

The Role of Non-State Armed Groups in MENA's Development: A Reassessment

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Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has witnessed a proliferation in the number of "failed" or "fragile" states. Being cut off from the financial, political, and security support networks previously endowed to them by the two superpowers, a sizable proportion of developing states have revealed the fragility of their governing capacity and their inability to provide even the most basic of services to their populaces. In parts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the absence of an efficient administrative bureaucracy has encouraged many armed social groups to emerge to provide such services. However, given the predominance of the "Westphalia" nation-state mindset, such non-state actors are often neglected by international policymakers and labeled as a homogenous group. By overlooking their role as important political actors, regional development strategies do not adequately factor in the political agents potentially impeding their effective implementation. This paper seeks to deconstruct this mindset by firstly, recognizing such groups as possessing notable state-like functions. From this, it will differentiate the different groups into their respective methods of rule and motivations to further break down simplistic definitions. This paper aims to reconsider prevailing attitudes towards such groups so that policymakers can identify which groups can support MENA development initiatives.

Introduction

In the absence of great power rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the post-Cold War era witnessed a rapid proliferation in the existence of "fragile" and "failed" states. Many developing states

were cut off from the financial, political, and security support systems previously endowed to them by the two superpowers, which laid bare the fragility of many of their governing platforms and in turn, their inability to provide even the most basic of services to their populaces.¹ Lacking a competent government bureaucracy to enact policy, many social groups within these failing states emerged by their own initiative to provide such services, ranging from the provision of community waste management to regional security. Known as “non-state” actors, these groups are commonly defined as political bodies that directly challenge the formal state’s control over the use of violence.² While their support is certainly beneficial to vulnerable populations or governments temporarily unable to fulfil its functions, their existence also presents considerable long-term challenges for state development. Such non-state groups often only provide services to those that are closely linked by ethnicity, religion, and/or political affiliation, etc., and generally seek to forward their own interests. This inadvertently promotes a process of unequal national development that is characterized by regional cleavages or is targeted towards specific populations. In many of these unstable societies where state administration is breaking down or, indeed, has already collapsed, such non-state groups often resort to the use of violent means to promote their agendas. Not only does this increased distribution of violence further the country’s instability, but it also undermines the central state government’s ability to maintain or heighten its domestic legitimacy and coercive powers, thereby making it more difficult for it to initiate nationwide programs of development. Nowhere is this more acute than in the politically contested region of the Middle East and North Africa (hereafter referred to as “MENA”), where non-state armed groups have evolved into powerful forces deeply entrenched in the day-to-day conduct of local politics and national government structures.³

To understand the role that these emerging forces play in such political decision-making processes and, consequentially, the prospects and impediments for national development, it is important to first define the still heavily contested concepts of “state” and “development”. Regarding the former, the most prevailing and foundational definition of a “state” is that of German sociologist Max Weber’s, who categorized it as a territorial space that is ruled by a central administering authority who possesses a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.⁴ More recent definitions, however, have sought to endorse more expansive characterizations.

According to sociologist Michael Mann, “most historic states have not possessed a monopoly of organized military force and many have not even claimed it.”⁵ As such, Mann identifies the state as not only including Weber’s notion of a militarily “despotic” governing body, but an entity with “infrastructural power”, or a clearly established cooperative relationship between the state and society.⁶ Charles Tilly, by comparison, identifies the state through its, supposedly, expected basic services, including the ability to go to war, remove internal violence amongst its populace in order to protect them, and the ability to collect taxes.⁷ What is common amongst all these varying notions is that they consider the state an empirical entity with self-evident political existence and features. However, such definitions often do not meet the reality of the political functioning of several parts of the world, since many official governing bodies lack the basic state responsibilities mentioned above. For several countries in MENA, the breakdown over the legitimate use of violence and the increasing spread of traditional state responsibilities to non-government-related actors reflects the erosion of the unitary state and, subsequently, the suitability in wholly applying such definitions of statehood to them.

For the latter, “development” originally applied to matters related to bettering economic prosperity, yet it has since been utilized, often in tangent or used interchangeably, with other processes, including modernization, industrialization, or Westernization.⁸ Thus, whether in the realm of economics or social sciences, development has been typically associated with a nationally beneficial or emancipatory process. For this paper, the methods of development will not be differentiated, due to their multifaceted nature and need to continuously adapt to changing environments. Rather, development will be broadly treated as an overarching framework that aims to enhance the political stability and economic growth of a fixed territorial area and its inhabitants. Given the difficulties in defining notions of statehood for parts of MENA, it is only necessary that we treat development fluidly as well.

