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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Since 2020, we have had to learn new pathways to deal with our daily lives. While some countries experience high rates of vaccinations and argue that the pandemic is coming to an end, other nations are still building resilient paths to deal with COVID-19. However, a thing that defines 2021 is adaptation. As human beings, we are constantly transforming to survive. In part, most of the essays and papers from this issue reflect how society and different community groups have changed both in the past and the future to face political, social, and development issues. At the same time, the remaining papers illustrate how we should adapt for future matters.

Before introducing the essays, papers, book reviews, and interviews, I wanted to mention something that I have learned through working on the Yonsei Journal of International Studies (YJIS). The pandemic also hit the academic sector. Now, more than ever, we need to understand and be empathic about the situation of those who submit and edit the articles published here. The YJIS appreciates all the efforts made by the authors of this issue.

The first paper of this issue is “Articulating Japanese Identities: Socialization Processes through Migration Experiences” by Ayako Suzuki. This paper is a clear example of adaptation since the author examines how Japanese people have built a collective identity while migrating to Dublin, Ireland. The research provides results into literature that analyzes how identity changes as people migrate from one place to another. The author interviewed 49 Japanese people living short and long term in Ireland to prove her argument.

Harmond Pedrosa Marte is the author of the paper “Development Aggression in Panay: A Study on the Impact of Dam Projects to the Tumandok Indigenous People in the Philippines.” This research illustrates how development projects challenge indigenous communities in the Philippines, precisely the Tumandok ethnic community living on the island of Panay. The author used key informant interviews and grounded theory to analyze the relationship between national development projects and development aggression, reflected in land dispossession and loss of traditional livelihoods.

The third paper by Matthew Heidenreich analyzes the experiences of ethnic Koreans placed in Japan after the annexation of Korea by Japan. “Living as *Zainichi* in the Twenty-First Century: Identity and Citizenship in Japan’s Ethnic Korean Community” contributes to the literature that presents the societal and economic challenges that ethnic Koreans experience in Japan. However, this paper tries to go further and analyzes these burdens in the twenty-first century.

According to the author, these disparities are existent still in this century.

Matthew F. Fleming also analyzes Japanese society in his essay “The Japanese Government and Immigration: A Duality of Policy in Media and Government Documents.” However, this paper’s argument exposes the dissonance between how Japanese media and the Japanese government portray immigration. On the one hand, media communicates that immigration is being assimilated and diversification has been accepted. On the other hand, Japanese immigration policy agrees with the movement of foreigners for economic purposes in the short term.

Our junior editor Megan Ann Pellouchoud wrote the paper called “An Analysis of White, Euro-American Female Sex Tourism in Thailand: Cross-Border Desire as an Outlet of Racial, Gender, Class, & Sexual Power.” The importance of this study lies in the understudy of female sex tourism by academia. Here, the author analyzes Euro-American white cis-gender females who go to Thailand for sex tourism. The main findings show that these female sex tourists interact with heterosexual Thai men based on race, gender, class, and sexual identity. The methodology was a textual analysis of news commentary and e-forums.

As our last paper, we have historical research made by editor-in-chief Grecia Dominique Paniagua Garcia. The paper, called “Anti-Chinese law and its consequences at the Mexican border,” illustrates the role of the Mexican government in Chinese migration after the United States implemented the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. The author displays that the Mexican government had an inconsistent policy in favor and later against Chinese migration by analyzing primary sources.

Then, we have “The US Should Join the CPTPP” as our first essay. Here, author Taehwa Hong argues that the United States can prevail as a great power and maintain alliances by engaging in international trade. The author presents the CPTPP as the instrument on how the US can achieve these two goals. At the same time, this essay also refers to China’s presence in the international community and how the new Biden administration could prevent China from transforming trade rules.

Hana You is the author of our second essay called “The Ethical and Legal Privacy in the World of Big Data and eHealth: Are the US and the EU Ready for the Big Change in Healthcare?” These days countries like the United States and regions like the European Union are not using traditional storages to save health data. Therefore, the dilemma between

ethical and legal privacy has raised concerns. The main questions of this essay are if the current legal frameworks protect health privacy and if these frameworks cover the adoption, facilitation, and use of data in healthcare.

Author Heidi Kasper analyzes the role of the United Nation's peacekeeping operation in Haiti and its relationship with the cholera pandemic in Haiti. In her paper "The United Nations and the Cholera Pandemic in Haiti," Heidi offers suggestions and preventive measures that the United Nations should take to avoid what happened in Haiti in 2010. At the same time, she describes how epidemics influence the role of the United Nations in the international community. For this essay, the author did a secondary analysis and database analysis.

"Rhetoric or Reality? An Assessment of Korea-Africa Relations So Far" is an essay by Hannah Evans which analyzes how Korea has found an economic opportunity in sub-Saharan Africa. African states are currently moving into the agricultural export market, and Korea could find a new space for Korean manufacturing as sub-Saharan African countries' livelihoods improve. The essay, in general, uses policy analysis to show the gaps between Korea and Africa. Additionally, the author gives recommendations on how Korea can strengthen its relationships and benefit from Africa's development.

For our book review, Aaron Molnar analyzes the book *The Steppe and the Sea: Pearls in the Mongol Empire* written by Thomas Allsen. In this review, readers can understand the impact of the cultural, political, and material history of the Mongol Empire through the pearl trade. At the same time, Molnar analyzes two other elements from Allsen's book: the importance of continental and maritime routes and the historiographic emphasis between continuity and exceptionalism in the Mongol empire.

Finally, this issue closes with two remarkable interviews with Saddek Chettab and Michel Setboun. These interviews give us insights into how is to report and photograph conflicts. Both interviewers have worked in different regions and countries such as Syria, El Salvador, Kenya, Somalia, Afghanistan, among others. Saddek Chettab, as a war reporter, illustrates how reporting conflict is unpredictable and dangerous if you are not disciplined in your field. Michel Setboun, a war photographer, also provides insights into emotionally coping when working in regions under conflict. These interviews are very original and provide first-hand insight into how the life of someone behind a camera is.

I am extremely grateful to a team of wonderful women and editors who dedicated their time and efforts to this issue's success. I am sure that without your selections, insights, and edits, completing this issue would have been impossible. Thank you to Megan Ann Pellouchoud, Julie Aase, Simone Liew, Amanda Herath, and Antonia Chettab for your excellent work and continuous support. To our readers, I am grateful for your interest in this journal. In the name of the whole editing team, we wish you good health and safety. Thank you, and enjoy this Spring/Summer issue.

Grecia Dominique Paniagua Garcia

Editor-in-Chief

MEET THE CONTRIBUTORS

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Ayako Suzuki completed her Ph.D. degree in social anthropology at SOAS, University of London. She is currently a part-time lecturer at Chuo University in Tokyo. She has published “Young Japanese men’s transnational mobility: a case study in Dublin,” *Asian Anthropology* (2015). Her fields of interest include lifestyle migration, youth migration, mobility, identity, gender, and nationalism.

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Harmond is a Ph.D. candidate at Hiroshima University. He also obtained a Master’s in International Cooperation degree in the same university. His current dissertation entitled ‘Spaces for Business and Peace: A Study on the Role of Private Sector in the Peace Agenda in Bangsamoro Philippines’ tackles the business and peace nexus in a conflict-affected community Bangsamoro. Harmond has previously worked as an intern at the UN Institute for Training and Research Hiroshima and has an extensive career in Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) research. Harmond earned a BA. History degree at the University of the Philippines, Diliman.

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Matthew Heidenreich is a graduate student at the University of British Columbia’s Department of Political Science. His research focuses on the role of nationalism and ethnic identity in policymaking with a focus on Japan. His previous works have dealt with the increasing influence of right-wing lobbying organizations on the Japanese government and the relationship between Shintō organizations and political nationalism. His works have been published in the University of Alberta’s Political Science Undergraduate Review and presented at the Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast 2019 Conference in Moraga, California. He is currently based in Vancouver, Canada. He is researching how modern ideas of Japanese nationhood inform defense policy within the context of an increasingly challenging security situation in Japan and its territorial waters.

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Matthew F. Fleming is currently a Master of Global Affairs and Policy student at Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies. Before moving to Seoul, Korea, he lived on the East Coast of the United States, studying Communication Studies and International Studies at the University of North Carolina Wilmington. While studying Japanese and Global Communication at Aichi Shukutoku University in Nagoya, Japan, Matthew found his research interests based in the Asia-Pacific. Matthew hopes to contribute to the repair of the world by focusing on issues of international human rights, cultural history, promotion of personal narratives, and the relationship of collectivism vs. individualism in contemporary issues.

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Megan Ann Pellouchoud is a graduate student finishing her final semester at the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. While Megan's research in this spring/summer issue explores a junction in the fields of migration and tourism studies, Megan's primary research interests extend to security and non-traditional security topics in Northeast Asia, human rights, and Asian studies. Megan enjoys making calculated moves in the stock market in leisure time, consuming gore and horror films, and watching street cats.

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Grecia Dominique Paniagua Garcia graduated from the Center of Research and Teaching in Economics in 2017, majoring in Political Science and International Relations. Currently, she is a graduate student at the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. She has experience in the private and public sectors doing data analysis, intelligence, research, and monitoring and evaluation. Her research varies between international security, sustainable development, human rights, and terrorism.

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Taehwa Hong is a Staff Sergeant in the Republic of Korea Air Force, on leave from Stanford University. He was formerly a research assistant at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and an intern at the East West Institute, Israel's Institute of National Security Studies, and the Korea Economic Institute. His previous work was featured in Asia Times, The Business Times, YaleGlobal Online, and Huffington Post.

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Heidi Kasper graduated from Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana, US, with a degree in Biology. Currently, she attends Yonsei University for a master's program in International Studies, focusing on international cooperation. Her background and experience are with science research. Heidi's research interest is in international organizations and their connection to the field of health science.

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Hannah Evans is a scholar of International Relations with a bachelor's degree from King's College London. She will begin a master's in International Security in September 2021. She has specialized in African

issues and currently works at Africa Insight in Seoul. Her essay was inspired by the work done at Africa Insight to improve Korean-African integration and relations and improve awareness of African issues in Korea.

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Aaron Molnar is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at the University of British Columbia. He specializes in the premodern history of Inner and Northeast Asia, with particular attention to the Mongol Empire in China, Korea, and Central Asia. His dissertation project looks at networks of urban steppe sites in their relationship to material and cultural exchange in the Mongol Empire. Therein, he looks closely at Koryo as an integrated realm in this circulations system in an attempt to include Korean history more fully in narratives of globalization. He has also written on Koryo-era Chinese language texts (*Paktongsa*; *Nogeoldae*) as sources for travel history. Thus, points of comparison with West Asian travelogues better understand the history of travel in Mongol Eurasia.

PAPERS

**Articulating Japanese Identities:
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Anti-Chinese law and its consequences at the Mexican border

Grecia Dominique Paniagua Garcia

Articulating Japanese Identities: Socialization Processes through Migration Experiences

Ayako Suzuki

Part-time lecturer at Chuo University

In post-war Japan, traveling abroad has become a common practice and has been undertaken by a wide range of people from varying demographic backgrounds. Although the purposes for which they travel overseas vary, those with the financial capacity move overseas to engage in a particular lifestyle in their chosen destinations. Over the course of their journeys, their migration experiences inevitably lead to a remaking of their identities. To disentangle the migration-identity nexus, this paper examines the construction of a Japanese collective identity amongst Japanese migrants who traveled to Dublin, Ireland. In their post-migration phase, their Irish experience contributed toward altering their perception of Asia. In a context where many forms of differences serve as signifiers of ethnicity, everyday encounters with Asian Others were inevitably instrumental in re-defining Japan's cultural and economic positionality in the Japanese migrants' minds. The question discussed in this paper is, given that Japanese ethnicity tended to be subsumed into an overarching framework of Asian Other, how Japanese ethnic distinctions were articulated and re-enacted in transnational spaces. Through an ethnographic exploration of their day-to-day interactions with Others, this paper will shed light on how they mobilized privilege to draw ethnic distinctions.

Introduction

When Nozomi announced that she was “still pissed off with the guy,” “the guy” in question was a young drunk man who had asked her to tell him about some homonyms for *nihao* (“hello” in Mandarin). “I don’t speak Chinese!” she told him, angry at his casual assumption. “I always challenge those asking me things like that [*nihao*], by asking back: ‘Are you a racist?’ This silences them,” she said. It was a joke, but one which hid a truth:

Those who have an interest in Asia know that I am from a well-off country, but there are some other people who assume that I have come to Ireland as an economic migrant... I can't understand why they [the local Irish] simplistically presume that Asian-looking people [in Dublin] are all Chinese, Thai, or Filipino – Is that all they think about?

During her three-and-a-half-year residence in Dublin, Nozomi had encountered “ethnicity confusion” several times among Irish citizens under the impression that Japan was just one more developing nation in Asia. Behind her polite smile, real anger could be seen, not only against that one drunken “guy” but toward the general perception of Asian people that she had found in the Irish capital. Her narrative sheds light on both the liminal status occupied by migrants and the refusal to accept the homogeneous East Asian identity that they are assigned.

Identity is a contested and central element of the multidimensional social reality of a world, in which the local constantly encounters the global, particularly in the context of transnational migration. Although there are as many definitions of identity as there are migrants, identity is conceptualized as bound up with notions of belonging, both in legal and emotional senses, within diaspora and migration studies. Multiple theories address the discursive conceptualization of identity in the social sciences. However, identity is most frequently seen as the *process* of identifying with group commonalities by recognizing Others and differentiating them from self.^{1 2 3}

For Stuart Hall, subjects construct their identity “on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation.”⁴ In so doing, they compare “similarity and difference” and “individuals and collectivities,”⁵ processes which both confirm a subject’s own uniqueness and generate a perception of belonging

1 Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

2 Stuart Hall, “Introduction: Who Needs ‘Identity’?” in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Stuart Hall, and Du Gay Paul (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 1996).

3 Takie Sugiyama Lebra, *The Japanese Self in Cultural Logic* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004).

4 Hall, “Introduction: Who Needs ‘Identity’?” 2.

5 Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), 3-4.

to a specific group. Hall argues that identity is neither fixed nor unified; rather, it is constantly being made. The multiple identities that we create for ourselves reflect the different episodes and periods of life through which we pass, and this continuous practice of identity construction is termed “becoming”. Identity, then, does not exist in the singular; it is in an unending process of reinvention according to changes in the perceptions and context of the self.⁶

Migrant identities can be understood as being formed by a continuous process of construction and reconstruction through interactions during the journey and at the migration destination. Self and others should not be seen as opposites but, rather, as two parts in the same constitutive process; recognition of self is dependent on recognizing Otherness. Identity constantly changes as people move through dense and interlinked social networks. The subject of this paper is the transformation of subjectivity engrained in this process of identity formation. The identity-mobility nexus is widely recognized as a key element of migration experiences, and this study will ethnographically explore the relationship between those experiences and the process of becoming. This study investigated the impact of encounters with Others on transnational migrants’ own fixed perceptions of Asia, to achieve a richer understanding of the multiple ways they delineate and perform identity. Ultimately, this paper will unpack ways in which respondents “became” Japanese.

Data were gathered through fieldwork conducted between 2010 and 2011 in Dublin, capital of the Republic of Ireland (hereafter, Ireland). Respondents were temporary (n=34) and long-term (n=15) Japanese migrants, of whom 38 were female and 11 were male, aged between 21 and 58 at the time of the survey. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. Most respondents were in their twenties and thirties (the older ones tended to have accompanied their Irish partners) and had migrated alone from Japan to pursue self-realization goals other than economic gain. The students and working holidaymakers in the sample mostly had no contact with Ireland, nor any definite image or perception of the country before traveling. Among the reasons cited for their choice of destination were that Irish visas were easy to obtain, and they wished to benefit from living in an English-speaking environment where there are few Japanese.

6 Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity,” in *Modernity and Its Futures*, ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with the Open University, 1992), 276-277, 287.

Their narrative of everyday encounters with, and experience of, living in a foreign culture illuminates the processes of identifying the Other and simultaneously discovering their own identities. Ethnic relations are, to varying degrees, an almost universal element in the socialization process of migrants, whether short- or long-term, and the Other. By exploring respondents' experience of racialization during contact with the Other, this study sheds light on the processes of the everyday socialization of Japanese migrants as "Japanese." Analysis of empirical data is presented in a later section; however, it is worth first exploring in some detail the context in which the particular racialization examined here took place.

The representation of Others in Ireland

In recent years, Ireland has undergone swift and dramatic change and is now home to 535,475 non-Irish nationals.⁷ Its unique social, political, and demographic makeup is primarily due to its historic association with the UK. The political and ethnoreligious divisions between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have been the subject of an enormous amount of academic study.⁸ However, the pluralism inherent in that historical situation is now being replaced by a "new" pluralist agenda, namely the arrival of migrants in Ireland.

A significant element in previous narratives of Irishness centered on the migratory history of the Irish diaspora, as the island was a net exporter of migrants for many generations. Today, however, the narrative is being reframed as the island became a target for migrants from the 1990s, leading to numerous social changes.⁹ Ireland gained the nickname "Celtic Tiger" due to the economic boom enjoyed between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, which was largely driven by the return of highly skilled Irish workers. The pull of the Celtic Tiger narrative was key to the arrival of today's migrant population, who originate from other EU countries, Africa, and South and East

7 Central Statistics Office, *Census 2016 Summary Results – Part 1*, Dublin: Government of Ireland, 2017, accessed March 1, 2021, <https://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/census2016summaryresultspart1/Census2016SummaryPart1.pdf>

8 John A Murphy, "Religion and Irish Identity," in *Irishness in a Changing Society*, ed. The Princess Grace Irish Library (UK: Colin Smythe Ltd, 1988).

9 Una Crowley, Mary Gilmartin, and Rob Kitchin, "Vote Yes for Common Sense Citizenship: Immigration and the Paradoxes at the Heart of Ireland's 'Céad Míle Fáilte'," *NIRSA: Working Paper Series*, no. 30 (2006).

Asia, and who are primarily motivated by the desire to seek employment.¹⁰ As Fanning observes, the Celtic Tiger era was the first time the Irish economy leveraged foreign labor as a means of growth.¹¹ Consequently, a country, from which huge numbers left in the past, now attracts migrants from over 190 countries.¹² Data from the 2011 census indicate migrants account for approximately 13 percent of a total population of 4,525,281¹³ – a massive increase from the one percent recorded in 1992, who were predominantly Jewish and Travelers. No other EU nation has undergone such a radical demographic transformation.¹⁴ Dublin has transformed into a global city characterized by multiculturalism, driven by the presence of many ethnic populations. As Mac Éinrí observes, a multi-ethnic state has come into being.¹⁵

However, local people have not uniformly welcomed the rapid demographic and ensuing social changes brought by the arrival of refugees, asylum seekers, and economic migrants, as well as a growing number of children born in Ireland to non-Irish parents. Despite its long history of net emigration, multiculturalism and immigration have also been found in Ireland in the past.¹⁶ Nonetheless, the speed and scale of recent changes have been perceived by many Irish as “a negative development,”¹⁷ and

10 Piaras Mac Éinrí, “Introduction,” in *The Irish Diaspora*, ed. Andrew Bielenberg (Essex: Pearson Education, 2000), 5.

11 Bryan Fanning, “Developmental Immigration in the Republic of Ireland and Taiwan,” *Taiwan in Comparative Perspective*, no.4 (2012): 162-169.

12 Chinedu Onyejelem, “Multiculturalism in Ireland,” *The Irish Review*, no. 33 (2005): 71.

13 “Population Usually Resident and Present in the State by Religion and Nationality,” Central Statistics Office Ireland, accessed July 7, 2014, <http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/census/documents/census2011profile7/Profile,7,Education,Ethnicity,and,Irish,Traveller,entire,doc.pdf>

14 Ronit Lentin, “At the heart of the Hibernian post-metropolis: Spatial narratives of ethnic minorities and diasporic communities in a changing city,” *City* 6, no. 2 (2002): 235.

15 Piaras Mac Éinrí, “Our Shelter and Ark? Immigrants and the Republic,” in *Nationalism And Multiculturalism: Irish Identity, Citizenship And The Peace Process*, ed. Andrew Finlay (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 1.

16 Lentin, “Spatial narratives,” 230.

17 Onyejelem, “Multiculturalism,” 71.

racism, both individual and collective, has been part of the backlash.¹⁸ An increased intolerance of non-Irish ethnicities is not only a sign of a city under dramatic transformation but the driver of defensive ethnocentrism amongst its inhabitants.¹⁹ The dissonance between ethnic groups has been theorized in many ways, for example, as deriving from a top-down governmental policy and lack of democratic consultation;²⁰ lack of grassroots cross-cultural contacts between local and migrant communities;²¹ and governmental refusal to acknowledge that racism exists alongside media misrepresentations of ethnic minority groups, particularly asylum seekers, which foster xenophobia.²² In these circumstances, the referendum in 2004 about abolishing the granting of citizenship to anyone born in Ireland was seen as a rational mechanism to restrict the legal rights of asylum seekers to work and control the size and nature of labor migration. As Fanning notes, migrants started to be referred to as “non-nationals” by media outlets and politicians during the referendum campaign, which also saw the national/non-national binary development.²³

The discourse of multiculturalism is a space in which the ideological visions of different ethnic groups compete. The cultural diversity and celebration of differences in the name of multiculturalism are, in fact, promoted by the problematization of foreignness among a previously homogenous group. When different ethnic populations live in close proximity to each other, as in Dublin, “a degree of disavowal” is inevitable.²⁴ This also leads to the creation of a White Irish ethnicity which is both dominant and homogeneous²⁵ and carries in its wake notions of “putative national

18 For example, asylum seekers are often viewed as “problematic” as their presence is perceived to adversely impact tourism, the economy, and local employment opportunities. Peillon recommends group protests of this type should be seen as responses to social, political, and economic relations rather than attempts to persecute marginalized groups. Michel Peillon, “Exclusionary protests in urban Ireland,” *City* 6, no. 2 (2002): 195, 202.

19 Mícheál Mac Gréil, *Prejudice in Ireland revisited. Survey and Research Unit*. (Maynooth: St Patrick’s College, 1996).

20 Lentin, “Spatial narratives,” 242.

21 Onyejlem, “Multiculturalism,” 71.

22 *Ibid.*, 74-75.

23 Fanning, “Developmental Immigration,” 168-169.

24 Lentin, “Spatial narratives,” 230.

25 *Ibid.*, 231.

cultures” and essentialized “singular culture(s).”²⁶ Under this understanding, narratives of exclusion become a fundamental element of multiculturalism.²⁷

However, the problematization of ethnicity is not homogenous in itself: Some groups are viewed as more problematic than others. Moreover, it is less the phenomenon of migration that draws objections but, rather, the issues raised by the migration and presence of certain ethnic minorities.²⁸ Census data from 2011 indicates that approximately 71 percent of the non-Irish population were EU nationals, compared to the 12 percent of Asian nationals.²⁹ Migrants of non-EU origin have expressed growing concern about rights to residence, employment, social welfare, and political participation in Ireland. Across all categories of migrants in Ireland, few have the option of long-term residence. State authorities became concerned that student visas, particularly for language courses, were being exploited by individuals seeking to remain and work in Ireland, with worrying consequences for the domestic labor market.

For this reason, student immigration regulations were reformed in 2009.³⁰ Under the New Immigration Regime for Full-Time Non-EEA Students introduced two years later, non-degree students enrolled in full-time study programs can stay in Ireland for no longer than three years. That period can only be extended if such students then enroll in degree courses and, after graduating, look for work in Ireland. It is now difficult for most Japanese migrants to obtain work visas or permits. Under the perceived need to control ethnic and religious diversity, these are predominantly reserved for migrants from white, Christian nations.³¹ In these circumstances, holders of temporary visas are less prioritized and are disembodied from other long-term migrants.

These developments and the consequent stratification of the migrant population have led to social and ethnic relations being viewed as

26 Gavan Titley, “Everything Moves? Beyond Culture and Multiculturalism in Irish Public Discourse,” *The Irish Review*, no. 31 (2004): 17.

27 *Ibid.*, 11.

28 Steve Garner, “Reflections on Race in Contemporary Ireland,” in *Race and Immigration in the New Ireland*, ed. Julieann Veronica Ulin, Heather Edwards, and Sean O’Brien (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 186.

29 “Population Usually Resident and Present,” CSO.

30 “Stamps - Main immigration,” Irish Naturalization and Immigration Service, accessed March 1, 2021, <http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/registration-stamps>

31 Crowley, et. al., “Vote Yes,” 16.

a black-white dichotomy; blackness is associated with asylum seekers, and migrants of African ethnicities principally represent Otherness.³² As a by-product of this development, a group of invisible Others has emerged of migrants who are neither White nor Black, such as the Asian populations who, for Irish citizens, constitute a new variety of Otherness. Historically, relations between Ireland and Asia have taken place within the larger context of British imperialism.³³ Therefore, “Asia,” for the Irish, generally denotes South Asia or China.³⁴ There has been a Chinese presence in Ireland for several decades due to the colonial connection between Hong Kong and the UK. Many ethnic-Chinese Hong Kong residents migrated to the UK from the 1950s onwards, passing through Ireland on their way.³⁵ The Asian population in Ireland is now primarily viewed from an economic perspective. King-O’Riain found positive representations of the Chinese in Irish media, which framed them as “the model minority” due to the perceived economic benefits they confer on the host society. They are perceived as “good short-term” workers who contribute economically to the host country, while posing no threat of permanent residence for legal reasons.³⁶ In this context, the predominant perception of the Japanese remains as faceless Others. This invisibility also derives from the relative newness of Japanese migration and the predominantly transient nature of the Japanese presence in Ireland.

The number of Japanese either traveling to or living in Ireland has doubled over the past ten years. Statistics from 2019 (the latest available) indicated 2,596 Japanese residents, approximately one-third (744) of whom had permanent residence while the remainder (1,852) were temporary

32 Nicola Yau, “Celtic Tiger, hidden dragon: Exploring identity among second generation Chinese in Ireland.” *Translocations* 2, no 1 (2007): 56–57.

33 Louise Harrington, “Simulating South Asia: literature, culture and belonging in Ireland.” *South Asian Diaspora* 6, no 1 (2014): 21.

34 This is reflected in the ‘ethnic group’ item in the national census which appeared in 2006, following a notable rise in inward migration to Ireland. ‘Asian or Asian Irish’ populations are subdivided into ‘Chinese’ and ‘any other Asian background’, which encompasses all those of South Asian background.

35 Yau, “Celtic Tiger,” 49.

36 Rebecca Chiyoko King-O’Riain, “Media Perspectives on Chinese Migrants in Ireland,” in *Globalization, Migration and Social Transformation: Ireland in Europe and the World*, ed. Bryan Fanning, and Ronaldo Munck (London: Ashgate, 2011), 206.

residents.³⁷ One-third of the latter group were businesspeople transferred to the Irish branch of a Japanese corporation, often accompanied by their families. The rest were mainly either undertaking working holidays or were in the country for educational purposes as students, teachers, or researchers.

Young people play a crucial role in the transient migratory streams of a globalized world. The Irish working holiday scheme, in particular, offers migratory opportunities to young Japanese, who typically study at English language schools for periods ranging from weeks to full academic years. The working holiday scheme was first set up in 1980, and the first nationals to benefit from it were Australians. It is now open to 26 other countries and regions, concentrated in Oceania, North and South America, and Europe, including three in Asia.³⁸ In 2007, to mark fifty years since diplomatic relations were initiated between Ireland and Japan, the scheme was opened to young Japanese. The visa allows single entry to Ireland and residence for up to twelve months and is open to Japanese aged 18–30.³⁹ It has become one of the easiest ways for this demographic to visit Ireland, as shown in the rapid rise in numbers taking up the opportunity: 165 in 2010 and 248 in 2013.⁴⁰ Its popularity partly derives from the fact that holders are entitled to work full-time for up to 39 hours per week, unlike student visa holders who must attend school and are subject to more restrictive conditions on working hours. The rise in numbers demonstrates that young Japanese are increasingly taking part in the transient global streams of working holidaymakers and language students.

For all these reasons, it is unlikely that Japanese migrants in Ireland will change their residence status from temporary to long-term, nor any clear economic motivation for their decision to travel to Ireland. The relatively short time Japanese people tend to spend in Ireland partly underlie the politics of differentiation which, in turn, foster the sense of

37 “2019 Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed March 1, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/toko/page22_003338.html

38 “About the working holiday system,” Japan Association for Working Holiday Makers, accessed March 1, 2021, <https://www.jawhm.or.jp/system.html>

39 In June 2015, the age limit for working-holiday visa holders was raised from 25 to 30. When my fieldwork was carried out, I encountered one case of a female informant successfully applying for this visa class when she was 33.

40 “2013 Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed May 26, 2014, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000017472.pdf>

belonging generated by the lived experiences of Japanese migrants. If migration mobility is understood as a means of socialization, this group also “became Japanese” through their migration experiences, as they were regarded as just one part of the overall Asian Other by the Irish. Thus, an investigation of their migration experiences sheds light on the processes through which Japanese migrants create, understand, and perform their identities during the migratory journey. The following sections present an analysis of the respondents’ narratives to show how the perception of a collective Japanese identity arose from their experiences of living in Ireland.

The Japanese as faceless Asian Others

After migrating to Ireland, the Japanese encounter “Others” who promote a distinct national and ethnic awareness; for example, respondents drew ethnic distinctions between themselves and other Asian populations, particularly mainland Chinese and South Koreans. Nozomi, the respondent quoted at the beginning of this paper, was not the only interviewee to express irritation at hearing repeated simplistic national/ethnic assumptions, however casual and non-threatening; long-term migrants told similar tales. Maki, the 35-year-old wife of an Irish citizen, was subjected to abuse related to East Asians on various occasions. In one of the city’s less salubrious areas, waiting to push her stroller across the road, she was shouted at by a male cyclist who told her to “go back to your own country with your baby.” She believed the man thought “her country” was China because she had heard phrases such as “go back to China” several times during her two-year residence in the city. She expressed the same resignation as other long-term migrants who experienced similar events in Dublin: that she would simply have to expect racism during the time she spent there.

Racism is part of today’s “real” Ireland. For Anderson, racism derives from national class ideologies and the nineteenth-century European systemized structural dominance of colonized peoples.⁴¹ Race-based hierarchies constructed in particular historical contexts are intertwined with ethnicization or racialization.⁴² More recently, individual racism, including

41 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso: London, 1991), 149-154.

42 Michael Weiner, *Race and migration in Imperial Japan, The Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge series* (Routledge, London; New York, 1994), 7.

assaults, which has emerged alongside institutional and collective racism,⁴³ has pervaded Irish society.⁴⁴ The increased xenophobia and racism seen in the country have been attributed to the social changes brought about by a migrant presence. As outlined earlier, the transformation from a homogenous to multi-ethnic state has been extremely rapid in Ireland, only really beginning in the 1990s.⁴⁵ One reaction to this dramatic shift has been reframing a dominant Irish culture through what Titley calls the “exogenous recognition” of other ethnic groups.⁴⁶ Hence, building a homogenous Irish identity entails the identification of minorities in order to create a dominant-subordinate social model.

Like Maki, most respondents had experienced at least one ethnic-based threat or act of discrimination during their time in Dublin. This East Asian discrimination spanned from threats of severe physical violence to the request to explain *nihao*, referenced by Nozomi, and can be seen as an inevitable consequence of a swift transformation from a homogenous to multi-ethnic society. In some cases, the insults based on perceived ethnicity and associated racism experienced by Japanese migrants were random expressions of hatred against all racial minorities. Most frequently, however, the nature of the slur or accusation revealed that the perpetrator believed that they were Chinese. 25-year-old Yusuke, married to an Irish woman, recounted similar experiences but with the added twist of perceptions of gender roles. On several occasions when he and his wife had been out, locals had targeted his wife and asked her why she was with a “Chinese man”. Yusuke said that although he did not care if he was perceived as Chinese, he realized that the perception of him was being used to insult his wife. The respondents’ experiences highlight the imposition of a homogeneous East Asian subjectivity. Simultaneously, it was only after the respondents migrated to Dublin that they became aware of their relationship with Japan and Asian neighbors.

According to 2009 census data, there were about 800 Japanese residents in Dublin at the time of the fieldwork. Public awareness of Japanese culture and people is minimal, deriving almost exclusively from

43 Onyejlem, “Multiculturalism,” 73.

44 Elisa Joy White, “Forging African diaspora places in Dublin’s retro-global spaces: Minority making in a new global city,” *City 6*, no. 2 (2002): 251–270.

45 Mac Éinrí, “Introduction.”

46 Titley, “Everything Moves?” 16.

the city's 13 Japanese restaurants and the Experience Japan Festival.⁴⁷ In contrast, multiple Chinese cultural signifiers exist in the public space, mainly driven by an established ethnic Chinese community. Research conducted by Wang and King-O'Riain on mainland Chinese students living in Ireland demonstrates strong social support networks. These networks help both residents and newly arriving migrants find accommodation, study opportunities, and work.⁴⁸ The authors discerned coordinated attempts to forge ties among ethnic Chinese in Ireland and the homeland, for example, by setting up a Chinese radio station in Ireland and print media available in Chinese supermarkets. Moreover, the huddle of restaurants and supermarkets on Capel Street and Parnell Street (Dublin's Chinatown) represents a physical marker of a Chinese ethnic presence, strengthening China's position as the chief representative of East Asia in Ireland.⁴⁹

As no comparable networking or support infrastructure exists for Japanese residents, some have sought to meet their social needs by setting up a free local magazine for Japanese residents, hairdressers, and professionals such as doctors. Chiho, the wife of an Irishman, stated that she would find it hard "to live here permanently without this social support." Having spent considerable time living in New Zealand and Australia in her twenties, Chiho found her first six months in Ireland difficult. She cited the almost complete absence of Japanese culture in Dublin as one of the primary reasons she was doubtful about remaining there in the long term. This sort of complaint is heard from many long-term migrants, alongside the difficulty of coping with everyday life; however, it is notable that very few have taken the initiative to construct solidarity support networks to address these difficulties. Expressing "Japaneseness" was perceived as doubly difficult due to the small number of Japanese in Dublin compared to Chinese and the fact that, unlike the latter,

47 'Experience Japan', launched 2011, takes place every year in early April in Dublin's Phoenix Park with the aim of introducing Japan to the locals through cultural events including music, story-telling, *kendo* (Japanese fencing) demonstration, dance, food, and workshops. It was founded by Motoko Fujita, the Japanese photographer residing in Chapelizod married to an Irishman, initially to promote Japanese solidarity by bringing together all associated societies and institutions in one place. It aims to attract both Japanese residents and local audiences and foster greater recognition of Japan.

48 Yin Yun Wang, and Rebecca Chiyoko King-O'Riain, *Chinese Students in Ireland* (Dublin: NCCRI, 2006).

49 *Ibid.*, 49-50.

Japanese residents had no shared social space wherein they could perform and affirm their culture. For Chiho, the lack of a specifically Japanese space within the Irish framing of Asia was the principal driver of her compatriots' facelessness.

I wish the Irish media featured more the recent news that Japan had loaned the IMF as much as one hundred billion Yen to help them out of their economic predicament! Despite Japan's financial support and my own contribution [her taxes], even local kids mocked me for being foreign on the assumption that I am living in this country for the purpose of making money. I wanted to say out loud that the Japanese government lent a large sum of money to your country because your parents don't work. I am still not comfortable being perceived as an economic migrant... But I feel sorry for those kids, because it's their parents who taught them to behave that way.⁵⁰

Chiho's statement indicates that the Japanese in Ireland feel their situation derives, at least in part, from lack of knowledge among Irish people of what Japan is capable of and, indeed, has done. Chiho felt that many locals believe that, given the magnetic pull of the Celtic Tiger economy of the 1990s and 2000s, all migrants have come for economic reasons. Although she was ostensibly talking about the fact that she did not feel accepted by the local people, her remarks indirectly express her belief in Japan's essential superiority to other Asian nations. The many accounts of social exclusion indicate that Japanese migrants are dealing with a fundamental misconception of their country's status. Rather than being acknowledged as a global political and economic player, Japan is relegated to just one more area within East Asia in the Irish consciousness. A longer history underlies the frustration this engenders in Japanese migrants. After World War II, Japan's economic success allowed it to reposition itself from a defeated nation to an equal partner to Western nations, easing the feeling of marginality that had weighed on the nation since as far back as the Meiji period (1868-1912).⁵¹

50 Chiho was referring to the news that the Japanese government was planning on buying about one hundred billion yen (equivalent to 930 million Euros) of the bonds issued by the European Financial Stability Facility Ireland as part of the bailout of the Irish banking sector. "Japan in pledge to buy eurozone bonds issued by EFSF," *BBC News*, January 11, 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-12159399>

51 Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentring globalization: popular culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 7.

Japan's pride in its remarkable post-war economic success and its status as the leading nation in East Asia laid solid foundations for developing a postmodern nationalism,^{52 53} which has deployed a burgeoning popular culture as a form of soft power.⁵⁴ The ideological discourse echoed by the respondents' narratives is framed by their country's economic and soft power, the consciousness of which overcomes all differences of gender, class, and place of origin to form the fundamental building block of Japanese collective identity. During their time abroad, respondents embraced this new identity by insisting on the higher international status enjoyed by their nation. Being "mistaken for Chinese," or the common perception that Japan, China, and Korea were largely interchangeable, disturbed the pride of Japanese migrants whose identity rested in knowing that Japan had more significant economic and soft power than the two other countries. Local people seemed unaware that they represented a state that, within Asia, regarded itself as hegemonic. The identity of Japanese migrants was fundamentally unsettled – and the migrants themselves felt marginalized by Irish assumptions of Asian sameness.

Striving for distinction

The dilemma outlined above was an essential driver in young Japanese migrants' decision not to associate with other "Asians" during their residence abroad. Almost all the temporary migrants interviewed said that most Japanese did not take up opportunities to interact with Chinese people and, in fact, tended to exclude them deliberately. Hiro, for example, explained that as a male working holidaymaker:

I now have a lot of Korean people in my social circle, whom I got to know through my Korean housemate. But as for the Chinese, I don't even want to talk to them. They have no second thoughts about assuming that whoever they think looks Asian is Chinese. Even when I tell them that I am Japanese, they don't care what I have said. They

52 Kosaku Yoshino, *Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan: A sociological enquiry* (London; New York: Routledge, 1992).

