
Reverse Models, Regional Order, and Influence Models: How African States Hedging Against Great Powers — The Case of Tanzania

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Abstract: *This study examines the hedging strategies of African states against the influence of great powers, focusing on Tanzania as a case study. It explores how Tanzania navigates its foreign policy and security strategies amidst the shifting regional order and power dynamics characterized by the increasing presence of China and India. The paper identifies the reverse models of regional order and influence models in comparison to Southeast Asia, where small states economically bandwagon with China and rely on the US for security. In contrast, African states, particularly Tanzania, are shown to bandwagon more with India economically while maintaining stronger military ties with China. This divergence is attributed to the different historical contexts, regional orders, and strategic narratives that shape the preferences and behaviors of small states in these regions. Through a comprehensive analysis that includes archival research, case studies, and process tracing, this paper hopes to contribute to the understanding of regional power dynamics and the agency of small states in international relations.*

Keywords: *Great Powers Hedging, China-Africa Relations, Regional Order, Influence Modes*

Introduction & Research questions

Southeast Asian countries have adopted “hedging” policies in response to the rise of China’s economic and military power and the longstanding commitment of the United States to maintaining regional order. The concept “hedging” is usually understood to avoid or prepare for contingencies in situations where states cannot choose more straightforward alternatives like balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality.¹ Typically, in the face of great power competition,

Southeast Asian countries do not exclusively choose sides. Instead, they engage in economic balancing with China while militarily bandwagoning with the United States. As great power competition becomes normalized and uncertain, both China and the United States are attempting to expand their economic and military influence. By the end of 2018, all member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had joined China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As Southeast Asia's largest long-term investor and trade partner, China has become a key reliance for Southeast Asian countries, thereby strengthening its diplomatic engagements with countries in the region. The United States views China as its most significant geopolitical challenger and is rallying its allies to form small multilateral groups and geostrategic frameworks. Since the United States, together with Japan, Australia, and India, revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), its European and Asian allies have successively released their "Indo-Pacific" strategies. In 2024, the first-ever U.S.-Japan-Philippines leaders' summit will focus on establishing a trilateral security alliance as a primary agenda item. The United States has increasingly relied on "minilateral" frameworks to support the Indo-Pacific security architecture.

In the context of heightened strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region, India aims to consolidate and develop its political leadership in Asia, thereby laying a solid foundation for establishing itself as a "world-leading power." Since Narendra Modi took office in 2014, India has demonstrated a more confident and assertive diplomatic style, with a clearer strategic goal of strengthening regional leadership. India no longer seeks to be a "Balancing Power" but aims to become a true "Leading Power." India's assistance targets include South Asian neighbors, East African countries in the Indian Ocean region, and Southeast Asian countries. Due to their shared colonial and non-alignment history and status as Global South countries, China and India have become two major powers in East Africa. East Africa and Southeast Asia share similar regional characteristics. First, both regions have two great or major powers that provide economic or military assistance or commitments to countries within the region. Countries in both regions have similar colonial histories and experiences of rapid economic development in the post-Cold War era. Additionally, both regions have established and developed regional cooperation mechanisms, namely ASEAN in Southeast Asia and the East African Community (EAC) in East Africa. Conventional narrative has always been the case that in Southeast Asia, China, and the United States are the two

powerful regional powers, with smaller countries implementing different foreign policies or security strategies as needed. The question this paper would like to raise is whether the regional order in Southeast Asia is similar or different in East Africa. Do the United States and China still assume the role of regional leaders as they do in Southeast Asia, and how should we position India?

The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. The second section reviews the literature on hedging strategies and regional order. It indicates that while research on hedging strategies has primarily focused on Southeast Asian countries, in East Africa, smaller countries also need to make strategic foreign policy choices concerning major powers. The third section incorporates the theories of Hedging and Influence Mode to understand the strategic choices of countries within the region and the influence of major powers. The fourth section selects Tanzania, the traditional regional leader of East Africa, as a case study to analyze the historical connections between this country and the two major powers in the region, as well as its methods of hedging risks. It also discusses the main foreign policies of the new President Samia Suluhu Hassan after taking office, to better understand the reverse models adopted by East Africa and Southeast Asia in dealing with major powers and how great powers expand their influence to ensure the creation of a regional order favorable to themselves.