While international policymakers have certainly recognized the existence of non-state armed groups as considerable impediments to developmental initiatives, they have too often viewed them through an exclusively militaristic lens. This viewpoint has grown since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with powerful political entities in the MENA region considered outside of the jurisdiction of the “state”, often being labeled as terrorist organizations, requiring in turn, military solutions to

deal with them.⁹ Yet, this mindset reflects a more deep-rooted belief in the predominance of the Westphalia “nation-state” concept in international politics which, as already explored, leaves no room for outside non-state political forces to be present in national decision-making processes.¹⁰ This paper does not seek to criticize the dominance of the Westphalia mindset. On the contrary, as the organizing principle of international politics and internal administration, states remain the most upstanding form of global governance to which all international development efforts should, where possible, continue to work within and strengthen. The limitation of this viewpoint, however, is that it neglects the reality that non-state groups are important political actors in many MENA communities and deploy a range of non-security measures that further their competitiveness and autonomy from the official state government. Moreover, because the state-centric mindset contrasts these groups solely with the state, international policymakers, unfortunately, treat armed non-state actors as an all-encompassing, homogenous grouping, neglecting the fact that substantial differences exist between their nature, motivations, and methods of rule. The term “non-state” is simply too vague to classify all of these diverse armed groups together. This is significant for policymakers and those involved in MENA development because identifying their unique features will better articulate which groups the international community should engage with to support development initiatives, and which groups should be avoided to prevent them from manipulating development efforts or further solidifying their political legitimacy.

By reassessing the role of MENA’s non-state armed groups through examples in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and elsewhere, this paper will firstly set out to deconstruct the prevailing security lens towards such groups, by recognizing their political and state-like attributes and behaviors. Secondly, this paper will seek to differentiate them into their respective characteristics and unique features to further break down prevailing simplistic and encompassing definitions so that, thirdly, it can recommend to policymakers which of these groups should be engaged in supporting MENA development initiatives. Ultimately, this paper’s findings aim to contribute to identifying possible pathways in which non-state armed groups can be incorporated into reversing over two decades of non-state proliferation and reasserting the primacy of the “nation-state” as the region’s overarching political unit, a critical condition for national development.

Recognizing Non-State Armed Groups as Political Actors

In order to better articulate and implement development initiatives in MENA, policymakers must first attempt to overcome the limitations imposed by state-centric mindsets and view the region's non-state armed groups as wielding considerable political power. Since the latter are typically *both* spoilers of instability and are themselves governance actors, international observers or those operating within limited functioning state governments are, in their inability to differentiate, quick to resort to the use of force to undermine or ignore them entirely.¹¹ This is severely detrimental to the efficient implementation of development initiatives, as it forces such programs to operate within a narrow framework that does not consider how these groups are continuously evolving to the dynamics of state instability and have, in some cases, politically consolidated themselves to the point of becoming exclusive points of authority for many MENA communities. The use of force, moreover, does not always target the most pressing obstacles to developmental and state leadership and often serves to exacerbate the country's instability, which non-state armed groups subsequently exploit to promote their supposed continuing necessity as legal and political "guardians". As a result, developmental initiatives are often not sufficiently far-reaching nor adequately sustainable in the long term, making it imperative to identify their political underpinnings in order to move away from inadequate security-driven strategies.

One way in which non-state armed actors perform political activities is by providing certain services typically held by state authorities, including, at the most basic level, citizen "security". The legitimacy of modern states rests on their monopoly of violence to provide domestic stability and national defense.¹² In MENA, state governments have often found difficulty in providing these services, thereby allowing other non-state political entities to take matters into their own hands. This is a notable phenomenon in Iraq where, in the absence of state protection, armed militia groups, like the Shia-orientated "Popular Mobilization Unit" (PMU), rose to prominence in early 2014 to fight against the then-burgeoning so-called "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" (Islamic State or ISIS), as state police and military forces were fleeing back to Baghdad.¹³ The organization and administrative efficiency of the PMU was so effective against the radical extremist group that most Iraqi citizens that took up arms against the Islamic State joined the PMU, in violation of Iraq's constitution and rejecting calls from the country's Shia Cleric,