53 Harumi Befu, "Symbols of nationalism and Nihonjinron," in *Ideology and Practice in Modern Japan*, ed. Roger Goodman, and Kirsten Refsing (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

54 Carl Cassegård, *Youth Movements, Trauma and Alternative Space in Contemporary Japan* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 42.

just keep on talking to me in Chinese...They don't have English. They are (immigrant) workers, aren't they?... It's just my impression that mainland Chinese cannot speak any English. Even if they can, they do with a very strong accent...They gave me a sort of puzzled look as if saying "Why do you not speak Chinese?" This idea is very wrong, and I don't like it. So, I tend to avoid the Chinese as soon as I distinguish people as having Chinese nationality...What I don't like about them is their self-righteous bigotry. I felt anger inside and wanted to say "Listen to me, I am neither Chinese nor speak Chinese!"

For Hiro, "China" meant mainland China; hence, he differentiated between mainland Chinese and people from Taiwan and Hong Kong. However, although he stated that he had once had a Taiwanese girlfriend, he demonstrated little interest in interacting with anyone of Chinese origin. Hiro and his housemates (Japanese plus one Korean student) could only socialize with each other and other participants of Japan-Ireland meetup nights they frequented. His housemates were therefore crucial to his everyday wellbeing. Hiro's reluctance to engage socially with any ethnic Chinese people derived from a need to assert a cultural and economic superiority. Hence, he experienced his sense of superior economic status not only as part of his identity as a member of a nation which exerted considerable economic and cultural power but one which required him to be openly contemptuous of the Chinese.

Many other respondents displayed similar ethnically-driven anger and resentment at being mistaken for Chinese by Dubliners. This "misplaced" racial discrimination led some respondents, such as Nozomi and Chiho, to focus their anger on the implied interchangeability of all East Asians and reclaim their "correct" nationality/ethnicity in protest. Their reaction to these types of incidents was to problematize the word *nihao*, which they perceived as racism intended to relegate East Asians to a lower rung of the ethnic hierarchy than the Irish. As a reaction, they sought to differentiate themselves from other Asian populations.

To extract themselves from their predicament, Japanese migrants frequently reinforced their national status by refusing to associate socially with Chinese people. Indeed, most of the temporary migrants interviewed had little, if any, interest in interacting with the Chinese. The main reason was that the Chinese migrants were there to find work, while the Japanese were in Ireland for other reasons; hence, they did not have shared objectives. When asked to explain why they felt superior to the Chinese, respondents cited various stereotypes, describing Chinese people as uppity, loud,

impudent, boorish, and poorly dressed. However, these prejudices and vague antipathies appear to derive more from negative portrayals of the Chinese people in different types of media than from any personal experience.

In large part, the prejudice expressed was underlain by the difference in Chinese and Japanese economic success and perceptions of greater social orderliness, as demonstrated by Japan's more advanced technologies and better-quality public services. In reality, however, the social status of Chinese people in Ireland is quite similar to that of the interviewees. Data from 2008 indicates that 43 percent of the total Chinese population in Ireland were students, mainly in their twenties, and originating from urban regions, whose migration was part of a journey to achieve an education and boost their professional prospects.⁵⁵ Most had jobs in low-paid sectors to support themselves and pay for their education and were short-term residents like the Japanese interviewees. Despite these similarities, Japanese migrants leverage their country's status as a modern economic and cultural power to claim superiority over their Asian neighbors and, simultaneously, a closer alignment with the West.

After World War II, Japan's successful pursuit of modernization won it an acknowledged place among Western nations.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, there is considerable consensus in the literature that, driven by the economic growth in Asia since the 1990s, Japan has switched its focus back to its Asian neighbors, strengthening the so-called "Asianism" and creating an overarching Asian identity.^{57 58} This high-level shift in priorities did not seem to be reflected in the attitudes of young Japanese people in Ireland concerning China. A continued perception of China as representing Asian backwardness has led them to protest their designation by the Irish as faceless East Asians and insist on a distinct economically and culturally privileged Japanese identity. As external depictions of Japan interact with individual processes of subjectification, Japanese migrants are caught in a position of neither being

55 King-O'Riain, "Media perspectives," 207.

56 Iwabuchi, *Recentring globalization*, 7.

57 Takashi Machimura, "Living in a transnational community within a multi-ethnic city: making a localised 'Japan' in Los Angeles," in *Global Japan: The Experience of Japan's New Immigrant and Overseas Communities*, ed. Roger Goodman, Ceri Peach, Ayumi Takenaka, and Paul White (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

58 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation, Japan in the Modern World* (Armonk, N.Y.; London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).

aligned with a Western nor an Asian identity.⁵⁹ Occupying this problematic middle ground, respondents indicated that their privileged Japanese identity was partly built on belonging to a nation founded on a structural accumulation of economic and cultural capital to which they had access.

In contrast, in the view of Hiro and other respondents, the Chinese were perceived as unable to acquire such capital. Proficiency in English and the ability to perform certain Western behaviors were commonly viewed as benchmarks of internationalization. Hence, the decision of respondents not to associate with Chinese migrants is best interpreted as a determination to step back from the enduring Irish perception of homogenous Asian backwardness. Ironically, this insistence on differentiation leads Japanese migrants to characterize the Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese as a homogenous group of economic migrants rather than differentiating them by the considerable occupational and ethnic diversity they present. All are placed in the generalized category of “Chinese”⁶⁰ in the same way that the Irish appear to place Japanese in the generalized category of East Asians. This generalization only perpetuates the perception of Asians as an undifferentiated mass.

In relation to Koreans

In contrast to the hostility shown toward Chinese migrants and the attempts to differentiate themselves from Asian Others, the younger interviewees were happy to incorporate Koreans into their friendship groups. The two groups often came into contact at language schools, workplaces, and residences. Noriko, the 28-year-old wife of a Japanese expatriate, stated that she had met more Koreans and had more contact with Korean culture than she had the Irish and Irish culture during the ten months she had been living in Dublin:

It is said that the number of Japanese students studying abroad has been declining, but it appears that more and more Korean people go overseas. When seeing the upsurge of the Korean cultural and economic power, I can see why. Samsung has now become famous worldwide. I don't have any Chinese

59 Susanne Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 22.

60 Yau's study of second-generation Chinese also shows how they struggled to identify themselves against this type of homogenization, unlike the 'new' Chinese sojourners, mainly students from mainland China. Yau, "Celtic Tiger," 48–69.

acquaintances here, not to mention Chinese friends. But instead, I have got to know so many Korean people after coming to this country. Many of them are very friendly and pro-Japanese. I gave up on the Irish long ago [because of her inability to speak English].

Interacting with Koreans of a similar age to herself, Noriko forged friendships with classmates while excluding fluent or native English speakers from her social circle. Her words can be interpreted as referencing a shared Asian culture and sense of belonging, as she cites her Korean friends' knowledge of Japanese popular culture.

The shared experience of being strangers in a foreign land can forge a powerful bond between marginal peoples, leading to the formation of friendships. In the context addressed in this study, non-native speakers of English share the experience of insecurity due to their limited proficiency. Most young Japanese people therefore seek out other Japanese students or working holidaymakers of a similar age. Simultaneously, they complain that they have not managed to improve their language skills. Migrants such as Noriko, similarly, form a social life with other non-native speakers, including Koreans and people from other European nations. The friendships which form among these individuals are based on a shared experience of social exclusion, perceived marginalization, and the adventure of discovering Dublin.

The Japan-Ireland meetup nights and Saturday language exchange that most temporary migrants frequented were often attended by Korean and Hong Kongese migrants and served as fora where young Japanese migrants came into contact with fellow Asians. The phenomenon of achieving an "Asian experience" in a third context has been seen in other locations. For example, White's case study found an increased pan-Asian consciousness among young Japanese travelers in Hoi Chi Min.⁶¹ An image of shared cultural and regional heritage provided common reference points which fostered a sense of "Asianness." Fujita's study of young Japanese residents in New York and London shows how the London group of respondents felt decidedly superior to the Taiwanese and Koreans. In contrast, the New York group became very friendly with their Asian neighbors because all three countries had similar levels

61 Bruch White, "Re-Orient-ing the Occident: How Young Japanese Travellers are using the East-West Dichotomy to Dismantle Regional Nationalism," in *Dismantling the East-West Dichotomy: Essays in Honour of Jan van Bremen*, ed. Joy Hendry, and Heung Wah Wong (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 127-129.

of industrialization. Although Fujita has not described the discrepancy in their perception of the Taiwanese and Koreans, more critical is the fact that both the London and New York groups considered mainland Chinese to be “racial insiders” but simultaneously “cultural outsiders.” This distinction indicates the cultural gulf which divides the mainland Chinese from other Asian nationalities.⁶²

The respondents in this study exhibited similar patterns of socialization to those revealed by Fujita. Social relationships mainly emerged through contact at language or other schools, leading to the presence of Korean students at most social events frequented by Japanese students. Forging relationships with Koreans was facilitated by the perception that Korea, unlike China, has common cultural reference points with Japan and a similar capitalist system. Japanese-Korean encounters gave rise to a sense of solidarity as the Japanese students ‘discovered’ how much they had in common with Koreans. This realization fostered a sense that both national groups belonged to one particular “Asianness” based on a shared cultural heritage and strong cultural and economic capital – neither of which were attributed to “the Chinese.” Most of the temporary migrants among the respondents framed their perception of the Japanese as culturally and economically superior to other Asian groups in these class-based processes of othering.

Conclusion

Respondents’ experience of multiple interactions over time with both Dubliners and Asian Others was an essential element in framing a Japanese collective identity. In social spaces which did not have clear signifiers of national culture to guide locals, the Irish tended not to see ethnic diversity among the Asians in their midst. In this context, the Japanese became faceless Asian Others and had to position their ethnicity within a discursive narrative of “Asianness,” which many found unsettling. This situation gave rise to a new collective identity framed as an insistence that Japanese cultural and economic privilege should be acknowledged rather than subsumed into a general homogenous Asian identity. Reclaiming their status as Japanese ethnicity was an essential means for the Japanese migrants to re-empower themselves. Hence, they were driven to carve out a Japanese collective identity differentiated from both the West and the rest of Asia, which many viewed as backward. With a perception of ethnicity based on notions of class,

62 Yuiko Fujita, *Cultural migrants from Japan: youth, media, and migration in New York and London* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 79, 91-92.

many migrants continued to see other Asians as an undifferentiated mass.

As many of the respondents had traveled to Ireland to pursue cultural and social capital, their rationale for not mixing with people they saw as inferior was that it would neither help them achieve this objective nor acquire any other type of capital. Instead, they sought to encounter people of perceived similar or higher social and cultural status, namely Westerners and, sometimes, Koreans. They viewed themselves as obliged to uphold 'superior' moral and cultural values. This conditioning acted as a brake to cosmopolitanism and, especially, to their ability to see past stereotypes of Chinese people.

The ethnographic data also suggests that the degree of the respondents' flexibility appears to be based on how far they were exposed to Dublin's broader social landscape. There was a tendency among those who had come into contact with Chinese people in Ireland to experience a realization of common Asian ground and values. Unfortunately, this point has not been discussed here for lack of space. Although the respondents might be engaged in multiple modes of identity construction, the ethnographic data reveals that the encounters with Others in the destination were the points of reference against which they re-defined their sense of belonging to Japan. Whether short- or long-term residents in Dublin, their stay had not always resulted in a transnational identity but, rather, in a strengthened national and ethnic consciousness. As Japanese migrants were exposed to local social discourse, the gap between Japanese and Chinese remained the same, or in some cases, increased. The ethnic tensions between Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese that originate from colonial times, as well as more recent political tensions, played a part in changing where they belonged. Therefore, it can be said that the migrants interviewed for this study undertook a process of becoming within a transnational space.

Development Aggression in Panay: A Study on the Impact of Dam Projects to the Tumandok Indigenous People in the Philippines

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In 2017, the Philippines approved a total of 26 projects worth approximately USD 20 billion. While this translates positively to the public following promises of economic growth, job creation, and improved infrastructure, indigenous communities are threatened by these changes. This research looks at the Tumandok ethnic community located at Panay Island in the Philippines and how indigenous people (IP) interacted with the changes brought by the Jalaur River Multi-Purpose Dam (JRMP) and the Panay River Basin Development Project (PRBIDP). These two mega-dam projects are predicted to provide year-long irrigation, road improvement, among others. This research links the State-led projects within the ancestral domain of the Tumandok community to the global phenomenon of development aggression, where land dispossession and loss of traditional livelihoods occur in the name of development. Through key informant interviews and the tenets of grounded theory, this research uncovered issues connected to the militarization of ancestral land, questionable consent acquisition procedures, and loss of livelihood within Tumandok's ancestral domain. This backdrop sits in striking contrast to the expected behavior of the State that is a signatory of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and has enacted the Indigenous People Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. Finally, this research argues that the IP's resistance to development projects displays their stake in society and should be considered partners of development.

Introduction

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Philippines

has recorded 110 ethnolinguistic groups, representing approximately 10-15 percent of the national population.¹ These groups are homogenous communities identified through self-ascription or ascription of others based on a distinct set of cultures and languages. In addition, a distinctive feature among indigenous communities is its strong affiliation to traditionally owned land that they have held since time immemorial.² Natives, locals, or aboriginals are synonymous words to describe these traditional communities. However, the term 'Indigenous People' or IP provides a generic description of the original inhabitants, and subsequently, this term has been used in various international platforms. More importantly, IPs link their ownership of land, commonly called ancestral land, to cultural survival.³

These ancestral lands are rich in natural resources and have become religious dwelling places for indigenous communities. In Human Geography, concepts such as culture and lifestyle flourish with the interaction with one's land. In addition, this spatial relation has influenced human behavior and created a sense of identity to distinguish one group from the other.

This long-standing importance of land and the need to uphold indigenous communities' cultural dignity is supported internationally and nationally. A leading document is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP), where it articulates IPs' rights, including their rights to utilize resources within their traditionally owned land. The Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) further stressed the state's obligation to guarantee ownership of traditionally owned lands to the IP. In Asia, the ILO has also placed the Philippines, along with Nepal and Cambodia, as trailblazers for adopting a contemporary understanding of the concept of IP and recognizing the IP's

1 United Nations Development Programme, *Fast Facts: Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines*, report for the United Nations, June 24, 2013, http://www.ph.undp.org/content/philippines/en/home/library/democratic_governance/FastFacts-IPs.html accessed July 31, 2018.

2 *The Indigenous Peoples Right Act of 1997*, Congress of the Philippines, Tenth Congress (1997).

3 R.K. Tartlet, "The Cordillera People's Alliance: Mining and Indigenous Rights in the Luzon Highlands," *Cultural Survival*, March 2001, [https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/cordillera-peoples-alliance-mining-and-indigenous-rights#:~:text=The%20Cordillera%20People's%20Alliance%20\(CPA,of%20the%20anti%2Dmining%20movement](https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/cordillera-peoples-alliance-mining-and-indigenous-rights#:~:text=The%20Cordillera%20People's%20Alliance%20(CPA,of%20the%20anti%2Dmining%20movement).

attachment to their territory.⁴ In terms of national legislations, the Philippines enacted the Indigenous Peoples Right Act of 1997 (IPRA) that comprehensively recognizes IP rights and subsequently creates the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) with the mandate of promoting the well-being of IPs.⁵

With this level of recognition of IP rights, opportunities for IPs to develop themselves within and outside their ancestral land appeared optimistic. However, IPs around the world face ongoing threats in preserving their ancestral land and means of livelihood. One of the triggers that heighten IPs' vulnerability is economic development programs that damage ancestral land and exhaust natural resources.⁶ These ancestral lands are generally rich in natural resources that have attracted domestic and international economic activities. Industrialization and development projects within these lands create jobs and contribute heavily to increasing national revenue. This is perceived as progress by the general public. However, the other end of the spectrum believes otherwise as these development activities harm the IPs. Alleged dispossession of property and coercion is widely reported, such as land-grabbing cases from Afro-Colombian communities in Colombia⁷ and cultural assimilation issues of the Cree Nations in Canada.⁸

This research focuses on the Tumandok IP community residing mainly in the provinces of Panay, an island located in the central Philippines. Tumandok people that stay in the hinterlands are generally farmers of crops, including rice,

4 Stefania Errico, "The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Asia. Human Rights-based Overview of National Legal and Policy Frameworks against the Backdrop of Country Strategies for Development and Poverty Reduction," *International Labour Organization*, March 1, 2017, https://www.ilo.org/gender/Informationresources/Publications/WCMS_545484/lang--en/index.htm

5 "Vision, Mission, and Mandate," National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, accessed July 31, 2018, <http://www.ncip.1gov.ph/index.php/agency-profile/vision-mission-and-mandate>

6 Chandra Roy, Victoria Tauli-Corpus, and Amanda Romero-Medina, eds., *Beyond the Silencing of the Guns*, (Philippines: Tebtebba Foundation, 2004), VI.

7 Jérémie Gilbert, "Land Grabbing, Investments, & Indigenous People's Rights to Land and Natural Resources: Case Studies and Legal Analysis," report for the *International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs*, 2017, 30.

8 Selena Randhawa, "'Our Society Is Broken': What Can Stop Canada's First Nations Suicide Epidemic?" *The Guardian*, August 30, 2017, accessed July 31, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/aug/30/our-society-is-broken-what-can-stop-canadas-first-nations-suicide-epidemic>.

coffee, coconut, banana, and ginger. IPs also grow root crops and fruit trees, including jackfruit. These crops are generally for the personal consumption of each household since selling these crops has only yielded marginal profit. Male members are often expected to tend to their farm lots, but these roles are also open to female IP members. IPs that reside in lowland areas interact more with non-indigenous communities and are often motorcycle drivers or household helpers. The livelihood and the way of life of these communities are threatened with the construction of two mega-dam projects on the island.

This research looks at the Tumandok ethnic community located at Panay Island in the Philippines and how indigenous people (IP) interacted with the changes brought by the Jalaur River Multi-Purpose Dam (JRMP) and the Panay River Basin Development Project (PRBIDP). This research asks, “How does IPRA protect the rights of the Tumandok concerning these development projects?” and “How does the Tumandok community in Panay perceive development?” The research attempts to underscore the imbalanced relationship between the marginalized IP groups and the State. Despite the promised benefit in terms of irrigation, jobs creation, and sources of hydroelectric power, this research zooms in at the human cost and land dispossession issues, which translates to acts of development aggression. Development aggression is an individual or collective rights violation that often manifests in the exploitation of ancestral lands and expropriation of said territories for state-sponsored development projects.⁹ In addition, this research is carried out using the principles of grounded theory. According to sociologists Blumer, Dey, and Jeon, grounded theory posits that meaning is negotiated and understood through interactions with others through social processes. These processes have structures, implied or explicit codes of conduct that circumscribe how interactions unfold and shape the meaning that comes from them. With this in consideration, this work adopted a qualitative research approach to capture the interaction of IPs with the changes in their surroundings. Grounded theory further calls on the researcher to draw up themes that emerged during data processing to establish their claims of development aggression.

The research project sought the assistance of JRPM in acquiring consent among Tumandok members, identifying research participants, and assisting in any research-related needs, including translation. The interview

9 *Victims of Development Aggression. Indigenous Peoples in ASEAN*, report for the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact, 2011, <https://humanrightsinasean.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Victims-of-development-aggression.pdf>

was semi-structured in design to allow flexibility in exploring the lived experiences of the respondents as they navigate their experiences about these projects. Likewise, a historical review of the development of indigenous communities in the Philippines was used in analyzing how the Tumandok interacted with its changing environment. In-person interviews were conducted with a total of 15 respondents, where each interview time-averaged to 45 minutes. The language used during the interview was a mix of Hiligaynon, a local language, and Filipino, the country's national language. However, the more senior respondents, despite their knowledge of Hiligaynon, replied using Karay-a, a local dialect often used by IPs in the hinterlands. The researcher has a base understanding of Hiligaynon owing to his family background. However, to avoid misinterpretation, this research sought the assistance of a local IP member knowledgeable of both languages. The selection of respondents was based on seniority in the community, positions assumed in its local political structure, and availability during the interview period.

Given that most Tumandok members are farmers, ten out of fifteen participants are female, while the remaining are male IP members. Most male members tend to set out to their farming lots at around 4:00 and return at around 16:00, which gave the researcher limited time to interview the whole area covered in darkness from 17:30 due to the lack of electricity. Thus, only limited male members were able to participate in the research. Names of the respondents are written in initials to protect their identity and ensure their safety. Before the actual interview, administrative approval and meetings with the civil organization first took place from the 9th-14th of September 2017. Upon receiving approval from the National Commission for Indigenous People, the fieldwork commenced in Barangay Tapaz from the 15th-21st of September 2017. The subsequent fieldwork in Barangay Alibunan was conducted from the 9th-12th of October 2017.

The Projects and Tumandok

One of the mega-dam projects, the Jalaur River Multipurpose Project (JRMP), was authorized under Republic Act. No. 2651. In 2015, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) and members of Tumandok allegedly signed a Memorandum of Agreement pursuant of the construction of the project. Tumandok communities in 16 affected areas in the Province of Iloilo were reportedly consulted regarding the free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) standards. Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd was awarded as the contractor of this PHP 11.2 billion Philippine Peso (approximately 240

million US Dollars) project.¹⁰ According to reports, the project would source its water from the Jalaur River basin, which covers 176,500 hectares, supplying resources to over 3 million in 75 cities and municipalities, as of the 2010 census.¹¹ Among the potential benefits of JRMP include year-round irrigation to 22,340 hectares; generate 6.6 megawatts of hydroelectric power; create 86,400 cubic meters per day of potable water; mitigate flooding hazards. The project would entail the creation of two high dams across the Jalaur River and Ulian River.¹² In addition, the Tumandok community allegedly consented to a resettlement plan proposed by NIA. As of a 2016 study, a total of 697 Project Affected Families (PAFs) have been displaced as several houses and farm lots have been submerged due to the dam construction.¹³

The Panay River Basin Integrated Development Project (PRBIDP) is another proposed mega-dam slated for construction in the province of Capiz. This project would source water from the 152 km. Panay River and reportedly would provide irrigation to a total of eighteen municipalities. Among the structures to be built is a High Dam towering up to 112 meters high and 12 meters wide, which would provide water storage for irrigation, potable water, and energy generation.¹⁴ Apart from feasibility studies, reports suggest that government agencies seek an estimated cost of PHP 18 billion Philippine Peso (approximately 362 million US Dollars) from donors in China. Further, NIA is set to conduct an FPIC process to 19 IP areas affected by this project.¹⁵

In response, the members of the Tumandok community have partnered with the Jalaur River for the People (JRPM) and other civil rights organizations

10 EC Garcia, "Winning Contractor Readies for JRMP II Construction," *Province of Iloilo*, March 2018, accessed July 31, 2018, <http://iloilo.gov.ph/infrastructure/winning-contractor-readies-jrmp-ii-construction>.

11 *Integrated River Basin Management and Development Master Plan*, report for the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, November 2014, <http://rbco.denr.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/jalarexecutivesummary.pdf>.

12 "NIA – JALOUR RIVER MULTI-PURPOSE PROJECT STAGE OO," *Environmental and Social Monitoring Updates*, <http://jrmp.nia.gov.ph/>.

13 National Irrigation Administration Upland Land Acquisition Action Plan (Upland LARAP), Jalaur River Multi-purpose Project Stage II (JRMP-II), July 31, 2016, 2.

14 National Irrigation Administration, Panay River Basin Integrated Development Project, Environmental Impact Statement, 1-5.

15 Lydia Pendon, "NIA includes Tapaz IPs for Panay River Basin project," *SunStar Philippines*, February 5, 2016, accessed July 31, 2018, <https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/56591/>.

to express their dissent to these projects.¹⁶ Actions such as blockades, lawsuits, and submission of alternative proposals to funding agencies were carried out as means to resist the project. One of its notable actions was in 2018 when JRPM facilitated a meeting between an IP member and officers of two South Korean companies that have won the JRPM construction contract. These are the Export-Import Bank of Korea (funding entity and the Daewoo Engineering & Construction (construction entity) in South Korea.

Literature Review

The relationship between IPs and the state or IPs and private enterprises have been the research interests in anthropology and environment studies. In his work, *The Art of Not Being Governed*, James Scott discussed the indigenous way of life due to state and nation-building in Southeast Asia. Scott portrayed the condition of indigenous communities residing along the mountainous region he coined as “Zomia.” He presented an alternative view on history and historiography in Southeast Asia by linking together concepts of civilization, agriculture, topography, development, and ethnicity into one. Moreover, the book discussed a recurring theme of how the ruled, which refers to those that welcomed the socio-political dogma of a dominant group, continued to engage the unruly or indigenous communities through state-initiated projects.¹⁷ The author has described his work as an anarchist for highlighting the narrative of the subaltern and marginal IPs, particularly on how they escaped state-making efforts of dominant cultures in Southeast Asia.

As Scott discussed, traditional dominant cultures endeavored to fully incorporate hill/indigenous people through farming, creation of walled-in communities, political structure, and common language. These pursuits were packaged as development, economic progress, education, and social integration. Centers and lowland folks gain an advantage in the dialectic relationship by building a strong military force and concentrating workforce and food supply. Hill peoples are then tagged as barbaric and nomadic, which presents a threat to the military and economy of lowland communities. The diverse lifestyle of the hill people is the main challenge

16 “Jalaur River Multi-Purpose Project (JRMPP) Phase II Dam, Iloilo, Philippines,” Environmental Justice Atlas, accessed May 18, 2021, <https://ejatlas.org/print/jalaur-river-mega-dam-project-philippines>.

17 James Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 3

for integration. Personifying an “indigenoussness” trait was seen as a strategy and adaptation design to evade state capture and state formation. Scott’s work captures parallelism to this research as it depicts the long-standing struggle of IPs to submit or fight off state-building mechanisms.

The book *In the Way of Development* by Harvey Feit and Glenn McRae, published in 2004, discussed the relations between globalization agents, particularly involving corporations and indigenous peoples worldwide. Globalization has allegedly continued to threaten the ancient ways of life. Nonetheless, the work by Feit and McRae suggests it is possible to integrate the concern of indigenous communities into a state’s national development agenda. In addition, the book showed how IP communities do not simply resist or react to the pressures of market and state. IP communities create ‘life projects’ of their own, which embody the local history and incorporate visions and strategies for enhancing their social and economical ways of living.¹⁸ This literature underscores that the framing of the plight of IPs can create traction for policies to ensue. Further, this work has tackled lessons learned from IPs activism, which can be studied and applied to the context of the Tumandok.

The article by Alfonso Castro and Erik Nielsen entitled “Indigenous people and co-management: implications for conflict management” focused on the interplay of local community members, indigenous people, private enterprises, and state agencies, particularly on spaces created by these groups to increase collaboration and responsibility-sharing.¹⁹ Locating and establishing this space, coined as ‘co-management,’ is not exclusive to the government and may even transfer from among non-state actors themselves. Non-state actors here refer to IPs, local small-scale businesses, and civil society organizations. Authors cited some examples in Canada, South Asia, and Norway where conflict served as a prerequisite for co-management regime creation.

The concept of co-management regimes, such as the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement in Canada and the Joint Forest Management in India, tackled the power relations between IP communities

18 Mario Blaser, Harvey Feit, and Glenn McRae, eds., *In the Way of Development: Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects and Globalization* (Zed, IDRC, 2004), 45.

19 Alfonso Peter Castro and Erik Nielsen, “Indigenous People and Co-management: Implications for Conflict Management,” *Environmental Science & Policy* 4, no. 4 (August 2001): 230.

and state agents.²⁰ Examples in this literature presented how the state transitioned to sharing its resource responsibility with other stakeholders despite perceived conflicting (but ideally complementing) interests. Co-management is described as the joint decision-making of about one or more aspects of natural resources executed in though participatory, collaborative, and multi-party manner. The goal of such partnerships may go beyond conservation and resource protection, such as in the case of the Norwegian Coastal Fisheries agreement, which was to increase profit among small-scale fishers while protecting marine life from excessive resource accumulation.

According to authors, Doyle and Gilbert, development aggression manifests itself in the questionable acquisition of consent among IPs, the disproportionate impact of the projects on community and livelihood, and the failure to include perspectives of IPs on the concept of development. In short, acts of development aggression are evidenced by rights-denying developmental processes experienced by the IPs.²¹ In response to these global phenomena, IPs have crafted a self-determined development premised on the respect of their rights, governance structures, and philosophies. The authors mainly argued that national development policies should encourage IP-led development efforts, remain compliant to FPIC standards, and ensure that formal policies hold all stakeholders accountable. However, as most State-led development projects are designed to extract natural resources found within ancestral lands, state-led development projects remain elusive.

In terms of studies related to Tumandok, there has been two significant anthropological research done in the indigenous communities in Panay. Professor F. Landa Jocano, in 1968, released his work entitled *Sulod Society*, where he discussed how the IPs are identified based on their kinship system, which governed the social equilibrium and rituals of the people. His monographs also revealed how other settlers described indigenous communities. Lowland communities call the IPs “Bukidnon,” which means “mountain dwellers” and often carries a derogatory meaning of being ignorant. Meanwhile, Christian inhabitants have used the term “Mundo,” which means

20 Ibid., 235.

21 Cathal Doyle and Jeremie Gilbert, “Indigenous Peoples and globalization: From “Development Aggression” to “Self-determined Development,”” *Social Science Research Network*, (January 20, 2015): 21

“very wild.”²² In the end, Jocano used the term *Sulod* or *Sulodnon*, which means “room” to reflect the dwelling spaces of indigenous communities, which are enclosed by the tall mountain ranges. According to Jocano, members in a *sulod* community are likely to be related to each other by blood or marriage. That leadership is often assigned to the oldest male member of the settlement.

As for their way of life, the author noted that the community practiced dry agriculture and believed in spirits.²³ Similarly, the work of Professor Alicia Magos discussed the nomenclature on identifying the IPs based on a specific territory. Her work stated that indigenous communities living near the Panay River are called Pan-ayanon, while those along the Jalaur River are called the Halawodnon.²⁴ Professor Magos further asserted that the identity of the Pan-ayanon and Halawodnon are linked to the local epics that they passed on to their kin. The chanting of epics plays an important feature in the social life of the people.²⁵

This survey of related studies directs the goal of this research, particularly in tracing acts of aggression towards the IPs. As most of the research done on Tumandok focused on the cultural and historical significance of the community, this research contributes to expanding the role of Tumandok as a pivotal stakeholder in the national development goals of the State. As such, this research tackles development issues and human rights problems faced by minority groups. Moreover, this study links the narrative of the IP rights struggle in the Philippines to the global phenomena of land dispossession and violation of international standards that uphold IP rights.

History

Understanding the relationship of IPs to their land entails a closer look at meeting points of these elements embedded in historical accounts and legal frameworks. This section presents an introduction of the IPs in the Philippines, including the oral history of indigenous communities that reflect the value of land to people and accounts of how traditional Filipino

22 Jocano, F. Landa, “The Sulod: A Mountain People In Central Panay, Philippines,” *Philippine Studies* 6, no. 4 (November 1958), 405.

23 Ibid., 407.

24 Alicia Magos, “The Sugidanon of Central Panay,” in *Edukasyon. Harnessing Indigenous Knowledge for Education* (Quezon City: Center for Integrative and Development Studies. University of the Philippines, 1996): 121.

25 Ibid., 130.

society responded to the entry of the Spanish colonial government.

Colonial Period

Efforts of the Spanish colonial government to integrate the Philippines under the crown were a complex process. The early recorded accounts from Spanish friars and historians state that traditional communities lived in political units called *barangay*.²⁶ This political unit is headed by a local leader called *datu*, to whom people owe their allegiance.²⁷ As part of its state-making projects, the Spanish colonial government retained the *barangay* system but maintained a close relationship with individual *datos* to win over the community quickly. Through a divide-and-conquer and their military superiority, the Spaniards successfully established their dominance in most parts of the Philippines. The colonial government installed a Governor-General as the highest political figure in the colony and acted on behalf of the crown. Corollary to this, the Roman Catholic Church played an influential role in reinforcing loyalty to the crown and removing indigenous beliefs.

In the sixteenth century, King Philipp II issued the *Recopilacion de las Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias*, which effectively presided over land distribution to religious organizations, ruling elites, and farm lots.²⁸ Rights over owning land were passed on to the colonial power, which allowed for creating a *pueblo* or plaza complex. This design of old towns in the Philippines followed a pattern where colonial administrative buildings and catholic churches are built at the center of the towns. The sound of church bells ringing would allegedly echo through all corners of the town, suggesting that *pueblos* were made to assert colonial dominance and control of the Filipinos. Moreover, this was an attempt to distinguish Christians from non-Christians. The term *indio* referred to indigenous people (or the general Filipino community). At the same time, *moros* was used to describe the Muslim community that was the most severe threat to the Spanish colonial government during their natal state-making projects. The religious importance of this geographical

26 Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Philippines: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2005): 12

27 William Henry Scott, *Barangay. Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society* (Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994): 6.

28 Jaime Veneracion, *Philippine agriculture during the Spanish regime* (University of the Philippines, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy Research and Publications and the Presidential Commission for the New Century and the Millennium, 2001): 85.

planning manifested with the exclusion of *indios* and *moros* who were disposed from the original inhabitants and resided outside these pueblos.²⁹

Despite policies during the Spanish period, indigenous communities were able to flee the colonial rule and preserve their identity. Geography and local resistance were factors for IP communities to escape the friars and the colonial rule. Traditional ancestral lands are situated in high mountainous areas that were difficult to access. IPs thrived in the Cordillera Region and the Sierra Madre mountain ranges in Luzon. The Lumads in Mindanao are just some examples where Spaniards failed to integrate indigenous communities. On the other hand, resistance was based heavily on the fight against conversion to the Catholic faith.

When the Spanish rule ended in 1898, the American colonial government continued to pay attention to indigenous communities, called non-Christian tribes. In 1917, the Philippine Commission created the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. Part of its programs was to provide a public school system, extend public work to ensue development, and invest in fertile regions in Mindanao to encourage domestic immigration.³⁰ The Bureau became an entity that allowed American researchers to conduct ethnological surveys in the country and learn about IPs' cultural attributes. In the end, indigenous communities became an object of research among western scholars, most of whom have described IPs as "savages, uncivilized or semi-civilized."³¹ This attitude towards IPs was best captured in Philippine history during the 1904 St. Louis Expedition, where the Igorot indigenous community in the Mountain Province were brought to America to serve as "living exhibits" and showcase their way of life, by which the main attraction was their practice of eating dogs.³² With the thrust of providing education and "civilizing" traditional communities, the Bureau became a springboard to assimilate minorities to the dominant culture.

29 Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 53.

30 Maximo Kalaw, "Recent Policy towards the Non-Christian People of the Philippines," *The Journal of International Relations* 10, No. 1 (1919): 3.

31 Mary Jane Rodriguez, "Reading A Colonial Bureau: The Politics of Cultural Investigation of the Non-Christian Filipinos," *Social Science Diliman* 6, no. 1 (2010): 23

32 Greg Allen, "Living Exhibits at 1904 World's Fair Revisited," *NPR*, May 31, 2004, <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1909651>.

Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997

In 1997, the Philippine Government passed the IPRA law to protect and promote the rights of IPs. Some of the salient features of this law are recognition of the scope of ancestral domain and IP rights in case of displacement in their territory. Concerning this study, the most relevant section of the law is the formal recognition provided by the state concerning IP rights over their ancestral land. In chapter two, section three of the law, the ancestral domain is defined as:

...all areas generally belonging to ICCs[indigenous cultural communities]/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals, corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral land, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.³³

This provision features self-determination among IPs to empower the minorities to continue with their traditional activities. Self-determination in UNDRIP adopts the same principle forwarded by the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), where individuals or groups of people are accorded with the right to participate in the democratic process of governance and decide their own economic, social, and cultural development.³⁴ However, the law contains a provision where these ancestral domains need to undergo a certification

33 *The Indigenous Peoples Right Act of 1997.*

34 International Work Group for Indigenous Affair, "Self-determination of Indigenous Peoples," April 8, 2011, <https://www.iwgia.org/en/focus/land-rights/330-self-determination-of-indigenous-peoples>.

process or land titling, which is carried out by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). Chapter three, section eleven of the law states:

The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.³⁵

The need to secure a CADT from a state agency has caused potential conflict between IPs and the state. In fact, despite NCIP's issuance of 182 CADTs, only less than 50 were registered to the country's Land Registration Authority. Registration of the CADTs is the next step to assign the scope of a certain ancestral domain officially, and at the same time, allows for the enforcement of laws against intrusion.³⁶ However, participation in this process required a full grasp of laws, which indigenous communities are not necessarily accustomed to doing. In addition, the determination of ancestral land meant that government officials would be given access inside indigenous territories. Given the history of the fragile relationship between State entities and IPs, this process might potentially have negative repercussions. While there is much to be celebrated with the IPRA law, the rights of IPs over their land remain fragile. Indigenous communities have long maintained their presence within these lands. However, the entry of colonial power in the past and the laws passed by the Philippine government have further threatened the tenure of IPs in their ancestral domain. The case of the Tumandok communities highlights the complicated relationship between IPs and the State.

This history emboldens the community with a strong connection to their ancestral land. The provisions in international norms and domestic laws also uphold IP rights but have nonetheless rendered inefficient as the Tumandok continues to find themselves struggling for their rights.

Militarized Ancestral Land

35 Ibid.

36 Paul Nera, *Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines: Submission to the 59th Session of CESCR*, report for the Tebtebba Foundation, <http://www.tebtebba.org/index.php/content/383-situation-of-indigenous-peoples-in-the-philippines-submission-to-the-59th-session-of-cescr>.

Despite the historical claims and legal provisions that promote IP rights, Tumandok communities remained exposed to constant threats owing to the context where its claimed ancestral land stands. Approximately 33,000 hectares of land in Jamindan and Tapaz in the province of Capiz in Panay Island is considered a military reservation camp under the Presidential Proclamation No. 67 decreed by then-President Diosdado Macapagal in 1962.³⁷ Part of this proclamation included the establishment of the 3rd Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. One of its known base camps is Camp Peralta, where military exercises and weapons training are conducted. This military camp is considered one of the largest military camps with responsibility for sixteen provinces and a mandate to contain insurgency problems in the Visayas region.³⁸

Militarization of IP land is defined both as the presence of military personnel and the actions done against IPs that disrupt their way of life. Thus, declaring the land of Tumandok as part of an ancestral domain continues to constitute a complicated process. The traditionally known ancestral land is officially a military base, which waters down the claim of the IPs over their land since the State grants no official title. The livelihood of the IPs was further threatened following the declaration of Martial Law in 1972 by then President Ferdinand Marcos as it placed the whole country under strict military oversight purportedly to cease communist threat. The respondents claim that the IPs have been erroneously tagged as communist members or have supported communist activities. At the height of Martial law, Tumandok members claimed that house searches and prosecution of male IPs became rampant. Implications of tagging Tumandok members as communists continue to the present-day experience of the community, most notably in the extrajudicial execution of 9 indigenous leaders and 17 IP members in December 2020. Alleged police and military operation in Barangay Tapaz were conducted to seize communist activities in the area.³⁹

Given this imbalanced relationship between the IP community and

37 "Tumandok People's Struggle for Their Ancestral Lands," *Philippine Network for Food Security Programs, Inc.*, accessed July 31, 2018, <https://www.pnfsp.org/single-post/2013/03/02/Tumandok-Peoples-Struggle-for-their-Ancestral-Lands>.

