through a duality, for example Filipino-American, Filipino-Australian, Filipino-Canadian, etc. In short, they have a hybridized identity. However, despite this duality one identity is usually preferred over the other, deliberately or not. For second generation Filipinos who grew up outside of the country, a certain disavowal of Filipino-ness occurs. When this group encounters someone or something “authentically Filipino”—like food, they fail to identify with it. A feeling of alienation occurs, as they are expected, in some way, to intrinsically be able to connect with their Filipino “roots.”

A case considered by Martin Manalansan in his essay “Beyond Authenticity: Rerouting the Filipino Culinary Diaspora” regarding the alienation of the second generation Filipino is the Philippine episode of *Anthony Bourdain: No Reservations*. Here, the author takes particular notice of the show’s “unusual rendering of a young Filipino American as ‘uneasy’ about being back in his parents’ homeland, his place of ‘origin.’”³³ *No Reservations*, at the time, opened a video competition where fans could submit videos of themselves persuading Anthony Bourdain to feature the food of their respective countries on the show. Filipino-American Augusto gained the attention of the producers with his energetic promotion of the “culinary desirability of the Philippines.”³⁴ Augusto meets with the food host after passing the initial cut. To Bourdain’s disappointment, however, during their meeting, Augusto does not exude the Filipino-ness portrayed in his video submission. The man lacks familiarity and ties with his Filipino roots, as he confesses that he has actually only spent a total of one week in the Philippines. The host expresses even greater disappointment when Augusto admitted to not having seen *Apocalypse Now*, an American movie filmed in the Philippines. This particular *No Reservations* episode evidences this expectation from Augusto to naturally be able to connect or identify with his ethnic origins despite having been born and raised in Long Island, New York.

When the two met in Cebu for the filming of the episode, the city where Augusto’s family resides, Bourdain takes note of the differences in Augusto’s behavior. Gone is the enthusiastic kid in the videotape submission, and instead there is this “decidedly toned down”³⁵ man who seems uncomfortable in his country of origin. The two share a meal of fried crabs, *bulalo* [beef shank soup], and rice at a local eatery in town. It is during this time when we see Augusto absently looking at his food, clearly alienated by the unfamiliarity of the Filipino dishes laid in front of him. His encounter with Filipino food is not that different from Anthony Bourdain’s. Augusto is as much a foreigner to Filipino food as Bourdain is. It is also during this time when the Filipino-

33 Manalansan IV, “Beyond Authenticity,” 296.

34 *Ibid.*, 295.

35 *Anthony Bourdain: No Reservations*, “Philippines,” directed by Zero Point Zero Production, aired February 16, 2009 on Travel Channel.

American admits feeling a sense of insecurity growing up because unlike his other Asian friends who have strong ties with their ethnic roots, he felt disconnected from his Filipino origins. Augusto expresses shame for his feelings of alienation.

In his concern for the melancholic Augusto, Anthony Bourdain sets up a grand Filipino feast. Where, *lechon* [whole roasted pig] is served as the main dish. *Lechon*, for the longest time, has been a great source of pride for Filipinos, especially for *Cebuanos* (people from Cebu, Philippines) who consider it their specialty. Perhaps, because of its massive size and “indigenous” cooking method, some Filipinos claim it as the representative dish of the Philippines. Bourdain, taken by the concepts of “authenticity” and “representativeness” entangled with the *lechon*, believes that this is exactly what Augusto needs. Bourdain believes that *lechon* would be the very dish to help him reconnect with his intrinsic Filipino-ness. Confirming the host’s expectations, Augusto enjoys the roasted pig. However, Augusto’s enthusiasm for the food does not necessarily mean that it had triggered a re-awakening in him. It could mean that the lechon was just *that* good to elicit such a response. Or perhaps it is because Augusto has an acquired American taste for meat, which makes it easy for him to enjoy the meal before him.

This episode of *No Reservations* continuously attempts to thrust an authentic Filipino identity onto Augusto through encounters with his “home” food. Its problematic that the in/authenticity of “Filipino” food and the correlated in/authenticity of the Filipino identity raises the traditional hierarchy issues that exist between “home nation” and the diaspora. By contrast, the diaspora is characterized as “the bastard child of the nation—disavowed, inauthentic, illegitimate, an impoverished imitation of the originary culture.”³⁶ Here, the diaspora and the immigrants are framed as imitations of the “real” citizens in the homeland, who must therefore constantly prove their authentic ethnic identities. Manalansan, in his essay, unpacks this hierarchy by dismantling the notion of authenticity in food scholarship. He regards authenticity “as a kind of constructed ‘settledness’ or static adherence to origins, identity, and belonging”³⁷ and inauthenticity “not as a lack of authentic elements (whatever they may be) but as a historically and cultural negotiated state and process of emotional discomfort and affective refusal to adhere to an easy mapping of identity.”³⁸ By using Augusto’s case to show the second generation Filipino immigrant’s uneasy encounters with what is deemed to be “authentic” Filipino food, Manalansan dismantles the static notion of “Filipino-ness.” Instead, he argues that “Augusto’s awkwardness is not due to the failure of food to do its work of authenticating homecoming natives. Rather, this situation speaks to the indeterminacy and instability of diasporic links among body, desire, place, and time.”³⁹

