
DRIFTING BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN: 1.5-GENERATION ZAINICHI KOREANS UNDER JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE

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This paper focuses on “1.5-generation Koreans” who immigrated to Japan when they were still children and spent their childhood and adolescence there during the colonial period. The research examines and analyzes how these Koreans developed different identities and ethnic consciousnesses from their parents. During Japanese colonial rule over Korea from 1910-1945, approximately two million Koreans immigrated to Japan for the purpose of seeking a way to make a living, or as forced laborers and mobilized soldiers. First-generation Koreans who immigrated to Japan as adults during the colonial period maintained a strong sense of being Korean in Japanese society where Koreans were usually discriminated and marginalized. In contrast, some of their children, 1.5-generation Koreans, developed contrasting identities and ethnic consciousnesses from their parents. It can be argued that there were three cases: (i) Those who felt humiliated for their ethnic origin; (ii) those who had come to regard themselves as “Japanese” and adapted to Japanese society; and (iii) those who had come to believe they were “loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire.” All these three cases were derived from the ambivalent nature of Japan’s ruling policy towards Korean, which attempted to “incorporate” Koreans as loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire while simultaneously leaving space for their political and social discrimination. This research serves to present relativized and multi-dimensional perspectives on the history of the colonial period and the national/ethnic identity of Korean people.

Keywords: *Ethnic consciousness, identity, Japanese colonial rule, Japanization, 1.5-generation Koreans, zainichi Koreans.*

Introduction

Fellow Koreans and compatriots abroad. One hundred years ago today, we were united as one. ...On that day, we were reborn as citizens of a republic; we were no longer subjects of a dynasty or a colony of Imperial Japan. ...We Koreans were also united as one in Yongjeong, China, across the border

*in what was North Ganbo; in Vladivostok in the Maritime Province of the Russian Far East; in Hawaii; and in Philadelphia. Anyone and everyone who felt a part of the Korean nation organized and took part in a rally.*¹

This is an excerpt from the speech delivered by South Korean President Moon Jae-in on March 1, 2019, during the centenary anniversary of the March First Independence Movement. The movement was a nationwide independence movement that began on March 1, 1919 and spread across the Korean Peninsula, which was under Japanese colonial rule. In the speech, President Moon stated that, “fellow Koreans and compatriots abroad...were united as one,” and “reborn as citizens of a republic” of Korea.²

President Moon’s speech implies that Korean people’s national identity and ethnic consciousness developed in response to Japanese colonial rule at that time, and that their identity and ethnic consciousness united them as a single people in a single nation. Moreover, this national identity and sense of unity have remained strong in South Korean people considering the fact that even today, Korean people sometimes hold nation-wide demonstrations and rallies when diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan become rattled. This suggests that identity and ethnic consciousness not only concern individuals but can become a tool to unite people as a single nation.

However, it can be questioned whether Korean people actually developed a common identity as Koreans became “one.” As will be discussed in detail in the next section, one’s identity develops through close interaction with specific social environments in which one lives at a specific time. In fact, a number of researchers, as well as Koreans themselves, point out differences in identity and ethnic consciousness among Koreans depending on whether they live on the Korean Peninsula or in Japan, the latter of whom are called *zainichi* (Japanese-resident) Koreans.³ Choi Seungkoo argues that *zainichi* Koreans’ ethnic identities partly develop out of experiences of discrimination in Japan, which is peculiar to the case of *zainichi* Koreans but not of Koreans living in Korea.⁴ At the same time, these ethnic minorities in Japan are not regarded as Koreans (*Hankukin*) once they go or return to Korea.⁵ In this regard, they are “not [fully] Korean nor Japanese,”⁶

1 The Republic of Korea. Cheong Wa Dae, “Address by President Moon Jae-in on 100th March First Independence Movement Day,” accessed April 29, 2020, <https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/128>.

2 Ibid.

3 Lee Kenji, *Nikkan Nashonarizumu no Kaitai* [The Dismantling of Japan’s and Korea’s Nationalism] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2009), 26; Park Il, “*Zainichi*” *toiu Ikikata* [A Life as “Zainichi”] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1999), 234; Yoon Geon-cha, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru* [Thinking About Zainichi] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2001), 326-328.

4 Park, “*Zainichi*” *toiu Ikikata*, 75.

5 Lee, *Nikkan Nashonarizumu no Kaitai*, 26.

6 Park, “*Zainichi*” *toiu Ikikata*, 234.

and, hence, possess “multiple identities.”⁷ If not “multiple,” their identities may be, as Yoon Geon-cha argues, in a cycle of constantly changing relations between Korea and Japan.⁸

Other researchers emphasize further differences in identity and ethnic consciousness between first-generation *zainichi* Koreans (i.e. those who immigrated to the Japanese mainland from Korea) and later generations (i.e. descendants of first-generation *zainichi* Koreans).⁹ Following Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, a majority of first-generation *zainichi* Koreans longed to return to Korea, a unified Korea, in the future. They looked towards the homeland instead of considering the possibility of spending a whole lifetime in Japan. However, in the 1970s, some second-generation *zainichi* Koreans began developing a new way of perceiving their life in Japan that was different from that of first-generation Koreans. They had been born and grew up in Japan, and some had never been to Korea. They expected to spend their whole lives in Japan. Consequently, some second-generation Koreans began seeking a new identity not as native Koreans in the homeland (the Korean Peninsula) or “alien” Koreans in Japan, but as “*zainichi*” Koreans. In this, they focused on their lifestyle in Japan instead of looking towards the homeland as older generations had done.¹⁰

While the existing literature presents important and insightful discussions, particularly regarding *zainichi* Koreans to whom identity has long been a central issue, they do not sufficiently discuss the differences within the same generation of *zainichi* Koreans. Therefore, this paper examines differences among first-generation *zainichi* Koreans highlighting the complexity and diversity of their identities and ethnic consciousness. More specifically, it focuses on those first-generation *zainichi* Koreans who immigrated to the Japanese mainland at young ages and spent their adolescence in colonial Japan. These cases can be contrasted with those of their parents that are also first-generation Koreans but immigrated to the Japanese mainland only after they became adults. The former group shall be termed in this paper as 1.5-generation Koreans since they were closer to the second-generation in terms of their life experiences since they spent their childhoods and adolescences, the latter of which is, according to Erikson, the important period for one’s identity development,¹¹ in Japan.