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who urged volunteers to join the official Iraqi army.¹⁴ According to Middle East security scholars Vera Mironova and Mohammed Hussein, had it not been for the efforts of non-state armed groups like the PMU, Iraq's territorial sovereignty would have likely collapsed and become engulfed into the Islamic State's caliphate.¹⁵ The PMU's services for many Iraqi citizens' protection against the Islamic State garnered them an overwhelming degree of political legitimacy, with one 2015 poll finding that 99 percent of Shia respondents claimed to support them.¹⁶ Therefore, during Iraq's war against the Islamic State, the PMU upheld the country's national security (and hence political) responsibilities traditionally expected by the "state", which served to further consolidate their political interests. Thus, even after the restoration of state authority, the PMU continued to occupy many of the areas it had liberated from ISIS against the wishes of the Iraqi state and provided policing services and anti-crime efforts there in return for the population's loyalty.

Similarly in Lebanon, with the absence of an effective state authority to provide security for its citizens, the non-state armed group, Hezbollah, has utilized the country's instability since its conception in 1982, to offer an alternative security umbrella. As such, Hezbollah's complex network of intelligence, police, and military boasts a monopoly over the use of armed force within its areas of control.¹⁷ Many within Hezbollah's community are provided with relatively effective protection from threatening rival communities. Organized crime rarely occurs in the more consolidated parts of Hezbollah-controlled territory. Rather, such activities tend to take place on the margins of the group's domain and at its approval. In a bid to counter the powerful clans of the Beqaa Valley or in the districts of South Beirut, Hezbollah tacitly cooperates with criminal leaders by permitting them to certain criminal activities in outskirt areas, so that their attention can be better directed towards these more urgent clan rivals; a seemingly necessary compromise for their larger objective of maintaining geographic control.¹⁸ Externally, the armed group has proven to be an effective deterrent against neighboring Israel, as seen by their relatively stable border since skirmishes in 2006.¹⁹ Thus, as seen in the cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the PMU in Iraq, non-state armed groups can perform basic state-like functions such as the provision of citizenry protection. Though these services are grounded in the use of force, they should not be misconceived by policymakers as purely "security" or "military" issues.

Not only do non-state armed groups provide security services to their controlled populaces, but they also provide an array of “non-security” related, political functions that visibly affect day-to-day citizen life. To return to Iraq, the PMU has provided a range of state-like functions in an attempt to rally popular support to justify their continued existence following the collapse of ISIS. In the southern Iraqi city of Basra, for example, the group administers garbage disposal, the maintenance of hospitals and schools, and the rebuilding of industrial facilities, such as its profitable date agricultural exports.²⁰ Moreover, when the city and its surrounding areas experienced a series of deadly floods in the summer of 2018, the PMU was quick to repair the damages inflicted upon its infrastructure and transportation networks to revitalize trade links and better guarantee that the people’s reduced standard of living would not be prolonged, an assurance that the financially stretched government in Baghdad failed to promise.²¹ In Lebanon, those loyal to Hezbollah can rely on a substantial social safety net, which provides a middle-class lifestyle and gives their children the opportunity to attend university.²² Hezbollah also runs schools, hospitals, youth associations (e.g., the Mahdi Scouts), and foundations that provide fiscal support for the surviving relatives of the group’s armed members who were killed during combat.²³

Whilst the use of force remains the source of non-state armed groups’ authority and a decisive means in downgrading the legitimacy of the official state government, the provision of such non-security related services is also instrumental for their political competitiveness vis-à-vis the central state in garnering popular support and the mobilization of resources. Without the presence of non-state armed groups, many populations would find themselves without opportunities for education, healthcare, and employment opportunities. As such, non-state armed groups act as important political actors, as their contributions to civil society set the foundations for their long-term legitimacy and serve to distance these populations’ loyalty from the central state.

We must also be reminded, however, that many armed non-state actors manipulate these services to only further *their* political interests rather than out of any sense of state-like responsibility or benevolence. Of course, such features can also be characteristic of certain official state governments, particularly in the MENA region, where the presence of accountable democratic governments is relatively few against absolute monarchies and nationalist military regimes.²⁴

The point, nevertheless, is to dispel the fabrication that many non-state armed groups' long-term leadership is wholly different and, if only comparatively, "better" than that of their official government counterparts.