38 "3ID's HISTORY AND LEGACY," *Spearhead Troopers*, November 2, 2014, accessed July 31, 2018, <http://www.spearheadtrooper.com/unit-history/>.

39 Nestor Burgos Jr., "Tumandok in Capiz Flee Homes After Killings," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, January 2, 2021, <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1378437/tumandok-in-capiz-flee-homes>.

the State, this research explored the actions done against IP members to pursue these development projects. While the country is a fervent supporter of IP rights, owing to its active involvement in the UNDRIP and passage of relevant IP laws, forms of development aggression persisted.

Findings

This research uncovered two categories that highlight acts of development aggression, which include questionable consent acquisition and failure to include IP-based perspectives in these development projects. It is important to remember that the full implementation of the dam projects is not in place as of this writing. There are future potential shifts in the current form of the projects since lobbying efforts to resist the construction is still ongoing. It is noteworthy nonetheless to discuss how the indigenous communities responded to constant changes in their ancestral land.

Consent Acquisition

The NCIP typically carries out consent acquisition in compliance with FPIC standards. When these standards are in place, coercion is avoided; all parties are aware of a certain project's timeline; full disclosure of any transaction is provided. In the end, all stakeholders would benefit when the FPIC is carried out. The NCIP has further codified its consultation practice in two documents entitled *The Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Practices and Customary Laws Research and Documentation Guidelines* and *The Revised Guidelines on Free and Prior Informed Consent and Related Processes*. Some of the salient features of these documents include consultation mechanisms and the power to reject activities as decided by the leadership body of the IP community. In addition, this document puts forward creating an indigenous socio-political structure (ISPS), which stands as the official body to conduct consensus-building mechanisms in the community and to liaise concerns of the IPs to other stakeholders.⁴⁰ This body has no codified structure since the IPs themselves decide it, but it has been a practice to elect identified elders as members of the ISPS.

The process of acquiring consent conducted by the State has been viewed as problematic by the participants of this research.

40 "The Revised Guidelines on Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) and Related Processes of 2012," NCIP Administrative Order, no. 3 (2012), <http://ncipro67.com.ph/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NCIP-AO-3-Series-of-2012-FPIC.pdf>.

Allegations of deceit and inducing one to agree to the terms of the projects were among the concerns brought by the Tumandok people. One of the common stories that surfaced during the fieldwork was an incident where IPs were deceived into signing an agreement. One spoke

...The FPIC conducted meetings here. They asked us to sign the attendance sheet. For them, when you sign the attendance sheet, that means you already agree with the implementation of the project. Just like in the case of Jalaur dam. The residents near the project site are very innocent about the matter. When the authorities came and gave them food items, they were asked to sign a paper. The authorities said that the signature was just for reference and for receipts when in fact, the signature of the residents meant that they already allow the dam project to push through. They trick people. This is the reason why we are really against NIA. There are a lot of reasons why we feel like this. (RG, 47 years old)

The absence of coercion and manipulation guides a standard process in FPIC.⁴¹ As such, the experience of the community in seeking its consent for the said projects has been tainted with direct manipulation. Likewise, due to their lack of formal education, the community has been forced into a situation where they have to absorb technical information that may be beyond their level of comprehension. A Tumandok member who also sits as a local leader said that government officials only present the projects' positive impact and place less importance on the social cost. He said:

Those who are not well-informed do not know about FPIC. However, officials like us are trained or informed about issues and matters like the FPIC. The problem with these government officials is that they only present the good side of the project. They don't reveal the projected negative impacts of their plans. (RL, 54 years old)

Tumandok members, even those elected officers, have been spared of the full implications of the project. Apart from deceitful and undemocratic tactics, the principle of consensus-building was not championed during

41 "Free Prior and Informed Consent," *Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*, accessed May 19, 2021, <http://www.fao.org/indigenous-peoples/our-pillars/fpic/en/>.

this process. One respondent claimed that she was rendered powerless to object to the project as bulldozers were already surrounding her property.

I just agreed eventually since they come to us every day just to convince us to say yes. I was actually avoiding and hiding from them before. But we didn't really have a choice because there are bulldozers around the area already. If we won't agree to them, they might bulldoze our house. (LC, 65 years old)

FPIC standards ultimately accord IP members a full array of choices. However, the experience of the Tumandok suggests that the State's actions overwhelmed some Tumandok members to give up their property eventually. The right to change one's mind is all within the tenets of the FPIC, but the experience of elderly members suggests that they were forced against a wall.

Viewing Development

With the history of violence in their ancestral land and fraudulent accounts during the consultation process, one must investigate how the IPs view development. The Tumandok community remains active in participating in political spaces, evidenced in the election of some of its members to local government posts. Likewise, the community has submitted petitions to other local politicians concerning the mega-dam projects' social and geological issues. In this section, this research argues that the community believes in forwarding its stances on development. Advocating for its survival and its stake in the development discourse links with the global trend of indigenous communities resisting development aggression. One participant claim that development projects are nonetheless beneficial and suggest progress. However, components of progress in these mega-dam projects are not highlighted:

In my own understanding, being progressive means being respectful of the desires of the people or the majority, absence of fear, peaceful life, absence of problems about sending your children to school, sense of security that your land will not be taken away from you and absence of projects that will bring about harm to the people or will take your property away from you, and most of all, having enough resources that will help you live and survive everyday life. In my own understanding, since I live in an agricultural community, they must invest on projects that will upgrade the agricultural system in the country without compromising

the poor people or marginalized groups. (RG, 47 years old)

Investing in agriculture-related projects, ranging from crops, equipment, and irrigation were the kind of development that the IPs wish to have. When asked if the IPs have any recollection of social welfare initiatives implemented in their communities, many participants would point to NGO projects first rather than those carried by the local government. Caritas Luxembourg and the Panay Center for Disaster Response (PCDR) have reportedly constructed a hanging bridge crossing Jalaur River, which helped ease the access of Tumandok in Barangay Tapaz down to low-lying plains. PCDR also has provided relief and disaster training to the IPs following the effects of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. The finding suggests that the impact of social development projects is placed at higher importance by the IPs than infrastructure-related projects, such as mega-dams. When asked what the IPs' expectation from the government are, she said:

...We are expecting something from the government. Something that can make people feel loved and projects that provide people with necessary materials they need for their livelihood. Sadly, we haven't received any sort of project until now. (GK, 60 years old.)

The case of the mega-dam projects highlights this distinction that IPs have created when looking at development projects. Some respondents argue that when a project has ruined one's ability to grow their crops, it should not be viewed as development. When asked to weigh the benefits of the mega-dam projects and their potential positive gains for the Tumandok community, one respondent stated the following:

We don't need it. What are we supposed to do with the electricity and irrigation if we don't have our livelihood anymore? Our lands will be taken away anyway. (MA, 52 years old)

The benefits of development projects are easily overlooked by the Tumandok community when their sense of identity and way of living are vulnerable. Protecting their ancestral land remains at the core consideration when IPs accept a development project. The state development projects, such as the dam projects, have been viewed more for its ill effects on their land and ultimately on people's survival. Despite the fragile relationship of the state and IPs, there are still opportunities to coexist.

It should be noted that the government has not abandoned its role in introducing social projects to the community. Government-initiated aid such as a conditional cash transfer program (locally known as 4Ps) and livelihood projects are some of the programs enforced in IP communities. In short, state development projects are implemented in indigenous communities, and yet it is not being perceived as development. The case of the mega-dam projects highlights this distinction where IPs no longer regard these efforts as development projects.

Conclusion

The case of the Tumandok represents the global phenomenon of development aggression experienced by vulnerable groups. As economic globalization heightens, unused resources become a new target of the expanding capitalist market. Development projects remain an essential piece for the overall growth of a nation. The case of the two mega-dams in Panay ushers a list of benefits for the whole island, including irrigation, hydroelectric power, and job creation. However, these projects would allegedly impact the livelihood and lifestyle of the Tumandok community as the construction of these projects sit within the IP's claimed ancestral domain. Given that these lands hold historical and cultural significance among the Tumandok, this research tackled how the State protects IP rights and how IPs themselves appreciate the promise of development.

In doing so, this research traced the history of IPs in the Philippines and, with that basis, conducted in-person interviews with members of the Tumandok community. This study followed Grounded Theory tenets to capture the experience of the community as it interacted with the changes in its environment. This research argues that at the onset, the claims of the Tumandok over its ancestral domain stand on fragile ground, given that their land is part of a military camp. Tumandok members claim that they have been wrongfully associated with communist insurgencies and have been persistently harassed by State agents. Concerning the mega-dam projects, this research uncovered reports of deceit allegedly from the government in inducing Tumandok members to sign their consent for the construction of these projects. This research argues that these mega-dams further marginalized the Tumandok community, evidenced by the failure of the State to enforce FPIC standards. Furthermore, this research further noted that the Tumandok community was not passive recipients of aggression but instead has taken proactive solutions to resist the projects and forward its alternative proposals that cover their vision of development.

In sum, the weak enforcement of consent acquisition standards,

failure to adopt IP's version of development, and the continued human rights violations linked with the presence of the military presence have all played a factor in the rights-denying actions done against the Tumandok. Relocating and seeking different economic opportunities have become less of an option to a community that has, for decades, worked as the herders of the land. Traces of development aggression are further highlighted by the inability of the government to put previously supported international norms into practice. Failure to fully enforce the principles of the UNDRIP and IPRA highlights the Philippines' approach to international standards, as though promulgation and support of it was a token gesture to the worldwide call for IP rights. Thus, the Tumandok narrative contributes to how indigenous communities defend their livelihood and their land. It is a narrative of active resistance not for the sole purpose of antagonizing other stakeholders but to claim their position in the greater society.

Living as *Zainichi* in the Twenty-First Century: Identity and Citizenship in Japan's Ethnic Korean Community

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While much of the existing academic scholarship on Japan-Korea relations has focused on the ongoing political and historical disputes related to World War II, this paper analyzes the experience of ethnic Koreans living in Japan on a microeconomic and sociological level. Zainichi Koreans and the ongoing structural societal and economic challenges they face in Japanese society are analyzed from a historical perspective throughout this paper. Through a comparative-historical analysis of the experience of Koreans from the point when Japan annexed the Korean Peninsula in 1910 until liberalizing reforms of the twenty-first century, this paper shows that the social rights, civil rights, and economic opportunities of Zainichi Koreans have remained fluid throughout much of the twentieth century. While the challenges faced by Japan's Korean population have marginally improved since liberalizing reforms in the 1990s, this paper demonstrates that ongoing scapegoating on the part of politicians and negative public perceptions of Zainichi Koreans continue to pose challenges to Japan's sizeable Korean minority population.

Introduction

Common perceptions of Japan in Western media often characterize Japan as a country of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. While there is some truth to this preconception, the reality is more complex. Even though ethnic diversity is not a term usually applied in the Japanese context, there are several non-Japanese ethnic groups living in Japan, many of which can be examined

and understood as scars of Japan's imperial project during World War II.¹ Ethnic Koreans make up one of the largest minority populations in Japan, with about 850,000 permanent residents identifying as ethnically Korean in 2014, according to Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.² In the Japanese context, these people are referred to in academic scholarship and media as "Zainichi" Koreans (*Zainichi Kankokujin*).³ The term *Zainichi*, literally meaning "foreign citizen in Japan", carries the significant connotation that these individuals are temporary residents rather than permanent members of society.

Korea and Japan have a long and complicated political history with longstanding and unresolved animosities mainly stemming from Japan's colonial rule and cultural assimilation policies on the Korean Peninsula. The most notable of these ongoing hostilities is Japanese compensation to Korean victims of forced labor during the years preceding and during World War II, which the Japanese government has argued have been resolved by existing treaties. Nevertheless, compensation disputes remain highly politicized and a source of ongoing tension between both Koreas and Japan. These unresolved hostilities and resulting tensions continue to complicate the situation of ethnic Koreans living in Japan. Most ethnic Koreans permanently residing in Japan today are descendants of Koreans that arrived in the country before or during World War II, usually as physical laborers and often against their will.⁴ These individuals remain largely marginalized in society, face workplace discrimination, lack employment opportunities, and are often prevented from holding passports due to their complicated citizenship status. The lack of opportunities for Koreans in Japan is not a new phenomenon. It is a fluid situation that has gradually shifted in both positive and negative ways since World War II. Ethnic Koreans were brought to Japan to work in many manual labor industries preceding World War II. However, many opportunities dried up in the decades following the war, as the Japanese economy shifted towards a growth-oriented nativist economic system in the mid-twentieth century. As the Japanese economy slowed down in the 1990s, following a series of

1 "Japan," CIA The World Factbook, accessed January 27, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/japan/>.

2 "Foreigners by nationality and by visas (occupation)," Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, accessed on March 30, 2019.

3 All translations are author's own unless otherwise stated.

4 Sonia Ryang, "Space and Time: The Experience Of The 'Zainichi', The Ethnic Korean Population of Japan," *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 43, no. 4 (2014), 520.

liberalizing reforms, many institutional barriers were eliminated, allowing ethnic Koreans to participate in a much more market-oriented economy more freely.

While the plight of Japan's Korean population has been studied extensively in English-language literature, many scholars have focused on the experience of these people during Japan's occupation of Korea and the war years.⁵ In contrast, few critical studies have been conducted on the continued challenges facing the Korean diaspora in Japan in the twenty-first century. While the situation for Japan's Korean residents has greatly improved in many ways as Japan has blossomed into a vibrant liberal democracy and developed economy, these residents still face several daily challenges. Such challenges include racial job discrimination, housing discrimination and ghettoization, and limited access to public services compared with ethnically Japanese citizens.⁶ This situation has been further complicated by the political division of the Korean Peninsula since the 1950s, which has resulted in Japan's refusal to recognize the existence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Japan, therefore, does not recognize North Korean citizenship as a legitimate nationality.

This paper will conduct a comparative study of the political, social, and economic challenges faced by Japan's ethnic Koreans. It will compare the period of colonial rule from 1910-1945 with the contemporary challenges faced by these individuals since the turn of the twenty-first century when Japan engaged in liberalizing economic reforms that removed many of the institutional barriers to Korean participation in society. As this paper will demonstrate, overt economic discrimination and systemic poverty among Koreans in Japan have drastically reduced as Japan has developed, resulting in a higher quality of life for both ethnic Japanese and Koreans. However, these economic improvements have not been uniform, as Korean communities have yet to see the same economic uplifting that the rest of the country has experienced. Ethnic Koreans continue to face systemic barriers preventing them from participating fully in Japanese society. In addition, this paper will highlight the social and political nuances faced by Japan's ethnic Koreans. It will demonstrate how a contested sense of ethnic identity has become a barrier to full integration into Japanese society and Japanese nationality. The tensions between ethnic

5 Japanese colonial rule of Korea lasted from the annexation of the peninsula in 1910 until Japan's surrender at the end of the Second World War in 1945.

6 Philip Brasor, "Japan's Resident Koreans Endure a Climate of Hate," *The Japan Times*, May 7, 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/07/national/media-national/japans-resident-koreans-endure-climate-hate/>.

Koreans and their Japanese counterparts have continued to foster a sense of hostility. The situation is further inflamed by the political activism of North Korea-aligned political advocacy groups such as *Chongryon*, which continues to operate as a middleman between the North Korean government and North Korea-aligned *Zainichi* Koreans.⁷ This paper will demonstrate that while Japan's economic and social situation has stabilized since the end of World War II, Korean residents' social rights, civil rights, and economic opportunities are still hindered by societal marginalization and racial discrimination. This issue can be attributed to continued hostility between Korean and Japanese residents and the unresolved political situation on the Korean Peninsula, which has left many Korean residents with precarious citizenship status.

This paper conducts a comparative-historical analysis of the challenges *Zainichi* Koreans face in Japan, beginning with the annexation of Korea in 1910 and concluding with contemporary trends since liberalizing reforms in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. This historical comparison demonstrates how the institutional barriers to Korean participation in Japanese society have changed over time, both negatively and positively, throughout the twentieth century. Social rights, civil rights, and economic opportunities are dependent variables in this analysis. Political and economic policies are demonstrated to significantly impact these rights and opportunities for the *Zainichi* Korean population. While institutional barriers should be considered a key obstacle to full participation in Japanese society, more nuanced societal barriers and anti-Korean discourses remain the greatest obstacles for *Zainichi* Koreans to enjoy equal social rights, civil rights, and economic opportunities as their ethnically Japanese counterparts.

Historical Background

The premise of this paper depends on how one defines "Korean" or "Japanese", which themselves are contested concepts. Korea and Japan have experienced a long history of cultural and linguistic exchange. Historians generally accept that ancient Koreans were some of the first settlers of Japan.⁸ In addition to this, both Hirohito and Akihito, the most recent two Japanese Emperors, explicitly

7 · Ibid.

8 · Hyung Il Pai, *Constructing "Korean" Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), 234.

acknowledged that the Imperial Family has Korean origins.⁹ Despite sharing a close ethnic and political history, Japan and Korea continue to see themselves as fundamentally distinct from one another. In the years leading up to World War II, the line between Koreans and Japanese was further muddled due to Japan's imperial expansion. As Toshiyuki Tamura explains, "people in the colonial territories were deprived of their native nationalities and incorporated into the Japanese nation."¹⁰ Consequently, there were legally no Koreans in the Japanese Empire, even though the whole of the Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule. Due to the complex history of Korean nationality, this paper will use the term "Korean" to refer to any individual who came to Japan after the Japanese Empire was established in 1868 and their descendants.

Following the Japanese Empire's annexation of Korea in 1910, the Japanese government began to bring as many as 2.2 million Koreans from the Peninsula into the Japanese home islands by 1945, usually to work as forced laborers for the war effort.¹¹ While these Korean laborers were technically Japanese subjects, their rights were severely limited. These workers were often employed in the most dangerous jobs, such as factories or mines, and were paid significantly less than their Japanese counterparts.¹² By some accounts, the situation faced by wartime Korean laborers amounted to slave labor.¹³ In addition to the poor working conditions faced by Korean residents of Japan, there was a history of racial segregation and discrimination. As far back as the Taishō Period (1912-1926), there are recorded events of lynching and public violence against Koreans. Immediately following the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake in Tokyo, mob violence immediately broke out, as rumors had spread that Koreans were plotting a coup. As a result, up to 10,000 ethnic Koreans were murdered by mobs in the weeks following the disaster.¹⁴ While this level of violence was by no means the

9 · Toshiyuki Tamura, "The Status and Role of Ethnic Koreans in the Japanese Economy," in *The Korean Diaspora in the World Economy*, ed. C. Fred Bergsten (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2003), 79.

10 · Ibid.

11 · Ibid., 81.

12 · Ibid., 82.

13 · Hyonhee Shin, "Thousand Koreans sue government over wartime labor at Japan firms," *Reuters*, December 20, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-forcedlabour-southkorea-idUSKCN1OJ0F7>.

14 · Joshua Hammer, *Yokohama Burning: The Deadly 1923 Earthquake and Fire That Helped Forge the Path to World War II* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 167.

norm, it is important to consider the animosity and suspicion felt towards Koreans by many Japanese citizens at this time. While Japan and Korea had historically held strong diplomatic and trading ties, the early 1900s were a time of suspicion towards Koreans in Japan – especially as the budding Korean independence movement gained steam on the Korean Peninsula. Korean nationalists had engaged in civil disobedience and assassination attempts on Japanese officials on multiple occasions, contributing to Japanese suspicions of Korean citizens domestically.¹⁵ Even though Korean residents of Japan were considered Japanese subjects and were politically equal, the reality was that they remained a significantly marginalized group.

With Japan's defeat and subsequent occupation at the end of World War II, the vast majority of Koreans were permitted to return to the Korean peninsula, which had only just been liberated from Japanese colonial rule.¹⁶ The population of ethnic Koreans in Japan immediately dropped significantly, as between 1.1 million and 1.4 million Koreans were repatriated immediately following the war.¹⁷ The political situation on the Korean Peninsula became more complicated with the division between the Soviet-backed North and American-backed South, and the nationality status of many remaining Koreans was brought into question. As part of the post-war reforms, Japan's Alien Registration Law of 1952 stripped Japanese citizenship from all ex-colonial descendants that remained in the country, including around 500,000 ethnic Koreans.¹⁸ This caused that many ethnic Koreans were left effectively stateless unless they chose to pursue repatriation.

The partitioning of the peninsula into North and South meant that many Koreans in Japan had no real homeland to which they could return.¹⁹ With anti-communist hysteria growing more prevalent in South Korea, many Koreans intending to repatriate to South Korea were barred from entry under suspicion of being Communist sympathizers, especially if they had engaged in left-wing politics or expressed leftist sentiments in Japan.²⁰

15 Sharon Minichiello, *Japan's Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2018), 60.

16 · Tamura, *Role of Ethnic Koreans*, 83.

17 · Ibid.

18 · Ibid.

19 · Sonia Ryang and John Lie, *Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 31.

20 · Ibid., 31.

As a result, the post-war period saw many ethnic Koreans placed in a stateless and marginalized position; they could not return to either Korean state on the newly divided peninsula and were largely unwelcome in Japan.

With the conclusion of World War II and the continued political instability on the Korean Peninsula, a large population of *Zainichi* Koreans remained in Japan. In line with its history of oppression and marginalization in Japanese society, this population continued facing significant barriers to full participation in society. Japan embarked on a rapid reconstruction and economic boom during the 1950s and 1960s; the mainstream of Japanese society was lifted out of poverty, and homeownership became the norm. The same was not true, however, for the ethnic Korean population. Just as before the war, Koreans were generally forced to live in ethnically segregated communities along riverbanks. These sites were often superstitiously believed to be “roads to the afterlife” and were undesirable locations to live.²¹

Zainichi Koreans were largely exempted from vast increases in wealth that Japan saw throughout the post-war period, as many institutional barriers to employment and movement remained. While racism was not institutionalized as part of policies, the relative statelessness of *Zainichi* Koreans prevented them from attaining the same social and economic rights as their Japanese counterparts, which served to institutionalize a sort of passive racial discrimination.²² Just as the post-war reforms had stripped Koreans of their Japanese nationality, the Nationality Act banned Japanese employers from hiring noncitizens as permanent employees. The Act thus effectively barred Koreans from seeking stable employment.²³ To survive, many Korean families were forced to operate small businesses, such as Korean food restaurants, within their segregated communities. Therefore, the Nationality Act created a situation in which the economy largely marginalized Korean-owned businesses and the families that depended on them. By cutting off access to mainstream commerce and the more mainstream Japanese economy, this system stilted the success of Korean businesses and left Korean families institutionally disadvantaged as a result. *Zainichi* Koreans were some of the last members of society to see improvements in their living conditions during the post-war period. This

21 · Ryang, “Space and Time,” 544-545.

22 · Tamura, *Role of Ethnic Koreans*, 83.

23 · *Ibid.*, 84.

had much to do with their inability to participate in the workforce fully.²⁴

Ethnic and National Identities

An important question that arises from this discussion is the issue of citizenship. Despite being stripped of their Japanese nationality after the war, *Zainichi* Koreans were not technically barred from pursuing Japanese nationality in the same way that any other immigrant arrivals in the country could. Although Japan's naturalization process has always been notoriously complicated and strict, the pursuit of Japanese nationality was not impossible, even in the years following the war. Despite this, the number of *Zainichi* Koreans that pursued Japanese nationality following the war remained surprisingly low, especially given the economic opportunities it would bring. The reality is difficult to explain fully, as all individual cases are different. However, some critical trends in the conceptualizations of national identity among Koreans and Japanese may differ from the typical Western conceptualization of national belonging. Japan's post-war order was primarily rooted in the idea that the country would only succeed as an economic and political power if it relied on its "ethnically and culturally homogenous nature", which was deeply entrenched in its social and political discourses.²⁵ This idea was also a guiding principle of the new governments in North and South Korea, especially to contrast these societies with their former colonizer. "Koreanness" and "Japaneseness" became mutually exclusive ideas, and social room for an identity in-between these two "essences" did not exist.²⁶ The Japanese government often expressed their belief in a "monoethnic ideology" through the bureaucratic system, which operated in a way that underscored the importance of "blood purity" when applying for citizenship.²⁷ For many Koreans, the pursuit of Japanese citizenship meant the abandonment of their Korean identity, and the vast majority of these individuals were categorically against naturalization.²⁸ For many *Zainichi* Koreans, the prospect of losing their identity as a people was too grave a risk to take, even if it meant passing up on the potential economic and social benefits of doing so.

24 · Ibid.

25 · John Lie, *Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 84.

26 · Ibid., 84-85.

27 · Ibid., 85.

28 · Ibid.

Zainichi in a Globalizing Japan

Japan, like much of the world, has been transformed in the age of globalization. In 2000, Japan was recovering from one of the most prolonged recessions in its history. When the Bubble Economy popped in the 1990s, it left Japan's economy in tatters, with low economic growth and uncertainty about its future. The first decade of the twenty-first century brought American-style economic and political reforms to Japan with the election of Junichiro Koizumi's conservative, reformist-minded government.²⁹ Reforms to the sprawling bureaucracy became the centerpiece of government, bringing new conceptualizations of citizenship and nationality as Japan sought to reinvent itself as a "normal" participant in the world order. These reforms, including the deregulation of the financial markets and liberalization of currency practices on American-style market lines, primarily began with the slowing of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. This new political age brought sweeping changes, especially to the *Zainichi* Korean population. As the government deemphasized the "monoethnic nation-state" narrative and expanded the employment rights of noncitizens, Japan's population of Koreans saw expanded opportunities to participate in the workforce without the need to give up their identity. As Japan's economy liberalized, foreign investment and an influx of foreign workers diversified the face of the labor force, creating an atmosphere in which non-Japanese, in this case, Koreans, became more common through increased exposure to the markets. As institutional barriers to participation fell, however, the existential threat to the continued existence of the *Zainichi* identity was even further clarified. In addition, these reforms have encouraged more *Zainichi* Koreans to pursue naturalization.

While the government does not publish official statistics, estimates place the number of *Zainichi* Koreans that pursued naturalization after 2000 to be in the tens of thousands.³⁰ This number sharply contrasts similar research performed in the 1950s, which saw about 232 ethnic Koreans naturalize in Japan. This increase in the willingness of Koreans to naturalize is fundamentally challenging to explain simply. However, the decline in the monoethnic public discourse is most certainly a critical component in driving this trend. If the pursuit of Japanese nationality does not demand that Koreans completely give up their identity, they may be more willing to naturalize.

29 · Ikuo Kabashima and Gill Steel, "The Koizumi Revolution," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 40, no. 1 (2007): 79.

30 · Tamura, *Role of Ethnic Koreans*, 84.

Despite this evidence, it is still important to consider that *Zainichi* Koreans are not guaranteed citizenship should they choose to pursue naturalization. Japan remains one of the most difficult states to naturalize in, as explained by Anna Boucher in her analysis of Japanese immigration policy: “naturalization is regarded as arduous, arbitrary, and unfacilitated; while 30,000 permanent resident visas are issued each year, the country processes only 1,000 annual naturalizations.”³¹ The barriers to citizenship still exist across all minority groups, especially since Japan does not guarantee birthright citizenship. While many *Zainichi* Koreans are third or even fourth-generation Japan-born Koreans, many still struggle to obtain Japanese nationality.

While ethnic Koreans no longer faced institutional barriers to economic well-being, threats to their linguistic and cultural identity intensified. Racialized discourses became more extreme, with several large-scale demonstrations by Japanese citizens against what many viewed as “preferential treatment” of *Zainichi* Koreans by the government.³² The improving livelihoods of *Zainichi* Koreans effectively brought many of these individuals into mainstream society, which potentially catalyzed public backlash. This backlash has been expressed in the establishment of several anti-Korean organizations such as *Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai*, or the Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of the *Zainichi*. They often organize large street protests calling for an end to state welfare and alleged “privileges” afforded to *Zainichi* Koreans.³³ As this paper discussed previously, anti-Korean sentiment has a long history in Japan. Nonetheless, it is important to note that a corresponding increase in anti-*Zainichi* sentiment has accompanied the increase in economic opportunity for *Zainichi* Koreans.

Korean Politics and *Zainichi* Identity

As this paper has already discussed, the complex political situation on the Korean Peninsula has repeatedly complicated the *Zainichi* identity and quest

31 · Anna K Boucher and Justin Gest, “Naturalization,” in *Crossroads: Comparative Immigration Regimes in a World of Demographic Change*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 118.

32 · Apichai W. Shipper, “Nationalisms of and Against *Zainichi* Koreans in Japan,” *Asian Politics & Policy* 2, no. 1 (January 2010): 55.

33 · Justin McCurry, “Police in Japan place anti-Korean extremist group Zaitokukai on watchlist,” *The Guardian*, December 4, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/04/police-japan-rightwing-anti-korean-extremist-group-zaitokukai-watchlist>.

for nationality, as the majority of *Zainichi* Koreans arrived in Japan before the partition of the peninsula. While many *Zainichi* Koreans self-identify with liberal-democratic South Korea, there is a sizable minority that has chosen to identify themselves with totalitarian North Korea. This has historically been a significant roadblock to repatriation; the Japanese government has never recognized the North Korean government as legitimate and therefore does not allow *Zainichi* Koreans to claim North Korean nationality.³⁴ In addition, the fierce political divide between the North and South in Korea is mirrored by *Zainichi* Koreans aligning themselves with different sides of the conflict. This divide has led to the establishment and rise of two separate political organizations: *Mindan*, which operates on behalf of South Korea-aligned *Zainichi* Koreans in Japan, and *Chongryon*, which operates on behalf of those who align themselves with North Korea. Notably, *Chongryon* also serves as a *de facto* embassy of North Korea in Japan, as the two countries do not have official diplomatic ties.³⁵ Both *Mindan* and *Chongryon* operate as middlemen between *Zainichi* Koreans and their respective Korean governments. They provide financial support and lobbying, especially in the case of *Chongryon*.

These organizations have also established a vast network of “Korean Schools” throughout Japan, which have become a point of serious controversy, especially with the renewed anti-Korean sentiment since the early 2000s. These schools operate similarly to private schools but offer education in Korean and provide students with a curriculum comparable to those of North or South Korea. Thus, North Korea-aligned schools have allowed *Zainichi* Korean students as young as preschoolers to be exposed to the propaganda and indoctrination promoted by the regime in North Korea.³⁶ Accompanied by an increasingly belligerent and nuclear-capable North Korea under Kim Jong Un, this has encouraged a fierce backlash by anti-Korean activists, who see the activities of *Chongryon* and North Korean schools as a threat to national security.³⁷ Directly following North Korea’s missile tests over Hokkaido in 2017, members of anti-Korean groups engaged in coordinated protests at Korean schools and Korean institutions around the country, further fueling the anti-

34 · Erik Ropers, *Voices of the Korean Minority in Postwar Japan*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2018), 97.

35 · Tamura, *Role of Ethnic Koreans*, 99.

36 · Misa Ryu, “Issues Concerning Immersion Education in Korean Schools in Japan,” *Japan Social Innovation Journal* 3, no. 1 (2013), 62.

37 · McCurry, “Zaitokukai on watchlist.”

Korean sentiment and pushing many *Zainichi* Koreans to fear for their lives.³⁸

Continued Challenges

The activities discussed above have continued to serve as a barrier for complete *Zainichi* integration into society, as these individuals continue to face discrimination. In addition to protests and threats made by fringe organizations and right-wing groups, significant social barriers to integration remain. While the laws have been generally reformed since the post-war years, *Zainichi* Koreans still experience workplace discrimination and lower salaries than their Japanese counterparts.³⁹ These individuals have also been subject to what Bumsoo Kim calls “practices of everyday exclusion.”⁴⁰ These practices include the inability of *Zainichi* Koreans holding permanent residency to return to Japan from abroad without attaining a re-entry permit, as well a public ban on employed *Zainichi* Koreans in managerial posts that have the potential to “shape the public will.”⁴¹ While not overtly discriminatory compared to past policies, these policies reflect a deep-seated distrust of *Zainichi* Koreans by the Japanese political elite and members of society. Antidiscrimination has been enshrined in liberal democracies around the world, including in Japan through its adherence to the International Covenants on Human Rights. Despite this, *Zainichi* Koreans are still subjected to policies and practices that place them in a permanent sub-citizen status. Even outside the realm of official policies, Koreans in Japan experience widespread harassment, especially when the threat of North Korea is in the media. Following the most recent missile tests over Hokkaido, police received several reports from Korean residents who had experienced physical or verbal abuse, such as having their bags sliced open and other types of physical assaults.⁴² While it should be noted that these types of violence are the exception rather than the norm, it cannot be doubted that *Zainichi* Koreans continue to suffer discrimination and abuse in contemporary Japanese society.

38 · The Japan Times, “Former Zaitokukai member pressed with libel charges for hate speech against Korean school in Kyoto,” *The Japan Times*, April 24, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/04/24/national/crime-legal/former-zaitokukai-member-pressed-libel-charges-hate-speech-korean-school-kyoto/>

39 · Brasor, “Climate of Hate.”

40 · Bumsoo Kim, “Blatant Discrimination Disappears, But...: The Politics of Everyday Exclusion in Contemporary Japan,” *Asian Perspective* 35, no. 2 (2011), 288.

41 · Kim, “Blatant Discrimination,” 294.

42 · *Ibid.*, 297.

However, what is likely to be more damaging to the lives of *Zainichi* Koreans is the blatantly inflammatory language utilized by some public figures in Japanese politics. There have been several examples since the 2000s of right-wing, even centrist, politicians joining in on the anti-Korean public discourse. One significant example of this was in April 2000, when Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara stated that, “atrocious crimes have been committed again and again by *sangokujin*.”⁴³ in a televised speech. The term *sangokujin* means “third country” and is commonly used in a derogatory manner to refer to Koreans. This language not only serves to intimidate and exclude *Zainichi* Koreans from feeling accepted in Japanese society but also further inflames the already problematic anti-Korean sentiment. While this type of discourse is not unique to the twenty-first century, such discourses are important to consider in reference to the liberalizing reforms that have eliminated many institutional barriers to Korean participation in the labor force.

Conclusion

Although Korea and Japan share more than two thousand years of political and cultural history, animosity between these two countries still exists. Japan’s imperial ambitions during World War II, in which Korea was absorbed into the Japanese Empire, have inflicted lasting scars on both Japanese and Korean societies. In Japan, the continued presence of *Zainichi* Koreans, who exist in a semi-stateless position, has complicated both countries’ efforts to move forward with reconciliation. Despite the narrow lens through which Japan is depicted in Western media, it is not an ethnically homogenous nation. The rights of minorities like *Zainichi* Koreans have routinely been threatened, and their challenges understudied.

While the number of Koreans in Japan today is far less than during the war years, the *Zainichi* population still represents a formidable cultural community. The rights of these ethnic Koreans living in Japan have been disrespected and oppressed since the early years of the Japanese Empire. However, they have improved marginally due to globalization and democratization. Rather than being forced to live in slums, *Zainichi* Koreans have been able to climb out of poverty and engage more meaningfully with Japanese society since the Koizumi era beginning in 2000. Despite this progress, however, Japanese ethnic Koreans continue to face systemic, often subtle, discrimination and exploitation in Japanese society. While,

economically speaking, *Zainichi* Koreans have progressed significantly, the continued challenges of these individuals in their daily interactions cannot be ignored. From outright abuse to subtle discrimination and inequality, Japan's Korean minority continues to suffer from social prejudice and institutional barriers to sufficient equity and equality in Japanese society.

This paper has demonstrated that the plight facing *Zainichi* Koreans has improved, but there is much work to be done in pursuit of equality. While economic development showed that progress could be made in bringing these individuals into mainstream society, public discourses have signaled a backslide. *Zainichi* Koreans living and working in Japan do not have access to the same opportunities as ethnic Japanese and are therefore excluded from full participation in society. While discrimination against these Koreans is not as overt as it once was, this paper has demonstrated that issues of prejudice and harassment are very much alive in contemporary Japanese society. As the political situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to worsen, *Zainichi* Koreans will require recognition as an at-risk group if they are to be adequately protected from further institutionalized discrimination. The first step to resolving these issues of identity is recognition. If Japan is to participate fully in the liberal-democratic order, it must acknowledge the continued social challenges facing its largest minority population, *Zainichi* Koreans.

The Japanese Government and Immigration: A Duality of Policy in Media and Government Documents

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The Japanese government implemented what can be perceived as a short-term fix for the lack of available workforce by easing immigration restrictions and supporting a rapid influx of international workers at a level never seen by the country. To better understand the reality and prioritization of immigration in Japan, this paper will compare documents released by governmental agencies with written newspaper articles directed towards domestic and international audiences. This comparison will expose and highlight the dissonance in perspectives concerning the effectiveness of Japan's immigration policy. Through examining Japan's domestic newspapers and policies and outward-facing media, including governmental agencies' documents aimed at international audiences, this dissonance emerges to reveal a cacophony of competing views over the current stage of immigration policy. Moreover, this comparison unveils how Japan walks a tightrope of fluctuating communication strategies to showcase effective immigration, such as assimilation and diversification, while enacting policies that support the use of immigration for economic purposes merely for short-term support, and how that dissonance is bleeding into the perceptions of media.

Prioritization vs Reality

In today's modern society, countries worldwide find themselves grappling with new social, economic, and political issues. As time continues to progress, so do the world's societies and the problems they face. These shifts have caused changes in various industries, government bodies, and societal structures. Understanding the reasoning for these changes and the effects these changes have in the societies they are formed in is critical to how responses will be

developed by inside and outside members. This formulation of responses provides a lens into the current priorities of a nation and society given a set parameter of values and people's realities. Therefore, to contribute to the goal of better understanding the state of prioritization of immigration in Japan, this paper will assess domestic newspapers and governmental agencies' outward-facing documents aimed at an international audience to underscore a disparity of dissonance and alignment in the communication of Japan's immigration policy.