Literature Review

Great Power Competition and Regional Influence

Why do great powers compete and pursue a dominant regional order? Realist theories use anarchy to demonstrate that states have to rely on self-help to secure their own interest and well-being. The absence of authority could lead to competition, conflicts, and security dilemmas when interests clash. To mitigate the uncertainty and risks, states engage in diplomacy, establish institutions, and participate in international or regional organizations.² The theory of offensive realism suggests that great powers, particularly those in a region, will seek to establish and maintain regional hegemony to maximize their security.³ Mearsheimer contends that states, especially great powers, are driven by the pursuit of power and security. In regions where a great power emerges as the dominant state, it will seek to establish itself as the regional

hegemon. This realist logic has influenced American foreign policy from the outset and has helped the United States gradually establish its position as the world's hegemon after the Cold War. China is acting according to the same realist logic but is far from being able to rival the United States.⁴ Barry Buzan discarded the unipolar and multipolar narratives and introduced the “1+X” terminology to explain the fact that the United States is the “only superpower” after the Cold War.⁵ In Southeast Asia, although major powers have adopted soft balancing or omni-enmeshment strategies to achieve regional stability and development after the Cold War, a regional order led by the United States with China as a regional power has already formed. This interim regional security order is fundamentally based on the recognition (in fact, the preference) of the United States as the superpower.⁶

Material capabilities are used to measure regional order and power, which are quantifiable resources, traditionally, material military capabilities.⁷ The rise of China and rapid economic development throughout the Asia Pacific have changed the distribution of material capabilities in the region, raising the specter of worsening and destabilizing military competition. Political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors. The United States as the core superpower has created a tributary system. The United States provides military protection and economic market access to its allies and partners and delivers or imposes its values and rules of the game in the international system through various equally impressive international regimes and organizations they established.⁸ Under the leadership of the Modi government, India has begun transitioning from a balancing power to a leading power. In the face of U.S.-China competition, India has chosen to expand its influence starting with neighboring countries, focusing on providing infrastructure and economic aid to regions such as South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Although India views itself as being in strategic competition with China, in practice, it continues to engage with China in various regional and international groupings to counterbalance the pressure to align too quickly with U.S. initiatives.⁹

Hedging: Power Uncertainty and Policy Spectrum

Hedging strategies are used to explain the balancing or bandwagoning behavior of smaller or secondary countries in the face of great power competition. When facing uncertainty in power and regional order, hedging

states adopt alliance choices such as forming coalitions and balancing power. Conventional narratives tend to dichotomize state choices into either balancing or bandwagoning. Criticisms of this dichotomy argue that hedging strategies are not simple alliance choices but involve various combinations of economic, military, and diplomatic balancing or bandwagoning.¹⁰ The concept of hedging strategy now is developed to explain how states manage specific risks, the unique security strategies of secondary states, their methods of adjusting risks, and their mixed policy approaches (often economic and security).¹¹

Existing explanations of hedging implicitly support some form of cost-benefit analysis. Hedging is generally described as a strategy to maximize economic returns and reduce security risks. States seek an approximate balance between economic interests and security interests in the context of great power competition.¹² These perspectives argue that the strategies of small countries in response to rising great powers are not driven by the growth of the great powers' relative capabilities themselves, but rather by the growth of these capabilities. In contrast, other viewpoints suggest that the hedging choices of smaller countries, at least in Southeast Asia, are more driven by internal processes of regime legitimization.¹³ In these processes, ruling elites assess and leverage the opportunities and challenges presented by emerging great powers to ultimately consolidate their domestic governance authority. Additionally, other domestic political factors and priorities, such as regime legitimacy, political fragmentation, and economic growth, also influence Southeast Asian countries' overall foreign policy decisions and their varying degrees of engagement with China and the United States.¹⁴