Citizens under non-state jurisdiction tend to be restricted to a selection of "mandated" services. The efficiency of such services is secondary to the ideological and political interests of non-state armed groups. They usually do not have access to communication avenues or a political apparatus, moreover, that can better express their concerns or desires for more and/or different services. This can, again, be seen in the case of Basra, where the city's dissatisfaction with the PMU's reconstruction process led to a mass protest that was subsequently suppressed, killing 21 people.²⁵ Lacking the political mechanisms to voice citizen dissatisfaction, non-state armed groups can risk exacerbating instability in their administered territories because of their provision of limited services in a highly unrepresented political system. Therefore, developmental efforts should include state authority over these deprived areas rather than informally accepting non-state sponsorship of services since they will likely promote long-term ruptures in MENA's social cohesion. Nevertheless, while public opinion polls conducted across the region indicate that most of its inhabitants wish to be ruled by a government or state authority rather than a non-state actor, the inability of the former to provide such non-security services often makes the latter a perceived necessity.²⁶

Lastly, the forms in which non-state armed groups can also participate as political actors in MENA societies are demonstrated by their ability to shape and be partially included in "official" political structures and administrative mechanisms. Though non-state actors desire to be wholly autonomous from the state, issues of fiscal resources and political legitimacy often push these groups into state parameters. In Lebanon for example, Hezbollah has developed itself into a political force that operates within the official state apparatus so that it can coopt the state's power and resources towards its interests, while remaining apart from it so that it can continue to function as a private entity and not be held responsible for those state services perceived beyond its capability or interest. Although Lebanon's political system provides constraints on Hezbollah, with a Maronite Christian serving as President, a Sunni Muslim as Prime Minister, a Shia Muslim as Speaker of Parliament, etc., Hezbollah has worked around these structural issues by having official

political representatives in Parliament and forming an array of intimate relationships with others political groups and individuals. Thus, though Hezbollah won only 13 seats in the 2018 parliamentary election, its wider influencing outreach meant it controlled a commanding coalition of 72 out of the total 128 seats, giving it immense sway over Lebanese politics.²⁷ As such, Hezbollah has been able to craft a vast complex network composed of cross-party political officials whose policy orientations are directed by its preferences. Thus, Hezbollah has obtained a “plural” or “hybrid” identity, where the parameters of its political activities and membership are often difficult to differentiate from other political bodies. It is at once, both separate from the official state government while also being integral participants benefiting from its inclusion.

Similarly, in Iraq, the collapse of the so-called Islamic State has pressured the PMU to enter official national politics to maintain some form of legitimacy with the populace. Several PMU groups have run in national elections under the name of the “Fatah Alliance” (or “Conquest Alliance”) to bypass Iraq’s restrictions on armed groups running for office.²⁸ By participating in politics, the PMU has been able to influence government policy, including the allocation of \$2.2 billion of the state budget to the salaries of some 122,000 of its fighters, as well as influencing the appointment of local governors and their councils to be of PMU-orientation and Shia followers, in order to form a supportive coalition to press Baghdad towards the PMU’s interests.²⁹ Thus, for non-state armed groups in many MENA societies, the state provides an efficient forum from which it can extract capital and political patronage to further cement relative autonomy.

In some parts of MENA, the inclusion of non-state armed groups in official political institutions is also often necessary for the official state government in order to maintain or achieve further political stability. For example, in Libya, the dismantling and subsequent dispersion of former police and military forces into the general population following the fall of the Ghaddafi regime left the state with a 70 percent reduction in its law-enforcement personnel.³⁰ Many of these former state armed forces had integrated or created armed groups of their own to protect their neighborhoods from rival groups and entities deemed a threat, thereby heightening the country’s instability and making it more difficult for the fragile, new government to reestablish its authority across the country. To reduce public suspicion of the government, the Libyan central authorities saw the reintroduction of these armed groups into the government as the

only viable means to create a more unified state.³¹ Therefore, whether out of political necessity or not, many states in MENA have found themselves susceptible to the growing influence and direct participation of such non-state armed actors to further their objectives. Such inclusion presents some significant challenges for development efforts, as it runs the risk of being manipulated to further these groups' interests or being directed towards areas and peoples that are the least vulnerable. Moreover, the relatively blurred position that non-state actors hold within the official state government allows them the flexibility to utilize their fiscal and political advantages while being distant enough to criticize state leadership when it has failed to meet its obligations to the public. As such, non-state actors will never be able to be held fully accountable or responsible for the provision of national development projects.