Among the other leading developed countries in the Asia-pacific, no other country has seen a more drastic decline in their workforce than Japan.¹ Because of a declining birth rate and an aging population, Japan needs to and has already implemented actions to address this declining workforce issue. The Japanese government has implemented what can be perceived as a short-term fix for the lack of available workforce by easing immigration restrictions and supporting a rapid influx of international workers at a level never seen by the country.² This influx of foreign workers brings about structural changes in Japan's culture and society, which could have lasting effects on the country. Due to Japan's traditionally isolationistic history, this continuous influx of foreign workers can create conflict among people with varying values and beliefs about how Japan's country should look and operate. Foreign nationals will also formulate opinions based on policy decisions and available information. Then, the question is how the reasonings and responses to and effects of Japan's immigration policies are being conveyed to the public? The first interaction with information about these policies for both people abroad and within Japan is received from newspapers and governmental agencies. Critical insights into the values being prioritized can be derived from the primary source's rhetoric choices, availability of information, and areas they focused on. Therefore, it is the purpose of this paper to take the competing values derived from Japan's domestic newspapers and governmental agencies' outward-facing documents and compare them with an overview of current secondary researchers' understandings. Through this comparison, the following scheme is obtained surrounding Japan's immigration policy: a greater understanding of the perspectives of international and domestic media, insight into how the government is presenting information, the experience of people affected by the policies, and advice for policies moving forward.

1 Toshihiko Hara, *A Shrinking Society Post-Demographic Transition in Japan* (Springer Japan, 2015).

2 Ibid.

Literature Review

Further insight into the reasoning behind the increased need for migrant workers can be gained from Toshikiko Hara's 2015 book: *A Shrinking Society: Post-Demographic Transition in Japan*. Hara's book investigated Japan's decreasing population, which is considered the main driver behind new immigration policies. Arguing that all Asian countries face this change in their population because of "demographic transition caused by a feedback loop between increasing longevity and decreasing fertility," Hara explained that Japan faces this decrease of population faster than any other country.³ Utilizing statistical analysis from governmental organizations, Hara argued that the increasing life expectancy and declining fertility rate played into the perceived cost-benefit imbalance held by Japanese women.⁴ However, this transfer from the costs of reproductive child-bearing and rearing has now shifted to the cost for elderly care, without the input from a younger generation. Hara suggested that for Japan to combat these challenges, they must "face corresponding policy challenges and have new systems to take responsibility."⁵ Hara's book is fundamental to the research surrounding Japan's immigration because it shows why immigration policy is changing now and why migrant workers are being considered a necessary supplement to the workforce. This notion also adds context for the rationale that underlies government policy decisions and what one should expect to be expressed in national agencies' outward-facing documentation.

Oh-Jung Kwon's 2018 comparison study titled, *The diverging paths of skilled immigration in Singapore, Japan, and Korea: policy priorities and external labor market for skilled foreign workers*, highlighted the different approaches and results of high-income Asian countries have experienced concerning their immigration policies. Kwon's study supports the idea that all three countries use what he called the "Typical Asian model of labor immigration."⁶ This model considers the amount of temporary employment in the country and compares it to the restrictions on the permanent settlement

3 Ibid., 65.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 63.

6 Oh-Jung Kwon, "The Diverging Paths of Skilled Immigration in Singapore, Japan and Korea: Policy Priorities and External Labor Market for Skilled Foreign Workers," *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources* 57, no. 4 (March 2018): 437, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1744-7941.12173>.

of immigrants in the country.⁷ However, in his research, Kwon observed that Singapore deviated from this model by implementing “institutionalized qualification-centered employment practices and greater access to permanent membership for skilled foreigners.”⁸ Singapore’s success from this deviation helps support Kwon’s findings that giving foreign workers accreditation and removing as many restraints on them as possible allows the migrant workers to integrate at a faster and more substantial level.⁹ This adds critical context to the policy decisions of Japan in the greater Asian country collective. Taking this insight into the comparison of governmental agencies outward facing documentation and media’s newspapers, a sharper image of Japan’s current immigration trajectory could be viewed as wavering between the typical immigration model and the integration model closer to that of Singapore.

Ayako Komine’s 2018 work, titled *A Closed Immigration Country: Revisiting Japan as a Negative Case*, argued that there are discrepancies between the Japanese government’s rhetoric in their communicated immigration rationale and priorities of actual immigration policies which is reflected in immigration patterns.¹⁰ Traditionally, Japan has been stereotyped as a country closed off to immigration, favoring only high-skilled labor. Komine agrees that the Japanese point-based approach to immigration may have contributed to this stereotype.¹¹ Through quantitative analysis of Japan’s immigration output, Komine found that “skilled economic migrants and co-ethnic migrants have greater access to rights than low-skilled economic migrants.”¹² This data supports the general stereotype of Japan favoring high-skilled migrant workers over low-skilled migrant workers. However, Komine’s research finding also supports a conflicting notion that the country is more open to low-skilled economic migrants. Identifying that while high-skilled migrant workers have more rights based on government policies, the government is currently allowing a higher influx of low-skilled migrant workers into the country while still

7 Ibid., 418-444.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ayako Komine, “A Closed Immigration Country: Revisiting Japan as a Negative Case,” *International Migration* 56, no. 5 (December 2018): 106-122, <https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12383>.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

prioritizing rights for high-skilled workers.¹³ Komine's work is essential to note because it reveals that the formal stance on the issue is different from what is taking place in the country. The differences expressed in the formal favoritism of high-skilled labor versus the actual high influx of low-skilled workers supports the need for further inspection of the dissonance and alignment of Japanese immigration policies and the information available to the public.

The 2017 study by James F. Hollifield and Michael Orlando Sharpe analyzed Japan as a so-called emerging migration state.¹⁴ Their study's goal was to highlight that as a country's national security and development becomes more dependent on migration, their society undergoes transformation relevant to the four dimensions of governance.¹⁵ These dimensions balance security, markets, rights, and culture, and finding a balance between all four can continue to be a difficult challenge.¹⁶ As one might assume, everything is a give and take; and as a nation moves in one direction, they move away from another. Their study added support to this notion and argued that the way migration is governed directly affects the country's political backlash and economic success.¹⁷ With this in mind, they proposed that Japan will "become trapped in a liberal paradox, needing to be economically open and politically closed for decades to come."¹⁸ Hollifield and Sharpe's work is critical to note for our purposes because it shows the importance of how the governance of migration can directly affect the country's domestic reaction and economic success. The rationale underlying immigration policies versus what is communicated by the media and the government hinges on satisfying progress in the economy and alleviating domestic reaction. This dynamic underpins the balancing act between the communication of policies and the policies themselves. Just as public perceptions and societal acceptance are dependent on this balancing act, our understandings over Japan's immigration policies are shaped by this interaction of political and economic priorities. Their work also highlighted that Japan is primed for societal change and has already

13 Ibid.

14 James F. Hollifield and Michael Orlando Sharpe, "Japan as an 'Emerging Migration State,'" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 17, no. 3 (January 2017): pp. 371-400, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcx013>.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., 394.

undergone profound immigration changes, laying out an angle for our research to investigate the perception of newspapers and government agencies on immigration changes and how these changes are being addressed publicly.

Rationale for Selecting Media and Government Documents for Comparison

With so much variety in conversation and angles that can be taken in a vast topic such as immigration, to gain any form of insight, we will need to narrow the scope of selecting media and documents by identifying common themes. For this comparison study, we will compare documents released by governmental agencies with newspaper articles directed towards international and domestic audiences. These articles and documents cover similar topics regarding the effectiveness of immigration, such as policy, rights, and rationale, and possess a comparable written communication style.

The choice of using governmental agencies' outward-facing documents is because they are the most prolific direct source of information for the general population concerning immigration policies and issues. Since these documents come directly from the governmental agencies themselves, they reveal how the Japanese government frames the immigration issue and what rationale they are trying to communicate to the public. This gives us a better understanding of the government's perception and the reasoning behind the reactionary stances the public can take.

Written forms of outward-facing documentation of the governmental agencies will be used because they tend to be the most used method of disseminating information to the public from the government regarding immigration. The use of written communication methods also means that the government tends to release translated versions to allow more accessibility to international and domestic audiences, something essential to identifying the disparities in perception, progress, and prioritization. For this comparison, we will use the four most prominent and most influential agencies regarding immigration in Japan: The Japanese Ministry of Health, Immigration Services, International Affairs Division, and The Ministry of Justice. From each agency, the most recent and updated releases of outward-facing documentation concerning immigration topics in Japan, such as policies, rights, data, and rationale, will be chosen.

The rationale behind using newspapers for this comparison with governmental agencies' written documents is rooted in its foundation as

a primary source of information for the general population. As technology advanced, these newspapers adapted and are now fully available online. This online presence has allowed ease of access for the domestic population and the international community and continues to be one of the most dominant news sources for both. The newspaper's written communication method is also the closest to that of the governmental agencies in the form of press releases and outward-facing style. By utilizing newspapers written articles and governmental agencies written releases, we do not have to account for other variables in the presentation of information inherent in visual media. Instead, we can immediately focus on the express rationale of policies, projected measurements of progress, and perceptions of topics in the government's writing to that of the written media.

Since some governmental agencies' documents are directed toward domestic Japanese audiences and the international migrant audience worldwide, prominent newspapers must be used for their proliferation both internationally and in Japan. To match this selection of four prominent governmental agencies, articles from four prominent international newspapers will be chosen. All of them will be internationally focused, but two of them will have a stronger focus on the national Japanese demographic, including *The Japan Times* and *The Asahi Shimbun*, while the other two will have a more robust international demographic focus with the use of National Public Radio (NPR) and *The Guardian*. However, articles from all four news sources will be chosen based on their coverage of similar topics to that of the governmental agencies' outward-facing documentation concerning the effective of immigration.

Comparison

Comparing all the sources selected, a significant difference amongst the news sources becomes immediately evident regarding the news articles predominantly concerned with the international demographic, compared to the articles targeting the Japanese audience. While articles from all four address similar topics of immigration policies and implementation to that of the governmental agencies, there is a preferred differing explanation method of gauging the effectiveness of immigration policies in both the international and Japanese media sources. The selected articles from the predominantly international audience-focused newspapers, including *The Guardian* and NPR, fixated on the experiences of migrant workers coming

to work in Japan as indicators of effective immigration.¹⁹ In contrast, the articles from national newspapers with a more robust Japanese audience focus, including *The Asahi Shimbun* and *The Japan Times*, focused on explaining the reasoning behind immigration and adaptation.²⁰ This difference in focus highlights a significant disparity in projected ideas on immigration directed towards international and domestic audiences.

The domestic newspaper articles sought to explain and justify why immigration is happening. They accomplish explaining reasons behind immigration by attributing statistical data to the workforce drop in Japan and talking to economists like Mitsuhiro Fukao.²¹ The *Japan Times* article, *Looking Overseas to Solve Japan's Labor Shortage*, covers how the economic effects of international workers affect Japanese organizations, and the economist Mitsuhiro Fukao states that:

Employers are put off by the high cost of hiring non-Japanese. Legally, companies must pay them the same wages they give Japanese workers. After paying insurance, pension, training, overseas flights, dormitory and recruitment expenses, it is often cheaper to hire a nonregular Japanese worker than a foreign citizen.²²

However, by talking about the effect immigration has on the economy and speaking about immigrants as if they are currently an economic burden on Japanese companies, the conversation about immigration is primarily economical in nature. The *Asahi Shimbun* article titled, *Foreign Population*

19 Justin McCurry, "The Changing Face of Japan: Labour Shortage Opens Doors to Immigrant Workers," *The Guardian*, November 8, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/09/the-changing-face-of-japan-labour-shortage-opens-doors-to-immigrant-workers>; Anthony Kuhn and Chie Kobayashi, "As Japan Tries Out Immigration, Migrant Workers Complain Of Exploitation," *NPR*, January 15, 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/01/15/683224099/as-japan-tries-out-immigration-migrant-workers-complain-of-exploitation>.

20 Richard Solomon, "Looking Overseas to Solve Japan's Labor Shortage," *The Japan Times*, November 16, 2019, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/08/commentary/japan-commentary/looking-overseas-solve-japans-labor-shortage/>; *The Asahi Shimbun*, "Foreign Population in Japan Reaches Record 2.93 Million at End of December," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 30, 2020, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13256541>.

21 Solomon, "Looking Overseas."

22 Ibid.

in Japan Reaches Record 2.93 Million at End of December, follows a similar approach by only referring to the data related to the number of people coming to Japan, staying in Japan, overstaying their visa, and where they came from.²³ Like the ones present in *The Japan Times*, the conversation focuses on economy and numbers to gauge effectiveness.

This perspective aimed at the domestic audience presents immigration as if they are trying to sell the audience on the need for immigration by presenting a rationale for its implementation economically. When presented this way, it implies that immigration is something negative, and that the audience needs to be convinced of its benefits and necessity through economic gains and statistical rationale. However, this use of gauging immigration's effectiveness primarily through economic reasoning guides a funneled perspective to the domestic audience on what immigration and migrant workers are for and their role in society.

In contrast, when discussing the same policies and implementation strategies, the international media is more focused on diving into the experience of how it is being implemented from the viewpoint of immigrant workers as gauges of effectiveness. NPR's article titled, *As Japan Tries Out Immigration; Migrant Workers Complain of Exploitation*, they interview immigrant workers in Japan who are very critical of foreign workers' treatment under the old and new immigration policies and initiatives. One of the interviews stated that "We were deceived," referring to what they expected to be able to do in the country based on the communication from the government compared to the jobs they were given.²⁴ Such comments even referred to worker exploitation and abuse through the employment of working on radiation cleaning without proper equipment for migrant workers.²⁵

It makes sense that the international media is looking towards the experiences of migrants since the international demographic are the possible migrants in question. So, with this demographic being the concerned party, it becomes intuitive for the international community to be more concerned with the reality of being a migrant worker in Japan. Using gauges of economic benefits for the government framing the need for immigration does not have the same persuasion or effect on the international audience as it

23 *The Asahi Shimbun*, "Foreign Population in Japan."

24 Kuhn and Kobayashi, "As Japan Tries Out Immigration."

25 *Ibid.*

could on the domestic one. The article titled, *The Changing Face of Japan: Labour Shortage Opens Doors to Immigrant Workers* by The Guardian, highlights this perspective even further by calling on the government to take responsibility for a plan to let foreign workers and Japanese citizens work together and “feel secure.”²⁶ This perspective is not about fixing the economy of Japan, but instead, sets up effective immigration for people coming to Japan and joining not only the workforce but also the country and society.

Between the diverging media perceptions of immigration, the dissonance between perspectives concerning the long-term goal of immigration in Japan is muddled. On one hand, for the media targeting the national Japanese demographic, the newspapers frame that immigration is necessary to support the dwindling workforce and strengthen the economy. At the same time, the sources of the International-focused media are more concerned with immigrant workers’ experiences in Japan and their ability to assimilate into society. The disparity in perceiving immigration through progress by assimilation into Japanese society and the prioritization of economic means to fix a problem could simply be based on what the media thinks would be best for each demographic market. However, this dissonance in how to view the progress of immigration and its long-term goals is not simply an issue created by the media, but one possibly birthed from the government’s communication of policies themselves.

Comparing the information from the news sources with the governmental agencies’ documentation, it becomes apparent that the government also tends to take a similar approach of different gauges of focus when communicating information targeting the domestic audience to that of the international audience. Japan wants to appease both the domestic audience and the international audience, with both demographics having access to the governmental agencies’ outward-facing documentation. However, while looking at the analysis of their policies through the literature review, the government of Japan’s immigration perspective closely aligns with the effectiveness gauge based on economic priority seen in the Japanese demographic-focused newspapers. However, despite this prioritization based on economic means of labor immigration in the policies, their communication strategies targeting the international community focus on immigrant workers’ assimilation and their role in growing the diversification of Japanese society.

26 McCurry, “The Changing Face of Japan.”

The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare wrote a piece titled, *For Foreign National Wishing to Work in Japan*, where they outlined who are allowed to work, what to do when looking for a job, Japanese labor laws, insurance offerings, reporting companies, and mandatory notifications.²⁷ This 47-page document outlines necessary information that immigrant workers need to know if they wish to come to Japan. However, the most noteworthy point of this document is that it includes information on immigrants' labor rights, how to report companies that violate these rights, and steps employers must take if they plan to hire foreign workers in their company.²⁸ This type of attention to laws to protect the immigrant workers is significant and will directly appeal to the long-term immigration perspective that the international media was using. This is further supported by information from the Immigration Service Agency of Japan article titled, *A Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign Nationals*. Here they speak about promoting acceptance of foreign nationals, support of foreign residents, and new resident management systems.²⁹

By outlining all these services, these government bodies address specifically what the international media was asking for Japan to do by framing immigration not merely as a temporary economic solution, but through assimilation and the long-term diversification of the Japanese society. However, the government's policies are still directed at supporting the perspective of the migrant worker as temporary economic solutions. The services they mention are all short-term quality of life improvements directed towards labor rights and information related to working life, instead of any long-term considerations for other societal aspects for long-term assimilation.³⁰ Given the dissonance between the priorities in government publications and the actual actions of policies, the government is actively creating information to attract immigrants while continuing to justify their policies as a temporary measure of influx to meet economic needs. With few

27 Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, *For Foreign Nationals Wishing to Work in Japan*, (Hello Work) Public Employment Security Offices, <https://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/06-Seisakujouhou-11650000-Shokugyouseiteikyokuhakenyukiroudoutaisaku/0000055573.pdf>.

28 Ibid.

29 Immigration Service Agency of Japan, *Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign Nationals (Revised) Outline*, <http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/english/keiziban/pdf/200317-measures-detailed.pdf>.

30 Ibid.

expressed policies or government incentives for long-term integration, the publication's voice is speaking of immigration on a progressive note, while their policies are following merely an economical solution. This divergence then bleeds into a competing cacophony of views found in international and domestic-focused new sources evaluating immigration effectiveness based on different aspects of the government's immigration plans.

Conclusion

In both the international and domestic newspapers and the governmental documentation directed towards the public, they talk about how this use of labor immigration will benefit Japan's economy in the long run. However, dissonance starts to form in conflicting perspectives of how one is supposed to judge its effectiveness. The domestic-focused newspapers and Japanese policies show a strong focus on gauging immigration's effectiveness on financial results. Simultaneously, the international-focused media and Japanese governmental agencies' outward-facing documentation view the importance of seeing immigration as more than just a financial solution and find value in the assimilation of immigrants. This dissonance in perspective has created uncertainty for the country in the direction of long-term policy and the lack thereof. No reliable information or passed legislation activity shows substantial progress, leaving Japan walking a tight rope of saying it wants immigration while enacting policies that support the use of immigration for economic purposes and not effective assimilation.

Suppose Japan continues to enact policies directed towards only absolute financial gains and ones not considering assimilation indicative of the Traditional Asian Model of immigration. They will not be able to maintain the current expressed message towards the international community promising support of permanent immigration. On the other hand, suppose the Japanese government does intend to open their country more regarding assimilation and diversification of their society. In that case, they must target the domestic audience with the same type of communication strategies targeted at foreign workers found in the governmental agencies' documents. If no action is taken, both Japanese citizens and foreign workers could end up viewing Japan's immigration strategy and policies as a failure. This will stifle economic progress and successful immigration. A clear message about long-term strategies that targets both international and domestic demographics with the same message about the real intention of the policies is necessary for any progress to be made.

An Analysis of White, Euro-American Female Sex Tourism in Thailand: Cross-Border Desire as an Outlet of Racial, Gender, Class, & Sexual Power

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Female sex tourism in migration and tourism studies is understudied. This gap in the literature has caused conventional definitions of sex tourism to be oversimplified and conceptually constrained. Although cross-border sexual encounters by women in the tourist landscape are becoming more frequent due to gendered trends of globalization, their presence and role as sex tourists are rarely considered. This paper refocuses the conceptual frame of sex tourism onto white, heterosexual, Euro-American female sex tourists in Thailand. Thailand, popularly known as a global sex tourist hub for males, is rarely recognized for its presence in female sex tourism. By focusing on this regional context, this paper advances a new perspective of sex tourism through the lens of race, gender, class, and sexual hierarchies. The intersections of race, gender, class, and sex in this tourist setting emerge to reveal complex power dynamics that shape the social position of the white female sex tourist. Findings reveal that interactions between white female sex tourists and local, heterosexual Thai men are patterned and enabled by their racial, gender, class, and sexual identities. These interactions, engendered by the intersection of these identities, are not limited to the stereotypical sex industry. White female sex tourists were found to negotiate and redefine these identities in ways they find authentic and suitable to their tourist experience. In conclusion, a new definition of sex tourism that aligns with these findings and new directions for research are offered to expand on the oversimplified, standard definitions of sex tourism.

Introduction

The prevailing western-centric image of sex tourism effortlessly invokes the image of a western male traveling to the developing world to purchase sex from

local women. Studies on sex tourism derived from the west; therefore, have focused overwhelmingly on males from developed nations traveling to engage in sexual activity, their female sex worker counterparts, and their motivations.¹ This paper expands the literature on sex tourism by shifting the spotlight to the phenomena of female sex tourism, defined as females from developed nations traveling to the developing world to purchase sex from local men.

Female sex tourism has been widely omitted from the analysis of sex tourism, especially in varying regional contexts. Although recognition of female sex tourism is infrequent relative to the male counterpart, the study of female sex tourism offers key insights surrounding racial, class, gender, and sexual hierarchies. Cross-border sexual encounters by women are increasingly popular, and the frequency and variety of different regional contexts provide a new lens for understanding power hierarchies. The discussion in this paper will interrogate and deconstruct the interplay of race, gender, class, and sexuality in the tourist landscape of sexual encounters between middle-class white, heterosexual, female migrants from economically developed states, such as the US and Great Britain, and young local Thai males and the wider sex industry in Thailand. This research will underscore this interplay of identities of white female tourists, seeking to fulfill romantic or erotic desires with young Thai gigolos that develop complex entanglements with these female visitors. This analysis will expand knowledge concerning racial, class, gender, and sexual hierarchies, which will emerge to confirm and further uncover global power structures inherent in these asymmetric, cross-border sexual encounters.

My central research question is “How do constructs of race, class, gender, and sexuality interact and impact interactions between white female tourists and young, male Thai locals?” In addressing this question, this research will advance an intersectional, transnational approach to sex tourism by arguing that an interplay of racial and class constructs reinforces an asymmetric power structure that these female sex tourists consciously and unconsciously wield. Commercial and non-commercial sexual encounters and relationships between white, heterosexual, female tourists and young, heterosexual Thai males are also shown to allow white female tourists to negotiate and redefine their conventional sexual and gender constructs internalized from their home culture. This paper will conclude by arguing

1 Martin Oppermann, “Sex Tourism,” *Annals of Tourism Research* 26, no. 2 (1999): 251–266; Héctor Carillo, “Sexual Migration, Cross-Cultural Sexual Encounters, and Sexual Health,” *Sexuality Research and Social Policy* 1, no. 3 (2004): 64.

that global inequalities in economic and racial power are the primary drivers facilitating cross-border sexual encounters in the tourist landscape.

To probe this question, a textual analysis of news commentary and tourist internet forums is performed to gauge conventional beliefs and prevailing ideas concerning race, gender, class, and sex in the discussion of white female sex tourists in Thailand. This analysis is informed by secondary research and theory in race, gender, and tourism studies. Limitations and challenges to the study of sex tourism and this methodology are discussed in the following sections.

Literature Review: Sex Tourism and its Conceptual Constraints

Research on sex tourism has been established as a legitimate area of tourism studies since the 1970s. Yet, the field remains constrained conceptually. Sex tourism is essentially a facet of the global sex trade, where travel is undertaken to engage in some type of sexual activity. Despite the reality of the broad scope of sex tourism, research has been narrowly confined by the definition of the topic. According to several dictionaries with a marked history in shaping the English language, the standard definition of sex tourism involves traveling to exchange money for sexual activity.² Likewise, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention defines sex tourism as “travel planned specifically for the purpose of sex, generally to a country where sex work is legal.”³ The conformity of these definitions signals that the concept of sex tourism has been funneled to the realm of commercial sex work. Traditionally, research has also followed this tendency and has oversimplified the roles between males and females into the dyad of local female sex workers and male tourist consumers that rely on monetary exchanges (See *Figure 1*).⁴ This focus reflects the paradigm of the sex trade as a feature in a market economy where liberalization has been extended to human bodies in a

2 *Cambridge Dictionary Online*, s.v. “Sex Tourism,” <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/sex-tourism>; *Oxford Reference Online*, s.v. “Sex Tourism,” <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199599868.001.0001/acref-9780199599868-e-1667>; *Macmillan Dictionary Online*, s.v. “sex tourism,” <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/american/sex-tourism>.

3 “Sex Tourism,” Travelers’ Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, last modified November 18, 2019, <https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/page/sex-tourism>.

4 Oppermann, “Sex Tourism,” 252; Andrew Spencer and Dalea Bean, “Female Sex Tourism in Jamaica: An Assessment of Perceptions,” *Journal of Destination Marketing & Management* 6, no. 1 (2017): 14.

framework of supply and demand.⁵ This paradigm is often constrained by the conventional image of male sex tourists and their patriarchal and economic power intrinsic in their travels to the Third World, leading researchers to ignore other important and relevant social phenomena.⁶ Ryan and Hall (2001) argue that despite the trend toward male client and female sex workers as the most prominent form of sex tourism, these images are rooted in a wider social context of issues materializing in the modern era, where different perspectives are often omitted and marginalized in the analysis of sex tourism. Thus, Ryan and Hall acknowledge that these interactions often go beyond the traditional sex worker and client paradigm, where both non-commercial and commercial transactions occur (See *Figure 2*).⁷ By acknowledging the nuanced nature and plurality of actors in sex tourism, simplified definitions of sex tourism lose their validity.⁸ Overall, the traditional view of sex tourism is oversimplified and inadequate; therefore, more recent literature moves beyond commercial sexual relations as the defining criteria for sex tourism.




Figure 1. The traditional paradigm of sex tourism: sex worker and client. (Diagram by author, Adapted from Oppermann, “Sex Tourism,” 252).

5 Jeremy Seabrook, *Travels in the Skin Trade: Tourism and the Sex Industry* (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 129.

6 Deborah Pruitt and Suzanne LaFont, “For Love and Money: Romance Tourism in Jamaica,” *Annals of Tourism Research* 22, no. 2 (1995): 437; David Leheny, “A Political Economy of Asian Sex Tourism,” *Annals of Tourism Research* 22, no. 2 (1995): 368–69.

7 Chris Ryan and Michael C. Hall, *Sex tourism: Marginal people and Liminalities*. (London: Routledge, 2001), 47–62.

8 Oppermann, “Sex Tourism,” 262.




Figure 2. “Sex tourism encounters,” in Chris Ryan and Michael C. Hall, *Sex Tourism: Marginal People and liminalities* (London: Routledge, 2001), 62, fig. 3.1.

Despite the abundance of past research attention on male sex tourism, recent years have increased the recognition of the reality that the sex tourism market includes a plurality of actors, including female clients. These studies have usually focused on relationships between North American and European female tourists that travel to underdeveloped countries for a holiday, including sexual relations with local males often referred to as “beach boys.”⁹ Although research on female sex tourism and male sex workers is less explored, there have been an array of studies done, encompassing multiple locations, which expose varying subjectivities underpinning female sex tourist interactions. Various studies involving female tourists and local

9 Joan Phillips, “Female Sex Tourism in Barbados: A Postcolonial Perspective,” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 14, no. 2 (2008): 203.

males have been conducted, including one in Kenya,¹⁰ and several in the Caribbean,¹¹ which includes various destinations, such as Jamaica,¹² Barbados,¹³ and the Dominican Republic.¹⁴ Some of this research theorizes that sexual relations in the Caribbean have been linked to the traditional power of European colonizers over colonized people and have emphasized structural inequalities that underpin these relations.¹⁵ Therefore, these studies have affirmed that sex tourism is underpinned by global inequality. However, debates concerning the motivations driving female sex tourism have obscured other factors that drive these asymmetric relationships.

Previous research describing female tourists' involvement with local men has also hinged on a debate of their objectives: to search for romantic love or desire for sexual excitement and novelty. According to a study done by Albuquerque (1998),¹⁶ relationships between female tourists and local males indicate the exchange of sex for money. However, most researchers argue this view is too narrow and highlight various additional motivations for female tourist involvement with local males, such as the roles of romance and companionship rather than purely economic and sexual motivations.¹⁷ Thus, Pruitt and LaFont (1995) coined the term 'romance tourism' to distinguish the sexual behavior between male and female tourists.¹⁸ Yet, regardless of

10 Kempe Ronald Hope, "Sex Tourism in Kenya: an Analytical Review," *Tourism Analysis* 18, no. 5 (2013): 533–42.

11 Klaus D. Albuquerque, "Sex, Beach Boys, and Female Tourists in the Caribbean," in *Sex Work & Sex Workers*, (London: Routledge, 1998), 87–112; Jacqueline Sánchez Taylor, "Dollars Are a Girl's Best Friend? Female Tourists' Sexual Behaviour in the Caribbean," *Sociology* 35, no. 3 (2001): 749–64.

12 Pruitt and LaFont, "For Love and Money," 422–40; Andrew Spencer and Dalea Bean, "Female sex tourism in Jamaica: An assessment of perceptions," *Journal of Destination Marketing & Management* 6, no. 1 (2017): 13–21.

13 Phillips, "Female Sex Tourism," 201–12.

14 Edward Herold, Rafael Garcia, and Tony DeMoya, "Female Tourists and Beach Boys: Romance or Sex Tourism?" *Annals of Tourism Research* 28, no. 4 (2001) 978–97.

15 Phillips, "Female Sex Tourism," 202; Spencer and Bean, "Female sex tourism," 13.

16 Albuquerque, "Sex, Beach Boys, and Female Tourists," 89.

17 Pruitt and LaFont, "For Love and Money," 422–40; Herold, Garcia, and DeMoya, "Female Tourists," 993.

18 *Ibid.*, 423.

any subtle and essentialist gender assumptions between women’s ‘romantic’ and men’s ‘sexual’ encounters, Taylor (2001) argues that any differentiation relies on the separation of the activity rather than the gender of the actors, and that female traveler behavior perceived as romance should be included in the category of sex tourism.¹⁹ Likewise, Taylor (2006) argues that this ‘double-standard in labeling, applied to differentiate between male and female tourists’ sexual behavior, overlooks more complex understandings motivating these relationships and obscures the significance of race and other factors that shape these encounters.²⁰ Regardless of the label of the pursuit, other findings support the idea that there is little difference between the two.²¹ Therefore, Herold et al. (2001) employ a continuum of romance/sex motivations to accommodate the complexity of sex tourism encounters.²² Their research also recognizes that encounters may be motivated by companionship, where neither love nor sex is desired (See *Figure 3*). Because of the varying subjectivities and motivations underlying female sex tourist interactions, it is critical for the literature to explore new terrains that present a broader framework than the dichotomy of ‘romance’ and ‘sex’ tourism, and further advance an intersectional, pluralistic framework to capture complex understandings and the diversity of these exchanges.




Figure 3. A continuum of romance and sex motivations in female sex tourism. (Diagram by author, Adapted from Herold, Garcia, and DeMoya, “Female Tourists and Beach Boys: Romance or Sex Tourism?” 994).

Unlike Africa or the Caribbean, female sex tourism has been relatively

19 Taylor, “Dollars Are a Girl’s Best Friend,” 761.

20 Jacqueline Sánchez Taylor, “Female sex tourism: a contradiction in terms?” *Feminist Review* 83, no. 1 (2006): 43–44.

21 Irmgard L. Bauer, “Romance tourism or female sex tourism?” *Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease* 12, no. 1 (2014): 25.

22 Herold, Garcia, and DeMoya, “Female Tourists,” 994.

unexplored in Southeast Asia. Discussions on female sex tourism in Southeast Asia have often focused on Bali's infamous Kuta Beach, where "muscular, bronzed Indonesian men with big smiles and long, wavy hair have been seducing foreign women..."²³ However, Bali, Indonesia is the only mainstream location, well-known for its presence of western female sex tourists in Southeast Asia. Thailand is also recognized as a significant site of sex tourism. However, anthropological literature on sex tourism is nearly exclusive to male sex tourists and female sex workers in this regional context.²⁴ This idea is epitomized by the expression developed in Germany, where "the men go to Thailand, and the women go to Jamaica."²⁵ Yet, some contributions to the literature have recognized the evolving stage of the sex industry in Thailand, identifying that Japanese female sex tourists traveling to Thailand have overtaken their Japanese male counterparts.²⁶ Accordingly, Carillo (2004) suggests that the study of sexual migration will illuminate more understandings of varying sexualities across the globe, especially in the arena of sex tourism, where "bodies carry with them ideologies, practices, desires, longings, and imaginings about ways of enacting sexuality differently in faraway locations."²⁷ Since each destination and plurality of actors has a unique history and culture of sexuality, it will also be prudent to explore the intersectionality of white, Euro-American female sex tourists and young local males in Thailand.

Brief Background on Thailand as a Sex Tourist Destination

As a popular destination for white western tourists, Thailand is frequently depicted as exotic and erotic. The designation of Thailand as a sex tourism destination was formulated during the Vietnam War, which continues today. In the late 1960s and 70s, Thailand's economy became dependent on US military personnel, where the central commodity became sexual pleasure. Thailand's sex industry was developed partly due to local demand represented in terms of the available number of sex providers and customers, which promoted it as a "Rest & Recreation" hotspot to

23 Shay Christopher, "Gigolos on the Beach: Cracking Down on Bali's 'Kuta Cowboys'," *TIME*, May 6, 2010, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1986847,00.html>.

24 Seabrook, *Travels in the Skin Trade*, 4.

25 Pruitt and LaFont, "For Love and Money," 425.

26 Leheny, "A Political Economy," 380.

27 Carillo, "Sexual Migration," 68.

become unofficially recognized as a station of “Intercourse and Intoxication” for US troops.²⁸ Thus, the international commercial sex scene in Thailand became its preferred image due to the influx of and participation by foreign sex tourists from the First World. Oppermann and McKinley (1997) found that using sexual imagery to promote these destinations was a meaningful factor in their marketing.²⁹ Similarly, Prideaux et al. (2004) illustrate how this process of eroticization overwhelmed its image as an exotic destination, which has impacted how tourists imagine its landscape and people.³⁰

Because there is no clear demarcation where ‘sex tourism’ takes place, venues of tourism and the sex industry overlap, where Thailand has been reduced to and normalized as a sexualized space in the imagination of western countries.³¹ People are naturalized as more promiscuous, and sex is naturalized as part of the cultural fabric. This is supported by Oppermann (1998), who suggests that travel destinations are impacted by the way tourists perceive those destinations.³² This would indicate that there is a link between the perception of the tourist and their consumption practices, where engaging in parts of the sex industry is constructed as visiting a tourist attraction. Therefore, the image of Thai culture and people as sexually open is reinforced by Thailand’s reputation as an international sex tourist destination. The consumption of sex shows is seen as a normal or even an authentic part of the tourist experience. Sanders (2011) reveals this is because the “[tourist] gaze is directed and mediated, and often they seek out places that are considered authentic.”³³ Although I have never physically visited Thailand, I gained similar impressions by word of the social

28 Ryan Bishop and Lillian S. Robinson, “In the Night Market: Tourism, Sex, and Commerce in Contemporary Thailand,” *Women’s Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1999): 34.

29 Martin Oppermann and Shawna McKinley, “Sexual imagery in the marketing of Pacific tourism destinations,” in *Pacific Rim Tourism*, ed. Martin Oppermann (CABI Publishing, 1997).

30 Bruce Prideaux, Jerome Agrusa, Jon G. Donlon, and Chris Curran, “Exotic or erotic—contrasting images for defining destinations,” *Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research* 9, no. 1 (2004): 5–17.

31 Sanders, “One night in Bangkok,” 128.

32 “Marketing Sex and Tourism Destinations,” in *Sex Tourism and Prostitution: Aspects of Leisure, Recreation, and Work*, ed. Martin Oppermann (Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998) 20.

33 Sanders, “One night in Bangkok,” 148.

media grapevine. My aunt first made me aware of the phenomena when she warned about female peers traveling to various destinations in Southeast Asia to engage in temporary relationships and casual sex with local men. Before traveling or residing in Thailand, Euro-American women internalize this reputation, viewing the sex industry as a natural part of Thailand's culture, which urges the need to reevaluate their access to seemingly 'innocent' forms of Thailand's tourist locations and the more overt sex industry.

Methodology and Limitations

To understand the subjectivities of female sex tourism in the Thai context, I performed a textual analysis of approximately forty commentaries contained within user posts from three forums intended for use by tourists and ex-pats, several online media commentaries, and two short interviews contained within news articles that encode first and third-person discussions of relationships between white, western, female tourists and male Thai locals (See *Figure 4*). All these materials are based on the English language. This analysis is theoretically informed and supported by secondary research to confirm and expand on ideas present in the research of race, sex, gender, class, and tourism. I will expand the classification of female sex tourists to gain access to more discussions of tourist and local interactions. In this analysis, I will strive to explore how these tourists interact with Thailand's formal and informal sex industry and interrogate how they can (re)fashion their sexual, racial, gender, and class identities. In my conclusion, I will summarize key findings, offer a new definition of sex tourism that aligns with these findings, and raise questions and implications for future research.

Upon engaging with this topic, I was challenged in identifying and measuring what qualifies as female sex tourism. To overcome methodological constraints and fully develop classifications of female sex tourists, I want to advance the idea that sex tourism is not exclusive to commercial sex work but also encompasses a range of ambiguous relationships.³⁴ While there may exist self-proclaimed sex tourists, most foreign tourists likely do not consider themselves as such.³⁵ Because of the perceived "taboo" and potential stigma surrounding the topic, I assumed I would run into trouble locating data, as well as interviews from the subjects who were willing to post and share their

34 Oppermann, "Sex Tourism.," Erica. L. Williams, *Sex Tourism in Bahia: Ambiguous Entanglements* (University of Illinois Press, 2013), 11.