36 Gayatri Gopinath, “‘Bombay, U.K., Yuba City’: Bhangra Music and the Engendering of Diaspora,” *Diaspora* 4.3 (1995): 317, quoted in Mannur, “Culinary Nostalgia,” 23.

37 Manalansan IV, “Beyond Authenticity,” 297.

38 *Ibid.*

39 *Ibid.*, 298.

Creating New Spaces

Unlike Augusto, there are other second generation Filipino/a/x, who explicitly claim a clear connection with their Filipino roots, specifically through food. Famous LA pastry chef Isa Fabro shares in the Philippine episode of the Emmy-winning documentary series *The Migrant Kitchen* how her parents really wanted her to fit into society. This, according to her, is very common for immigrant families: “I actually don’t speak the language. I was told to speak English. But if anything, I’ve always had the food. I always grew up eating that, and that’s always the main connection to my culture.”⁴⁰ This connection, however, cannot be necessarily considered a form of nostalgia, as opposed to the culinary and gastronomic experiences of first generation Filipino migrants. It’s more of an attempt to “connect” to this constructed essence of what it is like to be Filipino. In this episode of the series, several Filipino-American food entrepreneurs in Los Angeles, California are interviewed regarding their journeys in establishing Filipino-fusion restaurants, catering not only to Filipinos, but to the American market as well.

Despite such claims of connection to an ethnic origin, driven by the home nation/diaspora (authentic/inauthentic) hierarchy, there remains a feeling of alienation for the second generation. Food is an interesting starting point in analysing the identity formation of these second-generation Filipinos. According to sociology Professor Oliver Wang, “Food, I think, has always been one avenue for economic survival and success amongst immigrants because other kinds of businesses may succeed and fail but in the end everyone has got to eat at some point.”⁴¹ Food is an intrinsic part of everybody’s lives, which is why there is always the tendency to associate food with identity. For these young Filipino-American entrepreneurs, food not only becomes their avenue for economic survival and success, but also their way of “connecting” to their roots. This desire for “re-connection” stems from the unsettling feeling that comes with their encounters with the unfamiliar Filipino culture. This is also why these chefs are not necessarily concocting “authentic” Filipino dishes but rather Filipino-*fusion* dishes. Isa Fabro, for instance, created a Filipino-inspired dessert called *malas*— “a hybrid Filipino donut crossed between a *malasada*, which is a Hawaiian donut, and *carioca*, which is a Filipino fritter, and it is coated in *latik*, which is caramelized coconut milk.”⁴²

Creating spaces has become a main priority for these displaced Filipinos. The lack of a distinctive place and the desire to belong prompt them to create spaces of their own. In this process of creation, we must take particular note of how these people try to remain ambivalent towards both the “host” and “home.” The

40 *The Migrant Kitchen*, “Episode 2: Barkada,” produced by KCET Online, published in September 27, 2016 on YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=scoqj9FvoFg&list=LL3kAWJGP4tP_koUlibNcBQQ&index=2.

41 *The Migrant Kitchen*

42 *Ibid. The Migrant Kitchen*

second generation is literally a “hybrid”—a fusion of two different cultures. Chase Valencia, co-owner of Lasa restaurant located in LA’s Chinatown, claims that they use the produce available in Los Angeles and then integrate this into the food and flavor profiles of their “memories from childhood growing up eating Filipino food.”⁴³ The ambivalent culinary creation process enables these fusion dishes to serve as literal embodiments of the mixing of different traditions and tastes of the second generation.

In comparison to people of the first generation, like Ate Vee, who serves up “authentic” Filipino dishes for a majorly Filipino market abroad, the second generation and their Filipino-fusion dishes cater to a more global market. Their hybrid dishes are created not to induce nostalgia from diners, but rather to introduce new tastes to them. What these Filipino-American chefs are trying to do is bring the “Filipino” taste onto the global stage.

