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THE US-JAPAN-ROK RELATIONSHIP IN THE MAKING: A TRILATERAL ALIGNMENT

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North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear weapons capabilities since 2006 while the trilateral relationship between the US, Japan, and South Korea (ROK) has continued to deteriorate following the end of the Cold War. It is becoming clear that North Korea's constant sophistication of nuclear weapons as well as delivery systems is meant to increase the expected costs of US intervention in a Northeast Asian contingency situation and weaken the solidarity between the "Southern Triangle." This article first examines the definitions of alliances and alignments to see why the trilateral relationship could not develop into an alliance. Next, it is argued that the biggest obstacle in constructing an efficient trilateral alliance is the Japan-ROK relationship and that a trilateral alignment should be sought in the face of a North Korean nuclear threat. Finally, areas of security cooperation in order to effectively cope against North Korea are identified.

Keywords: *Alignment, Alliance, Military, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Security Cooperation, Trilateral Alignment, Trilateral Relationship.*

Introduction

The Korean Peninsula is in turmoil. North Korea continues to develop its nuclear capabilities while the US-ROK alliance and the ROK-Japan relationship are waning. During the Cold War, cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea was effective against communist threats, but today, North Korea's nuclear weapons capability is driving a wedge between them. Although the Cold War ended almost 30 years ago, the Korean Peninsula remains intensely competitive, and the two Koreas are de facto still at war. The solidarity among US, Japan, and South Korea remained strong throughout the Cold War under the leadership of the US, but the transformation from a bipolar system to a multipolar system created different perceived interests. The trilateral cooperative relationship is key in deterring North Korean threats as strong ties between the three parties will raise the costs of North Korean provocative measures. Hence, the greatest challenge in the 21st century is to redefine the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship and search for areas of common

interest that can reinvigorate the "Southern Triangle."[1]

Literature Review: Alliance and Alignment

The two main approaches in modern international relations theory are neorealism and neoliberalism.[2] While both neorealism and neoliberalism concur on the assumption that the international system is anarchic — absence of sovereignty or authority over individual states — the two differ on viewing the viability of cooperation among states.[3] In a neorealist international society, states form alliances in order to achieve 'balance of power.' The purpose of balancing is to survive in an anarchic international system where all states are forced to act upon the mandate of 'self-help.'[4] According to neorealism, the systemic attribute causes states to compete, and uncertainty of the other's intentions makes cooperation difficult.[5] Neoliberalists, on the other hand, argue that anarchy and the concomitant prevalence of dispute can be overcome by the increasing level of economic interdependence and the establishment of international institutions.[6] There are other theories that challenge the structural analysis of both neorealism and neoliberalism. Constructivism, for instance, disagree with structural theories' assumption that a material world exists objectively. Instead, "anarchy is what states make of it," meaning that ideational factors such as knowledge, culture, and norms shape and construct international politics.[7] However, as Thucydides saw through the essence of inter-state politics, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."[8] Although institutions and international law contribute in alleviating tensions between states, absence of an authority higher than the state sustains uncertainty among states and forces national survival to be their utmost priority. In other words, the unchanging systemic attribute explains states' behavior of balancing and enables analysis of why the trilateral alignment — a form of external

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1 Noa Ronkin, "Japan and South Korea on the Brink: International Affairs and Trade Relations Experts Elucidate the Conflict between the Two US Allies," *Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies*, October 31, 2019, https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/japan-and-south-korea-brink-international-affairs-and-trade-relations-experts-elucidate.

2 For theoretical review of neorealism and neoliberalism, see, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (January 1988), 235-251.

3 David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 5.

4 Stephen Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring 1998): 31; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1979), 118.

5 Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," 5.

6 Ibid., 8.

7 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 395.

8 Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap?* (New York: Mariner Books, 2017), 38.

balancing against North Korea — is important.

When there is an equilibrium in the distribution of relative power in the system, the adversary will be deterred because the expected benefits of initiating an attack will be less than the expected costs.[9] Since 'power' is "estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units," achieving 'balance of power' is to increase military and economic strength.[10] This is called 'internal balancing' while 'external balancing' is to sign formal alliances with other states to combine relative power against an adversary.[11] Internal balancing takes time because increasing military expenditure does not automatically yield equal relative power vis-à-vis the opponent. External balancing, on the contrary, renders enhanced capability instantly. Not only is external balancing advantageous in terms of speed, it is also more cost-efficient. While internal balancing is equally important in the long-term, in face of an immediate threat from North Korea, the importance of external balancing in the form of a trilateral alignment is becoming more significant for South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

Alliance

Glenn Snyder defined alliances as "formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership."[12] The US-ROK alliance stands as an 'alliance' because it is a formal association explicit in a treaty. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America was signed in October 1953, clearly stipulating that "the parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external armed attack."[13] However, the US-ROK alliance could be characterized as "asymmetric" or "unilateral" because the relative power gap between the US

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9 Now with the invention of nuclear weapons, its destructiveness renders "unacceptable costs" rather than costs which would "deter one's opponent from initiating a first strike attack." Richard Shultz, "Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Western Political Quarterly* (1979): 446.

10 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Long Grove: Waveland Press, Inc., 1979), 98.

11 Ibid., 118.

12 Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4; an earlier work that defines an alliance in a similar manner is made by Robert Osgood as "a formal agreement that pledges states to cooperate in using their military resources against a specific state or states . . . to consider the use of force in specified circumstances." Robert E. Osgood and John H. Badgley, *Japan and the US in Asia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17.

13 "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea; October 1, 1953," *The Avalon Project*, accessed December 19, 2019, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp#1.

and ROK was substantially wide.[14] Economically, South Korea's GDP per capita was USD$66 while the US GDP per capita was USD$2,449 in 1953, and the gap between the two countries in terms of military capabilities was incomparably wider.[15]

The US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Defense was signed in 1951 and Article V clearly mentions that "an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger."[16] Although the specific wordings are slightly different from the US-ROK treaty, the essence of the two treaties is that both sides will come to each other's assistance in case of an attack by a third party. The two formal alliances constitute the so-called "hub-and-spokes" system in Northeast Asia. It is a system "defined as a set of tightly held and exclusive, one-to-one bilateral partnerships with countries in the region."[17] The hub refers to the US while Japan and South Korea are the spokes. Such a system contrasts with the Western European system of collective security institutionalized as NATO. Phillip Saunders explains that "historical animosities and fears of Japanese or Chinese domination" limited the formulation of an Asian regional security organization.[18] Victor Cha argues that the individualistic alliance system was inevitable in Asia to gain control over assertive counterparts. In sum, the current "hub-and-spokes" system that the United States devised in the 1950s serves two purposes: to maintain effective control over South Korea and Japan; and to externally balance against communism in Northeast Asia.[19]

Alignment

On one hand, Snyder clearly differentiates 'alignment' from 'alliance' stating that an alignment is based "solely on common interests" whereas an alliance focuses on military and security purposes.[20] On the other hand, Stephen Walt does not differentiate the two and defines alliance as "a formal or informal relationship of

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14 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 12.

15 Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), "An Annual Index of National Accounts," *KOSIS* (Mar 5, 2019), accessed December 19, 2019, http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=301&tblId=DT_102Y002&vw_cd=MT_ZTITLE&list_id=301_A_A05_B01&seqNo=&lang_mode=ko&language=kor&obj_var_id=&itm_id=&conn_path=MT_ZTITLE; "United States (USA) GDP – Gross Domestic Product," *countryeconomy.com*, accessed December 19, 2019, https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/usa?year=1953.

16 "Japan-US Security Treaty," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, accessed December 20, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.

17 Victor D. Cha, *Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 3.

18 Phillip Saunders, "A Virtual Alliance for Asian Security," *Orbis* (Spring 1999): 247.

19 Cha, *Powerplay*, 3.

20 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 4.

security cooperation between two or more sovereign states."[21] Throughout this paper, alignments will be clearly distinguished from alliances not only for taxonomic reasons but also for a more detailed account of the various relationships that falls short of an alliance.

Thomas Wilkins deconstructed alignments into seven sub-categories including: alliances, coalitions, security communities, strategic partnerships, concerts, ententes, and non-aggression pacts.[22] For Wilkins, an alignment is the broadest notion encompassing the seven specific forms of associations. Such classification renders descriptive power in reflecting the diversities in inter-state relationships, but lacks parsimony and complicates the use of analytical concepts. For example, Wilkins puts 'strategic partnership' as distinct from 'alliance' because the former is "primarily [a] 'goal-driven' rather than [a] 'threat-driven' arrangement."[23] However, the difference between the two concepts is unclear as alliances often develop into what is referred to as '*strategic* alliance.'[24] Moreover, many alliances incorporate elements of Wilkins' 'strategic partnerships'. For example, the 'Joint Vision' statement released by the US and ROK declares that both countries "will build a comprehensive *strategic alliance* of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust."[25] This does not mean the US-ROK Alliance had transformed into a 'strategic partnership,' but instead endorsed that the ties had been strengthened. In addition, variants of similar concepts need elaboration such as arrangements, groups, institutions, and regimes. Wilkins' categorization certainly renders descriptive power, but the purpose of this paper is not to account for all types of associations. Rather, by focusing on the dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula and its key players, the dichotomy between alliances and alignments is enough.

Thus, this paper focuses on two concepts: alliances and alignments. Snyder's dichotomy is the best alternative, defining alignments as "expectations of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions."[26] While alliances and alignments both expect mutual support in

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21 Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 1; Walt mentions that he uses the two "interchangeably" (page 12) throughout the book.

22 Thomas S. Wilkins, "'Alignment', not 'alliance' – the shifting paradigm of international security cooperation: toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment," *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 1 (January 2012): 53-76.

23 Ibid., 68.

24 Scott A. Snyder, "US-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015," *Council on Foreign Relations*, September 1, 2010, https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-rok-strategic-alliance-2015.

25 "Joint Vision for the alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea," The White House President Barack Obama, June 16, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-vision-alliance-united-states-america-and-republic-korea.

26 Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 6.

contingencies, allied states are bound by formal treaties whereas aligned states are absent of obligations. In brief, positive relationships that fall short of an alliance (formal associations institutionalized by a treaty stipulating specific circumstances for security cooperation) would be alignments. This categorization allows the US-ROK and US-Japan relationship to be defined as alliances, whereas the positive relationship between the three parties are defined as an alignment.

The Trilateral Alignment

ROK-Japan Alignment

First, there exists no formal military pact between South Korea and Japan, even though both countries face a common adversary: North Korea. In theory, mutual expectations of support arise when "threatened by the same adversary."[27] This shared understanding between South Korea and Japan creates a positive relationship but falls short of being defined as an alliance due to the absence of a formal military pact. When examining the history of North Korean provocations against South Korea and Japan, there were 424,122 cases of armistice violations since 1997 and the number continues to increase with North Korea's improvements in the nuclear weapons program. Both South Korea and Japan have experienced numerous acts of aggression since the armistice in 1953: several underground tunnels were found intended for clandestine infiltration into the ROK, an attempt to assassinate the Korean president failed but killed a number of high officials in Myanmar, and in 1987, a civilian aircraft heading to Seoul exploded in midair due to a planted bomb by North Korean terrorists.[28] The Japanese government claims that 17 of its citizens were kidnapped by North Korea and many more found missing over the course of history.[29] Considering threats come from a common adversary, South Korea and Japan had to cooperate, "enmeshing them in the Cold War defense network of their common ally (the United States)."[30]

The reason why Japan and South Korea could not form an alliance in the first place is because of historical and territorial disputes.[31] It was the imminent

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27 Ibid.

28 Hannah Fischer, "North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007," *CRS Report for Congress*, April 20, 2007.

29 Adam Edelman, "Japanese citizens simply vanished. North Korea had abducted them. But why?" *NBC News*, June 12, 2018, accessed December 22, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/japanese-citizens-simply-vanished-north-korea-had-abducted-them-why-n881546.

30 Victor Cha, "Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty," *Korean Studies* 20, no. 1 (1996): 124.

31 Hahnkyu Park, "Between Caution and Cooperation: The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 10, no. 1 (1998): 95.

security threat coming from the communist bloc that had kept ties relatively stable throughout the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Korea restored diplomatic relations with China and Russia in the early 1990s and as the threats of communism diminished, various agendas separate to national security emerged.[32] Historical and territorial issues were one of them. South Korea demanded that the Japanese government take more responsibility and sincerely apologize for the atrocities committed during the colonial era on issues such as forced labor and comfort women.[33] That said, Japan referred to the 1965 Basic Relations Treaty and argued that it had settled all liabilities regarding the past. More recently, the South Korean Supreme Court ruled that the Japanese company Mitsubishi Heavy Industries had to compensate South Korean victims of forced labor.[34] In retaliation, Japan then excluded South Korea from its 'white list' of favored trading partners and South Korea announced that it would not renew the military information sharing agreement (GSOMIA).[35] Conflicts between the two nations have always sustained with ad hoc cover ups such as the 2015 agreement to resolve the comfort women issue with finality and irreversibility.[36] The Korean public condemned the government for its early and insufficient compromise with the Japanese side. In a recent poll conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, the Korean public's favorability towards Japan marked lower than China and even North Korea by a large margin.[37]

Second, under the US "hub-and-spokes" system, South Korea and Japan were able to focus more of their attention on economic development, which helped pave the way for future economic cooperation. In 1965, the Basic Relations treaty was signed, normalizing their stalled diplomatic relationship. Article V of the treaty

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32 Choong Nam Kim, "Changing Korean Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the US-ROK Alliance, *East-West Center*, no. 67, April, 2003, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/api067.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=31914.

33 Simon Denyer, "New South Korean court ruling angers Japan, deepening crisis between America's closest Pacific allies," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/s-korea-court-orders-japans-mitsubishi-to-pay-compensation-for-wartime-forced-labor/2018/11/28/4f0a6616-f37e-11e8-9240-e8028a62c722_story.html.

34 Ibid.

35 Frank Jannuzi, "Out of Tune: Japan-ROK Tension and US Interests in Northeast Asia," *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, October 9, 2019, https://www.nbr.org/publication/out-of-tune-japan-rok-tension-and-u-s-interests-in-northeast-asia/.

36 Ankit Panda, "The 'Final and Irreversible' 2015 Japan-South Korea Comfort Women Deal Unravels," *The Diplomat*, January 9, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-final-and-irreversible-2015-japan-south-korea-comfort-women-deal-unravels/.