35 *Ibid*, 91.

experiences publicly. This sentiment is shared by Albuquerque (1998), who resorted to sensational films and fiction to capture the motivations of female sex tourism because they found it difficult to find and interview female sex tourists on the record.³⁶ Likewise, Günther (1998) encountered the same dilemma in their classification of the sex tourist because subjects would reject the label in their self-definition due to the strong public stigma of sex tourists and tourism.³⁷ I anticipated that it would be challenging to source discussions about female sex tourism in Thailand because there appeared to be limited data available about behaviors of western female tourists in Thailand. This is possibly because the destination traditionally attracted a disproportionate number of male visitors, which has been a mainstay of Thailand's tourism industry.³⁸

I had further reservations due to how Asian male masculinity and sexuality are stereotyped in the west, particularly in the United States, which has traditionally reduced Asian males to an inferior, undersexed category, prescribing them as sexually undesirable.³⁹ This concern was confirmed when I uncovered unmistakable stigmatizations of Asian male race and masculinity in the forums, one which notably expressed disbelief in the concealed phenomena of white female sex tourism occurring in Thailand: "these sort of women used to go to Jamaica for the 'big members,' whether they will tolerate the small Thai members remains to be seen."⁴⁰ Adding to my concerns, most of the discussion of the sex tourism scene in Thailand is dominated by western male tourists who participate in Thailand's well-known sex industry, which appears to uphold the dichotomy of eroticized Asian women and undersexed Asian males in the western social imaginary.⁴¹ However, as I probed discussion threads within several Thai tourist and ex-pat forums, a dissertation, and general discussions of female sex tourism in online media, I found that western

36 Albuquerque, "Sex, Beach Boys, and Female Tourists," 87–112.

37 Armin Günther, "Sex tourism without sex tourists," in *Sex tourism and prostitution: Aspects of leisure, recreation, and work*, ed. Martin Oppermann (New York: Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998), 71–80.

38 Ryan Bishop and Lillian L. Robinson, *Night Market: Sexual Cultures and the Thai Economic Miracle* (London: Routledge, 1998).

39 Yen Le Espiritu, *Asian American women and men: labor, laws, and love* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 2008), 97.

40 Darlek, "Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok," *Thai Visa-The Nation*, accessed April 30, 2021 (August 19, 2004), <https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/15247-sex-starved-women-fuel-gigolo-boom-in-bangkok/#comments>.

41 Ibid.

women are also engaging with the sex tourism industry in Thailand; albeit, on a curiously less recognizable scale. The concealed nature of these interactions may result because gendered norms of behavior veil their engagement with Thailand’s sex industry regarding their femininity, which allows them to deny the sexual nature of their visit.⁴² Although less visible on the surface, the liaisons of western female sex tourists with local Thai males emerge to reveal a complex interaction of race, gender, class, and sexual power relations.




Figure 4. List of textual materials discussing Western, white female sex tourism in Thailand used in the analysis (Diagram by author). *indicates secondary discussion of or participation by both US/Canada and UK females.

Who are the Female Sex Tourists?

This discussion of female sex tourism in Thailand requires a detailed description of who the sex tourists are and their origins. The transnational

42 Erin Sanders, “One night in Bangkok: Western women’s interactions with sexualized spaces in Thailand,” (PhD diss., University of Nottingham, 2011), 189.

encounters of heterosexual, white female tourists from western nations, primarily the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK), and their social and sexual liaisons with young adult, local Thai males are considered within the tourist landscape. I focus on the tourist perspective due to my greater access and potential insight, my gender, reliance on English, and nationality as a US citizen. Due to the difficulty to affirm the nationality of the white female sex tourists in question, I decided to include a few cases where the white female subject in question is nationally ambiguous, but speculated to belong to a developed western nation, considered “economically rich,” such as Canada or the United Kingdom. To avoid conflating differences in culture, gender, and sexual subjectivities, I will treat this analysis with sensitivity and label my speculation when appropriate. The white, Euro-American tourists I will focus on in this analysis range from young adults, as young as nineteen years of age, to elderly females as old as fifty that are considered much wealthier than the local Thai males they interact with, according to a tabloid-style article titled “Sex Starved Women fuel the Gigolo Boom in Bangkok” from the *Mirror* based in the UK.⁴³ On this age continuum identified from trends in the composition of female sex tourists in a field report and also codified in the media materials of this paper, the older women are typically retired, assumed to be lonely, disillusioned, and bored in their home relationships. On the other hand, the younger women are viewed as adventurous and more likely to consume alcohol and drugs when partaking in local culture. Both are considered unattractive in their home country, free from social constraints, and seek “thrill” in their new landscape.⁴⁴ These female “sex tourists” can include expatriates in Thailand for study or work purposes and women on holiday. Their relationship statuses vary between single, divorced, and married. Their relationships with local Thai men vary between casual friendships with local guides, more serious relationships with Thai men, and short-time encounters with male sex workers.⁴⁵ These women are typically located in well-known tourist destinations, such as Chiang-Mai, Bangkok, Phuket, and Pattaya.

It is commonplace for white, western women to interact with the wider sex industry catered and designated specifically for men in these tourist

43 “Sex Starved Women Fuel Gigolo Boom in Bangkok,” *The Mirror*, August 18, 2004, Wayback Machine Internet Archive, <https://web.archive.org/web/20040528081758/http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/allnews/page...ll&siteid=50143>.

44 Bauer, “Romance tourism,” 27.

45 Phil Nicks, “Where Foreign Women Find Love,” in *Love entrepreneurs: cross-culture relationship deals in Thailand* (Chiang Mai: Fast Track Publishing, 2009), 46.

destinations. Although most sexualized venues are catered and set for men, women are also allowed to enter and engage in these sexual entertainment locations as either voyeurs or clients that can negotiate sexual encounters. This is because western women's access to such venues is considered an acceptable tourist behavior, according to a study done by Sanders (2011) that traced and examined western women's interactions with sexualized tourist venues in Thailand.⁴⁶ It was found that these heterosexual women are less likely to visit sexual shows with exclusively male sex workers because it allows them to deny the sexual nature of their visit and highlight their femininity as passive, making it a point to distinguish themselves from "problematic white western males" by strategically positioning themselves away from the category of sex tourist.⁴⁷ This could explain why their involvement with Thai males was not exclusive to overt sexual entertainment venues but extends to galleries, beaches, and cafes. Bars, hotels, host clubs, massage parlors, and male-catered ping pong shows are all described as locations that enable white female tourists to interact with local Thais, corresponding with descriptions found in the following analysis.

Female Sex Tourism in Thailand: The Significance of Race, Gender, Sex, and Class

In a forum known as "ThaiVisa," intended for the use of tourists and ex-pats from Thailand, a post describing the "Thai gigolo boom in Bangkok" signals the Thai sex industry is no longer limited to Western men and testifies to the sprawling number of women "spawning a new breed of gigolos to satiate their carnal desires."⁴⁸ The central post in the thread refers to the article published in the UK-based media company *The Mirror* that describes the women as anywhere between nineteen to fifty years of age, attending so-called "sex clubs" or "go-go bars" in the Thai night scene, chatting up a young male gigolo with the purchase of a drink or meal, and eventually taking them home.⁴⁹ This single thread attracted a total of 42 comments discussing western women's visitation of both sexualized and tourist venues in Thailand to enter a form of casual and commercial sexual relationships; although, they, themselves,

46 Sanders, "One night in Bangkok."

47 Ibid, 189.

48 george, "Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok," *Thai Visa- The Nation*, accessed September 22, 2019 (August 18, 2004), <https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/15247-sex-starved-women-fuel-gigolo-boom-in-bangkok/#comments>.

49 "Sex Starved Women," *The Mirror*.

may not always see it as so. This idea is personified by the user “JemJem” in a comment describing their feeling on the matter, “I personally think sex is overrated. For me, nothing beats an evening out drinking a few beers ... and having some fun conversation with a [Thai guy] or people you have just met that evening.”⁵⁰ This sentiment also corresponds with the findings from Herold et al. (2001), which found that companionship was also a valid motivation for sex tourist encounters with locals on the romance and sex motivation continuum.⁵¹ Such an expression that denounces sexual activity allows the sex tourist to distance from labeling themselves as so. Furthermore, this reconfirms the idea that the sex tourist engages in a wide variety of ambiguous interactions that do not necessarily involve exchanging money or overt sexual venues.

In the same thread, a separate comment reads, “many people still feel embarrassed in talking about sex, so no wonder people feel they have to travel to the other side of the world in secret to relieve themselves.”⁵² This comment suggests that these women, in the period of holiday, enter these spaces seeking romantic or sexual attention associated with these venues. Perhaps “starved for love at home,” the tourist suddenly finds herself desirable to attentive, younger male companions. This sentiment is supported by another comment remarking on how

In an effort to heal the wounds from *farang* men... [these female tourists] enjoy show[ing] off their latest loverboy that they picked up at the bar and they look good to have someone hold their hand on the street, to hug at night, to make them feel beautiful, sexy, and desirable.⁵³

These venues encourage the negotiation of sexual and gender norms a woman adheres to in her home country, which may erase her reservations

50 JemJem, “Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok,” *Thai Visa- The Nation*, accessed April 30, 2021 (August 18, 2004), “<https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/15247-sex-starved-women-fuel-gigolo-boom-in-bangkok/#comments>.”

51 Herold, Garcia, and DeMoya, “Female Tourists,” 994.

52 dazdaz, “Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok,” *Thai Visa- The Nation*, accessed September 22, 2019 (August 18, 2004), <https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/15247-sex-starved-women-fuel-gigolo-boom-in-bangkok/#comments>.

53 jigsaw, “Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok,” *Thai Visa- The Nation*, accessed April 30, 2021 (August 19, 2004), <https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/15247-sex-starved-women-fuel-gigolo-boom-in-bangkok/page/2/>.

on the consumption of sex and simultaneously confirm her femininity as part of her tourist desire. Femininity is confirmed through the attention young Thai locals are willing to give her. By engaging in this relationship, she can reject the white men who rejected her, assigning her sexual power.⁵⁴ This comment also signals the white female sex tourist's insecurity about their physical femininity in relationships with *farang* (foreign, western) men: "What do *farang* men think about us? Our vaginas are big, the thin lines around our eyes are getting deeper, especially whenever we try to look happy and confident, our tits are hanging, we are hysterical, demanding bitches..."⁵⁵ By picking up or interacting with Thai "loverboys," the female sex tourist can destabilize traditional gender constructs and forge new gender and sexual identities by denying their perceived physical unattractiveness in their home country. While the female sex tourist can tap into this newfound sexual power in the spirit of the holiday, this negotiation is nuanced, simultaneously influenced by hegemonic notions of gender in respect to their sexual attractiveness, physical desirability, and other perceived forms of femininity. These comments in the thread of the ThaiVisa forum signal how traditional notions of hegemonic femininity revolving around their perceived attractiveness underlie their desire to pick up a Thai "loverboy."

As the white female sex tourist enters these casual and commercial relationships with Thai men, we can also witness the expression of white women's heterosexuality that influences these interactions through their desire for sexual or romantic attraction. Two comments within the Bangkok Tonight Forum, which attracted a total of 36 comments, hint at this phenomena where female sex tourists project their sexual and romantic fantasies onto the Thai tourist context, which are stagnant in their home country:

Women don't have to travel 10k miles to get laid... For the most part, it's a 'fantasy island' and that's what it ends up- being a fantasy. No doubt a few women go on vacation to get laid...⁵⁶

The woman is not paying for someone to [redacted] her, as

54 Taylor, "Dollars Are a Girl's Best Friend," 760.

55 jigsaw, "Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok," *Thai Visa-The Nation*, accessed April 30, 2021 (August 19, 2004), <https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/15247-sex-starved-women-fuel-gigolo-boom-in-bangkok/page/2/>.

56 BigDUSA, "Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok," *Bangkok Tonight Forum*, accessed April 30, 2021 (January 1, 2005, 1:24 a.m.), <http://bangkok2night.com/cgi-bin/forum/topic.cgi?forum=23&topic=532&start=0>.

she can get this anywhere... perhaps from her husband or boyfriend. No, she wants someone to make her feel special if only for a few minutes and even if only she has paid him.⁵⁷

Likewise, commentary within an article based in the UK discussing western women “chasing Thai gigolos,” endorses that the majority of these women “aren’t looking for a relationship, but they do appreciate being treated well, getting paid lots of positive attention, and having good sex.”⁵⁸ Here, the white female sex tourist is not just interested in engaging in sexual activity, but also values the romantic attention and companionship offered by these young male locals, which reaffirm their heterosexuality and femininity through attraction from the opposite sex.

Due to the hedonism inherent in the western view of a vacation, these women’s sexual behavior is impacted by the tourist context. Sanders-McDonagh (2019) suggests that this is due to the “liminal nature” of the tourist context that acts as a gateway for women to undertake risky, unusual behaviors beyond their everyday experiences.⁵⁹ This allows women to access and experience spaces, such as red-light districts or strip clubs, which they would generally consider taboo or too risky. These ideas about women’s risk-taking behavior defy traditional notions of femininity, where women are typically interpreted as ‘passive victims’ rather than ‘active risk-takers.’⁶⁰ This idea advanced by Sanders-McDonagh (2019) is embedded in female sex tourist behaviors, which are epitomized by descriptions in the forums and commentaries where reservations to consume sex or interact with local men, even ones they just met that evening, are alleviated by the tourist context. A comment by an interviewee supports this “no-strings strings-attached” view, under the pseudonym Stacy, who differentiates sex tourism between males and females, stating, “when [females] go abroad for sex, it’s about wanting

57 GuestNickRoach, “Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok,” *Thai Visa-The Nation*, accessed April 30, 2021 (August 19, 2004), <https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/15247-sex-starved-women-fuel-gigolo-boom-in-bangkok/page/2/>.

58 Liz Hoggard, “Women who travel for sex: Sun, sea and gigolos,” September 17, 2011, *The Independent*, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/women-who-travel-for-sex-sun-sea-and-gigolos-5329678.html>.

59 Erin Sanders-McDonagh, “Ontologies of Difference: The low-Other,” in *Women and Sex Tourism Landscapes* (London: Routledge, 2019), 81.

60 Ibid, 159.

to feel special and escaping the [social] boundaries at home.”⁶¹ The women can enter informal arrangements without the luggage of a formal relationship. There is also the added value of anonymity, where “what happens in Thailand, stays in Thailand.” In this equation of anonymity and lack of formal norms and social constraints to govern their desire hinted by Stacy, these women can pursue taboo desires that would be closed off to them due to the sexual etiquette that limit the parameters of their desire at home. Another comment in the ThaiVisa forum thread highlights this dynamic, revealing, “there’s a lot of frustrated western women out there. I can understand why they come searching for something and suddenly the environment provides it.”⁶² Here, their sexual and intimate demands are listened to due to the “liminal nature” of the tourist context, whether that is companionship or oral sex: “[these women] could be a goddess starlet fine assed bitch, old divorced hag with boobs down to her chest [redacted for obscenities] ugly dog we’ve ever seen. But they still can get laid/licked/lavished when they walk into that good ol’ local pub....”⁶³

The transition into a new social environment creates the perception of spontaneity that overrides the inhibitions and physical insecurities of the tourist. Pessar and Mahler’s (2003) framework of “gendered geographies of power” and “social imaginaries” also reveal how hierarchies of power can be signified through (re-)imagined categories of gender structure that characterize the cross-border fantasies and transnational sexual encounters.⁶⁴ White female heterosexuality and gender are constituted and redefined, enabling new identities and subjectivities. The reconfiguration and inversion of traditional gender roles and intimacy for heterosexual, white women that engage in these relationships demonstrates their gender and sexual power constructed through these interactions and is enabled by their migration.

While gender and sexual power are embedded in these interactions,

61 Ibid.

62 rod_kalashnikov, “Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok,” *Thai Visa- The Nation*, accessed September 22, 2019 (August 19, 2004), <https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/15247-sex-starved-women-fuel-gigolo-boom-in-bangkok/#comments>.

63 StrayGypsy, “Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok,” *Bangkok Tonight Forum*, accessed April 30, 2021 (January 1, 2005, 5:09 a.m.), <http://bangkok2night.com/cgi-bin/forum/topic.cgi?forum=23&topic=532&start=10>.

64 Patricia R. Pessar and Sarah J. Mahler, “Transnational Migration: Bringing Gender In,” *International Migration Review* 37, no. 3 (2003): 828–31.

the dimension of race that underlies and shapes these deceptively spontaneous relationships cannot go unnoticed. In Omi and Winant's (2014) discussion of race constructs, they demonstrate how "race-making" is a process to other, which is not restricted to distinctions based on race, but argue that other perceivable distinctions underpin this process to justify power structures.⁶⁵ This can be validated in the dynamics of white female sex tourism in Thailand, where white female sex tourists actively engage in this process of othering their Thai male counterparts through their racialized and gendered tourist desires and expectations. This process of racial othering is wielded in their fantasy and desire for intimate, local, and "exotic" entanglements. For example, a comment from the Bangkok Tonight forum points to the process of racial othering, "[western women] starve for those [Thai] men who have nice asses, good manners, shave and after shave themselves, have stylish clothes and are 'young'."⁶⁶ Literature on sex tourism also elucidates this process. Taylor (2000) argues that a key part of tourism processes is tourists' desire to "consume difference."⁶⁷ In a thread discussing "Thai men and the white women who love them," an American woman, Samantha, mentions how the tourist context underpins this desire, "Both *farang* men and women 'feel like a prince or princess' when they first arrive in Thailand because they are able to [score] young, beautiful [Thai] partners."⁶⁸

The perceivable distinctions "may be arbitrary, but they are not meaningless" because they reinforce and codify perceived differences in the process of "making-up people."⁶⁹ This process is formulated through tourist expectations of feeling elevated like a "princess," signified by their comparably easy access to Thai bodies, and their desire for difference in the Thai Other's lifestyle and culture, re: "good manners," "stylish clothes," and a nice "shave."

65 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, "The Theory of Racial Formation," in *Racial Formation in the United States*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 105.

66 griffin, "Re: Sex starved women fuel gigolo boom in Bangkok," *Bangkok Tonight Forum*, accessed April 30, 2021 (January 1, 2005, 5:09 a.m.), <http://bangkok2night.com/cgi-bin/forum/topic.cgi?forum=23&topic=532&start=0>.

67 Jacqueline Sánchez Taylor, "Tourism and 'embodied' commodities: sex tourism in the Caribbean," in *Tourism and Sex: culture, commerce and coercion*, ed. Stephen Clift and Simon Carter, (Leicester: Pinter, 2000), 41–53.

68 Samantha, "Thai men and the white women who love them," *Teakdoor*, accessed April 30, 2021 (November 29, 2019, 3:30am), <https://teakdoor.com/the-teakdoor-lounge/194504-thai-men-white-women-who-love.html>.

69 Omi and Winant, "The Theory," 111.

Because their travel provokes attention to racial and cultural differences, the tourist context, constructed around these ideas of difference, helps enable their consumption and desire for the bodies of exotic/erotic Thai Others.⁷⁰ Consuming difference is presented as an “acceptable” and authentic aspect of tourism. Ruth Evans, a nineteen-year-old visitor to a Bangkok club from the US, was quoted in *the Mirror* stating that seeking “for sex with a Thai man” can be a “real power trip.”⁷¹ White female tourists position themselves against the lower racial Thai Other in their quest for tourist thrill, presenting them with opportunities to project their erotic and exotic expectations and desires onto these men and affirm racial, gender, and sexual forms of power. The importance of race cannot be underestimated in these interactions because these women are in a position that allows them to derive power from their racial difference.

Cross-border desires and the asymmetrical relationships of these tourists are shaped not by race nor gender alone but mutually interact among other facets of identity, such as nationality, marital status, age, and socio-economic status. Although age and marital status will not be explored in the confines of this paper, female sex tourism, with its commercial and casual engagements with local Thai men and the sex industry in Thailand, is enabled by the women’s middle-class status. Women traveling alone and in groups are observed to have the capital to depend on, enabling their travel and forming a foundation for unequal relations. Their privileged position is contrasted with their perception of “poor” Thai locals, especially those who participate in the sex industry. This material power and privilege relegates the racialized Thai Other as a commodity of their tourist desire. Gillian Kitrick, a 50-year old tourist from London, describes this material power,

I’d been in Bangkok for a week or so when a waiter approached me and asked me if I wanted to take him home. He was 22 years old and absolutely beautiful. He came with me, and I paid him for four days. It’s a nice business transaction. I know plenty of women here who are bored and horny-so they buy a boy for the night.⁷²

This is also exemplified by the fact that these women can afford an overpriced

70 Sanders, “One night in Bangkok,” 251.

71 “Sex starved women,” *The Mirror*.

72 Ibid.

beer and can access spaces that local Thai visitors are denied, which “locates them in a relative position of power over the Others they consume.”⁷³ For example, an article from a US online media company covering travel and entertainment known as the *Thrillist* quotes the experience of a young American female tourist attending an all-male host club, stated they only had to pay for a \$10 drink if they wanted to select a male escort to accompany her and her friends.⁷⁴ Another example is described by a third-party observer discussing white women in the ThaiVisa forum: “foreign women picked up Thai guys to have a fling. It was common for foreign women to hire a slow boat and its captain for \$5 to go out to the islands for a day...!”⁷⁵ Female tourists may be emboldened by their dominant economic standing and ideas of racial or geopolitical superiority signified by their purchase of “cheap” Thai male bodies or concealed through an inexpensive drink or meal. This material power encasing the geo-political and economic privilege of the First World over the Third World enables and consolidates the white, female sex tourist’s position on gender, racial, and sexual hierarchies. This material power represented by the overt purchase of Thai male escorts or concealed through a veil of companionship is embedded into the intersections of race, gender, and sexual power that enable these interactions.

Conclusion

Female sex tourism in Thailand can be interpreted as a microcosm of larger transnational and global processes. Here, the power dynamics at work should be considered through the intersections of race, gender, class, and sexuality. Viewed through the lens of class, these white female tourists are in a position of privilege, where they possess the resources to travel and purchase their racialized desires of local men. Their acquisition of economic and political capital allows them to engage in these asymmetric relationships. Viewed through the lens of gender, these female sex tourists can invert social order by accessing spaces that foster encounters that would usually be denied to them. In this process, they can affirm their femininity through

73 Sanders, “One night in Bangkok,” 171.

74 Gabrielle Davis, “My Night in a Bangkok Escort Club for Women,” *Thrillist*, January 22, 2016, <https://www.thrillist.com/travel/nation/my-night-in-a-bangkok-escort-club-for-women>.

75 dighambara, “Re: Sex Starved Women,” accessed April 30, 2021 (August 19, 2004), <https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/15247-sex-starved-women-fuel-gigolo-boom-in-bangkok/page/2/>

the attraction from local Thai men. In these spaces, they can negotiate and redefine their sexualities in a way that they perceive as authentic to their travel experience. Viewed through the lens of race, white female sex tourists are actively racializing their consumption practices toward local young Thai males, where desires for difference and the Other are pronounced in a tourist context. In this formula, the racialized Thai other is cast as a tourist commodity to fulfill the heterosexual desires of these women.⁷⁶

Although the Thai context is a relatively new example of female sex tourism, the emerging popularity of female sex tourism in Thailand and worldwide suggests that women are participating in power processes that underpin the sex industry. However, these power processes are not exclusive to the formal sex industry, which is consistent with the position that the definition of sex tourism needs to expand and accommodate various types of complex interactions, motivations, and migrations. Seeking commercial sex while on holiday is only a partial truth. The definition of sex tourism should not require overt engagement with sexualized venues, explicit sexual acts, and should challenge preconceived notions about acceptable tourist behavior. White female sex tourists in Thailand wield their racial, gender, class, and sexual currencies to veil local interactions with Thai men and the wider sex industry as conventional tourist activities. The sexual liaisons and temporary romances of white female sex tourists with local Thai men in tourist locations and the wider sex industry are not spontaneous but instead patterned. These patterns are enabled by fluid constructs of class, gender, sexuality, and race. Because these women do not subscribe to the standard definitions of sex tourism, this new definition must also include these intersections of class, gender, sexuality, and race that shape the undercurrents of the sex tourist's identity and their potential to destabilize social constructs that guide their behavior in the context of their migration. These intersections emerge to confirm complex power processes that characterize and enable these encounters.

Although this paper strived to expose and analyze the power processes and hierarchies underlying the white female, Euro-American sex tourist through an array of media sources, this analysis should be treated as a small sample of attitudes and motivations that underpin Euro-American white female's interactions with the informal and formal spaces of Thailand's sex industry. More ethnographic studies performed on the ground in Thailand are needed to confirm and expand on the trends found in this analysis. New

76 Taylor, "Tourism and 'embodied' commodities," 41–53.

directions for research on female sex tourism in Thailand and abroad will also include examining the subjectivities of young male locals participating in these relationships with white female sex tourists. The perceptions of the local Thai community are critical to understanding the meanings attached to Thai male's interactions with white female sex tourists. More research investigating the behaviors of both female sex tourists and their male counterparts in Thailand and beyond is required to bring new insights into the fields of tourism and migration studies, which will further modify the standard definitions of sex tourism.

Anti-Chinese Law and Its Consequences At the Mexican Border

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After the United States (US) implemented The Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, Chinese immigrants only had two means of entering the US - via Canada or via Mexico. This made the border between the US and Mexico the principal route for undocumented migrations of Chinese migrants. While the US kept a tight policy against international migration, Mexico played an inconsistent role in allowing Chinese immigrants access into the country. This historical paper displays that the Mexican government at first supported the free movement of the Chinese through primary sources. However, after anti-Chinese movements advanced in Mexico, the government developed strict immigration measures against the Chinese population.

Keywords: Mexico-US relations, migration, discrimination, Chinese migration, historical analysis

Introduction

Today, Mexico and the United States (US) share a battlefield: the frontier. On the border, Mexicans fight in search of a brighter future in the US, while US immigration agents relentlessly track and pursue them. However, there was a time in history when the frontier was mainly crossed by another group - the Chinese. After the United States implemented The Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, Chinese immigrants had only two means of entering the US: via Canada or via Mexico. Though some of them were able to cross through the northern frontier, the Mexico-US border became the main bridge for undocumented Chinese migrants. According to the Mexican Constitution of 1857, Mexican officials should not have persecuted any Chinese immigrants because:

Every person has the right to enter and leave the country, to travel through its territory and to move to a new

house without the necessity of a letter of safe passage, passport, safe-conduct or any other similar requirement.¹

However, when it came to confronting Chinese immigrants, Mexico played an inconsistent role. This “unpredictable” part of history makes us wonder how Mexico participated in the persecution of Chinese people on the frontier. Therefore, the central question this research aims to ask is: What was the role of Mexico in the undocumented migration of Chinese people to the United States? This paper argues that Mexico initially supported the free movement of the Chinese; however, after anti-Chinese movements advanced in Mexico (an indirect consequence of racist US laws), the government developed strict immigration measures against the Chinese population.

This paper is divided into four parts. The first part will briefly discuss the history between the United States, China, and Mexico and the growth of the Chinese population in both countries across the Pacific. The second part will discuss how the increase in Chinese migration impacted Mexico and examine the underlying reasons why the Mexican government defended Chinese migration. In the third part, an analysis will be conducted regarding the anti-Chinese movements in Mexico and how they contributed to the reversal in immigration policies against the Chinese population. Finally, conclusions and potential implications of Mexico’s shift in policy concerning Chinese migration will be presented at the end of this paper.

The primary sources are reports by Mexican and US officers involved in migration policies from 1882 to 1943. These years were chosen for the following two reasons: first (1882), because undocumented migration of Chinese to the United States intensified after the enactment of The Chinese Exclusion Act. Secondly (1943), because the laws that excluded Chinese people were in force until Franklin Roosevelt signed the Magnuson Law allowing the controlled entry of Chinese people into the US.² At the same time, newspapers and archives from the Mexican revolution (1910) onwards will be analyzed to illustrate how an anti-Chinese movement emerged in Mexico and impacted the immigration policies.

1 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States. *Art. 11*. 1857.

2 Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hansen, “El contrabando de chinos en la frontera de las Californias durante el porfiriato (1876-1911),” *Migraciones Internacionales* 1, no. 3 (July-December 2002): 9.

United States: The Link Between China and Mexico

Although the history between China, the US, and Mexico dates from the conquest period (1519-1810), this paper will not include those dates, as they are not relevant for the research of Chinese migratory movements. Since the nineteenth century, contact between China and Mexico has been indirect. Neither country had the necessary resources to trade bilaterally, so they depended on foreign companies (mainly France, England, and the United States).³ From 1850 to 1860, American vessels used San Francisco as their primary port for exporting silver to China. Since Mexican silver mines were the primary source of materials, US trade ships were also connected to Mexican ports.⁴

The development of the US seemed to promise new opportunities, and along with trading between China and the US, several Chinese people (mostly young men) migrated to the US under labor contracts. At the same time, the prohibition of African slaves in some colonies in Latin America prompted certain landowners to hire Chinese people. These groups of contract workers were colloquially referred to as coolies.⁵ Between 1847 and 1862, Chinese coolies arrived in the United States through American shipping and trade companies. However, rather than realizing their promised dreams, the workers were tricked into fulfilling labor under contracts while working in inhumane conditions. They were paid less than negotiated, would live in precarious conditions, and were mistreated. Since these companies started to monopolize the traffic of coolies, the US government applied restrictive laws. As a conclusive measure, the Burlingame Treaty prohibited the trade of such workers in 1868.⁶

Additional groups of Chinese immigrants arrived in the United States to voluntarily work in factories, railroads, farms and create businesses such as laundries and some street markets. The increase of Chinese, accompanied by high unemployment rates and the development of racist practices (such as Yellow Peril) in the US, cause the attacking of Chinese immigrants by the American population. Among the attacks, there were physical confrontations and damages to Chinese businesses and property. The anti-Chinese movement

3 Vera Valdés Lakowsky, "México y China: Cercanía en la distancia," *Estudios de Asia y África* 15, no. 4 (1980): 818, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40311987>.

4 *Ibid.*, 820.

5 Flora Botton Beja, "La persecución de los chinos en México," *Estudios de Asia y África* 43, no. 2 (2008): 478, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40313757>.

6 María Elena Ota Mishima (ed.), *Destino México. Un estudio de las migraciones asiáticas a México, Siglos XIX y XX* (México: El Colegio de México, 1997), 193.

gained more and more strength, prompting the government to restrict Chinese migration to the US. On May 6, 1882, the government banned Chinese workers from entering the country for the next ten years.⁷ After that, the US continued to create and enact discriminatory laws against the Chinese population, such as the Geary Act in 1892, where the government implemented rigid rules regarding Chinese detainees. They also demanded that every Chinese person carry a certificate authenticating their legal status in the United States.⁸

Mexico as the defender of undocumented Chinese immigrants

The anti-Chinese movement in the United States pointed to the Chinese as inadmissible people, as they were seen as job stealers who were dirty and inferior to US citizens.⁹ In response to this, Chinese migrants who still wished to enter the United States crossed borders illegally. There were four main routes by which undocumented Chinese could cross into the United States. The first one was the Pacific coast. However, this was dangerous as US agents inspected everyone who disembarked at the ports for documents. The second route was through the Caribbean; however, the trip was complicated given the islands' conditions, mainly because the waters around them were challenging to navigate. The third route, which was through Canada, did not last long as an illegal crossing between the US and Canada was quickly prevented by introducing immigration laws. Then, Mexico became the main crossing point. The border's condition made it easier to cross through Mexico compared to other routes. The frontier between the US and Mexico covered 3,169 kilometers and did not have enough checkpoints at that time.

A significant amount of the Chinese population seeking to enter the United States intended to work there temporarily; they either wished to earn enough to return to China and get married there or to be able to support their families. As more Chinese sought to enter the United States, Chinese associations were created to help border crossing and provide financial support. The most famous group was the Chinese Benevolent Association, better known as the Chinese Six Companies.¹⁰

When the US banned the Chinese from entering the country, smuggler

7 Ibid., 195.

8 The Geary Act (Extends Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 for Ten Years), Sec. 2-7, 1892.

9 Botton Beja, "La persecución de los chinos en México," 479.

10 Taylor Hansen, "El contrabando de chinos," 11.

companies began to emerge. According to the Treasury Department, Chinese workers entered the United States with fake documents through Canada and Mexico.¹¹ However, as US immigration operatives intercepted illegal networks along the Pacific Ocean, smugglers found new paths through Mexico and Cuba because they had no laws against Chinese migration. According to statistics, around “60,000 Chinese had entered Mexico, but it is estimated that almost 48,000 of them had crossed into the United States illegally.”¹² Additionally, diplomatic relations between China and Mexico were held through and shaped by the United States. The former Mexican diplomat Matías Romero was ambassador to the US from 1837 to 1899 and was considered the most prominent link in the China-US-Mexico relations. Since the implementation of the Exclusion Act, the US government tried to reach an agreement with the Mexican government to limit Chinese migration. However, Matías Romero and other officers, such as Y.L. Vallarta, refused to prohibit the free movement of people based on Mexican legal frameworks and Article 11 of the Mexican Constitution. This was an unanticipated response because it went against the United States’ policies despite the two countries’ close relationship.¹³ A perfect example is reflected in the newspaper Ontario Times, which reported that:

Mexico refuses to engage in an anti-Chinese crusade. On fact, encourages the immigration of the Mongolian population. Employers of labor find the Chinamen much more tractable than the ordinary ‘greaser,’ as willing workers are hard to get, especially in the mining and agricultural districts, there is a disposition to give the almond eyed toiler full swing, however objectionable his presence may be in some social respects.¹⁴

The support for Chinese immigrants in Mexico did not stop there. In 1884,

11 Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury: transmitting, in response to Senate resolution of March 28, 1890, statement of arrivals of Chinese at the port of San Francisco: April 8, 1890, referred to the Committee on Immigration and ordered to be printed, Collection Development Department, Widener Library. HCL, Harvard University Archives, <https://curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/immigration-to-the-united-states-1789-1930/catalog/39-990112870980203941>.

12 Elliott Young, *Alien Nation. Chinese Migration in the Americas from the coolie era through World War II* (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 160.

13 *Ibid.*, 99-100.

14 *Ibid.*, 99-107.

Matías Romero tried to reach a treaty between Mexico and China to allow the free movement of a steamboat company called *Compañía Mexicana de Navegación del Pacífico* (Mexican Pacific Navigation Company). For Chinese companies in the United States, this agreement was a great incentive since it would facilitate the movement of Chinese people to America.¹⁵ Later, thanks to the influence of Matías Romero, stressing that the Chinese were a good fit for Mexican labor needs given the weather similarities between both countries,¹⁶ Mexico and China signed the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in 1899. Upon signing this treaty, the free movement of Chinese and Mexican workers and the naturalization of Chinese immigrants in Mexico took place.

Anti-Chinese movements in Mexico and their consequences

Even though most Chinese were in Mexico for the sole purpose of crossing into the United States, some groups decided to withdraw their plans of further migration and settled in the northern states of Mexico. These included groups fleeing from discrimination in America. The majority lived in the border city of Sonora due to its proximity to the US and for the opportunity of mining and railroad jobs. At first, Mexico agreed to the Chinese diaspora's settlement in the north, as the government wanted to develop the country via Chinese labor. For the government of President Porfirio Díaz, European immigrants were the preferred option to ensure national progress. President Porfirio Díaz was well-known for his preference towards Western culture and society, and he tried to incentivize European people to live in Mexico. Hence, the government implemented the *Ley de Extranjería y Naturalización* (Immigration and Naturalization Law), which granted foreigners the same rights and guarantees as Mexicans.¹⁷ However, there were not enough Europeans willing to move to Mexico. The Chinese were considered cheap labor and were already moving around the northern states, so there was no other option but to accept them.¹⁸

The Chinese community competed successfully in several sectors like small businesses, private services, and agriculture. Their success caused anti-Chinese sentiments among Mexicans who felt they were

15 Valdés Lakowsky, "México y China," 824.

16 Young, *Alien Nation*, 99-106.

17 Ley de Extranjería y Naturalización [Immigration and Naturalization Law], *Capítulo 4. De los derechos y obligaciones de los extranjeros*. [Chapter 4. Of the rights and obligations of foreigners] Art. 30, 1886.

18 Botton Beja, "La persecución de los chinos en México," 479.

missing out on job opportunities, especially in northern states.¹⁹ Some Mexican groups also opposed marriages between Mexican women and Chinese men, arguing that the Chinese were weak and ugly. They were only allowed to live in Mexico as “workers,” not potential “breed mixers.”²⁰

The Anti-Chinese movement continued to spread and culminated in the murder of several Chinese migrants in the city of Coahuila in May 1911. According to the *East Oregonian* newspaper, the federals had control of Coahuila city, and insurgent forces thought they were arming Chinese people to attack. The federal army was not strong enough to contain the insurgents, and while retreating, “280 Chinese, 70 Japanese, 12 Spaniards and one German were shot down after the town was captured.”²¹ Although there were deaths of various foreign nationalities, years later, different newspapers confirmed it was an attack directed at the Chinese population.

After the event, US Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson received a request from China’s diplomatic representative in Mexico City asking for assistance from the United States to protect them and waive the exclusion act.²² Hostilities continued and, one year later, the Chinese minister Chang Ying Tang wrote to the acting Secretary of State requesting refuge for the Chinese residents in Mexico that were victims of the “disturbances.”²³ Who would have thought that Mexico, a country that had accepted and protected

19 Samuel Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes. The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 121.

20 Moisés González Navarro *et al*, “Introducción a la historia de las migraciones asiáticas a México, Siglos XIX y XX,” in *Destino México. Un estudio de las migraciones asiáticas a México, Siglos XIX y XX*, ed. María Elena Ota Mishima (México: El Colegio de México, 1997), 19.

21 “Massacre at Torreon Cause,” *East Oregonian*, May 23, 1911, accessed May 10, 2020, <https://oregonnews.uoregon.edu/lccn/sn88086023/1911-05-23/ed-1/seq-1.pdf>

22 Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 7, 1911, “Telegraph from The American Ambassador to the Secretary of State, May 8, 1911”, File No. 704.9312/2, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1911/d876>.

23 Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1912, “The Chinese Minister to the Acting Secretary of State March 6, 1912,” File No. 151.07/4, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1912/d1317>.

Chinese migration, would end up discriminating against them? Direct attacks on the Chinese population continued, and state congresses legislated laws against mixed marriages and laws favoring Chinese district segregation.