Children of Multicultural Families

This episode of *The Migrant Kitchen* specifically illustrates the culinary and gastronomic experiences of the children of two ethnically Filipino migrant parents, who, despite growing up in the United States, are somehow still able to identify with their Filipino roots through food served by their parents. This television series perfectly encapsulates the way second generation Filipino immigrants negotiate their place within the home and diaspora hierarchy. These Filipino chefs, through their culinary creations, try to assert their “Filipino-ness” while incorporating the hybridity of their dual identities by creating fusion dishes instead of purely authentic Filipino food.

Hanna Norimatsu’s short story entitled “Pininyahang Tonkatsu Dinner Rituals” published in *Moving Portraits: Life Stories of Children of Migrant and Multicultural Families in Asia* epitomizes multicultural children’s ambivalent relationship with food. Norimatsu is of Filipino-Japanese heritage, as her mother is Filipino and her father Japanese. Like most other children of multicultural families, she possesses two identities partly due to the fusion of cultures imposed by her ethnically different parents. These children are thus subject to a much more complex process of identity formation.

In her short story, she shares that having parents—one who is Filipino and another who is Japanese, meant that they always had more than one kind of dish prepared for every meal. The people of their house “learned to jump between [her] father’s Japanese cuisine and [her] mother’s Filipino creations over the decades.”⁴⁴ Dinners are particularly tricky, according to her, as she, along with her siblings and

43 *The Migrant Kitchen*

44 Hanna Norimatsu, “Hanna: Pininyahang Tonkatsu Dinner Rituals,” in *Moving Portraits: Life Stories of Children of Migrant and Multicultural Families in Asia*, eds. Maruja M.B. Asis and Karen Anne S. Liao, (Manila: Scalabrini Migration Center, 2017), 46.

her father, ask for “special orders” from her mother. Her brother, who takes after their father’s Japanese taste, would often ask for *tonkatsu* [fried pork coated in breadcrumbs]. As for Hanna, she particularly enjoys *pininyahang manok* [Filipino dish of chicken with pineapple sauce]. With these variations in requests, she describes the usual dinner preparation in their house as a situation where “mother will try her best to cook the food that she thinks will best satiate us all.”⁴⁵

However, it is problematic when Norimatsu contemplates her grandmother’s claim that they [the children] have “sworn allegiance to different generals though we’ve taken a liking to our enemy camps’ cuisines.”⁴⁶ Here, she tries to make sense of her plural identity—one as a Filipino and one as a Japanese. Similarly, both second generation Filipinos (children of two ethnically Filipino parents) and the children of multicultural families undergo a kind of displacement, which forces them to try and choose one particular identity over the other through food preference. Norimatsu points out in her work, that this disavowal of one identity is not simple, and not possible. By growing up in an environment where two distinct cultures are being practiced, Norimatsu argues that she, along with other children of multicultural families, must not be forced to choose one identity over the other. Rather, they should be able to create a certain hybrid identity, or a hybrid space within the practice of eating and cooking food. In her case, as both Filipino and Japanese, she states: “Why should we only be likened to one? Aren’t we the products of both? At the same time, are we not our own? The food laid out on the table is to be enjoyed, and thanked for regardless of where they originated, I say. The table isn’t a battlefield; children shouldn’t be forced to choose.”⁴⁷ This evidences the absence of nostalgia in the second generation’s encounters with Filipino food. Instead of identifying with just one “authentic” national cuisine, they create food of their own by fusing together the culinary/gastronomic cultures they have acquired and grew up with. For Norimatsu, this is embodied by her mother’s *pininyahang tonkatsu*—the fusion of the Filipino *pininyahang manok* and the Japanese *tonkatsu*.

Conclusion

Food is an intrinsic part of our lives part of our daily routine. Thus, it is often overlooked as a possible starting point for discussions regarding identity formation within the context of migration. Ubiquitous as it is, it asks us to re-examine the Filipino identity. Is being Filipino an intrinsic aspect—something we’re born with? Or is it a process of “becoming”—the same way our palate acquires new tastes? What we decide to cook or eat ultimately invites us to look into the mechanism behind our choices.

This paper demonstrates the contrasting encounters of first generation and second-generation Filipino immigrants with “authentic” Filipino food. For the first

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 50.

47 Norimatsu, “Hanna: Pininyahang Tonkatsu Dinner Rituals.”

generation, there exists a nostalgia, as these Filipino immigrants grapple with the unfamiliarity of their new homes in their respective host countries, they attempt to maintain their connections to the “conceptual homeland” with fragmented memories of their national cuisine. This phenomenon equates to nostalgic longings for the past, embedded in the Filipino food they create and consume. With the presence of nostalgia in the first generation’s culinary and gastronomic encounters with food, their criterion for the authenticity of Filipino food is its essential identification with home—the Philippines.