37 On a scale of 0 to 10, Japan scored 2.30 while China and North Korea scored 3.63 and 3.44 each. US scored 5.45; J. James Kim, "South Korean Attitudes about ROK-Japan Relations on the Rocks," *The Asan Institute for Policy Studies*, October 14, 2019, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-korean-attitudes-about-rok-japan-relations-on-the-rocks/.

pledged to place "commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis"[38] and it was evident that their motivation came from "pressing South Korea's need for economic assistance and Japanese interest in the Korean economy."[39] Following the ratification of the treaty, Japan agreed to provide "grants of US$300 million in goods and services, long-term, low-interest loans of US$200 million repayable over 20 years at 3.5 percent per annum after a seven-year grace period, and private credits amounting to at least US$300 million."[40] Today, the level of economic interdependence between the two countries remain substantially high.[41] For the United States, cooperation between South Korea and Japan was imperative in effectively countering against communist threats. US pressure to normalize the relationship contributed to the signing of the Basic Relations treaty, implicitly holding economic aid and security guarantee as a leverage.[42]

Finally, Japan and South Korea are committed to common values such as democracy, freedom of expression, and human rights. Snyder mentioned that "expectations of support may also stem from common ideologies."[43] This means that openness in both societies can enhance mutual understandings in various sectors through increased communication and travel despite negative national sentiment over territorial and historical disputes. Recently, Jung Pak and Ethan Jewell provided two potential areas which could reinvigorate ROK-Japan cooperation: interest in the status of women and the aging problem. First, women's under-representation in government bodies and the gender pay gap are issues that both parties can mutually agree on to create joint initiatives in overcoming common societal agendas. Second, the overall trend in population where the elderly population are predicted to surpass the younger generation could cause numerous social problems such as economic burdens and a reduced work force. Pak and Jewell recommends that forming a cooperative body could have positive diffusive effects on the two countries'

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38 "Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea," The United Nations, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/volume-583-I-8471-English.

39 Michael J. Green, "Japan-ROK Security Relations: An American Perspective," *Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research*, March 1999, 9.

40 CIA, "The Future of Korean-Japanese Relations," *CIA Special Report*, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060002-9.

41 Japan's share in South Korea's commercial services exports is 8.5% in 2018 and South Korea's share in Japan's merchandise exports is 7.1% in 2018. See World Trade Organization's member profiles for details: WTO, Member Information – Japan and the Republic of Korea, access through: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm; Nippon.com, "South Korea: Japan's Third-Largest Trading Partner," *Nippon.com* (August 20, 2019): https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00516/south-korea-japan%E2%80%99s-third-largest-trading-partner.html.

42 Tim Shorrock, "In a Major Shift, South Korea Defies Its Alliance With Japan," *The Nation*, August 27, 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/south-korea-japan-cold-war/.

43 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 7.

relationship as a whole.[44] Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye asserted that though there are contradictions between Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo, they are "united by common values and shared economic and security interests."[45]

In sum, the lines connecting the US-ROK and US-Japan are defined as an 'alliance', while the ROK-Japan relationship remains an 'alignment' for the reasons presented above. Michael Green also mentioned that "Japan and the Republic of Korea have been aligned but not allied since the beginning of the Cold War."[46] Recalling the definitions bisecting the two concepts, what makes the ROK-Japan relationship an alignment instead of an alliance is the absence of a military agreement despite having a positive relationship in terms of shared threats, economic interdependence, and shared values such as democracy and openness in society.

The US-ROK Alliance

Signs of weakening US-ROK relations have appeared as well. Since 1991, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiations took place every five years, but the tenth SMA, that was signed on February 2019, was valid for only one year and was set to expire on December 31, 2019.[47] It is reported that in the eleventh SMA, the US is asking for a fivefold increase in payment to approximately $5 billion.[48] As a result, the deadline for the recent SMA negotiations had passed and almost half of the South Korean nationals working for the US Forces Korea had to be furloughed.[49] Considering that "defense cost-sharing has an important influence factor in the continuation of [the] bilateral alliance," turbulence in the negotiations process is becoming a concern for the stability of the alliance.[50]

Furthermore, Trump had been calling the annual military drills "very, very expensive"[51] and as a result, scaled down the combined exercises to 'Dongmaeng'

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44 Jung H. Pak and Ethan Jewell, "South Korea and Japan have more in common than they think," *Brookings*, September 5, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/09/05/south-korea-and-japan-have-more-in-common-than-they-think/.

45 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, "The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020," *CSIS*, February 2007, 8.

46 Green, "Japan-ROK Security Relations," 5.

47 "ROK and US Reach Agreement on 10th Special Measures Agreement," Ministry on Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=320383.

48 Sarah Kim, "Seoul stresses sticking to framework of current SMA," *Korea Joongang Daily*, December 20, 2019, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3071724&cloc=joongangdaily%7Chome%7Cnewslist1.

49 "USFK CDR Addresses Furloughed Korean National Employees," *USFK*, March 31, 2020, https://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/2132718/usfk-cdr-addresses-furloughed-korean-national-employees/.

50 Park Won-gon, "A Challenge for the ROK-US Alliance: Defense Cost-Sharing," *EAI*, Security Initiative Working Paper, July 2013.

51 Hyung-jin Kim, "Trump's cost complaint casts doubt on SKorea military drills," *AP News*, March 1, 2019, https://apnews.com/e828d1bdcd4e4f01894eb74a109fbe9c.

from what used to be 'Key Resolve (KR),' 'Foal Eagle (FE)' and 'Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG).'[52] KR, FE, and UFG were massive annual combined exercises, involving thousands of military personnel from both sides. In particular, FE and UFG were combined maneuver exercises in which US strategic assets such as Carrier Groups would participate to increase interoperability between the two militaries and effectively showed force against North Korea. In contrast, 'Dongmaeng' does not involve outside training and is "conducted at regular intervals."[53] This means that the field-based exercises have been called off, and actual deployment of costly military assets are no longer needed annually for exercise. Thomas Spoehr argues that ending the combined exercises is a mistake, as the exercises had guaranteed US readiness with South Korea against North Korea.[54]

In sum, along with the transformation of a bipolar system to a multipolar system, national interests are no longer dominated by security but by diverging interests. The territorial and historical dispute came to surface between Japan and South Korea, negatively affecting joint security ties against North Korea. Randall Schweller called this "alliance handicaps," the existence of various impediments rooted in national hatreds and ongoing territorial disputes that hamper the formation of alignments sharing short-run strategic interests.[55] The US-ROK alliance is no longer an asymmetrical relationship and the increased relative power of South Korea has led to US demanding more burden sharing from South Korea and the down scaling of combined exercises.

Transformations and the Future of the Trilateral Alignment

Despite the faltering trilateral alignment, maintenance and development in military cooperation remains vital in deterring North Korean nuclear threats.[56] Alignments are innately weaker than alliances because they are informal and are malleable with "changing patterns of power, interests, and issue priorities."[57] The bipolar international structure during the Cold War was characterized as an ideological competition between the two superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union) and the priority of members on each side was to contain the influence of the other. The rigid

52 Jo He-rim, "South Korea-US Kick Off Combined Exercise Dong Maeng," *The Korea Herald*, March 5, 2019, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190304000744.

53 Ibid.

54 Thomas Spoehr, "Why Ending US-South Korea Joint Exercises Was the Wrong Move," *The Daily Signal*, March 3, 2019, https://www.dailysignal.com/2019/03/03/why-ending-us-south-korea-joint-exercises-was-the-wrong-move/.

55 Randall L. Schweller, "China's Aspirations and the Clash of Nationalisms in East Asia: A Neoclassical Realist Examination," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 23, no. 2 (2014): 31.

56 Ralph A. Cossa, "US-ROK-Japan: Why a "Virtual Alliance" Makes Sense," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 12, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 68.

57 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 7.

bipolar system "kept [diverging interests among members] under control because there was a fundamental consensus on anticommunism."[58]

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created "different long-term strategic concerns for the United States and South Korea."[59] For Washington, the main strategic priority was to retain its leadership as the sole superpower while for South Korea, it was "national reconciliation."[60] Furthermore, the bilateral relationship between the two countries destabilized because of the rise of anti-American sentiments in the ROK, especially after South Korea's democratization in 1987. Examples of that include nation-wide protests after the 'Hyosun-Misun Incident' on June 2002 and the controversy over US imported beef in 2008. Scott Snyder noted that "the alliance appears demonstrably less important to both Americans and South Koreans than it was during the Cold War."[61]

Due to changes in the international system, the "hub-and-spokes" model led by the US is now under pressure. The "blood alliance" that tied South Korea and the United States as a result of having fought side-by-side during the Korean War transformed into a "transitional alliance" after the end of the Cold War with the weakening of the adversary's relative power[62]; Japanese conservatives are seeking to revise its peace constitution to further their role in line with its increased relative power in the region; and the ROK-Japan relationship is caught up with historical and territorial disputes. At the same time, North Korea's nuclear weapons program and delivery capabilities are becoming more and more sophisticated. Indeed, North Korea conducted six nuclear tests since 2006 and approximately 80 ballistic missile tests since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011.[63]

Blueprints for a Trilateral Military Alignment

Considering the security environment in Northeast Asia, the US-led "hub-and-spokes" system that kept South Korea, Japan, and the United States intact during the

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58 Byung-Kook Kim, "Democratization and Alliance Crisis in South Korea," in *Asia-Pacific Alliances in the 21st Century*, eds. In-Taek Hyun, Kyudok Hong, & Sung-han Kim (Seoul: Oreum Publishing House, 2007), 288.

59 David C. Kang, "The Cause of Strife in the US-ROK Alliance," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 30, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 24.

60 Ibid., 24; Scott Snyder put it similarly as "the gap between the US interest in stability and the aspiration for Korean reunification." Scott Snyder, "US Views of Korean Reunification: Evolution and Prospects," *Korea Review* 1, no. 1 (August 2011): 88.

61 Scott Snyder, "The Beginning of the End of the US-ROK Alliance?" *PacNET* 36, Pacific Forum-CSIS, August 26, 2004, https://www.pacforum.org/sites/default/files/tmp/pac0436.

62 Kim, "From Blood Alliance to Strategic Alliance," 275.

63 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Caitlin Elizabeth Campbell, and Will Mackey, "North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation," *Congressional Research Service*, July 27, 2018, 20.

Cold War must be redefined and reconstructed in order to effectively deter against North Korean threats. This paper argues that while acknowledging the reality that a trilateral alliance is "neither advisable nor achievable"[64] due to insurmountable historical and territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan, various practical measures should be implemented to precipitate a trilateral alignment. To reiterate, an alignment takes an intangible form whereas an alliance is apparent by a military pact. Although, the degree of credibility is greater in an alliance, an alignment can strengthen its ties by adapting measures that boost cooperation. If signing a trilateral military alliance is realistically impossible considering the Japan-ROK relationship, implementing practical measures that shore up mutual expectations of support becomes an essential task. This requires efforts from all parties within the alignment "to find new areas of cooperation," adjusting to the new international system.[65]

Two avenues can be taken to strengthen the trilateral alignment. First, South Korea and Japan can enhance their ties with the US and second, South Korea and Japan can separate security matters from historical and territorial issues.[66] The former Korean ambassador to Japan noted that "the souring Japan-Korea relationship is a big blow to the maintenance of the Southern triangle and its ability to cope with the volatile security environment in Northeast Asia."[67] Overlapping security interests in the face of an increasing North Korean nuclear threat remain even after the end of the Cold War, and therefore, the security domain should be once again prioritized over other issues — especially territorial and historic ones — that are hard to come to an agreement with in the foreseeable future. This means that while sustaining the US "hub-and-spokes" alliance system, South Korea and Japan should commit to trilateral security cooperation measures regardless of the ongoing disputes in other domains. Afterall, South Korea and Japan must realize the need for an alignment "whether they like each other" because joining forces will enhance deterrence against North Korea.[68] While maintaining a robust military alliance with the United States, South Korea and Japan should devise practical mechanisms that can foster military cooperation without an overt pact. GSOMIA, signed in 2015, is a good example of such a mechanism. Since there is no formal military alliance treaty between the two, GSOMIA has provided a good alternative for institutionalizing cooperation on security

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64 Cossa, "US-ROK-Japan," 72.

65 Victor D. Cha, "The Unintended Consequences of Success," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 31, no. 2 (2019): 172.

66 Randall Schriver, the US assistant secretary of defense spoke at a CSIS event: "historical disputes, animosities and political disagreements should be kept separate from shared vital military and security cooperation. We hope to see our security relationship insulated from political disputes and disagreement." / *CSIS*, "The Importance of US-Japan-Korea Trilateral Defense Cooperation," August 28, 2019.

67 Ronkin, "Japan and South Korea on the Brink."

68 Scott A. Snyder, "Why the Japan-South Korea Dispute Just Got Worse," *Council on Foreign Relations* (August 27, 2019): https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/why-japan-south-korea-dispute-just-got-worse.

matters. Article 20 of the agreement mentions that the parties will have to engage in consultation for its application or interpretation.[69] The US Senate reaffirmed the importance of the agreement between Korea and Japan which it considered to be "foundational to Indo-Pacific security and defense, and specifically to countering nuclear and missile threats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."[70] In fact, the US has to take a leading role in "emphasizing the shared interests of the three countries as a foundation for enhancing trilateral cooperation, a core pillar of US strategy in the region."[71] On October 2019, the US arranged a meeting involving the three states' chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington amid troubles over GSOMIA.[72] Consultation led by the US paid off when South Korea eventually decided to suspend the withdrawal decision. In addition, in 2014, when the tension between South Korea and Japan was high over historical and territorial disputes, US President Barack Obama took the lead in gathering the three parties quietly on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit to mediate cooperation between South Korean president Park Geun-hye and Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo. The talks led to augmenting coordination against North Korean nuclear threats.[73] These events summarize the US role in managing close coordination between the three parties. Additional measures could include collaboration in inspecting North Korean illegal activities at sea; jointly responding against North Korean provocations; and finally, creating consultation mechanisms between the three parties.

Incorporating North Korea into the international community failed; the 1994 Geneva Framework and a series of six-party talks broke down due to North Korea's deceptive behavior. It became clear that the regime's intention is to stick with nuclear weapons regardless of peaceful incentives such as economic assistance and regime guarantee. Moreover, the intention behind Kim Jong-un's recent commitment to the peace talks was to buy "much needed time and reduce the chances of possible kinetic action against the North."[74] James Schoff's recommendation to consider "publicizing certain existing trilateral cooperation initiatives more actively" can

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69 GSOMIA treaty article 20 clause 1.