After the anti-Chinese movements intensified in Mexico, the government also strengthened its immigration policies. Around 1930, the Mexican government began cooperating with the United States to control Chinese migrants crossing the border. The Chinese caught on the frontier by US agents were deported to China (which was preferred by the Chinese instead of being deported to Mexico due to the tensions). As the Mexican government had previously announced that it would not prosecute or stop Chinese people along the border, the US government diplomatically asked Mexico for measures regarding immigration movements.²⁴

At first, US ambassadors and *Chargé d’Affaires* tried to convince high-ranking Mexican officers to intervene in anti-Chinese movements to reduce the number of Chinese people fleeing from Mexico to the United States. In a letter by the *Chargé d’Affaires*, Arthur Bliss Lane notified the US Secretary of State about the negotiations that he had had with the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Puig. In the letter, he assured that Dr. Puig was trying to alleviate the anti-Chinese movements in the northern Mexican cities.²⁵

Upon the reception of that letter, the Mexican government changed its immigration policies and turned against Chinese immigrants. In May 1933, US Ambassador Daniels sent a memorandum about a conversation with Dr. Puig regarding immigration and the Chinese population. According to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, over the two preceding years (1931-1933), 2,667 Chinese were caught on the border around Texas and deported. However, they were not considered refugees because they were able to pay for their flight tickets. Therefore, the Mexican government was “willing to cooperate by refusing to permit these Chinese nationals to proceed to the border, unless they [were] in possession of documents visaed by American

24 Foreign Relations of the United States, diplomatic papers, 1933, the American Republics, volume V, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Clark) November 32, 1932,” File No. 812.504/1363, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d752>.

25 Foreign Relations of the United States, diplomatic papers, 1933, the American Republics, volume V, “The Chargé in Mexico (Lane) to the Secretary of State March 30, 1933,” File No. 812.504/1381, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d754>.

consular officers.”²⁶ Expressly, the Mexican government did not object when the American consul in Ciudad, Juarez William P. Blocker, and Mexican authorities began implementing measures to contain Chinese migrants.

As one of the measures taken against the Chinese immigrants, the governor of Sonora tried to prohibit the entrance of Chinese people to Sonora so that none of them could reach the frontier.²⁷ Furthermore, immigration officers began to apprehend Chinese people before crossing the borders of Nogales²⁸ and Navojoa²⁹ (cities in Sonora), making work easier for US immigration officers. However, it was not until July 1933 that the Mexicans “issued definitive instructions to the Migration offices on the border to prevent its illegality.”³⁰

Finally, in a letter from Diplomat Wilbur J. Carr to the *Chinese Chargé*, the US and Mexican governments announced that the Chinese government should be responsible for the expatriation of the Chinese people caught on the frontier. As a response, the Chinese government paid around 4,000 dollars

26 Foreign Relations of the United States, diplomatic papers, 1933, the American Republics, volume V, “Memorandum by the American Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) of a Conversation with the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs (Puig) May 17, 1933,” File No. 812.504/1392, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d755>.

27 Foreign Relations of the United States, diplomatic papers, 1933, the American Republics, volume V, “The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State May 22, 1933,” File No. 812.504/1397, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d756>.

28 Foreign Relations of the United States, diplomatic papers, 1933, the American Republics, volume V, “The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State May 24, 1933,” File No. 812.504/1398, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d757>.

29 Foreign Relations of the United States, diplomatic papers, 1933, the American Republics, volume V, “The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State June 23, 1933,” File No. 812.504/1404, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d758>.

30 Foreign Relations of the United States, diplomatic papers, 1933, the American Republics, volume V, “The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Acting Secretary of State July 1, 1933,” File No. 812.504/1406, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d759>.

to the US.³¹ At the same time, the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hsu Mo, thanked the US government for absorbing expatriation costs and considered the concerns that America had regarding undocumented migration.³²

Conclusion

As illustrated in this paper, the Exclusion Act not only affected the immigration situation of the Chinese in the United States but also affected the entire area of North America. Migration is a phenomenon that persists regardless of adversity. After the US banned the entry of the Chinese, people found new ways of entering the territory through Canada and Mexico. As Canada bowed to US pressure, the US-Mexico border became the main path for Chinese immigrants. At first, the Mexican government was against American Anti-Chinese policies and defended that everybody had the right to absolute freedom of movement.

Furthermore, the government of Porfirio Diaz encouraged immigrants to stay in Mexico and work towards national progress. The regime thought that the greater the number of foreigners, the greater the speed with which Mexico would develop. Although Mexico preferred European foreigners, given the minimal number of European immigrants, the government accepted Chinese laborers, especially in the north of the country.

However, certain factors among Mexican society merged, and racism began to proliferate. First, the Chinese population became a competitive labor force in the mines. Second, they successfully established reliable, competitive businesses that threatened Mexican-owned companies. Consequently, after the revolution began in 1910, Chinese people were killed or kicked out from several states. This anti-Chinese sentiment not only reached society but also influenced immigration policies. Around the 1930s, Mexico completely changed from being an advocate of the freedoms of Chinese immigrants to an anti-Chinese country like the United States.

31 Foreign Relations of the United States, diplomatic papers, 1933, the American Republics, volume V, "The Secretary of State to the Chinese Chargé (Yung kwai) September 1, 1933," File No. 812.504/1412, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d760>.

32 Foreign Relations of the United States, diplomatic papers, 1933, the American Republics, volume V, "Memorandum by the Minister in China (Johnson) of a Conversation with the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Hsu Mo) November 11, 1933," File No. 812.504/1421, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d761>.

The Chinese Exclusion Act resulted in new perspectives on migration. On the one hand, the undocumented migration of Chinese consolidated the criminalization of undocumented immigrants, which nowadays is portrayed through the concept of an “illegal alien.”³³ On the other hand, the period between the exclusion act and the Magnuson Law strengthened immigration checkpoints on the Mexico-US frontier, particularly after Mexico began to cooperate with the US to control the movement of Chinese immigrants. Chinese immigrants eventually stopped using the Mexico-US frontier, and Mexicans along with Central Americans started to move up north to accomplish the “American dream,” even if that meant migration without documents. Since then, those immigrants have been criminalized, and strict immigration policies have been implemented to prosecute them. Who could have predicted that years after these two laws were enacted, the indirect consequences of this US legislation would end up being used against Mexican and Central American immigrants?

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Waning US Leadership

After four tumultuous years of the Donald Trump administration, there is a pervasive belief in the US and abroad that America's role as a global policeman and the common good provider is gone for good.¹ Years of costly war in the Middle East have been rescinded with troop withdrawals; multilateral agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords and the Iran nuclear deal were abandoned; plus, international organizations, including the UN Human Rights Council and UNESCO, were left behind.

Lack of US leadership was particularly salient in the global trade regime, where the administration was bent on leveraging tariffs for "free and fair" trade agreements. Contrary to the stated purpose, the means Washington deployed bordered outright protectionism. The US imposed tariffs on allies to revise trade agreements. The US-China trade war escalated without a clear end-goal, harming the economic interests of US allies dependent on both America and China for trade. While Beijing extends its economic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, Washington shied away from its traditional role as the architect of the liberal international order buttressed by free commerce and trade.

Significantly, Trumpism was a symptom rather than the cause. The inclination for retrenchment is only growing in Washington.² While Congress disagrees on the specific courses of action, they call for a focus on domestic

1 Thomas Wright, "The Folly of Retrenchment," *Foreign Affairs*, April 16, 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/foolly-retrenchment>.

2 Hal Brands, Peter D. Feaver, John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Walt, "Should America Retrench?" *Foreign Affairs*, November 29, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/should-america-retrench>.

issues over foreign adventures.³ The devastating implications of the COVID-19 pandemic increasingly compound their voice. Although President Joe Biden promised America's return to the world stage, his priorities will also presumably lie in domestic recovery from the economic and social impacts of COVID-19. However, as TIME noted, the Biden administration inherits an unprecedented opportunity to "remake American foreign policy"⁴ - it cannot afford to look inward when the world is rapidly transforming against its interests.⁵

President Biden's foreign policy will expectedly focus on two related tasks: prevailing in the Great Power Competition with China and reassuring US allies of America's sustained global leadership. Engaging in the international trade regime could be a first step to address both issues. The Biden administration needs to prevent China from rewriting the norms and rules of global trade. It should also reaffirm its commitment to international free and fair trade, dispelling protectionist tendencies by the previous administration.⁶ To that end, President Biden could begin with joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

What is the CPTPP?

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was a mega trade agreement encompassing 12 nations, representing 40% of the global GDP and one-third of all trades.⁷ Signatories included Japan, Australia, Canada, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The pact focused on removing not only tariffs but also non-tariff trade barriers. By eliminating 99% of all tariffs within the bloc, it was intended

3 Uri Friedman, "The Sanders Doctrine," *The Atlantic*, February 14, 2020, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/02/bernie-sanders-doctrine-america-military-foreign-policy/606364/>.

4 Kimberly Dozier and W.J. Hennigan, "Why Trump's Foreign Policy Efforts Give Biden Opportunities," *Time*, December 3, 2020, <https://time.com/5917389/joe-biden-foreign-policy/>.

5 Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, "How Hegemony Ends," *Foreign Affairs*, January 31, 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends>.

6 Marcus Noland, "Protectionism under Trump: Policy, Identity, and Anxiety," Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 2, 2019, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/protectionism-under-trump-policy-identity-and-anxiety>.

7 "Overview of TPP," United States Trade Representative, accessed May 4, 2021, <https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP>.

to eventually create a “new single market” resembling the European Union.⁸

Given its high trade standards, the TPP was designed to, as President Obama put it, “let America, not China, lead the way on global trade.”⁹ However, in 2017 swiftly after his inauguration, President Trump left the TPP.¹⁰ The original TPP would have increased US output by more than \$130 billion annually by 2030, but domestic opposition revoked its membership.¹¹ As the agreement required that all signatories ratify it, the TPP did not enter into force. Spearheaded by Japan, the remaining parties went ahead with the deal, renaming it the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in January 2018, retaining two-thirds of the TPP’s provisions while suspending those backed by America but contested by others. The CPTPP currently has 11 signatories, representing 13.4% of the global GDP. The agreement is looking to expand its membership since the UK has formally applied to join,¹² while the Philippines, Thailand, and Taiwan also expressed interest.

Washington’s absence from the CPTPP overlaps with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiation, signed in November 2020 by 15 countries, including key US allies such as Korea, Japan, and Australia.¹³ RCEP is expected to precipitate a more unified trading system, “making it easier for the region’s manufacturers to import raw materials from around the bloc without facing high tariffs,” and “export

8 “TPP: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?” *BBC News*, January 23, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715>.

9 Barack Obama, “President Obama: The TPP Would Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade,” *The Washington Post*, May 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html.

10 “Trump Executive Order Pulls out of TPP Trade Deal,” *BBC News*, January 24, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38721056>.

11 Jeffrey J. Noland, “Rebuild the Trans-Pacific Partnership Back Better,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 1, 2020, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/rebuild-trans-pacific-partnership-back-better>.

12 “UK Applying to Join Asia-Pacific Free Trade Pact CPTPP,” *BBC News*, January 31, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-55871373>.

13 Joshua Kurlantzick, “The RCEP Signing and Its Implications,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 16, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/rcep-signing-and-its-implications>.

finished products throughout the region with lower tariffs.”¹⁴ China organized the pact, leading analysts to speculate if Beijing is leading the restart of globalization in the post-pandemic era. General Secretary Xi Jinping further suggested that China will “favorably consider joining the CPTPP.”¹⁵

China and the CPTPP

The chances of China entering the CPTPP - which requires much more profound economic reforms than the RCEP does - remain slim.¹⁶ Unlike RCEP, CPTPP ensures member states “share information on state-owned enterprises and their subsidization.”¹⁷ It remains highly unlikely that China would make groundbreaking reforms on its state-owned enterprises - and companies with extensive ties with the government - and government subsidies to enter a trade agreement that is not of crucial importance.

Nonetheless, China’s presence in the CPTPP could be strongly favored by signatories hoping to fully utilize the “rules of origin” clause, which grants preferential treatment for products with at least 70% of the components coming from any of the CPTPP parties.¹⁸ As China remains the world’s largest “factory nation,” its inclusion significantly expands the scope of products that can receive a “rules of origin” advantage. Furthermore, developing countries could aspire to bandwagon with China to water down regulations such as health standards, which all signatories must follow. The transition from TPP to CPTPP, with US pressure removed, clearly demonstrated that many members seek to “soften” issues on intellectual property and patent protection. They could see an opportunity in bringing China into the game.

More importantly, Beijing will likely seek to recalibrate the terms of

14 Jon Emont, and Alastair Gale, “Asia-Pacific Countries Sign Major Trade Pact in Test for Biden,” *The Wall Street Journal*, November 15, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/asia-pacific-nations-sign-major-china-backed-trade-deal-11605434779>.

15 “China to ‘Favorably Consider’ Joining CPTPP,” *Global Times*, November 21, 2020, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1207536.shtml>.

16 Eric Johnston, “What Does RCEP Mean for Japan and Its Asian Neighbors?” *The Japan Times*, November 15, 2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/11/15/national/politics-diplomacy/rcep-japan-asia-trade/>.

17 Christian Le Miere, “Commentary: Is It Too Late for the US to Join the CPTPP?” *CNA*, January 29, 2021, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/us-china-rcep-tpp-cptpp-trade-joe-biden-join-trans-pacific-13635230>.

18 David Dharshini, “UK Wants to Join the Club - but What Is the CPTPP?” *BBC News*, January 30, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-55858490>.

regional trade by engaging in multilateral projects, agreements, and funds. It hopes to normalize government subsidies, malleable intellectual property rights, and lax environmental regulations. China already has a record of influencing European response to its revisionism through the multilateral “16+1” format, which turned the central and eastern European states against the wealthier western and northern Europe when dealing with Beijing.¹⁹ Given the lucrative access to the Chinese market, certain COVID-19-stricken countries could drop the demands of Beijing’s reform. China does not need an official acceptance of its anti-market practices. A *de-facto* acquiescence to flexible terms in return for improved trade balance is enough to aggrandize its economic influence in the region and obscure the liberal international trade regime.

The US Should Enter the CPTPP

Profoundly wary of such implications, America’s closest allies aspire for Washington’s return to the stage.²⁰ As former Acting Deputy USTR Trade Representative Wendy Cutler noted, having the US in the CPTPP will provide a “stronger sense of purpose” for allies and strengthen the impetus for the remaining members to ratify the deal.²¹

Time is ripe for Washington to return to the game. The US should work with allies to renovate the CPTPP while preventing China from watering down its standards. The Biden administration will need to expand the scope of the agreement to cover issues such as “digital governance, supply chain resilience, and foreign investment reviews.”²² The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) report recommended advancing new trading rules, covering “subsidies for state-owned enterprises and digital trade.”²³

19 Jonathan E. Hillman and Maesea McCalpin, “Will China’s ‘16+1’ Format Divide Europe?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 11, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-chinas-161-format-divide-europe>.

20 Wendy Cutler, “Reengaging the Asia-Pacific on Trade: A TPP Roadmap for the Next U.S. Administration,” Asia Society, September 30, 2020, <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/reengaging-asia-pacific-trade-tpp-roadmap-next-us-administration>.

21 Ibid.

22 Charles D. Lake II, “Memo to the CPTPP Countries on How to Take the Agreement to the next Level,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 16, 2020, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/memo-cptpp-countries-how-take-agreement-next-level>.

23 Jeffrey J. Schott, “Rebuild the Trans-Pacific Partnership Back Better,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 1, 2020, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/rebuild-trans-pacific-partnership-back-better>.

In the process, America will have to cooperate with its allies, including Korea and Japan. Notably, Korea has not signed on to the CPTPP yet but is considering joining the agreement.²⁴ Seoul shares some of Washington's concerns and could be a valuable partner in requesting additional changes to the agreement for their entrance. Japan has been a champion of digital governance and coined the Data Free Flows with Trust (DFFT) concept during the Osaka G20 meeting in 2019.²⁵ As a report by the Asia Policy Institute argued, US allies with advanced economies can "set high standards, rebuild trust and build momentum."²⁶

However, after America left the TPP, the remaining countries decided to remove provisions added at US insistence. It would take more than just America's economic size and influence to restore them; Washington urgently needs Korea and Japan's cooperation for its entry, potentially by helping other signatories bolster supply chain resilience, severely impacted by COVID-19. They could lead to diversification of supply chains while implementing reforms requested by the US.²⁷

At the same time, the Biden administration must be careful not to leverage its future presence in the CPTPP to put itself in a zero-sum position with China in the global trade architecture. It would be unwise to demonize every China-led economic initiative and agreement. Unlike certain aspects of the security competition, cooperation with China in the global economy is possible and necessary. For example, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) provides relatively safe and transparent infrastructure

24 "S. Korea to Actively Consider Joining CPTPP," *Donga Ilbo*, January 12, 2021, <https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20210112/2364529/1/S-Korea-to-actively-consider-joining-CPTPP>.

25 "G20 OSAKA SUMMIT (SUMMARY OF OUTCOME)," G20 Osaka Summit 2019, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 29, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/g20_summit/osaka19/en/overview/.

26 Cutler, "Reengaging the Asia-Pacific on Trade."

27 Takashi Nakano, "TPP Countries Defy Protectionist Trend to Maintain Supply Chains," *Nikkei Asia*, May 1, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/TPP-countries-defy-protectionist-trend-to-maintain-supply-chains>.

loans,²⁸ unlike many of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects.²⁹

Similarly, the RCEP is expected to eliminate tariffs on 91% of items³⁰ traded by the signatories and increase trade by \$428 billion.³¹ Japan alone will be relieved from tariffs on the nearly \$50 billion worth of auto parts exports to China every year.³² While progress on intellectual property protection, patents, labor, and environmental obligations is modest, the RCEP promotes substantial market liberalization and trade barrier removal. Equally importantly, RCEP presents a valuable chance for growth for US allies and partners. It is no coincidence that Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, some of America's closest allies and vocal critics of China, are all signatories.³³ Instead of outright denying China access to the international trade regime, which would be both impossible and counterproductive, the Biden administration should signal a willingness to help China increase its contribution to international economic institutions.

However, Washington should work with allies to pressure China to anchor its enhanced institutional standing to corresponding domestic reforms. The international community can no longer allow China to exploit its developing country status to avoid higher standards.³⁴ Candor and

28 Niruban Balachandran, "The United States Should Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," East-West Center, November 29, 2017, <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/the-united-states-should-join-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank>.

29 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, "China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative," Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>.

30 "Eyes on Biden's TPP Move as China Joins Mega Trade Deal RCEP," *Nikkei Asia*, November 15, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/US-elections-2020/Eyes-on-Biden-s-TPP-move-as-China-joins-mega-trade-deal-RCEP>.

31 Pawel Paszak, "The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific," Warsaw Institute, November 19, 2020, <https://warsawinstitute.org/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-rivalry-indo-pacific/>.

32 Emont and Gale, "Asia-Pacific Countries Sign Major Trade Pact in Test for Biden."

33 Tim McDonald, "What Is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)?" *BBC News*, November 16, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54899254>.

34 David Ahlstrom, "Time for China to Accept It Is No Longer a 'Developing Country'," *Nikkei Asia*, August 25, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Time-for-China-to-accept-it-is-no-longer-a-developing-country>.

reciprocity will be the key.³⁵ As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan argued, China cannot expect to garner benefits of free trade while “forcing foreign companies to localize their operations and engage in joint ventures, subsidizing state champions, discriminating against foreign companies and stealing intellectual property.”³⁶ The US and its partners should present China with a choice to either adjust its trade practices or face “less favorable terms from more than half of the global economy.”

To assure US allies’ sustained engagement, and as a concession for America’s conditional entrance into the CPTPP, the Biden administration needs to lay out a clear and finite set of areas for renegotiation. The requested revisions should not amount to a wholesale reformation of the agreement. Instead, it should be limited to address the most urgent needs. US allies would warmly welcome America’s return to counterbalance Chinese influence, but “not at any cost.”³⁷ There will be stringent limits on the depth and scope of revisions; America is, after all, hoping to re-enter as a new member of an existing mechanism rather than as an architect. A strategic choice based on the changing global economic landscape is required to prioritize trade agendas over others.

Outside the CPTPP, it should drop the previous administration’s excessive demands on trade. For example, tariffs imposed on washing machines with national security rationale should be rescinded. Section 232 reports by the previous administration’s Commerce Department must be dropped;³⁸ steel and aluminum exports to Japan pose no security threat.³⁹ Such indiscriminate tariffs on US allies and partners significantly hinder the

35 Matthew Pottinger, “The Importance of Being Candid: On China’s Relationship with the Rest of the World,” Policy Exchange, October 23, 2020, <https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxevents/on-chinas-relationship-with-the-rest-of-the-world/>.

36 Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “Competition Without Catastrophe,” *Foreign Affairs*, February 12, 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe>.

37 Cutler, “Reengaging the Asia-Pacific on Trade.”

38 “Section 232 Investigation on the Effect of Imports of Steel on U.S. National Security,” U.S. Department of Commerce, January 21, 2021, <https://www.commerce.gov/issues/trade-enforcement/section-232-steel>.

39 Emily Rauhala and Anna Fifield, “As U.S. Allies, Japan and South Korea Feel Particularly Wounded over Steel Tariffs,” *The Washington Post*, March 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-us-allies-japan-and-south-korea-feel-particularly-wounded-over-steel-tariffs/2018/03/08/ef12b432-2260-11e8-946c-9420060cb7bd_story.html.

prospect of a united front against China on trade. Even domestically, they did not precipitate a “steel renaissance”⁴⁰ that President Trump promised to America’s industrial heartland. As the Wall Street Journal asserted, the tariffs hurt US manufacturers, including those in the automotive and appliance sectors, “by increasing metal costs than what overseas competitors pay.”⁴¹

Subsequently, the Biden administration needs to persuade the domestic constituents on the strong need to re-engage in the free trade regime. While 80% of American adults continue to believe that “trade represents an opportunity for economic growth,”⁴² the allure of protectionism remains strong. President Biden explicitly promised that he would “not enter into any new trade agreements until we have invested in Americans and equipped them to succeed in the global economy.”⁴³ This is not necessarily a protectionist move; domestic agendas will continue to take precedence, particularly considering COVID-19, and consultations with stakeholders across the country are inevitable and required.

It is also worth remembering that both major candidates opposed the original TPP in the 2016 Presidential Election.⁴⁴ Opposition from some Democrats and labor unions was fierce, although the deal was President Obama’s brainchild.⁴⁵ Opposition was primarily concerned with biologics patents, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) processes, and labor, environmental obligations.

40 Ed Crooks, “Trump Puts Steel at the Heart of Industrial Policy,” *Financial Times*, December 3, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/bca2d4fc-b883-11e6-961e-a1acd97f622d>.

41 Bob Tita and William Mauldin, “Tariffs Didn’t Fuel Revival for American Steel,” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 28, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/tariffs-didnt-fuel-revival-for-american-steel-11603877400>.

42 Lydia Saad, “Americans’ Vanishing Fear of Foreign Trade,” Gallup, February 26, 2020, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/286730/americans-vanishing-fear-foreign-trade.aspx>.

43 Joseph R. Biden Jr, “Why America Must Lead Again,” *Foreign Affairs*, 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again>.

44 Jacob Pramuk, “Clinton and Trump Can Agree on at Least One Thing,” *CNBC*, August 11, 2016, <https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/11/trump-and-clinton-now-sound-similar-on-one-key-issue.html>.

45 Jason Margolis, “Labor Unions Remain Steadfastly Opposed To Trans-Pacific Trade Measure,” *NPR*, June 16, 2015, <https://www.npr.org/2015/06/16/414831901/labor-unions-remain-steadfastly-opposed-to-trans-pacific-trade-measure>.

Against such a backdrop, the Biden administration could believe that a wholesale suspension of trade talks is a necessary evil to reunite the country, going through unprecedented levels of division and partisanship. However, as former President of the World Bank Robert Zoellick suggested, “Biden could package openness to trade with assistance to workers and an increase in the minimum wage.”⁴⁶ Entering the CPTPP would open new markets for US exporters since Asia is bouncing back fast from COVID-19.⁴⁷

The idea that protectionism will bring back American jobs is naive.⁴⁸ The Biden administration should persuade domestic constituents that high-quality trade agreements will bring high-paying jobs to the US. New foreign investments in America will enhance the country’s innovative edge. The Biden administration should focus on building a robust safety net and worker adjustment programs in conjunction with its domestic economic revival plan. With or without the CPTPP, the changing industrial structure is driving out workers in the manufacturing industry;⁴⁹ it is essential to help them adjust to changes incurred by both domestic and international trends.

The CPTPP will grant American exporters unprecedented opportunity to expand new markets, particularly as the world recovers from the pandemic. With US inclusion, the CPTPP’s trade area would be larger than that of the North American Free Trade Agreement (now USMCA). The original TPP would have “increased exports by \$305 billion

46 Robert B Zoellick, “Opinion | Biden Can Make American Trade Deals Great Again,” *The Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-can-make-american-trade-deals-great-again-11607622762>.

47 Eun-Young Jeong, “‘The Zoom Boom’: Asia Leads the World in Covid-19 Economic Recovery,” *The Wall Street Journal*, November 15, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-zoom-boom-asia-leads-the-world-in-covid-19-economic-recovery-11605445200>.

48 Hans F. Sennholz, “Protectionism and Unemployment: Hans F. Sennholz,” Foundation for Economic Education, March 1, 1985, <https://fee.org/articles/protectionism-and-unemployment/>.

49 “How Trade Did and Did Not Account for Manufacturing Job Losses,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 10, 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/12/10/how-trade-did-and-did-not-account-for-manufacturing-job-losses-pub-77794>.

per year by 2025 and added \$77 billion to American workers' income."⁵⁰

Another advantage is that the US will not have to negotiate separate trade agreements with CPTPP signatories, which would take years to discuss, settle and ratify.⁵¹ As the Obama administration officials relentlessly stressed, "over 80 percent of imports from TPP countries already enter the US duty-free,"⁵² acceding to the CPTPP would help level the playing field.

Conclusion

After years of global leadership abrogation, the US is presented with an opportunity to re-engage the international trade regime through the CPTPP. The Joe Biden administration should join the CPTPP, where it can work with partners to prevent China from rewriting the rules and norms of trade. Domestically, entering the agreement will accelerate, not hinder, economic recovery from COVID-19.

As the case of the CPTPP itself demonstrates, the world will not stop and wait for America to return to the game; regional players will move ahead in shaping trade arrangements, while Washington is excluded in the process. As President Biden himself acknowledged, the TPP was a "good way for countries to come together to curb China's excess."⁵³ It is not too late for him to exploit the CPTPP's potential collective bargaining power vis a vis China.

A post-pandemic China could potentially entrench even further, resisting external demands of reforms.⁵⁴ Beijing, however, will simultaneously reach out to recession-hit nations to enlarge its economic

50 Kimberly Amadeo, "How the TPP Lives on Without the United States," *The Balance*, November 13, 2020, <https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-trans-pacific-partnership-3305581>.

51 Hayley Channer and Jeffrey Wilson, "Expanding the CPTPP: A Form Guide to Prospective Members," Lowy Institute, February 22, 2021, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpretor/expanding-cptpp-form-guide-prospective-members>.

52 "TPP Economic Benefits Fact Sheet," United States Trade Representative, n.d. <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Economic-Benefits-Fact-Sheet.pdf>.

53 "The Presidential Candidates on the Trans-Pacific Partnership," Council on Foreign Relations, July 30, 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/article/presidential-candidates-trans-pacific-partnership>.

54 Hosuk Lee, "Biding Time for Biden's New Trade Agenda," Special Issue Brief. Lee & Ko Global Commerce Institute, December 2020, http://www.leeko.com/news/gci/2012/specialissuebrief_dec2020_tradegroup.pdf.

influence.⁵⁵ A new opportunity has arisen with the turnover in the White House. It is in Washington's hands to prevent such outreach from mutating into a disruptive revision of the free and open trade regime.

Given Washington's political climate, President Biden will be pressured to portray himself as "tough on trade,"⁵⁶ with a focus on "Buy American"⁵⁷ to revive US industries and job growth - something the President has constantly pointed out as his predecessor's failure. The US, however, cannot call for synergetic geo-economic policies with slogans such as "America First." Instead of succumbing to the allure of retrenchment, the Biden administration should retain agency in global trade. It is time for America to build the international trade regime back better, starting with rejoining the CPTPP.⁵⁸

55 Brian Padden, "China's Coronavirus Foreign Aid Expands Influence, Shifts Blame," *Voice of America*, April 3, 2020, <https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/chinas-coronavirus-foreign-aid-expands-influence-shifts-blame>.

56 Aime Williams, "Joe Biden to Remain Tough on Trade While Re-Embracing Partners," *Financial Times*, November 16, 2020, <https://www.ft.com/content/c4e1c0e3-ba5b-46f8-87c7-9a56ca7a0a1a>.

57 Allan Smith, "Biden Signs 'Buy American' Executive Order," *NBC News*, January 25, 2021, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-sign-buy-american-executive-order-monday-n1255487>.

58 Chad P. Bown, "To Build Back Better, Biden Needs to Fix Trade," *Foreign Affairs*, January 22, 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-21/build-back-better-biden-needs-fix-trade>.

The Ethical and Legal Privacy in the World of Big Data and eHealth: Are the US and the EU Ready for the Big Change in Healthcare?

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Changes in global health care are occurring with the adoption of big data, and the digitization of health and patient data as traditional paper-based medical records are being switched to electronic health records (EHRs). Although the implementation of EHR systems has incredible potential to improve health management, it has raised significant ethical and legal concerns over data privacy and security, with large volumes of health data becoming available and accessible online. What calls for greater attention is that neither the existing legislative nor constitutional law sufficiently protects health information privacy. The privacy rights for healthcare information and data protection laws are different in the US and the EU and are often inconsistent and fragmented across and within states and nations. This essay examines the ethical and legal privacy concerning big data and eHealth in the US and the EU. It looks at the extent to which the legal frameworks have been established to protect health privacy, questioning whether the existing legislative framework comprehensively covers the facilitation, adoption, and use of big data and EHRs in health care.

Introduction

With the rapidly growing amount of medical data in the world, big data in health care has gained greater attention partly due to the adoption of the Electronic Health Record (EHR) in health care. Big data has been defined in several ways, but it generally refers to enormous data sets with sizes beyond what can be managed by traditional software tools. An example of a big data application in health care is the EHR. The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) defines the EHR as follows:

An electronic record of health-related information on an individual

that conforms to nationally recognized interoperability standards and that can be created, managed, and consulted by authorized clinicians and staff across more than one health care organization.¹

EHRs enhance the health care process by managing health information electronically, improving data availability, and providing more accurate and complete documentation, mainly through longitudinal health records (LHRs). These can track an individual's health history data over time from numerous data sources across the health system.² Along with the benefits associated with EHR, there are some risks and barriers that raise privacy concerns. A significant challenge regarding the use of big data in health care is that it is difficult to standardize and form a single large-scale database that is compatible across all nations. Linking data about the same individual from multiple sources is another challenge since traditional health records are stored in various institutions. Additionally, switching to EHR and linkages will require identifiers – such as a patient's name and date of birth – which will increase privacy concerns.³

Many national health policies or strategies and data protection laws do not encompass the use of big data and health information in an online environment. Less than one-fifth of countries have reported having a national policy or strategy that regulates the use of big data in health care. Those numbers become smaller when asked about having a national policy or strategy that regulates the use of big data by private companies. Moreover, a survey that asked the EU Member States about barriers to adopting big data for health has shown that a lack of data privacy and security laws is regarded as the top barrier to implementing big data in health care.⁴ Based on the results of a global survey on eHealth conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2012, 70 percent of the 113

1 “Medline/PubMed Search & Electronic Health Record Information Resources,” National Library of Medicine (NLM), accessed May 8, 2021, <https://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/queries/ehr.html>.

2 Shelley Reynolds, “Making sense of information technology,” *British Journal of Midwifery* 11, no. 3 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.12968/bjom.2003.11.3.11130>.

3 Margaret Foster Riley, “Big Data, HIPAA, and the Common Rule: Time for Big Change?” in *Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics*, eds. I. Glenn Cohen et al. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2018), 253-54.

4 Who Regional Office for Europe, *From Innovation to Implementation – EHealth in the WHO European Region*, report for the World Health Organization, 2016, 72.

responding countries reported having general legislation that provides a basic right to privacy.⁵ However, when asked whether the responding countries have legislation that specifically protects the privacy of the EHR, only 30 percent globally reported having such legislation established.⁶

The right to privacy is recognized as a fundamental human right under Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; however, protection of privacy is not universally guaranteed because it is often based on the actions of governments. For example, the United States Constitution does not explicitly state the right to privacy. Only certain aspects are dealt with by the government and law enforcement, and the privacy rights for healthcare information are regulated sector by sector.⁷ The notion of legal privacy can take different forms in different geographical regions and circumstances; however, it can largely be sorted into two scopes. According to William W. Lowrance, the two privacy regimes are (1) broad privacy and data protection regimes and (2) regimes specific to health care, public health, and health research.⁸ This essay focuses on privacy issues regarding big data in eHealth from privacy regimes specific to health care. The essay examines the scope of the legal and regulatory framework supporting health information privacy in the US and the EU and the challenges arising from big data and eHealth not covered by the existing legal framework.

The Ambiguity of Privacy and Confidentiality in Health Care

Defining privacy is complex and challenging. There is no universal consensus that defines privacy and the right to privacy in its legal context. Alan Westin defines privacy as the claim of an individual or group to arbitrate for themselves about how and to what extent information is shared with others.⁹ Lawrence O. Gostin defines privacy as one's claim to limit access by others to some parts

5 WHO Global Observatory for eHealth, *Legal frameworks for eHealth: Global Observatory for eHealth series – Volume 5*, report for the World Health Organization, 2012.

6 Ibid.

7 Mary F. E. Ebeling, *Healthcare and Big Data* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), chap.3, 49-66.

8 William Lowrance, *Privacy, Confidentiality, and Health Research* (New York: Cambridge, 2012), 36.

9 Alan F. Westin, *Privacy and Freedom* (New York: Ig Pub., 1967), 7.

of his/her private life.¹⁰ Generally, most definitions of privacy are not adequate to specifically cover privacy in health care or online platforms. For this essay, based on O. Gostin's research, we define privacy as "an individual's claim to control the circumstances in which personal health information is collected, used, stored, and transmitted."¹¹ More often than not, privacy is interpreted as confidentiality, even though the two have essential differences. Confidentiality is an individual's claim to handle information disclosure within relationships of trust between individuals respectfully.¹² Confidentiality is a form of health information privacy that emphasizes the relationships of trust between individuals in an intimate relationship, such as those between a physician and patient.¹³ Confidentiality becomes tied with ethical issues in health care for traditional reasons concerning the role of trust in personal information disclosure, the fear of discrimination, and for contemporary reasons such as greater accessibility to information via the Internet.¹⁴

The Complexity of Privacy with Big Data in Health Care

EHRs complicate the issue of privacy and confidentiality since medical information is shared through the Internet. Additionally, the EHR can exchange patient data outside the healthcare delivery system, which means data sharing across multiple organizations is possible.¹⁵ Although health care information is primarily transmitted between authorized users, mainly healthcare providers, it is essential to note that the collected data may not solely be limited to medical purposes. This implies medical information is electronically stored and is available for purposes other than those it was initially obtained for, that is, secondary uses. Such secondary data uses may involve personal, public, and commercial purposes (e.g., the development of new drugs, treatment, and marketing) by health and non-

10 Lawrence O. Gostin, *Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint* (California: Univ California Press, 2008), 316-7.

11 Ibid.

12 Lowrance, *Privacy, Confidentiality, and Health Research*, 33.

13 O. Gostin, *Public Health Law*, 316.

14 James Anderson and Kenneth W. Goodman, *Ethics and Information Technology: A case-based approach to a health care system in transition* (New York: Springer, 2002), 2.

15 Ramona Nelson and Nancy Staggars, *Health Informatics: An Interprofessional Approach* (St. Louis, Missouri: Elsevier Mosby, 2014), 88.

health providers.¹⁶ With goals specifically including protecting and promoting public health, there will probably be a gradual integration of individuals' health records within an expansive public health information infrastructure.¹⁷ There is no doubt that big data in health care will catalyze this assimilation.

Health Privacy Laws of The US and The EU and Their Challenges

In the US, the legislation relevant to EHRs is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), signed into law in 1996 by President Bill Clinton. It aims to protect patient's health information from unauthorized disclosure or use in any form. Broadly, the HIPAA privacy rule is designed to establish national standards. Although the US attends to privacy through various methods, its privacy or data protection law is not consistent according to the Constitution, which does not explicitly address information privacy.¹⁸ Thus, apart from the HIPAA, the Privacy Act of 1974 covers the use of personal information collected by federal agencies, and the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 provides public access to the individual's records.¹⁹ However, most health information is collected, stored, and handled by private organizations not subject to these laws. Because of the absence of comprehensive legislation that governs the privacy and security of EHRs, there are fewer incentives for organizations to make investments in enhancing their security. Instead of having a coherent system, privacy protections in the US have referred to statutes, guidance, and professional and business self-regulation that are inconsistent and fragmented across and within states. Furthermore, private health organizations, having competitors in the field, are reluctant to share proprietary information with other entities, as they see little or no incentive when making their database available to others.²⁰

The HIPAA law regulates much from US national standards, but there are still ambiguous and controversial aspects of its coverage at an entity and individual level. In her book, Sharona Hoffman offers a critique of the narrow definition of the "covered entities" as HIPAA does not apply to every person who may monitor or use health information, thus, not

16 Anderson and Goodman, *Ethics and Information Technology*, 64.

17 Roger S. Magnusson, "The Changing Legal and Conceptual Shape of Health Care Privacy," *The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* 32, no. 4 (2004): 686.

18 Lowrance, *Privacy, Confidentiality, and Health Research*, 47.

19 Anderson and Goodman, *Ethics and Information Technology*, 70.

20 Molla S. Donaldson and Kathleen N. Lohr, eds, *Health Data in the Information Age: Use, Disclosure, and Privacy* (National Academy Press, 1994), 31.

protecting all health information.²¹ The HIPAA privacy rule covers entities such as healthcare insurers, providers, clearinghouses, and their business associates. Thus, its jurisdiction does not cover government entities, website operators, and private data collectors.²² This means that HIPAA does not protect personal health data collected by social media firms. Moreover, data collected from unregulated domains, such as de-identified data, patient-generated data, and non-regulated entities (e.g., pharmaceutical companies), are not subject to health information privacy laws.²³

The EU implemented the Data Protection Directive to regulate the processing of personal data.²⁴ Although the EU has taken initiatives to promote big data in health care and develop a comprehensive policy strategy across nations, there are still obstacles; gathering health data across countries is not systematized, nor do they have a shared integrated structure.²⁵

European countries have all adopted EHRs in differing ways, and thus it is challenging to transfer medical data from one country to another within the EU.²⁶ While the US privacy legislation is “sector-specific” within its states, the EU privacy law is rather “omnibus” and coherent within its countries and regions.²⁷ However, there is a notable contrast between the EU and the US privacy laws regarding data mobility across nations and states.²⁸ The EU Data Protection Directive of 1998 requires member states to prevent the transmission of health information to non-EU countries that do not have laws

21 Sharona Hoffman, *Electronic Health Records and Medical Big Data* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 181.