On the other hand, for both categories of the second generation there lies the absence of nostalgia in their encounters with Filipino food. While the first category—the children of two ethnically Filipino parents might feel the urge to “re-connect” with their ethnic Filipino roots, it is important to note that they do not necessarily try to associate themselves with just one type of national identity or national cuisine. Through their creation and consumption of Filipino-x *fusion* dishes, they negotiate their position within the home nation/diaspora hierarchy. These second generation Filipino migrant chefs thus incorporate the hybridity of their dual identities by creating fusion dishes instead of purely authentic Filipino food. The difference between the two categories of the second generation is that for the second category—the children of multicultural families, the desire to assert their “Filipino-ness” does not exist. Being the product of biological and cultural diversity, they inherently disavow the need to associate themselves with just one national identity or just one national cuisine. Synonymous to the first category of the second generation, they create and consume fusion dishes like *pininyahang tonkatsu* which embodies their hybridity—the “fusion, diffusion, or confusion”⁴⁸ of their dual identities. In conclusion, the criteria for the authenticity of Filipino food differ among generations of the Filipino diaspora. For the first generation, as long as the food served before them reminded them of the “conceptual homeland,” they would consider it authentic. For the second generation, the concept of authenticity may remain contestable. As they associate themselves with more than one national identity, their perceptions of a distinct and authentic Filipino cuisine constantly and continuously changes.

Is there really such a thing as “authentic” Filipino food? Although food and identity will always be tied to each other, we must acknowledge the fact that culinary and gastronomic experiences are continuously evolving. Therefore, what are nostalgia and in/authenticity but ideational romantic notions that assist us in going through the complex process of becoming Filipino in the age of globalization.

INTERVIEW

THE IMPORTANCE OF PASSION IN DIPLOMACY

Interview with *Liga Tarvide*

THE IMPORTANCE OF PASSION IN DIPLOMACY

Interview with *Liga Tarvide*

Liga Tarvide is an Officer for education, culture, and public diplomacy at the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia in the Republic of Korea, where she assists in the development of bilateral relations and cooperation between Korea and Latvia. Liga has endeavored to raise awareness of Latvia in Korea through many projects involving translation, interpretation, event coordination, facilitation, and cross-cultural communication in the fields of education, culture, literature, history, and more. Previously, Liga has worked as an intern on projects in human rights and education for the Center for Dalit Women Nepal (CDWN), an NGO in Nepal, as well as participated in many translation projects in her home country of Latvia. Liga pursued her bachelor's in Asian studies at the University of Latvia in Riga, as well as received her master's in International Development Cooperation from Ewha Woman's University, Seoul.

The Journal's editor Danielle French sat down with Liga Tarvide to discuss her role as an officer at the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia.

*All thoughts and opinions presented by Liga Tarvide in this interview are her own, and do not reflect the views of the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia.

Y: Would you please introduce yourself and your position at the Embassy of Latvia?

LT: My name is Liga Tarvide, and I am an Officer responsible for education, culture, and public diplomacy at the Embassy of Latvia in Seoul. My position is exciting and dynamic, and includes many different roles such as that of educator, consultant, curator, and event planner. For the most part, my work involves presenting Latvian history, culture, and values to Korean audiences in order to raise awareness about Latvia in Korea. I also assist Korean students interested in studying in Latvia, and connect them to our many programs available, such as scholarships in Latvia. Moreover, I work to expand partnerships in the field of education and at the institutional level, while also coordinating the participation of different Latvian artists and performers in various events taking place in Korea. Lastly, we also plan and organize different events as the Embassy of Latvia, such as Latvian film screenings, book presentations, exhibitions, and lectures. The ultimate goal of all these activities

is to create a better understanding of Latvia in Korea, and to allow for the cultivation of friendship and closer cooperation between the two countries.

Y: What kind of efforts have to be made in order to work for an Embassy?

The Foreign Service itself is very broad, and there are many career tracks in the economic, political, administrative, management, and diplomacy sectors as well as many more. However, quite often these sectors are interconnected and therefore interdisciplinary knowledge is essential to reflect the complex elements of international affairs. That being said, in particular degrees in diverse subjects such as international relations, international economics, international business, law, history, environmental studies, and migration studies, only to name a few, are well suited for work in the Foreign Service. On one hand, the presence of a multidisciplinary approach is important, while on the other hand, regional expertise, a solid knowledge of the region or host country, including its history, and its cultural and political situation, is also essential. Additionally, to work for an embassy, proficiency in foreign languages is required and a good command of the language of the host country is considered to be an immense benefit that adds to the competitiveness of prospective diplomats. Also, while specialized expertise and knowledge in a specific sector remain relevant, intercultural communication skills are crucial considering how networking is a vital aspect of modern diplomacy as diplomats must communicate with a broad range of partners.