Methodology & Argument

This paper will use the Tanzanian example as a case study to illustrate how African states choose security and foreign policy strategies in a shifting regional order. The paper will use analogical analysis to compare the foreign policy patterns of Southeast Asian states with those of African states (in the case study, Tanzania), adopting hedging and influence mode as theories to explain how these states choose in foreign policy when facing two major powers in a region, and how these major powers affect states' behavior and choice in economic and security affairs. This paper will adopt Kei Koga's definition of hedging and Evelyn Goh's conceptual framework of influence

mode. According to Koga, hedging refers to the behavior of States that attempt to maintain strategic ambiguity to reduce or avoid the risk and uncertainty of negative consequences arising from balancing or ganging up alone.¹⁵ Koga discarded the dichotomous theoretical framework and argued that the concept of “hedging” should be understood within the “balancing-bandwagoning” spectrum of the balance of power theory, where hedging lies between balancing and bandwagoning as a third strategic option for states. He considered diplomatic, military, and economic factors and developed six primary hedging modes, including conventional hedging, soft hedging, economic hedging, security hedging, diplomatic hedging, and politico-military hedging. The distinction between conventional hedging and economic hedging lies in whether the state engages in hedging behaviors. This is because such behaviors are based on actual economic and military actions rather than plans. In contrast, soft hedging, security hedging, diplomatic hedging, and politico-military hedging are based on expectations of the state’s future behavior rather than its actual behavior.¹⁶ Therefore, a state’s hedging strategy may vary at different times because the primary variables are both military and economic.

Goh used Max Weber’s concept of *power* and defined “influence” as “the act of modifying or otherwise having an impact upon another actor’s preference or behavior in favor of one’s own aims.”¹⁷ Goh’s theory provides a framework for understanding the behavior of major powers, which contrasts and complements Koga’s concept of hedging in this paper. Goh’s paper uses China as a case study to summarize the reactions and decisions of target actors across various contexts of divergent and convergent preferences. She argues that the use of power resources to achieve the influencer’s goals is most potentially effective when the influencer’s prior preferences are pre-aligned with the target’s preferences; it is most challenging when these preferences are initially opposed.

The influence mode for major powers can be categorized into three types based on their preferences and goals. Firstly, the Preference Multiplier primarily uses structural positions to generate policies of mutual benefit and produce collective outcomes. For example, a major power utilizes the distribution of its own economic resources and market potential to influence the choices and policies of smaller countries. In this process, the major power does not merely use its economic dynamism for inducement or coercion but acts as a catalyst and force multiplier to convert latent shared preferences into actual regional

economic integration. Persuasion involves telling a better story to assure and convince smaller countries to align their policies and choices with those of the major powers. Ability to prevail is the most unpredictable scenario. In this case, the major power ensures its own interests and preferences by altering the preferences and behaviors of other actors. Consequently, it inevitably coerces, induces, or persuades smaller countries to ensure that they can convert resources into potential influence outcomes.

This paper argues that in both Southeast Asia and East Africa, there exists a hierarchical order dominated by two great powers. These two great powers lead different regional orders, while other countries adopt various hedging strategies. In Southeast Asia, the small states bandwagon economically with China and balance militarily by relying on the US for security. But in Africa or even the Indian ocean, small states bandwagon more with India economically and have stronger ties to China militarily. So, it is the reverse of Southeast Asia. The United States' role here, influenced by the old non-alignment movement and their financial aid with political pressure, their role is more like India in Asia, not the regional hegemon but has an influential status.

Case study: How Tanzania Hedging Against Great Powers

Brief history of Tanzania's foreign policy

Following the wave of colonial independence after World War II, East African countries, including Tanganyika and Zanzibar, seized the opportunity to gain independence. At that time, Tanganyika was a mainland country, and Zanzibar was an island nation. Both nations shared a common language (Kiswahili) and had formed deep bonds during their struggle for independence. This led to widespread political calls for their merger to promote economic development and security. In April 1964, Presidents Nyerere of Tanganyika and Karume of Zanzibar declared the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania. Due to its colonial history and Nyerere's anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance, Tanzania became a staunch advocate of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Consequently, after Tanzania's establishment, Britain and the United States delayed recognizing the new regime and maintained a strong naval presence in nearby waters, exerting significant pressure on Tanzania.