Differentiating Non-State Armed Groups

Because of the state-centric viewpoint held amongst policymakers, current approaches to non-state armed actors in the Middle East and North Africa have tended to dismiss them into a collective basket that obscures identifying which groups provide some degree of stability and statehood, and those that are merely benefiting from the absence of effective state leadership. The inability to decipher such differences can tend to result in developmental initiatives being either not sufficiently far-reaching or not adequately sustainable in the long term. Thus, it is also imperative to differentiate MENA's non-state armed groups to better understand the ways in which they interact with the state and can be incorporated into development programs.

Though there exists an array of subcategories of non-state armed groups in the region, they can be grouped into three main overarching conceptual frameworks: organized criminal networks, insurgency (or terrorist) groups, and warlords. While all these categories emerged from the absence of state institutions that could effectively provide services to their populations, they share little in terms of their motivations and nature. To begin with, organized criminal networks seek to exploit the political vacuum left by an absent or failing state for purely economic reasons. Though they may engage with non-state groups with political interests, this does not mean that they themselves are motivated or guided by political ambition. As such, organized criminal

networks continue to work within weak state structures and do not seek a territory of their own or departure from the state-system architecture, since the state enables their profitable existence. Their use of violence, furthermore, tends to be directly linked with their economic activities, in order to avoid gaining too much attention from state authorities or creating overwhelming opposition from wider civil society.³² This can clearly be seen in Afghanistan, where opium drug cartels were able to operate under both the Taliban regime and the previous U.S.-backed government in Kabul, as their activities were perceived not to directly undermine the political foundations of the two governments and thereby received fewer countermeasures than other armed groups.³³

The other two categories of non-state armed groups differ from criminal organizations in that they are both fundamentally motivated by political ambition, albeit at different scales and visions. Insurgents (sometimes categorized as terrorist groups), typically use violence for political goals, namely by challenging the state's existence and seeking to supplant it with a new legal and political order. Such groups are heavily motivated by ideological considerations delineated along religious, ethnic, and/or political characteristics and seek to transplant these ideals into a population and/or territorial boundary (existing or new) from which they can make such ideals a "reality". This is acquired by assuming the full responsibilities held by states either through overtaking the government or separating from it.³⁴ The case of the so-called Islamic State presents an extreme example of this motivation. The Sunni Jihadist organization's vision to construct a divine state in its interpretation of Islam resulted in the combination of its non-state practices with ideas typically associated with the state system. According to an examination of ISIS documents taken from the group's former capital of Mosul, the insurgency governed its conquered territories in a surprisingly state-like fashion. As well as operating the police, armed forces, and legal courts, ISIS leaders also issued civil-society legislation such as marriage certificates, regulating market prices, registering vehicles, banning trademark infringements, and organizing school exams.³⁵ Insurgency groups, therefore, seek to transition from their non-state actor status to full 'state' status. In doing so, insurgent groups tend to use violence indiscriminately and excessively against the state's populace to weaken the legitimacy of the central state government or any other potential opponents.