70 United States Senate, S/RES/435, November 21, 2019.

71 Nicholas Szechenyi, "Mounting Tensions: A Timeline of Japan-South Korea Relations," *CSIS*, October 22, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/mounting-tensions-timeline-japan-south-korea-relations.

72 Lee Haye-ah, "Military chiefs of S. Korea, US, Japan meet amid tensions," *Yonhap News Agency*, October 2, 2019, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191002000251325.

73 Thomas Escritt, Steve Holland, "Obama brings US allies South Korea and Japan together for talks," *Reuters*, March 25, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-korea-trilateral/obama-brings-u-s-allies-south-korea-and-japan-together-for-talks-idUSBREA2O1OT20140325.

74 Sue Mi Terry, "US-ROK Alliance," *The Asan Forum*, February 27, 2018, http://www.theasanforum.org/us-rok-alliance/.

minimize uncertainty and ameliorate the security dilemma in Northeast Asia.[75]

The North Korean threat has become a major concern for both Japan and South Korea. It is also in the US' best interests to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ralph Cossa mentioned that the trilateral cooperation had "already paid rich dividends in pressuring North Korea" and that the "challenge is to bring the three sides even closer together in the future."[76]

Participation in Multilateral Inspections Against North Korean Illegal Activities at Sea

Preventive strikes on North Korean key military facilities is impossible due to potential spiral effects and insufficient knowledge about North Korean nuclear sites. Economic sanctions thus appear to be the most suitable means in changing North Korea's behavior. There are controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions in general, but in the case of North Korea, it is becoming evident that the regime is suffering substantially from international sanctions. In 2016 and 2017, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed two economic sanctions that prohibited North Korea's export of coal[77] and capped import of crude oil to 4 million barrels and refined petroleum to 500,000 barrels annually.[78] As a result, North Korea's total trade volume fell from US$6.53 billion in 2016 to US$5.55 billion in 2017 and further down to US$2.84 billion in 2018.[79] Consequently, Kim Jong-un strongly demanded the lifting of economic sanctions at the 2019 Hanoi Summit, which he was willing to trade for the closing of the Yongbyon nuclear complex.[80]

Even though economic sanctions are generally successful in slowing down North Korea's economy, the country can still evade sanctions to a certain level. According to the recent report published by the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1874, North Korea has conducted acts of illegal ship-

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75 James L. Schoff, "Strengthening US Alliances in Northeast Asia," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, July 15, 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/16/strengthening-US-alliances-in-northeast-asia-pub-60750, 11.

76 Cossa, "US-ROK-Japan," 85.

77 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2371, S/RES/2371, August 5, 2017.

78 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397, S/RES/2397, December 22, 2017.

79 Sanghoon Kim, "An Analysis on the Conditions for Successful Economic Sanctions on North Korea: Focusing on the Maritime Aspects of Economic Sanctions," *Strategy 21* 23, no. 1, 245.

80 Daniel Wertz, "US-DPRK Negotiations After Hanoi: Reconcilable Differences?" *38 North*, March 4, 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/03/dwertz030419/; Adam Taylor, "Nukes and Sanctions: What Actually Went Wrong for Trump and Kim Jong Un," *Washington Post*, March 2, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/03/01/nukes-sanctions-what-actually-went-wrong-trump-kim-jong-un/.

to-ship transfers in an attempt to evade UNSC Resolutions.[81] The report dedicates more than a hundred pages revealing North Korea's sophisticated methods in evading sanction measures such as use of false automatic identification system (AIS) broadcasting, physical disguise and false documentation, false certificate of registry, false flagging, etc.[82]

As a result, multilateral efforts took place in the suspected seas to interdict North Korean illegal trans-shipment acts. United States Coast Guard Cutter (USCGC) Bertholf and Stratton conducted surveillance operations near the East/South China Sea along with allied countries including France, U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.[83] Joint efforts at seas provide a good opportunity for allies to boost military cooperation and enhance interoperability in contingent situations. There are concerns from China that the multilateral efforts are actually part of US "freedom of navigation" operations and that the purpose is to pressure China.[84] However, interdiction of North Korean illicit activities at seas are legitimized by UNSC resolutions and allies should request for China to take part in the joint efforts. This way, China will be less suspicious of the nature of the joint operations while at the same time elevating its prestige through abiding by the international norm. Surveillance operations would halt only after North Korean illegal ship-to-ship transfers are completely eradicated.

South Korea should proactively take part in the joint operations as well, especially as there are suspicions over South Korea overlooking sanctions against North Korea after a US report mentioned that a South Korean ship named 'Lunis' engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean tankers.[85]

Jonathan Pollack emphasized that "unless the ROK upholds larger goals endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council, the collective effort to inhibit and reverse Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons could appreciably weaken."[86]

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81 United Nations Security Council, Panel of Experts Report, S/2019/171, March 5, 2019.

82 Ibid.

83 Kim, "An Analysis on the Conditions for Successful Economic Sanctions on North Korea," 263.

84 John Power, "US freedom of navigation patrols in South China Sea hit record high in 2019," *South China Morning Post*, February 5, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3048967/us-freedom-navigation-patrols-south-china-sea-hit-record-high.

85 "S. Korean shipper suspected of N.K. sanctions violations stresses innocence," *Yonhap News Agency*, March 22, 2019, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190322012700320.

86 Jonathan D. Pollack, "Economic Cooperation with North Korea: Implications for the Sanctions Regime and Denuclearization," *7th Korea Research Institute for National Strategy-Brookings Institution Joint Conference, Seoul, Korea*, January 16-17, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/KRINS-Brookings-2019-Economic-Cooperation-with-North-Korea-Jonathan-Pollack.

Joint Response Against North Korean Provocations

An important aspect in deterring North Korean threats is to maintain superior relative strength over North Korea. One way is by levying heavy economic costs on the North Korean regime through international sanctions, and the other is to discourage North Korea from engaging in conventional provocations by imposing heavy retaliatory measures. As mentioned above, economic sanctions proved to be effective, therefore preventing North Korea's evasion efforts at sea, and joint interdiction operations could weaken North Korea's economic foundations. In any case, South Korea, Japan, and the United States should coordinate plans for combined countermeasures against prospective North Korean provocations. The purpose is not limited to enhancing interoperability and maintaining military readiness against future North Korean aggression, but also to show North Korea that military superiority lies in the trilateral alignment. When North Korea understands that they are unable to coerce the trilateral alignment using nuclear threats, the expected advantages of nuclear weapons will be reduced.

North Korea finds nuclear weapons to be effective in deterring retaliation, following the failure of engagement using conventional provocations, as seen in the 2010 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents.[87] Moreover, the United States took the lead in restraining South Korea from further escalation of the situation. As Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense during the Obama administration, mentioned in his memoir, "We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously. The president, Clinton, Mullen, and I were all on the phone often with our South Korean counterparts over a period of days."[88] North Korea understood that their nuclear weapons were effective in keeping the US estranged in conventional crises in the Korean Peninsula, and could impose heavy costs on South Korea with impunity.[89] Also, when North Korea's ballistic missiles landed in the Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the US-Japan alliance was unable to effectively respond even though the action was a clear violation of Japan's sovereignty and a violation of international law.[90] Inaction upon North Korea's provocative measures only encourages their resolve and displays weakness in the US alliance system. Therefore, it is imperative that the trilateral alignment jointly respond against further provocations and make clear that North Korea will suffer heavy costs upon provocative actions.

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87 Mike Mullen, Sam Nunn, and Adam Mount, "A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia," *Council on Foreign Relations*, Independent Task Force Report No. 74, 2016, 25.

88 Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 497.

89 Jung H. Pak, "What Kim Wants: The Hopes and Fears of North Korea's Dictator," *Foreign Affairs* 99, no. 3 (May/June 2020): 96-106.

90 Motoko Rich, "North Korean Missile Delivers a Message: There's Little Japan Can Do," *The New York Times*, October 3, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/world/asia/japan-north-korea-missile.html.

Institutionalizing Trilateral Security Consultation Mechanisms

Finally, institutionalizing consultation mechanisms are important in deterring North Korea. As noted above, preventing North Korea's misperception on the utility of nuclear weapons is paramount. Proportional retaliation against conventional provocations will alter North Korea's calculations that benefits no longer exceed the costs. Another option for the trilateral alignment is to institutionalize regular consultation meetings. The institution will not only enhance cohesion within the trilateral alignment, but also increase the trilateral alignment's credibility of retaliation against North Korean provocations.

Currently, consultation mechanisms exist bilaterally between the US-ROK and US-Japan. In 2010, the United States and South Korea established the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) during the forty third US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting to enhance credibility of US extended deterrence to South Korea.[91] In addition, in 2016, an additional mechanism was created, the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG).[92] Similarly, in 2010, the US-Japan alliance established a mechanism, called the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD).[93] These mechanisms are found to be effective in strengthening internal alliance cohesion between the two parties. As how the bilateral-based US extended deterrence consultation mechanisms contributed significantly in sustaining credibility of the alliances against North Korean threats, the trilateral alignment needs to form an institution that can coordinate relevant policies more efficiently against North Korea and promote ties between the three parties.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to examine the trilateral relationship and emphasize that strengthening the trilateral alignment is vital for the security of the three parties. First, some key concepts were defined: alignments were differentiated from alliances in terms of formality – the (non)existence of a formal military agreement which stipulates specific conditions for mutual assistance. Alignments are vague as they arise from "mutual *expectations* of support." While alliances are visible by formal treaties or organizations, alignments are invisible because they rely on psychological attributes. Second, the definitions were applied to the trilateral relationship, rendering a combination of alliances and an alignment. The two pillars were the US-ROK

91 Robert A. Manning, "Reassuring Korea: The US-ROK Alliance," in The Future of US Extended Deterrence in Asia to 2025, *Atlantic Council* (2014): 14.

92 "Joint Statement on the Inaugural Meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG)," US Department of State, December 20, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/265886.htm.

93 "United States and Japan to Hold Session of Extended Deterrence Dialogue," US Department of State, December 9, 2019, https://www.state.gov/united-states-and-japan-to-hold-session-of-extended-deterrence-dialogue/.

and US-Japan alliance, whereas the ROK-Japan relationship was characterized as an alignment. They were integrated into a "hub-and-spokes" system under the leadership of the US Third. The faltering trilateral relationship was examined within a transforming international system and laid out a blueprint for strengthened trilateral alignment. Finally, the paper identified three areas of cooperation—participating in multilateral inspections against North Korean illegal activities, jointly responding against North Korean provocations, and creating trilateral consultation mechanisms—which could enhance deterrence capabilities, and at the same time, strengthen ties between South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

In the early 1990s, experts and policy makers anticipated that the North Korean regime was coming to an end along with the demise of the communist bloc.[94] However, North Korea managed to muddle through its disadvantageous position in the international system by developing nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, cohesion between South Korea, Japan, and the United States is weakening with divergent interests becoming more apparent. Policies that enhance military readiness need to be implemented to effectively deter North Korea. A trilateral alignment will shore up practical military readiness posture and military coordination to effectively cope against North Korea.

94 Nicholas Eberstadt, *The End of North Korea* (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1999).

THE US-TAIWAN-CHINA RELATIONS: MAINTAINING PEACE THROUGH TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between US-Taiwan-China relations through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) using a historical approach and secondary data to analyse the topic. The clarity of Taiwan's status as an independent country or a province of China is a controversial matter which has been frequently debated by both China and Taiwan until today. Although Taiwan has been returned to China after Japan's defeat in World War II and has been legally recognized as one of China's provinces through the San Francisco Agreement, Taiwanese Nationalists who are influenced by liberalism still demand the establishment of Taiwan as an independent state. As a sovereign state, China has the power to achieve the "One-China Principle" through methods ranging from soft power to hard intervention. The United States, who have openly supported China, simultaneously continue to establish close relations with Taiwan, beginning with the TRA in 1979. The TRA has become an important factor in complicating matters between China and Taiwan providing both security, and opportunities for Taiwan to conduct arms trade with the US This paper contends that as long as the US lends its support to Taiwan as a strategy to curb the spread of the Chinese communism and maintain US influence in the Asia-Pacific, integration of China and Taiwan will be difficult to realize.

Keywords: *Taiwan, China, US, Taiwan Relations Act, and Arms Sales.*

Introduction

Taiwan's status as an independent country rather than as one of the provinces in China is a controversial matter. Although Taiwan has been recognized as part of China by the United Nations (UN), Taiwan, which adheres to democratic ideology, claims to be an independent country that is different from China and its communist

ideology.[1] The United States, is a country that embraces liberalism with the aim of internationalizing democracy and freedom for all people. The US has established non-diplomatic and informal relations with Taiwan, supported by the existence of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) since 1979, which regulates the continuation of US-Taiwan relations after the normalization of diplomatic relations between the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Through the TRA, the US provides Taiwan with protection under the US security umbrella. The US seems to declare that those who threaten Taiwan must face the United States. This threat extends to China, which encourages the integration of Taiwan into itself and challenges its existence as an autonomous territory. If Taiwan is part of China, the TRA can threaten the mainland's sovereignty as an independent country that has full rights over Taiwan. Therefore, this paper seeks to explore the impact of the TRA on the US-Taiwan-China relations by posing the following question: does the TRA assure security for Taiwan?

In the first part of this paper, a brief history of the TRA will be explained. The next section will explain current US-Taiwan-China relations. Finally, an analysis of the implications of TRA on future relations between US-Taiwan-China will be explored. This paper argues that the US' support of Taiwan through the TRA can be viewed as a pragmatic policy which concerns the American strategy to curb the spread of Chinese communism to maintain its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the paper contends that the US's role obstructs the integration of China and Taiwan.

Conceptual Framework

To understand the reasoning behind America's involvement in China and Taiwan, this paper uses Henri Kissinger's concept of *triangular diplomacy*, which he developed during the Vietnam War in 1955-1975. It refers to the American foreign policy that exploited the ongoing rivalry between the Soviet Union and China to strengthen US hegemony and diplomatic interest.[2] After the defeat of Japan in World War II, the Soviet Union, and China, two communist countries, became the object of "US containment." This term, originally coined by George Kennan, refers to the halting of the Soviet Union's power expansion wherever it seemed likely to spread.[3] Meanwhile, Soviet Union policy in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War Era during 1947-1991 was designed not only to counter the US policy of containment, but also to compete for influence with China.[4]

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1 Lindsay Maizland and Samuel Parmer, China-Taiwan Relations, Council on Foreign Relation, last modified January 22, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations.