7 Lee, *Nikkan Nashonarizumu no Kaitai*, 26.

8 Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 328.

9 David Chapman, *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2008), 37-59; Chung Youngjin, *Zainichi Chōsenjin Aidentetei no Yuragi* [Variations of Zainichi Koreans’ Identities] (Kyoto: Horitsu Bunka Sha, 2018), 59; Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 200-202.

10 Chapman, *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity*, 44-46.

11 Erik Erikson, *Jigadōitsusei: Aidentetei to Raifu Saikuru* [Psychological Issues: Identity and the Life Cycle], trans. Keigo Okonogi (Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1959=1973), 111-118.

First, the paper reviews various theories of identity and the so-called “Japanization policy” that was applied to Koreans during the colonial period. While this policy will be discussed in more detail later, it should be noted that the Japanization policy was at its peak when 1.5-generation Koreans were adolescents, and therefore it can be assumed that the policy exerted significant influence on the development of the identities and ethnic consciousness of 1.5-generation Koreans. Following the review of identity theories and discussions on the Japanization policy, the paper moves to the analysis of some specific cases of 1.5-generation Koreans which show their unique patterns of development of identity and ethnic consciousness. The analysis takes a sociological approach based on identity theories, and analyzes autobiographies written by 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans to observe one’s inner changes related to development of identity and ethnic consciousness. To examine such inner aspects of individuals, it is necessary to analyze detailed autobiographies that cover a sufficient period of time. In this respect, it should be noted that autobiographies available for this analysis are rather limited. Due to low literacy among *zainichi* Koreans at the time, available autobiographies are mostly written by those people who attained a higher level of education such as intellectuals, authors, educators, and social activists.

The research is expected to enrich the existing literature through the sociological analysis of life experiences of 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans, presenting relativized and multi-dimensional perspectives on the history of the colonial period. Such perspectives may provide opportunities for future study to re-examine the national/ethnic identity of Korean people and to re-think the issues of the colonial past—especially in an attempt to, in President Moon’s words, “wip[e] out the vestiges of pro-Japanese collaborators.”¹²

Theories of Identity

It was Erik Erikson who first articulated the concept of identity. According to the author, one develops identity during adolescence through the stage of “identity diffusion.” During this stage, one adjusts one’s ego to the roles and values that are assumed to be expected in society, so that identity may develop towards adulthood.¹³

While Erikson discusses identity from a psychosocial development perspective, others put more stress on social aspects of identity development. According to these theorists, such as Mead, Berger, and Luckmann, identity develops through social interaction. That is, one develops identity by negotiating

12 Cheong Wa Dae, “Address by President Moon Jae-in on 100th March First Independence Movement Day.”

13 Erikson, *Jigadōitsusei*, 111-118.

one's ego with the expectations of others or that of society's.¹⁴ While this statement is similar to Erikson's, their discussion goes further by pointing out that identity does not develop and complete at once. It can continuously change and re-develop depending on changing historical, political, and social environments, and depending on the relationship between oneself and the world.¹⁵

Stuart Hall relates this negotiating process of identity development to power relations. Resembling the argument on disciplinary power that Michel Foucault made in his book *Discipline and Punish*, Hall argues that identities are "produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices," and that "they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion."¹⁶

Hall also discusses the issue of identity in relation to the colonial experience. According to the author, the colonized were "positioned and subjected in the dominant regimes of representation."¹⁷ Consequently, they were not only "constructed as different and other within the categories of knowledge" of the colonizers, but also made to "see and experience [themselves] as 'Other'."¹⁸ A similar argument was made by Chizuko Ueno who, based on Hall's discussion, argues that a "(social) minority" is defined by power relations in which someone in power minoritizes a specific group of people who in turn identify themselves as the minority or "Others."¹⁹

The self-minimization that Ueno points out further leads to the issue of complexes of ethnicity argued by Albert Memmi. Examining the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, Memmi discusses that as a possible solution to the status of a "creature of oppression" under the colonial situation, the colonized attempts "to become equal to that splendid model [of the colonizer] and to resemble him."²⁰ He adds that "[l]ove of the colonizer is subtended by a complex of feelings ranging from shame to self-hate" of the colonized.²¹ Although his argument does not

14 George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1934=1967), 175, 178-179; Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 131-132.

15 Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 173; Stuart Hall, "The Meaning of New Times," in *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, eds. Dave Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (London: Routledge, 1989=1996), 225.

16 Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, eds. Stuart Hall and Paul de Gay (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 4.

17 Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, ed. Jonathan Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 225.

18 Ibid.

19 Chizuko Ueno, "Joshō: Datsu Aidenteitei no Riron" [Introductory Chapter: Theories of Post-Identity], in *Datsu Aidenteitei [Post-Identity]*, ed. Chizuko Ueno (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 2005), 30-31.

20 Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, trans. Howard Greenfield (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1957=1991), 119-121.

21 Ibid.

directly concern the issue of identity, it certainly presents important implications to identity discussions, especially for identity of colonial subjects.

These various theories on identity have important implications to the development of identity and ethnic consciousness of Koreans, particularly 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans. Identity develops and re-develops repeatedly in close interaction with environments and within specific historical, social context. Power relations in society also exert influence on one's identity development, which is particularly applicable to the cases of ethnic minorities and the colonized. In this regard, 1.5-generation Koreans may be one of the most appropriate examples to examine this implication since they spent their adolescence, an important period for one's identity development, in the Japanese mainland as ethnic minorities who were direct subjects of the "Japanization policy," as discussed in the next section.

Japan's Ambivalent Policy Towards Koreans in Colonial Japan

To analyze the development of identity and ethnic consciousness in 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans, it is necessary to grasp an overview of the contemporary political and social environments in which they spent their childhoods and adolescence. Therefore, this section will look at a brief history of *zainichi* Koreans during the colonial period focusing on colonial measures that might have exerted a significant influence on the development of identity and ethnic consciousness of 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans.