In comparison, a closer analysis of warlords reveals that this

branch of armed non-state actors possesses the greatest degree of political power and autonomy from the central state. Warlords occupy what Thanassis Cambanis terms, a blurred “hybrid” space, acquiring some of the responsibilities held by states and rejecting those responsibilities considered beyond their interest or capability to deliver.³⁶ Warlords, therefore, are primarily concerned with occupying a territory to govern according to their vested interest *within* the wider prevailing state architecture. Moreover, despite their autonomy and competitiveness with the central state, they must often continue to cooperate with the state on certain issues or receive financial and/or political support from international clients, thereby making them relatively malleable to the influence of other interest groups. However, though these relationships may appear detrimental to the flexibility of warlords’ exercise of power, it is these very connections that endow them with the most political power of all the non-state armed groups. Warlords’ continued engagement with the official state administration furthers their negotiating power over it. Without favors and support mechanisms, further degradation of the central state government is plausible. Their connection with international powers, furthermore, provides a form of protection for warlords in times of uncertainty or temporary decline, as they are endowed with financial and security-related support, among others, that helps uphold their political existence. According to the historian Niall Ferguson, modern Europe is the product of centuries of conflict in which its “naturally” victorious powers constructed cohesive nation-states from which they can develop.³⁷ The MENA region, in contrast, has been unable to reach this level of cohesion and unity, as foreign intervention has propped up many armed warlords and political players past the point where their fiscal and military apparatuses would have exhausted them. A clear example of this can be seen in the ongoing Syrian Civil War, where Russian and Iranian support for the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, has protected his rule against his opponents, who are themselves funded by a network of patrons extending from the Gulf to the United States.³⁸ Thus, the MENA region can be considered a patchwork of “unnatural” non-state political entities, whose prevailing ties with weak official states and a network of international relationships have made such warlords some of the most politically dynamic players in the region.

The prevailing conditions have seen warlords come to rule large swathes of the MENA region’s populations and in turn, acquire more

experience in territorial governance. Thus, warlords possess more resources and an accessible taxable population from which they can mobilize to expand or adapt their interests towards political arrangements that heighten their powers, including a transition to statehood. Therefore, while warlords hold a hybrid space that does not seek to possess all the functions of the “state”, the most successful of them hold the potential to shift their political interests and motivations (see Figure 1). As such, warlords’ use of violence is generally dependent on their political aims but is usually deployed more selectively than that of insurgency groups.




Figure 1: Motivations of the most successful warlords

By examining the three categories of non-state armed groups via their differences in motivation and deployment of violence to further their respective interests, it is easier to articulate who is shaping the political contours of the MENA region and influencing development initiatives the most. To recount, criminal organizations are primarily focused on financial considerations and do not seek a change in the “status quo” of the weakened state administration and wider state system. Insurgency groups, by contrast, seek a total transformation of prevailing conditions, primarily through violent means that seek to either take over the official state or separate from it. Lastly, warlords occupy a political space between these two groups. Though they are politically motivated, such activities take place within state architecture and they remain considerably tied to other domestic and international political actors to maintain such an arrangement. The possibility, nevertheless, remains for them to expand their political ambitions further if they choose and, crucially, have the capacity to do so.

Conclusion

For many developmental-related policymakers, the Middle East and North Africa are largely conceptualized by their “official” and internationally recognized boundaries and governing bodies. Though not oblivious to the influence of non-state armed groups in these polities, they have overwhelmingly treated them through a primarily ‘militarist’ or security-driven lens, thereby neglecting the reality that such groups play important political functions, whose power and responsibilities often cross with their official state government counterparts or displace them entirely. It is evident in the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and elsewhere, the dangers of not sufficiently addressing such a reality. While the re-establishment of an official central government as the sole legitimate authority should remain a long-term goal, development initiatives must first recognize and accept the current distribution of power within many parts of MENA and attempt to work through such channels of leadership in making developmental programs more far-reaching and long-lasting. This is not to suggest that development programs work with all non-state armed groups. Criminal organizations and extremist insurgent groups cannot be expected to work for the general well-being of MENA populations, since they are self-interested, utilize extreme methods and/or represent the interests of only a minority of society, respectively. Such engagement would most likely be used to only strengthen their fiscal well-being and ideological interests. As such, certain warlords appear to be a relatively more acceptable avenue to work through. Their hybrid interaction with the official state government provides the best opportunity to further integrate them under the latter’s authority. Regardless, such efforts must be carefully chosen on a case-by-case basis, looking to these non-state armed groups’ conduct of authority, their motivations, and sources of domestic and international power in navigating the implementation of development initiatives. Given the changing nature of such conditions, this paper has not offered concrete policy suggestions, but rather urged policymakers to first consider the *full* extent that such non-state armed groups play politically in many MENA communities. By merely categorizing them into an encompassing, homogenous grouping, development initiatives risk missing the nuances that separate such groups and potentially overlook sources of cooperation that would further the reach and effectiveness of development projects and, crucially, the quality of life for those currently under non-state political jurisdiction.

Notes

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