2 Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004): 42-45.

3 Ibid., 34.

4 Ibid., 115.

Through triangular diplomacy the US avoids taking sides and maintains good relations with both the Soviet Union and China to promote their vision of an international order. Within this international order, all major powers agree to act with restraint and continue the status quo by not resorting to violence either directly or indirectly. This is referred to by Kissinger as *global equilibrium*.[5] Kissinger's idea of *global equilibrium* equates to neorealists' concept of *balance of power*, which refers to the general concept of one or more states' power being used to balance other states. Alternatively, it can refer to the process by which counter balancing coalitions have repeatedly formed in history to prevent one state from conquering an entire region.[6]

Brief History

China vs Taiwan and US Involvement

In 1885, under Qing dynasty leadership from 1644 to 1911 CE, Taiwan became China's twenty-second province. However, during the last decades of the Qing dynasty, China experienced economic difficulties and political chaos. This caused the loss of its territorial control over its Eastern seaboard to foreign powers. At the end of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, under the Shimonoseki treaty, Taiwan was ceded to Japan, which retained control of it until the end of World War II in 1945.[7] After the defeat of Japan in World War II, Taiwan was restored to Chinese control due to a pledge made by world leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek at the Cairo Conference in 1943, which was later adhered to by the Soviet Union. Hence, from 1945, Taiwan became a province of China once again. [8] The conflict between Nationalists and Communists in China reached its peak during the civil war of the late 1940s. From their bases in Northern China, the Communists, led by Mao Zedong, gradually expanded their control to the whole mainland, successfully claiming the land as the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, known as ROC, fled to Taiwan in late 1949. From the Communist perspective, Taiwan remained the last issue that needed to be settled in order to complete their victory over the Nationalists. They confidently expected that their forces would accomplish this goal in 1950, but the involvement of the US in Taiwan frustrated the Chinese. The US intervention in the Taiwan conflict in 1950 arose from the outbreak of the Korean War. The US had not set out to deliberately intervene in the Chinese Civil

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5 Ibid., 96.

6 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. PevehoU.S.e, *International Relations Tenth Edition* (Boston: Pearson Education, 2014): 52.

7 Gary Sheu, "No, Taiwan's Status Is Not Uncertain," *The Diplomat*, August 08, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/no-taiwans-statU.S.-is-not-uncertain.

8 Winberg Chai, "Missile Envy: New Tensions in China-US-Taiwan Relations," *Asian Affairs* 34, no. 1 (Spring, 2007): 39.

War. However, with the onset of the Korean War in June 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent Communist forces from attacking the Nationalists in Taiwan. The US administration viewed the Korean War in Cold War terms and saw North Korea as part of the Communist bloc that launched an attack on South Korea, an anti-communist state. The actions taken in Taiwan were part of a regional and global containment strategy to prevent any further communist expansion. By deploying its forces in the Taiwan Strait, the US had effectively intervened in the Chinese Civil War. China believed that the US was using Taiwan as part of a strategy to encircle and weaken the mainland. Conversely, the US viewed China's aggressive intentions as part of its expansionist design policy. The US' defense link with Taiwan was part of its system of alliances in the Asia-Pacific that held China's containment as a primary objective. A Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan was signed in 1954, and, for the next three decades, the US treated Taiwan as having separated from China, viewing the mainland as an illegitimate governing force that threatened the US' position in the policy landscape.[9]

The Enactment of TRA

Under the terms of the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972, the US began to normalize its diplomatic relations with China. The US acknowledged the 'One-China Principle' which states that Taiwan is a part of China. Essentially, the US extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC, with both governments opening liaison offices in their respective capitals. Taiwan remained a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) until 1971, when it chose to voluntarily exit the council rather than face a vote of expulsion. In 1972, China assumed Taiwan's UNSC seat and by 1978, an agreement to establish full diplomatic relations between the US and China was set to take effect. This event marked the end of formal diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan and its previous Mutual Defense Treaty. [10]

Instead, the US-Taiwan defense link continued on a different basis.[11] Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) on March 29, 1979 to provide a framework for a new US-Taiwan relationship, signed into law by President Carter on April 10, 1979.[12] The TRA provided the continuation of extensive commercial links, with defense support to maintain Taiwan's ability to defend itself.[13] In other words, the TRA

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9 Derek McDougall, *Asia-Pacific in World Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007): 164-165.

10 McDougall, *Asia-Pacific in World Politics, 166.*

11 Alexander Chieh–cheng Huang, The United States and Taiwan's Defense Transformation, *Brooking*, February 16, 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-united-states-and-taiwans-defense-transformation.

12 Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schrive, "An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act", *Cambridge University Press*, no. 165 (2001): 147-172.

13 McDougall, *Asia-Pacific in World Politics.*

provided Taiwan with defensive capability, and enabled the US to maintain its capacity to oppose any force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, social and economic systems of Taiwan.[14] The TRA makes it clear that any threat to Taiwan would be considered a threat to the security of the entire Western Pacific. Section 2(b) (4) of the TRA states: "Any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, [is] a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." Section 2(b) (6) also asserts that it is US policy to maintain the capability "to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." [15]

U.S.-Taiwan Relations Today

Threat from China

China has always maintained a single, consistent policy towards Taiwan, regarding the island as a province of China. However, according to China's Defense White Paper, Taiwan refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus which embodies the 'One-China Principle'. Instead, Taiwan furthers down the path of separatism by increasing efforts to sever the connection with the mainland in favor of gradual independence, pushing for *de jure* independence, intensifying hostility and confrontation, and borrowing the strength of foreign influence.[16] The presence of the US in Taiwan can be explained by a democratization process. According to Immanuel Kant's democratic peace theory, although democratic states fight wars against authoritarian states, democracies almost never fight each other, as they tend to be capitalist states whose trade relations create strong interdependence. War would be costly, disrupting trade, and citizens of democratic societies (whose support is necessary for wars to be waged) may simply not see the citizens of other democracies as enemies.[17] This is precisely why Taiwan, as a fellow democracy, receives greater support from the US. The US' view of international order is not only confined to balance of power considerations, it also puts a premium upon domestic stability in the form of democratic institutions within states.

There are, of course, several more reasons behind the US' presence in Taiwan. Through the TRA, the US' position in relation to Taiwan can be characterized as a form of strategic ambiguity. The US acts as a security guarantor for Taiwan, but at the same time, does not encourage any attempts by Taiwan to change the status

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14 Winberg Chai, "Missile Envy," 40.

15 Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, "Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act," *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs* 44, no. 1 (Winter, 2000): 64-65.

16 "China's National Defense," Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, last modified July 2019, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2019-07/24/content_4846452.htm.

17 Goldstein, *International Relations*, 95.

quo from a province of China to an independent country.[18] For China, Taiwan's unification and incorporation into the Motherland evokes a sense of justice from a past, where the existence of Taiwan as a separate administrative authority represents an injustice. China considers intervention by any foreign power as an interference in its internal affairs that is paramount to injustice and humiliation. If it acts as a de facto independent state, China fears that Taiwan could indirectly encourage separatist tendencies in other regions of the mainland. If it declares independence, Taiwan could set a dangerous precedent. Under these circumstances, China's existing minority problems are likely to intensify, as secessionist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang for example, could be further encouraged. Thus, *de jure* independent Taiwan could become a serious threat to Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Taiwan issue is also a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its ideologies. If it turned out that the CCP were incapable of controlling its territory, confidence in the Party would be undermined.[19]

While China has been publicly and formally willing to reject the use of force to settle other regional issues, such as the Spratly islands dispute, this is not the case for Taiwan. Indeed, China has been doing everything in its power to make credible its threat to use force in order to stop Taiwan from declaring independence.[20] To show that it is decisive in defending its 'One-China' policy, Beijing took a crucial step that codified its resolution to dissuade Taiwan from any possibility of formal secession. On March 2005, the National People's Congress passed the anti-secession law, which gave China the right to "employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."[21] The menacing tone of China's legislation, accompanied by more than 1,200 ballistic and cruise missiles poised just across the Taiwan Strait, has been an explicit warning to Taiwan that China was ready to take it back by force, should its leaders challenge the status quo in the Strait.[22] Considering the huge gap between Taiwan and China in terms of overall national power and military strength, there is little Taiwan can do to protect itself.[23] While China's military budget has skyrocketed, Taiwan's defense outlays have remained flat. Defense spending as a percentage of GDP hovers close to 2 percent — despite pledges to sustain an investment in defense of at least 3 percent. Compounding problems include a plan to shift to an all-volunteer force — meaning that a larger share of military resources must be allocated to cover personnel costs. Despite deep cuts in force levels, the implementation of the program has been

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18 Mau Kuei Michael Chang, "Taiwan's Nationalistic Politics and Its Difficult 'StatU.S. Quo'", *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, no. 21 (2005): 91-124.

19 Dario Kuntić, "The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan the United States relationship," *CIRR* 21, no. 72 (2015): 247-248.

20 David C. Kang. China: Identity, Sovereignty, and Taiwan within China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007): 93.

21 Kuntić, "The Ominous Triangle," 262.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

delayed due to an inability to attract recruits. Furthermore, morale is low among the armed forces and much of Taiwan's military equipment is getting old and obsolete.[24] Thus, as a protectionist measure, Taiwan needs to tread carefully and nurture its informal alliance with the US as a guarantor of its survival.

US-Taiwan Arms Sales

The TRA contains explicit references to the continuation of the sales of US arms to Taiwan. It is a source of tension in the US-China relationship. Even after US-China diplomatic relations were normalized in 1979, the US insisted on selling weapons to Taiwan for the following three reasons. First, the US arms sales to Taiwan would give more confidence in Taiwan's defense capability against the PRC. AS a result, Taiwan does not need seek radical solutions, such as nuclear options that would contradict American interests.[25] Second, the continuation of US arms sales to Taiwan could reduce suspicion and doubt from other allies in the region about US' reliability in keeping its defense commitments.[26] Third, if Taiwan remained strong militarily, the PRC would be less likely to launch an attack on the island.[27]

In the US-China Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan in 1982, the US agreed to gradually reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan and promised that future arms sales would not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, those of recent years.[28] However, the record of US arms sales since suggests that the communiqué has a limited constraining effect on American behavior. This limited constraining effect can be seen in the chart below, which displays the number of Taiwan arms sales as reported to Congress from 1990 to August 2019 for foreign Military Sales (FMS) in US dollars. This data was taken from the US-Taiwan Business Council, which is based in the Washington, District of Columbia.[29]

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24 Shelley Rigger, Dennis V. Hickey, and Peter Chow, *U.S.-Taiwan Relations: Prospects for Security and Economic Ties* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 2017): 10-11.

25 Chang, "Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act", 66.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 "Joint Communiqué of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (August 17, 1982)," Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, Accessed April 23, 2020, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/doc/ctc/t946664.htm.

29 "Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress, 1990-2019," U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, last modified August 21, 2019, https://www.UStaiwandefense.com/.



In 2015, during Obama's presidency, the highest amount of US-Taiwan arms sales reached 1.72 billion US dollars.[30] During Trump's administration, beginning from 2017, the US-Taiwan arms sales reached 1.36 billion US dollars.[31] There is a decrease of 0.33 billion US dollars in 2018, but sales increase exponentially in 2019 to 10.72 billion US dollars.[32] This chart shows that although the US has agreed to obey the 1982 communiqué, it does not guarantee that it will reduce or stop its arms sales to Taiwan. There is possibility for the US to continue its arms sales to Taiwan for a long time. From China's perspective, the presence of the US in Taiwan is a form of intervention in China's sovereignty over Taiwan. Because of China, the US has to adopt a cautious approach to any arms deals or high-level exchanges with Taiwan. Although China has the military capability to unify Taiwan and the mainland, the presence of the US consistently provides security to Taiwan and has emerged as an obstacle to China's integration.[33] It is not just an obstacle for integration, but the US' arms sales to Taiwan also threatens to undermine China's sovereignty and national interests. If the tension between the two countries continues, US-China bilateral relations could be negatively impacted.

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30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 "Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress, 1990-2019."

33 Deng Yuwen, "Is China planning to take Taiwan by force in 2020?" *South China Morning Post*, January 03, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2126541/china-planning-take-taiwan-force-2020.

Taiwan Under Tsai Ing-wen's Administration

Since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders have realized that the US plays an essential role in China and Taiwan relations. Today, Xi Jinping diverts from the political heritage of his predecessors, developing a new strategy, which emphasizes that the Taiwan issue should not interfere with US-China bilateral relations. Xi has been trying to isolate the Taiwan issue from the US-China bilateral relationship while developing his rhetoric of a "new type of great-power relationship." Xi's stance has excluded mentions of the Taiwan issue in his published discussions, communications, and joint statements related to the United States.[34] Since Taiwan is of great value for China, the Middle Kingdom will not allow Taiwan to become a bargaining chip while it is works to develop a new type of relationship between major powers. Xi's objective is to isolate the Taiwan issue from the US-China bilateral relationship, and cut any US involvement in cross-strait relations, or at least verify that there is no direct US involvement.[35]

Under Xi's administration, "Peaceful Reunification" and "One Country, Two Systems" have become China's guiding principles to resolve the Taiwan matter and the optimal way to achieve national reunification.[36] This formulation has consistently been rejected across the political spectrum in Taiwan, and although Xi seeks to soften the impact of such policies by proclaiming that China would consider Taiwan's history and circumstances, negative reactions from Taiwanese people still prevail. Taiwan maintains that, unlike Hong Kong, it is not a colony. With US aid in developing defense capability and a fully-developed central government, Taiwan has no incentive to downgrade itself from an effectively independent polity to a local or regional government of the PRC.[37] In the beginning of the 1980s, Taiwanese citizens began to discover and promote what scholars call "Taiwan subjectivity." Taiwan subjectivity refers to the fact that Taiwan does not exist solely as the object of others' intentions and desires, but as the subject of its own history with a legitimate claim to self-government.[38] Subjectivity is not the same as Taiwanese independence because it does not prescribe any particular relationship with Beijing, but rather insists that the people of Taiwan have a right to decide for themselves what that relationship will be. As China's political and military strength increases, Taiwan's subjectivity and autonomy faces many challenges. Taiwan has a limited freedom to act; they need to choose between a close relationship with China, which puts them at risk of falling under the country's influence, or decide to drift further away from China which could

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34 Jing Huang*, Xi Jinping's Taiwan Policy: Boxing Taiwan with the One-China Framework, within Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace* (California: University of California Press, 2017): 245.