Y: Please tell us about your background and how it informs your current work.

LT: My background is very much related to Asia. During my bachelor's degree, I majored in Asian studies at the University of Latvia, Riga, studying Japanese through my university, and Korean on my own, as no Korean courses were offered at the time. I later continued my Korean studies, following the completion of my bachelor's degree at Inha University, Incheon. I then pursued my Master's degree in International Development Cooperation at Ewha Womans University, Seoul. Through my studies, I acquired not only knowledge on the [Asian] region and Korea, but I also gained insight into international global issues. Especially, this knowledge enables me to more quickly analyze current events in-depth while working. Additionally, my Korean studies have allowed for greater opportunity to reach out and communicate more effectively with foreign audiences. Furthermore, I have also studied and volunteered abroad, which allowed me to experience various cultures and learn how to work with people from different backgrounds.

Y: Please give a brief overview of the development of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Korea. What are the future goals for the development of this relationship?

LT: Latvia established diplomatic relations with Korea in 1991. However, the Embassy of Latvia was opened in 2015, meaning we are one of the newer embassies in

Korea and the newest Latvian embassy abroad. Currently, Latvia and Korea have an excellent political dialogue and promote active exchange in education, culture, trade, and tourism. In fact, during the months of May and June, the first charter flights between Seoul and Riga will begin which we hope will enable us to cooperate more closely in the future. Considering our future goals, we will continue to work in developing our bilateral relations on every level, particularly in the IT sector. We also expect to have Latvian companies expand their reach to the Korean market with high quality niche products, especially design and bakery products.

Y: What are some of the specific challenges you face as the Officer for education, culture, and public diplomacy for the Embassy of Latvia in Korea?

LT: At the beginning, one of the major challenges we faced was a very low awareness of Latvia in Korea. Koreans were not, and are still not, completely familiar with Latvia. Often, many Koreans easily recognize the names of famous Latvians, but they do not realize that they are Latvian. Especially in regards to classical music, many world famous Latvian violinists, cello players, and conductors are recurrently invited to perform in Korea. However, generally not many know that they are Latvian. To overcome this challenge was not easy and it took a lot of effort to raise awareness and visibility of Latvia in Korea. In order to tackle this challenge, we focused on the youth by visiting many schools, and universities, as well as inviting students to our embassy. Additionally, we also focused on working with media, producing promotional materials in Korean, and actively promoting these materials through social media. The situation is gradually improving through these efforts. However, we had to start with the basics of who we are.

Y: As an Officer at an Embassy, cultural challenges must occasionally arise. What skills are needed to deal with culturally sensitive issues?

LT: In my experience, attention to detail is vital in communication when working in a multicultural and multilingual environment. For instance, while Latvia and Korea share similar history, and some distinctive qualities when it comes to work ethic and resilience in facing challenges, there are also cultural differences. In Korea, society is generally more fast-paced and spontaneous, which has contributed to Korea's rapid development and economic achievements. Conversely, Latvian society is more slow-paced and centers on systemic planning. Throughout my daily work at the embassy, I do feel the presence of these cultural differences and detailed communication is key in avoiding any misunderstandings.

Y: What are the most challenging and rewarding projects you have worked on during your time at the Embassy of Latvia? Please describe your work on the projects and how you overcame any difficulties that arose during the projects.

LT: There are a number of very rewarding projects that I have taken part in at the embassy. However, I would like to highlight two particularly notable projects. First, I

would like to briefly touch upon a project we have undertaken in the education field pertaining to the formation and introduction of two courses at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies: Baltic studies and Latvian language. These optional courses have been running for one year, and there has been a keen interest from Korean students with around 19 students registered for both courses. These courses were developed on the initiative of the Embassy of Latvia, in cooperation with the professors from Hankuk University, and with support from the Ministry of Education and Science of Latvia. In the future, we hope that the introduction of these subjects will serve as a basis for the establishment of a Baltic research center facilitating further cooperation between the two countries. Secondly, I would like to introduce *Latvia 100 Snapshot Stories*, a project in the field of culture, literature, and history. Prior to the publication of the book *Latvia 100 Snapshot Stories*, there were no one-volume books about Latvia available in Korea in Korean. In order to provide the Korean public with easily accessible information about Latvia, the embassy initiated this project, producing a comprehensive publication that includes a hundred stories about Latvian culture, history, and achievements in various fields. The project took around four months to complete, with most of the work involving translation since the original publication is in English. This is a special project because this book is only available in four languages at the moment, with the original in English, and subsequent publications in Russian, Arabic, and now Korean. Furthermore, this book is not for sale, and has instead been distributed to public libraries and universities, and is freely available online.