22 Ibid.

23 Jane H. Thorpe and Elizabeth A. Gray, “Big Data and Public Health: Navigating Privacy Laws to Maximize Potentials,” *Public Health Rep* 130, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 2015): 171-175.

24 Karim Abouelmehdiet al., “Big data security and privacy in health care: A Review,” *Procedia Computer Science*, 113, (2017): 73-80.

25 Sebastian S. Vega, Adria Haimann and Elias Mossialos, “Big Data and Health Care: Challenges and Opportunities for Coordinated Policy Development in the EU,” *Health Systems & Reform* 1, no. 4 (2015): 285-300.

26 Charles Auffray et al., “Making sense of big data in health research: Towards an EU action plan,” *Genome Medicine* 8, no. 71 (2016): 1-13.

27 Ebeling, *Healthcare and Big Data*, chap. 3, 49-66.

28 Ibid.

with an equivalent level of privacy protection.²⁹ This kind of directive eliminates the exchange of data between the US and the EU states. In contrast, under US law, most personal data can be transferred outside national boundaries.³⁰

Collaboration, Combination, and Refinement between the US and the EU privacy laws

Since the notion of what constitutes personal or private information is different from culture to culture and change over time, there is a contextual aspect of privacy that needs to be considered along the conditions in which data has been privatized. Big data contains personal and sensitive data, and, depending on the context, non-sensitive data can turn into sensitive data.³¹ Much of the privacy legislation in the US and the EU may serve as models for other countries, particularly for developing countries. Further research could examine how privacy legislation built around big data and eHealth is carried out in developing countries through the legal architecture of their boundaries.

Big data is challenging existing paradigms for governing, using, and managing data in health care. There is a need to develop and reform policies and laws in health care that can allow synergies between health and data to maximize the potentials of big data. One of the key barriers to developing big data policies and regulations in healthcare is that the US and the EU have different data protection laws. Also, there is no one big data exchange ecosystem that integrates and connects all nations. Existing legislation and legislative infrastructure will require ongoing collaboration, combination, and refinement concerning the health privacy of EHRs and big data to deploy these frameworks in developing countries. There is a definite need for new legislation to establish privacy guidelines ready to face the digital world.

29 Anderson and Goodman, *Ethics and Information Technology*, 72.

30 Ebeling, *Healthcare and Big Data*, chap. 3, 49-66.

31 United Nations Development Group, *Data Privacy, Ethics and Protection: Guidance note on big data for achievement of the 2030 agenda*, report for United Nations, 2017.

The United Nations and the Cholera Pandemic in Haiti

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The United Nations (UN) established the Department of Peace Operations in 1992 to observe and monitor areas in conflict. Since the first peacekeeping missions in 1948, they have assisted in establishing peace agreements and strengthening the law. In 2010, however, infected UN peacekeepers from Nepal were sent to Haiti to give relief after a cataclysmic earthquake. The cholera outbreak occurred shortly after the peacekeepers' arrival and was traced back to the UN. Criticism grew over the legitimacy and abilities of the UN, and distrust also emerged when UN peacekeepers were connected to sexual misconduct during the cholera outbreak. As the UN did not want to lose more control, they originally denied responsibility for the breakout, but later acknowledged that they did contribute to it. In the future, what could the United Nations do to prevent their organization from being contaminated with a disease such as Cholera? This research analyzes which measures can be taken to prevent such occurrences in the future, and how this outbreak affected UN influence in the international community. A descriptive section will also examine the sexual misconduct allegations. This research was mainly conducted through secondary analysis and analysis based on government databases. This analysis presents possible preventive measures to limit infectious diseases and further contamination by UN staff, as well as also to increase accountability within the international organization, to prevent similar or worse outcomes in the future.

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization founded shortly after

World War II, in 1945, by 51 countries, and is active across the globe.¹ Its main missions focus on preventing conflict, aid in humanitarian efforts, and peacebuilding. The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, to observe and monitor conflict areas, assist in setting peace agreements, and strengthening the law. However, in 2010, the legitimacy of the UN was brought into question, when infected UN Peacekeepers from Nepal were sent to Haiti for relief aid after an earthquake, and a cholera outbreak occurred. The cholera outbreak was traced back to the UN, as the bacterial disease swept across Haiti soon after the arrival of the Nepali Peacekeepers. Trust in the UN also declined as allegations of sexual misconduct and exploitation by UN staff arose. This critical multi-layered situation raises the following question: which measures could the UN implement to prevent staff contamination by a disease as well as misconduct? The following analysis suggests possible solutions to prevent the spread of infectious diseases by UN staff, manage potentially disastrous situations, as well as limit sexual exploitation by peacekeepers, to improve accountability within the organization and prevent worse outcomes in the future.

Since its creation in 1945, the UN's main goals have focused primarily on fostering durable partnerships and friendships between countries, maintaining security and peace, and establishing cooperation in the international sector. In February 2013, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated the UN's main purpose during a speech at a book launch: "The United Nations is counting on each and every one of you to be a global citizen, to do your part to build a better world, and to take up the mantle of global leadership."²

Methodology and Limitations

This research analyzes the cholera outbreak in Haiti and suggests preventive measures for future UN Peacekeeper missions. The section covering the cholera outbreak in Haiti, sexual abuse allegations, and UN accountability, is based on qualitative research. This descriptive breakdown establishes a better understanding of the UN's failure in preventing the cholera outbreak and sexual

1 "History of the UN," *United Nations*, 2015, <https://www.un.org/un70/en/content/history/index.html#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20is%20an,living%20standards%20and%20human%20rights>

2 Ki-moon Ban, "Remarks at Launch of 'Building a Better Future for All: Selected Speeches of United Nations Secretary-General,'" *United Nations Secretary-General*, accessed December 19, 2020, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2013-02-20/remarks-launch-building-better-future-all-selected-speeches-united>

misconduct, mainly due to lack of control. Then, an analysis of preventative measures will be conducted, based on secondary analysis. The main goal of the analysis section is to find helpful preventive measures to keep such issues from occurring in the future and propose measures to prevent a similar outbreak.

The main research method is secondary analysis. Through secondary analysis, this paper gathered information on the cholera outbreak, collected from published primary data resources, government databases, research articles, and medical reports in journal articles. Governmental databases and the United Nations' website were used for focused information on the disaster in Haiti. The United States' national public health agency, the Center for Disease Control and Protection (CDC) is also useful for detailed information on diseases and preventive measures. Additionally, it allowed for the location of medical reports, as well as medical journals, such as *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, giving a more detailed scope of cholera, and accurate information on where the disease originated from in Haiti.

Relying on secondary data allowed for the use of previous research that analyzed the UN's failure to control and prevent the cholera outbreak, as well as the sexual abuse that followed. The graph from Figure 1, in the appendix, is a visual tool to better understand the spread of cholera in Haiti, and how it is connected to the UN peacekeepers. The graph analyzes the time-period during which the first cases were reported to pinpoint the location where the outbreak originally emerged. The map shows the first reported cases near Meille and Mirebalais, and then along the Artibonite river in October 2010. Considering that peacekeepers arrived in the area on October 9, 12 and 16, correlation in time and space can be concluded. However, this research has limitations, due to some audit reports on the epidemic not being released, and conflicting numbers on the infected and death toll victims.

The United Nations and the Peacekeepers

The UN Peacekeepers have operated for over 70 years and performed more than 55 operations that have been considered successful. UN peacekeeping operations were launched to aid the most vulnerable people. According to the UN, the peacekeepers' ultimate purpose is to "protect civilians, actively prevent conflict, reduce violence, strengthen security, and empower national authorities to assume these responsibilities."³ Peacekeeping is considered

3 United Nations Peacekeeping, "What We Do Peacekeeping," *United Nations*, accessed December 19, 2020, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-we-do>

political, and any success is reliant on sustainable political processes. The Security Council is essential in upholding Peacekeeper's values and objectives, as well as providing mission mandates that are clear and rational.⁴ Despite their ambitions and goals, peacekeeping operations are not without controversy, and the peacekeeping mission that left Haiti in disaster in 2010 contributed to the doubts of their success and abilities.

Cholera Outbreak in Haiti

In October 2010, it was reported by the Haitian Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) that an epidemic of cholera was caused by a particular strain of bacteria known as *Vibrio Cholerae*.⁵ This strain of bacteria derives from a gram-negative strain that spreads through water and is found in saltwater or brackish environments. This strain of bacteria was considered rare, especially in the United States, and an outbreak in Haiti had not been reported in over a century. The outbreak can be linked to Nepali UN Peacekeepers, who arrived around the same time in Haiti for aid relief after an earthquake. During that time, Nepal had a Cholera outbreak from a similar strain of bacteria found in Haiti. The Nepali Peacekeepers were camped along the Meille River, which connects downstream to the Lantern River, and then the Artibonite River, a major water source for the people in Haiti. The Nepali Peacekeepers were illegally dumping waste in the river without treatment, which resulted in the spread of a cholera epidemic. According to the CDC, this cholera outbreak is considered one of the most catastrophic in recent history, with more than 820,000 cases and approximately 10,000 deaths since the initial outbreak occurred in Haiti.⁶ The disease has taken over ten years to eradicate.

Analysis on the cholera outbreak and UN responsibility

The onslaught of cholera in the Haiti outbreak brings into question the UN's ability to control their own personnel. What could the UN do to prevent its staff from being contaminated and spreading diseases such as cholera in the future? Before crafting and implementing measures that can prevent such a disaster from occurring, it is important to first track exactly how the

4 Ibid.

5 Renaud Piarroux et al., "Understanding the Cholera Epidemic, Haiti," *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 17, no. 7 (2011): 1161-1168.

6 "Cholera in Haiti," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, <https://www.cdc.gov/cholera/haiti/index.html>

Nepali Peacekeepers contaminated the water system. As mentioned earlier, it was found that the root cause of cholera in Haiti was unsuitable waste management and water contamination by the UN peacekeepers' camp. The peacekeepers were dumping inadequately treated sewage into public canals, ignoring laboratory cautions on fecal waste causing water contamination, leaving their camps with trash and toilets overflowing, and lacked inspection of their septic tanks or water treatment plants.⁷ As they did not inspect their septic tanks and lines, pipes leaked sewage and caused more contamination.

One study correlates the arrival of the peacekeepers to the first reported cholera cases at health centers in the area (Figure 1). The peacekeepers arrived on October 9, 12, and 16, and cases were reported by October 20, 2010. Epidemiologists in Haiti reported a pipe discharging sewage directly into the river from the camp as well as other deficiencies in sanitary measures.⁸ The UN's abilities and responsibilities were further questioned when auditors found inadequate measures for sewage disposal three years after the initial outbreak. There are other reports that Haiti is not the only case of waste mismanagement and inadequate treatment by UN staff. There are audits from other missions that reported inadequate waste management in the Ivory Coast, South Sudan, the Darfur region of Sudan, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia.⁹ This inadequate waste management is a significant issue within the UN framework and shows a lack of accountability within the international organization. Experts and professionals, including Beatrice Lindstrom, a lawyer from the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, have been pushing for UN accountability for the cholera crisis. Lindstrom states that regarding waste management, "the results are egregious and show that this is a massive problem across the UN missions around the world."¹⁰

Solutions and Preventive Measures for the Future

Some waste management progress was achieved within the UN framework since the initial cholera outbreak. In 2015, the Department of Field Support (DFS) started implementing a stricter Environment Strategy to achieve

7 Rick Gladstone, "Poor Sanitation Persisted at U.N. Missions Long after Haiti Cholera Crisis," *The New York Times*, August 19, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/world/americas/haiti-cholera-sanitation-un-peacekeepers.html>

8 Renaud Piarroux et al., "Understanding the Cholera Epidemic, Haiti."

9 Rick Gladstone, "Poor Sanitation Persisted at U.N. Missions Long after Haiti Cholera Crisis."

10 Ibid.

set goals by 2020. Implemented measures include the development of a strategic coordination role for the office of the Under-Secretary-General, the creation of a three-year partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), closer environmental risk monitoring, and a more secure governing framework for managing waste.¹¹ There was additional progress in July 2016 when the UN purchased over 400 wastewater treatment plants for missions supported within the DFS.¹² Progress has been made and progressive measures have been put in place since the cholera disaster occurred, however, there is still a need for tighter accountability within the missions carried out by peacekeepers.

Even though some success towards managing waste have been implemented, there are still issues that remain within the Peacekeepers' UN framework. Although waste management is being monitored, more regular inspections are necessary. One solution is that inspections (both scheduled and unannounced) could be conducted more than once a month at all facilities or camps used by UN Peacekeepers. This would pressure individuals in charge of waste management to be compliant and up to date on all protocols or procedures for maintaining proper facilities. An internal unit within the UN is responsible for inspecting how waste is managed, but the use of local contractors would help boost community employment and provide more accountability. If waste management violations are found, penalties should be enforced for all those responsible. The case of Haiti shows a lack of accountability and enforcement, as the camps used by peacekeepers were neither closely monitored nor adequately enforced waste management rules.

The DFS could conduct risk assessments and data analysis throughout missionstopreventcontaminationandensureenvironmentallyfriendlymeasures in the disposal of wastewater. To ensure these new protocols are adhered to, another solution is to provide extensive training to peacekeepers regarding sanitation protocols in all countries. Personnel should be trained properly in protocols for disposal of wastewater and garbage. In the case of Haiti, garbage was found littered around the camp. Additionally, local communities can benefit from learning preventive measures to help eliminate the spread of disease.

11 Office of the Under-Secretary-General, *DFS Environment Strategy. Executive Summary*, report for the United Nations, April 2017, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping/en/UNDFS_Environment_Strategy_ExecSum_vF.pdf

12 Ibid.

Another preventive measure that can help limit the spread of cholera and other infectious diseases is daily sanitary practices. The UN could administer education programs to help communities understand daily sanitary measures for proper hygiene, such as regular handwashing before food preparation and eating, as well as the use of sanitation facilities. Appropriate water drinking methods can be implemented into the program. If there is access to bottled water, programs should also teach the importance of unbroken seals and recommend that all water should be boiled for over one minute before drinking. Programs should also teach food health as some bacteria, such as the *Vibrio Cholerae* strain, can attach to shrimp and other species of shellfish. This means seafood should be handled with care and properly cooked to ensure that no bacteria linger.¹³ Proper disposal of fecal matter is also important in a teaching program, by including information on how to build simple sanitation systems, such as latrines. Protocols on proper distances for waste disposal should also be implemented, to ensure facilities are far enough from residential homes and located over 30 meters away from any body of water.¹⁴ For example, the Ethiopia Public Health Training Initiative (EPHTI) conducts missions that include the prevention of any possible contamination that could leak into a water source. Programs like this could not only help the peacekeepers, but also the local community in the area.

One factor behind the cholera epidemic in Haiti is the absence of proper screening of peacekeepers assigned to the area. There should be proper physical and health reviews before peacekeepers (or other personnel) travel to a mission area. Health checks should follow a strict protocol that is strongly adhered to as a preventive measure to halt the possibility of spreading a disease to another country. All personnel in the monitored area should undergo monthly health and physical medical checks to ensure that there are reduced possibilities of contamination.

The UN received criticism for the cholera outbreak and for not taking responsibility. Additionally, the UN also faced criticism over reconstruction efforts being slow and even sidestepping business and governments. While the UN has made progress toward more accountability, the organization has not accepted legal responsibility for the cholera epidemic in Haiti. However, steps

13 Aaron Sidder, "How Cholera Spread So Quickly Through Haiti," *National Geographic*, August 18, 2016, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2016/08/haiti-cholera-crisis-united-nations-admission/>

14 Ibid.

were taken in 2016, when the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, publicly apologized for the UN's role in the epidemic and declared that there would be a fund of USD\$400 million set up to help Haitian victims affected by the epidemic.¹⁵

Sexual Misconduct Allegations

UN responsibility in the cholera outbreak is also accompanied by allegations of sexual misconduct and sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers. Paired with criticism over the peacekeepers' behavior resulting in the cholera outbreak, the additional sexual misconduct allegations raise concerns regarding the lack of supervision and control that the UN has over its personnel. The outbreak of cholera caused a distraction and enabled the peacekeepers to take advantage of the system. The UN expects every peacekeeper to adhere to a strict code of behavior and conduct; including respecting local customs and laws, treating the inhabitants of the host country with respect, and acting with integrity.¹⁶ However, those rules were ignored and, instead, UN peacekeepers in Haiti were accused of rape.

When sexual abuse by several UN peacekeepers in Haiti was brought forward, there was even more questioning over the ability and control of the international organization. In 2011, Jose Mujica, former Uruguayan President, made a public apology on behalf of Uruguayan UN peacekeeping troops who allegedly raped an eighteen-year-old Haitian young man. Additionally, less than a year later, the military court in Pakistan found two Pakistanis guilty for the rape of a fourteen-year-old Haitian boy who was 14 years old.¹⁷ More reports leaked in 2015 expressed those women were being exploited for sex by UN Peacekeepers in Haiti. At least 229 women were traded goods (such as medicine or food) and money in exchange for sex.¹⁸ In response to these sexual misconduct allegations, the UN established a fund that has

15 Andres Martinez Casares, "U.N. Peacekeeping Mission to Haiti Ends after 15 Years with Mixed Legacy," *Reuters*, October 15, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-politics-idUSKBN1WU2SP>

16 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Standards of Conduct Peacekeeping," *United Nations*, accessed December 19, 2020, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/standards-of-conduct>

17 Andres Martinez Casares, "U.N. Peacekeeping Mission to Haiti Ends after 15 Years with Mixed Legacy."

18 "UN peacekeepers leave Haiti: What is their legacy?" *Al Jazeera*, October 6, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/6/un-peacekeepers-leave-haiti-what-is-their-legacy>

grown to over USD\$1.5 million to help sexual abuse survivors worldwide. The international organization has set tighter protocols, investigations, and appropriate actions whenever an allegation is made. The current UN Secretary-General António Guterres treats sexual exploitation seriously and states:

As we serve the world's people and work for peace and the advancement of humanity, the United Nations must be a source of inspiration and a beacon of hope for all. Together, let us solemnly pledge that we will not tolerate anyone committing or condoning a crime, and in particular, crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse. **Let us make zero tolerance a reality.**¹⁹

Conclusion

The legitimacy of the UN was questioned due to the cholera outbreak in Haiti and the recent accusations of UN Peacekeepers' misconduct of sex exploitation. What could have been done to prevent workers in this international organization from being contaminated with a disease or carrying out misconduct? The United Nations has yet to take legal responsibility for the cholera outbreak, but there has been some improvement towards their accountability, waste management practices, and tightened restrictions on UN Peacekeeping conduct. *In this research*, possible solutions are suggested for managing disasters that have potentially destructive outcomes, preventive measures are introduced, and accountability within the organization to prevent worse outcomes are put forward.

While there are still issues regarding waste management protocols being ignored in some UN facilities, more awareness and procedures have been put in place to prevent further disasters. Mismanagement of fecal waste was found to be the root cause of the cholera outbreak and updated physical waste disposal measures could prevent the spread of disease in the future. It was suggested that the UN could administer education programs to increase awareness related to proper hygiene. Another prevention method is that all UN Peacekeepers must go through a medical physical and health assessment before deploying them to their mission country.

The UN received more criticism because several peacekeepers were accused and convicted of sexual exploitation in Haiti and other countries. The organization has since established funds for cholera victims in Haiti and victims

19 United Nations, "Standards of Conduct Peacekeeping."

of sexual exploitation. Convicted UN Peacekeepers have gone through the appropriate legal processes and issued public apologies towards the people of Haiti. Strict protocols were put in place for codes of conduct. Furthermore, the international organization has set even tighter protocols when accusations are made, to take appropriate actions as soon as allegations are charged.

The measures suggested in this research, if implemented, could help prevent diseases from exacerbating into future pandemics and could provide some useful ways for the UN to achieve higher levels of accountability. Additionally, if the UN publicly apologized for their part in the epidemic, they could set a precedent of taking responsibility for their actions, holding themselves accountable, as well as showing resolve in mitigating problems in the future.

Appendix




Figure 1: This is a map showing the first reported cases of Cholera soon after the peacekeepers arrived in October on the 9th, 12th, and 16th days. Source acquired Hanyi Piarroux et al., “Understanding the cholera epidemic, Haiti,” *Emerging infectious diseases* 17, no. 7 (2011): 1161-1168.

Rhetoric or Reality? An Assessment of Korea-Africa Relations So Far

Hannah Evans

Africa Insights

This essay seeks to assess Korea's relationship with sub-Saharan Africa so far and make a case for future change as the Korean government continues to increase engagement with countries in the region. The Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) had a unique experience as a developmental state and has much development experience to offer African states. As African states move to diversify their exports and foster entrepreneurship, Korea will also be a favorable economic partner, as Korea is strong in many areas valued by African states, such as technology. Similarly, African states have much to offer Korea. African states are traditional natural resource exporters and are moving to gain space in the agricultural export market. In addition, as a new urban middle class begins to rise in many African states, a new market for the Korean manufacturing and technology sectors emerges. This will be particularly helpful as these sectors continue to face increased competition from China and Japan. As this essay will argue, however, Korea has not yet fully utilized its unique development experience and has fallen into typical Global North-Global South relationships. This essay examines the rhetoric surrounding Korea's approach and conducts policy analysis to highlight the gaps in current Korea-Africa relations. The overfocus on Korea's needs, which prevents economic diversification and skews the relationship, is discussed; ideas for how Korea can develop its still-young Africa relations will be presented to achieve truly mutually beneficial partnerships.

Introduction

Following the Korean War (1950-1953), Korea entered the twentieth-century

state system as an economically weak aid recipient.¹ Indeed, in 1956 the East Asian country shared a GDP per capita with newly independent Ghana, a mere \$500.² This statistic pales compared to Korea's present-day \$42,000 GDP p/c,³ one of the many marks of its "miracle" transformation into a formidable middle power.⁴ In its development policies, Korea emphasizes the uniqueness of its trajectory to set itself apart as a development partner.⁵ As this essay will highlight, however, this is not the case, and Korea's policies so far have fallen into the same pattern as the rest of the global North (and now emerging China)—assistance in exchange for resource access and beneficial trade agreements. These relationships prevent the natural and effective development of policy and economy in recipient African states. At the same time, historically, aid-resource partnerships have not significantly advanced any African state and often resulted in aid rentiers, misuse of funds, and continued problems. This does not mean, however, that Korea cannot develop these relations. This essay will identify the areas in which Korea can be an ideal partner, based on its own unique state experience and the many areas in which African states have much to offer. This essay's thesis argues that the influence of Korea's legacy as a developmental state is visible in its development discourse and the reality of its policies. However, this influence does not exempt Korea from criticism or improvement. The first section of this essay will briefly outline Korea's unique development experience and Korea-Africa relations so far to provide the necessary background information. The second section will offer an in-depth analysis of Korea's development cooperation rhetoric and establish that while Korea's unique experience does influence its policies, the idea of Korean exceptionalism is a myth. Next, the positives and negatives of the current approach to the Korea-Africa relationship will be assessed. The final section will make a case for improvement and suggest areas and case studies where Korea's relations with African states could be improved.

1 Mi Yung Yoon and Chungshik Moon, "Korean Bilateral Official Development Assistance to Africa Under Korea's Initiative for Africa's Development," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 14, no.2 (2014), 279.

2 Françoise Nicolas, "Korea in Africa: Between Soft Power and Economic Interests" Paris: *Études de l'Ifri*, January 2020, 28.

3 "Korea – OECD Data," OECD Data, Countries. Accessed March 2, 2021, <https://data.oecd.org/korea.htm>

4 David Shim and Patrick Flamm, "Rising South Korea: A Minor Player or a Regional Power?" Hamburg: *German Institute of Global and Area Studies* (GIGA) 2012, 9.

5 Nicolas, "Korea in Africa," xii.

Background

Korea's history must be understood to analyze the discourse surrounding Korea-Africa relations. This discourse centers around the idea that Korea has a shared experience with African states due to its trajectory from a poor state to an economic powerhouse. By extension, Korea offers something different from other development partners. This rhetoric presents itself to export policies modeled on Korea's development experience to African states. This is promoted primarily by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) through its 'Knowledge Sharing Program' established in 2004.⁶ Members of parliament had also promoted this idea, as Park Geun-Hye did when she defended the idea of Korea as a bridge between developed and developing countries.⁷ The clearest example of this discourse's impact can be seen through the introduction of the "Global *Saemaul Undong*" (New Villages) movement for rural development in developing countries, including African states such as Kenya and Rwanda,⁸ which directly imitates the "*Saemaul Undong*" movement implemented to develop Korea in the 1970s.

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the Korean government multiplied industrialization efforts, focusing heavily on stimulating the supply side of industrial activity. The state provided support until the private sector was stable and profitable on its own, allocating resources to encourage comparative advantage in targeted export industries.⁹ This began in industries such as cement and petroleum and was later followed by goods like steel and petrochemicals.¹⁰ Support came through direct tax reductions, preferential interest rates for business loans, and privileged access to import licenses for specific industries. In return, government departments set export quotas and requirements for corporate performance, smoothly overseeing Korea's transformation. The policy of state intervention undoubtedly facilitated Korea's rapid industrialization,¹¹ as is most clearly evidenced by Korea's monopolistic business conglomerates, the *Chaebols*, such as Samsung and Hyundai.¹²

6 Ibid., 28.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 29.

9 Garth Shelton, "Korea & South Africa: Building a Strategic Partnership," Johannesburg: *Institute for Global Dialogue* 2009, 8, 11.

10 Ibid., 10.

11 Ibid., 8.

12 Nicolas, "Korea in Africa," 30.

This growth can be accredited to apt state policies, assisted by the \$12 billion in official development assistance (ODA) the Korean government received.¹³

On paper, Korea should have much to offer the African continent as an example of effective aid utilization and state intervention to achieve economic transformation. Unlike other dominant global powers who achieved their status through industrialization and colonization in the nineteenth century, Korea entered the global system in the mid-twentieth century in a similar position to many African states today. Utilizing these strategies to transform that situation into one of economic prosperity in the twenty-first century places Korea in an optimal position to offer advice to African states. Until 2006 however, Korea had limited economic relationships with countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In the 1970s and 1980s, Korea interacted with Africa along Cold War lines, with support being offered to key states, including Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda, based on the Pyeongyang-Seoul rivalry. Following the end of the Cold War, Seoul pursued “Northern Diplomacy,” focusing foreign policy on the Korean peninsula, pushing African relations to the periphery until 2006, when “Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development” was launched.¹⁴ This initiative proclaimed a focus on “win-win cooperation,” championing Korea’s unique development experience as an example and presenting Korea as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds.¹⁵ Since 2006, Korea has strengthened its policy approach and official relations with Africa, with the African continent seeing increased heads of state visits, increased Korean interaction with the African Union, and various forums and foundations aimed at improving cooperation.¹⁶ In addition, Korea has continued to increase aid flows, trade, and foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa. Despite these increases, neither trade nor FDI exceeds 1.5 percent of the Korean total;¹⁷ nevertheless, those efforts demonstrate continued Korean interest in the African continent. As this essay will argue, however, the construction and integrity of this relationship deserve further scrutiny, and in the next decade, improvement.

Rhetoric or Reality?

13 Yoon and Moon, “Korean Bilateral Official Development Assistance to Africa Under Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development,” 279.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Nicolas, “Korea in Africa,” xii.

Korea's legacy as a developmental state influences its discourse surrounding development cooperation policies and affects the reality of its policies to a certain extent. Korea presents its relationships with Africa as a variant of its developmental state policy, championing the Korean trajectory as the path to success for African states. This emphasis aims to distinguish Korea from other African development partners, depicting Korea as a friendly helper offering the solution to facilitate a strong, independent Africa, in comparison to the greedy neocolonial actions of other partners, with Korea being a "South-South" bridge as opposed to a "North-South" trade partner.¹⁸ This emphasis is based upon the foreign policy idea that Korea's unique development trajectory sets it apart. While it is correct that Korea and Africa share experiences of colonialism, independence timings, and to a certain extent, conflict,¹⁹ there are several features of this discourse that bear discussion.

First is the claim that Korean-African interactions promote the Korean development trajectory. Kalinowski and Park highlight the continued importance of institutional support in Korea's cooperation with the developing world. Case studies and investment projects suggest that state initiative and strong state-business partnerships define development cooperation elements.²⁰ Kalinowski and Park also suggest that developmental state policies have lost domestic relevance, as *chaebols* have grown beyond the need for state assistance. Therefore, "institutional retreat" occurs, whereby the goals of industry expansion and investment facilitation are now being pursued internationally, as there is no longer domestic policy space for them.²¹ South Korean development cooperation, therefore, does utilize the same rationale as Korea's experiences as a developmental state. This can be seen most clearly in the attempt to transport the "*Saemaul Undong*" (New Villages) movement to the African continent. In the 1970s, the original "*Saemaul Undong*" Movement encompassed a set of government policies focused on building rural infrastructure and improving community income to ensure that rural communities were not left behind following rapid urban industrialization,

18 Ibid., 19.

19 Youngho Park and Yejin Kim, "The Strategic Value of Africa as the New Market and Korea's Economic Cooperation with Africa," *Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law* 11, no.5 (2018): 236-48, 243.

20 Thomas Kalinowski and Min Joung Park, "South Korean Development Cooperation in Africa: The Legacy of a Developmental State," *Africa Spectrum* 51, no.3 (2016): 61-75, 61.

21 Ibid., 62-63.

as is now occurring in several growing African states.²² In 2013, The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) launched the “Global *Saemaul Undong*” Movement in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya.

Interestingly, information about the outcomes of these projects is not easily accessible beyond what is available on the official website of the movement, leaving this essay with limited scope to assess the efficacy of these projects. The *Saemaul Undong* Foundation has also been established in various countries, with the stated aims of helping locals diversify sources of income and contribute to community development.²³ This movement is founded on the belief in the utility of Korean state-interventionist policies and attempts to transport those policies to the African continent. Thus, “Global *Saemaul Undong*” highlights how the legacy of Korea’s experiences influences Korean developmental cooperation policies in Africa as a developmental state. Policies such as “*Saemaul Undong*” have significantly been championed by KOICA and the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance.²⁴ Thus, this essay confirms its argument that the influence of Korea’s legacy as a developmental state is visible in both its development discourse and the reality of its policies.

The second facet of Korea’s development cooperation rhetoric is that Korea exemplifies the South-South partnership and offers an alternative to self-centered Western assistance. Due to the exceptional nature of the Korean economic trajectory, Korea is portrayed to be theoretically different from traditional donors. However, this essay rejects this claim, as Korea-Africa relations have typically followed only Korean interests. In the twentieth century, this is best highlighted through Seoul’s abandonment of the “One Korea” policy in 1973 in favor of African support at the United Nations (UN), as newly independent African states now represented a large voting bloc.²⁵ Support to Africa to achieve diplomatic objectives has continued in the twenty-first century, most notably during the 2006 campaign to elect Ban Ki-Moon as UN Secretary-General, which included a marked increase in aid disbursements.²⁶ Korean-African relations have also been directed to counter North Korean influence on the African continent. This was particularly clear during the Lee

22 Nicolas, “Korea in Africa,” 29.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Yoon and Moon, “Korean Bilateral Official Development Assistance to Africa Under Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development.” 282.

26 Nicolas, “Korea in Africa,” 31.

Myung-Bak administration (2008-2013), which focused on developing ties with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia, two states with high levels of cooperation with Pyongyang in particular.²⁷ When visiting both countries, Lee discussed issues African leaders had previously discussed with Pyeongyang, demonstrating an interest in developing commercial and geopolitical ties to counter decades-old North Korean cooperation with these states.²⁸ This continued in the Park Geun-Hye era (2013-2017), which saw several visits to Uganda and meetings with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, a long-time North Korean co-operator, to discuss commercial ties, security cooperation, and education assistance – fields where Uganda had a history of cooperation with North Korea.²⁹ This successfully culminated in Uganda suspending military cooperation with Pyeongyang in 2016.³⁰ This change was even emphasized by Korean news agencies in 2016, with the visit cited as “an important opportunity to enhance cooperation between Uganda and other major African countries in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.”³¹ Korea’s diplomatic needs have influenced Korea-Africa relations in the twenty-first century.

Resource needs have also been a clear driver of Korea-Africa relations. Korea is pursuing “resource diplomacy,” actively using development cooperation to secure resource access and open African markets to Korean businesses.³² This can be seen most clearly through Korea’s oil field project in Mozambique, which opened the door for state-owned Korea Gas (KOGAS) to secure Korea’s natural gas needs – KOGAS’s 10 percent stake Mozambican project is equivalent to Korea’s five-year demand.³³ Following their analysis, Yung Yoon and Moon conclude that Korean bilateral ODA does not significantly

27 R. Maxwell Bone and Matthew Minsoo Kim, “South Korea’s Africa Outreach,” *The Diplomat*, August 2, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/south-koreas-africa-outreach/>

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Samuel Ramani, “North Korea’s African Allies,” *The Diplomat*, June 4, 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/north-koreas-african-allies/>

31 Kim Hanyoung, “President Park Geun-hye visits Africa... Prospects for North Korean Nuclear Pressure Diplomacy,” *Voice of America: Korea*, May 25, 2016, <https://www.voakorea.com/korea/korea-politics/3345306>.

32 Kalinowski and Park, “South Korean Development Cooperation in Africa,” 63, 65.

33 Ibid., 66.

differ in approach from conventional donors.³⁴ Similarly, Nicolas concludes that Korea-Africa relations reflect traditional North-South relationships, overwhelmingly seeking raw materials for manufactured products.³⁵ This rejects the discourse of South-South partnership or Korean exceptionalism.

Furthermore, rhetoric can be rejected based on elite opinions as well. Seoul can publicly declare itself as an altruistic benefactor; however, research on the policymaking elite's argument highlights the importance of Korean aims. When surveyed, policy and government elites expressed support for development assistance to enhance overall peace and stability in the international society.³⁶ However, they also expressed motivations to improve Korea's international image and diplomacy and motivations to serve national interests, such as increasing trade.³⁷ This exemplifies the nature of Korean-African relations: while they may seek to help develop the African continent, they are also grounded in self-serving motivations. Thus, this section concludes that while Korea's experiences as a state have affected its development cooperation policies, Korea's espoused rhetoric of development exceptionalism or a South-South partner does not hold when the facts are examined.

The Hidden Negatives

As this essay has established, Korea's stated and actual aims differ significantly. The question that must be asked next is, is this a bad thing? There is a case to be made for the policies so far. In Mozambique, Korean investment improved infrastructure and has led to an increase in Mozambican gas exports while meeting Korea's gas import needs.³⁸ Korean involvement in Rwanda established a 4G LTE network across the country, ensuring that 95 percent of Rwandans have access to fast wireless and broadband services while fitting into the Rwandan government's preexisting development framework.³⁹ Therefore, there are broad material benefits from ODA and Korea-Africa cooperation. However, an examination of the details is vital.

34 Yoon and Moon, "Korean Bilateral Official Development Assistance to Africa Under Korea's Initiative for Africa's Development." 279.

35 Nicolas, "Korea in Africa," xii.

36 J. James Kim et al., "The Giving Mind: Analysis of South Korean Public and Elite Attitudes on ODA," Seoul: *ASAN Institute for Policy Studies* 2017, 20.

37 *Ibid.*, 20, 25.

38 Kalinowski and Park, "South Korean Development Cooperation in Africa," 65.

39 Nicolas, "Korea in Africa," 24.

In Mozambique, the creation of oil fields could be detrimental to long-term economic development, as it is overwhelmingly based on raw materials and prevents economic diversification.⁴⁰ Gas extraction creates relatively few jobs, and profits are usually divided among foreign investors and a small local elite, negatively impacting local fishermen's income, already affected by ecological changes.⁴¹ Therefore, Korean investment may benefit Mozambique in the short term. However, the choice of an oil field to fulfill Korean resource criteria may harm the Mozambican economy in the long term. This is not solely blaming Korea for a mutual agreement but highlight the gaps in Korea's current resource-focused approach to African states.

Conversely, investment in Rwanda may have more positive outcomes. Projects in Rwanda, especially an ICT-related project involving the Korean telecommunication company KT, had a significant degree of ownership by the Rwandan government and assisted in the technology sector, an area in which Korea excels.⁴² This model presents a more promising framework for future Korean engagement with other African states. Korean influence has had a mixed impact, then positives are found despite Korea-Africa relations diverging from their stated aims.

Despite the positives, Korea-Africa relations still warrant some criticism. As established, these relations mimic other typical North-South relations. Conventional donor-recipient relations and aid flows have been responsible for a loss of policy space in sub-Saharan Africa.⁴³ These relations limit policy space for local governments to innovate and contribute to the growing marginalization of sub-Saharan African countries from international capital flows.⁴⁴ In addition, projects and aid that only seek to serve donor interests are ineffective and detrimental at worst. At best, only provide benefits with longer-term drawbacks, as the case of Mozambique shows. Therefore, the disparity between Korea's stated aims and actual

40 Kalinowski and Park, "South Korean Development Cooperation in Africa," 65.

41 *Ibid.*, 67.

42 *Ibid.*, 70, 68.

43 Carlos Oya, "The Political Economy of Development Aid as Main Source of Foreign Finance for Poor African Countries: Loss of Policy Space and Possible Alternatives from East Asia," Paper Presented at International Forum on Comparative Political Economy of Globalisation, Beijing, China. September 1-3, 2006, 3.

44 *Ibid.*

policies is detrimental to the African continent. The possibility of African countries' needs being overlooked in favor of Korean diplomatic and material conditions hinders Korea-Africa relations from developing into a mutually beneficial partnership, relegating them into the same category as the conventional, borderline neocolonial relationships by Western states.

Furthermore, the disparity between stated and actual aims also prevents accountability. If Korean influence in Africa is presented as a South-South partnership and as an exception from Northern relationships, appropriate criticisms and scrutiny cannot be applied – the discourse prevents accountability. Therefore, the disparity between Korea's described and actual interactions can be seen as unfavorable and should be altered to ensure prosperous relations in the next decade.