35 Ibid., 245.

36 Alan D. Romberg, "Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 45 (Fall, 2014): 6.

37 Romberg, "Cross-Strait Relations," 6.

38 Rigger, Hickey and Chow, *U.S.-Taiwan Relations,* 2.

lead to provocation of military responses and economic sanctions.[39]

Taiwan's responses and alignment to China has differed depending on its leadership. Under President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008, Taiwan leaned away from China, but under President Ma Ying-Jeou from 2008 to May 2016, Taiwan has steered toward the Middle Kingdom. The current Democratic Progressive Party President and Taiwan's first female President, President Tsai Ing-wen, has been re-elected for a second term in January 2020. She straddles a stable balance between protecting the subjectivity of Taiwan and avoiding confrontation with China. Her administration has not accepted the preconditions to China's 1992 Consensus for good relations, but has instead based her policy on avoiding confrontation and provocation, while disallowing Beijing to dictate the terms of the relationship.[40]

Since Tsai's election, Beijing has gradually taken different measures to convince Taipei to return to the 1992 Consensus. On June 2016, Beijing suspended official communication with the Taiwanese government and reduced mainland tourism to Taiwan, igniting protests by the tourism industry. The Chinese administration also locked out Taiwan from the 39th assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization.[41] Since then, Beijing has begun to slowly accede Taipei's remaining diplomatic allies to switch their alliance to Beijing. Consequently, São Tomé and Príncipe dropped Taiwan on December 2016 while also convincing states like Nigeria to downgrade their relationship to unofficial relations.[42]

Triangle Relation Between Xi Jinping's and Donald Trump's Administrations

Today, the disagreement on which government is legitimate still undermines China-Taiwan cross-strait relations in Xi Jinping's administration. Xi's policy towards Taiwan continues to follow the fundamental approach adopted by the previous Hu Jintao administration. It prioritizes prevention of Taiwan's *de jure* independence over promotion of reunification. Xi also emphasizes the strengthening of the "One-China" principle strategic framework in China-Taiwan relations, hoping that it will push Taiwan towards eventual reunification. This has been incorporated into his grand goals for China as expressed in his "Chinese Dream." Although Taiwanese people seem to identify less with mainland China nationally and politically, Taiwan has been drawn into China's economic orbit while its international status, in terms of both legitimacy and influence, continues to decline. Therefore, Taiwan recognizes the increasing difficulty in moving away from mainland China's influence both economically and politically. The dilemma faced by Taiwan is that it will either be drawn into China's orbit or be marginalized in international affairs as well as in regional economic integration efforts. Taiwan has little choice but to accept the fact

39 Rigger, Hickey and Chow, *U.S.-Taiwan Relations,* 2.
40 Ibid., 2-3.
41 Ibid., 14.
42 Ibid.

that it will have greater interdependence with the mainland. [43]

Greater economic interaction between China and Taiwan plays an important role in China's Taiwan policy. China is Taiwan's largest trading partner and also the island's number one destination for foreign direct investment.[44] China hopes that the benefits of economic cooperation will lead to negotiations with Taiwan on the future status of Taiwan and eventually end with reunification.[45] For the central Chinese government, using Taiwanese investors to achieve unification is the ultimate goal. China has always hoped that Taiwan's investment in China would lead the way for reunification and disincentivize independence.[46] PRC officials have explicitly stated that economic interaction with Taiwan is intended to promote unification.

Conversely, US involvement also has an important role in determining the resolution of the conflict. The issue will be hard to solve without a cooperative relationship between the US and China. Trump's administration has been approving arms deals with Taiwan at a faster rate than under Obama's and Bush's administrations, and has also shifted its foreign policy from not provoking China, to challenging the mainland government and focusing on Taiwan's defenses.[47] China under Xi's administration has repeatedly warned the US against seeking closer military ties with Taiwan, and has protested against every arms deal they have made. Every US-Taiwan exchange has been seen as a violation of the "One-China Principle" but Trump, who views China as a strategic competitor instead of a partner, continues to develop closer ties with the island and helps to boost its defenses as part of his national security strategy in dealing with China.[48]

On May 2018, Trump agreed to issue the marketing license required for US manufacturers to sell to Taiwan the technology it needs to build eight submarines. This was previously approved by President George W. Bush, but has been stalled since 2001. A month after the agreement, hundreds of US arms dealers and former US military officials travelled to Taiwan for the first-ever defense industry forum jointly held by the US-Taiwan Business Council and Taiwan Defense Industry Development Association in the southern city of Kaohsiung.[49] Since July 2018, at least four US warships risked escalating tensions in the South China Sea, challenging China's military expansion in the Indo-Pacific, by passing through the Taiwan Strait during

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43 Huang, "Xi Jinping's Taiwan Policy," 239-240.

44 "The World Factbook: Taiwan," Central Intelligence Agency, last modified March 16,2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tw.html.

45 Kuntić, "The Ominous Triangle," 250.

46 Ibid.

47 Lawrence Chung, "US,Taiwan military ties closer than ever as Donald Trump challenges Beijing,"*South China Morning Post,* October 29, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2170449/U.S.-taiwan-military-ties-closer-ever-donald-trump-challenges.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

freedom of navigation operations.[50] On July 7 and again on October 22, when the US Navy vessels were still in transit, Taiwan's military issued a statement about the destroyers' movements in the Taiwan Strait.[51] Other than the competition between the US and China, US skepticism towards China encourages close US-Taiwan relations. Though the current American administration is reconciliatory and pragmatic, the US is still highly skeptical about China's intention to develop its military. The US has been particularly concerned about the lack of transparency in China's military programs.[52] The Pentagon's annual reports on Chinese military power have constantly pointed out that China's emergence as a global military power poses serious threats to US interests.[53] The US Department of Defense was alarmed by China's investment in disruptive military technologies designed for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. If accurate, those military developments would come with serious impacts on the balance of power in the region and beyond.[54] Washington has also noted that the long-range projection capabilities developed by the People's Liberation Army, PLA, has reinforced China's claims over disputed territories.[55] China is the second economic power in the world behind the US, and third in military and global firepower, behind the US and Russia.[56] Consequently, it is only logical for the US to build strong relations with Taiwan to defend its influence in the Asia-Pacific.

Conclusion

The involvement of the US with Taiwan through the TRA cannot be avoided since both countries share the same ideology. The TRA was adopted by the US to protect Taiwan from China's expansion, but it has become controversial due to China's claims over the region. Besides its intentions to maintain Taiwan's defenses, US involvement in Taiwan can be seen as an intervention to hinder the development of China in the Asia-Pacific. Although it can provide security for Taiwan, the TRA is also a form of US strategic ambiguity that justifies their situational policies for their own interest in the Asia-Pacific.

As long as the US continues to involve itself in Taiwanese security matters through the TRA, especially with its arms sales implications, it will be hard for China to unify Taiwan. In the end, the triangular relationship between US-Taiwan-China

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50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Francis Yi-hua Kan, "Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations after President Ma's Inauguration," *38th Taiwan-U.S. Conference on Contemporary China* (July 14–15, 2009): 21.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Global Firepower, "*2019 Military Strength Ranking,*" last modified 2019, https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp.

raises a dilemma. The option to end the arms sales to Taiwan will remove a major irritant in the US-China relationship and would increase trust and cooperation in bilateral relations. It could also lower the risk of armed conflict in East Asia. However, there is no guarantee that cutting security ties with Taiwan will transform the US-China relationship since their interests clash on many other issues, such as North Korea, maritime disputes in East Asia, and economic issues. The reputation of the US in the region is also at stake. Walking away from a commitment to Taiwan will send a troubling signal to other US allies, such as Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, the reunification of China and Taiwan threatens US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.

The TRA creates a complex problem that is hard to resolve. This paper argues that the TRA needs to be reviewed in order to create a win-win solution for all parties. The US-China governments must review the points in the TRA which allow for US intervention. However, the Chinese government first needs to embrace Taiwan by promoting a peaceful approach rather than an aggressive approach. There is no denying that firm action is needed to maintain China's sovereignty over Taiwan. However, the important point to be considered is that any kind of aggressive approach only increases Taiwan's dependency on the US security umbrella. Thus, it will be hard for China to halt US intervention. For now, the only offer that can be given to Taiwan to resolve this matter is the "One Country Two Systems" policy even though it will not be easy to achieve since all parties have their own interests. Moreover, the "One Country Two Systems" policy is not effective when used as a long-term permanent policy, as in the case of Hong Kong. It may not be the most lucrative offer because of the unequal power distribution between China and Taiwan. However, it could reduce the possibility of China's invasion by force and Taiwan's independence. In the end, "One Country Two Systems" creates a conducive environment for all parties and its effects within the Asia-Pacific region.

DRIFTING BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN: 1.5-GENERATION ZAINICHI KOREANS UNDER JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE

Dr. Yuko Takahashi

This paper focuses on "1.5-generation Koreans" who immigrated to Japan when they were still children and spent their childhood and adolescence there during the colonial period. The research examines and analyzes how these Koreans developed different identities and ethnic consciousnesses from their parents. During Japanese colonial rule over Korea from 1910-1945, approximately two million Koreans immigrated to Japan for the purpose of seeking a way to make a living, or as forced laborers and mobilized soldiers. First-generation Koreans who immigrated to Japan as adults during the colonial period maintained a strong sense of being Korean in Japanese society where Koreans were usually discriminated and marginalized. In contrast, some of their children,1.5-generation Koreans, developed contrasting identities and ethnic consciousnesses from their parents. It can be argued that there were three cases: (i) Those who felt humiliated for their ethnic origin; (ii) those who had come to regard themselves as "Japanese" and adapted to Japanese society; and (iii) those who had come to believe they were "loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire." All these three cases were derived from the ambivalent nature of Japan's ruling policy towards Korean, which attempted to "incorporate" Koreans as loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire while simultaneously leaving space for their political and social discrimination. This research serves to present relativized and multi-dimensional perspectives on the history of the colonial period and the national/ethnic identity of Korean people.

Keywords: *Ethnic consciousness, identity, Japanese colonial rule, Japanization, 1.5-generation Koreans, zainichi Koreans.*

Introduction

Fellow Koreans and compatriots abroad. One hundred years ago today, we were united as one. …On that day, we were reborn as citizens of a republic; we were no longer subjects of a dynasty or a colony of Imperial Japan. …We Koreans were also united as one in Yongjeong, China, across the border

> *in what was North Ganbo; in Vladivostok in the Maritime Province of the Russian Far East; in Hawaii; and in Philadelphia. Anyone and everyone who felt a part of the Korean nation organized and took part in a rally.*[1]

This is an excerpt from the speech delivered by South Korean President Moon Jae-in on March 1, 2019, during the centenary anniversary of the March First Independence Movement. The movement was a nationwide independence movement that began on March 1, 1919 and spread across the Korean Peninsula, which was under Japanese colonial rule. In the speech, President Moon stated that, "fellow Koreans and compatriots abroad…were united as one," and "reborn as citizens of a republic" of Korea.[2]

President Moon's speech implies that Korean people's national identity and ethnic consciousness developed in response to Japanese colonial rule at that time, and that their identity and ethnic consciousness united them as a single people in a single nation. Moreover, this national identity and sense of unity have remained strong in South Korean people considering the fact that even today, Korean people sometimes hold nation-wide demonstrations and rallies when diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan become rattled. This suggests that identity and ethnic consciousness not only concern individuals but can become a tool to unite people as a single nation.

However, it can be questioned whether Korean people actually developed a common identity as Koreans became "one." As will be discussed in detail in the next section, one's identity develops through close interaction with specific social environments in which one lives at a specific time. In fact, a number of researchers, as well as Koreans themselves, point out differences in identity and ethnic consciousness among Koreans depending on whether they live on the Korean Peninsula or in Japan, the latter of whom are called *zainichi* (Japanese-resident) Koreans.[3] Choi Seungkoo argues that *zainichi* Koreans' ethnic identities partly develop out of experiences of discrimination in Japan, which is peculiar to the case of *zainichi* Koreans but not of Koreans living in Korea.[4] At the same time, these ethnic minorities in Japan are not regarded as Koreans (*Hankukin*) once they go or return to Korea.[5] In this regard, they are "not [fully] Korean nor Japanese,"[6]

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1 The Republic of Korea. Cheong Wa Dae, "Address by President Moon Jae-in on 100th March First Independence Movement Day," accessed April 29, 2020, https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/128.

2 Ibid.

3 Lee Kenji, *Nikkan Nashonarizumu no Kaitai* [The Dismantling of Japan's and Korea's Nationalism] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2009), 26; Park Il, *"Zainichi" toiu Ikikata* [A Life as "Zainichi"] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1999), 234; Yoon Geon-cha, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru* [Thinking About Zainichi] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2001), 326-328.

4 Park, *"Zainichi" toiu Ikikata*, 75.

5 Lee, *Nikkan Nashonarizumu no Kaitai*, 26.

6 Park, *"Zainichi" toiu Ikikata*, 234.

and, hence, possess "multiple identities."[7] If not "multiple," their identities may be, as Yoon Geon-cha argues, in a cycle of constantly changing relations between Korea and Japan.[8]

Other researchers emphasize further differences in identity and ethnic consciousness between first-generation *zainichi* Koreans (i.e. those who immigrated to the Japanese mainland from Korea) and later generations (i.e. descendants of first-generation *zainichi* Koreans).[9] Following Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, a majority of first-generation *zainichi* Koreans longed to return to Korea, a unified Korea, in the future. They looked towards the homeland instead of considering the possibility of spending a whole lifetime in Japan. However, in the 1970s, some second-generation *zainichi* Koreans began developing a new way of perceiving their life in Japan that was different from that of first-generation Koreans. They had been born and grew up in Japan, and some had never been to Korea. They expected to spend their whole lives in Japan. Consequently, some second-generation Koreans began seeking a new identity not as native Koreans in the homeland (the Korean Peninsula) or "alien" Koreans in Japan, but as "*zainichi*" Koreans. In this, they focused on their lifestyle in Japan instead of looking towards the homeland as older generations had done.[10]

While the existing literature presents important and insightful discussions, particularly regarding *zainichi* Koreans to whom identity has long been a central issue, they do not sufficiently discuss the differences within the same generation of *zainichi* Koreans. Therefore, this paper examines differences among first-generation *zainichi* Koreans highlighting the complexity and diversity of their identities and ethnic consciousness. More specifically, it focuses on those first-generation *zainichi* Koreans who immigrated to the Japanese mainland at young ages and spent their adolescence in colonial Japan. These cases can be contrasted with those of their parents that are also first-generation Koreans but immigrated to the Japanese mainland only after they became adults. The former group shall be termed in this paper as 1.5-generation Koreans since they were closer to the second-generation in terms of their life experiences since they spent their childhoods and adolescences, the latter of which is, according to Erikson, the important period for one's identity development,[11] in Japan.