After becoming the first president of Tanzania, President Nyerere implemented

a policy called “ujamaa” (African socialism) aimed at achieving self-reliance and national unity. Following the break in diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, Tanzania began seeking aid from “Third World” countries and rapidly developed cooperation with China, which resulted in projects like the construction of the TAZARA railway. China’s extensive cooperation with Africa also facilitated its admission to the United Nations. During the 1970s, Tanzania’s non-alignment stance attracted aid from Scandinavian countries, the Soviet Union, and even the United States. The economic significance of Tanzania’s foreign relations and the diversification of aid sources brought some economic improvement before the 1978 war with Uganda. In 2001, President Benjamin Mkapa adopted the ‘New Foreign Policy’ strategy, linking the country’s foreign relations with economic interests and pursuing “active and sustainable economic diplomacy,” which led to a rapid increase in foreign investment and aid commitments.¹⁸

Before the current President Samia took office, Tanzania experienced a period of disengagement from the international community. Former President John Magufuli framed a retreat from the international stage and a rejection of principled foreign policy as part of a broader crackdown on government profligacy. Not only did he withdraw from multilateral commitments, including the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), but he also reviewed and delayed major economic aid projects. Magufuli questioned the Chinese port development projects and raised concerns multiple times, believing that Tanzania might fall into debt traps created by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Consequently, he announced Tanzania’s withdrawal from the BRI during his tenure. Magufuli’s sudden death in March 2021 led to the succession of President Samia, who initiated reforms and updates in the field of foreign policy. Upon taking office, she visited China, India, and the United States, achieving a series of diplomatic outcomes and bringing Tanzania back into the international spotlight.

Tanzania is a comprehensive case that demonstrates how East African countries hedge against regional powers. Firstly, Tanzania has maintained long-standing historical connections and exchanges with both China and India. However, due to geographical proximity and their shared location along the Indian Ocean, the relationship between Tanzania and India is more similar to the model of China and Southeast Asia. Because of regional mobility and migration history, Tanzania and other East African countries

are more influenced by India's "soft power," such as religion, culture, and lifestyle. Indian higher education institutions also play an important role in cultural dissemination in Africa, which is somewhat similar to the cultural connections formed under the tributary system between China and Southeast Asia. Secondly, although China began to exert its influence on a large scale in Africa only after World War II, initially through parallel economic and military approaches, its economic influence on Tanzania is no longer as competitive due to geographical distance and market saturation (it still exists but is less advantageous compared to India). This situation is close to the economic cooperation between the United States and Southeast Asia.

Therefore, the reverse model refers to the fact that although there are two great powers in both Southeast Asia and East Africa, the roles undertaken by these two great powers are different. China's differences and role shifts in the two regions are noteworthy. Initially, China expanded and implemented its influence in both Southeast Asia and East Africa using the Preference Multiplier model. Prominent examples include economic regionalism in Southeast Asia and infrastructure aid projects in East Africa. However, as India's market competitiveness gradually emerged, China began to deepen its military influence.¹⁹ A notable change is that during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to Africa in 2024, he chose West African countries and Egypt, which had experienced several coups, indicating a shift in diplomatic focus to military aspects and attempting to establish more connections with the military governments of African countries.

China's presence in Tanzania

Tanzania's military cooperation with China dates back as far as the 1960s. In 1964, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai spent two months visiting ten countries in Africa. This visit was a strategic move in Chinese diplomacy and was of great significance in China's struggle to gain the support of the Asian, Latin American, and African countries and to break the diplomatic isolation of the United States and the Soviet Union. During his visit to Africa, Prime Minister Zhou proposed and elaborated for the first time the eight principles of China's foreign aid, including equality and mutual benefit, providing interest-free or low-interest loans, and respecting each other's sovereignty. At the same time, Tanzania is rich in mineral resources, but because the deposits are not located in the coastal area, it is difficult to have development value without

transportation. In February 1965, Tanzanian President Nyerere visited China and wanted to ask for China's assistance to build a railway, which was the start of Tanzanian Railway. The successful construction of Tanzanian Railway laid the foundation for subsequent cooperation between China and Tanzania.²⁰

Tanganyika (the former part of Tanzania) originally had a colonial army, but after independence, the army mutinied and was disbanded. The Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) was created because of defense and security needs. However, the British colonizers had already been expelled and there was no one to train the new army. During the visit to China, Nyerere visited the training of the PLA and asked China if it was possible to send some military instructors to help train the Tanzanian army. China readily acceded to this request and sent a group of instructors from the Shijiazhuang Senior Infantry School (later known as the Shijiazhuang Army Command College, *Shijiazhuang Lujun Zhihui Xueyuan*) to Tanzania. From then on, the military relationship between China and Tanzania began to become closer. The Shijiazhuang Army Command College has since become one of the regular colleges for military officers from some African countries to study and train in China. In addition to the Tanzanian Army, the Ethiopian Army and South Sudanese generals during the North-South Sudanese War had the experience of studying in Shijiazhuang. Later, China National Defense University (*Zhongguo Guofang Daxue*) and Nanjing Army Command College (*Nanjing Lujun Zhihui Xueyuan*) approved the policy of recruiting African students at the same time, but Shijiazhuang Army Command College still attracted many African generals with its targeted preferential policies.