Y: What advice can you give to those hoping to work at an Embassy?

LT: Working for an embassy is challenging, but rewarding and fulfilling since there is the possibility to contribute to wider goals and objectives. First, to be a successful diplomat you must have a passion for international issues, a passion for the country you represent, its culture and history, as well as a passion for sharing the stories of that country with the rest of the world. Passion is very important because being a diplomat is not only a profession, it is a lifestyle. I would also encourage students to continue to be curious and to attentively observe any developments or trends taking place on the ever-changing international stage.

BOOK REVIEW

DECENTERING CITIZENSHIP: GENDER, LABOR, AND MIGRANT RIGHTS IN SOUTH KOREA

*Negotiating Citizenship and Identities
Among Filipina Migrant Women in South Korea*
Review by Alexandra Micu

DECENTERING CITIZENSHIP: GENDER, LABOR, AND MIGRANT RIGHTS IN SOUTH KOREA

Book Review by Alexandra Micu

Yonsei University

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Decentering Citizenship: Gender, Labor, and Migrant Rights in South Korea by Hae Yeon Choo examines how Filipina migrant women challenge the limits of the South Korean citizenship in their interactions with other migrants, South Korean employers, immigration officers and civil society groups. The book skillfully compares diverse paths for claiming rights by bringing to the forefront three migrant categories, namely female factory workers, marriage migrants, and hostesses. This book differentiates itself from other similar studies not only through the spaces and groups of people it focuses on, but also through its methodology. The ethnographic approach combined with several series of interviews conducted between 2008 and 2014 offers a comprehensive account of how the basis of citizenship and rights is negotiated by Filipino migrants, South Korean advocates, and authorities. Therefore, the seven chapters of the book and its concluding section highlight the sometimes divergent opinions and goals of the aforementioned actors, arguing that the issue of migrant rights and justice cannot be separated from a shift in citizenship boundaries.

Given the ethnic, gender, class and international¹ hierarchies at work, labor immigration policies in many Asian countries, including South Korea, have been highly exclusionary² when it comes to workers from developing nations. Indeed, Choo declares that these migration regimes are defined by a stark incongruence between the existence of formal rights and the immigrants' ability to exercise said rights. The author situates migrant groups at the "margins of citizenship," where the inequalities embedded in law and policy are revealed and reproduced horizontally among polity members. Therefore, *Decentering Citizenship* delves into the formulation process of state membership which, although premised on equality and inclusiveness, excludes low-skilled and non-ethnic migrants to different extents.

Choo's view on transnational flows of people is congruent with the dual labor market theory, which assumes that demand for labor in developed countries engenders international migration.³ Similarly, she argues that the movement of Filipino workers abroad is motivated by domestic and global forces, namely the home government's labor export policy and the international need for cheap and short-term migrant labor. In addition, *Decentering Citizenship* unveils a new side of transnational migrants: despite their limited opportunities for full integration into the South Korean state, the Filipina migrant women do not consider the Philippines as the home they have to return to either. Therefore, while some of them choose to build a life in South Korea, for many more it is a temporary destination in their continuous pursuit of mobility and security, ideals which are widely associated with Western welfare states.

The importance of recognition and respect when deciding to take part in the cycle of migration is further highlighted by Choo, who points out that legal status does not deter discrimination and disrespect. Moreover, the discourse of human dignity was also widely adopted by South Korean people in their claim-making, although the way in which diverse groups integrate this ideal into migrant activism is influenced by gender and generation. Men who took part in the labor movements between 1960s and 1980s see migrant laborers as the new working class who should be protected against abuses at the workplace. The women who came of age during the same period perceive migrant women as the mothers of the future

1 Choo argues that Filipina migrant women's decision to move to South Korea is based not only on individual circumstances, but also on their understanding of South Korea as superior to the Philippines within the global hierarchy of nations. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore are perceived as having a similar standing to South Korea, which transformed the four states into countries of destination for many Filipino migrants (22-23).

2 The author observes how the immigration policies of South Korea and other Eastern and South Asian countries have largely discouraged the permanent settlement of migrant workers by enforcing short-term employment systems and denying family reunification requests. At the same time, the South Korean government heavily funds assimilation programs catered to marriage migrants, who are eligible to naturalization.

3 Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor, "Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal," *Population and development review* 19, no. 3 (1993): 440, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938462>.

generation of South Koreans and consequently fight against their subordination within the family. Finally, younger activists are seemingly guided by the pursuit of their personal freedom and claim that immigrants should have the right to do the same.