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7 Lee, *Nikkan Nashonarizumu no Kaitai*, 26.

8 Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 328.

9 David Chapman, *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2008), 37-59; Chung Youngjin, *Zainichi Chōsenjin Aidenteitei no Yuragi* [Variations of Zainichi Koreans' Identities] (Kyoto: Horitsu Bunka Sha, 2018), 59; Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 200-202.

10 Chapman, *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity*, 44-46.

11 Erik Erikson, *Jigadōitsusei: Aidenteitei to Raifu Saikuru* [Psychological Issues: Identity and the Life Cycle], trans. Keigo Okonogi (Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1959=1973), 111-118.

First, the paper reviews various theories of identity and the so-called "Japanization policy" that was applied to Koreans during the colonial period. While this policy will be discussed in more detail later, it should be noted that the Japanization policy was at its peak when 1.5-generation Koreans were adolescents, and therefore it can be assumed that the policy exerted significant influence on the development of the identities and ethnic consciousness of 1.5-generation Koreans. Following the review of identity theories and discussions on the Japanization policy, the paper moves to the analysis of some specific cases of 1.5-generation Koreans which show their unique patterns of development of identity and ethnic consciousness. The analysis takes a sociological approach based on identity theories, and analyzes autobiographies written by 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans to observe one's inner changes related to development of identity and ethnic consciousness. To examine such inner aspects of individuals, it is necessary to analyze detailed autobiographies that cover a sufficient period of time. In this respect, it should be noted that autobiographies available for this analysis are rather limited. Due to low literacy among *zainichi* Koreans at the time, available autobiographies are mostly written by those people who attained a higher level of education such as intellectuals, authors, educators, and social activists.

The research is expected to enrich the existing literature through the sociological analysis of life experiences of 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans, presenting relativized and multi-dimensional perspectives on the history of the colonial period. Such perspectives may provide opportunities for future study to re-examine the national/ethnic identity of Korean people and to re-think the issues of the colonial past—especially in an attempt to, in President Moon's words, "wip[e] out the vestiges of pro-Japanese collaborators."[12]

Theories of Identity

It was Erik Erikson who first articulated the concept of identity. According to the author, one develops identity during adolescence through the stage of "identity diffusion." During this stage, one adjusts one's ego to the roles and values that are assumed to be expected in society, so that identity may develop towards adulthood.[13]

While Erikson discusses identity from a psychosocial development perspective, others put more stress on social aspects of identity development. According to these theorists, such as Mead, Berger, and Luckmann, identity develops through social interaction. That is, one develops identity by negotiating

12 Cheong Wa Dae, "Address by President Moon Jae-in on 100th March First Independence Movement Day."

13 Erikson, *Jigadōitsusei*, 111-118.

one's ego with the expectations of others or that of society's.[14] While this statement is similar to Erikson's, their discussion goes further by pointing out that identity does not develop and complete at once. It can continuously change and re-develop depending on changing historical, political, and social environments, and depending on the relationship between oneself and the world.[15]

Stuart Hall relates this negotiating process of identity development to power relations. Resembling the argument on disciplinary power that Michel Foucault made in his book *Discipline and Punish*, Hall argues that identities are "produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices," and that "they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion."[16]

Hall also discusses the issue of identity in relation to the colonial experience. According to the author, the colonized were "positioned and subjected in the dominant regimes of representation."[17] Consequently, they were not only "constructed as different and other within the categories of knowledge" of the colonizers, but also made to "see and experience [themselves] as 'Other'."[18] A similar argument was made by Chizuko Ueno who, based on Hall's discussion, argues that a "(social) minority" is defined by power relations in which someone in power minoritizes a specific group of people who in turn identify themselves as the minority or "Others."[19]

The self-minimization that Ueno points out further leads to the issue of complexes of ethnicity argued by Albert Memmi. Examining the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, Memmi discusses that as a possible solution to the status of a "creature of oppression" under the colonial situation, the colonized attempts "to become equal to that splendid model [of the colonizer] and to resemble him."[20] He adds that "[l]ove of the colonizer is subtended by a complex of feelings ranging from shame to self-hate" of the colonized.[21] Although his argument does not

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14 George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1934=1967), 175, 178-179; Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 131-132.

15 Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 173; Stuart Hall, "The Meaning of New Times," in *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, eds. Dave Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (London: Routledge, 1989=1996), 225.

16 Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, eds. Stuart Hall and Paul de Gay (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 4.

17 Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, ed. Jonathan Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 225.

18 Ibid.

19 Chizuko Ueno, "Joshō: Datsu Aidenteitei no Riron" [Introductory Chapter: Theories of Post-Identity], in *Datsu Aidenteitei* [Post-Identity], ed. Chizuko Ueno (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 2005), 30-31.

20 Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, trans. Howard Greenfield (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1957=1991), 119-121.

21 Ibid.

directly concern the issue of identity, it certainly presents important implications to identity discussions, especially for identity of colonial subjects.

These various theories on identity have important implications to the development of identity and ethnic consciousness of Koreans, particularly 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans. Identity develops and re-develops repeatedly in close interaction with environments and within specific historical, social context. Power relations in society also exert influence on one's identity development, which is particularly applicable to the cases of ethnic minorities and the colonized. In this regard, 1.5-generation Koreans may be one of the most appropriate examples to examine this implication since they spent their adolescence, an important period for one's identity development, in the Japanese mainland as ethnic minorities who were direct subjects of the "Japanization policy," as discussed in the next section.

Japan's Ambivalent Policy Towards Koreans in Colonial Japan

To analyze the development of identity and ethnic consciousness in 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans, it is necessary to grasp an overview of the contemporary political and social environments in which they spent their childhoods and adolescence. Therefore, this section will look at a brief history of *zainichi* Koreans during the colonial period focusing on colonial measures that might have exerted a significant influence on the development of identity and ethnic consciousness of 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans.

Although there had been Koreans living in Japan before the twentieth century, the increase of Korean immigration to the Japanese mainland in modern times was accelerated by Japan's colonization of Korea in 1910. The colonization deprived many Koreans of their means of living on the Korean Peninsula through colonial measures such as the land reform project (1910-1918) and the rice production development program (1920-1934). As a result, the number of Koreans migrating to the Japanese mainland to make a living began to increase.[22] The rise of Korean immigrants to the Japanese mainland was further enabled by the transport infrastructure that had been laid throughout the peninsula by the Japanese with the purpose of improving the efficiency of exporting agricultural and industrial products from Korea to Japan, and more importantly, to facilitate military logistics as Japan expanded its influence on the continent.[23]

Koreans immigrated to the Japanese mainland following familial ties or those of neighbors from the same village and from the late 1930s, through forced labor and war mobilization. At the end of 1944, the Korean population in Japan is said to have been 1,936,843 a significant increase compared to 2,527 in 1911. Although there is no official record, it is estimated that at the time of Japan's surrender in the Second

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22 Kim Chanjung, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to "Zainichi"* [100 Years since the Annexation of Korea and "Zainichi"] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2010), 30-32, 68-69.

23 Naoki Mizuno and Mun Gyongsu, *Zainichi Chōsenjin: Rekishi to Genzai* [Zainichi Koreans: History and the Present] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 24-25.

World War in August 1945, there were approximately 2.1 million Koreans living on the Japanese mainland.[24]

Under Japanese colonial rule, Koreans were regarded as Japanese subjects and given Japanese nationalities. However, the Japanese authorities became concerned that the increasing number of these colonized subjects might "disturb" the social order, particularly after the March First Independence Movement when Koreans carried out mass demonstrations across the Korean Peninsula from March to May in 1919, to resist Japanese colonial rule.[25] Therefore, the Japanese government adopted measures of "indoctrination of Koreans" and of their "assimilation" so that they would become "loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire."[26] This "indoctrination" and "assimilation" of Koreans was implemented in various forms. For instance, Koreans were denied using the Korean language and instead forced to use Japanese. Additionally, their names were changed to Japanese names. They were strongly encouraged to visit and pay homage at shrines of Japanese Shinto which is originally an indigenous folk religion but was "invented" in the modern times as a state religion, a tool to unite the nation with the Emperor at its pinnacle.[27]

Among various measures of the Japanization policy, education was the most crucial tool used to Japanize 1.5-generation Koreans. *Zainichi* Korean children had not been subject to compulsory education. However, partly for the purpose of transforming Koreans into "loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire," and partly out of fear that Koreans might gain and strengthen ethnic consciousness and rebellious attitudes against the Japanese through private education,[28] in 1930 the Japanese authorities applied compulsory education to *zainichi* Korean children, and from 1934 they further strengthened encouragement for enrollment.[29] At school, Korean children received "Japanization" education alongside Japanese children, using the Japanese language, learning Japanese history, and more importantly, indoctrinating themselves to the spirit of Emperor worship.[30]

At the same time, Koreans in the Japanese mainland were put under the control and scrutiny of the police through, for example, the nation-wide organization named *Kyōwakai*. Since the establishment of the first *Kyōwakai* in Osaka Prefecture in 1924, the organization opened chapters across the country, particularly after 1936

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24 Kim, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to "Zainichi"*, 21, 119; Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 80-81.

25 Kim, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to "Zainichi"*, 60-61; Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 19-20.

26 Kim, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to "Zainichi"*, 94; Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chō-senjin*, 49.

27 Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 35-36, 62, 75-76.

28 E. Patricia Tsurumi, "Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 294-296.

29 Kim, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to "Zainichi"*, 30-32, 95-98.

30 Ibid., 95-98.

when the then Home Ministry (*Naimushō*) issued a directive, and they were put under the Central *Kyōwakai* (*Chūō Kyōwakai*) established in 1939. From this time onwards, under the supervision of the Special Police and through hiring Koreans as local officers, *Kyōwakai* functioned to control *zainichi* Koreans. The organization encouraged Koreans to adapt to Japanese lifestyle and work for the Japanese Empire through, for example, wearing Japanese clothes, visiting and paying homage at Shinto shrines, donating to the country, and volunteering for public construction work. Assimilation of and control over Koreans through *Kyōwakai* was further tightened as Japan went to war with China. During the Second World War, Koreans were mobilized through the organization's network for Japanese war efforts through donations and later as laborers and soldiers.[31]

The Japanese authorities adopted the Japanization policy towards Koreans through various measures as discussed above. It was a way to show that Japan's colonial administration was different from colonialism of the Western powers which put different races under their control in their remote colonies such as those in Africa and Southeast Asia. On the contrary, the Japanese authorities regarded Koreans as racially close to the Japanese. This provided a base for the Japanization policy towards Koreans that attempted to "assimilate" and "convert" them into the "loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire" throughout the colonial era.[32]

However, the Japanization policy had an ambivalent character since it left some room for distinguishing Koreans from the Japanese. For instance, Koreans were given Japanese nationality when Japan colonized Korea, nevertheless, different family registration decrees were applied to the two ethnic groups so that Koreans remained legally differentiated from the Japanese.[33] Conscription ordinances were applied to Koreans several years later than to the Japanese because the Japanese authorities were cautious about providing Koreans with weapons as they were concerned that armed Koreans might become a threat to colonial rule.[34] This reveals that for the Japanese authorities, Koreans were still "Others" who were "peripheral" and "inferior," and in some cases could even become a threat to the colonial administration.

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31 Kim Gwang Yol, "1940-nendai Zenhan ni Okeru Nihon Keisatsu no Zainichi Chōsenjin Tōsei Taisei" [The Control System by Japanese Police over Zainichi Koreans in the First Half of the 1940s], in *Teikoku Nihon no Saihen to Futatsu no "Zainichi"* [The Reorganization of the Japanese Empire and Two "Zainichi"], eds. Kim Gwang Yol et al. (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2010), 59-67; Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 59-63.

32 Shinobu Oe, "Higashi Ajia Shinkyū Teikoku no Kōtai" [Change from an Old to a New Empire in East Asia], in *Kindai Nihon to Shokuminchi 1* [Modern Japan and Colonies 1], eds. Shinobu Oe et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 24-27.

33 Eiji Oguma, *"Nihonjin" no Kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen, Shokuminchi Shihai Kara Fukki Undō Made* [The Boundaries of the Japanese] (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1998), 154-161.

34 Eiji Oguma, *Tan'itsu Minzoku Shin'wa no Kigen: "Nihonjin" no Jigazō no Keifu* [A Genealogy of Japanese Self-Images] (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1995), 256.

The fact that Koreans were still regarded as "peripheral, inferior Others" in Japanese society was more obvious in social life. They lived in slums with very poor sanitation, were mostly engaged in low-wage, dangerous, and dirty occupations, such as mining and construction, were denied job opportunities by Japanese employers, marriage to Japanese people, and many other forms of social access.

The Japanization policy was, after all, a double standard with simultaneous acts of assimilation and discrimination against Koreans. As a result, Koreans could not be fully "Japanized" not only because Koreans themselves resisted, but also because institutionally the colonial rule left room for distinguishing Koreans from the Japanese as "peripheral, inferior Others," and socially Koreans had to endure many forms of discrimination in daily life.

In such an environment, many first-generation *zainichi* Koreans who immigrated to the Japanese mainland as adults generally developed anger and hatred against the Japanese and maintained their pride in being Korean as a sign of resistance against the Japanese. Some of them did not hesitate to show that they were Koreans, by wearing Korean clothes in the public and even resisting verbal and physical discrimination.[35] Still, there were some first-generation *zainichi* Koreans who did not want to reveal that they were Korean, or even tried to adapt to the Japanese community, in order to protect themselves from marginalization and discrimination within a local community. Nevertheless, many first-generation Koreans remained proud of their Korean identities, and had a strong will, as well as courage, to resist discrimination against them by Japanese people. Such an attitude might have come from the fact that they were already adults when Korea was colonized or when they were compelled to immigrate to Japan, therefore, they had a clear understanding that their suffering was caused by Japan's imperialism and colonialism.