China then sought to shape a diplomatic narrative as "Africa's good partner" or "Africa's revolutionary ally." Slogans and posters such as "Long Live Sino-African Friendship" began to be displayed throughout the country.²¹ The official media are portraying the achievements of China-Africa relations and the Non-Aligned Movement while positioning third-world countries against the two superpowers. China is trying to build an image of standing with Africa in the "Non-Aligned Movement."²² Tanzania's role transitioned from that of an obscure colonial state to a good friend of China, paving the way for more Chinese companies to go to Africa and setting a positive example of cooperation for the rest of the continent. Based on this image of closeness and generosity, China has begun to cooperate widely with African countries in various fields beyond military and economic domains.

Through the foundation established by railway cooperation, China has assisted Tanzania in military training and shaped a positive cooperation narrative. China has initiated infrastructure aid and military model assistance. Firstly, China has promoted and penetrated its model of “Party leads the military” to African countries.²³ As China deepened its ties with African militaries, including through training and educational initiatives, Beijing introduced its views on the Party-military relationship. Over the past decade, the venues for these activities have steadily increased. According to the China-Africa Action Plan 2018-2021, China receives 60,000 African students annually, more than the United States and the United Kingdom, with most of these officers assuming important military positions upon returning to their countries. Even Tanzania’s former President Jakaya Kikwete was an alumnus of the Nanjing Army Command College.²⁴

China traces the establishment and development of political-military schools to its shared traditions with many African liberation movements. Similar political-military schools have been adopted in various African contexts. In 2022, the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School opened in Kibaha, Tanzania, demonstrating these connections.²⁵ This is China’s first overseas ideological school, funded with \$40 million by the International Department of the CCP Central Committee and equipped with lecturers.

In practice, military ties between China and Tanzania are also very close, especially after President Samia took office. In 2023, the China-Tanzania Marine Corps “Beyond 2023” joint training was conducted at the Dar es Salaam training base in Tanzania, marking the first engagement between the two militaries since the “Beyond 2014” joint training nine years earlier. In 2024, China and Tanzania celebrated the 60th anniversary of naval cooperation. President Samia attended and spoke, summarizing and looking forward to the continuous good relations with China since she took office. Continuous military exercises and training, as well as the promotion and penetration of ideology and military models, have become ways for China to exert military influence in Tanzania. China’s shift from economic and infrastructure aid to military relations demonstrates that China’s influence mode in Tanzania is Persuasion, and it is “telling a better story to assure and convince smaller countries to align their policies and choices.” China has already planned to build a second PLA Support Base in Africa, and as a country adjacent to the Indian Ocean, Tanzania’s continued naval cooperation

will help China further deepen its influence in East Africa.

India's presence in Tanzania

Since 2001, India has been providing financial support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), initiating economic aid and exchanges with Africa. The India-Africa Forum Summit mechanism was established in 2008, and India views this mechanism as an important platform for providing international public goods to African and some Indian Ocean countries.²⁶ This platform is aimed at enhancing India's influence in the African region, including seeking support from African countries on issues such as climate change and United Nations Security Council reform. India continues to offer low-interest loans, grants, and government scholarships to Africa, covering both "hard projects" such as trade and infrastructure and "soft projects" like capacity building and skills training. It also provides preferential arrangements for duty-free trade to the least developed African countries.


At the third summit held in 2015, Indian Prime Minister Modi announced a commitment of \$600 million to help Africa's development, including contributions to the "India-Africa Development Fund" and the "India-Africa Health Fund." Modi also pledged to provide \$10 billion in low-interest loans to African countries over five years, aimed at developing infrastructure, agriculture, energy, education, health, human resource development, and information technology sectors in Africa.²⁷ India's soft power resources are quite rich, including both traditional and modern cultural resources such as religion, literature, yoga, and film, as well as widely influential ideas like non-violence, humanistic values, stable parliamentary democracy in the developing world, and relatively advanced science and technology education. Due to historical cultural exchanges, including immigration, between India and East Africa, India's cultural outreach to East African countries such as Kenya and Tanzania has been quite successful, with Indian universities playing an important role.