Improving the Relationship

The case for improvement can be made on several grounds, the first of which is timing. Both Korea and the African continent are poised to interact with each other as Korea moves towards a global outlook and African states diversify their economies, indicating promising economic growth. Seoul aims to achieve a "Global Korea"⁴⁵ and recognize global issues, both inside and outside of Africa.⁴⁶ Nicolas suggests that Korea is still in its learning stage. Now is the ideal time to improve relations with KOICA and the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) to implement a consistent approach towards Africa.⁴⁷ President Moon Jae-in (2017-) has emphasized more diversified diplomacy, with a global outlook and commitments rather than a Korean-peninsula-focused approach,⁴⁸ and in addition, does not seem to view Africa as a venue for competition with North Korea⁴⁹ divergence from past presidents. If the cards are played right, the next decade could be a game-changer for Korea to provide an alternative form of development cooperation. In addition, the African continent is primed to become an ideal trade partner for Korea.

Furthermore, the African continent has significantly in the past two decades, maintaining an average economic growth rate above five percent

45 "Information on the Region: The ROK-Africa Relations."

46 Shim and Flamm, "Rising South Korea," 3-4.

47 Nicolas, "Korea in Africa," xiii.

48 J. James Kim and Hong Sanghwa, "Moon's Foreign Policy Priorities in Words and Deeds," Seoul: *ASAN Institute for Policy Studies* 2020, 9.

49 Bone and Minsoo Kim, "South Korea's Africa Outreach."

since the early 2000s.⁵⁰ Africa is a promising market and offers Korean companies the opportunity to expand when the domestic market is stagnating.⁵¹ As the continent develops further, it will continue to grow into a promising partner for Korea. This makes the next decade the perfect time to iron out any creases in the relationship and develop truly mutually beneficial partnerships.

Improving the Relationship: Trade and the Economic Relationship

Beyond timing, there are various ways the economic relationship between Korea and the African continent could be expanded. From a trade perspective, rapid economic growth on the continent has strengthened the purchasing power of African consumers, particularly those in the swiftly growing urban centers.⁵² These consumers represent a growing African middle class from a new urban culture that demands household appliances such as washing machines, refrigerators, and air conditioners, in addition to mobile phones and computers.⁵³ This is a perfect match for Korean appliance manufacturers facing international competition, particularly as China expands. Furthermore, Korea's technology brands have a strong reputation in Africa, with Samsung and LG placing among the top 10 most admired brands in Africa in 2020 (2nd and 10th, respectively).⁵⁴ It is clear, therefore, that Africa represents a budding market for Korean production. The state should continue to foster this relationship and encourage Korea-Africa economic cooperation. With the establishment of several conferences and events, such as the Korea-Africa Economic Co-operation Conference, this has already begun. This establishes a permanent framework for cooperation between the African Development Bank and the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and the wider Korean private sector, focusing on discussing opportunities for Korean companies and furthering trade links.⁵⁵ This forum and other forums such as the Korea-Africa Forum and the Korea-Africa Forum for Industrial Co-operation are steps in the right direction. They suggest that Seoul is paying attention to the potential the African continent has to offer. This essay hoped to see the continued

50 Park and Kim, "The Strategic Value of Africa as the New Market and Korea's Economic Cooperation with Africa," 237.

51 Nicolas, "Korea in Africa," 27.

52 Park and Kim, "The Strategic Value of Africa as the New Market and Korea's Economic Cooperation with Africa," 237.

53 Ibid., 238.

54 Nicolas, "Korea in Africa," 11.

55 Ibid., 11.

expansion of these programs and continued Korean-African trade in the next decade to realize a mutually beneficial partnership between the two thoroughly.

Improving the Relationship: Knowledge and Experience

Outside of the direct economic relationship, Korea has much to offer Africa development knowledge and experience beyond rhetoric. Indeed, Africa generally seeks technology transfer and education techniques from Korea.⁵⁶ This call has been answered through forums such as the Korea-Africa Youth Forum and the Seoul Dialogue on Africa in 2020, which provided African graduate students with the opportunity to present their research to experts and the opportunity for entrepreneurs to establish networks with industry professionals.⁵⁷ The Korean government should continue to foster these relations and work to make its discourse a reality. Recent smart city development projects in Africa, most notably in Kampala, Uganda, are an excellent example of a new direction; however, Korean expertise must be catered to local contexts in each African country rather than imported as a blanket solution. This could be further fostered by increasing the number of researchers working in the region and increasing academic and policy knowledge of Africa, as both general and professional knowledge of Africa remains low in Korea.⁵⁸

Korea could also offer a framework for cultural export. Korea is the only country that successfully exports across all cultural sectors⁵⁹ because of the government's focus on creative industries. The drive to diversify exports will be critical to African development.⁶⁰ African countries could offer the world much culturally, from music to food to other creative industries, such as the arts. In South Africa, music is thriving, with styles such as *gqum*, *afrohouse*, and *amapiano* beginning to receive wider international attention.⁶¹ Nigeria is already home to a strong domestic film industry (colloquially referred

56 Park, "Korean ODA Strategies for Resource Diplomacy Towards Africa," 26.

57 Emilia Columbo, "South Korea's Evolving Role in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Centre for Strategic and International Studies: Analysis*. January 2, 2020. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-koreas-evolving-role-sub-saharan-africa>

58 Nicolas, "Korea in Africa," 34.

59 Dal Yong Jin, *New Korean Wave* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2016), 5.

60 Chris Alden, "Emerging Powers and Africa: From Development to Geopolitics," London: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) 2019, 3.

61 "It Speaks to an Ancient History': Why South Africa Has the World's Most Exciting Dance Music," *The Guardian*, December 21, 2020, <http://www.theguardian.com/music/2020/dec/21/south-africa-dance-music-afrohouse-gqum-amapiano>.

to as *Nollywood*). Since 2008, the Korean state has renewed its focus on creative exports, working for the “intensification of the commodification and capitalization of cultural products”⁶² through investment and subsidization, with the express intent of economic benefit.⁶³ This has been wildly successful, mainly due to the cultural and financial success of K-Pop. For example, the hit group *BTS* generates an estimated KRW4 trillion (US\$3.54 billion) in added economic value to the country per year.⁶⁴ The success of K-Pop combined with the global success of the 2020 film *Parasite* moved Korea to 10th place on the Global Innovation Index last year.⁶⁵ Therefore, Korea’s interventionist cultural policies have greatly benefited the Korean economy and Korea’s reputation as a state and offer a framework from which other African states could benefit. This is an area that the Korea-Africa relationship has not yet prioritized. This essay argues that it presents an opportunity for Korea to provide the exceptionalism it seeks in its relationships with African states.

Improving the Relationship: Individual and Diaspora-Level Support

Finally, Korea could offer much in terms of migration and individual level support to African people. As previously mentioned, projects such as the Korea-Africa Forum already exist, establishing linkages between African entrepreneurs and industry professionals in Korea. These projects should, and likely will, continue to expand. In addition, the African diaspora could be better fostered in Korea. Diaspora communities greatly benefit the African continent, with Africans remitting more than development aid funds in 2012.⁶⁶ There are various advantages to remittance funds, including the fact that they leave less room for misappropriation and usually come without

62 Yong Jin, *New Korean Wave*, 28.

63 *Ibid.*, 32.

64 “K-pop Group BTS Induces Production Worth 4 Tril. Won per Year,” *Businesskorea*, December 19, 2018, <http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=27583>.

65 “Economic Effect of BTS’ Conquest of Billboard Hot 100 Chart,” *KBS World*, September 14, 2020, http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/contents_view.htm?lang=e&menu_cate=business&id=&board_seq=390930.2021, http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/contents_view.htm?lang=e&menu_cate=business&id=&board_seq=390930.

66 Adams Bodomo, “African Diaspora Remittances Are Better than Foreign Aid Funds: Diaspora-Driven Development in the 21st Century,” *World Economics Journal* 14 (December 1, 2013), 21-29.21

conditionalities to satisfy individual and community needs.⁶⁷ A few programs to foster African migration to Korea exist, such as programs and opportunities to study abroad. However, support following the completion of a migrant's program is limited.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the Korean immigration system is strict with high entry requirements for migrants,⁶⁹ and Korean society is homogenous and often opposed to foreign residents, particularly those of African origin.⁷⁰

Overcoming these barriers to African migration to Korea would benefit the African continent and wider Korean society, as African individuals have much to offer. Korea is currently facing an aging population and a low birth rate,⁷¹ which will present problems for its workforce. Improving Korea-Africa migration links, increasing awareness, and combatting anti-African prejudice in society would offer a partial solution to this problem and help invigorate Korea's labor force. This is a new avenue for the Korea-Africa partnership.

Conclusions

In summary, this essay has analyzed Korea's relationships with African countries, companies, and institutions so far and suggested areas for improvement. In the post-2006 era of renewed Korean-African cooperation, Korea has attempted to present its relations with Africa as a cut apart from traditional relations, emphasizing its unique development trajectory as a model for African states. While Korea's developmental experiences have been shown to influence its development cooperation policies, the idea that Korea-Africa relations are unique to other North-South relationships is just that, an idea. This prevents the full realization of Korea-Africa relations, hindering policy space development and often trapping African states in economic relationships that do not fully benefit them. Improvement of these relations would provide a mutually beneficial opportunity to fully achieve the potential of both Korea and its African partner states. However, there is great space for improvement

67 Ibid., 21, 25.

68 Seongyong Heo, "Measures to Raise African Awareness and Implications for Our Foreign Policy Against Africa," Seoul: *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* November 2020.

69 Young-bum Park, "South Korea Carefully Tests the Waters on Immigration, With a Focus on Temporary Workers," Migration Policy Institute, March 1, 2017. <https://bit.ly/3xrfED>

70 Heo, "Measures to Raise African Awareness and Implications for Our Foreign Policy Against Africa."

71 Park, "South Korea Carefully Tests the Waters on Immigration, With a Focus on Temporary Workers."

as Korea and Africa have much to offer one another and are poised at a prime time to do so. The economic relationship could be tweaked, and Korea's developmental policies could be altered to transport its experiences to the continent in both traditional economic spaces and cultural spaces.

Furthermore, awareness and acceptance could be improved in Korean society to help foster African migration and diaspora communities, again for the mutual benefit of both communities. Ultimately, Korea will have to entrench the importance of African relations into its foreign policy and public consciousness to achieve a focused, long-term African policy that avoids the influences of diplomatic considerations, material needs, and administration changes. In the next decade, it can be hoped, expected with reasonable certainty, that this will occur.

INTERVIEW

**Conflict through a lens: Conversations with a war reporter and a war
photographer Saddek Chettab and Michel Setboun**

CONFLICT THROUGH A LENS: CONVERSATIONS WITH A WAR REPORTER AND A WAR PHOTOGRAPHER

Saddek Chettab and Michel Setboun

Saddek Chettab became a freelance investigative war reporter, cameraman and documentary film-maker in 1989. He has covered conflicts around the world, including Pakistan, Ukraine, Somalia; wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria as well as lighter stories. He also worked on award-winning documentaries such as "Iraq: The Agony of a Nation" on the Iraqi civil war, and "Les enfants sorciers de Kinshasa" about the stigma on child sorcerers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which he co-authored in 2007. Saddek Chettab has worked with production companies and press agencies such as Capa, Elephant & Cie, Premières Lignes, Tony Comiti, Magneto Presse, for stories released on television channels including ARTE, Canal+ and TF1. In the past few years, he has focused on investigations and filmmaking as an executive producer and director for reports and documentaries on various topics, including deforestation, forgery, poaching as well as cultural topics such as sharing African contemporary art with other parts of the world.

Michel Setboun started as an architect and became a photographer in 1978 as a news and war photographer covering conflicts around the world. He worked as a photo reporter covering Iran, El Salvador, Afghanistan, among others, before focusing on long-term international stories in the 1980's such as Mongolia or Albania. In 1984, he was awarded the first prize of the World Press for his work on the expulsion of refugees from Nigeria. Michel Setboun has collaborated with the biggest photo agencies, starting with Sipa, then Black Star, Rapho, Sygma, Corbis and finally Getty. His photography has been published in The New York Times, Géo, Life, and Paris Match, among others, and his photos of Khomeyni, Saddam Hussein and the pope made the cover of some of the biggest magazines. Since becoming a freelance photographer in the early 90's, Michel Setboun has focused on long-term projects, fine art photography and books, including

books on iconic cities such as Paris, New York, Cairo and Hong-Kong.

YJIS: Please introduce a little about yourself and how you got started in your field of work.

SC: I was a war reporter for 25 years, mostly freelance. I started in 1989 and covered many conflicts from their early beginnings, including in Iraq and Syria in the Middle East. I was even in Iraq before the war, when Saddam Hussein was in power. I was one of the first ones on the ground in Syria, at the end of 2010, covering the beginning of the revolution and what was going to be a civil war, and then again in 2013 to expose the government's use of chemicals on civilians. I also covered the war in Afghanistan, conflict in Somalia, the civil war in Kenya and followed migrants between Niger and Libya to name a few.

My job mainly consisted mainly of investigation, filming video footage and capturing audio, and I also participated in the editing process and was credited as co-author. For war reporters, we usually prepare for a month, then film for 20-30 days maximum and edit the movie back home for a month. We have a fixed budget and salary with the production company, not including author rights. But with video, we can never make as much as a photographer if they sell a big picture. As a freelancer, I either pitched a story to a production company, or I was directly contacted by them. In the field, I usually worked alone or in a team of two with a journalist, but always accompanied by a local fixer as a guide. Having a local fixer is an essential element of war reporting.

MS: To make it short, for the first part of my life I worked as a war photographer, and then I was working as a magazine photographer on softer stories. My first big story I covered was in Angola during the independence war around 1975-76 and then power hand-off to the revolutionaries. I was still writing at the time and then realized photography made more money than text. I got the hang of it and was already enjoying this type of life.

Photo-reporters are paid by publication and at the time, we had to pay 50% of all expenses and sell the pictures. Once you became known, some magazines like Newsweek and Time magazine guaranteed expenses and daily rate. French magazines had no power because they had no money. So, we worked mostly for American newspapers, and on the side sold some pictures to French magazines.

In 1977, I had my architecture exam on a Monday but the Thursday before, Sipa wanted to send me to South India to cover a tidal wave. On a whim, I said yes—I was a little crazy. I got the first and cheapest flight out that had a return in three months. It took me three days to get there because of lack of transportation and on Sunday morning I reached the location. After taking pictures, I caught a red cross flight, then one to Delhi and faked the date on my Paris return ticket so they let me go. I hadn't slept for four days and took the exam. Later, I got two calls: my photos made the cover of a magazine and I graduated with honors. My life as an architect and a photographer were starting at the same time.

I thought, what am I going to do with my life? I started reading up on Iran. I was intrigued and felt like the regime of the Shah was going to fall. No one believed me, and I went there in March '78, but came back with nothing except better knowledge of the country. In May-June, protests started to grow. I was right about the regime exploding. Then, I travelled a bit with the Shah during the summer, it was a revolutionary period. I knew something was coming and I was waiting for it. In September 1978, on the eve of the Black Friday, most famous photographers had left and I was one of the only ones covering it. This moment was extraordinary and, through perseverance and hard work, this story launched my career. I started making a name for myself and I quit my architect job.

YJIS: What made you interested in this line of work?

SC: As far as I remember, I have always been drawn to telling stories about war, so becoming a war reporter just made sense. As a teenager, I was already fascinated by stories of war photojournalists and reporters, such as Robert Capa and Ernest Hemingway. Since I was about fifteen years old, that passion became self-evident—it was a mix of passion for war, conflict, politics, camera work, story-telling and mostly travelling. Considering what all of those things mean to me, I knew this line of work was for me.

MS: You have to be a little bit crazy to work in this profession. I was also focused on politics and third world countries. In 1968, I was sixteen years old, and I grew up with the idea that photography could change the world. We thought showing the reality of war could be a way to stop the war, especially because it was very important during the Vietnam War. Of course, we were wrong because you can see forty years later nothing has changed, and it's even getting worse. But when I was young, in my mind, I thought I could change something.

YJIS: How would you describe your role and your status in the field? How would you describe the main goal of your work?

SC: Pre-investigation and on site investigation are also essential. It is our responsibility to double and triple check every number and every source, to make sure what you release is accurate. In the field, the most important thing is to always know your place and stay in your role. We are on the ground, the battlefield, to tell the story of war and its impact on the local population. We tell the stories of those people, we give them a face. We are the witnesses of some key and important moments in history, and then we are forgotten.

MS: Pictures of war are not only about people shooting or tanks, they are mainly the pictures of the result of war. People, civilians, children, women, men. Those are more powerful than any picture of a man shooting a gun. Photographing the war is mainly photographing the result of war more than anything else. Journalists don't shoot the war, we shoot the result of the war.

YJIS: Are there any particular themes that run through your reporting/ photography? For example, do you focus on active combat or the aftermath of conflicts?

SC: As a reporter covering a conflict on the ground, you don't really know or choose what you are going to capture. You always have to try to be in the right place at the right time in order to get to the heart of the story. That way, you capture the before, during and after of a conflict.

MS: As a war photographer, I was focused on every news and conflict. We are like bounty hunters looking for a reward, and the one who gets published on the cover of Time magazine wins. Once you're on the ground, what you capture can be during or after conflict. We don't usually cover the aftermath, because many newspapers are mostly interested in the action and daily life.

YJIS: How many countries have you travelled to for your work? And what are the most memorable countries out of them and why?

SC: For work, I have travelled to about 50 countries, I think. Several countries remain memorable in my memories, each for specific reasons. For example, in a country like Somalia, it's the contrast between the beauty of the land, the

beaches and the color of the sea, and the devastated houses, the running noise of Kalashnikovs and the frightened faces of the children. But every face, every child, every conflict, is different, except the common theme of fear and suffering.

MS: Maybe around 150 countries, but not all of them were at war. I prefer to talk about where I've spent the longest time, because everything is memorable. One of my main countries is Albania. I've done a book and several exhibitions there. In those poor countries, very few people had a camera, film, etc., and in the 80's, few people travelled the world taking pictures. So, in a way, I have a kind of familial bond with the country.

Another one is, of course, Iran because I started my career there. Without Iran, I would have done nothing. I've done several books, including some that were published in Iran. Today, I still go there because I managed to keep my relationships alive. Behind a country, even a country you don't like, you have people. And they are good, they are interesting, they are interested in what you are doing and that's more important than politics. If you continue to be interested in them, that changes everything.

Afghanistan was also an important place for me, because I have followed the story of this country for 40 years since 1969. I was there for the first coup of Daoud, then for the first communist take-over by Taraki, and when Amin took power. I was also one of three guys who went with the Mujahideen in June 1979 before the Russians took over.

YJIS: Is being a war photographer/reporter dangerous? Are there any protections for war reporters/photographers?

SC: For security reasons, we had to change the place we stayed at every couple of days, and being a war reporter can be dangerous if you are not disciplined in the field. Each reporter has their own security protocol. It consists in having careful behavior and strict conduct when an event occurs. For example, when a bomb explodes, you should never rush in to get a scoop of the injured and dead. Because, usually, a second bomb is ready to explode once people have gathered. War reporters, with video, can still zoom; however, photographers have to be closer and take more risks. But the adrenaline never stopped and where there is action, that's where I want to go. That's also why I slowed down on war reporting, because I was going

towards danger and I wasn't scared anymore. That's when it becomes really dangerous for me and the people working with me, and you can get hurt.

MS: Of course it's dangerous. El Salvador was maybe one of the most dangerous places I've been during the civil war. I was wounded there, I got a bullet on my side, near my stomach. Nowadays, there are protections for anybody going to war, but in my time, we had no jackets, no protections. But we love it, because it's a kind of game. If I had to do that again, I would do it again because I'm still crazy. The best protection would be not to take the plane.

YJIS: In this line of work, you come across a lot of disturbing and emotional situations. How do you cope with such incidents?

SC: You can't just focus on the emotional aspect because we wouldn't be able to do our jobs. Our goal is to continue and tell the story. Otherwise you'd be doing humanitarian work. We try to take and absorb those events as part of our profession, and remind ourselves that the people we film are the ones who suffer the most. Once the job is done, we get to go home to a more peaceful country. They don't.

In terms of logistics and how to deal with risk-taking in the field, we sort of forget ourselves. We are immersed in the moments, because those are hard moments, violent moments, that can change lives. With bombs, children can become orphans. Their lives can be turned upside-down in a split second. It's our job to tell that, to tell those stories. We don't have time to think about being objective or subjective, we are just there, to capture and tell. That's war reporters. We are just witnesses, there to report.

MS: Everybody is different. Some people just can't, and some people, I don't know if they are stronger, but they do what they can. The camera is a kind of protection, when you are behind the camera, you don't see the real war. The screen of the camera is the best protection in order to have distance between you and what is happening around you.

YJIS: Does a war photographer/reporter get to choose where they go?

SC: Some reporters or photographers choose to focus on a specific geographic area. Others, like me, go around the globe, wherever there

is a conflict happening. But you always have to be ready to leave at any time. Sometimes you get a call and you have to leave right away, especially when something big happens, without knowing your return date.

MS: Of course, nobody can force you to go to war, it's a choice to go. Not only is it dangerous, you are not paid that well and there is a chance you don't come back. It's a personal interest. People who are capturing conflicts were not forced to go, they wanted to go. If you're an independent photographer, you're the one that goes to see a newspaper and tell them I want to go to Syria, for example.

YJIS: Can you share some of the most memorable incidents you came across in your career?

SC: The second big story I did in Syria, in 2013 during the civil war, we went near Aleppo to gather evidence that the government was using chemicals on civilians. It was so dangerous. One night, we were stuck in a house with jihadists. They were trying to decide what to do with us, and somehow the war chief that protected us on site got us out. That's when I realized our local fixer was not trustworthy anymore and we had to leave. Our departure was set for Friday, and my instinct told me it was too dangerous because too many people knew. At that time, the team didn't agree, but on Wednesday, I decided to call the guy who brought us from the Turkish border and made up an excuse about how we needed a car to film. I told the team to pack and get ready to leave at any time. On Thursday, we used the car for work, and then I casually asked him how long it would take to get to the Turkish border and what time it closed. He said it was easy, an hour and a half at least. Soon after, I just said let's go. He couldn't say no but I could see he was uncomfortable, and we left an hour later. We stopped on the way, something about him having to donate blood, but I didn't give him any space to make a call or anything. We made it to the border, paid him and got through. I learned that the very next week, this man was the intermediary for a group of French journalists that got kidnapped on the way.

A funny incident happened to me in Kenya. During a confrontation between ethnic groups, we had to move because a group was heading towards the journalists. I kept on filming, ran and jumped into the back of a moving pickup truck. Suddenly, the button from my pants popped and I found myself holding onto a ledge on the truck with one hand so I wouldn't fall and holding my pants up with the other hand that was also holding the camera. All at around 100 km/h.

MS: One of my last experiences, I was in Morocco in 2010 when there was a bomb that exploded in the main square, Jemaa el-Fnaa. I was drinking my coffee and the waiter told me it was just a gas bottle that exploded. Because I have experience in war photography, I recognized the sound, and I knew something was not normal. I ran in the direction of the explosion when people were fleeing to the other side. I was there just maybe one minute after the explosion, I could see all the dead bodies and people cut in different parts. I could see the face of one woman looking at me with despair, and part of her face was missing, she had no mouth. I remember just her eyes, and she died a few hours later. That was my last terrible experience. Only a few newspapers published it because it was so gruesome and with “droit à l’image” (image consent) in France, those kinds of pictures are forbidden. It makes me crazy, you cannot publish anything in France, especially nothing related to death. Anyway, one of the girls who survived called me some time ago, and she thanked me for the pictures. I was a bit anxious about it, but she said it was so important. It is important, I think that kind of picture should be shown to the guy who committed the attack, show them the picture of the people, of their eyes. Because, when you look at that, I don’t even know how to put it into words..... I remember the body of one guy, the body was blown into maybe four parts. You cannot imagine, it’s not a movie, it’s real. But people now get used to that, because they can watch crazy surrealist movies.

YJIS: What is your perspective about war and world power struggles?

SC: I gave up on the idea of a world without war, I think there will always be wars. More civilians are becoming combatants overnight and war crimes are becoming commonplace. I believe international bodies and organizations should use their experience of war and personnel in risk zones in order to anticipate and react faster. Especially when there are signs a war or conflict will break out. They can act faster to protect children, who are the most vulnerable, because they can be victims in different ways: dying or becoming orphans overnight.

MS: It will never end. War is connected with human beings. I hope there will be no nuclear war, but I’m not that confident. Of course, we have no world war today, but you can see around the world you have wars absolutely everywhere. Equality is not for tomorrow and all the social questions we had in the past still remain. I’m not optimistic, it’s just what it is. Hopefully, we are in less dangerous countries. If you are born in Chechnya or Afghanistan,

you have no choice. It's just a question of luck— lucky or unlucky.

YJIS: If someone is interested in following your career path, what advice can you give to such an aspirant?

SC: Nowadays, conflicts have changed, and what has really changed in this line of work is kidnappings. Before, guerillas and groups used to communicate with journalists. During the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict for example, reporters stayed with the Eritrean guerillas. Now, it's more about religion wars, religious movements have confused social demands and there have been more kidnappings, it's very dangerous.

Also, the new generation of journalists and reporters don't work the same way we did. Things are not being told the same way and I don't agree with that. Now war is being told differently through a new generation of new media. There are even 'influencer' war reporters, but are they sharing real information? With social media, it's become complete disinformation. We're moving forward with fake news, but back in the days, our job used to be all about fact-checking. Now, the real story, the origin of the conflict, the consequences, all gets drowned in sensationalism. Before, we just filmed real attacks as they were happening. Now, reporters ask for action just for the sake of creating buzz. If you ask for a show, they'll give you a show – they can even kill right in front of you. What is important is to create a relationship, a proximity, a degree of trust. With key words and the right approach, you can get the truth. That's when they tell you things they've never told others before. That's the key.

MS: My advice would be don't do anything like that. It's over. The business of war photography is finished. There are no more magazines, no money. Do something else, sell potatoes in the countryside. It's impossible to make money, it's dangerous, it's useless, it's complicated, and all the guys I know who did that I don't know if they survived, even my old friends. It was good at the time, but today photography is good to hang on a wall, that's all.

BOOK REVIEW

**Towards a Global Narrative of Medieval Exchange:
Review of Thomas Allsen. *The Steppe and the Sea: Pearls in the
Mongol Empire*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019**

Aaron Molnar

Towards a Global Narrative of Medieval Exchange: Review of Thomas Allsen. *The Steppe and the Sea: Pearls in the Mongol Empire*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019

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Pearls have transfixed human imaginations and tugged at desires since antiquity. Lustrous, reflective, and even transparent, these optical qualities have commanded human fascination by virtue of the crystalline structure's ability to scatter light within itself. Altered optics, too, are at the core of Thomas Allsen's *The Steppe and the Sea: Pearls in the Mongol Empire*. In this study, he seeks to use the global circulation of pearls during the Mongol period (1206-1368) to expand perspectives on the patterns of global material circulation, the place of luxury goods in the Mongol political economy, and finally on the debate between continuity and exceptionalism of the Chinggisid imperium.

Allsen's study, much like his previous works on the Eurasian royal hunt and textile circulations, is succinct without sacrificing density of detail, depth of argument, or narrative flow. The book is further an astounding accumulation of primary source material in Arabic, Armenian, Chinese, Mongolian, and Persian with secondary material in nearly every major European language, with particular attention to Russian historiography. These documentary spires are buttressed by archaeological and anthropological studies. It is an evidentiary standard that is staggering. The book is divided into two parts: the first addresses the cultural and commercial background of pearls in Eurasia, which outlines aspects of continuity in production, accumulation, and use of this key positional good. The second part looks more broadly at circulations of pearls with particular attention to the roles of merchants and markets in the interconnectivity of the global north and south.

Allsen weds the material, cultural and political history of the Mongol Empire in his emphasis on pearls as the *sine qua non* positional good in Eurasia during Mongol expansion. He asks the reader to question whether pearls drove Mongol imperialism as much as they were necessary for expansion to take place. This focus is both a continuation of the pan-Eurasian perspective and its material cultural exchange that has been a hallmark of Allsen's research. However, it is also an acknowledgment of a trend in the historiography of Qing China (1644-1911), exemplified by Jonathan Schlesinger, that has refocused attention on the material cultures, particularly of Inner Asia. This trend undergirded imperial practice and the creation of notions of "nature."

In contrast, Mongol expansion narratives posit *tengrism* as the core of imperial ideology: rooted in indigenous Mongol shamanism, *teng'ri* or Heaven/God bequeaths the Earth, and the mandate to rule to Chinggis Qaghan.¹ This approach has often led to a chicken-before-the-egg debate on whether an innate need for positional goods extracted from neighboring sedentary societies was the key motivating factor for expansion. Such an approach would render ideology as a *post-facto* rationalization for empire.² However, Allsen's look at the role of pearls as a positional good in the expansion of the Mongol empire avoids this pitfall by arguing that ideology and material culture were co-generative. Political culture, material objects, and the imperial enterprise are deeply entangled. Pearls are the physical manifestations of political capital used to create and sustain political hierarchies (50-60). He links this motivation with the Mongol invasion of the Song Empire and strategies to secure maritime routes, which were vital in supplying large quantities of pearls (134-141). However, his discussion on a consumer culture inherited from Liao and Jin societies leaves open the question to what degree steppe imperial practice stems from this received material culture centered on pearls (61-68).

The significant contribution of his present work, and indeed a departure from his previous studies, emphasizes the Mongol period as

1 Reuven Amitai-Preiss, "Mongol Imperial Ideology and the Ilkhanid War against the Mamluks" in *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* ed. Reuven Amitai-Preiss (Leiden: Brill, 1999).

2 Thomas Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2010).

a watershed in the “southernization”³ of material and cultural exchange in Eurasia. Previous studies of Eurasian exchange are almost exclusively oriented along an East-West axis. Thirteenth-century exchange tends to focus on the continental routes best exemplified by Marco Polo and William of Rubruck’s travelogues. When this continental trade was interrupted and fragmented by internecine strife among competing Chinggisid qanates, maritime routes were enhanced along a similar axis from China to the Middle East via India.⁴ Allsen insightfully points out that such a pattern is directionally counterintuitive: these E-W circulations are simultaneously enmeshed with North-South vectors. One cannot go from Quanzhou to Malacca, a common trade route often thought of as E-W exchange, without making significant latitudinal headway – a difference of nearly 23° of latitude, whereas around 16° of longitude are crossed. Here he combines David Christian’s reorientation of trans-Eurasian exchange on an N-S axis coterminous with trans-ecological migrations of agro-pastoral peoples with Lynda Shaffer’s emphasis on the “dispersal of cultural traits” from the Indian Ocean littoral northward (6). This emphasis on “southernization” allows for a more geographically textured, nimble approach to global mobility that sheds oversimplified N-S or E-W axes.

Pearls in the Golden Horde serve as the first case of this in the book. Allsen has assembled a host of documentary and archaeological evidence to show how Indian and Persian Gulf pearls were harvested, manufactured into positional goods in Egypt and Persia, and ultimately consumed in the Golden Horde centered in the Russian steppe, e.g., pearled robes in investiture. The late fifteenth-century Muscovite successor state then inherited this material cultural matrix, demonstrated by the famed pearl-studded crown of Monomakh⁵ and linguistic adoption of Mongol pearl nomenclature (e.g., *zhemchug*) (77-85). Cycles of serial bestowal and booty acquisition further embedded these

3 The “southerization” thesis developed by Lynda Shaffer holds that a spread of cultural traits from the Indian Ocean littoral northward occurred from 5th to 15th centuries. This was inclusive of both maritime and subtropical products and their associated technologies. Lynda Shaffer, “Southernization.” *Journal of World History* 5 (1994): 1-21.

4 Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jerry H. Bentley, *Old World Encounters: Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

5 A fourteenth century jewel-encrusted filigree skullcap worn by Russian sovereigns as a symbol of their rulership.

objects and their attendant material cultures in the southernization process.

This movement of objects and material culture north outlines Allsen's second significant reorientation: an emphasis on the simultaneity of entwined continental and maritime routes. Tansen Sen and John Chaffee both have worked extensively on the lasting importance of maritime trade and connections in the Mongol world. Nevertheless, as experts in southern maritime circulations, the organic connections of maritime trade with corresponding continental patterns are not readily linked.⁶ Moreover, a common historiographical trope is a chronological division between maritime and continental route usage. During the unified Mongol Empire (1206-1259CE), continental routes predominated, while post-Qubilai (1260-1368CE) maritime routes dominated on account of the inter-*qanate* rivalries and war. Allsen ventures to redress this periodization by arguing that the case of pearls distinctly shows that commercial land and sea routes were entwined and operational to some degree for the entirety of the Mongol period (124-141). Simultaneity also meant the adaptability of land and sea routing to warfare, piracy, and other disruptions as part of commerce's larger *modus operandi* (150-152). The steppe branch of the Silk Road, for instance, included waterborne connections on the Mediterranean, Volga, Caspian, and Black Seas. Though directionality remained consistent, roads and sea lanes were multiple and not necessarily permanent built features. Caravans and even postal routes could thus avoid zones of conflict by choosing the safest combination of both.

The third and, perhaps for Mongolists, most impactful historiographic intervention is Allsen's take on the question of continuity versus exceptionalism in the Mongol imperium. Though perhaps not as explicit in his disappointingly brief concluding notes, Allsen argues for a *via media*: Mongols in their participation in a Eurasian culture of positional goods, combined with their co-option of production networks, regional political elites, and merchant-dominated commercial avenues, were undoubtedly active heirs of an established Eurasian praxis. Yet, within this continuity, there are unique amalgams and departures. Pearls as socio-political status markers were not new, but the Mongol assumption of white pearls as generators of *su*, meaning imperial good fortune, in their rulership ideology is unprecedented (75). Preceding

6 John Chaffee, *The Muslim Merchants of Premodern China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Tansen Sen, *Buddhism, Diplomacy and Trade: The Realignment of India-China Relations 600-1400* (Lanham: Rowen and Littlefield, 2016).

in part from this, the scale of their resource extraction and accumulation as evinced by pearls is equally peerless (23-33). Yet, Allsen goes a step further. The Mongols privileged “Indian-Buddhist and Muslim merchants skilled in cross-cultural commerce,” groups with networks that long pre-dated their rise. The successful fusion of these groups’ material and communication networks across land and sea allowed a dynamic global trade to flourish (168). Thus, even the unique aspects of Mongol rule built on a foundation of Eurasian material culture and the merchant networks developed therein.

Despite the obvious strengths of the study, the praxis of maritime and continental simultaneity is left obscure. Admittedly, Allsen shows this connection in certain instances. For one, the timing of caravans in Il-qanate Persia was synchronized with the arrival of cargo ships from the Indian Ocean trade (125). Further details are also provided for how Qubilai and his successors unsuccessfully attempted to co-opt maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean littoral and place Muslim merchants in overseer roles in order to link maritime and continental routes within their jurisdiction (134-141). However, this raises the question about the exceptionality of pearls as the premiere positional good. One wonders if all commodities carried the same weight and influence or simultaneously crisscrossed continental and maritime routes like pearls. Celadon, for instance, is excellent evidence of how ballast in the medieval period could develop into a global trade good. However, where its weight is an asset in maritime circulations, it served as a distinct disadvantage in continental ones.⁷ Further troubling, Allsen eludes more significant, more comprehensive explanations of these inter-webbed circuits and the other goods (and people!) merchants transported, preferring to leave this task to future scholars. Presumably, his intention was, like his work on textiles, to alter historiographical trajectories, not to provide definitive studies like Peter Jackson’s hefty monograph on the Mongol Empire in the Islamic world.⁸

A further but mild disappointment is the study’s failure to engage with the idea of globalization during the medieval period. Peter Stearns and others have argued that a global world was forming or did form under

7 Robert Finlay, *The Pilgrim Art: Cultures of Porcelain in World History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

8 Thomas Allsen, *Commodity and Exchange in Mongol Eurasia: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World: From Conquest to Conversion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018).

the Mongols.⁹ Nancy Steinhardt has also advanced the idea that a world of regional diversities existed in the medieval period, and certainly by the time of the Mongols.¹⁰ Valerie Hansen in *The Year 1000* has positioned the onset of globalization well before the Mongols in the 500-1000CE period rather than the late medieval period. Frustratingly, Allsen remains silent on this issue in the book, more concerned with Eurasian circulations during the Mongol Empire and their socio-cultural underpinnings than their relation to globalization. However, the argument for deep and long continuities does imply that if globalization can be evidenced by pearls and the culture of positional goods, then there is undoubtedly merit to Hansen's date and even Benjamin Craig's implied argument for a much earlier onset of 100BCE-250CE.¹¹

Ultimately, these minor shortcomings pale compared to the immense value Allsen's study has for both the history of the Mongol Empire and the field of Eurasian studies as a whole. Understanding the agency of positional goods in the practice of empire is certainly new to the Mongol Empire's history. The integration of multiple vectors and "southernization" in Eurasia during this period is equally unprecedented. Therein, it invigorates current calls to fully and constructively integrate the global south in global historical narratives. This work will undoubtedly remain of great importance far into the future and provide a new and dynamic vector in the study of the Mongols and their role in a global world.

9 Peter Stearns, *Globalization in World History* (London: Routledge, 2019).

10 Naomi Standen, "Colouring Outside the Lines: Methods for a Global History of Eastern Eurasia 600-1350," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 29, (2019): 27-63.

11 Benjamin Craig, *Empires of Ancient Eurasia: The First Silk Roads Era, 100BCE-250CE* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Valerie Hansen, *The Year 1000: When Explorers Connected the World – and Globalization Began* (New York: Scribner, 2020).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION

PEAR (Papers, Essays, and Reviews) welcome submissions from all scholars, most notably graduate students, regarding the diverse field of International Studies, particularly those topics that challenge the conventional wisdom of any given issue. Each issue of the printed Journal will contain the following three sections:

PAPERS This section includes feature length articles of original research and must include proper citations. It is this section that showcases compelling and stimulating research that provides a collage of situations and cases. Inclusions should range from 3,000 to 8,000 words.

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The following guidelines should be adhered to for all submissions:

1. All submissions must be sent as a Microsoft Word file.
2. Citations should appear as footnotes as per the Chicago Manual of Style, 17th Edition.
3. Pages should not be numbered or marked with the author's name.
4. All submissions should include a proposed title.
5. Papers and Essays submissions should include an abstract of no longer than 250 words.
6. A short author biography should also be included with each submission.
7. Foreign words should be romanized according to the following systems:
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 - Korean: Revised Romanization*
 - Chinese: Pinyin*
8. American English spelling and punctuation should be used in all submitted pieces.

Submissions that neglect these guidelines will take further time to review. They may therefore be sent back to the author for revisions or be rejected altogether.

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