Although there had been Koreans living in Japan before the twentieth century, the increase of Korean immigration to the Japanese mainland in modern times was accelerated by Japan's colonization of Korea in 1910. The colonization deprived many Koreans of their means of living on the Korean Peninsula through colonial measures such as the land reform project (1910-1918) and the rice production development program (1920-1934). As a result, the number of Koreans migrating to the Japanese mainland to make a living began to increase.²² The rise of Korean immigrants to the Japanese mainland was further enabled by the transport infrastructure that had been laid throughout the peninsula by the Japanese with the purpose of improving the efficiency of exporting agricultural and industrial products from Korea to Japan, and more importantly, to facilitate military logistics as Japan expanded its influence on the continent.²³

Koreans immigrated to the Japanese mainland following familial ties or those of neighbors from the same village and from the late 1930s, through forced labor and war mobilization. At the end of 1944, the Korean population in Japan is said to have been 1,936,843 a significant increase compared to 2,527 in 1911. Although there is no official record, it is estimated that at the time of Japan's surrender in the Second

22 Kim Chanjung, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to "Zainichi"* [100 Years since the Annexation of Korea and "Zainichi"] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2010), 30-32, 68-69.

23 Naoki Mizuno and Mun Gyongsu, *Zainichi Chōsenjin: Rekishi to Genzai* [Zainichi Koreans: History and the Present] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 24-25.

World War in August 1945, there were approximately 2.1 million Koreans living on the Japanese mainland.²⁴

Under Japanese colonial rule, Koreans were regarded as Japanese subjects and given Japanese nationalities. However, the Japanese authorities became concerned that the increasing number of these colonized subjects might “disturb” the social order, particularly after the March First Independence Movement when Koreans carried out mass demonstrations across the Korean Peninsula from March to May in 1919, to resist Japanese colonial rule.²⁵ Therefore, the Japanese government adopted measures of “indoctrination of Koreans” and of their “assimilation” so that they would become “loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire.”²⁶ This “indoctrination” and “assimilation” of Koreans was implemented in various forms. For instance, Koreans were denied using the Korean language and instead forced to use Japanese. Additionally, their names were changed to Japanese names. They were strongly encouraged to visit and pay homage at shrines of Japanese Shinto which is originally an indigenous folk religion but was “invented” in the modern times as a state religion, a tool to unite the nation with the Emperor at its pinnacle.²⁷

Among various measures of the Japanization policy, education was the most crucial tool used to Japanize 1.5-generation Koreans. *Zainichi* Korean children had not been subject to compulsory education. However, partly for the purpose of transforming Koreans into “loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire,” and partly out of fear that Koreans might gain and strengthen ethnic consciousness and rebellious attitudes against the Japanese through private education,²⁸ in 1930 the Japanese authorities applied compulsory education to *zainichi* Korean children, and from 1934 they further strengthened encouragement for enrollment.²⁹ At school, Korean children received “Japanization” education alongside Japanese children, using the Japanese language, learning Japanese history, and more importantly, indoctrinating themselves to the spirit of Emperor worship.³⁰

At the same time, Koreans in the Japanese mainland were put under the control and scrutiny of the police through, for example, the nation-wide organization named *Kyōwakai*. Since the establishment of the first *Kyōwakai* in Osaka Prefecture in 1924, the organization opened chapters across the country, particularly after 1936

24 Kim, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to “Zainichi”*, 21, 119; Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 80-81.

25 Kim, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to “Zainichi”*, 60-61; Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 19-20.

26 Kim, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to “Zainichi”*, 94; Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 49.

27 Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 35-36, 62, 75-76.

28 E. Patricia Tsurumi, “Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 294-296.

29 Kim, *Kankoku Heigō Hyaku-nen to “Zainichi”*, 30-32, 95-98.

30 *Ibid.*, 95-98.

when the then Home Ministry (*Naimushō*) issued a directive, and they were put under the Central *Kyōwakai* (*Chūō Kyōwakai*) established in 1939. From this time onwards, under the supervision of the Special Police and through hiring Koreans as local officers, *Kyōwakai* functioned to control *zainichi* Koreans. The organization encouraged Koreans to adapt to Japanese lifestyle and work for the Japanese Empire through, for example, wearing Japanese clothes, visiting and paying homage at Shinto shrines, donating to the country, and volunteering for public construction work. Assimilation of and control over Koreans through *Kyōwakai* was further tightened as Japan went to war with China. During the Second World War, Koreans were mobilized through the organization's network for Japanese war efforts through donations and later as laborers and soldiers.³¹

The Japanese authorities adopted the Japanization policy towards Koreans through various measures as discussed above. It was a way to show that Japan's colonial administration was different from colonialism of the Western powers which put different races under their control in their remote colonies such as those in Africa and Southeast Asia. On the contrary, the Japanese authorities regarded Koreans as racially close to the Japanese. This provided a base for the Japanization policy towards Koreans that attempted to "assimilate" and "convert" them into the "loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire" throughout the colonial era.³²

However, the Japanization policy had an ambivalent character since it left some room for distinguishing Koreans from the Japanese. For instance, Koreans were given Japanese nationality when Japan colonized Korea, nevertheless, different family registration decrees were applied to the two ethnic groups so that Koreans remained legally differentiated from the Japanese.³³ Conscription ordinances were applied to Koreans several years later than to the Japanese because the Japanese authorities were cautious about providing Koreans with weapons as they were concerned that armed Koreans might become a threat to colonial rule.³⁴ This reveals that for the Japanese authorities, Koreans were still "Others" who were "peripheral" and "inferior," and in some cases could even become a threat to the colonial administration.

31 Kim Gwang Yol, "1940-nendai Zenhan ni Okeru Nihon Keisatsu no Zainichi Chōsenjin Tōsei Taisei" [The Control System by Japanese Police over Zainichi Koreans in the First Half of the 1940s], in *Teikoku Nihon no Saihen to Futatsu no "Zainichi"* [The Reorganization of the Japanese Empire and Two "Zainichi"], eds. Kim Gwang Yol et al. (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2010), 59-67; Mizuno and Mun, *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 59-63.

32 Shinobu Oe, "Higashi Ajia Shinkyū Teikoku no Kōtai" [Change from an Old to a New Empire in East Asia], in *Kindai Nihon to Shokuminchi 1* [Modern Japan and Colonies 1], eds. Shinobu Oe et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 24-27.

33 Eiji Oguma, "*Nihonjin*" no Kyōkai: *Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen, Shokuminchi Shihai Kara Fukki Undō Made* [The Boundaries of the Japanese] (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1998), 154-161.