The feelings of anger and hatred towards the Japanese that many first-generation Koreans developed were shared by 1.5-generation Koreans as they realized the unfair treatment that Koreans faced in Japan, whether through their own first-hand experiences or that of other Koreans around them such as their parents.[36] However, the experiences of 1.5-generation Koreans were not so simple. Having spent their childhood and adolescence in Japan, some of them developed identities and ethnic consciousnesses that differed from that of first-generation Koreans who immigrated to the Japanese mainland as adults, as will be examined in the following sections.

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35 Kim Teseng, *Watashi no Ningen Chizu* [My Map as a Human] (Tokyo: Seikyusha, 1985), 78; Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 93.

36 Hyeon Soon-im, "Shokumin shihai no konjō mada nukete imasen" [They haven't overcome their colonial ill-nature], in *Zainichi Issei no Kioku* [Memories of First-generation Zainichi Koreans], eds. Eiji Oguma and Kang Sang-jung (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2008), 393-395; Jang Doo-sik, *Aru Zainichi Chōsenjin no Kiroku* [A Record of a Zainichi Korean] (Tokyo: Dohsei Publishing, 1976), 32; Jung Hwan-gi, *Zainichi wo Ikiru* [To Live a Zainichi's Life] (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 1990), 32-33.

1.5-generation Koreans: Humiliated for Their Ethnicity

Personal experiences of 1.5-generation Koreans had other consequences besides the development and strengthening of anger and hatred towards the Japanese. One case is the development of feelings of humiliation for their ethnicity.

Kwon Sun-geum, who was born in Andong-gun, Gyeongsang-bukdo, in 1926 and immigrated to Japan at the age of three, recalls she did not want other children to know that she was Korean. On a rainy day, for example, when her mother came to school to pick her up with her umbrella and in Korean clothing, she could not go to her mother out of fear that fellow students might know that her family was Korean and tease her.[37]

Historian Kang Duk-sang who was born in Hamyang-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1932 and immigrated to Japan at the age of two in 1934 remembers a similar story. He recalls that he did not want his mother to come to events at his school since it was obvious that his mother was Korean.[38] On another occasion, when he saw that a Korean female student was being teased by Japanese students for being Korean, he recalls that he could not stop their behavior. Although he was physically stronger than those Japanese students, he would simply feel humiliated by the simple word "You, Korean!"[39]

Another example is the novelist Kim Tal-su, who was born in Changwon-gun (the present Changwon City) of Gyeongsang-namdo in 1920 and immigrated to Japan at the age of ten in 1930 to join his mother, eldest brother, and younger sister who had moved to Japan five years earlier. His father had passed away in Japan in 1928. He recalls that when his mother threw stones back at Japanese boys who teased them on a street, he rather felt embarrassed about his mother:

> *In such a situation, I could not help feeling both embarrassed and miserable at the same time. I felt such embarrassment and misery, not so much for the fact that the kids teased us and threw stones at us, but rather that my mother threw stones back at them.*[40]

These cases show that some 1.5-generation Koreans came to hide their ethnic origin out of a feeling of "shame" for their ethnicity. This tendency is unique to

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37 Kwon Sun-geum, "Hibaku wo norikoe fujinkai katsudō ni kōken" [Having gone through the atomic-bombing, I worked for a women's association], in *Zainichi Issei no Kioku* [Memories of First-generation Zainichi Koreans], eds. Eiji Oguma and Kang Sang-jung (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2008), 335-336.

38 Kang Duk-sang, "Watashi to rekishigaku no deai" [The encounter between me and history], in *Zainichi Issei no Kioku* [Memories of First-generation Zainichi Koreans], eds. Eiji Oguma and Kang Sang-jung (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2008), 647.

39 Kang, "Watashi to rekishigaku no deai," 647-648.

40 Kim Tal-su, *Waga Ariran no Uta* [My Arirang Song] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 1977), 47.

1.5-generation Koreans and cannot be found among first-generation Koreans.

There were some first-generation Koreans who did not make it obvious that they were Koreans since they thought it was "wise" to not overtly show their ethnicity while living as minorities in Japan. When they immigrated to Japan, these first-generation Koreans had already developed their ethnic identities and understood the fact that they were minorities. Therefore, it is likely that they expected to be targets of discrimination in Japanese society.

In contrast, 1.5-generation Koreans' attitude of hiding their ethnicity emerged from a feeling of "shame" of being Korean, rather than as a reluctant but strategic means to live in Japanese society as in the case of first-generation Koreans. It should be added that, unlike first-generation Koreans, 1.5-generation Koreans were not immediately aware that they were different from other Japanese children. In fact, historian Park Jong-myeong, who was born in Gwangju, Jeolla-namdo, in 1928 and immigrated to Japan at the age of five, said that "I gradually came to understand that I was teased and bullied because of being Korean. But I didn't know why [being Korean was the reason for bullying]…."[41] When these 1.5-generation Koreans later came to understand that they were "Others" in Japan whom Japanese people regarded as "inferior," 1.5-generation Koreans internalized this perspective, seeing themselves as "shameful Others." Therefore, they necessarily came to terms with the unfair treatment against them.

As Hall has argued, under the colonial situation and through colonial experience, the colonized people internalize the negative image held by the colonizers and come to see themselves as "inferior Others."[42] Albert Memmi further argues that the negative image of "inferior Others" held by the colonizers are accepted and put in practice by the colonized people, and as a result the colonized contribute to consolidate such an image.[43]

Scholars' arguments may help explain the 1.5-generation Koreans examined in this section. They reflected the idea of "inferior Koreans" that was prevalent in Japanese society. It does not mean, of course, that they believed in their "inferiority" themselves. Nevertheless, by living in Japanese society, receiving education at school in Japan, and being surrounded by or interacting with Japanese people, 1.5-generation Koreans reluctantly accepted and internalized the perspective of those in power; they began to see Koreans as "peripheral, inferior Others" which they put in practice through trying to hide their ethnicity, instead of developing anger or hatred against the Japanese. Some 1.5-generation Koreans put in practice their "inferiority" in a different way: adaptation to Japanese society. This is the case that will be examined in the next section.

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41 Park Jong-myeong, "Genjitsu wo ikiru tameno jissenteki na rekishigaku wo" [Practical history for living in the reality], in *Zainichi Issei no Kioku* [Memories of First-generation Zainichi Koreans], eds. Eiji Oguma and Kang Sang-jung (Tokyo: Shueisha 2008), 432.

42 Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," 225.

43 Albert Memmi, *Jinshu Sabetsu* [Le Racisme], trans. Masami Kikuchi and Shigeo Shirai (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 1982=1996), 195-196.

1.5-generation Koreans: Adapted to Japanese Society

Some 1.5-generation Koreans adapted to Japanese society without necessarily developing anger, hatred or a sense of resistance against the Japanese. One example is the case of Jang Tae-hee, who was born in Changnyeong-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1912 and immigrated to Japan on his own at the age of 11 in 1924.

Jang spent his first five years in Japan at a confectionery, where he lived with the Japanese owner and his wife who treated him as if he was their real son. He established a good relationship with this family and in fact he visited them six years after he left them in 1929 to join his father in Hiroshima.[44] This may show that his good personal relationship with Japanese people lessened his negative feelings towards the Japanese:

> *While I lived and worked hard, I learned that not all Japanese people were bad. The Murakami family [that owned the confectionery] saved me from a human trafficker and raised me as if I was their real son. Later, I worked for Kyōwakai which was a nation-wide organization that subjected Koreans in Japan under the control [of the Special Police] and mobilized Koreans [for Japan's war effort]. However, there were nice people among the Special Police.*[45]

It is noteworthy that Jang mentions *Kyōwakai* here. In the post-liberation era, those Koreans who had worked for *Kyōwakai* were regarded as "pro-Japanese" and many of them did not want to reveal their past involvement with the organization, even though most were reluctantly involved in the organization to survive under the colonial rule. In this respect, it was highly unusual that Jang does not hesitate to reveal his past affiliation with *Kyōwakai* and even says that there were nice Japanese people in the Special Police that supervised *Kyōwakai*. Whether his past deeds and perspectives may be interpreted as pro-Japanese or not, it is at least certain that he established good relations with some Japanese individuals and as a result, he held rather positive impressions about those individuals, if not about the Japanese as a whole.

Another case of a 1.5-generation Korean who adapted to Japanese society is that of novelist Kim Tal-su, who was quoted earlier. When he immigrated to Japan at the age of ten, he couldn't speak or understand Japanese. His family was so poor that they could not afford proper education for the children. Therefore, he started working to help his family as soon as he arrived to Japan, and discontinuously funded himself to attend schools for three years at different primary schools, a half

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44 Jang Tae-hee, "Okizari ni sareta kankokujin gembaku giseisha ireihi" [The Cenotaph for Korean Atomic-bomb Victims left abandoned], in *Ikiru: Hibakusha no Jibun-shi* [To Live: Autobiographies of Atomic-bomb Victims], ed. Hibakusha no Jibun-shi Henshū Iinkai (Hiroshima: Hibakusha no Jibun-shi Henshū Iinkai, 1995), 18-19.

45 Ibid., 39-40.

year at a junior high school in evening course, and three years at a college.

Despite unsatisfactory schooling, Kim familiarized himself with Japanese literature from a young age as he read novels that he found in the trash or bought from ragpickers for cheap prices. He then began to dream of studying literature and even becoming a novelist himself.[46] He recalls that he was particularly moved by works by Japanese novelist Naoya Shiga who wrote many "I" novels, that is, novels based on the author's own life:

> *I encountered typical Japanese "I" novels for the first time [through Shiga's works]. "If Shiga writes such novels," I thought, "I will write novels about us, Koreans." But what I had in my mind was only "within the framework of zainichi Koreans."*[47]

In this quotation, it can be pointed out that Kim was motivated to write "I" novels as a Korean which may demonstrate his ethnic consciousness. However, at the same time, it can be said that his sense of being Korean is not particularly strong and it was rather narrowly defined as it was only "within the framework of *zainichi* Koreans." In fact, he said that he was not familiar with Korean literature at that time:

> *I had only discussed world literature and Japanese literature, but what about Korean literature which is supposed to have significance for me, a Korean? Strangely enough, having spent ten years since I came to Japan as a small child who knew nothing at the time, I have become "half-Japanese." The language I speak, novels that I read…all are in Japanese. In other words, almost everything I see and hear is in Japanese, and there is nothing I could do about it.*[48]

Kim did experience discrimination from Japanese people during his childhood and adolescence, whether being teased by children or rejected for employment because of being Korean. Nevertheless, having become a "half-Japanese," his feeling towards the Japanese was not only of anger and hatred, at least at this point. A young literature enthusiast, he even lamented Korean people's unfamiliarity with literature which, to him, was one factor that led Korean people to lead miserable lives and with low status in Japan.[49]

The development of a sense of "half-Japanese" and lament for Korean compatriots is not exclusive to Kim. For example, Jang Doo-sik, who was born in Haman-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1916 and immigrated to Japan in 1923, also argues that through reading Japanese literature, he "came to have sensibilities of Japanese people on purpose, and perceive myself as a terribly unfortunate person

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46 Kim, *Waga Ariran no Uta*, 169.
47 Ibid., 169-170.
48 Ibid., 188.
49 Ibid., 155, 169.

since I was born Korean."[50]

Kim Moon-seon, who was born in Chungcheong-bukdo in 1925 and immigrated to Japan at the age of three in 1928, recalls that he felt he was different from other Koreans. After Japan went into the Second World War in 1941, he began construction work with Koreans under a Korean boss. However, the environment of being surrounded only by "pure Koreans" was nothing but uncomfortable for him:

> *I was more and more Japanized while I lived in different Japanese communities one after another, hiding the fact that I was Korean. [I was] half-Japanese that pure Koreans' community scorned at that time. … This place [new working place] was under total control of a pure Korean community. It felt like another world. …Because [I] say something and do something based on my Japanese sense, those pure Koreans scorned me, and I couldn't get along with them and often alienated.*[51]

The examples examined above demonstrate that the 1.5-generation Koreans who spent their childhood and adolescence in colonial Japan did not necessarily develop a strong sense of self as Koreans nor a sense of resistance against the Japanese. They could have been aware of prejudice and discrimination against them and had bitter feelings, however, the discrimination against Koreans in Japan had been so deeply institutionalized and prevalent in society that they, despite their discontent, internalized this unfair social environment. Moreover, since they were always exposed to the thoughts and sensibilities of the Japanese people whom they interact with on a daily basis, they themselves imitated and practiced the way of thinking of the Japanese people, consequently contributing to consolidate the negative image against Koreans held by the Japanese.

It can further be argued that their internalization and practice of the Japanese way of thinking might have come from their complexes about their Korean ethnicity. As discussed earlier, Albert Memmi argues that as a possible solution to the status as "inferior" colonial subjects, they attempt to become "equal" to the colonizers and, at the same time, develop "a complex of feelings ranging from shame to self-hate."[52] In a similar manner, it is possible that some 1.5-generation Koreans tried to become closer to the Japanese colonizers out of desperation to detach themselves from the "inferior" status and negative image of Koreans held by the Japanese and also internalized by themselves, some even developing into self-hate.

Based on this, it can be argued that some 1.5-generation Koreans developed complicated, or even contradictory, feelings towards their Korean ethnicity as well as first-generation compatriots. This is expressed by some 1.5-generation Koreans

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50 Jang, *Aru Zainichi Chōsenjin no Kiroku*, 49.

51 Kim Moon-seon, *Hōrōden: Shōwashi no Naka no Zainichi* [A Story of a Wanderer: A Zainichi Korean in the History of the Showa Era] (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 1991), 106.