In less than a decade, India quickly became one of sub-Saharan African countries' largest trading partners. By 2016, India had become the second largest trading partner after China. In 2005, India was ranked 11th on the list of exporters to sub-Saharan African countries, while China was then in the top five. Since then, India has made the most rapid rise, jumping from 11th

place in 2005 to second place in 2016.²⁸ In Tanzania, India became its largest exporter. According to 2022 data, Tanzania's share of goods exported to India ranked first at 17.3 percent of total exports. India has become Tanzania's largest customer. At the same time, the proportion of Tanzania's imports to India is third with 12.5 percent of total imports.²⁹ India opened up Tanzania through increasing economic and trade cooperation and subsequently started investing in infrastructure and other areas and India is now the fifth largest investor in Tanzania.

After deepening economic cooperation and investment, this year, India and Tanzania announced that they would begin trading in the currencies of both countries, instead of using the currencies of other countries.³⁰ In October 2023, India and Tanzania announced the upgrading of their relationship to a strategic partnership that includes various areas such as economic and trade cooperation, defense and security, maritime security cooperation, and higher education.³¹ The new Tanzanian President renewed and concluded new diplomatic cooperation and relations with China and India in the second year of her power. The Tanzania-India strategic partnership is aimed at further strengthening the overall framework of engagement and cooperation between India and Tanzania in order to contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity in their respective countries, regions, and beyond.

India's influence on Tanzania has then expanded from the economic level to other areas. Due to India's economic advantages and sufficiently large market size, Tanzania needs India's market and trade cooperation. Meanwhile, India is gradually shifting from economic cooperation to other areas, mainly those related to India's soft power and public goods. In Tanzania's port infrastructure negotiations with China, India has become a reliable donor for taking over some of China's projects. This economic regionalism is helping Tanzania reduce its economic dependence on China and gradually move closer to India.



Source: United Nations (2023) 'UN Comtrade Database', UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, <https://comtrade.un.org/data> (accessed 25 Jan. 2024).

Note: GCC states refers to the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. EU data includes the UK until 2020.

Figure 1 Tanzania’s annual export by destination, 2013-22

The Models of Influence: China and India

Based on the Tanzanian case, it does not pick one side and accommodate either regional power, but bandwagon more with India economically and has stronger ties to China militarily. Tracing back to the definition and conceptual framework of influence, according to Goh’s framework of the influence modes, India’s regional influence falls more into the category of preference multipliers, and its policies are more focused on bilateral interests and aim to

produce joint outcomes. China's influence is in the stage of persuasion. First, military cooperation with countries such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Sudan is not as widespread and extensive as that of the United States in Southeast Asia. China is still in the phase of "telling a better story" to achieve the ultimate goal.

| | Influence mode | Tanzania's hedging strategies |
|-------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| China | Persuasion | Military hedging |
| India | Preference Multipliers | Economic hedging |

Figure 2 The framework of great power's influence modes and Tanzania's hedging strategies

Conclusion

This study examines the hedging strategies of African states against the influence of great powers, with a focus on Tanzania. It explores how Tanzania navigates its foreign policy and security strategies amidst the shifting regional order and power dynamics characterized by the increasing presence of China and India. The paper identifies reverse models of regional order and influence in comparison to Southeast Asia, where small states economically bandwagon with China and rely on the US for security. In contrast, African states, particularly Tanzania, bandwagon more with India economically while maintaining stronger military ties with China. This divergence is attributed to different historical contexts, regional orders, and strategic narratives that shape the preferences and behaviors of small states in these regions.

The Tanzanian case highlights how African states hedge against regional powers by adopting varied strategies. Tanzania's economic alignment with India and military cooperation with China exemplify a reverse model

compared to Southeast Asia. India's influence is categorized as preference multipliers, focusing on bilateral interests and producing joint outcomes, whereas China's influence is in the persuasion stage, aiming to align smaller countries' policies and choices through a compelling narrative.

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