34 Eiji Oguma, *Tan'itsu Minzoku Shin'wa no Kigen: "Nihonjin" no Jigazō no Keifu* [A Genealogy of Japanese Self-Images] (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1995), 256.

The fact that Koreans were still regarded as “peripheral, inferior Others” in Japanese society was more obvious in social life. They lived in slums with very poor sanitation, were mostly engaged in low-wage, dangerous, and dirty occupations, such as mining and construction, were denied job opportunities by Japanese employers, marriage to Japanese people, and many other forms of social access.

The Japanization policy was, after all, a double standard with simultaneous acts of assimilation and discrimination against Koreans. As a result, Koreans could not be fully “Japanized” not only because Koreans themselves resisted, but also because institutionally the colonial rule left room for distinguishing Koreans from the Japanese as “peripheral, inferior Others,” and socially Koreans had to endure many forms of discrimination in daily life.

In such an environment, many first-generation *zainichi* Koreans who immigrated to the Japanese mainland as adults generally developed anger and hatred against the Japanese and maintained their pride in being Korean as a sign of resistance against the Japanese. Some of them did not hesitate to show that they were Koreans, by wearing Korean clothes in the public and even resisting verbal and physical discrimination.³⁵ Still, there were some first-generation *zainichi* Koreans who did not want to reveal that they were Korean, or even tried to adapt to the Japanese community, in order to protect themselves from marginalization and discrimination within a local community. Nevertheless, many first-generation Koreans remained proud of their Korean identities, and had a strong will, as well as courage, to resist discrimination against them by Japanese people. Such an attitude might have come from the fact that they were already adults when Korea was colonized or when they were compelled to immigrate to Japan, therefore, they had a clear understanding that their suffering was caused by Japan’s imperialism and colonialism.

The feelings of anger and hatred towards the Japanese that many first-generation Koreans developed were shared by 1.5-generation Koreans as they realized the unfair treatment that Koreans faced in Japan, whether through their own first-hand experiences or that of other Koreans around them such as their parents.³⁶ However, the experiences of 1.5-generation Koreans were not so simple. Having spent their childhood and adolescence in Japan, some of them developed identities and ethnic consciousnesses that differed from that of first-generation Koreans who immigrated to the Japanese mainland as adults, as will be examined in the following sections.

35 Kim Teseng, *Watashi no Ningen Chizu* [My Map as a Human] (Tokyo: Seikyusha, 1985), 78; Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 93.

36 Hyeon Soon-im, “Shokumin shihai no konjō mada nukete imasen” [They haven’t overcome their colonial ill-nature], in *Zainichi Issei no Kioku* [Memories of First-generation Zainichi Koreans], eds. Eiji Oguma and Kang Sang-jung (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2008), 393-395; Jang Doo-sik, *Aru Zainichi Chōsenjin no Kiroku* [A Record of a Zainichi Korean] (Tokyo: Dohsei Publishing, 1976), 32; Jung Hwan-gi, *Zainichi wo Ikiru* [To Live a Zainichi’s Life] (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 1990), 32-33.

1.5-generation Koreans: Humiliated for Their Ethnicity

Personal experiences of 1.5-generation Koreans had other consequences besides the development and strengthening of anger and hatred towards the Japanese. One case is the development of feelings of humiliation for their ethnicity.

Kwon Sun-geum, who was born in Andong-gun, Gyeongsang-bukdo, in 1926 and immigrated to Japan at the age of three, recalls she did not want other children to know that she was Korean. On a rainy day, for example, when her mother came to school to pick her up with her umbrella and in Korean clothing, she could not go to her mother out of fear that fellow students might know that her family was Korean and tease her.³⁷

Historian Kang Duk-sang who was born in Hamyang-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1932 and immigrated to Japan at the age of two in 1934 remembers a similar story. He recalls that he did not want his mother to come to events at his school since it was obvious that his mother was Korean.³⁸ On another occasion, when he saw that a Korean female student was being teased by Japanese students for being Korean, he recalls that he could not stop their behavior. Although he was physically stronger than those Japanese students, he would simply feel humiliated by the simple word “You, Korean!”³⁹

Another example is the novelist Kim Tal-su, who was born in Changwon-gun (the present Changwon City) of Gyeongsang-namdo in 1920 and immigrated to Japan at the age of ten in 1930 to join his mother, eldest brother, and younger sister who had moved to Japan five years earlier. His father had passed away in Japan in 1928. He recalls that when his mother threw stones back at Japanese boys who teased them on a street, he rather felt embarrassed about his mother:

*In such a situation, I could not help feeling both embarrassed and miserable at the same time. I felt such embarrassment and misery, not so much for the fact that the kids teased us and threw stones at us, but rather that my mother threw stones back at them.*⁴⁰

These cases show that some 1.5-generation Koreans came to hide their ethnic origin out of a feeling of “shame” for their ethnicity. This tendency is unique to

37 Kwon Sun-geum, “Hibaku wo norikoe fujinkai katsudō ni kōken” [Having gone through the atomic-bombing, I worked for a women’s association], in *Zainichi Issei no Kioku* [Memories of First-generation Zainichi Koreans], eds. Eiji Oguma and Kang Sang-jung (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2008), 335-336.

38 Kang Duk-sang, “Watashi to rekishigaku no deai” [The encounter between me and history], in *Zainichi Issei no Kioku* [Memories of First-generation Zainichi Koreans], eds. Eiji Oguma and Kang Sang-jung (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2008), 647.

39 Kang, “Watashi to rekishigaku no deai,” 647-648.

40 Kim Tal-su, *Waga Ariran no Uta* [My Arirang Song] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 1977), 47.

1.5-generation Koreans and cannot be found among first-generation Koreans.

There were some first-generation Koreans who did not make it obvious that they were Koreans since they thought it was “wise” to not overtly show their ethnicity while living as minorities in Japan. When they immigrated to Japan, these first-generation Koreans had already developed their ethnic identities and understood the fact that they were minorities. Therefore, it is likely that they expected to be targets of discrimination in Japanese society.