The author also refutes the idea that legal status minimizes the threat of immigration enforcement. In South Korea, racial profiling is a widespread practice which places phenotypically different Filipinos at a higher risk of being detained, regardless of documentation status. In certain instances, the political activism of immigrants, although a statutory right, transforms them into a target of immigration raids and deportation. Choo attributes this paradoxical nature of citizenship to the need to contain the alien population within well-established boundaries by using fear as a method of discipline. Choo's approach seems to build upon two of Calavita's main statements: it is difficult to differentiate between legal and illegal migrants, due to the blurred line that separates the two. Also, inequality is embedded in the national law in order to perpetuate the vulnerability of the migrant community.⁴

The inferiority of the Filipino migrant community, which is predominantly church-based, is not only imposed by state authorities, but is also reinforced by South Korean advocates, who often adopt a paternalistic or maternal attitude towards the migrants. Choo clearly describes the drawbacks and limitations of such approaches, at the same time suggesting a personal bias towards the maternal educators active in both faith-based migrant advocacy organizations and social welfare centers. The author argues that the female educators encourage marriage migrants to capitalize on their entitlements and become involved in migrant advocacy not only at the local level but also at the national one. This in turn begs the question whether formal politics will become available to other categories of migrants, or whether state repression against MTU and illegal workers will continue.

Choo predicates the expansion of labor rights for migrant workers on the long-established relationship between dignified work and citizenship, and the legacy of labor movements in South Korea. While Filipina factory workers benefited from the mobilization of civil society actors in the name of a gender and an ethnically mixed workforce, Filipina camp town hostesses have been excluded from right-claiming based on the disreputable nature of their work. The interplay between morality and state membership, as well as the stigmatization of particular sectors of work, discouraged most migrant advocates from including hostesses within the category of dignified migrant workers. This in turn forced migrant hostesses to choose between maintaining a sense of self-respect and adopting the narrowly-framed victim-of-human-trafficking status proposed by feminist NGOs.

Decentering Citizenship argues that not only hostesses, but also marriage-migrants are constructed as victims of human rights violations as a basis for political claims. For both groups of women, accepting the rhetoric of victimhood implies giving

4 Kitty Calavita, "Immigration, law, and marginalization in a global economy: Notes from Spain," *Law & Society Review* 32 (1998): 529- 566, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/827756>.

up on moral respectability as a member of the community. Consequently, migrant wives adopted the morally elevated status of mother-citizens as an alternative path towards the expansion of rights. Motherhood is glorified by both church and the state, a reason as to why cross-border marriages probably represent the safest option to full and equal South Korean membership citizenship. Meanwhile, hostesses that reject the downgrading status imposed on prostitutes or victims are left on the margins of citizenship.

One aspect notably absent in Choo's study is the religious discourse of faith-based migrant advocacy work. Indeed, the author mentions in a note that she has developed the topic in a previous study, hence its omission in the book. However, a reiteration of her results would have benefited the analysis by offering a complete image of the narrative employed by pastors and staff members. Given that Protestants and Catholics are the two denominations most involved in migrant advocacy, migration scholars such as Joon K. Kim and Denis Kim emphasize the universalistic character of Christianity as one of the main drivers behind migrant support and activism. The migrant workers' issues have been therefore situated within the biblical message of equal treatment, humanitarian assistance and selflessness.⁵ Moreover, Joon K. Kim observes⁶ that the purpose behind the programs launched by the conservative churches was to transform migrant workers into missionaries that would spread the word of God back in their home countries. This would explain why churches are eager to offer language courses, services of worship, and other specialization classes even to non-religious foreigners.⁷ Subsequently, just by focusing on secular factors, namely the legacy of church participation in the domestic labor movements, an important dimension of faith-based migrant advocacy is overlooked.

The book could have also offered a more balanced view on advocates' motivation for participating in migrant advocacy by providing other examples besides an altruistic desire to help. Choo primarily argues that the rationale behind migrant activism is the advocates' sense of duty to protect South Korea by helping immigrants integrate into the host society and to fight for the respect of human dignity.⁸ In turn, this would suggest that pro-immigrant organizations have been created in order to influence state policy. However, there are scholars that suggest the contrary is also possible. Denis Kim presents the criticism of two NGO representatives against faith-based organizations that took part in the labor movement in the 1970s and 1980s. They assert that their commitment to immigrant rights is motivated by the need

5 Denis Kim, "Catalysers in the promotion of migrants' rights: Church-based NGOs in South Korea," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37, no. 10 (2011): 1649-1667. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2011.613336.