52 Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, 119-121.

such as Kim Teseng who was born in Jeju-do (Jeju Island) in 1925 and immigrated to Japan at the age of five in 1930. He recalls the thoughts and feelings that he held towards Korean adults when he was fourteen seeing them as "ignorant, filthy, lazy, untrustable, barbarous, cunning, and indecent."[53] At the same time, however, he also confesses his thoughts and feelings were rather complicated:

> *[W]ere they no more than such people? Was it really true? …[S]uch an image [about them] was something that was imposed on me by those [Japanese] people who treated [Korean] people as vicious creatures and at the same time rejected [them] and denied them any opportunity to get out of their adversity. It was obviously prejudice. And it was because of this very prejudice that [Korean] people were persistent in their [Korean way of] life despite of suffering through despisal and humiliation [by the Japanese]. But I could not understand it [their lives] since I myself was polluted by such prejudice without myself realizing it.*[54]

Here Kim expresses his confused, conflicting thoughts: he follows the Japanese by holding a negative image towards Koreans, but at the same time, he is critical against the discriminative attitude of the same Japanese people. This contradictory thought and attitude manifested itself among Koreans yet in a different way after Japan went to war in the 1930s and Koreans were mobilized. Some 1.5-generation Koreans were "willing" to work for Japan's war effort. However, their "contribution" was not necessarily based solely on their "willingness," but also based on the awareness of discrimination against them and out of desperation to overcome it.

1.5-generation Koreans: Aspired to Work for the Japanese Empire

The cases discussed in the previous section examined the 1.5-generation Koreans who adapted to Japanese society. The cases that will be discussed in the following go beyond it. They are 1.5-generation Koreans who even became "loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire."

The news of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 gave Kim Moon-seon, who was quoted in the previous section, a "sense of indescribable tension," a feeling that he felt because, he thinks, he had become a "Japanese."[55] When Japan lost the war four years later in August 1945, he said: "as a military boy tried hard to hold back my tears" as he saw his Japanese boss at a coal mine was weeping.[56]

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53 Kim, *Watashi no Ningen Chizu*, 79.

54 Ibid.

55 Kim, *Hōrōden: Shōwashi no Naka no Zainichi*, 105.

56 Ibid., 137.

Jang Tae-hee, who was also quoted in the previous section, is another example. Jang says after Japan went to war, he worked hard for the sake of Japan's war effort:

> *I did this job [of making military swords] earnestly every day. Believing [that this was] for the Japanese military and for Japan to win the war, I worked hard without any personal interest and gain.*[57]

Jang also worked as a member of *Kyōwakai* and sold war bonds to and collected donations from compatriot Koreans for war effort.[58] He even says that he "behaved as if [he was] a Japanese, more so than Japanese people, and even cooperated for Japan's war effort."[59]

Kim and Jang's ambivalent identities of being Korean and being a "loyal subject of the Japanese Empire" may seem contradictory. However, it is not necessarily so, as Yoon Geon-cha discusses:

> *Young generations who had the Emperor-centred sense of value drilled into them came to live a different psychological world from their parents whose lives were filled with "everything Korean." These Korean children who had grown up as "loyal young boys and girls" always kept it in mind to "become Japanese more than Japanese people," and as a reaction to the denial of their identities as Koreans, they even came to have a mentality that they were willing to die for the Emperor.*[60]

It can be argued that their "willingness" to contribute to Japan's war effort among some Koreans was a result of the Japanization policy during the colonial period. Their "willingness" was also a means to overcome discrimination against Koreans in Japanese society. For instance, historian Kang Duk-sang says he was an "enthusiastic military boy,"[61] and entered Tama Junior High School in Tokyo which was, according to Kang, a quasi-military academy since the school was for students who wanted to enter a formal training academy for military cadres such as army and naval officers.[62] He recalls that his aspiration to be an "enthusiastic military boy" emerged because he was "desperate to get out of poverty and discrimination."[63]

Regarding this psychological state, Kim Gi-bong, who served the Japanese Imperial Army, discusses that even though serving the Japanese Empire was only to "play right into the hands of [the authorities of] the Japanese Empire," Koreans

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57 Jang, "Okizari ni sareta kankokujin gembaku giseisha ireihi," 21-22.
58 Ibid., 20-21.
59 Ibid., 28.
60 Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 126.
61 Kang, "Watashi to rekishigaku no deai," 648.
62 Ibid., 648.
63 Ibid.

still needed to prove that "we Koreans were in no way inferior to the Japanese."[64] In other words, consciously or unconsciously, becoming an "enthusiastic military boy" and serving the Japanese Empire was, as Setsuko Miyata argues, a means for Koreans to prove that they were not "inferior" but equal to Japanese people, and consequently to dismiss all discrimination against them.[65] Or in the words of Ko Samyong, serving the Japanese Empire and also dying for the Japanese Emperor was "the final conclusion" and "the only exit" left for Koreans who "were born as non-Japanese 'Japanese'" in order to get out of the "never-ending" "suffering" from discrimination against them.[66]

Yoon Geon-cha further elaborates these arguments, discussing the fact that these Koreans wished to become loyal subjects of and serve the Japanese Empire to emerge from discrimination against them was a manifestation of their "ethnic complex." He argues that their ethnic complex made them believe that the only way for them to live a satisfactory life is to "become Japanese more than the Japanese people."[67] His argument may resemble the argument by Memmi on complexes of the colonized, as discussed in the previous section.

There were 1.5-generation Koreans who became "loyal subjects" and were "willing to serve the Japanese Empire." As a result of the Japanization policy and particularly having received Japanization education during the colonial period, they made them believe that it was their "duty" to serve the country, particularly after Japan went to war with China and in the Second World War. This pattern is similar to the cases examined in the previous section where both of these groups of 1.5-generation Koreans, having spent their childhood and adolescence in the colonial Japan, were "made into Japanese." At the same time, their willingness to serve Japan's war effort also came out of their desire to overcome discrimination against them in Japanese society, since they expected that becoming "loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire" would be a means of proving they were not "inferior" to Japanese people.

1.5-generation Koreans in the Post-1945 Era

So far, some cases of unique identity and ethnic consciousness among 1.5-generation Koreans born in Korea who immigrated to the Japanese mainland at young ages, and consequently spent their childhood and adolescence in colonial Japan have been examined. Some 1.5-generation Koreans developed anger and hatred towards the Japanese as many older first-generation Koreans had. Nevertheless, as discussed in this paper, there were some cases that can be regarded as peculiar

64 Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 97.

65 Setsuko Miyata, *Chōsen Minshū to "Kōminka" Seisaku* [The Korean People and the "Japanization" Policy] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1985), 162-164.

66 Ko Samyong, *Ikiru Koto no Imi* [A Meaning of Living] (Tokyo: Chikumashobo, 1974), 242.

67 Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 97.

to 1.5-generation Koreans.

The first case was that some 1.5-generation Koreans felt humiliated for their ethnic origins. The second case was that other 1.5-generation Koreans had come to regard themselves as "Japanese," and adapted to Japanese society. The third case was another group of 1.5-generation Koreans who had come to believe they were "loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire."

The commonality among the three cases is that these 1.5-generation Koreans had, during their childhoods and adolescences, critical periods for one's personality development, had internalized the image of Koreans that had been constructed by the Japanese who were in power in Japanese society. This was closely related to the ambivalent policy towards Koreans of the Japanese Empire. Koreans were treated as subjects of the Japanese Empire. At the same time, Koreans were not always treated as equals as the Japanese, institutionally, socially, and psychologically. In turn, Koreans internalized this ambivalent perspective under the Japanese colonial measures which further led to the three types of development of identity and ethnic consciousness among 1.5-generation Koreans.

Then, what happened to them following Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945? Japan's surrender, Korea's liberation, and return to the Korean Peninsula—all these drastic changes had them experience (re-)development and confusion of their identity and ethnic consciousness.

An example of the former case is that of historian Park Kyong-sik. Park developed his identity as Korean through participating in the post-1945 activities of *zainichi* Koreans' movement for unification of the Korean Peninsula and abolition of discrimination against Koreans who remained in Japan:

> *Up to 8.15 [the anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945], I had been subsumed by the racist discrimination and the education policy of Japanization of the Japanese Empire, therefore, I could not develop ethnic subjectivity [i.e. consciousness] and gain any experience through which I could be proud [of being Korean].*[68]

> *My life up to 8.15 was that of a slave, and … I will never repeat such a humiliating life without an ethnic identity. [My life after 8.15 has been] a process of struggling to regain my identity as a Korean.*[69]

While Park gained and consolidated his Korean identity, there were some 1.5-generation Koreans who experienced identity confusion, some of them not being able to get out of such confusion. In the case of historian Kang Duk-sang, his ambivalent identity of being Korean and being a "military boy" of the Japanese Empire led to identity confusion after the empire dismantled and Korea was liberated

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68 Park Kyong-sik, *Zainichi Chōsenjin: Watashi no Seishun* [Zainichi Koreans: My Youth] (Tokyo: San-Ichi Shobo Publishing, 1981), 5.

69 Ibid., 239.

in 1945. He recalls his complicated feeling immediately after Japan's surrender:

> *[As I was told by the teacher about Japan's defeat] I cycled to my boarding house which was 20 kilometres away, being rather confused about what actually happened. When I got there, it was filled with people grieving. Everyone was raising their face to the sky, punching the floor out of chagrin, and crying out. It was then, for the first time, that I comprehended that Japan had lost the war. However, I didn't know why, I just couldn't join that crowd in great sorrow. I was only a bystander, stunned and staring at them crying.*[70]

He then headed home, and on his way, he stopped at the house of a compatriot where dozens of Koreans gathered from across the town and were having a celebration. There he saw people making a Korean national flag. For Kang, it was the first time in his life to see the Korean national flag. He recalls:

> *Not knowing it was the Korean national flag, I was just stunned and gazing at them waving the flag and yelling "Hurray, Great Korea!" and "Hurray, independence!" Earlier I was a bystander amid the grieving crowd [of the Japanese] in great sorrow for the 8.15 surrender, and now I couldn't join the [Korean] people with a joyous mood for liberation. I felt some discomfort with both groups of people.*[71]

Similarly, Jung Hwan-gi who was born in Jinyang-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1924 and immigrated to Japan at the age of three in 1927, recalls that when his father said he wanted to return to Korea immediately after Japan's surrender, Jung and his elder brother felt a "great anxiety" because "since we came to Japan at a young age, we didn't know the homeland [Korea]. We were more fluent in Japanese than in our mother tongue [Korean]. Having received education at Japanese schools, in the Japanese language, and as Japanese, both my brother and I sometimes felt the homeland was like a foreign country."[72]

Some others actually experienced difficulties after returning to Korea. Eom Boon-yeon who was born in Hapcheon-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1929 and immigrated to Japan with her family when she was one in 1930, returned to Korea following Japan's surrender and Korea's liberation. However, she recalls that Korean returnees from Japan like Eom had to endure prejudice and discrimination as they were regarded as "pro-Japanese" who had had "luxurious" lives in Japan and had

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70 Kang, "Watashi to rekishigaku no deai," 650.

71 Ibid., 650-651.

72 Jung, *Zainichi wo Ikiru*, 73-74.

little knowledge of the Korean language and customs.[73] In terms of the language, for example, after returning to Korea she could not have an opportunity to receive a proper education and learn the language, and lacked confidence, particularly in writing, throughout her life.[74] As a result, many Korean returnees felt it was difficult to adapt to their new life in Korea, leading to some sort of identity confusion.

The ambivalent identity experienced by these 1.5-generation Koreans may sound perplexing. However, it may be understandable since, for those 1.5-generation Koreans who spent their childhood and adolescence in Japan, Korea was "not where [they] 'return to,' it [was] the place to 'go'." Unlike their parents, Korea was "an unknown place" for them, and their "experience and knowledge about Korea was too little for [them] to feel unconditional affection only because it was [their] homeland."[75] In some cases, their memories of their time in Japan could be something to long for, even though they also experienced discrimination. The childhoods and adolescences they spent in Japan could still be "a precious time," and Japan was "the root of [their] life" whereas they "can find nowhere in Korea that reminds [them] of [their] childhood."[76]

These 1.5-generation Koreans experienced (re-)development and confusion of their identity and ethnic consciousness following Japan's surrender and Korea's liberation. Whether (re-)development of their full and firm identity as Korean or an ambivalent, confusing identity, it can be pointed out that it again occurred under the influence of a power relation either vis-à-vis the Japanese in Japan where they remained, or vis-à-vis Koreans in the homeland to which they returned. In the new political and social environment of the post-1945 period, 1.5-generation Koreans developed a new sense of self, reflecting the new power relations. Koreans as "Others" in Japanese society who were now fully aware of their ethnicity and clearly distinguished from the Japanese, especially having been deprived of their previous Japanese nationality following the dismantlement of the Japanese Empire; or returnees in Korea who were not necessarily familiar with the life in Korea and were envied by their compatriots in Korea for their previous life in Japan.

Conclusion

This paper examined the development and changes of identity and ethnic consciousness among 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans that occurred within the colonial power relationship with the Japanese. The cases of 1.5-generation *zainichi*

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73 Eom Boon-yeon, "Hiroshima kara nigete kita" [I escaped from Hiroshima], in *Hiroshima E: Kankoku no Hibakusha no Shuki* [To Hiroshima: Autobiographies by Korean A-bomb Victims], ed. Kankoku no Gembaku-higaisha wo Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai (Hiroshima: Kankoku no Gembaku-higaisha wo Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai, 2019), 131-132.

74 Ibid., 132.

75 Lee Sang-geum, *Hambun no Furusato: Watashi ga Nihon ni Ita Toki no Koto* [A Half Homeland: The Time I Spent in Japan] (Tokyo: Fukuinkan Shoten, 2007), 418.

76 Ibid., 9.

Koreans examined in this paper are particularly unique to them compared to those of first-generation Koreans. There were primarily three cases as follows: (i) Those who felt humiliated for their ethnic origin; (ii) those who had come to regard themselves as “Japanese” and adapted to Japanese society; and (iii) those who had come to believe they were “loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire.”

Moreover, 1.5-generation Koreans who spent their childhoods and adolescences in colonial Japan were directly influenced and affected to a significant degree by some of the most drastic changes of the geopolitical landscape of the region such as Japan’s colonial rule over Korea, and the collapse of the Japanese Empire. These changes were accompanied by shifting power relations surrounding them. Consequently, their identities and ethnic consciousness developed, changed, re-developed, and even went through periods of confusion following Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945.

With such peculiarity and dynamics, the cases of 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans examined in this paper may represent the diversity of identity and ethnic consciousness among Korean people. They also present an example of the dynamics, complexity, and diversity of one’s identity and ethnic consciousness that are formed in interplay with others within the power relations of society. As suggested by President Moon’s words quoted at the beginning of this paper, identity and ethnic consciousness can be a strong tool to unite people. However, it should be remembered that there is always some room for diversity and complexity which is sometimes overlooked. This understanding may lead to re-examination of the national/ethnic identity of Korean people, and to relativized multi-dimensional perspectives on the issues of the colonial past.