In contrast, 1.5-generation Koreans’ attitude of hiding their ethnicity emerged from a feeling of “shame” of being Korean, rather than as a reluctant but strategic means to live in Japanese society as in the case of first-generation Koreans. It should be added that, unlike first-generation Koreans, 1.5-generation Koreans were not immediately aware that they were different from other Japanese children. In fact, historian Park Jong-myeong, who was born in Gwangju, Jeolla-namdo, in 1928 and immigrated to Japan at the age of five, said that “I gradually came to understand that I was teased and bullied because of being Korean. But I didn’t know why [being Korean was the reason for bullying]....”⁴¹ When these 1.5-generation Koreans later came to understand that they were “Others” in Japan whom Japanese people regarded as “inferior,” 1.5-generation Koreans internalized this perspective, seeing themselves as “shameful Others.” Therefore, they necessarily came to terms with the unfair treatment against them.

As Hall has argued, under the colonial situation and through colonial experience, the colonized people internalize the negative image held by the colonizers and come to see themselves as “inferior Others.”⁴² Albert Memmi further argues that the negative image of “inferior Others” held by the colonizers are accepted and put in practice by the colonized people, and as a result the colonized contribute to consolidate such an image.⁴³

Scholars’ arguments may help explain the 1.5-generation Koreans examined in this section. They reflected the idea of “inferior Koreans” that was prevalent in Japanese society. It does not mean, of course, that they believed in their “inferiority” themselves. Nevertheless, by living in Japanese society, receiving education at school in Japan, and being surrounded by or interacting with Japanese people, 1.5-generation Koreans reluctantly accepted and internalized the perspective of those in power; they began to see Koreans as “peripheral, inferior Others” which they put in practice through trying to hide their ethnicity, instead of developing anger or hatred against the Japanese. Some 1.5-generation Koreans put in practice their “inferiority” in a different way: adaptation to Japanese society. This is the case that will be examined in the next section.

41 Park Jong-myeong, “Genjitsu wo ikiru tameno jissenteki na rekishigaku wo” [Practical history for living in the reality], in *Zainichi Issei no Kioku* [Memories of First-generation Zainichi Koreans], eds. Eiji Oguma and Kang Sang-jung (Tokyo: Shueisha 2008), 432.

42 Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” 225.

43 Albert Memmi, *Jinshu Sabetsu* [Le Racisme], trans. Masami Kikuchi and Shigeo Shirai (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 1982=1996), 195-196.

1.5-generation Koreans: Adapted to Japanese Society

Some 1.5-generation Koreans adapted to Japanese society without necessarily developing anger, hatred or a sense of resistance against the Japanese. One example is the case of Jang Tae-hee, who was born in Changnyeong-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1912 and immigrated to Japan on his own at the age of 11 in 1924.

Jang spent his first five years in Japan at a confectionery, where he lived with the Japanese owner and his wife who treated him as if he was their real son. He established a good relationship with this family and in fact he visited them six years after he left them in 1929 to join his father in Hiroshima.⁴⁴ This may show that his good personal relationship with Japanese people lessened his negative feelings towards the Japanese:

While I lived and worked hard, I learned that not all Japanese people were bad. The Murakami family [that owned the confectionery] saved me from a human trafficker and raised me as if I was their real son. Later, I worked for Kyōwakai which was a nation-wide organization that subjected Koreans in Japan under the control [of the Special Police] and mobilized Koreans [for Japan's war effort]. However, there were nice people among the Special Police.⁴⁵

It is noteworthy that Jang mentions *Kyōwakai* here. In the post-liberation era, those Koreans who had worked for *Kyōwakai* were regarded as “pro-Japanese” and many of them did not want to reveal their past involvement with the organization, even though most were reluctantly involved in the organization to survive under the colonial rule. In this respect, it was highly unusual that Jang does not hesitate to reveal his past affiliation with *Kyōwakai* and even says that there were nice Japanese people in the Special Police that supervised *Kyōwakai*. Whether his past deeds and perspectives may be interpreted as pro-Japanese or not, it is at least certain that he established good relations with some Japanese individuals and as a result, he held rather positive impressions about those individuals, if not about the Japanese as a whole.

Another case of a 1.5-generation Korean who adapted to Japanese society is that of novelist Kim Tal-su, who was quoted earlier. When he immigrated to Japan at the age of ten, he couldn't speak or understand Japanese. His family was so poor that they could not afford proper education for the children. Therefore, he started working to help his family as soon as he arrived to Japan, and discontinuously funded himself to attend schools for three years at different primary schools, a half

44 Jang Tae-hee, “Okizari ni sareta kankokujin gembaku giseisha ireihi” [The Cenotaph for Korean Atomic-bomb Victims left abandoned], in *Ikiru: Hibakusha no Jibun-shi* [To Live: Autobiographies of Atomic-bomb Victims], ed. Hibakusha no Jibun-shi Henshū linkai (Hiroshima: Hibakusha no Jibun-shi Henshū linkai, 1995), 18-19.

45 *Ibid.*, 39-40.

year at a junior high school in evening course, and three years at a college.

Despite unsatisfactory schooling, Kim familiarized himself with Japanese literature from a young age as he read novels that he found in the trash or bought from ragpickers for cheap prices. He then began to dream of studying literature and even becoming a novelist himself.⁴⁶ He recalls that he was particularly moved by works by Japanese novelist Naoya Shiga who wrote many “I” novels, that is, novels based on the author’s own life:

I encountered typical Japanese “I” novels for the first time [through Shiga’s works]. “If Shiga writes such novels,” I thought, “I will write novels about us, Koreans.” But what I had in my mind was only “within the framework of zainichi Koreans.”⁴⁷

In this quotation, it can be pointed out that Kim was motivated to write “I” novels as a Korean which may demonstrate his ethnic consciousness. However, at the same time, it can be said that his sense of being Korean is not particularly strong and it was rather narrowly defined as it was only “within the framework of *zainichi* Koreans.” In fact, he said that he was not familiar with Korean literature at that time:

I had only discussed world literature and Japanese literature, but what about Korean literature which is supposed to have significance for me, a Korean? Strangely enough, having spent ten years since I came to Japan as a small child who knew nothing at the time, I have become “half-Japanese.” The language I speak, novels that I read...all are in Japanese. In other words, almost everything I see and hear is in Japanese, and there is nothing I could do about it.⁴⁸