6 Joon K. Kim, "The politics of culture in multicultural Korea," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37, no. 10 (2011): 1583-1604., DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2011.613333.

7 Ibid, 1589.

8 While this statement might seem to contradict my previous point, in my understanding the concepts of "duty" and "human dignity" Choo uses are not based in religion, but rather in the global human rights discourse.

to find new targets for advocacy, after the democratization movement weakened the position of *minjung* churches.⁹ Nora Hui-Jung Kim adopts a similar stance by claiming that the multicultural boom might have been engendered by the migrant incorporation programs launched by the Korean government. She recounts how the prospect of government funding led to the creation of several migrant advocacy organizations, while already existing NGOs changed their name and even structure in order to accommodate the needs of their new multicultural targets.¹⁰

Such an addition would not have undermined the contributions made by the activists in expanding the social and civil rights of immigrants. On the contrary, it might have strengthened the sense of responsibility Choo's subjects have expressed by contrasting it with the selfish pursuit of individual financial gain. Moreover, linking self-serving migrant advocacy with the drawbacks of NGO professionalization, another undeveloped discussion point, would have facilitated further inquiries into several issues: why certain migrants groups are preferred as subjects over others and what could be the logic behind creating hierarchies within the migrant population? Given that state sponsorship represents not only a means of survival, but also proof of official recognition for NGOs, financial aid might heavily influence the choice of its advocacy targets. Therefore, the tendency to focus on targets that attract the most grants and whose needs are easier to satisfy often leads to the concentration of programs within one segment of the population. At the same time, the groups excluded by the state are also ignored by civil society organizations.

Despite a few shortcomings, *Decentering Citizenship* is still an exemplary account of the dynamics of citizenship in South Korea, proposing a model in which rights are not only formulated within a top-down relation between the state and the citizen, subject, but they are also created within day-to-day interactions between the members of a moral community. To reiterate, one of the merits of Choo's study is its ethnographic approach, which provides valuable insight into a community and their advocates that had been previously limited in the literature. Indeed, taking into consideration the premise of this book, the immersion of the researcher into the migrant community seems vital for the authenticity of the results. By looking at three overlapping groups of Filipina migrant workers, the author has shown that from a moral and right-entitlement point of view, they are notably different. Therefore, *Decentering Citizenship* is a representative work of the feminization of migration which, although not as significant in South Korea,¹¹ is relevant to the global circuit of migration. As it stands, Choo's research could help illuminate what type of social remittances Filipina migrants bring or send back to their home country and their

9 Denis Kim, "Catalysers in the promotion of migrants' rights: Church-based NGOs in South Korea," 1657-1658.

10 Nora Hui-Jung Kim, "Multiculturalism and the politics of belonging: the puzzle of multiculturalism in South Korea," *Citizenship studies* 16, no. 1 (2012): 105,108. DOI: 10.1080/13621025.2012.651406.

11 Hye-Kyung Lee, "Gender, migration and civil activism in South Korea," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 12, no. 1-2 (2003): 127-153, DOI: 10.1177/011719680301200106.

effects on the local communities. Moreover, this exploratory data could represent the starting point for future studies focusing on the identity and integration of second-generation Filipino migrants residing abroad. Should more background information be given on the issues mentioned above, the present work could also serve as a fundamental academic resource for both undergraduate and graduate students interested in migration studies.

GUIDELINES

FOR SUBMISSION

PEAR (Papers, Essays, and Reviews) welcome submissions from all scholars, most notably graduate students, regarding the diverse field of International Studies, particularly those topics that challenge the conventional wisdom of any given issue. Each issue of the printed Journal will contain the following three sections:

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REVIEWS This section focuses on evaluations and reviews of existing arguments contained in essays, articles, and books, in addition to policy reviews. The pros and cons of each argument or policy reviewed should be provided for a broader and more comprehensive understanding of not only the argument, but the situation of the assertion in a greater context. Inclusions should be no longer than 2,000 words.

The following guidelines should be adhered to for all submissions:

1. All submissions must be sent as a Microsoft Word file.
2. Citations should appear as footnotes as per the Chicago Manual of Style, 17th Edition.
3. Pages should not be numbered or marked with the author's name.
4. All submissions should include a proposed title.
5. Papers and Essays submissions should include an abstract of no longer than 250 words.
6. A short author biography should also be included with each submission.
7. Foreign words should be romanized according to the following systems:
 - Japanese: Revised Hepburn
 - Korean: Revised Romanization
 - Chinese: Pinyin
8. American English spelling and punctuation should be used in all submitted pieces.

Submissions that neglect these guidelines will take further time to review and may be sent back to the author for revisions or rejected altogether.

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