Kim did experience discrimination from Japanese people during his childhood and adolescence, whether being teased by children or rejected for employment because of being Korean. Nevertheless, having become a “half-Japanese,” his feeling towards the Japanese was not only of anger and hatred, at least at this point. A young literature enthusiast, he even lamented Korean people’s unfamiliarity with literature which, to him, was one factor that led Korean people to lead miserable lives and with low status in Japan.⁴⁹

The development of a sense of “half-Japanese” and lament for Korean compatriots is not exclusive to Kim. For example, Jang Doo-sik, who was born in Haman-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1916 and immigrated to Japan in 1923, also argues that through reading Japanese literature, he “came to have sensibilities of Japanese people on purpose, and perceive myself as a terribly unfortunate person

46 Kim, *Waga Ariran no Uta*, 169.

47 Ibid., 169-170.

48 Ibid., 188.

49 Ibid., 155, 169.

since I was born Korean.”⁵⁰

Kim Moon-seon, who was born in Chungcheong-bukdo in 1925 and immigrated to Japan at the age of three in 1928, recalls that he felt he was different from other Koreans. After Japan went into the Second World War in 1941, he began construction work with Koreans under a Korean boss. However, the environment of being surrounded only by “pure Koreans” was nothing but uncomfortable for him:

*I was more and more Japanized while I lived in different Japanese communities one after another, hiding the fact that I was Korean. [I was] half-Japanese that pure Koreans' community scorned at that time. ... This place [new working place] was under total control of a pure Korean community. It felt like another world. ...Because [I] say something and do something based on my Japanese sense, those pure Koreans scorned me, and I couldn't get along with them and often alienated.*⁵¹

The examples examined above demonstrate that the 1.5-generation Koreans who spent their childhood and adolescence in colonial Japan did not necessarily develop a strong sense of self as Koreans nor a sense of resistance against the Japanese. They could have been aware of prejudice and discrimination against them and had bitter feelings, however, the discrimination against Koreans in Japan had been so deeply institutionalized and prevalent in society that they, despite their discontent, internalized this unfair social environment. Moreover, since they were always exposed to the thoughts and sensibilities of the Japanese people whom they interact with on a daily basis, they themselves imitated and practiced the way of thinking of the Japanese people, consequently contributing to consolidate the negative image against Koreans held by the Japanese.

It can further be argued that their internalization and practice of the Japanese way of thinking might have come from their complexes about their Korean ethnicity. As discussed earlier, Albert Memmi argues that as a possible solution to the status as “inferior” colonial subjects, they attempt to become “equal” to the colonizers and, at the same time, develop “a complex of feelings ranging from shame to self-hate.”⁵² In a similar manner, it is possible that some 1.5-generation Koreans tried to become closer to the Japanese colonizers out of desperation to detach themselves from the “inferior” status and negative image of Koreans held by the Japanese and also internalized by themselves, some even developing into self-hate.

Based on this, it can be argued that some 1.5-generation Koreans developed complicated, or even contradictory, feelings towards their Korean ethnicity as well as first-generation compatriots. This is expressed by some 1.5-generation Koreans

50 Jang, *Aru Zainichi Chōsenjin no Kiroku*, 49.

51 Kim Moon-seon, *Hōrōden: Shōwashi no Naka no Zainichi* [A Story of a Wanderer: A Zainichi Korean in the History of the Showa Era] (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 1991), 106.

52 Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, 119-121.

such as Kim Teseng who was born in Jeju-do (Jeju Island) in 1925 and immigrated to Japan at the age of five in 1930. He recalls the thoughts and feelings that he held towards Korean adults when he was fourteen seeing them as “ignorant, filthy, lazy, untrustable, barbarous, cunning, and indecent.”⁵³ At the same time, however, he also confesses his thoughts and feelings were rather complicated:

*[W]ere they no more than such people? Was it really true? ...[S]uch an image [about them] was something that was imposed on me by those [Japanese] people who treated [Korean] people as vicious creatures and at the same time rejected [them] and denied them any opportunity to get out of their adversity. It was obviously prejudice. And it was because of this very prejudice that [Korean] people were persistent in their [Korean way of] life despite of suffering through despisal and humiliation [by the Japanese]. But I could not understand it [their lives] since I myself was polluted by such prejudice without myself realizing it.*⁵⁴

Here Kim expresses his confused, conflicting thoughts: he follows the Japanese by holding a negative image towards Koreans, but at the same time, he is critical against the discriminative attitude of the same Japanese people. This contradictory thought and attitude manifested itself among Koreans yet in a different way after Japan went to war in the 1930s and Koreans were mobilized. Some 1.5-generation Koreans were “willing” to work for Japan’s war effort. However, their “contribution” was not necessarily based solely on their “willingness,” but also based on the awareness of discrimination against them and out of desperation to overcome it.

1.5-generation Koreans: Aspired to Work for the Japanese Empire

The cases discussed in the previous section examined the 1.5-generation Koreans who adapted to Japanese society. The cases that will be discussed in the following go beyond it. They are 1.5-generation Koreans who even became “loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire.”

The news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 gave Kim Moon-seon, who was quoted in the previous section, a “sense of indescribable tension,” a feeling that he felt because, he thinks, he had become a “Japanese.”⁵⁵ When Japan lost the war four years later in August 1945, he said: “as a military boy tried hard to hold back my tears” as he saw his Japanese boss at a coal mine was weeping.⁵⁶

53 Kim, *Watashi no Ningen Chizu*, 79.

54 Ibid.

55 Kim, *Hōrōden: Shōwashi no Naka no Zainichi*, 105.

56 Ibid., 137.

Jang Tae-hee, who was also quoted in the previous section, is another example. Jang says after Japan went to war, he worked hard for the sake of Japan's war effort:

I did this job [of making military swords] earnestly every day. Believing [that this was] for the Japanese military and for Japan to win the war, I worked hard without any personal interest and gain.⁵⁷

Jang also worked as a member of *Kyōwakai* and sold war bonds to and collected donations from compatriot Koreans for war effort.⁵⁸ He even says that he “behaved as if [he was] a Japanese, more so than Japanese people, and even cooperated for Japan's war effort.”⁵⁹

Kim and Jang's ambivalent identities of being Korean and being a “loyal subject of the Japanese Empire” may seem contradictory. However, it is not necessarily so, as Yoon Geon-cha discusses:

Young generations who had the Emperor-centred sense of value drilled into them came to live a different psychological world from their parents whose lives were filled with “everything Korean.” These Korean children who had grown up as “loyal young boys and girls” always kept it in mind to “become Japanese more than Japanese people,” and as a reaction to the denial of their identities as Koreans, they even came to have a mentality that they were willing to die for the Emperor.⁶⁰

It can be argued that their “willingness” to contribute to Japan's war effort among some Koreans was a result of the Japanization policy during the colonial period. Their “willingness” was also a means to overcome discrimination against Koreans in Japanese society. For instance, historian Kang Duk-sang says he was an “enthusiastic military boy,”⁶¹ and entered Tama Junior High School in Tokyo which was, according to Kang, a quasi-military academy since the school was for students who wanted to enter a formal training academy for military cadres such as army and naval officers.⁶² He recalls that his aspiration to be an “enthusiastic military boy” emerged because he was “desperate to get out of poverty and discrimination.”⁶³

Regarding this psychological state, Kim Gi-bong, who served the Japanese Imperial Army, discusses that even though serving the Japanese Empire was only to “play right into the hands of [the authorities of] the Japanese Empire,” Koreans

57 Jang, “Okizari ni sareta kankokujin gembaku giseisha ireihi,” 21-22.

58 Ibid., 20-21.

59 Ibid., 28.

60 Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 126.

61 Kang, “Watashi to rekishigaku no deai,” 648.

62 Ibid., 648.

63 Ibid.

still needed to prove that “we Koreans were in no way inferior to the Japanese.”⁶⁴ In other words, consciously or unconsciously, becoming an “enthusiastic military boy” and serving the Japanese Empire was, as Setsuko Miyata argues, a means for Koreans to prove that they were not “inferior” but equal to Japanese people, and consequently to dismiss all discrimination against them.⁶⁵ Or in the words of Ko Samyong, serving the Japanese Empire and also dying for the Japanese Emperor was “the final conclusion” and “the only exit” left for Koreans who “were born as non-Japanese ‘Japanese’” in order to get out of the “never-ending” “suffering” from discrimination against them.⁶⁶

Yoon Geon-cha further elaborates these arguments, discussing the fact that these Koreans wished to become loyal subjects of and serve the Japanese Empire to emerge from discrimination against them was a manifestation of their “ethnic complex.” He argues that their ethnic complex made them believe that the only way for them to live a satisfactory life is to “become Japanese more than the Japanese people.”⁶⁷ His argument may resemble the argument by Memmi on complexes of the colonized, as discussed in the previous section.

There were 1.5-generation Koreans who became “loyal subjects” and were “willing to serve the Japanese Empire.” As a result of the Japanization policy and particularly having received Japanization education during the colonial period, they made them believe that it was their “duty” to serve the country, particularly after Japan went to war with China and in the Second World War. This pattern is similar to the cases examined in the previous section where both of these groups of 1.5-generation Koreans, having spent their childhood and adolescence in the colonial Japan, were “made into Japanese.” At the same time, their willingness to serve Japan’s war effort also came out of their desire to overcome discrimination against them in Japanese society, since they expected that becoming “loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire” would be a means of proving they were not “inferior” to Japanese people.

1.5-generation Koreans in the Post-1945 Era

So far, some cases of unique identity and ethnic consciousness among 1.5-generation Koreans born in Korea who immigrated to the Japanese mainland at young ages, and consequently spent their childhood and adolescence in colonial Japan have been examined. Some 1.5-generation Koreans developed anger and hatred towards the Japanese as many older first-generation Koreans had. Nevertheless, as discussed in this paper, there were some cases that can be regarded as peculiar

64 Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 97.

65 Setsuko Miyata, *Chōsen Minshū to “Kōminka” Seisaku* [The Korean People and the “Japanization” Policy] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1985), 162-164.

66 Ko Samyong, *Ikiru Koto no Imi* [A Meaning of Living] (Tokyo: Chikumashobo, 1974), 242.

67 Yoon, *Zainichi wo Kangaeru*, 97.

to 1.5-generation Koreans.

The first case was that some 1.5-generation Koreans felt humiliated for their ethnic origins. The second case was that other 1.5-generation Koreans had come to regard themselves as “Japanese,” and adapted to Japanese society. The third case was another group of 1.5-generation Koreans who had come to believe they were “loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire.”

The commonality among the three cases is that these 1.5-generation Koreans had, during their childhoods and adolescences, critical periods for one’s personality development, had internalized the image of Koreans that had been constructed by the Japanese who were in power in Japanese society. This was closely related to the ambivalent policy towards Koreans of the Japanese Empire. Koreans were treated as subjects of the Japanese Empire. At the same time, Koreans were not always treated as equals as the Japanese, institutionally, socially, and psychologically. In turn, Koreans internalized this ambivalent perspective under the Japanese colonial measures which further led to the three types of development of identity and ethnic consciousness among 1.5-generation Koreans.

Then, what happened to them following Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945? Japan’s surrender, Korea’s liberation, and return to the Korean Peninsula—all these drastic changes had them experience (re-)development and confusion of their identity and ethnic consciousness.

An example of the former case is that of historian Park Kyong-sik. Park developed his identity as Korean through participating in the post-1945 activities of *zainichi* Koreans’ movement for unification of the Korean Peninsula and abolition of discrimination against Koreans who remained in Japan:

Up to 8.15 [the anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945], I had been subsumed by the racist discrimination and the education policy of Japanization of the Japanese Empire, therefore, I could not develop ethnic subjectivity [i.e. consciousness] and gain any experience through which I could be proud [of being Korean].⁶⁸

My life up to 8.15 was that of a slave, and ... I will never repeat such a humiliating life without an ethnic identity. [My life after 8.15 has been] a process of struggling to regain my identity as a Korean.⁶⁹

While Park gained and consolidated his Korean identity, there were some 1.5-generation Koreans who experienced identity confusion, some of them not being able to get out of such confusion. In the case of historian Kang Duk-sang, his ambivalent identity of being Korean and being a “military boy” of the Japanese Empire led to identity confusion after the empire dismantled and Korea was liberated

68 Park Kyong-sik, *Zainichi Chōsenjin: Watashi no Seishun* [Zainichi Koreans: My Youth] (Tokyo: San-Ichi Shobo Publishing, 1981), 5.

69 *Ibid.*, 239.

in 1945. He recalls his complicated feeling immediately after Japan's surrender:

[As I was told by the teacher about Japan's defeat] I cycled to my boarding house which was 20 kilometres away, being rather confused about what actually happened. When I got there, it was filled with people grieving. Everyone was raising their face to the sky, punching the floor out of chagrin, and crying out. It was then, for the first time, that I comprehended that Japan had lost the war. However, I didn't know why, I just couldn't join that crowd in great sorrow. I was only a bystander, stunned and staring at them crying.⁷⁰

He then headed home, and on his way, he stopped at the house of a compatriot where dozens of Koreans gathered from across the town and were having a celebration. There he saw people making a Korean national flag. For Kang, it was the first time in his life to see the Korean national flag. He recalls:

Not knowing it was the Korean national flag, I was just stunned and gazing at them waving the flag and yelling "Hurray, Great Korea!" and "Hurray, independence!" Earlier I was a bystander amid the grieving crowd [of the Japanese] in great sorrow for the 8.15 surrender, and now I couldn't join the [Korean] people with a joyous mood for liberation. I felt some discomfort with both groups of people.⁷¹

Similarly, Jung Hwan-gi who was born in Jinyang-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1924 and immigrated to Japan at the age of three in 1927, recalls that when his father said he wanted to return to Korea immediately after Japan's surrender, Jung and his elder brother felt a "great anxiety" because "since we came to Japan at a young age, we didn't know the homeland [Korea]. We were more fluent in Japanese than in our mother tongue [Korean]. Having received education at Japanese schools, in the Japanese language, and as Japanese, both my brother and I sometimes felt the homeland was like a foreign country."⁷²

Some others actually experienced difficulties after returning to Korea. Eom Boon-yeon who was born in Hapcheon-gun, Gyeongsang-namdo, in 1929 and immigrated to Japan with her family when she was one in 1930, returned to Korea following Japan's surrender and Korea's liberation. However, she recalls that Korean returnees from Japan like Eom had to endure prejudice and discrimination as they were regarded as "pro-Japanese" who had had "luxurious" lives in Japan and had

70 Kang, "Watashi to rekishigaku no deai," 650.

71 Ibid., 650-651.

72 Jung, *Zainichi wo Ikiru*, 73-74.

little knowledge of the Korean language and customs.⁷³ In terms of the language, for example, after returning to Korea she could not have an opportunity to receive a proper education and learn the language, and lacked confidence, particularly in writing, throughout her life.⁷⁴ As a result, many Korean returnees felt it was difficult to adapt to their new life in Korea, leading to some sort of identity confusion.

The ambivalent identity experienced by these 1.5-generation Koreans may sound perplexing. However, it may be understandable since, for those 1.5-generation Koreans who spent their childhood and adolescence in Japan, Korea was “not where [they] ‘return to,’ it [was] the place to ‘go’.” Unlike their parents, Korea was “an unknown place” for them, and their “experience and knowledge about Korea was too little for [them] to feel unconditional affection only because it was [their] homeland.”⁷⁵ In some cases, their memories of their time in Japan could be something to long for, even though they also experienced discrimination. The childhoods and adolescences they spent in Japan could still be “a precious time,” and Japan was “the root of [their] life” whereas they “can find nowhere in Korea that reminds [them] of [their] childhood.”⁷⁶

These 1.5-generation Koreans experienced (re-)development and confusion of their identity and ethnic consciousness following Japan’s surrender and Korea’s liberation. Whether (re-)development of their full and firm identity as Korean or an ambivalent, confusing identity, it can be pointed out that it again occurred under the influence of a power relation either vis-à-vis the Japanese in Japan where they remained, or vis-à-vis Koreans in the homeland to which they returned. In the new political and social environment of the post-1945 period, 1.5-generation Koreans developed a new sense of self, reflecting the new power relations. Koreans as “Others” in Japanese society who were now fully aware of their ethnicity and clearly distinguished from the Japanese, especially having been deprived of their previous Japanese nationality following the dismantlement of the Japanese Empire; or returnees in Korea who were not necessarily familiar with the life in Korea and were envied by their compatriots in Korea for their previous life in Japan.

Conclusion

This paper examined the development and changes of identity and ethnic consciousness among 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans that occurred within the colonial power relationship with the Japanese. The cases of 1.5-generation *zainichi*

73 Eom Boon-yeon, “Hiroshima kara nigete kita” [I escaped from Hiroshima], in *Hiroshima E: Kankoku no Hibakusha no Shuki* [To Hiroshima: Autobiographies by Korean A-bomb Victims], ed. Kankoku no Gembaku-higaisha wo Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai (Hiroshima: Kankoku no Gembaku-higaisha wo Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai, 2019), 131-132.

74 Ibid., 132.

75 Lee Sang-geum, *Hambun no Furusato: Watashi ga Nihon ni Ita Toki no Koto* [A Half Homeland: The Time I Spent in Japan] (Tokyo: Fukuinkan Shoten, 2007), 418.

76 Ibid., 9.

Koreans examined in this paper are particularly unique to them compared to those of first-generation Koreans. There were primarily three cases as follows: (i) Those who felt humiliated for their ethnic origin; (ii) those who had come to regard themselves as “Japanese” and adapted to Japanese society; and (iii) those who had come to believe they were “loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire.”

Moreover, 1.5-generation Koreans who spent their childhoods and adolescences in colonial Japan were directly influenced and affected to a significant degree by some of the most drastic changes of the geopolitical landscape of the region such as Japan’s colonial rule over Korea, and the collapse of the Japanese Empire. These changes were accompanied by shifting power relations surrounding them. Consequently, their identities and ethnic consciousness developed, changed, re-developed, and even went through periods of confusion following Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945.

With such peculiarity and dynamics, the cases of 1.5-generation *zainichi* Koreans examined in this paper may represent the diversity of identity and ethnic consciousness among Korean people. They also present an example of the dynamics, complexity, and diversity of one’s identity and ethnic consciousness that are formed in interplay with others within the power relations of society. As suggested by President Moon’s words quoted at the beginning of this paper, identity and ethnic consciousness can be a strong tool to unite people. However, it should be remembered that there is always some room for diversity and complexity which is sometimes overlooked. This understanding may lead to re-examination of the national/ethnic identity of Korean people, and to relativized multi-dimensional perspectives on the issues of the colonial past.